A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF US-EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EASTERN, BALKANS AND SOUTH ASIAN CRISES (1990-2002)

By

SHAISTA SHAHEEN ZAFAR

AREA STUDY CENTRE FOR EUROPE, UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI 2014

Ph.D Dissertation

Topic: A Comparative Study of US-European Union Policies towards the Middle Eastern, Balkans and South Asian Crises (1990-2002)

Submitted by: Shaista Shaheen Zafar Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi

DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my mother (late) and daughter Maryum (late). It is also dedicated to my daughter Sana and nephew Syed Osaid

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements………………………………………………... i Abstract……………………………………………………………. ii-v

 English  Urdu

List of Abbreviations……………………………………………… vi-vii

Introduction……………………………………………………….. viii-xxvi

Chapter-I

The United States and the European Union in the ……………... 1-75 Post-Cold War International Order

Chapter-II

The Balkans Crisis: The Responses of the United States ……… 76-178 and the European Union

Chapter-III

The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; the Peace Process and ……… 179-264 the Policies of the US and the EU

Chapter-IV

The Post-Cold War Crises in the Subcontinent: ……………. 265-350 The Responses of the EU and the US

Conclusion ……………………………………………………….. 350-409

Maps……………………………………………………………… 410-420

Bibliography …………………………………………………….. 421-433 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I thank Almighty Allah for his great kindness, in making it possible for me to accomplish my research.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Naveed Ahmed Tahir, former Director of the Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi for her invaluable guidance, encouragement and gracious cooperation throughout, which enabled me to complete my thesis.

I am grateful to the librarians of the Area Study Centre for Europe, the Mahmood Husain

Library, University of Karachi, the Liaquat National Library and the Pakistan Institute of

International Affairs Library for their cooperation.

I am indebted to my dear parents (May they rest in peace). Without their blessings and care I could never have accomplished any of my goals in life.

I also thank to my friend Dr. Fatima Agha for her unselfish support in finalizing my thesis.

I would like to acknowledge the contribution of all my family members, especially my sister Shagufta Shaheen Zafar and nephew Syed Osaid Adil who constantly urged me to continue work on my thesis.

I am highly indebted to my beloved daughter Sana Munir Alam who has borne occasional neglect on my part while I was writing this thesis; her emotional support and love has been invaluable.

ABSTRACT

The international strategic situation in the cold war period which began after 1945 was characterized by a bipolar power structure along the lines of the East-West rivalry.

European politics–whether in the West bloc or in the East bloc-drew upon this major struggle between the superpowers. The member states of the European Community (EC) had very little space to define their own strategies for they were part of the western alliance led by the United States.

Thus, European policies reflected the superpower rivalry in the ideological and geo- strategic realms. The European Community acted within this strategic and ideological framework, which was mainly structured by the EC (now EU) countries’ membership of

NATO.

After the end of the cold war, the bipolar international power structure has been replaced by a unipolar structure upheld by the United States as the self-appointed guardian of a

“new world order” and leader of the “West” which dominants world affairs. As the

“victor” in the global power struggle of the cold war, the US is convinced that it has especial rights and privileges in world affairs, even vis a vis its allies in Europe.

The present global situation which favours the US as the only remaining superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union has marginalized Europe as just a regional power center with limited global reach as far as geo-politics is involved. In the economic realm, undoubtedly, it enjoys great clout.

Multi-polarity with different power centers is yet to emerge. Though, China and the

Russian Federation are increasingly assertive, Europe often displays its weakness. A multi-polar global structure may be a long time away if we take into consideration

Europe’s string of failures since 1989 to jointly address major international crises as they broke out in the Gulf in 1990-1991, on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the early nineties or in the Middle East at various intervals.

In all these crises, it was the United States that eventually took the initiative and imposed its own solutions while the European Union dithered and was not even able to agree on the basic principles for solving these issues nor could it stand up against the overwhelming strength of the US in the military, logistic and communication realms. Yet

Europe has a positive impact on world affairs. Its ‘soft power’ approach is in sharp contrast with the ‘hard’ approach of the US. Though, double standards often become apparent, the EU’s emphasis on human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and other moral values do exert a positive influence on international actors.

INTRODUCTION

In the nineteenth century several European states such as Great Britain, France, Spain,

Portugal, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium were involved in a fierce competition for colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They ruthlessly exploited the natural and human resources of the subjugated peoples and established their hold on the trade and commerce of the world. The Europeans imposed artificial boundaries on their colonies often based on give and take between the colonial powers. This resulted in societal divisions. For example the Somali people were spread across the colonial administrations of the British, French and Italians. Such situations occasionally led to colonial wars, but above all divided ethnic, linguistic and religious groups across boundaries which created severe problems for the future. (1)

By the end of the nineteenth century the major European colonial powers had carved up

Africa and Asia between them. Those European powers that joined the colonial race later, such as Germany and Italy challenged these divisions, while the Ottomans, whose empire was being slowly nibbled up by the French and the British or by others through their connivance, were also angry and unhappy. This situation divided Europe into two armed camps and soon the First World War broke out. The defeated powers--Germany, the

Habsburg empire and the Ottoman empire faced not only severe humiliation, but also heavy reparations, loss of empire and the reduction in the size of military and cut down in production of armaments. The boundaries of Europe were redrawn to serve the interests of the victors. Ottoman Turkey lost all its possessions in Europe and the Middle East and was threatened with disintegration. The victorious European powers were determined to destroy its national sovereignty and integrity. The Habsburg empire too was broken up.

Its borders now shrunk to what is present day Austria. The humiliation heaped on

Germany, led to the rise of Nazism, an extremist ideology and a dangerous demagogue---

Hitler. Hitler started to negate the Versailles treaty imposed on Germany and reasserted the latter’s sovereign rights. Hitler’s ally, Mussolini in Italy was devoted to recreating the

Roman Empire. Fascist Japan, had ambitions that matched those of Germany and Italy.

Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931 and launched a full-fledged aggression against China in 1937. In the same year, the Fascist powers formed an alliance after Italy became part of the German-Japanese Anti-Commintern Pact signed earlier in November 1936. The fascist powers had decided that they would re-divide the world in their own favour. (2)

This ambition to alter by force, the international order which had been set up by the victors of the First World War created a situation that led to outbreak of the Second

World War, which caused even more devastation than the first war. When the war ended it badly weakened the colonial powers; and owing to the momentum gained by movements for self-determination all over the European colonies in Asia, combined with pressure from the US, the Europeans began to grant independence to their colonies. (3)

The cold war followed at the heels of the Second World War. The Cold War was a post war conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

This conflict spanned political, ideological and military issues. It has often been described as a struggle between the two systems of governance---capitalism cum democracy and communism. In the European context, this meant the US led the West and NATO on one side and the Soviet Union led Eastern and Central Europe and the Warsaw Pact on the other side. It lasted from 1945 until the collapse of communism in the East bloc in 1989. The manner in which the Soviet Union sanitized its satellite states from Western thoughts and its way of life is dubbed as the ‘Iron Curtain’. (4)

The Truman Doctrine of 1947, on the containment of communism formed the basis of

American foreign policy for the next five decades or so. The US in this context began to provide huge amounts of aid to help revive the European economies after the end of the second world war. This assistance to Europe (the western part of it) was disbursed under the Marshall Plan. A military alliance, NATO was also set-up as a bulwark against

Soviet expansion. This total involvement of the US in European affairs was a departure from the traditional American isolationism which had initially kept it from joining the

Allies in the first and second world wars. The US was now the undisputed leader of the so-called “free world”. (5)

Truman and Stalin knew very well that another world war was not an option, but they at the same time saw each other as rivals for domination over Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. There were apprehensions on both sides that the other would make all out efforts to exploit the resources of the new areas under its influence, for building military capabilities. The rival blocs and their respective leaders feared that they would lose access to their traditional markets. Above all, there was the tussle to win the 'war of ideas', or in other words the contest between the rival ideologies to win the hearts and minds of the people of Europe and Asia and the rest of the world. Democracy combined with capitalism claimed the West, was the only legitimate system of governance, while the Soviet side insisted that the only just and human system in the world was communism. (6)

During the early cold war years there were a series of serious crises beginning with the

Berlin Blockade (1948-49) and peaking with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when the two superpowers came close to exchanging blows. It was a very dangerous situation for the world for it could have led to a nuclear Armageddon. However, they soon realized that in this case brinkmanship would not work, so both backed down from their maximalist positions. This provided the basis for détente between the superpowers. Later other developments took place which tempered the bipolar division of the world. The

People’s Republic of China which had distanced itself from its ideological mentor and ally, the Soviet Union, now emerged as an independent new factor in international politics in the sixties. The third world countries formed the Non-Aligned Movement which also became a significant new factor in international relations. (7)

In this scenario, West Europe launched a major project of economic integration. French

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, to bring the former foes---France and Germany together proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of the two countries and other

West European countries were also invited to join this scheme. The Treaty of Paris of

1951, created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) comprising six member states. The pooling of these two important resources which could be used for manufacturing weapons and for building a war machine were put under supranational control. Thus, while the Treaty of Paris appeared to be a scheme for integration in an economic sector, it actually had a very strong political motivation. (8)

A further step toward closer European integration was taken in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the

European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The six countries—France,

Germany, Italy and the Benelux that were the founding members of the ECSC, had decided to create the two new communities. Britain did not consider these communities attractive enough to join them at the outset. The EEC aimed at creating a common market which could later become a unified single market where goods, persons, capital and services could move about freely. (9)

The most dangerous phase of the Cold War transformed into the decade of détente (1969-

79). In this phase the two superpowers made efforts to improve their relations through various agreements to limit nuclear and conventional armaments. This relaxation in superpower relations encouraged the member states of the European Community to try to work together on foreign policy cooperation, with the objective of being heard in world politics. This appeared a significant step from the European point of view, for a number of events had demonstrated that the Six member states of the European Community differed on international issues and that not only global but European affairs, were managed by the superpowers without input from the Europeans. One crisis that clearly illustrated differences of opinion between the Six on international issues was the Arab-

Israeli war of June 1967. The Six could not agree on a common position on the conflict. That the destiny of the Europeans was not in their own hands was clearly illustrated during the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968 and its aftermath.

Altogether, this was not a bright phase for the European Community, which was further held back by French President de Gaulle’s attitude towards the inclusion of the UK in the

Community and European integration in general. De Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 and other international developments opened up the prospects for an expansion of the

European Community and a deepening of European integration. These prospects became a reality when the Community expanded to include Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. There were now nine member-states of the Community. (10) The Community also took measures to create a single European market and as a first step adopted the single

European Act (1986).

The EC had by then become the world’s largest trading bloc, and economic integration was making progress. Thus, success of internal integration generated an expectation of some kind of foreign policy cooperation in the EC. Foreign Policy Cooperation or

European Political Cooperation (EPC) as it was called began in 1970, but it did not involve the formal institutions of the Community. It was the member states which came together at governmental level to cooperate in this field. The first meeting of the foreign ministers for the European Political Cooperation was held in Munich in November 1970.

It is noteworthy that one of the foremost topics on the agenda of this meeting was the

Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict defied resolution. The Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) launched after the Helsinki Accords defused tensions and increased interaction between the countries of the East and West blocs. (11)

The West European Countries had played a very important role in the Helsinki process.

Détente was thus utilized by the Europeans to further the ‘European way’ of cooperation.

However, détente did not bring about peace all over the world. While tensions cooled somewhat within Europe, in the rest of the world US-Soviet rivalry did not abate. The détente period petered out as the Soviet Union started to render more and more support for various left-oriented regimes in the third world. Some examples are Mozambique

(1975), Ethiopia (1975), Angola (1978) and Afghanistan (1978). NATO took the decision to deploy Pershing II Cruise missiles in Europe, for talks with the Soviet Union were not leading to a reduction in what the West perceived as a dangerous imbalance of power, caused by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. Thus, the international environment was extremely tense and EPC had to go through tough tests from 1973 onwards. (12)

After the Copenhagen summit held in December 1973 the European Community heads of state and government adopted a declaration that emphasized EPC was not separate from the Community and that the EPC was important as a tool for making a united Europe and for giving an opportunity to the European Community to play its proper role on the international stage. (13)

The US, it must be pointed out, was not very happy with this European resolve to develop its own foreign policy. Washington was afraid that the political unity of the West would be harmed by this move. To dissipate these fears an agreement on informal consultations was signed between, the US and the EC countries. But it demonstrated that the US perceived a common European foreign policy as a real threat to its supremacy. The US now adopted an ambivalent attitude towards European integration. The nine had to adopt a more low-key approach in view of American sensitivities. (14)

At the start of the eighties, the Cold War was reignited and détente was completely eclipsed. Once again there were fears of the outbreak of a nuclear war that would be fought in the European theater. These fears were evoked by three important events: (i) the launch of the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or ‘Star Wars’; (ii) the declaration by the Polish government of martial law in Poland in 1981; (iii) and misinterpretation by the Soviet Union of the NATO military exercise named ‘Able

Archer’ in 1983. In all three events there was a hint of the possibility of a nuclear exchange, in the event of something going wrong. It was extra-European powers that had been responsible for pushing Europe to the brink of another war. (15)

Germany and Italy were the first European Community countries to call for strengthening

West Europe’s voice in the affairs of Europe. German Foreign minister Hans Dietrich

Genscher and Italian Foreign minister Emilio Colombo in 1981 suggested some measures to strengthen European integration and to bridge the unnatural gap between the EPC and the Community. Their proposal was that security issues should be included in EPC. Here, it must be pointed out that after the earlier failure of the European Defence Community

(EDC) proposal in 1954, the Europeans Community had become shy about discussing the possibility of making foreign policy and security a part of the European Community. However, divisions among the member states on cooperation in sensitive sectors like security and defence, contributed to the failure of the idea. (16)

Thus, the European states were left with the option of two strategies: more integration in other fields to knit the societies of European countries closer together or to continue to look up to organizations such as NATO for their security. (17)

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 was the first significant and wide-ranging treaty reform of the European Community since its formation. The SEA envisaged measures aimed at creating a unified internal market (for instance, harmonization) plus reform of the EC institutions related to the market (such as the application of qualified majority voting to more internal market related areas and a cooperation procedure conferring greater legislative power on the European Parliament). The Single European Act recognized European Political Cooperation (EPC) as part of European Community procedures. The SEA was signed in February 1986 and was implemented in July 1987.

(18)

Towards the end of the eighties the cold war came to an end. As the Berlin Wall, the hated symbol of the iron curtain fell in November 1989, it was followed by the collapse of communism in East and Central Europe and then in December 1991 the breakup of the

Soviet Union itself. While these momentous events were taking place, the first Gulf war took place in early 1991 triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait earlier in August 1990.

The unraveling of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began in June 1991 which caused much bloodshed, particularly when the Bosnian Serbs and their backers the rump FRY extended the war to Bosnia and Herzegovina from where they wanted to wipe out the

Muslims population. The EC was faced with a difficult situation for it belonged to the

‘winning side’ in the cold war, but was under the domination of the only surviving superpower, the US. It was an oppressive situation for the European Community. (19)

Thus, while the West was now freed of the old ideological conflict between communism and democracy which could be traced back to the Russian Revolution of October 1917, the feeling arose in the Western world that they were now facing a new security challenge from Islamist extremism. The West considered the manufacture and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the trafficking of chemical and biological weapons as well as contraband nuclear material, as issues related to Islamist extremism and the concentration of policy makers in Western capitals, particularly

Washington was now on these security concerns. Another serious security threat was posed by the growing number of ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states in the world owing to economic and political factors. (20)

The European Community’s response to these forbidding challenges to the post cold-war world order was the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which was implemented in 1993.

The treaty introduced Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V) as the second pillar of the newly formed three-pillared European Union. (21) This allowed the EU to adopt common positions and common actions on important international issues. But there were more failures than successes in this regard.

An effort to strengthen the CFSP was made by the Amsterdam Treaty, which introduced the position of the High Representative to give “a face and a phone number” to the EU’s

Common Foreign Security Policy. (22)

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 shocked the world. It had the impact of strengthening the unilateralism of the only superpower. Europe gave full sympathy and support to the US, but soon differences arose between Washington and its allies because the former was placing too much emphasis on the “clash of civilizations” aspect of the War on Terror, it had declared soon after 9/11. (23)

Washington formulated the doctrine of pre-emption for tackling a faceless enemy having no clearly demarcated territory, tangible institutions of power or international personality.

The US cobbled together a coalition to invade Afghanistan in fall 2001 and later in 2003 took unilateral action against Iraq, accused of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD). The American unilateralist approach was also reflected in its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and its rejection of the Kyoto protocol on climate change. These actions confirmed American predominance in the ‘new world order’. The

US has not abandoned its determination to stick to its leading role and this can be seen very clearly in the case of Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It is very clear that the US is not willing to allow space for others to act and to take the lead wherever the important interests of the superpower are at stake. Though, the US and the

EU had similar concerns on global challenges and similar threat perceptions but their manner of handling such situations was very different. A crucial policy difference was that the Americans laid stress upon security and for this defense spending was greatly increased. Besides, Washington preferred unilateralism, for it gave more space to it to act for securing its own interests.

On the other hand, the EU expressed preference for effective multilateralism. The EU’s security strategy announced in 2003 avoided open references to ‘rogue’ states and also did not endorse the US agenda for regime change in regions of strategic importance, particularly the Middle East and instead announced the milder goal of encouraging good governance and democracy. As far as the EU is concerned, it interprets pre-emptive engagement as early diplomatic action rather than military strikes. (24)

The European Security Strategy of December 2003 provides a framework for the Union's security related actions. The strategy defines the EU’s common interests, strategic goals and capability requirements based on its security environment and threat assessment. The strategy lays stress on the creation of an effective multilateral system at two levels: cooperation and coordination between EU member states, and cooperation between the international community. (25)

The hypothesis of this research is that the US, now the sole and unchallenged superpower, believes firmly in using ‘hard power’ to resolve conflicts and settle international issues; the European Union on the other hand, wants the resolution of international issues by the application of ‘soft power’. In other words, the EU believes that International law should be upheld and international institutions maintained, to resolve international issues, particularly in the Middle East, the Balkans and the South

Asian regions. In these regions the interests of the US and Europe converge but also at times clash. In this connection the thesis will also examine how these convergences and divergences in American and European policies have impacted the resolution of issues.

The focus of this thesis is on examining US-EU policies starting from the end of the cold war till 2002. However, in order to understand the impact of these policies and the reasoning behind them, the researcher has also analyzed the historical origins and various aspects of the conflicts in question. Furthermore, while the period discussed in this thesis covers the period uptil 2002, crucial new developments have taken place after this period which have made it necessary to discuss them in the concluding chapter, for these throw light on the direction of American and European policies in more recent years, and are closely connected with what happened in the past.

The thesis is divided into four chapters plus a conclusion. In these four chapters the dissertation will attempt to explore the following research questions:

i. To what extent are the US using ‘hard power’ and the EU exercising ‘soft power’

able to succeed in resolving the crises, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East

regions?

ii. To what extent has the EU been able to exert its influence on international issues

in today’s unipolar world? iii. What are the problems that the EU has to face in formulating a common foreign

policy to establish itself as a credible global actor?

iv. In what way were US-EU relations affected by the crises that erupted after the end

of the cold war?

v. What are the respective interests of the US and the EU in the Middle East?

vi. Is there any room for the EU in the presence of the US to play a significant role in

the Middle East Peace Process?

vii. Why have the US and the Europeans failed to resolve the Kashmir issue even

after the passage of sixty seven years?

In chapter one, the thesis discusses the Gulf war of 1990-91 that was the first crisis to erupt after the end of the cold war and that confirmed the US supremacy in world affairs.

The Gulf region has special strategic importance for the western powers owing to its oil resources. The embargo imposed by the Arab oil exporters on exports of oil after the

Arab-Israeli war of 1973 on some countries, was an economic trauma for the US, West

Europe and the international economy. After the end of the cold war, Iraq and Iran emerged as the region’s strongest military powers and there were fears in Washington that these two Muslim countries would pose a direct challenge to American interests in this region. Israel, the protégé of the US was seen as being particularly vulnerable to pressure from these two powers.

Chapter two, deals with the Yugoslav, particularly the Bosnian crisis, which was the first greatest challenge that the EU faced after the end of the cold war. It exposed the problem of the lack of commonality of interests and perceptions among member-states and the divergences in their respective national security priorities. The crisis demonstrated the failure of the EU in its own backyard, despite it initial confidence that it would be able to deal effectively with the conflict through mediation and diplomatic means and without

American help.

Chapter three, examines EU and American policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the US has over the years begun to be seen as the protector of Israel. The EU on the other hand, perceived the resolution of the issue as being very important for European security. (26)

Chapter four, deals with the Kashmir conflict, a burning issue of the South Asian region.

South Asia undoubtedly has an intrinsic geo-strategic importance, but the presence of nuclear weapons and the intra-regional issues especially over borders, poverty, pressure on resources and terrorism, indeed make this region a very dangerous place. The most difficult issue in this region is Kashmir which is a bone of contention between the two nuclear power states---India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. In this chapter EU and US policies on the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir issue has been analyzed in detail.

