85 T h e J o u r n a l o f T e c h n o l o g y S t u d i e s One Man One Vote: Trust between the Electorate, the Establishment, and Voting Technology Laurie Robertson Election Day 2004: A voter arrives in per- token with an official who escorts the voter to son to a polling location, which although a tem- the hallowed machine with allows him to per- porary setup projects an image of impartial form the holy rite of democracy – voting. integrity. Bland signage, temporary tables, vot- Ordained election officials protect the integrity ing machines and other election paraphernalia and sanctity of the machines and space through- turn a school gymnasium or a civic center into a out the day and it is these officials who perform sacred space. Upon entering the polls a voter the all-important, but private ceremony, of the approaches a table where a series of rituals tally and report of the votes. After this official (e.g., appropriate identification, verbal affirma- sanctification, the results are publicly ordained tion of name and residence) verify his or her and once again the “voice of democracy has registration and identity. After the officials per- spoken.” form a mysterious rite with the poll book, the voter is provided with a sacred token, be it a Of course, voting realities are much messier paper polling pass or a DRE smart card, and is than this idealized account promulgated by the admitted to vote. The voter exchanges the sacred electoral establishment. The seminal image of Election 2000 was the Florida election official arrive at the polls expecting that voting technol- 86 behind a magnifying glass examining a circa- ogy will ensure that their vote “counts.” 1960s mainframe computer punch card with s e But no matter what voting technology is i Republicans and Democrats arguing the legal d u used, any election system must be approachably t fine points about hanging chads. For the elec- S y toral establishment, which presents itself as a voter friendly while simultaneously satisfying g o l protector of voting integrity, it was a retro- hard technical criteria such as system reliability o n h embarrassment. It was “obvious” to legislators, and availability, integrity, data confidentiality, c e T lawyers, and election officials that “obsolete” operator authentication, and system accountabil- f o ity (Mercuri, 33-34). Forgotten in the post- l voting technology had failed and the perpetua- a n Election 2000 rush to modernize is the percep- r tion of American Democracy required a massive u o technological upgrade. As a result, in 2002, tion risk inherent in any technological transition. J e Even “primitive” election techniques such as h Congress passed the Help America Vote Act T (HAVA), which provided over $325 million for paper ballots bear the imprimatur of established states and localities to upgrade their current voting technology. In the case of electronic vot- “presumably obsolete” voting technologies. For ing machines, voters and election officials must technological advocates “modern” electronic gain confidence and comfort with the new tech- voting equipment, many designed using bank- nology. Until that occurs, the number of voting ing’s “familiar” automated teller machine (ATM) errors (probably mostly unintentional) may actu- paradigm, would solve many if not most of ally increase. For example, the Caltech/MIT Election 2000’s technological problems. Voting Project statistically analyzed voting However, most academic and popular post- results in all U.S. counties that changed their Election 2000 critiques (especially the many voting technology between 1988 and 2000 and electronic voting accounts) focused on voting found that only optically scanned ballots offered technology and overlooked the fact that voting similar rates of reliability (as measured by resid- machines and systems are technologically-situat- ual voting) as lever machines. Despite their bal- ed. Technological advances completely outside lyhooed promises, Direct Recording Electronic the electoral realm can significantly impact the (DRE) machines performed equivalently well as perceived “trustability” of a voting technology. “discredited” punch cards and significantly For example, in the late 1800s, mechanical lever worse than paper ballots (Alvarez). Conduct this machines were introduced as a “state-of-the art” transition in an environment of electoral and advance from handwritten ballots to “solve” the media hysteria and it is not surprising that pub- problem of human interpretation and ballot box lic confidence in the establishment is shaken. tampering. With the emergence of mainframe computers in the 1960s, mechanical lever The mantra of the U.S. voting establishment machines seemed “old-fashioned” and “state-of- is “One man, one vote,” so it is understandable the-art” optical and punch card technology that voting machines are the lightening rods for offered a modern mechanism to rapidly process electoral integrity, but voting is a process per- results and “solve” human calculation errors. formed and administered by humans. No matter Now with widespread personal computing and what