In this thesis, the qualitative method has been applied i.e. review of available literature on the topic. Further, efforts have also been made to get material from different sources related to the subject. So, there is a combination of primary and secondary sources. Information has been collected from documents, books, journals, newspapers, speeches, statements and official declarations. Discussions, with local and foreign scholars, during the international seminars, conferences and workshops, held by the Area Study Centre for

Europe have been very useful for the author in further developing her understanding of the various aspects of the issues discussed.

REFERENCES

1. Dr. A. A. Kadeer and Naveed Ahmed Tahir, “Preface”, in A. A. Kadeer and Naveed Ahmed Tahir (eds.), Pakistan-Europe Ties (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 1988), vi-vii.

2. Ibid.

3. Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2007), 190.

4. David S. Mason, A Concise History of Modern Europe: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2011), 150.

5. Ibid.

6. http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/cold/articles/suri.html.

7. Dr. A. A. Kadeer and Naveed Ahmed Tahir, “Preface”, vi-viii.

8. David S. Mason, A Concise History of Modern Europe. 182.

9. http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decisionmaking/treaties/index.en.htm.

10. Soren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, The European Union and the Middle East (London: Sheffield Academic Press Ltd, 2002), 3-4.

11. Ibid, 4-5.

12. Ibid, 4-6.

13. Ibid, 6-7.

14. Ibid, 7.

15. Ibid, 8-9.

16. Desmond Dinan. “The Development of the European Community: Boundaries, Agenda and Decision-Making” in Glennon J. Harrison (ed.), Europe and the United States: Competition & Cooperation in the 1990s (USA: M.E.Sharpe, Inc, 1994), 56.

17. Soren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, The European Union and the Middle East.10.

18. Ibid, 12.

19. Ibid, 13.

20. Naveed Ahmed Tahir, The Post-September 11 International Scenario and the European Union (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 2004), 22.

21. Ibid, 22-23.

22. Ibid, 24.

23. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

24. Anders Persson, A depressing anniversary? Available at http://www. europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/a-depressing-anniversary-/71082.aspx.

25. Visit at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/.

26. Anders Persson, A depressing anniversary? Available at http://www. europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/a-depressing-anniversary-/71082.aspx.

CHAPTER – I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE POST COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The historic events of 1989-90 formally ended the cold war and the bipolar world order that had dominated world politics for nearly half a century. The Soviet Union’s relinquishment of superpower status left the US the only superpower. The Eastern

European countries were no longer part of the Soviet bloc. They had shed the communist ideology. East and West Germany were united. Thus, the entire edifice of the cold war that had emerged after second world war had crumbled. Before the Gulf war 1990-1991, some analysts had predicted that the United States would decline, and Japan and the

European Community would emerge as the new power centers in a multipolar world.

Although Europe is not behind the United States in population, economy and skilled human resources and has also established a Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP), the European Union, which collectively represents Europe, has not been able to muster the political unity that would allow it to act as a single global power. Similarly, there is no lack of economic and technological strength in Japan, but its military strength has limits. (1)

As already pointed out, the United States emerged as the sole superpower to fill the power vacuum after the Soviet Union disintegrated; the American role in the Gulf war confirmed its status.

The New World Order

It was President George Bush Sr. who presented the concept of a New World Order just after Iraq occupied Kuwait. An important factor which motivated this concept was to explore the options that the United States could exercise in the Gulf crisis. (2)

President Bush on April 13, 1999, described the New World Order as envisioned by

Washington, to an American audience. The New World Order stated Bush, actually described the new global responsibilities that American successes in the realm of foreign policy had imposed on Washington. The concept presented new methods of cooperation with other nations to deter aggression and achieve international stability, prosperity and most importantly peace. The American President pointed out that the end of the Cold

War had not, ushered in an era of permanent peace. While the threats of the cold war era had receded, new threats had now emerged. The pursuit of a New World Order is, partly a challenge to the US and the international community to identify ways and means of controlling disorder and instability. (3)

The concept’s apparent aims were to bring the world closer through greater cooperation between nations and support for the principles of the charter of the UN and use of the UN system and various regional organizations with firm American support. The United

Nations was to become a forum for achieving international consensus and wields influence as an instrument for peacekeeping at the international level. The new world order would be based on shared commitment, among all nations whether large or small, to certain principles, such as the peaceful settlement of international disputes, unity against aggression, reduction and control of armaments and justice for all peoples worldwide.(4)

The New World Order addressed three areas considered of the utmost importance by the

US and its allies. These are as follows: (i) to arrest the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to stop states having nuclear ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons, (ii) to assist the developing countries to adopt economic reforms geared towards privatization of state-owned enterprises, avoidance of subsidies to industry and agriculture, reduced deficits, more incentives to draw private domestic and foreign investment, eschew protectionism, and to establish closer cooperation with IMF, GATT, and the World Bank.

In the realm of international aid, priority should be accorded to those countries which prove their capability to keep up their economic growth by encouraging international and domestic investment; show regard for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens; and are sincerely striving to tread the path of genuine democracy and good governance. These security and economic changes would help create the New World

Order. This new World Order would, as pointed out earlier, be based on the principles of global cooperation, democracy, economic development, protection of the environment and shared values.(5)

Of course, not all scholars interpreted the New World Order in the same way. Some analysts viewed it as a genuine system striving for collective security under the auspices of the UN. Others predicted that it would to be a condominium of the superpowers, with the US and the Soviet Union (which had not actually disintegrated, but was in turmoil) that would dictate to the world, using the UN as their handmaiden. (6) Still another interpretation was that through this new order, the US would establish a ‘Pax Americana’ which would allow it to dominate the world as the pre-eminent superpower that would enforce collective security with the support of its allies. The UN would be a subservient body, endorsing American actions. In this type of New World Order, most policies and actions would be determined by US interests. Care would be taken that UN decisions do not clash with US interests. It would be the US and not the UN, which would decide what constituted a threat to peace. (7) The last view prevails among independent analysts.

The new international order is seen in the developing world as a new form of gunboat diplomacy which was prevalent in the era of colonialism. However, this time around more sophisticated and lethal weapons are used to subjugate the weak nations. In the

Muslim world, there are many who consider it as a western conspiracy to decimate the

Islamic factor from international politics. (8) Many Arabs nationalists in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq see the western armed forces as a reincarnation of the former imperial armies. Even before the Iraq episode, the US record, of direct and indirect interventions in the affairs of other countries, was quoted to support the arguments. (9)

Some cases in point were Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic etc. (10)

Undoubtedly, these countries were victims of American aggression. Very glaring post- cold war examples are the US led attack on Iraq in 2003 carried out without a UN mandate, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the continuing war against terror. The US claimed that it had intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq, because these two countries were promoting terrorism and the proliferation weapons of mass destruction, and were therefore a threat to American and international security. Many in the Muslims world however, saw the matter in a different light. Thus, in the Muslim world strong anti-west feelings prevail. Here disputes with the west are seen in the historical context of the crusades and the artificial boundaries created by the colonial powers. A section of opinion in the Muslim world view the New World Order as a conspiracy in which the

Jews and the Christians have joined hands to counter the resurgence of Islam and to keep

Muslims all over the world subservient and unable to challenge dictates of the west.

There are laments that influentials from the whole political spectrum, including the liberals, the leftists and the fundamentalists have not shown unity in unequivocally condemning this new kind of American imperialism. (11)

There are scholars who opined that the New World Order wanted to create a new global

‘balance of power’ and an ‘ordered’ relationship between the centers and peripheries.

They are also of the view that the so-called new order determines how power is used as an instrument for exercising control and applying pressure over this ‘ordered’ world. (12) As pointed out earlier this Pax Americana, would basically serve US interests and

Britain, as the most staunchly Atlanticist member of the EU would be accommodated in this system as a ‘co-pilot’. The Pax Americana, would besides dominating the globe, also build the unchallenged leadership of the US and its ally in Europe over the others in the continent and elsewhere in the developed world. (13)

This contention is supported by the argument that from the British and the American perspectives, it has become absolutely essential for the sole superpower and its ally to create this type of an order for many reasons. Firstly, say scholars, nurturing this line of thought, are the economic challenges to the US and Britain offered by Japan and

Germany. Second, a resurgent Islam poses a real as well as long-term threat to the west’s strategic interests. The international system rooted in the western civilization, upholding secular and materialistic values are the main targets of this aggressive brand of Islam.

Third, there is an essential need to control oil, its sources and supply lines for undoubtedly this commodity is immense strategic importance for the west. The western economies depend on the uninterrupted supply of oil. Control of oil would enable the US to dominate the world economy and the international political scene. The world’s oil reservoirs are concentrated in the Muslim world. This factor has enhanced the latter’s importance which at the same time is perceived by the West as a serious long-term threat to its own security. Finally, the West is deeply concerned about Israel’s security, which was created by the west in the midst of the Arab world. Israel is perceived as a protector of western interests in the volatile region. (14)

An American scholar Noam Chomsky, who is not accepted by the mainstream US academia, opined that the Iraq war was an effort by Washington to strengthen its control over the global energy reserves and the profits generated by them rather than to quell aggressive tendencies in the Iraqi regime. Also, he opined that the episode was only a continuation of the war against the third world that the west has been waging for half a millennium. (15) In other words it was just a manifestation of neo-colonialism/neo- imperialism.

Statesmen and intellectuals in most countries have not minced words in expressing opposition to the idea of a unipolar world. At a conference at the Harvard University in

1997, scholars pointed out that the elites of China, Russia, India, the Muslims and the

Arab world and Africa perceive the United States as the most serious external threat to their respective countries. While some see the US as a military threat, others consider it as a menace to their independence, integrity, and freedom of movement. (16) The US is perceived as a power which does not hesitate to intrude and intervene in other’s affairs. It is prone to hegemonism and hypocrisy and applies double standards with impunity. Its domestic politics has a strong impact upon its foreign policy. (17) An Indian scholar has opined that Indians see the US as a major diplomatic and political threat. (18) The fact is that in recent years India has become very close to the US and the latter has begun to view it as its biggest strategic partner in Asia, and a significant counter-weight to China, which is emerging as an economic and military giant. A Russian scholar has said that Washington since the end of the cold war has imposed upon others powers a policy of

“coercive cooperation”. The Russian ruling elite strongly oppose a world order where the diktat of the US prevails. (19) A Chinese scholar also expressed similar sentiments.

Chinese scholars and leaders have time and again stated that the major threats to global peace, and stability, are hegemonism and power politics. This is an oblique reference to

American policies that are aimed at weakening unity among the developing countries.

(20) Many Arab scholars and those in the corridors of power, generally see the US as an evil force in world politics, (21) though they realize that interaction, even cooperation with Washington cannot be avoided. Over the years, major regional powers have expressed their unease about American interference in their respective areas. For instance

Iran, a maverick state strongly opposes American military presence in the Persian Gulf.

(22) Iran has boldly defied the US by refusing to give up its nuclear programme, which it is suspected is geared towards developing nuclear weapons.

The scenario which appeared after the end of the cold war, in particular 9/11 followed by the American declaration of the war on terror, the first victim of which was Taliban-led

Afghanistan and the second Iraq, had confirmed unchallenged American predominance in the existing world order. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement in this regard has a bitter tone. He points out that the ‘New’ world order is totally American-centric. It is a world where there is only a sing Master, as well as sovereign. This, for Putin, is a dangerous and unacceptable situation. (23)

The European Union’s Foreign Policy

In recent decades, the European Union has emerged as an economic super power and since the seventies it has also aspired to play a major role as a global political power.

The Community met with some failures, before it launched foreign policy cooperation in the seventies. An important event in this regard was the failure of the proposals for a

European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community in 1950–

54. The 1961-62 Fouchet Plan for foreign policy cooperation also did not materialize.

With changed circumstances on the international scene, there was progress in the foreign policy field in 1969. The six member states of the European Economic Community

(EEC) - France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg placed great emphasis on the need to introduce political unification in the European Community. The foreign ministers’ report presented in November 1970 also recommended the introduction of cooperation in the EC in the field of foreign policy (24)

A committee was formed under the chairmanship of Etienne Davignon, a Belgian diplomat which looked into procedural problems connected with foreign policy cooperation. European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was introduced after reflection on the reports was based on meetings of foreign ministers twice a year. The

Political Committee prepared these meetings. This Committee comprised the heads of the foreign ministries’ political departments. They would hold meetings at least four times in a year. To manage particular functional and regional issues, special working groups were to be constituted and “group of correspondents” mostly junior officials from the foreign ministries of member states would take care of daily liaison. The system was not made a part of Community structures and was based on intergovernmental cooperation. All

European Community member states had the right to stop any action proposed if it was perceived as hurting their respective national interests. That the arrangement was between

Community member states became evident from the fact that the member state which held the Presidency of the Council of Ministers automatically chaired Political cooperation proceedings. The responsibility for carrying out the secretarial and organizational work of EPC was also vested in that state. EPC lacked a legal basis. It functioned on the basis of consensus among the member states. (25)

Over the years there was an informal evolution of EPC and to some extent foreign policy cooperation developed a European “reflex”. (26) The informal structure of EPC, its mechanisms, and in particular its flexibility on joint positions and actions pleased the member states, who were not really willing to abandon their sovereignty in this realm. A telex communication system, called COREU linked up the member states’ foreign ministers, which made consultations easier and more frequent. In 1974, it was decided by the foreign ministers that EPC meetings would be held at the margins of Council meetings. This decision was made to avoid situation such as the one in November 1973 when the EC foreign ministers met in the morning in Copenhagen to discuss European

Political Cooperation matters (preceded over by Denmark) and went to Brussels in the afternoon for a meeting of the Community’s General Affairs Council (foreign ministers).

To allow more frequent exchange of views, it became customary to hold informal meetings of ministers, nicknamed the Gymnich meetings. The troika arrangement, a frequently used diplomatic mechanism of the EU, in which each rotational presidency is assisted by its immediate predecessor and successor, was originally a feature of European

Political Cooperation. The Paris summit held in 1974 proved to be very important for it laid the foundation of the European Council (regular meetings of heads of state and government). Its aim was to provide a discussion platform for EPC at the highest level.

(27)

In various periods the Community member states made attempts to create more formal institutions for EPC. The aim was also to make EPC decisions more binding as well as coherent. The London Report of 1981 and the initiative of November 1981 by the

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Italian Foreign Minister

Emilio Colombo were part of these efforts. Together these resulted in the Solemn

Declaration on European Union, also called the Stuttgart Declaration of 1983. The

London Report adopted by the foreign ministers at a meeting in London in October 1981 endorsed the practices already in existence but also called for making that EPC to adopt a less reactive and more proactive approach with regard to international events. Member states had boldly debated EPC structure. This had not been done in the past. The report took note of the fact that they had agreed to discuss in EPC meetings important foreign policy questions concerned with the political aspects of security. In November 1981,

German Foreign Minister Genscher and Italian Foreign Minister Colombo presented before the European Parliament their governments’ proposal for drawing up a European

Act, which would also have a clause on closer political cooperation. This was followed up by the adoption of the Solemn Declaration on the European Union by the Community heads of state and government at their summit meeting in Stuttgart in June 1983. The

Solemn Declaration however, only served to expand the scope of EPC debate to the political and economic aspects of security. (28)

The Stuttgart Declaration was followed by a very important event regarding foreign policy cooperation. This was the incorporation of EPC into the Single European Act

(SEA) of 1986, the basic organizational design and operational framework of EPC. By inclusion in the SEA, recognized by international law, the EPC acquired legitimacy.

Despite this major step, the decisions made in EPC meeting were still not legally binding on member states. Inter-governmentalizm still prevailed in EPC. (29)

However, the SEA validated EPC's organizational structure, in which a central role was given to the Council presidency. The Single European Act also endorsed the EPC customs of quarterly meetings of foreign ministers; the Political Committee’s preparatory responsibilities and the responsibility of the Group of Correspondents for looking after regular coordination between member states. It also conferred recognition upon the role of the working groups comprising officials of the foreign ministries of member states’ to deal with specific issues under the supervision of the Political Committee. To support the presidency in preparing and implementing the decisions of EPC, a Secretariat was set-up under the Presidency’s authority. It is very important to note that EPC dealt with only the political and economic aspects of security. There was an implied exclusion of the military aspects of security. (30)

The momentous changes in the international scenario in 1989 highlighted the inadequacy of the EPC structure. There was now an increasing realization of the need to make the European Community as an independent international actor, instead of acting in a “superpower constellation”. (31) What it actually meant was that the European

Community was now fully aware of the need to adopt positions and take actions independent of the Washington.

When the two Germanies were unified in 1990, member states decided to reform EPC in order to enhance the European Community’s External Relations as well as its role on the international stage. The treaty on European Union set up the European Union which entered into force on November 1, 1993. A three-pillared structure would uphold this

European Union. In this structure Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) was the

‘second pillar’ of the European Union. The Amsterdam Treaty modified some of provisions of the embryonic CFSP. This treaty was signed on October 2, 1997 and it introduced many important changes to bring about an improvement in the European

Union’s external action particularly in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP). (32)

The TEU described the objectives of CFSP in detail. The basic objectives are to strengthen the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the European

Union; to strengthen the Union’s security and that of its member states; to preserve peace all over the world and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act as well as the objectives of the Paris

Charter. Furthermore, CFSP would promote global cooperation and help to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the EU and elsewhere in the world. (33)

Four policy instruments were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty to further these goals.

They are as follows:

 The Principles and guidelines adopted by the European Council would provide

general political direction to CFSP.

 Common strategies again, set down by the European Council would be adopted

when the member states need to protect and promote important interests. The

objectives of a strategy and its duration would be clearly defined. The resources

required would be provided by the Union and its member states.

 Joint actions would be decided upon by the Council in certain situations where

operational actions by the European Union were necessary. The Council may ask

the Commission to table proposals that would help in the effective

implementation of joint actions.  Common positions may be adopted by the Council for clearly starting the

Union’s position on specific international issues. (34)

CFSP would be implemented through actors as well as institutions. These are as follows:

 The European Council: This has in recent decades emerged as a formal

institution. It comprises Heads of State or Government of the member states of

the EU and the President of the European Commission. The European Council

holds regular bi-annual meetings where besides other matters it also defines the

principles and general guidelines of CFSP and adopts common strategies. (35)

 The Council: Ministers from each member state together from the Council. The

Foreign Affairs ministers discuss CFSP matters in the General Affairs Council

which holds monthly meetings. The Council adopts common positions or takes

joint actions with regard to CFSP. The Council supervises authorizes and

concludes negotiations with other countries and entities. To implement Common

Foreign and Security Policy, the Council takes decisions and acts according to

the principles laid down by the European Council. The ambassadors of member

states to Brussels and, their deputies and other officials constitute the Permanent

Representatives Committee (COREPER). The COREPER discusses the agenda

of meetings of the Council about to be held. The Political Committee was given the task of keeping a close watch on the international events. It helps in defining

policies and also supervises the implementation of the policies agreed upon. (36)

 The Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the European Council: This

is held on the basis of rotation by each member state of the EU by turns. The

Presidency changes every six months. It can call an extraordinary meeting of the

Council by giving a 48 hours notice, or if there is an emergency situation even

on a shorter notice. The Presidency implements the decisions taken with regard

to CFSP. It represents the EU in international forums. (37)

 The European Commission: This institution has been fully associated with

CFSP matters, although CFSP is based on cooperation between member states.

Its focus however (until the Lisbon Reform Treaty brought about many changes)

is on “external relations” activities i.e. trade and aid and the various international

agreements that the European Community signs. The Commission does not have

the right of initiative, but its view point on policy has weight. Some years ago, in

view of the Commission’s contribution to CFSP, a new Directorate-General for

External Political Affairs (DGIA) was set up. (38) Later, several new

Directorates-General were created to deal with the Union’s relations with various

regions and organizations.

 The High Representative: This post was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

These gave the CFSP a new actor. The HR was simultaneously the Secretary-

General of the Council of Ministers. The High Representative would assist the

Council in matters relating to CFSP, He/She would help formulate, prepare and

implement policy decisions, and when required, act on behalf of the Council at

the request of the Presidency, by carrying out political dialogue with third

countries. (39) Thus, the Presidency relies on the High Representative in

representing the EU in the international arena. The HR also helps in

implementing EU decisions on CFSP. (40)

 The European Parliament: The EU member states, not liking the intervention

of this directly elected body assigned no role for it in Common Foreign and

Security body. However, the Presidency has to consult the EP on the main

aspects of CFSP. The Council is supposed to ensure that the EP’s views are not

ignored, and that all questions raised in the body regarding CFSP are duly

answered. Moreover, Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and

Defence Policy holds special dialogues after every four months with the

chairman of the Political Committee (who belongs to the member state which is

holding the Council presidency). Some indirect influence on CFSP is exercised

by the Parliament since the latter has much say in budgetary matters. It can ask

questions, sometimes awkward ones on spending on, CFSP, which can impact on

joint actions. (41)

 Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit: The Treaty of Amsterdam

established PPEWU within the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. It keeps a

close watch on and continuously analyses developments in various regions,

particularly volatile ones. As a vigilante, the PPEWU helps to identify the

European Union’s foreign policy and security interests worldwide and also

warns the EU about situations that would require responses under CFSP. This

makes it an important contributor to policy formulation in the Council. The Unit

is comprises personnel drawn from the Council Secretariat, the European

Commission, the now defunct Western European Union (WEU), and from

member states’ bodies, and works under the supervision of the High

Representative. (42)

The Treaty of Nice of February 2001 introduced some new provisions with regard to

CFSP. These are as follows:

 The Political and Security Committee (PSC) replaced the Political

Committee. The Council was empowered to grant the PSC operative

decision-making powers with regard to crisis - management operations

(Article 25 TEU).

 EU Special Representatives representing the EU in hot spots around the

world can be appointed with a qualified majority (Article 23(2) and

Article18 (54) TEU).

 References to the WEU and its role in CFSP were removed for the EU was

now developing its own Security and Defence policy; defence policy now became an EU policy field in its own right (Article17 TEU). However,

the close linkage with NATO was highlighted in Security and defence

matters.

 Enhanced cooperation, that is cooperation between some willing member

states to push ahead with certain CFSP-related actions, was also made

possible in some circumstances. (Article 27a TEU). Military or defence

policy questions were however excluded (Article 27b TEU). (43)

Further major changes were introduced in the realm of CFSP through the Lisbon Reform

Treaty. It came into force in December 2009 after ratification by all EU member states.

The treaty terminated the pillar system of the EU. It extended the qualified majority voting to more areas and also increased the European Parliament’s powers through co- decision with the Council in further areas. The offices of the High Representative for

CFSP and the External Affairs Commissioner were amalgamated to create the post of

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The treaty also established a new European External Action Service (EEAS) placed under the authority of the new High Representative. (44)

Decision making

The decisions on CFSP are taken by member-states unanimously. The Treaty of

Amsterdam however, introduced the constructive abstention clause which gave the choice to a member state to abstain from voting on a specific issue in the Council. This allowed willing member states to take decisions on certain joint actions in CFSP, without a veto from the unwilling states. The state that abstains from vote may not participate in the implementation of the decision, yet undertook not to disrupt any action that has been agreed upon by the others. The abstaining state however has to bear any costs arising from the decision, excluding situations where 'operations having military or defence implications’. Thus, because of the constructive abstention clause, member states unwilling to take part in an action do not have to resort to the use of veto. (45)

The use of qualified-majority voting (QMV) on issues relating to policy implementation was formalized by the Amsterdam Treaty. After the European Council adopts a common strategy, the Council goes on to adopt common positions or joint actions in accordance with the strategy. QMV is used to implement this decision. Qualified majority voting can also be used for adopting decisions implementing other common positions or joint actions. If a member state objects to the use of qualified-majority voting owing to

‘important and stated reasons of national policy’, it can request for a referral of the matter to the European Council, which then takes a decision by unanimity. (46) The Lisbon

Treaty introduced another exception to unanimous decision making on CFSP. Member states can now adopt a decision through QMV on proposals presented by the HR. (47)

A Common Security Policy

The Western European Union (WEU) was an independent European defence and security related institution. The WEU was established in 1954 in the post Second World War milieu. Some West European countries, which were afraid of the defeated Germany’s resurgence and an expansionist Soviet Union had come together first, to form the

Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) in 1948 and later the BTO was transformed into the

Western European Union (WEU), in which Germany and Italy were included, for it was felt that inclusion of these countries in western institutions would make them responsible members of the international community. The WEU was characterized by the Treaty on

European Union (TEU) as “an integral part of the development of the Union”. The 1997

Treaty of Amsterdam accorded even more importance to the organization in the contexts of the CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In the revised text of

Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the WEU would render support to the Union ‘in framing the defence aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. The Union, on its part would make full efforts to foster closer institutional links with the WEU. The EU was seriously considering the possibility of incorporating the WEU into the Union. The final decision would rest with the council. (48) The article also called attention to the fact that some member states had special responsibilities, as members of NATO, and this would be taken into due consideration. Under the Amsterdam Treaty whenever, the

Union decided to make use of the WEU for implementing decisions of the Union, all member countries, irrespective of whether they were WEU members or not could participate on an equal position in planning and decision-making in the WEU. (49)

At the Cologne European Council meeting (June 1999) and the Helsinki European

Council meeting (December 1999), the EU heads of state and government discussed how to further develop CFSP, particularly in the areas of security and defence. At the Helsinki summit the mood was very upbeat, for the leaders expressed the conviction that by voluntarily cooperating in EU-led operations, member states would, by the year 2003, be able to deploy around 50,000-60,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain the deployment for at least a year to carry out the Petersburg tasks. The tasks it was decided would be incorporated in the TEU. The decision was taken by heads of state and government at a summit in Amsterdam in 1997. The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the tasks in the TEU. The Petersburg tasks were first formulated by the WEU in

1992.These includes humanitarians and rescue tasks, crisis management and peace keeping operations. (50)

The Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 has reiterated that the EU’s Common Security and Defence

Policy is an integral part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has now been named the “Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP)” and if the time is considered right it could lead to common defence if the European Council decides upon it consensually (Article 42 of the Treaty on

European Union). It is the council which takes decisions relating to CSDP, but on the basis of unanimity.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has been given the responsibility by the Treaty of Lisbon of implementing the Union’s Common

Security and Defence Policy. He/She is also supposed to coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the “Petersberg tasks” (Article 43 TEU). Member countries may carry out such missions under the framework of a “permanent structured cooperation”. The Treaty of Lisbon consolidates member states’ obligation of solidarity on security and defence matters. It includes:

 a “common defence clause” which places the obligation upon member states to

assist a fellow member which becomes a victim of armed aggression.

 a “solidarity clause” (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU) which permits the mobilization of all civilian and

military resources for assisting a member country which has been struck by

terrorists or a natural or man-made disaster.

The Lisbon Treaty has also given a formal status to the European Defence Agency which was formed in July 2004 through a joint Council action. This Agency has been given the following responsibilities:

 to enhance the defence capabilities of the Union in the area of crisis

management;

 to strengthen the Union’s technologies capacities in armaments manufacturing;

 To promote cooperation among the EU’s countries in matters related to

armaments.

The Lisbon Treaty led to the dissolution of the Western European Union in 2010 for after the introduction of the solidarity clause and the introduction of the more broad-based

CSDP, the WEU was perceived as redundant. All the residual activities of the WEU were wound up or transferred to the EU by June 2011. (51) Despite the progressive development of CFSP and ESDP related developments and borrowing of assets and mechanisms from other western institutions such as WEU and

NATO, the EU’s performance in the area of foreign and security policy is to date unsatisfactory. (52) It is to be noted that the member states acknowledge that they can attain greater power and influence in international politics acting in unison rather than individually. (53) Each EU member has its own historical and cultural traditions and their respective national interests which hinders the adoption of a single ‘European foreign and security policy’. The EU has been quite successful in handling political support and economic assistance for the newly freed states of Central and Eastern Europe. In comparison, it has not been able to give a coherent and united response to crucial

European and international issues, such as the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean islands, Yugoslav conflict that broke out in the nineties and more recently regarding the US -led attack on Iraq. (54)

European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003

The European Security Strategy highlighted the following new threats to Europe:

 Terrorism

 The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

 Regional conflicts around the world

 States in the world which have failed or failing

 Organized crime that is operating through international networks

In 2008, a report was presented on implementation of ESS. It also drew the EU’s attention to three more threats:

 Cyber crimes, which had transformed into an economic, political and military

weapon;

 The dependence of Europe on energy imports, which could be disrupted owing to

any crisis;

 Climate change across the globe which can have the effect of multiplying other

security threats

Countering the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction is an important objective, of the

EU, as stated in the ESS. It is supported by an action plan. The production and spread of

WMD is a global concern. The prevention, halt and where necessary elimination is widely considered necessary in post 9/11 scenario. However, the EU has promised that when it takes any such action, it will ensure that human rights are respected. (55)

The First Post-Cold War Crisis (1990-91)

Kuwait is a tiny country with an area of 6880 square miles (17,818 sq. km). It is bounded on the south by Saudi Arabia and on the north and west by Iraq. No demarcation had been done of the 130-km border between Kuwait and Iraq by the colonial powers. Two main islands, Bubiyan and Warbah belonging to Kuwait, face Iraq's coast line and Umm al Qasr, an Iraqi port. Bubiyan’s distance from Kuwait’s mainland is around 1.6 km, while from Iraq it is 8 km. Warbah is situated about 3.2 km from the Kuwaiti mainland and 1m from Iraq. These islands have a bearing on the security of Iraqi oil – loading facilities in the Gulf. (56)

Present-day Kuwait had its origins around 1716. Kuwait first appeared in a map produced by the Danish traveller Niebuhr in 1765. In earlier European documents the name ‘Grane’ had been used in trade with the region. The small trading town of Kuwait was built by

Sheikh Barrak Iban Ghurair Al-Hamid who was leader of the Bani Khalid tribe and ruled

Eastern Arabia in the 17th century. As Kuwait began to more towards independence, its original boundaries expanded and Jahra village where the waters wells were better than those in Kuwait town was included. Kuwait had an ideal location, with its shores washed by the Persian Gulf and being part of the desert caravan trade routes. Kuwaiti merchants were therefore actively participating in transporting goods from Kuwait to neighbouring countries in the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean region. Kuwait began to grow in the eighteenth century. (57)

Since there was no strong centralized rule in Eastern Arabia, the ruling Sheikh Al-Sabah became the first independent Emir of Kuwait. By the close of the nineteenth century, a great part of the Arabian Peninsula was divided and administered by rulers who flouted the authority of the Ottoman sultans with impunity. Britain always on the lookout for promoting its political and economic interests took advantage of the situation. It signed treaties of friendship with these Emirs. (58)

Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous ‘Kaza’ of the Ottoman Empire by the

Convention signed by the Great Britain and Turkey on July 29, 1913. This document demarcated Kuwait’s territorial boundaries and the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak, was conceded autonomy. The latter slowly managed to move towards an independent status, and freed himself from pressures from the Ottoman Sultanate. When the First

World War broke out, Mubarak formally severed all connections with the Ottoman

Empire. (59)

Grateful to the British, Kuwait maintained close relations with it. Also, the country was not in any direct or indirect manner under the influence of the regional powers, such as the Ottomans, Persia or the Wahabis of Arabia. However, this minuscule state needed economic and military power to defend itself against any potential aggressor, and retained its independence and sovereignty. (60)

When Britain began fighting the Ottomans, Kuwait stuck to the agreement signed with the British by Sheikh Mubarak in 1899 and supported the British against the Ottomans.

After Mubarak’s demise in 1915, Jabir took over the reins of powers in Kuwait, followed by Salim in 1917. Jabir and Salim did not abandon their predecessor’s policy and continued the alliance with Britain. However, Kuwait did not give up trading with Syria and Turkey, which meant that the British blockade of the Ottoman Empire was disregarded. Salim sympathized with the Ottomans. This made the British furious and they threatened to break the 1899 agreement, which would leave Kuwait vulnerable to foreign attack. Salim, however, expressed his determination to defend the Kingdom against any aggression. At this point in time, Abd-al-Aziz, the ruler of Najd and al-Hasa, rejected the 1913 demarcation of boundaries between Kuwait and his territories. Tension between the two sides escalated when Kuwait was attacked by Ikhwan, backed by Abd- al- Aziz. (61)

While this crisis was continuing Great Britain anointed Faisal, son of King Hussain of

Hijaz, as the King of Iraq. Under the Mandatory system of the League of Nations, Britain had been allotted Iraq in 1918. The dominions of the defeated Ottomans had been given to the victorious European powers to administer under the mandatory system. Kuwait in the 1899 agreement between the British and Mubarak had already given full authority to the British to conduct its foreign affairs. Abd-al-Aziz received considerable financial aid from Great Britain for he had allied himself with the latter against the Ottomans. The

British now convened a meeting in Uqair to resolve the border dispute between Kuwait and Najd. (62)

The Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1913 had demarcated the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and

Najd. By this agreement, Kuwait’s borders in the south had been extended to include

Jabal Munifa, about 160 miles south of its present-day boundaries with Saudi Arabia.

This agreement has been signed when Sheikh Mubarak-al-Sabah, was the ruler of

Kuwait. At that time, he was the most powerful ruler in the Arabian Peninsula.

Circumstances had completely changed when the conference was convened in 1922 in Uqair by Sir Percy Cox, attended besides the British, by Iraq, Kuwait and Najd. This meeting was actually in continuation of an earlier moot held in May 1922 at Muhammara

(Khoram-Shahr) on Persia’s southern border with Iraq. The objective was to come to an agreement on the borders between Najd and Iraq. Signed in May 1922, the Al-

Muhammara agreement delineated the Iraq–Najdi borders, incorporating the 1913 agreement on the Kuwait-Najd border. Initially Abd-al-Aziz accepted the Muhammara accord, but later he arrived at the conclusion that the terms of the agreement would go against his interests. In his view Iraq, had been given territory that had never belonged to it. Aziz also wanted that Kuwait’s southern borders with al-Hasa should be further modified. (63) He thus backed out of the Muhammara accord. Sir Percy Cox had then invited Iraq, Kuwait and Najd to a meeting in al-Uqair. The main objective of the conference was to once and for all settle the Iraq-Najd boundary. When talks dragged on without making any real progress, Cox at the plenary meeting of the conference drew a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Jabal Anaisan, on the map of Arabia, close to the border with TransJordan. A large part of the territory claimed by Najd was allotted to

Iraq. As compensation for Najd, Kuwait was divested of nearly two-thirds of its territory which was given to Najd. Thus, Cox jettisoned the previous Anglo-Turkish Agreement which had defined the borders of Kuwait. On Kuwait proper’s south and west he marked two zones which would be neutral and named as the Kuwait Neutral Zone and the Iraq

Neutral Zone. (64)

The Iraq-Najd protocol was signed on December 2, 1922. The exact extent of the Iraq

Neutral Zone was clearly drawn by this protocol. It allowed the free movement of Arab Bedouin tribes across the frontier, and allocated the water wells near the border, to be used by both countries. The arrangement announced at the al-Uqair conference, were beneficial for Iraq and compensatory for Abd-al-Aziz. Kuwait, however, had to surrender two – thirds of its southern territories (extending 160 miles beyond its present borders).

On Kuwait’s borders with Iraq the status quo was maintained. (65)

The choice of rejection was not given to Shaikh Ahmad al Jaber of Kuwait. He was forced to sign this unfair and unjust agreement. In April 1923 the British government informed him that it had recognized the Iraq–Kuwait frontiers as claimed by him in his letter in the same month to the Maj.-Gen. Sir Percy Cox, then British high commissioner for Iraq. This included the islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan, Auha, Failaka, Qaru,

Kubbar, Qaru, Naqta, and Umm al Maradim, and the tiny islands near them. This was exactly the same as the frontier delineated by the July 29, 1913 Anglo-Turkish

Agreement’s Green Line. (66)

Shortly after its Iraq gained independence in 1932, it sought membership of the League of Nations. The most important prerequisite for a state to become a member of the world body was a stable government and a properly demarcated boundary. After correspondence with Kuwait in 1932, Iraq confirmed its border with Kuwait. (67)

Iraq now developed an ambition to dominate Kuwait, and became more assertive after the

British withdrew from Kuwait on June 19, 1961. Britain announced the termination of the

1899 agreement with the then Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak. Iraq’s Baathist revolutionary regime of Abdul Karim Qassem was quick to react to this British announcement and Baghdad now laid claim to Kuwait. The Sheikhdom according to the

Iraqi regime was an ‘integral part’ of Iraq. Kuwait quickly mobilized its small army to its northern border with Iraq and asked Britain and Saudi Arabia for military assistance. The two countries also responded promptly and sent troops to Kuwait. In another move to enhance its security, Kuwait applied for membership in the UN and the Arab League. By seeking membership of these international organizations Kuwait wanted affirmation of the international recognition of its independence and sovereignty. (68)

Under pressure from the Arab world and the international community Iraq recognized the independence and sovereignty of Kuwait in 1963 and accepted the agreement of 1932 which defined the boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait. An agreement on borders came into force on October 4, 1963. (69)

Kuwait became embroiled in the Iraq – Iran dispute over the Shatt al Arab during the seventies. Iraq was keen to find a method for loading large oil tankers without their being exposed to attack by Iran. It relied on a route that made its ports vulnerable to artillery attacks from Iran. Iraq therefore looked for a less vulnerable location, and this was lacking in its own territory as well as territorial waters. Iraq has a small 38 miles wide coastline, and the only port at a comparatively safe distance from the Iranian shore was near the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, both part of Kuwaiti territory. (70)

Iraq therefore began to develop its port and naval facilities at Umm al Qasar, and pressured Kuwait for access to its waters and territory in order to build an offshore oil- loading amenity. For this purpose pipelines had to cross the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan.

Fearing that Iraq would attempt to permanently occupy the islands, Kuwait did not give in to this demand. In response Iraq sent its troops into northern Kuwait on March 20,

1973, occupying the island of Bubiyan and the land around the Kuwaiti border post at

Samita. This led to the closure of the border between Kuwait and Iraq. After this period of tensions, relations steadily improved after 1975, and Iraq formally renounced its claim over Kuwait’s territory. (71) The political situation in the region radically changed with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-79 which led to the ouster of the pro-American regime of the Shah of Iran.

The Iraqi regime now once again put forward its claim in July 1990. It alleged that

Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had begun ‘an economic war’ against Iraq. (72) A meeting of the OPEC ministerial Council was convened in Geneva which thoroughly debated the matter and it appeared that the issue was resolved. Kuwait had given in to many of Iraq’s demands. In July 1990 negotiations were held in Saudi Arabia between

Iraq and Kuwait. Among the issues discussed were territorial dispute, the pricing of oil and the debt Iraq owed to Kuwait. The talks ended in failure on August 1, and Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait the next day. Baghdad set up a so-called Provisional Free

Government in Kuwait which was short lived. When there was wide spread condemnation of this Iraqi action, the Saddam regime came out with the excuse that it had invaded Kuwait because local insurgents had overthrown the Kuwaiti Government and invited Iraq to step in. Saddam Hussein had no evidence to support his claim. It is likely that this invasion motivated by the financial problems faced by Iraq in the aftermath of the prolonged Iran-Iraq war. Strategic interests also played an important role. (73)

The Saddam regime made an effort to justify the invasion by invoking old documents regarding the Kuwaiti rulers’ acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the territorial arrangements made by the Ottoman Empire. Iraq’s claim was that Kuwait had been made part of the Ottoman province of Basra (a part of present-day Iraq). (74)

However, there was documentary evidence which belied this argument. For any link with the Ottomans had been severed when Kuwait by the agreement of 1899 accepted the status of a British Protectorate. The Republic of Turkey, which was the successor to the

Ottoman Empire, also endorsed this arrangement in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).Thus

Baghdad’s claim which was based on the connection between Basra and Kuwait lacked any legality. Before Iraq became fully independent in 1932, Baghdad formally reaffirmed its acceptance of the existing borders with Kuwait which had been delineated under

British supervision. (75)

The US Role in the Gulf War 1990-91

During the Cold War, American national security strategy was spurred by enmity and competition with the Soviet Union and the specter of a world war and a nuclear show down. The Cold War lasted for more than four decades, with brief periods of détente. The

US could often predict Soviet behavior. Nevertheless, the US and its allies had drawn up appropriate strategies to curb Soviet ambitions around the globe. The two rival camps closely observed occurrences in all regions, for these could have a bearing on their respective positions in the world. No development could be ignored. The Gulf region was of great importance to Washington and its allies owing to the west's dependence on the region’s energy resources. (76)

With the demise of Cold War, certain regions that were previously considered important, have lost some of their importance for the US, but the Gulf is still very important for it.

Several reasons can be cited in this regard: First, the Gulf's significance can be measured in relative terms. Soon after the Soviet threat ended, the US propounded a regional, not a global, national defence strategy. (77) Washington restructured its forces to deal with two major regional conflicts at the same time. The United States have particularly focused on building its defences in West Europe, during the cold war, but it now began to pay attention to two major extra-regional fronts: the Gulf and the Korean peninsula. This alteration in strategy was begun during the administration of Bush Sr. and further developed by the Clinton administration. (78)

Second, the Gulf oil’s importance for the world was increasing over the years. The vulnerability of the supply lanes had also increased over the years. In 1973 when the

Arabs decided to use oil as a weapon against the countries supporting Israel, the Gulf region was providing around 40% of the non-communist world’s oil supplies. The Gulf at that time was said to have 60% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil. The embargo imposed by the Arab oil exporters on exports to oil to certain countries and the sharp rise in oil prices this withholding of oil caused inflicted quite a significant economic trauma on the US, west Europe and the international economy. However, the apprehension of losing access to oil from the Gulf at any time in future and the steep increase in the price of Gulf oil forced the West to rethink its energy policy and to cut down its dependence on it. The Gulf's share in the west’s oil supplies fell to 20% in 1985. This reduction in the

Gulf’s share and other steps, like the accumulation of a strategic petroleum reserve, weakened the potential economic damage to the US and other oil consumers in the industrialized world. They had now found ways to shield themselves from future disruptions in the supply of Gulf oil. (79)

However, some time later there was again a change in trend in the oil market. The dependence on Gulf oil which had become so apparent in the seventies cropped again.