voting technology is used, cumulatively banking automated teller machines, the main- individual mistakes and misperceptions can frame technologies that epitomized Florida 2000 undermine voter confidence. Electronic voting seem antique and the rush is on to replace them machines may be problematic, but so are the with more “accurate” state-of-the-art electronic other election technologies. There will never be voting technology. a perfect election, but perception is everything. Today, voter concerns regarding electoral Historically any U.S. voting technology is integrity are epitomized by not only by past burdened from its very inception with the expec- (e.g., punch cards) but current (e.g., DREs) tation of technologically ensuring voting integri- computerized voting technologies. Voters want ty. Beginning with Thomas Edison in 1869 and to believe that their vote counts and that it is continuing today, numerous U.S. manufacturers counted properly. Post-Election 2000, the elec- have produced machines and systems to “protect tion establishment is under increasing scrutiny the voter from rascaldom” (Phillymag). Voting is and technology alone will not solve the problem. an officially sanctioned social activity/ritual in a technologically-focused nation, so U.S. voters Ironically the current electronic voting hys- teria focuses on one of the more trustworthy components – the technology of voting. most jurisdictions serve as the primary gate- Individual voting technology, such as lever keepers for voting. Affirmed voters listed in the 87 machines, punch cards, and DRE may be prob- book are permitted to vote and the overall expe- T h lematic, but they are only a part of an underly- rience is positive; but for unlisted voters the e J ing electoral establishment. It is here that experience may quickly degenerate into a frus- o u r n numerous new technological issues emerge. tration of potential disenfranchisement. Even in a l Voters need to believe that their vote actually today’s post-1960s Civil Rights and Election o f T “counts” otherwise they will not bother to par- 2000 environment, the electoral landscape con- e c h ticipate. Procedural rituals such as voter registra- sists of a mind-numbing number of widely-vary- n o l tion, poll-side voter identification, and official ing state and local procedures to handle not only o g ratification are designed to create trust in the routine but especially anomalous voting circum- y S t overall voting establishment. The modern U.S. stances. Given this patchwork of voting laws and u d i e voting establishment bases its legitimacy by procedures it is not surprising that many denied s pre-qualifying and registering acceptable voters voters are left with the impression their right to prior to an election, then on election day pub- vote was unfairly denied. licly verifying their acceptability prior to permit- ting them to anonymously vote, then performing Although most jurisdictions use computers elaborate official post-electoral rituals to recon- to maintain their voter registration lists and pro- cile any voting discrepancies. This admirable duce their poll books, technology is not usually Norman Rockwell-type portrayal was never at fault here. Typically, an individual doesn’t attainable but especially not in this post- appear in the poll book because he or she moved Election 2000 world. Although most electronic and didn’t update their registration, he or she voting accounts focus on technological disen- didn’t register in time, or he or she hadn’t voted franchisement, there are numerous other non- for a significant period of time and were DRE means by which a voter may end up disen- dropped from the rolls. These long-standing fac- franchised and most do not involve technology. tors are social not technological; however, recently Federal legislation has muddled the sit- Underlying the United States voting uation and introduced unanticipated technologi- process/establishment there is a fundamental cal consequences. Today, a registered voter may paradox – a citizen must personally publicly requested to produce an “H” (the Arlington certify his or her identify prior to being permit- County Virginia code for post-Help America ted to vote anonymously. Consequently, any U.S. Vote Act [HEPA] registered voters) acceptable electoral mechanism be it manual or electronic, form of identification; and here Federal and is expected to produce an official trusted state laws regarding acceptability vary consider- auditable record of anonymous votes cast by ably. For example, Virginia state law accepts approved voters. In the idealized election estab- employer photo identification as an affirmation lishment world, jurisdictions vet, pre-approve of identity; while other states and Federal and publish on approved voters on registration (HEPA) standards disallow it. Given these con- roles; on Election Day officials challenge tinuing jurisdictional inconsistencies it shouldn’t prospective voters to validate their legitimized be surprising that individual disenfranchisement identity and if approved the individual voter is persists in electoral debate.