Oil prices however, lessened and the lower prices led to an increase in production in the

Gulf which were owing to decreased production costs and increased capacity of production. Lower prices oil is favourable for the economies of the US and other oil– importing countries for it help lower inflation and leads to economic growth. On the other hand, a drop in prices also resulted in an increase in world-wide consumption of petroleum and therefore greater dependence on the Gulf. (80)

Third, over the passage of times the Gulf’s impact on stability and security in other regions with strategic importance had increased and there was a likelihood that it would increase even further. An unstable conflict-ridden Gulf can have a destabilizing influence on the rest of Middle East and the Maghreb. It is said that the Islamist movement in the

Arab world has received moral and material support from the Gulf. (81) Moreover, after the end of the cold war, Iraq and Iran had emerged as the region’s top military powers and there were apprehensions in Washington that these two powers could pose a direct challenge to US interests in this region. (82) Israel a close ally of the US was seen as being particularly vulnerable to pressure from these powers. Thus, the US played a crucial role during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis to safeguard its own interests. (83)

Saddam Hussain the Iraqi dictator obliged Washington by falling into what is now perceived by some as a trap especially prepared by the US, to encourage him in indiscreet actions. In a speech on April 2, 1990, Saddam threatened that he would not hesitate to use new chemical weapons that had been perfected by Iraqi scientists, against those countries which were threatening to use atomic weapons against Iraq. US President Bush Sr. forcefully condemned the statement and demanded that Saddam immediately retract its threat and pledge not to use chemical weapons. Such threats, said the American

President, would have an adverse impact upon Iraq as well as the Middle East's security.

(84) Here it must be recalled that in 1981 Israel had already destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor in Osirak. Thus, Iraq’s nuclear ambition had already been nipped in the bud.

Earlier, in February 1990, US Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly during a visit to

Iraq had stated that Washington wanted to enhance its relations with Iraq. (85)

After the Arab League meeting in Baghdad, it appeared that war in the Gulf region had become inevitable. The US government however, was apparently unmoved by the danger and continued to exude positive signals despite Saddam’s bullying. The CIA had warned the White House in early June, of the increasing possibility of a war in the Gulf. The

White House was apparently knowingly looking the other way. (86)

In July 1990, Tareq Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Iraq participated in the Arab League meeting in Tunis where he presented the memorandum alleging that Kuwait had started economic warfare against Iraq. (87)

This memorandum raised fears about an imminent war in the Gulf. Saddam Hussain’s speech in Baghdad, confirmed these fears. Soon after, Iraqi troops began marching towards the Kuwaiti border. (88)

It is a strange fact that despite the undoubted imminence of war, Washington issued no warning to Saddam Hussain to refrain from attacking Kuwait a sovereign country. It is said that the messages from Washington at this juncture made Saddam confident that the

United States would not respond to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is noteworthy that it was just the opposite when in 1994 Saddam Hussain once again moved troops to the

Kuwaiti border the then American President Bill Clinton did not lose any time in warning

Saddam against crossing the border. Ships and troops were immediately sent to region; demonstrate the Washington’s determination resolve to launch an air attack on Iraq if

Kuwait’s sovereignty and integrity was challenged. In this scenario troop movement was quickly halted by Iraq and Kuwait was safe. The US reaction in contrast was very mysterious when Iraq, in no uncertain terms declared its intention to attack Kuwait in

1990. (89) In fact the US ambassador to Iraq, April Gilaspie met Saddam Hussain and in what appears a deliberate move, misguided him by indicating that Washington would remain neutral on the Iraq-Kuwait border issue. (90) Also American Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, John Kelly stated a House Foreign

Affairs subcommittee that no mutual security agreements had been signed between the

United States and Kuwait, or the other Gulf states. (91) Saddam Hussain felt reassured by these statements that if he attacked Kuwait, there would be no American intervention in favour of Kuwait. (92) On August 2, 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait.

Baghdad was completely taken a back by the stern American reaction to its misadventure.

President Bush in his address to the nation on August 8, 1990, presented four policy aims for resolving the crisis. Firstly, he demanded that Iraq withdrew all its troops from

Kuwait immediately, unconditionally and completely. Secondly, the legitimate government of Kuwait would have to be restored at the earliest. Thirdly, Bush stated in very clear terms that the stability and security of the Gulf region was essential for the protection of US interests. Fourthly, Bush expressed his deep concern about the lives and safety of those American nationals who were living in the Middle East particularly Iraq and Kuwait. The US would make every effort to protect them. (93)

To evict Iraq from Kuwait the US applied diplomatic pressure through UN resolutions and by gathering a broad coalition. The American role in the UN was an important part of its international strategy. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 was the first resolution passed with regard to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. (94) It called for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait unconditionally. Just before the adoption of this resolution

President Bush Sr. declared that Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States would be frozen. He also banned all American transactions with Iraq including trade, air and sea travel to Iraqi ports was disallowed. (95) In August, under UN resolution 661 international economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq. (96)

The US focused all efforts on forming the anti-Iraq coalition and mustering support for more UN resolutions on Iraq. (97) In August 1990, the US Secretary of State and the

Soviet Foreign Minister met in Moscow where they jointly condemned the invasion and called upon the international community to stop all arms deliveries to Iraq. (98) American

President George Bush Sr. and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met in Helsinki, on

September 9, and a together demanded that Saddam Hussain withdrew his troops from

Kuwait. They warned that other steps would be adopted to force Iraq to withdraw from

Kuwait if the measures already announced did not have the desired effect. (99)

This unified Soviet-US approached was surprising for the Soviet Union had close relations with Iraq. However, at this point in time, Moscow had recently lost the leadership of the communist bloc in Europe; it had withdrawn its forces from

Afghanistan, having failed to keep a hold on the country; also the political situation in the

Soviet Union itself showed signs of turbulence. It was therefore in a vulnerable state.

Using the Baghdad card, Gorbachev wanted to please the US, now the sole superpower.

It badly needed western technology and economic favours to make the transition from communism to capitalism, and it also required US political support to become part of the global economy, dominated by the west. On its part, the US wanted the support of its former rival in the United Nations Security Council, where it had the right of veto. The

Soviet Union could have made the situation difficult for the US if it along with France and China had pushed for a resolution reaching for a compromise with the delinquent

Iraq. Such a situation would certainly have harmed US interest. (100)

Initially China had refused to support UN sanctions against Iraq; but then Bush sent messages through the State Department and National Security Advisor Scowcroft, requesting Beijing’s support for the US stand on Iraq. As quid pro quo, Washington offered to restrain its criticism of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and to provide the support to the Chinese government to rehabilitate itself in the international community after the Tiananmen incident. Bush had served as US Ambassador to China and had good personal contacts with important Chinese government officials. China was now quite willing to support the UN resolution of August 6. On later UN resolutions on the Gulf crisis, Beijing either supported or abstained from voting. (101)

It is apparent that the US successfully used diplomacy to induce China and the Soviet

Union quietly to acquiesce to the US-led coalition’s attack on Iraq. Moscow and Beijing also agreed to stop arms sales to Iraq, and also participated in the UN economic sanctions against Iraq. On the twelve UN resolutions on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the two either gave their assent or abstained from voting. If these two important countries had adopted a different stand, the course of the Gulf crisis would without any doubt, have been quit different. (102)

Bush also persuaded major countries in the Middle East particularly Syria, Egypt, and

Jordan to provide cover to Saudi Arabia’s decision to allow the stationing of western forces in the sacred soil of the country, to ease the coalition’s Operation Desert Shield.

(103)

President Bush used a two pronged strategy to convince King Fahad of the absolute necessity of the deployment of American forces in Saudi Arabia and Washington’s commitment to maintain a military presence there until the resolution of the crisis. As request of Bush the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar first met with Scowcroft at the

White House. Bandar expressed his apprehension over the withdrawal of troops from the

Middle East in the past (particularly after the bombing by terrorists of the American

Marine Barracks in Beirut, in October 1983) Scowcroft gave the Saudi Prince the firm assurance that there would not be a repeat performance this time. This was followed by a visit to Jeddah by a senior American administration team which gave assurance to Saudi top officials that there would be no withdrawal from the Middle East before a settlement is reached. Bush also talked to Fahad on phone to reassure him in this regard. (104) This

American diplomatic offensive proved very effective and Saudi Arabia allowed the stationing of American and other western forces in Saudi Arabia. American forces now have a permanent presence on the Holy soil.

The US and Saudi Arabia worked jointly to first secure and then maintain Syria’s participation in the affair. Syria was on the American list of countries that were accused of being sponsors of terrorism. Also, it was an avowed and active enemy of Israel.

Syria’s anti west credentials could not be doubted. The coalition and its operation gained legitimacy in Arab eyes with Syria’s acquiescence. (105) The commitment of the forces of many Arab countries to defend Saudi Arabia completely isolated the Iraqi government.

(106)

The only support for Saddam Hussain came from the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) and the stateless Palestinians, who later paid a heavy price for this indiscretion.

The most authentic endorsement of the coalition’s intervention came with the hastily called Arab League summit condemned Iraq, supported the steps taken by Saudi Arabia for self-defence, and decided to send troops to support the Saudi effort. The very next day the first contingent of Egyptian troops landed in Saudi Arabia. Soon these were joined by troops from Morocco Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Syria. Thus, the Arab world was well- represented in the coalition. (107)

It was important to take on board the two non-Arab countries of the Middle East Turkey and Iran, especially with regard to the sanctions imposed on Iraq. The sanctions would have been ineffective if these northern and eastern neighbours opened their borders for

Iraq oil. Since Iran and Iraq had waged a war for eight years and no peace treaty had yet been concluded (there was only a cease-fire) official cooperation between them was ruled out. However, an important Iraqi pipeline located in Turkey which exported oil to Europe was working. Turkey was seen as a crucial ally for the US. (108) Thus, in this connection, President Bush consulted Turkish President Turgut Ozal who informed Bush about his readiness to shut down its pipeline. (109)

Other allies of the US, including Japan also played an important role in the anti Iraq coalition. Around fifteen of the thirty five core states in the coalition were allies of the

US. All NATO states, excluding Iceland and Luxembourg contributed armed forces to the coalition. These forces were dispatched either to defend Saudi Arabia or to help liberate Kuwait. Australia and New Zealand also sent their troops. The Japanese constitution which forbids the country sending combat units abroad was the biggest non

Middle Eastern contributor of funds meets the cost of the military operations. (110) The constitution of Germany also ruled out the deployment of its military forces outside the

NATO area, therefore it too gave $ 2 billion to the coalition for this operation. (111)

The formation of this broad coalition was counted as a great success of the Bush administration. It served to enhance the political legitimacy of the coalition, provided the military forces, and helped meet the costs of the operation to liberate Kuwait as well as efforts to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. (112)

The American leadership played an important role in cobbling this coalition together and also keeping it in tact. In all likelihood in the absence of the American initiative, there would not have been this broad-based coalition and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would not have been vacated. (113)

The personal diplomacy of President Bush Sr. also played a very vital role in creating and maintaining the coalition. Bush, even before he became President had cultivated good relations with various Heads of State and senior leaders around the world, and this came in useful during Operation Desert Shield. The personal calls made to several Head of

State and government requesting support for the anti-Iraq coalition was very effective.

Also of importance were the foreign trips by many senior American administration officials to garner support for the anti Iraq coalition. Bush made three foreign trips in late

1990 for mustering support for the operation. He went to Helsinki in September, where he met with Soviet leader Gorbachev. In November he went to Europe and the Middle

East, while in December to Latin America. Secretary of Defense Cheney visited the

Middle East to discuss military issues, while Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady was sent to wealthy countries such as Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the Gulf

States for collecting funds for Coalition. Nurturing relations with foreign diplomats in

Washington was also very helpful. For instance, from the very beginning of the crisis

Saudi Ambassador Bandar was kept informed of the intentions of Washington. Bush called the ambassadors of twenty-eight most important coalition countries on December

21, for a meeting to discuss Coalition plans. (114)

Though there appeared to be a consensus in the international community on the Iraq-

Kuwait crisis, there were some significant differences between the US, the Europeans and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and some European states proposed that the troops from various countries dispatched to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf should be placed under the command of the United Nations, especially if military action were to begin. (115)

Just a few days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US and the UK, without a specific

UN mandate had begun to deploy their naval forces in the Gulf. President Bush Sr. had already announced on August 8 that in response to request made by Saudi Arabia King

Fahad and the exiled ruler of Kuwait, he had decided to send American air and ground forces to Saudi Arabia. This was being done under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which acknowledges the inherent right of member-states to individual and collective defence if there is an armed attack against a member state of the United Nations. This is applicable until the Security Council decides upon measures for safeguarding international peace and security. The US and Britain claimed that Article 51 conferred on them the right to defend Saudi Arabia and also to launch military action against Iraq, which had attacked a sovereign country. (116) The United States had deployed about 230,000 troops in the

Gulf region, accompanied by formidable naval and air power by early November. (117)

It was quite apparent that this was not a defensive measure but a plan for freeing Kuwait from Iraq clutches. (118)

On November 12, American Senators, Richard Lugar and Robert Dole, called on

President Bush to summon a session of the Congress to debate the Gulf crisis and to define lucidly the American goals in the crisis. The intended American action needed the seal of congressional approval. The US Presidential spokesman however, rejected calls to convene the Congress. The next day the president met with congressional leaders and discussed with them ways and means to handle the Gulf crisis. He told the lawmakers that US troops had been sent to the Gulf for defensive purposes and to reinforce sanctions against Iraq. He said that there was no need to convene an emergency session of

Congress for a debate on the crisis. (119)

Washington began to exert pressure on the UN to adopt another resolution against Iraq.

The UN Security Council under immense pressure from Washington passed Resolution

678 on November 29, 1990 which demanded that the Iraqi government promptly and fully comply with resolution 660 (1990), that had called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait as well as all the relevant resolutions that came afterwards. The

Security Council resolution also permitted its member states to extend full cooperation to the Government of Kuwait and authorized them to use "all necessary means" to push Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline. The phrase “all necessary means” was what the US had wanted to intervene in the region. (120) All its subsequent actions drew legitimacy from this phrase.

Before the UN body passed resolution 678 the US, had dexterously used the carrot and stick diplomacy. Washington’s actions with regard to China, the Soviet Union and Jordan are good examples. In the case of China, a few days before voting was to take place in the

Security Council, the US invited Chinese government to send a trade delegation to

Washington for enhancing mutual trade relations. This induced China to abstain on the resolution, and a Chinese trade delegation did visit the US. With regard to the Soviet

Union to please the latter, the US refused to support the three Baltic Republics’ request to attend the 1990 CSCE meeting and also cancelled the Assistant Secretary of the treasury’s visit to Lithuania. In Jordan’s case, Bush, in August sent the Deputy National

Security Adviser to Jordan to convey a warning to King Hussein that if Amman did not condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US would slow down economic assistance to

Jordan.(121)

To show to the world that the US still had hopes of finding a peaceful solution of the crises and that the Coalition did not want to unnecessarily use force, President Bush also presented a peace plan for the Gulf. He announced that Secretary of State James Baker

would be sent to Iraq and the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz had been invited to

Washington DC. Neither of these visits actually materialized. (122)

 The Baltic States had declared their independence from the USSR in 1990.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussain requested that he wanted to hold a meeting with James

Baker on January 12, 1991. This proposal was outrightly rejected. The excuse put forth was that it was too close to the deadline of January 15, set for Iraq’s withdrawal from

Kuwait. (123) Washington’s refusal to hold a meeting with the Iraqi leader clearly indicated that the US was not really serious about avoiding war. (124) However, one meeting was held between the Iraqi foreign minister and the US Secretary of State on

January 9, 1991, in Geneva. (125) This six hour meeting did not have a positive outcome.

James Baker blamed this failure on the lack of ‘any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever’. He warned that if Iraq did not immediately vacate its occupation of Kuwait, a military showdown was sure to take place and Iraq would be the loser. There would be devastating consequences of this war for Iraq. (126)

Stubbornly, the Iraqi foreign minister stuck to the position that there was a linkage between the withdrawal from Kuwait and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Tareq

Aziz bragged that Iraq was ready to take on the coalition and added that his forces would attack Israel in retaliation for being it attacked. (127)

While apparent attempts were bring made to find a peaceful solution of the crisis,

President Bush sought the Congress’ support for the UN call for the use of all necessary means to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Bush told Congress that its endorsement would send an unmistakable signal to the Iraqi dictator that he must withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally. This would also serve the purpose of sending the message to Iraqi leaders that the US institutions were united and would act decisively.

(128) The US Congress did authorize military intervention in the Gulf region on January

12. (129)

Iraq and its leader were quite close to the Soviet Union, had several times spoken out against the Israel-Egypt peace accord and were also supporting many Palestinian militant groups against Israel. In 1979, it had been put on the US list of State Sponsors of

Terrorism. But when Iraq was nearly dented by Iran, the US which until then had officially maintained neutrality began providing support to the Iraqi regime. The US also began cultivating diplomatic relations with Iraq when it expelled Abu Nidal from its soil.

Iraq was struck off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The American support to Iraq, forced Iran to sign a cease-fire agreement with Iraq. At that time Iraq had become bankrupt and had requested Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to waive the debt lent to it for waging war against Iran. Iraq had also demanded a stop in the reduction oil prices that was having a catastrophic impact on the Iraqi economy. (130)

Saddam reminded the Saudis that he had done a favour to them by engaging Iran in an exhausting war. The Saudis had been very uneasy about the influence of Iranian revolution on its own Shiite minority. Therefore, Saddam was angered when asked to return the loans. However, when both countries refused to write off the loans and stop the reduction of oil prices he opted to attack Kuwait. (131)

Thus, the US played upon the fears of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Iraq, about whom hype about its military strength was prevalent. (132) The formation of a coalition in which the

Muslims world was well represented was meant to convey to the world that the Muslim world supported the US in its action against Iraq. The UN forum was also skillfully used to exert pressure on Iraq.

The coalition force comprised thirty four countries. The biggest and most formidable military force in the coalition was from the US, while Saudi Arabia, the UK, and Egypt made a leading contribution in the military field. (133) Saudi Arabia which had refused to write off a loan of 26 billion dollars to Iraq, (134) pitched in about $ 36 billion to the

US, for meeting the cost of the operation. (135) Kuwait was successfully liberated from

Iraq by the US, but the whole matter was perceived by many Muslims as the declaration of a new crusade against the Muslim world by the west. (136)

The European Community’s Role in the Gulf War

The debate on European Political Cooperation (EPC) was transformed by the Gulf crisis and its aftermath. While this security threat was not Europe-based, but since it could lead to war in a nearby region, discussion on EPC became necessary and urgent. The need for an effective Community foreign and security policy also became more evident. The EPC reform debate was dominated by two themes. The first one was the idea of a ‘common’ foreign policy and security policy which would mean a ‘quantum leap forward’ for the

Community. (137) In particular Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece expressed interest in this approach. However, each country’s degree of enthusiasm for the idea varied. The second approach rejected a sudden and abrupt change. Those favouring this approach wanted an improvement in the structure of the existing EPC. Britain,

Ireland and Denmark did not want a transformation of the existing set up, for they were concerned that it would disturb the coordination of foreign policy through consensus.

Also, they did not want EC involvement in defence matters, which they felt should remain exclusively the job of NATO and the WEU. The Republic of Ireland did not want its neutral status to be compromised. The introduction of any collective defence arrangement in the EC would certainly damage its neutrality. Dublin pointed out that the

Single European Act (SEA) which had conferred legal status on EPC did not mention the military aspects of security. The Danish legislature did not like the idea of endorsing political union and the assuming of a strong security profile by the EC. (138) The UK have special ties with the US and therefore an Atlanticist approach on foreign and security policy did not want to encourage measures that would lessen the importance of

NATO. Britain was also not eager for majority voting to prevail in the Community; it preferred that member- states should have the choice to veto decisions which did not suit their interests. London acknowledged that there were lessons to be drawn from the EPC’s feeble response to the Gulf crisis, but it did not think it appropriate for a defense role to be foisted on the Community prematurely. It was pointed out that the Community’s common response to the Gulf War had not been up to the mark, not because of the absence or breakdown of EPC machinery, but owing to differences in the thinking of member states on the important questions relating to the crisis. (139)

The European states were perplexed about the role and responsibilities of institutions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and were also faced with the question of how to rationalize the activities of many defence-related institutions in Europe which seemed to have functions which overlapped and members with varying security needs. (140) The

Gulf crisis and the war in the Balkans focused attention on the Western European Union, for the Europeans felt that they must first agree upon and then project a European view on security. (141)

It is noteworthy that the domestic politics in member states was very crucial in determining their respective reactions to the Gulf crisis. The coalescing partners in the

Italian government were divided over the issue. Prime Minister Andreotti, Christian

Democrat, and Foreign Minister de Michelis, a Socialist, sharply disagreed over the approach to be adopted on the crisis. This domestic bickering caused embarrassment, for

Italy was holding the presidency of the EC in the second half of 1990. The other member states and allies were unhappy about this divided leadership. Also, Italy’s own actions such as the cautious initial response to the crisis, such as the decision to send only two frigates and a support ship as its contribution to the coalition forces, was demoralizing for other European Community states. Besides, Italy did not appear in a hurry to convene EC meetings for discussing the crisis. The Italian Prime Minister’s early statements were also marked by their vagueness. The Italian Parliament approved of participation in an

‘international policing operation’ in January. This phrase was meant to dodge the constitution which disallows recourse to war for settling disputes. It was evident that pressure from the domestic political scene shaped the position adopted by Andreotti. The

Italian Premier tried to overcome domestic disagreements by emphasizing upon its obligations under EPC and by conveying clearly to the EC and the partners in the US-led coalition that Italy would initially be able to contribute only to the naval embargo and that too if a WEU umbrella was provided. Possibly, it may have been owing to all these concerns that Italy encouraged the idea of integrating the WEU with the European

Community. Italy eventually dispatched three frigates and ten Tornado planes for the operation to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. (142)

The French government also faced criticizm from its people for its vague stance on the various aspects of the crisis. France's allies were worried over the indecisiveness displayed by the French government, the resignation of Defense Minister and late efforts to avert war. However, France adopted an independent policy which was in keeping with its traditional policy of not giving in to American pressure. It was also careful to avoid giving the Arabs, whom it had befriended in the late sixties, the feeling that it had abandoned them. The French government was therefore keen that every possible avenue for peace should be looked into. French reluctance on military action was not liked by the

British, and the British media accused France of “dithering”. Finally, France agreed that

Iraq could only be removed by force from Kuwait. Paris adopted this position when the French Embassy in Kuwait was ransacked. France wanted to maintain its historic and economic ties with the Middle East and to preserve its friendship with the Arabs.

Ultimately it fulfilled its role and obligations as a member of the UN as well as the WEU.

(143)

At the time of the Gulf crisis Germany was engrossed in issues relating to its reunification. Therefore, it could make no significant diplomatic contribution in defusing the crisis. It also did not contribute military force. (144) However, there was moral pressure on Bonn with regard to its passiveness on the crisis and a domestic debate was triggered about the German military power and its functions, obligations and limitations.

Since the end of the Second World War, Germany was for the first time under pressure to take part in an extra European military conflict. The German constitution which had been prepared under the supervision of the Allied powers proscribed such military actions.

These constitutional provisions clashed with Germany's contemporary status as a very important global economic power, for economic prowess and political power go hand in hand. An important question which was posed in this regard was whether an economically powerful state, could without any moral qualms ignore its obligation to help defend a system to which it owes much of its prosperity. The German moral dilemma was not resolved, but it made up by making a commitment to meet significant part of the financial costs of the operation. This was a short-term solution to the dilemma, which was addressed later when German participation in NATO operations in

Afghanistan came up. (145)

Britain has close historical links in the Middle East as a whole and particularly the Gulf region. Its contemporary interests in this oil rich and strategically placed region are considerable. (146) The United Kingdom being also a close US allies contributed a substantial military force to join the coalition against Iraq. It played a significant role in the military operations. (147)

The Netherlands was in favour of a military response for being dependent on oil from the region, its stakes in securing the supply of oil and the shipping lanes were considerable.

But it wanted the coalition to be as ‘international’ as possible. (148) Tiny Belgium being more concerned than the others about protecting itself from any vendetta from the

Muslim world was more inclined towards using a WEU umbrella for operations. It had promised two minesweepers and a logistics vessel for enforcing the UN embargo on Iraq but did not send these until after a WEU meeting was held on August 21, 1990. The small

EU member state later enhanced this presence, but it quite firmly stuck to its position of the need for unanimity of European action in this conflict. Denmark, which has traditionally been an American ally, supported the American initiative for punishing the delinquent state. Greece was reticent about joining the blockade, but did send a frigate.

There were protests in Greece, by communists and socialists against their country's participation in the coalition. Portugal having not long ago come out of its isolation, brought on by a prolonged military dictatorship, favoured international military action. It sent its warships to join the Western fleet and expressed willingness to add cargo ships and airliners to render assistance in the deployment of American forces. The United

States was permitted to use the air base in the Azores. This served as an important staging post for US forces. (149)

There were protests in Spain over Madrid’s decision to use conscripts to man the three warships that were being sent to the Gulf. The Spanish people were apprehensive that participation in operation would undermine country’s traditional policy of maintaining cordial relations with the Arab world and North Africa. To remove his fellow country man’s apprehension Prime Minister Gonzalez made it clear to the coalition partners that his country’s participation in the naval operations would not go beyond enforcing the embargo, and that too if the WEU umbrella was there. Spain did not take part in active combat. In fact its three warships stayed clear of the combat zone. A concession that

Spain extended to the coalition was the use of its air bases for B-52s bombers on the way to Iraq. Madrid took care to unequivocally condemn the bombing of a building in

Baghdad, in which reportedly there were several hundred civilian deaths. It demanded that air attacks on cities be stopped. The people came out on the streets in Spain in large numbers, throughout the war, protesting against the war. Opinion polls showed that only

30 percent of the people approve of the war. Ireland, stuck to its neutrality. (150)

Though differences between member states were quite apparent, the Community did take some prompt and unanimous measures against the aggressor. On August 4, an EC meeting was held in Rome on an emergency basis and there Iraq was condemned. To punish Iraqi aggression an embargo was imposed on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait and Iraqi assets in the EC were frozen. Also, the EC announced the suspensions of the sale of military equipment to the country. All military, technical and scientific cooperation with Iraq was also suspended. (151) These sanctions were intended to weaken Iraq's economic and military interests. In comparison to these measures, the EC’s responses in the US hostages' crisis in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were quit weak. The EC member states were unable to agree on the measures to be taken in these crises. (152)

The fact is that circumstances were vastly different at this point in time. The Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union, weakened after the debacle in Afghanistan and the loss of its satellite states now quiescent about defending the existing international order alongside its former foes, the US and Europe. Iraq was a country heavily in debt and dependent for its economic survival on the export of oil. Thus, a freeze credit and a boycott of its oil would debilitate Iraq. Both these measures however, had to be universally enforced. (153)

The EC embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil was the most significant of the economic sanctions, for in 1989, oil supplies from Kuwait and Iraq made up about 10 percent of total EC oil imports. For some EC member states such as Denmark oil imports from these two countries accounted for nearly fifty percent of their total imports of oil. They would therefore suffer more than the others. Britain also was in a very vulnerable position because its economy was in doldrums with a 10.5% inflation rate. The prospect of an increase in oil prices was frightening for it. Also, for Bonn it was most worried about an impending oil crisis, for Chancellor Kohl had assured his people that taxes would not be increased to meet the cost of Germany's unification. Any big time borrowing from international markets would cause a steep rise in inflation and interest rates. (154) The

European countries were very apprehensive about the consequences of inflation.

However, it was reassuring that the EC had stored very good quantities of oil, which would avert an immediate crisis. (155)

Nevertheless, the Europeans were on the whole convinced that the embargo would have a positive outcome. Iraq was totally dependent on oil for its foreign exchange earnings and around 20% of its oil was exported to the European Community. Besides, the assets of

Iraq in Europe were worth around ($100 billion). This gave Europe much leverage vis-a- vis Baghdad. (156)

There is also a general downside against such punitive actions against a country. The sanction imposing country/countries can become the target of international criticism. To defend the measures against Iraq it could be said that there were not taken in revenge against a hostile country, but was to force a belligerent state to vacate the territory of the sovereign country it had illegally occupied. (157) In short, the actions taken by the

Community were for punishing the aggressor and helping the victim to recover its territory as well as its wealth. (158)

As regards arms supplies to Iraq, the Soviet Union was the biggest seller of arms to the country, followed by France. There were some other European countries that also supplied arms to Iraq. The stoppage of arms supplies caused temporary economic loss to the European Community countries. (159)

When the war ended, the UN carried out the inspection of Iraq’s weapons’ research and manufacturing facilities. It became known through these investigations that several EC states had been supplying directly or through third parties, weapons – related technology to Iraq. (160) Also, before the war began some experts held the view that an arms embargo would have little effect upon the Iraqi armed forces, because Baghdad had stocked up large quantities of military equipment and was prepared for a lengthy war.

(161)

The European Community from the very start of the crisis had denied recognition to the puppet regime installed by Baghdad in Kuwait. Thus, it had upheld the legitimacy of the

Kuwaiti Emir’s government-in-exile. With regards to armed intervention for restoring

Kuwait’s sovereignty, the European Community member states in a joint statement promised to support military intervention if the UN Security Council passed a resolution in favour of it. Some analysts however, were doubtful about some member-states’ willingness to send troops to the Gulf region in the event of an armed conflict following the UN decision to impose a blockade against Iraq. Initially, the European Community’s reaction appeared so strong and unified that Iraq’s ambassador to Paris warned that the industrial economies of the EC member states would not be able to withstand the stoppage of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. The Iraqi regime also threatened that it would attack

European concerns in the Middle East. The European leadership was not cowed down by

Saddam's bluster. Some other countries’ stance on the crisis was also influenced by the

European reaction. Japan, in particular, towed the western line with regard to the embargoes and sanctions on Iraq. The People’s Republic of China, which had lately adopted the practical approach in world politics, instead of an ideological one, announced that it would not sell arms to Iraq. (162)

The Europeans were firm in enforcing the embargo. Germany made sure that no goods were destined for Iraq. Italy too strictly applied Community trade guidelines for Iraq. The

Spanish government also froze Kuwaiti assets in Spain. Kuwait’s London based state investment arm, the Kuwait Investment Office, which had 72% of shares in Gruppo

Torras SA, a giant holding company which controlled several major Spanish companies was the most affected by this move. (163)

After the UN Security Council imposed wide-ranging compulsory economic sanctions against Iraq on August 6, 1990, to punish the latter for ignoring UN resolution 660, (164) the Community took more legislative and administrative measures for enforcement of the embargo. Three measures were adopted in this regard: (i) a general embargo on trade, (ii) a specific embargo on oil imports (already decided upon on August 4), and suspension of trade concessions to Iraq. (165) The EC decided upon continuing humanitarian assistance such as medical and food supplies to the people of Iraq. Iraq sealed its borders to stop the escape of foreigners from Iraq or Kuwait. In fact these foreigners were taken from Iraqi- occupied Kuwait to Iraq and kept at strategic locations to serve as human shields against attack on Iraq by the hostile forces. (166)

The EC Foreign Ministers of the European Community expressed deeply concerned about their citizens and warned Baghdad that they would give a befitting response to their citizens were hurt. (167) After, French President Francois Mitterrand showed, an equally strong reaction to Iraqi bellicose attitude, France came closer to the US and Britain. Paris announced that French warships would assist in the enforcement of the embargo, and also military advisers and military assistance would be sent to countries in the region. Though any direct contacts with the Iraqi regime for realising their nationals was considered out of the questions, some European countries made unofficial contacts with Iraq. Thus just three days after the European Community top leaders’ meeting in Rome in October

1990, in which the European leaders agreed that government representatives would not be sent to Iraq to make a deal with the Saddam regime on the release of the European hostages, the former west German Chancellor and elder statesman Willy Brandt visited

Baghdad. Many other prominent European political personalities including former

British prime minister, Edward Heath also went to the Iraqi capital. Both these statesman had tried to impress upon the western leaders that it would help defuse the crisis if negotiations were held with Saddam Hussein. There contention was that assurances of non-aggression should be extended to the Iraqi leader, to which he was likely to respond by withdrawing from Kuwait. The European Community also appealed to the Arab countries to use their influence to secure release of the hostages. (168) President Saddam announced the release of all hostages held in Iraq and Kuwait on December 6. (169)

Brandt’s visit Baghdad had caused annoyance in some European countries, coming as it did so soon after the Rome declaration of the EC and also because it was seen as an example of the prioritization of national interest over Community interest. Many

Europeanists strongly felt that it damaged the goal of unity in foreign affairs. And according to a British analyst it set a bad example for others governments. (170) To address this situations Belgium and Holland requested that an emergency meeting of EC foreign ministers. At this meeting another declaration was issued, which besides other things, reaffirmed the Rome declaration and expressed the determination to eschew any trade off with the aggressor. (171)

An analyst has drawn attention to the fact that the sortie by Iraqi forces into the enclave in Kuwait where the diplomatic representations of some European Community and other countries were located toughened the stance of France and other European Community member states. Their position was now more in line with that of the US. Retaliating to

Iraq’s action, European Community member states ordered that all Iraqi military attaches be expelled and the movement of the remaining diplomatic staff was restricted. (172)

Typically, certain aspects of French policy were still ambiguous. Though it demonstrated solidarity with the partners in the anti- Iraq coalition it did assert some of its traditional independence in the foreign policy domain. On September 24, President Mitterrand in an address to the UN General Assembly made a final effort to stop a military show down.

He offered that France would guarantee non-aggression if Iraq abided by the UN resolutions. (173) Also, he did not reiterate the Security Council’s demand that Kuwait's legitimate government be reinstalled. Instead, in a deliberately vague manner he referred to "the democratic expression of the Kuwaiti people’s choices". (174) In an apparent bid to please the Arabs, he added that when the Gulf crisis ended the outstanding disputes in the Middle East including the Lebanese and the Palestinian issues should be comprehensively debated and sincere efforts should be made to resolve them. The speech of the French leader sharpened the differences within the Community. There were the hardliners and the flexible ones. Of course, Britain led the hard line group, while those believing in the policy of conciliation, was led by France. Germany, concerned about preserving the special Franco-German relationship sided with France. In this situation, there were suspicions in some quarters that France was trying to arrive at a secret understanding with Iraq to protect its own interests. (175)

As the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait approached France made some more diplomatic moves to avert war. Michel Vauzella, an important personality in the Socialist

 The deadline was set for January 15, 1991.

Party and close to Mitterrand was sent to Baghdad. Mitterrand’s special envoy was not even able to gain a symbolic concession from Baghdad, but the French President did not give up. Vauzelle now arrived in Tunis to meet Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The latter was told that France would propose the convening of an international conference on the Palestinian issue to placate the Iraqi dictator. (176)

Here it may be pointed out that PLO leader Yasser Arafat, in an unwise move, had openly supported the Iraqi dictator. He alienated the Arab world by this action and became internationally isolated. PLO’s position was greatly weakened and the Palestinian cause suffered a setback from which it has never been able to recover.

The Foreign Minister of France also presented a seven point peace plan to the French legislature on January 4. The provisions of the plan were as follows:

i. Before January 15, Baghdad should announce its intention to withdraw from

Kuwait;

ii. After this announcement the international community should extend full

guarantee that Iraq would not be attacked;

iii. After Kuwait was freed from foreign occupation, all the Middle East conflicts

should be attended to, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian one;

iv. The EC should arrange a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz to

spell out to him their position; v. The member states of the European Community must fully back the American

initiative to arrange a last meeting in Geneva between James Baker and Tareq

Aziz ;

vi. The European Community's ‘troika’ should contact all other governments that

had proposed peace plans for the conflict in the Gulf;

vii. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should be

adopted as a model for security in the Middle Eastern region.

French diplomacy seemed to be focusing upon giving the Iraqi dictator a chance to avoid war and a humiliating defeat. (177)

A regards humanitarian assistance for refugees and financial backing to the frontline states were concerned, these matters too, brought out in the open the complications in the decision-making process of the EC. The Irish, Italian and Luxembourg foreign ministers were sent to the Middle East to make an assessment of the assistance needed for the victims of the conflict, but they were only able to reach an agreement as late as October.

(178) It was decided that aid amounting to £1.04 billion would be given to Egypt,

Jordan, and Turkey. The European Commission was made efforts to speed up the delivery of EC aid to these countries, but by January 1991, only a third of the aid promised by the EC member states reached its destination. (179)

It had already became apparent during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war, that the WEU was the only organization in Europe that was capable of addressing the security aspects of conflicts. It could help in the co-ordination of the operational plans of member states and also convey to the world the non-aggressive nature of their naval presence in the Gulf.

(180) The capabilities of the WEU were again tested by the Gulf crisis. (181) The defence ministers of WEU member states met in Paris on August 21, 1990. Denmark,

Greece and Turkey attended the meeting as observers but Ireland owing to its permanent neutrality refused to attend. (182) After deliberations the member states spelled out the principles of European coordination in situations where crisis management was the need of the hour. To be covered was the overall operational plan and detailed guidelines for coordination between member states’ military forces. Among other tasks of WEU were identifying areas of operation, tasks sharing, mutual logistical support and intelligence sharing. (183) After issuance of this declaration, work began on ways and means of practically implementing these principles. There were complications owing to Anglo-

French disagreement with some other member states who considered it safer to begin operations after further UN endorsement of more use of force. Thus, the WEU played a crucial role in the enforcement of the naval embargo before and during the war.

However, the WEU as an organization did not participate in the war; it was individual member states which did so, after entering into bilateral agreements with Washington.

(184) On the whole, we can say that the EC lacked unity in its response to the crisis owing to disagreement on political and moral aspects of the crisis. Also their respective national interests differed. The mechanisms of EPC were also rather weak for dealing with this serious crisis. REFERENCES

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57. Ibid, 99-100.

58. Ibid, 100.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid, 101.

64. Ibid, 101-102.

65. Ibid, 102.

66. Ibid.

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70. Ibid, 103.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid, 103-104.

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74. Ibid, 104.

75. Ibid, 104.

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77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid, 95-96.

80. Ibid, 96.

81. Ibid.

82. Pierre Salinger, “The United States, the United Nations and the Gulf War”, Middle

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83. Ibid, 597.

84. Ibid, 597. 85. Ibid, 599.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid, 599

88. Ibid, 599-600.

89. Ibid, 600.

90. Ibid, 600.

91. Michael J. Glennon, “The Gulf War and the Constitution”, Foreign Affairs 70, no.2

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92. Pierre Salinger, “The United States, the United Nations and the Gulf War”,

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97. Ibid.

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110. Daniel S. Papp, “The Gulf War Coalition”, 33.

111. Robert J. Pauly, US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf, 50.

112. Daniel S. Papp, “The Gulf War Coalition”, 26.

113. Ibid, 37.

114. Ibid, 38-39.

115. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects”,

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116. Agha Shahi, “Flashpoint in the Gulf”, Pakistan Horizon, 43, no.4 (1990): 30.

117. HMSO, Britain and the Gulf Crisis, (London: HMSO, 1993), 21.

118. Pierre Salinger, “The United States, the United Nations and the Gulf War”, 607.

119. Gulf Crisis Chronology, 89.

120. Pierre Salinger, “The United States, the United Nations and the Gulf War”, 607.

121. Daniel S. Papp, “The Gulf War Coalition”, 39-40. 122. Ibid, 39.

123. The Muslim, 5 January, 1991.

124. Pierre Salinger, “The United States, the United Nations and the Gulf War”, 607.

125. The Frontier Post, 10 January, 1991.

126. HMSO, Britain and the Gulf Crisis, 17.

127. Ibid, 17.

128. Gulf Crisis Chronology, 151.

129. Michael J. Glennon,“The Gulf War and the Constitution”, 85.

130. Shahid M. Amin, Europe and the Muslim World: Coexistence or Conflict? (Karachi:

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131. Ibid, 321.

132. Ibid, 322.

133. Ibid, 316.

134. Ibid, 321.

135. Ibid, 316.

136. Ibid, 326.

137. Trevore Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf War and Yugoslavia 1990-1992”, International Affairs 68, no.2 (1992): 236. 138. Ibid, 236.

139. Ibid, 236.

140. Ibid, 236.

141. Ibid, 236.

142. Ibid, 237.

143. Bruce George, Roinmondo Luraghi, Bruce W. Watson, "Coalition Diplomacy", in

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145. Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations (London: Routledge,

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146. Ibid, 85.

147. Ibid, 61.

148. Trevore Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation, 241.

149. Ibid, 241-242.

150. Ibid, 242. 151. Dawn, 5 August 1990.

152. Ilan Greilsammer, “European Reaction to the Gulf Challenge”, in Gad Barzilai,

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153. Ibid, 209.

154. Ibid, 211.

155. Ibid, 211.

156. Ibid, 211.

157. Ibid, 211.

158. Ibid, 211.

159. Dawn, 8 August, 1990.

160. Martin Holland, Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Records and Reforms

(London: Printer, 1997), 77.

161. Ilan Greilsammer, “European Reaction to the Gulf Challenge”, 212.

162. Ibid, 212.

163. Ibid, 212.

164. HMSO, Britain and the Gulf Crisis, 8. 165. Ilan Greilsammer, “European Reaction to the Gulf Challenge”, 212.

166. HMSO, Britain and the Gulf Crisis, 8, 10.

167. The Muslim, 11 August, 1990.

168. Ilan Greilsammer, “European Reaction to the Gulf Challenge”, 220-221.

169. The Economist 317, no.7684 (December 8, 1990): 45.

170. Trevore Salmon, “Testing times for European Political Cooperation”, 247.

171. Ibid, 247.

172. Keesing’s Record of World Events 36, no.9 (1990): 37697.

173. Trevor. Salmon,“Testing times for European Political Cooperation”, 240.

174. Ilan Greilsammer, “European Reaction to the Gulf Challenge”, 222.

175. Ibid, 222.

176. Ibid, 222.

177. Ibid, 222-223.

178. Keesing’s Record of World Events 36, no.7-8 (1990):37640.

179. Trevore Salmon, “Testing times for European Political Cooperation, 246.

180. Willem Van Eekelen, “WEU and the Gulf crisis”, Survival .xxxii, no.6 (1990): 524-

525.

181. Ibid, 525. 182. Keesing’s Record of World Events 36, no.7-8 (1990):37640.

183. Trevore Salmon, “Testing times for European Political Cooperation, 245.

184. Ibid,

CHAPTER – II

THE BALKANS CRISIS: THE RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Bosnia and Herzegovina is located in South-Eastern Europe. On its north and west is

Croatia, while Serbia and Montenegro are on its south-eastern border. It has a short 12 miles long coastline on the Adriatic Sea on its west. Its terrain is mostly mountainous. (1)

Before the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the country’s Muslim population numbered around 5-6 million. It was therefore Europe’s largest Muslim community, west of Istanbul. Mostly belonging to the Sunni sect these Muslims live in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (Kosovo and Sandzak). (2)

A census taken in 1991 revealed that Bosnia and Herzegovina had a total population of

4.35 million, of which around 2 million were Muslims. These Muslims were of Slavic origin and spoke the Serbo-Croatian language. They constituted around 43.7 percent of the Republic’s total population and exceeded in numbers the Bosnian Orthodox Christian

Serbs and the Catholic Croats who accounted for 31.3% and 17.3% of Bosnia-

Herzegovina's population respectively. Before Communism ended, inter-ethnic marriages were quite common. The Muslim Slav nation was the third largest in the former

Yugoslavia, the largest being the Serbians, followed by the Croatians. (3)

Historical background

Archaeological work has revealed that the land comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina had been populated ever since the Palaeolithic age (150,000 BC). The first people whose artefacts have been found by archaeologist are the Illyrians. After the Roman conquest

Bosnia became part of the Roman Empire. When Roman fell there was a division of the empire in 395 A.D. between east and west. To the Western Roman empire were attached

Croatia, Slovenia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Macedonia, Serbia and the rest of

Bosnia and Montenegro were taken over by the Eastern Roman empire or the Byzantine empire, with Constantinople as its capital city. The Celts, Ostrogoths, Germans, Huns and some Asian tribes migrated to or invaded this region up to the 6th century A.D. (4) The

Serbs settled in the lands that today constitute south western Serbia. In the later part of the Middle Ages this area began to be called Raska or Rascia. There was a gradual take over by Rascia of Duklje or Dioclea (Montenegro) and Hum or Zachumlje

(Herzegovina). In modern Croatia settled the Croats. A large part of Bosnia proper, excluding the eastern strip of the Drina valley was also said to have been part of Croatia.

(5)

The local Slav populations of the region had a socio-political set-up based on tribalism.

Society had a pyramidal structure with the family as the base. Several families together formed clans and clans made up tribes (plemena). The territory of a tribe was called a

Zupa, and it was headed by the Zupan. (6) The Serbs established their hold over many areas in the territories known today as Herzegovina and Montenegro and by mid ninth century A.D. the eastern group of Serb Zupas formed a sort of Serb princedom (under a

‘grandzupan’). Croatia became soverign and strong under King Tomislav, who had taken over parts of northern and western Bosnia. After Tomislav's death, civil war broke out in his territory from the 930s to the 960s a large part of Bosnia was taken over by the Serb princedom which had been restored. It remained powerful for some time. However, this princedom was a subject of the Byzantine Empire. In the 960s, Bosnia once again came under Croatian rule, and this situation lasted for around half a century. (7)

The Byzantine Empire entered another era of supremacy in 1019 under the Emperor Basil

II. Using terrorizing tactics, he forced the Serb and Croat rulers to accept Byzantine supremacy. Bosnia was ruled alternately by Croatian and Serbian governors under the direct control of the Byzantine empire. Duklje, also known as Zeta (Montenegro) and

Hum or Zachumlje (Herzegovina), which were situated on the south of Bosnia proper, had a degree of independence. In these territories the local Serb nobility resisted

Byzantine rule. Eventually this resistance led to the formation of a united Serb kingdom, which was extended in the 1070s to include the Serbian territory of Raska. King Bodin expanded it further by including nearly all of Bosnia in the 1080s. However, Bodin's

Kingdom broke up soon after he died in 1101. (8)

Nearing the end of the eleventh century there was a turning point in the history of the western Balkans. Serbia’s attention after Bodin’s death turned eastwards towards Raska, which now acquired a central importance in the kingdom of Serbia. While these events occurred in Serbia, the Hungary conquered Croatian territory and in 1102 the Hungarian

King Koloman also declared himself King of Croatia. Hungary and Croatia now established strong ties that were based on personal union and alliances. This relationship endured until 1918. Bosnia also came under the control of Hungary in 1102. Owing to its remote location a ban (governor) was appointed to rule over it. Over a period of time, the bans began to gain more autonomy. Owing to the campaign of expansion by Emperor

Manuel Comnenus, Croatia and Bosnia came under Byzantine rule. With Comnenus’ death in 1180 this link was broken. While the relationship between Croatia and Hungary was revived, Bosnia, managed to nearly free itself from Hungarian control. For the first time, Bosnia enjoyed a semi independent status, for it was no longer under the tutelage of

Serbia, Croatia or the Byzantine Empire. Kinnamos, a Byzantine historian wrote around

1180 that Bosnia does not take dictates from the grand Zupan of the Serbs. It has its own customs and government. (9)

However, there were serious clashes in the region over religion between those who belonged to the Eastern Orthodox Church and those who believed in Roman Catholicism.

The Church of Bosnia was accused of heresy by these two mainstream Christian

Churches. It was named the ‘Bogomil heresy’. Historical documents reveal that the

Bosnian Church turned aside from the established theological doctrines of the Roman

Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The Pope in Rome and the Orthodox patriarch in

Constantinople, declared the Bosnians as heretics. (10)

The conflict between the various sects of Christianity continued to impact upon the politics of the region beginning from the late 12th century till the end of the 14th century.

This era of the history of Bosnia is known as the ‘Medieval Bosnian State’. It was marked by the Pope’s disapproval of the heresy of the Bosnian Church and simultaneously there were moves by Hungary to subjugate Bosnia. (11) Despite the complicated situation local rulers emerged in this period. These were Ban Kulin (1180-

1204), Ban Stephen Kotromanic (1322-53) and King Stephen Tvrtko (1353-91). (12)

Stephen Kotromanic expanded Bosnian territory by annexing the principality of Hum

(Herzegovina) and under King Stephen Tvrtko there was further expansion to the south.

A large part of the Dalmatian coast was also occupied by Bosnia. Bosnia emerged as the most powerful state in the western Balkans in the second half of Tvrtko’s reign. Most of modern day Bosnia, was part of Tvrtko’s realm. (13)

Ban Kulin converted to the ‘Church of Bosnia’ in 1199, but later in 1203, giving in to the

Pope’s pressure; he stopped adhering to the heresy. After Kulin died, many Bosnian people reverted to the heretic church. Hungary incited the Pope to launch a crusade against the country, which began in the latter half of the 1230s. (14) Hungary occupied the south-central part of Bosnia and Vrhbosna (known today as Sarajevo). The

Hungarians then made an effort to install the Dominican Order of Friars in Bosnia. At this juncture, when the Mongols attacked Hungary in 1241, the Hungarian army was called back from Bosnia to fight the hordes. (15)

Bosnia went into a period of isolation in the second half of the 13th century. Hungarian ruler convinced the Pope in 1252 to bring under the authority of an archbishopric in

Hungary, the bishopric of Bosnia. Since the Bosnian bishop was now stationed in

Hungarian-controlled Slavonia, he did not have any real control over the Bosnian

Catholic Church. Hungary once again attacked Bosnia in 1253. (16) The Bosnian forces could not hold back the onslaught and succumbed to the invaders. Hungary ruled over

Bosnia till the end of the 13th century, after which it loosened its hold on the Bosnian territory, owing to domestic turmoil. (17)

As mentioned earlier, the Bosnian state became strong when two of the most assertive local rulers Ban Stephen Kotromanic and King Stephen Tvrtko ruled the country. They even managed to expand Bosnia's borders. (18) Kotromanic in order to gain acceptance in Rome supported the Franciscan mission in Bosnia in 1340 and even became a Roman

Catholic. All successive rulers of Bosnia, with one exception, were also Catholic. (19)

The Ottoman Turks, who had become strong, began raiding Serbia in 1380. A Turkish army attacked Hum (Herzegovina) in 1388. Hum at that time was ruled by the Bosnian king. The Turks were however, defeated. In 1389 the Serbian ruler Lazar who resented

Turkish suzerainty asked his neighbours and allies to help him against the Turks. King

Tvrtko responded to this call for help by sending a Bosnian army, which fought side by side with Lazar’s forces at the battle of Kosovo Polji in June 1389. Nevertheless, by 1392 all the Serbian Orthodox lands, except Bosnian-ruled Hum, had bowed to the Ottomans as their suzerain. (20)

Bosnia went through a prolonged period of political chaos after Tvrkto’s death in

1391.This emboldened the Hungarian King to again start sending military expeditions to

Bosnia, but after the Turks inflicted defeat on Hungary in 1396, the latter's forays into

Bosnia became less frequent for many years. However, in 1404 the Bosnian King Ostoja was ousted from the throne by the nobles, and replaced by an illegitimate son of King

Tvrtko, who assumed the title Tvrtko II. Ostoja re-gained his throne with the support of

Hungarian troops. In 1414, the Ottomans again changed the situation by backing Tvrtko

II as the legitimate King of Bosnia and despatched their army to Bosnia. The Hungarian forces in Bosnia were completely routed in central Bosnia, and Ostoja struck a deal in which it was agreed that he, would be reinstated as the legitimate king of Bosnia. After

Ostoja’s death in 1418, his son who had succeeded him as king was deposed in 1420, and the Turks now reinstated Tvrtko II as Bosnian King. Until the early 1420’s peace and stability prevailed in Bosnia, but turmoil soon hit the country again. Tvrtko II now asked

Hungary to help him against his former partners the Ottomans, and also fought Serbian forces over territorial claims. During the early 1430s Tvrtko’s most prominent foes in

Bosnia, the nobleman Sandalj and Radivoj, King Ostoja’s son, now got moral and military support from Serb noblemen and the Ottomans. They were able to establish control over a large part of Bosnia. Between 1433 and 1435 some areas of south-central

Bosnia, including the Vrhbosna (near contemporary Sarajevo), became the bone of contentions between Hungary and the Ottomans. (21)

On Tvrkto’ demise in 1443, Stephen Vukcic, the Lord of Hum refused to acknowledge

Tvrtko’s successor Stephen Tomas a king of Bosnia and declared his independence in

1448. He discarded the title of vojvoda of Bosnia, which was a symbol of his subordination to the King of Bosnia and declared himself ‘Herceg of Hum and the

Coast’, which later became to ‘Herceg of St. Sava’ (22) Ottoman ambition’s with regard to Bosnia were now quite obvious and after Stephen Tomas’ death in 1461 Bosnia’s survival as an independent country became very doubtful. Stephen Tomas’ successor

Stephen Tomasevic in a letter to the Pope in 1461 and again in 1463 alerted him of the danger of an Ottoman attack on Bosnia and requested Papal help. The Turkish army attacked a weakened Bosnia, with no support forthcoming from Rome. The whole kingdom fell within a few weeks. King Stephen Tomasevic was captured and put to death. (23) Bosnia and Herzegovina remained under Ottoman rule until 1718, after which some parts of its territory were taken over by the Hapsburgs, for two decades. (24)

Turkish conquest resulted in the spread of Islam in this region. Large numbers from the local population voluntarily converted to Islam. There is the well-known incident of the conversion of an Orthodox priest in Herzegovina in 1509. (25) Many theories have been expounded regarding the spread of Islam. One overwhelming factor its spread is the complex religious composition of the Bosnia, where Christianity was not only deep rooted but was also divided into three sects: Catholic, Orthodox and Bogomil. (26) There were few clerics and churches which resulted in most Bosnians remaining detached from Christianity. (27) Further, the Bogomils who were considered as heretics and faced oppressed by both the Orthodox and Catholic churches preferred the alternative of converting to Islam. (28) Another reason was the emergence of urban centers in Bosnia under Ottoman rule. The construction of mosques and Islamic educational institutions was an important factor in the emergence of Muslim Bosnia. (29) The prevalence of slavery is also considered an important cause for the spread of Islam. To bocame free slaves in large numbers converted to Islam. In 1528 these freed slaves constituted around

8 per cent of the entire population of Sarajevo. (30) The Devsirme system also promoted the Spread of Islam in Bosnia. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Christian boys were picked up from areas under the Ottomans and taken to Istanbul for conversion to Islam. They were then trained to become Janissaries, the servants of the sultan, ready to give their lives for the latter. They also became officials in the various departments of state. The system however was discarded by the first half of the seventeenth century, when the Empire opted to create to a professional army, and the title of Janissary merely became a symbol of rank. (31) Historians believe that the grant of economic and social rights motivated many Christians to convert to Islam and in this connection the example of the ‘pool tax’ is given. This tax was paid by non Muslims and the rate of this tax could be increased in war time. (32) Moreover, it is argued that the local Christian nobility became Muslims to retain their feudal estates. But this contention is refutable because those Bosnian land-holders who rendered military service could retain their estates without converting to Islam. Christian soldiers in the Ottoman army were not uncommon in the early years of Ottoman Bosnia. (33)

The avoidance of the poll tax too, could not have been a strong reason for conversion to

Islam, for the tax was sometimes even imposed on Muslims. Besides, unlike Christians, the Muslims also paid the zakat (alms-tax) which is one of the basic obligations of Islam.

(34)

In the 19th century, there were several revolts in the region. These revolts took place in

1821, 1828, 1831 and 1839 and the rebels were the rich landowners who were opposed to administrative reforms and the restraints on local government. Turkish troops helped to restore the writ of the central government. The peasantry who were discontented led the revolts of 1858, 1861 and 1862. The peasants wanted the implementation of the reforms introduced by the Ottoman sultanate, favouring the peasants. (35)

A revolt in Herzegovina escalated into a wider crisis in Europe in 1875. In that year the peasants too again revolted and the Ottoman government had a hard time trying to crush the rebellions. Mediatory efforts were made by the great powers which did not succeed and while negotiations, were going on, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the

Ottoman Empire. Russia fought a war with the Ottoman empire in 1877. Moscow first negotiated with Austria-Hungary to remain neutral in the conflict by promising them a predominant influence in the region. After the war ended, the great powers met at the

Congress of Berlin where they decided to give the Austro-Hungarian Empire the right to occupy and govern Bosnia and Herzegovina. (36)

As a result of being run by a European administration, Bosnia became more modernized.

The Hapsburg reforms modernized Bosnia’s communication and transport system, education, industries, commerce and mining. They even introduced a rudimentary sort of democracy in the region. (37)

However, the Austro-Hungarian government did not disturb the established social structure, except for a few changes. For instance, a law was passed, based on an Ottoman reform of 1876 that encouraged peasants to purchase the land they tilled. The peasants were to make fully payment to the landlord, but this of course hardly any peasant could afford. Therefore, this modest effort to free the peasants from the oppression of land owners could not do much to resolve the underlying issues. (38)

In the early twentieth century, friction arose between Hapsburg Empire and independent

Serbia. Serbia which became a leader of pan-Slavism, posed a big threat to the Hapsburg monarchy. As a step to counter this menace, the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed

Bosnia in 1908. This action was one of the major causes of the First World War. (39) In the summer of 1914, a young Serb nationalist who was a member of the ‘Mlada Bosna’

(Young Bosnia) assassinated the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife while they were paying a state visit to Sarajevo. (40) This was the spark which caused this huge conflagration.

When the Hapsburg’s declared war on Serbia, the First World War broke out. The great powers were already divided into two armed camps. When the war ended, the Austro-

Hungarian empire not only suffered a humiliating defeat but was also broken up. The defeat of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire resulted in a serious power imbalance in the Balkans. Serbia's expansionist ambitions now became more unbridled than ever. A major power vacuum appeared with the collapse of the Hapsburg realm’s central administration, and this was filled when the regions declared autonomy and set up separate National Councils to run the affairs of government. The Croats and Slovenes took the lead in this regard and Bosnians followed suit. The Bosnians formed their

National Government in November 1918. Bosnia and Herzegovina was small and very vulnerable state in the post war Europe, which became even more volatile than before.

Serbia’s aggressiveness posed the main threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (41) The leaders of

Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia held meetings in Corfu in 1917 and agreed to unify the three nations. Thus, on December 1, 1918, the political leaders of these three nations again met in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and announced the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes. The King was a Serb. Tiny Montenegro too opted to join the new kingdom. This arrangement had a serious imperfection. The new state’s structure was not clear about federalism or centralism. (42) The Croat nationalists were not too happy in the Serbian dominated kingdom. There was unrest, which began to spread. Croat leader

Ante Pavelic left the country and was able to get Mussolini’s backing for organizing the

“Ustasha” movement for an independent Croatia. Bosnia had been divided into regions which made the Muslims a minority in each of them, although they had an overall majority in the country. (43)

It soon became apparent that the King would not be able to administer the union through consensus and democracy. To get rid of the chaos, he suspended the parliament, assumed dictatorial powers and the country was renamed ‘Yugoslavia’. King Alexander was assassinated in 1934. The Second World War broke out in 1939 and the German and

Italian troops invaded and occupied Yugoslavia in 1941. (44) The Axis Powers set up the

“Independent State of Croatia” which was then subdivided into German and Italian zones of occupation. The division ran across the southeast to northwest. Bosnia and

Herzegovina was incorporated into this state. Sarajevo and other prominent Bosnian cities became part of the German zone, while Mostar became part of the Italian zone. In

Serbia, as well as all occupied countries, Nazi Germany put up puppet regimes. In

Serbia, the puppet regime with the assistance of local collaborators killed or deported thousands of Jews, Serbs and Gypsies. (45)

A small group of officers and soldiers who had belong to the army of former Yugoslavia united under the command of Colonel Draza Mihailovic to resist German occupation.

This band of fighters became known as the Chetniks. (46)

The Chetniks, were no better than the Nazis, for they too adhered to exclusivist nationalism. They began to systematically exterminate Muslims and Croats in areas in eastern Bosnia where there was a majority of Serbs. Mihailovic’s plan was to draw a direct, and unbroken boundary between Serbia and Montenegro, and between Serbia and Slovenia. To achieve this Muslims of Sandzak and the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia had to be gotten rid off. In June 1941, a memorandum was issued by Stevan Molijevic, a member of the Chetnik, titled “Homogeneous Serbia”. It stated that it was the duty of all

Serbs to help build and organise a homogenous Serbia that should include all the lands inhabited by Serbs. He asked the Serbs in February 1942, to racially cleanse the area.

This came to be known in the nineties as ‘ethnic cleansing’. He exhorted fellow Serbs to extend the territory of Serbia to Dalmatia, and then to expel or exterminate all non-Serbs.

In this situation, the non-Serbs had no choice but to abandon their homes and go back to the lands of their ancestors. Thus, the Croats returned to Croatia and Muslims fled to

Turkey or Albania. (47)

Unlike the jingoistic and exclusivist Chetniks, the “Partisans” another anti-fascist resistance group, comprised all ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. The leader of the partisans was Josip Broz Tito, who later became founding father and President of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia. Tito belonged to the outlawed Communist party of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Communist Party, as Communist parties elsewhere upheld federalism and the equality of all people, without consideration of caste, class or creed. The Communists led by Tito believed that thinking on ethnic lines would harm the aim of ousting the fascists. What constitutes contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of its location, became the centre of the resistance against fascist occupation. (48) The Serbs living in

Bosnia who were being butchered by the “Ustasha” had to choose whether to join the

Partisans or the Chetniks. On the other hand, the Croats of Bosnia in the beginning had sympathy for the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) government, while a good number of them joined the ‘Ustasha’ militia. (49)

The Muslims had divided loyalties. They were sandwiched between the hostile Serbs and

Croats. The Muslims got such brutal treatment from the Chetniks and the Ustasha that they even tried to seek Hitler’s help in creating their own self-defence force. Thus, the

“Hanzar Muslim SS Division” was formed which never fought in any campaign. Later, this division was disbanded when a large number of Muslims left it and joined the

Partisans. Some Muslims and Croats had joined the Ustasha earlier, for they believed that this would protect them from Serb atrocities. When the Partisans challenged the Chetniks, a large number of Muslims joined the Partisans. As the war continued the ‘Ustasha’ which had acquired the repute of being a proxy of the Axis powers, was so discredited that the Croats joined Tito in large numbers. (50)

Tito's popularity increased greatly among the Yugoslavs and they now believed that he was a genuine freedom fighter. His mass appeal in Yugoslavia enabled him to gain the support of the Allied Powers who were no longer patronising the Chetniks. It was now widely known that the Chetniks were collaborating with the Axis forces. (51) The

Partisans now became the main force fighting against the fascist powers and they liberated Saragevo on April 6, 1945. The Partisans set up a ‘People’s Government’ for

Bosnia on April 28, 1945. (52)

Marshall Tito is admired by many scholars for not only liberating, but reinventing

Yugoslavia. Under his benign dictatorship, the different ethnic groups that had thirsted for each other’s blood now lived in peace and amity in the new federation. (53) The

Yugoslav Federation set up by Tito had six federating units i.e. Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,

Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. There was an indisputable Serb majority in Serbia and Montenegro and the Slovenes were in a majority in Slovenia.

Croatia had a clear Croat majority but a good number of Serbs were living a belt all along the eastern edges of the Croatia. (54) In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia many ethnic groups lived and none of them had a clear majority. Therefore, Bosnia had a complicated societal structure with at least three religious and ethnic groups dominating. The Serbs,

Croats and Muslims had been hostile to each other since several centuries. (55) Tito, an astute statesman, understood this situation very well and he made all out efforts to extinguish these rivalries and hatreds after the Second World War came to an end.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was not easy to handle, owing to its complicated ethnic composition and also because during the war the ethnic militias had unleashed horrors on rival communities. The Federal Republic punished those proven to have been involved in crimes against humanity. (56) It is estimated that nearly 250,000 people lost were massacred by militias or died in concentration camps in the period 1945-46. Most of this brutality was carried out on the puppet government’s orders. (57) Being a Marxist, Tito spurned all religions and refused to patronize the Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and Islam. The most badly treated was the Catholic Church for its clergy had openly collaborated with the Ustasha in Bosnia and Croatia. (58)

Tito saw Islam not only as a religion with spiritual beliefs but also as a way of life. Islam therefore, posed a threat to the polity and society. Not only was this it also considered reactionary and Asian. (59) A ban was imposed on religious education and property belonging to religious institutions, was taken over by the state. Institutions such as

Islamic courts were shut down. It is said that in villages, the clergy were killed and religious building were destroyed. (60)

Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, which was the largest component of the Federation, also became the capital of Yugoslavia. Back in the nineteenth century, it had been the capital of the Serb kingdom and before the second world war that of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Adopting Serbia’s capital as the capital of the Federation, Tito’s government conferred recognition on the predominant position of the Serbs in the new Yugoslav Federation.

Incidentally, constituting the majority in the country, the Serbs began to dominate the military as well as the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY). (61)

Tito’s defiance of Moscow and his nonconformism in the Soviet satellite system greatly angered the Soviet leadership. Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the COMINFORM in

1948. Though, the west was delighted by Tito's detachment from the Soviet satellite system and gave Yugoslavia considerable economic assistance, Tito was still a communist and he did not enter into any formal defence relationship with the West. Thus, the country had to deal with a serious security dilemma. In the early years of the Cold

War, Yugoslavia was under great pressures from the west to join their bloc. The Soviet Union also wanted it back in its fold. The west, when it realized that the Tito would stick to communism, did not want to enter into a formal security arrangement with Yugoslavia.

However, the west was sympathetic to Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow went through innumerable ups and downs. Thus, Tito sought collective security with the Third World and became one of the pioneers of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). (62)

NAM not had an impact on cold war and regional politics but also shaped domestic developments in Yugoslavia. For coming closer to the Muslim members of NAM, Tito did not hesitate to use Yugoslav Muslims as an instrument to promote his position in the movement. (63) At this point in time he found it expedient to give some degree of religious freedom to the Muslim community. In this scenario, the other religious groups too had to be accommodated; therefore the constitution of 1954 granted religious freedom, at least on paper. (64)

As religious freedom was granted by the constitution, ethnic and religious differences started to surface in an unpleasant manner. Tito's efforts to get rid of ethnic rivalries now became more difficult, for ethnicity and religion were closely related in Yugoslavia. The

Croats strongly felt that Tito favoured the Serbs. On the other hand, the Serbs felt that

Tito who himself was a mix of Croat and Slovene, was working against the interests of

Serbia. What irked the Serbs the most was, that he had given some autonomy to

Vojvodina and Kosovo. The last was an enclave in Serbia with a majority of Muslims of

Albanian descent. (65)

Vojvodina and Kosovo had never really been part of Serbia, nor did they have Serb majorities. These regions had been annexed by the Serb Kingdom in 1918 and 1912 respectively. By the end of the sixties, a movement for the return of Kosovo to Serbia was begun by Serb nationalist politician Dobrica Cosic. (66)

In Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims constituted the single largest religious/ethnic group, they therefore sought recognition of their distinct national identity. When restrictions on the practice of religion were removed, the Bosnians began agitating for recognition as a distinct national group like the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia. The prominent Muslim members of the Communist party were in the forefront of this campaign. This pressure succeeded, for the Muslims were counted in the 1971 census as “Muslims in the national sense”. The chauvinistic Serbs strongly disapproved of this step but Tito did not back down. This was perceived as a major triumph for the Muslims of Bosnia. Later, however, this measure cost thousands of Muslims their lives. After Tito’s death in 1980 ethnic issues that had been suppressed erupted in a vicious manner. (67)

Yugoslavia in the Post Cold War Period

Deep rooted economic, political and social problems surfaced in Yugoslavia, after the demise of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe and the end of the bi-polar world order. In particular the multi party elections held in 1990 sounded the death knell of the

Yugoslav Federation. In the elections in 1990, the Communist party became unpopular and could gain majorities only in Serbia and Montenegro. In the other republics, parties of different hues swept into power. In Macedonia the communists joined the government as a minority partner. (68)

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the elections and the preceding campaign clearly demonstrated the ethno/religious fault lines. The three main ethno nationalist parties emerged as winners. These were the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (PDA), (86 seats), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), (72 seats) and the Croatian Democratic

Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CDU-BH), (44 seats). The election campaign had been marked by bitterness among the rival ethnic groups and the parties that represented them. However, after elections a coalition government was formed. Each party was represented on the seven members Bosnian State Presidency. Alija Izetbegovic, the PDA leader held the Presidency for a year. (69)

After waging brief wars with the FRY, Croatia and Slovenia won independence in 1992 and was quite soon recognized by the international community. In Bosnia-Herzegovina referendums were held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. The Bosnian Serbs did not participate in the vote. Of the 63% electorate which voted 99.4% favoured a fully independent republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Izetbegovic immediately announced the independence of the Republic and the term “socialist” was dropped from the new state’s official nomenclature. The European Community and the US extended recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. The country was given membership of the United Nations in May 1992. (70)

Soon after Bosnia declared its independence the hostilities between the Muslims and

Serbs which had been summering for quite some time turned violent. The Yugoslav

Peoples Army attacked Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 and in response Bosnian

Croats and Muslims and even many Serbs fought together to defend the newly independent state. Initially, the Muslim-Croat alliance in Bosnia and Herzegovina got support from the Croatian government that besides supplying weapons to both ethnic groups, also gave shelter to many war affected Bosnian refugees. (71)

The aim of the Serbian or Federal Yugoslav attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina was not just to defeat the Bosnian army, which comprised Serbs, Croats as well as Muslims. (72)

Clearly, the FRY wanted to occupy a large part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to split

Sarajevo into two parts. (73) To support these objectives, the Bosnian Serb militia, supported by paramilitary forces from Serbia proper launched a campaign to ‘cleanse’

Bosnia of other ethnic groups, particularly the Bosnian Muslims. Deportation, detention and killing of people were the tactics they adopted. Later, the war crimes tribunal for

Bosnia and Herzegovina also found that the Serbs perpetrated mass rapes in the country.

Reviving memories of the Nazi era, Prisoners of war and non- combatants were herded into concentration camps so that only Serbs would inhabit Bosnia and Herzegovina. (74)

A detailed UN study of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in former Yugoslavia, based on hundreds of interviews with survivors of the Prijedor district in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina and on population statistics, revealed that crimes against humanity and possibly genocide had been committed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina by military and paramilitary forces controlled by Serbians. The Prijedor district in 1991 had a population of 112,000, out of which 44% or more than 49,000 were Muslims 5.6% or more than 6000 were Croats and 42.5% were Serbs. As of June 1993 the total number of those’ killed or deported was 52,811. Crimes against humanity had been perpetrated repeatedly throughout Bosnia- Herzegovina. The report stated that sufficient evidence had been collected to arrive at the conclusion that ‘ethnic cleansing’ was not coincidental, isolated or carried out by disorganized bands of civilians whom the Bosnian Serb leadership could not control. There were definite the patterns of conduct which together reveal purposeful and systematic action. Higher authorities had planned and coordinated these activities. (75) A high classified report of the US Central Intelligence Agency in

March 1995 stated, that the Serbian actions involving deliberate destruction and expulsion of non Serb populations strongly suggest that Pale and perhaps Belgrade had played a carefully camouflaged role in mayhem. (76) Thus, by early 1995, the Bosnian

Serbs controlled about 70% of the country’s territory. (77)

The Croatian government too had its own agenda vis-à-vis Bosnia. Although the Croatian government, the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims were allies in early stages of the war, it did not stop Croatian President Tudjman from holding several meetings with his Serbian counterpart Milosevic. The two discussed the carving up of Bosnia without taking the

Bosnian government into confidence. (78)

It is said that the Croatian government had used the ‘Bosnian card’ to appease Milosevic and to divert his attention away from Croatian Krajina. If this was done at the expense of the hapless Muslims, it was their bad luck. However, Tudjman’s strategy was not supported by all Croats. Bosnian CDU leader Stjepan Kljuic was openly critical of

Tudjman’s plan to split Bosnia- Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. Kljuic was punished for this by being removed from his post and replaced by Mate Boban, who was close to Tudjman. (79)

Boban and Karadzic the Bosnian Serb leader met in Graz, Austria in May 1992. They agreed on a plan to divide Bosnia between them. This agreement broke up the alliance between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, besides the one between Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina. (80)

This was an intensification of the military campaign and Croatian units began ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the area of ‘Herzeg-Bosnia’ including the town of Mostar. Thousands of

Muslims refugees who had fled from eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina were stopped from taking refuge in Mostar, which was to the future capital of, Herzeg- Bosnia. (81)

The Special rapporteur of the UN on Human Rights squarely blamed the Bosnian Croats

(HVO) for deliberately and systematically perpetrating ethnic cleansing against Muslims in the Central Bosnian region of Vitez and Mostar. The Croatian Army too assisted the

HVO in attacks on the Muslims. The information gathered by the UN revealed that nearly

5000 Croatian troops were operating on Bosnian soil to support the Bosnian Croat militia.

(82)

An editorial in the Washington Post, succinctly wrote that what was happening in

Yugoslavia was, reminiscent of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which divided Poland between

Germany and Russia on the eve of Second World War. However the scale was much smaller. The Milosevic–Tudjman proxy agreement by which Serbia and Croatia have decided upon carving up Bosnia is one of the most cynical acts in the history of international relations. Even when Bosnian Serbs (constituly 31% of the country’s population) and Croats (barely 17%) were feigning to negotiate with the new state’s

Muslims,who were 44% of the population under the supervision of the European

Community, the Serbs and Croats were holding secret meetings under the patronage of

Serbia’s President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman. The two leaders probably heartily hate each other and differ on most matters, but they conspired on the sly against the largest community in Bosnia. They ignored its elected leadership, dismembered the country and with impunity displaced a half million of its citizens and then tossed a few territorial crumbs to the largest community. (83)

Bosnian Croats militias and Muslims forces now openly fought in many cities of central

Bosnia- Herzegovina. By the end of 1992 Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs had become military allies against the Muslims of Bosnia. Croat forces withdrew from the town of

Bosanski Brod, on the Sava River border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, leaving the Muslims alone to defend themselves against Serb forces. (84)

The rationale given by the government in Zagreb for its war against the Muslims in

Bosnia and Herzegovina and to cover up its irredentist ambitions was that the government of Bosnia was promoting ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. At that time ‘Islamism’ was practically non-existent in the Balkans region. Belgrade too had used the same excuse to hide its vicious objectives. (85)

The Bosnian forces which were not as well equipped as the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had suffered a further setback when the UN imposed an arms embargo in September 1991, on all of former Yugoslavia. Although the UN had recognized Bosnia and admitted it as a member state the embargo was imposed on it. While the embargo was applied on Serbia as well, the latter was in a strong position for it held most of the stockpiles of the former federal army, and had a large indigenous armaments industry. Thus, Serbia’s military capability was not greatly harmed by the UN action. However, for the Bosnian forces, it had a crippling impact. From July 1992, NATO and WEU navies, had mounted a blockade of the Croatian coast, but small quantities of arms did reach the Bosnians, mostly through Croatia. But owing to the blockade the much-needed heavy armour, artillery and anti-tank weapons were lacking. (86) Sympathetic neighbouring states taking advantage of the long Croatian coastline violated the embargo and provided military equipment to Croatia against Serbia. Thus, the Croatian government was able to arm Bosnian Croats, the HVO. (87)

In response to the hue and cry across the world on the inaction of the US regarding the hapless Bosnian Muslims, the US mediated between the Croats and Muslims, who ceased their hostilities and signed an agreement in Washington DC, in March 1994 to collaborate against the Serbs. (88) Bosnian Serbs however, backed by rump FRY continued the fighting and massacred unarmed civilians in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and other towns and cities that had been declared ‘safe areas’ by the UN. In Srebrenica, the Serbs killed in cold blood more than 7000 Muslim refugees. To put a stop to Serbian atrocities NATO began unrelenting air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions throughout Bosnia-

Herzegovina. (89)

The Bosnian Serbs and their backer the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to buckle under the air assaults. The EU had failed dismally in bringing about peace in

Bosnia. The FRY now humiliated and sobered, agreed to sign a US brokered agreement, in Dayton, Ohio in 1995. This agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities, a Muslim/Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic or the Republika

Srpska. Fifty-one percent of territory was awarded to the Muslim/Croat Federation while

Srpska was given forty- nine percent of the territory. (90) This was an unfair agreement for it rewarded the aggressors. The Muslims and Croats are uneasy partners. The peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina too is an uneasy one. Also, the mass scale killings and prolonged hostilities could have been avoided if an intervention had taken place earlier.

The US Response to the Bosnian Crisis

The US emerged as the sole superpower with the end of the cold war. In this capacity it was immediately faced with two major crises one in the Middle East and the other in

Europe.

During the early years of the cold war US relations with Yugoslavia were seen in the larger context of relations between the Soviet and West blocs. When Tito distanced his country from the Soviet bloc in 1948 the US and West Europe gave full backing to

Yugoslavia’s declaration of political independence from the USSR. Though, it had become clear that Belgrade would continue to stick to its own brand of Communism, the

West did not withdraw its support to Yugoslavia’s right to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence. Even Tito’s non-aligned foreign policy was acceptable to the

West. (91)

Behind Washington’s support to Belgrade was the determination to counter any further extension of Soviet influence in Europe. Yugoslavia was presented as a model for other

East European states that had the gumption to make a bid for autonomy from Moscow.

(92) Further, American security interests were also involved with regard to Yugoslavia. The country was perceived as a geo strategic buffer that separated the NATO and the

Warsaw Pact areas in southern Europe. The rigid bipolar structure of Europe, determined the geopolitical and strategic importance of Yugoslavia for Washington and the Western

Capitals. As a consequence, American foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis Yugoslavia were concentrated on stopping the Soviet Union from reclaiming the country as a satellite and preventing Yugoslavia from becoming a base for Soviet military that could upset the balance of power in Europe, the Mediterranean region or the Middle East. (93) A United and strong Yugoslavia could best serve American national security interests. For these reasons, successive American administrations conveniently ignored human rights violations by the Tito government. (94) The winds of change had begun blowing in

Central and East Europe even before the cold war ended and many analysts were expecting that the US would adopt a new strategy for East and Central Europe based on support for democratic minded leaders governments. The Bush Sr. Administration instead opted for a policy of close cooperation with ‘reformist’ communist leaders in Eastern

Europe, with Gorbachev as their model. The approach of President Bush, which favoured reformist communists, in effect proposed to support the continuation of a variant of communism in East Europe. (95) It negated the decades’ long struggle of the west to bring democracy to the whole of Europe.

In some cases the US even showed more eagerness to work with communist leaders, such as Poland’s Wojciech Jaruzelski and Yugoslavia’s Ante Markovic, rather than with the new generation of mostly untried or post-communist reformers. These reformers included Lithuania’s Vitautas Landsbergis, The Russian Federation’s Boris Yeltsin and Ukraine’s

Leonid Kravchuk. (96)

When the communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe collapsed this policy of differentiation became obsolete. The political damage done owing to earlier US policies towards Hungary and Poland was not long lasting, for politics stabilized after some time in both these countries following the liberation of 1989. Non-communist political leaders now emerged who got widespread popular approval. Strangely, when non-communist popular leaders emerged in Croatia and Slovenia they were not given recognition by the

US administration. As a result, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic‘s government was strengthened. He gained political legitimacy not only in Yugoslavia but also abroad and this emboldened him to use force to keep Yugoslavia united. (97) In March 1991, US president Bush Sr. in a letter to the Federal Republic’s Prime Minister Ante-Markovic that the US administration would not back those who were determined to break up the country. Incidentally Markovic was known as an intrepid reformer. Again, in a telephonic conversation on May 20, 1991, President Bush assured the Yugoslav prime minister of the uninterrupted flow of US aid to Yugoslavia. (98) Secretary of State James Baker too met with Yugoslav leaders, including Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on June 21, 1991 and presented a five point formula for promoting democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms and Yugoslav unity. Baker, on behalf of his government, once again called for maintaining Yugoslavia’s unity and once again assured Belgrade that the US would not support any action that would put the country’s unity in jeopardy. (99)

President Bush in an address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, on August 1, 1991, said that the US would not support those in East Europe who wanted independence, but only to replace a long-distance tyranny with a local dictatorship. He also warned that his government would withhold assistance to those who were fanning ethnic hatred and ethno-nationalism. (100) These statements did not defuse the situation, rather these increased tensions in Yugoslavia. Serbia escalated its oppression of other ethnic groups and was determined to crush them in the name of safeguarding Yugoslavia’s integrity. The US had been emphasizing that the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation would endanger international peace and stability. (101)

As tensions increased in Yugoslavia, the US which had so strongly expressed support for

Yugoslavia’s integrity adopted a cautious waits and sees policy. It encouraged the ‘EC plus CSCE’ conflict resolution formula, and studiously avoided direct involvement. US interests, it was pointed out were not directly at stake in the Balkans region. Perhaps, another reason for its aloofness was that the Gulf war had just ended and it did not want involvement in another conflict so soon. (102)

As the conflict in Yugoslavia escalated by early September 1991 and turned into full- scale fighting, there was change in American policy. Ralph Johnson a State Department official declared in December 1991, that henceforth the US approach towards

Yugoslavia would be based on the principles of self determination, respect for the sanctity of borders, support for democracy, protection of human rights and respect for international law. Johnson omitted reference to unity and integrity of Yugoslavia or adoption of the market economy as goals to be supported by Washington. (103)

However, the US official did not endorse the use of force against Serbia as a viable option, even though he acknowledged that Serbia was mainly responsible for the violence. (104)

In December 1991 recognition of Yugoslavia’s secessionist republics became a divisive issue between the US and its allies in Europe. The US was resentful regarding EC support for Slovenia and Croatia, the first breakaway republics. Lawrence S. Eagleburger the US

Deputy Secretary of State issued a strongly worded warning to the European Community that to give premature and selective recognition to the breakaway Yugoslav republics would only cause a setback for peace and add fuel to ethnic tensions. (105)

The US government’s worries regarding Bosnia increased by reports began to come in about ethnic clashes in the republic and the formation of their respective militias by the

Serb, Croats and Muslims to defend the areas they considered theirs. In view of the explosive situation in Bosnia, the US Secretary of State, James Baker at a meeting with

European foreign ministers in Brussels on March 10, 1992 urged the Europeans to extend recognition to Bosnia immediately, and promised in return that the US would immediately follow with diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia too. (106)

US Ambassador Zimmermann called on Izetbegovic in Sarajevo. Izetbegovic had recently returned from Lisbon where an agreement had been signed under EU auspices.

After the meeting with the US ambassador, the Bosnian Muslim leader publicly renounced the Lisbon agreement. (107) Under this agreement, the three Bosnian ethnic leaders Karadzic, Izetbegovic and Stepan Klujic had agreed to divide the republic into three cantons, each for one ethnic group. It had been decided that these cantons would be loosely joined in a confederation that would operate as a sovereign state. (108) Some observers were of the view that the shift in American policy toward recognition had encouraged Izetbegovic, to break the deal. (109)

Zimmerman rejected this report in a letter to the New York Times. He asserted that US policy had been supportive of the EC talks, and that he did not in any way encourage

Izetbegovic to break the deal with the other ethnic group’s leaders. Zimmerman however, added that he did suggest to Izetbegovic that the agreement was not final, and he could take the opportunity to further advance his view point. (110)

The attempts to avert war collapsed after the failure of the Lisbon agreement. The

Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were now openly in conflict. (111)

Zimmermann later, admitted that the US had thought that if the issue was internationalized, the Serbian quest to grab power and territory might be stopped. US policy makers had believed that recognition by the west of Bosnia’s sovereignty would have acted as deterrent to Serbian aggression. (112) Zimmermann had added that the agreement brokered by the EU at Lisbon was “not bad at all.” (113)

The US favoured a single state with all ethno-religious group together. It promised to recognize its independence and urged that a partition would set a bad example for the region, in particular for the successor states of the erstwhile USSR, where ethnic violence had already begun to spread. (114)

In the referendum held in Bosnia at the end of February 1992, the Muslims and the

Croats voted for independence, but the Bosnian Serbs boycotted it. This referendum led to a rapid increase in tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (115) It is interesting to note that European efforts to broker an agreement for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on ethnic lines and US efforts to promote the recognition of the country’s independence proceeded on parallel tracks. In April 1992, the Europeans and Washington agreed to grant diplomatic recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (116) The result was bloody clashes between ethnic groups across the republic which soon turned into a full-scale civil war.

Though, the US and the EU expressed much eagerness to grant recognition to the pluralistic, multiethnic Bosnian state, the west did not back its words by actions. They did not take any steps to secure the country against the schemes of those who were willing to break it up. While symbolic gestures were offered in profusion, no effective actions were taken to deter the vulture –like intentions of neighbouring states and the menace posed by the YPA. (117)

Serbia and Montenegro joined in announcing the formation of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (FRY) on April 27, 1992. A ceremony was held in Belgrade to mark the occasion, but it was widely was boycotted. The republics which had declared their independence as well as the US boycotted it, for the so-called Federal Yugoslav army continued to occupy parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also the fighting had become more vicious in Bosnia. (118)

This situation prevailed, despite the fact that at a meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki, in

April 1992 Secretary of State James Baker warned the Serbian government that unless it stopped its aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and withdrew its forces within two weeks, Washington would seek FRY’s suspension from CSCE. The US did not pressure the other members of the organization for the aggressor’s suspension at the meeting. This was done to avoid annoying some European states and Russia, which opposed such moves. (119)

Three weeks after the war began, the US frustrated by its failure to dissuade Serbia from launching more attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina withdrew into passivity. The US again became more active used unilateral and multilateral methods to stop Serbia from use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (120) The US called back its Ambassador from Belgrade on May 12, 1992. A withdrawal of landing rights on US soil for JAT Yugoslavia’s national airline came next. The international community had been further provoked by a

Serb attack on a convoy of the Red Cross and a hostage-taking of around 3000 people.

(121)

The international media at that time began to focus on showing to the world the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by Serb forces on the Bosnian Muslims. In response, on May 22, Washington announced the shutting down of Yugoslav consulates in New

York and San Francisco and also sent back the staff, particularly military attaché of the

Yugoslav embassy in Washington. (122)

By the end of June 1992 Washington imposed more sanctions on FRY. The US government refused the credentials of Belgrade’s Ambassador to Washington. The FRY was stopped from attending the CSCE summit held in July and the United Nations

General Assembly session in September 1992. (123)

The US also took some positive measures in April 1992 for the victims of aggression.

Economic sanctions, that were imposed on Yugoslavia on December 6, 1991, were lifted from the breakaway republics Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The US State Department firmly stated that the sanctions imposed on Belgrade would be lifted only after it removed the economic blockade of Macedonia and Bosnia-

Herzegovina. (124)

When Serbian forces continued to unrelentingly shell Bosnian cities and towns, many UN member states began to demand the imposition of sanctions against the FRY, particularly

Serbia. The US and the European members of the Security Council started preparing a resolution for sanctions but could not resolve differences amongst themselves about how far the Security Council should go in putting pressure on the Yugoslav government for ending its aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The US wanted prompt and comprehensive sanctions which would include oil embargo against Belgrade (125) This, Washington believed would isolate Serbia and perhaps even lead to the ouster of the government led by Milosevic. (126) France, Britain and Belgium, on the other hand supported more gradual moves. The strongest measures, such as an oil embargo were to be imposed as a last resort. The Europeans believed that the Yugoslav government should be given a further chance to stop its aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (127) The economic sanction that imposed by the UN Security Council resolution 757 in May 1992, it appeared were causing more harm to the poorer people in Serbia and Montenegro.

Milosevic, in the meanwhile firmly held on to power. (128)

The US Treasury Department in June froze approximately $ 450 million worth of

Yugoslav assets including bank deposits. (129) In mid July to reinforce UN sanctions US warships alongwith NATO and WEU navies began patrolling the Adriatic and

Mediterranean seas. (130) However, these ships did not detain or check the vessels in

Yugoslav waters. (131)

Serbia remained as recalcitrant as earlier and did not stop its aggression against Bosnia-

Herzegovina. The situation was such that the supply of humanitarian aid had become impossible. There was much debate on the possible the use of force as an offensive military operation against Serbian troops or to protect convoys carrying relief supplies to the affected population. There were divisions in the US government on the use of force in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Defence Department strongly opposed the involvement of US forces in any direct combat action. The State Department on the other hand, supported the use of force but only for safely escorting relief missions. Some members of the US

Congress, particularly in the Senate, pressured the Administration to seriously consider military intervention to stop the Serbian aggression in Sarajevo. The US administration however, preferred to adopt the position that it would send US troops to Bosnia-

Herzegovina only to safeguard humanitarian assistance and that too after agreement on a durable cease-fire. (132)

Thus, when Bosnian Foreign Minister, in June 1992 urgently requested, military intervention to stop the massacre of thousands of innocent civilians, President Bush Sr, rejected this option as in applicable in the circumstances. The US government took the position that the sanctions had generated enough pressure on Serbia, for it to stop further aggression. (133) However, this did not happen.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council on August 13, 1992 adopted resolution 770, which had been sponsored by the US, Russia, UK, France and Belgium. By this resolution, the

UN body got the authority to take all necessary measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affecters. The US still hesitated to make any commitment to use its ground forces to put a stop to the conflict. General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, dismissed the possibility of even a limited form of

American military intervention for protecting the unfortunate Bosnian Muslims or to put a stop to the fighting. (134) The Pentagon believed that the use of any sort of force would inevitably result in the involvement of US force in ground combat with the Serb forces. Opposition by this very important government department became the biggest hurdle in direct U.S. involvement in the war. The deployment of American troops even to implement or enforce a negotiated settlement became impossible. However, the most credible explanation for American refusal to get militarily involved in the early stages of the war was that prominent policymakers were convinced that the war in Bosnia did not in any manner threaten US national interests. (135)

George D. Kenney the acting Chief of Yugoslav affairs at the US State Department, was forthright in his criticism of this policy. He dubbed the American approach on the

Yugoslav crisis as a classic case of appeasement of the aggressor. Kenney said that when in 1991 the breakup of former Yugoslavia appeared imminent the US administration had made it amply clear that the United States would not carry out military intervention to stop the conflict. This stance greatly emboldened Serbia’s thuggish leaders to carry out their schemes for a greater, ethnically ‘pure’ Serbia. (136)

The State Department officially held the view that the argument that the US was avoiding a potential quagmire was just a “smoke screen”. Further explaining his point Kenney said that it was cold political calculus that was holding back the US and Europe from militarily intervening in the conflict. They even thought it expedient to ignore the undeniable genocide being carried out by Serbia. The Administration, Kenney was convinced, had decided that it had more to gain by eschewing involvement in a very messy foreign abroad, which defied an easy or quick solution. In this way Washington was avoiding risks getting the blame for failure. The official even went to the extent of saying that despite all its rhetoric about concern for the hapless Muslims and their sincerity about wanting to stop the war, the administration simply did “not care about

Bosnia”. (137)

A scholar who also shared Kenney’s viewpoint, said that the US and European government by clearly stating what they would not do in Yugoslavia (basically use of force), had given up the “heavy advantage of ambiguity”. By this policy, the scholar further pointed out, the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing got great encouragement to continue with their cruelties. A long term problem also ensued for European governments as refugees began to pour into their countries. (138) The US too had to face this problem and when requested by international relief workers accepted 1,000 Bosnian refugees on its soil, albeit with reluctance. (139)

In July the war weary and battered Bosnian Muslim leadership requested the international community to exempt them from the weapon embargo, imposed in September 1991, on all of former Yugoslavia. This was urgently needed to allow them to defend their community more effectively. (140) A Canadian scholar noted, that it was highly unjust on part of the UN to treat the victims and the perpetrator in an equal manner. The neutrality in the matter of the arms embargo was not only unjust but even immoral. (141)

The US administration was inclined to support the removal of the embargo on the

Bosnian Muslims, but Cyrus Vance the UN negotiator and Owen, representing the EC said that removal of the embargo on one party would lead to an escalation of the conflict.

(142) This argument was seen as weighty and the victims were left to cope with the situation as best as they could.

On September 14 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to reinforce the UN

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. About 6000 troops were contributed by NATO countries not only to monitor aid delivery, but also to escort civilians who had been freed from detention camps across the country. The US had pressed for the addition of a clause from chapter seven of the UN Charter to allow the use of force. However, since China threatened to use its veto if it were included, this clause omitted. (143)

Actually, countries like China were afraid that this would set a precedent for international intervention in domestic matters of countries. With trouble in its own Muslim populated region of Xinjiang this was the last thing China wanted.

The US then suggested that the UN should adopt a resolution conferring on the US and its allies the authority to enforce a “no fly zone” over Bosnia-Herzegovina as had been done in Iraq. Such a resolution was passed by the UN body on October 11, 1992. The importance of the resolution was undermined when US Assistant Secretary of State

Eagleburger stated that its passage did not mean that strong military action would necessarily be taken. (144)

When it became apparent that UN sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia were being violated with impunity, the UN Security Council in November 1992 passed a resolution with the support of the US, Russia, Britain, France and Belgium for a naval blockade of the FRY. (145)

At this point in time the US Embassy in Belgrade and the American consulate in Zagreb started collecting evidence of human rights violations perpetrated by all parties in erstwhile Yugoslavia. There was strong condemnation of such actions. The US made public three reports on atrocities committed in Bosnia respectively in August, October and November 1992. A War Crimes tribunal for Bosnia-Herzegovina was set up by the

UN Security Council in October 1992. US Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger announced in December a list of Serbs and Croats who deserved to be brought to justice.

Included in this list were Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Karadzic, the

Bosnian Serb leader. (146)

A serious moral dilemma was posed for the American people and the administration by the Yugoslavia crisis. (147) Many officials of the Department of State resigned in protest against the decisions on the Bosnian crisis. The first to resign was George D. Kenney, the official who was overseeing the State Department’s policy on the Balkans. He wrote an article in which he expressed the belief that the Bosnian government had the right to self- defence. He warned policymakers that the failure of the Bosnian government and the completion of conquest of Bosnia by Serb forces would worsen the situation. He gave example of Croatia’s war with FRY, in which hostilities only came to a halt when a rough balance between the two sides was achieved. Kenney pointed out that the Serbian forces in Bosnia were over extended and if a strategy combining American and Western air strikes, air cover and arming of the Bosnians is adopted, Serbia would have to vacate its gains. He described the Americans role in resolving the crisis as “ineffective and counterproductive”. (148)

In his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton who had been strongly critical of President

Bush’s policy on Yugoslavia indicated that if he became president, a sterner policy against the Serb aggressor in Bosnia would be formulated and enforced. However, when

Clinton took over the reins of government, he backtracked on his campaign promise and avoided a direct American led military intervention in the region. (149) His justification was that the US had to avoid taking any action that could expose the peacekeeping troops of its European allies in Bosnia to danger. (150)

The new American administration under Bill Clinton was sceptical about the Owen-

Vance peace plan that had been presented in January 1993. The US saw it as having rewarded those involved in ethnic cleansing, (151) The plan gave the cantons ethnic labels on the map but the boundaries were not precisely and finally defined. This would have the predictable impact of triggering a renewal of competition for territory. (152)

The Clinton administration continued to criticize the Vance-Owen plan, but was still not willing to engage in a military operation in Bosnia. Washington offered no feasible alternative. (153) According to Secretary of State Warren Minor Christopher, the administration had come to the decision to be actively and directly involved in the multilateral efforts to work out a just and workable solution to this conflict, in particular to address both humanitarian and strategic issues. Humanitarian concerns meant “the human toll” taken by the war owing to ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Serbia and

“atrocities...committed by other groups”. In the strategic realm the US focus was on upholding the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered forcefully and, in preventing the crisis from turning into a wider conflagration in the Balkans. Defending the rights of minorities was also a major concern according to the

Secretary of State. Alongwith these concerns the US Administration was also worried that failure to act would damage the US image as the sole super power and leader of the western world. (154) Croat leader Mate Boban was the first to approve the Vance-Owen plan. He threatened the Muslims that the areas that had marked as Croat provinces in the

Vance-Owen plan would have to revert to Croatian authority. The Croat he said would make all out efforts to make other agree by political means, but this did not happen, then they reserved the right to use force. This attitude ended the alliance between the Croats

(HVO) and Bosnian Muslim forces. Now ferocious fighting began between them for central Bosnia. (155) The Special Rapporteur of the UN on Human Rights blamed the

Bosnian Croats (HVO) for a deliberately and systematically indulging in ethnic cleansing of Muslims in central Bosnia. (156) The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic too accepted the Vance-Owen proposal for they saw it as a mean to avert a possible military operation by the US and its European allies. Bosnian Serb Assembly however, rejected this plan. The Muslims rejected the plan for they perceived US involvement in the crisis as beneficial for them. (157)

In a session of the National Security Council on February 5, 1993, announced some measures. Among these measures was American participation in giving humanitarian aid to the victims. The Council also decided to endorse the enforcement of no flight zones in

Bosnia, and to back a strict enforcement of the economic embargo against Serbia. (158)

Besides, Reginald Bartholomew was appointed as a special US envoy to the United Nations. The purpose was to more proactively participate in efforts to resolve the crisis and in a manner which would be acceptable to the Bosnian Muslims. (159)

In a further effort Washington to pressure Serbia to stop its aggression in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Clinton tightened sanctions on Serbia through the following measures: (a)

Boats were given to Romania and Bulgaria to patrol the river Danube (b) Those firms which broke the embargo, were singled out and inactivated; and (c) the European allies were requested to cut back any financial dealings with Serbia. (160)

Serious differences arose between the US and its European allies on the matter of use of force against Serbia. In March 1993 the US pressed its NATO allies to mobilize 50,000 troops, while the US would contribute 25,000 soldiers for deployment in Bosnia and

Herzegovina for peace-keeping or intervention, as the situation demanded. France rejected the plan on the issue to allow NATO to command such forces. In the same month, the US rejected the Franco-British proposal to the UN Security Council to pass a resolution in support of the Vance-Owen Plan. (161)

Owing to these differences with allies, President Clinton on April 23, 1993, announced at a press conference that it would be better for the US to adopt a unilateral policy on

Bosnia. (162) A week later, the Washington made it know that it was seriously considering the lifting of military sanctions on the Bosnian Muslims. The tactic behind this announcement was that if the Serbs reacted to it by intensifying military action the

US could use it as a valid excuse to start aerial attacks on it. (163)

However, it was feared in government circles in Washington that if the UN imposed weapons embargo on the Bosnian Muslims was lifted, there would be more bloodshed.

Also, the European allies of the US were against it, for they were afraid that this action could put in danger the lives of the European troops carrying out humanitarian assistance operations in Bosnia. (164)

In a bid to convince the Europeans on US “lift and strike” proposal, Clinton sent US

Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe in early May, but Warren did not succeed in his mission. (165) The European partners wanted to establish safe areas, but the US was doubtful about their usefulness in resolving the crisis. The safe areas in the

US view would further encourage the ethnic cleansing policy by promoting the Muslim exodus from Serb-held areas. Besides more ground forces would be needed for providing protection to the Muslims. The Europeans were already pressuring the US to participate more fully in the on-going operation. So the acceptance of the plan for safe areas would not only increase European pressure but also increase the possibility of US involvement in combat on ground. The US had been assiduously avoiding this. (166)

Warren’s failure to convince the European partners to accept the American ‘lift and strike’ proposal undermined US credibility with regard to applying force against the

Serbs. (167) The US now accepted albeit reluctantly the proposal for establishing safe areas. (168)

The foreign ministers of the Russian Federation, the UK, France and Spain met in

Washington on May 22, 1993. At this moot they agreed on a joint strategy, which was as follows:

i. To continue with the sanctions on rump FRY and a ‘no fly zone’ over Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

ii. The issuance of a warning to Croatia, in the event of it continuing to assist

Bosnian Croat forces. Sanctions could also be imposed on it.

iii. Yugoslavia would be provided with monitors and technical assistance to make

sure that its offer to seal the Serbian border with Bosnia was genuinely

implemented.

iv. To mark out more ‘Safe areas’ in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

v. To consider the possibility of the Russian Federation’s troops joining the UN

troops in Bosnia.

vi. The US would protect the UN forces if attacked.

vii. To set up a war crimes tribunal to put on trial those involved in perpetrating

atrocities. viii. Acceleration of efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict

based on the Vance-Owen peace plan

ix. To establish close cooperation between the participating countries to stop an

escalation of the conflict. (169)

According to an observer these decisions signalled the final death warrant for Bosnia”.

The Bosnian Muslims were now encouraged to huddle together in a number of so-called

‘safe areas’, credible guarantees to which were not forthcoming. These areas would be guarded by UN forces whose mandate limited them to returning fire if they themselves came under attack. They could actually do nothing to stop the Muslims from being attacked, or to reiterate if they were. (170)

The warring parties reacted to the Washington Plan in different ways. President Alija

Izetbegovic the Bosnian Muslim leader saw the plan a totally “unacceptable” for the

Muslims. The OIC too rejected it for legitimising aggression against the Muslims of

Bosnia. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic (later indicted for war crimes) praised it for representing a “more realistic approach by the west”, He said it justified Serb opposition to the Vance-Owen Plan, which he declared as being dead. (171)

The Serbian government stuck to its stubbornness and declared on May 25, that it would not accept international monitors on its boundaries with Bosnia. It also declared that it would not accept the stationing of monitors in Kosovo, its ethnic Albanian dominated enclave. Croatian President Tudjman saw the plan as not being “sufficiently effective” for establishing peace. Tudjman dismissed the threat of sanctions against his country as a lame “excuse” to divert blame for the ineffectiveness of the measures adopted by the international community for resolving the crisis. (172)

The collapse of the Vance-Owen plan led to more intense fighting in Bosnia. The three warring factions were bent upon making more territorial gains. When the Serbs blockaded Sarajevo the US had no choice but to once again express its resolve to carry out air strikes against the Serb artillery. (173) When new rounds of peace efforts were launched in Geneva, in July 1993 the US tried to persuade France and Britain to agree to air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs to free Sarajevo. France at first expressed its reservations on air strikes but when the French manned UNPROFOR base in Sarajevo came under attack, it stopped its opposition. (174) At the end of July the Clinton administration began air attacks on the Serbs to force them to halt the shelling and abandon the siege of Sarajevo. These air strikes exceeded the authorization given by

Security Council Resolution 836, which only allowed air strikes for the protection of UN forces. There was now a clear change in American policy. The US wanted NATO too, to start attacks on its own initiative, without taking permission from the UN beforehand.

The US allies in NATO strongly opposed the plan as exposing their troops in Bosnia to danger. (175) At the NATO meeting of August 2, the NATO member states which had troops in Bosnia, insisted that air power should only be used for the defence of UN troops. The Canadians and the French were in the forefront in demanding this. It was said that the air strikes would lead to Serb retaliation and also weaken the ongoing peace talks in Geneva. The statement finally adopted by NATO deterred those who were dared to attack UN troops or stopped humanitarian assistance. It however, did not approve of any immediate action against the Serbs. Nevertheless, the NATO decision led to Serbian withdrawal from Mount Igman. (176) Meanwhile, Washington and its NATO allies forced the Bosnian government to come back to the negotiating table in Geneva from where it had withdrawn due to the decision of the International Conference on Former

Yugoslavia (ICFY) to focus negotiations in Geneva on partition. According to Media reports the US had decided to participate in the Geneva discussions to support the

Muslims in the talks and to persuade them to accept a deal. (177)

UN envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen presented a new peace plan in August

1993, dividing Bosnia into three mini-states based on ethnicity. They rewarded 50% of the land to Serbia, 20% to the Croats and 30% of the land in two separate pockets that were land locked to the Muslims. Tudjman and Milosevic accepted this plan but

Izetbegovic who was opposed to tripartite division of Bosnia accepted it, albeit reluctantly under US pressure. The Bosnian Parliament however, rejected this plan. (178)

Izetbegovic came to Geneva again on August 31 and with the Clinton administration’s backing requested the Serbs and Croats, to accommodate Bosnian Government’s demands for including additional territories. The US had warned of using the military option if the Bosnian Muslims were not accommodated. Apparently, there was public pressure on the administration to military intervene against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to stop the ongoing war. (179)

After the UNSC withheld its approval for NATO air strikes and refused to endorse a suspension of the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Izetbegovic went to Washington in September 1993 to seek support of the Congress for direct US military involvement to save the country. Clinton in his meeting with Izetbegovic had emphasized the need for endorsement by congress for a deployment of American forces in Bosnia. Since this endorsement was not forthcoming, the administration refused any commitment regarding deployment of US troops. (180)

There was no agreement on the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, but negotiations continued within and outside the ICFY process. In September 1993, a meeting was held on a ship in the

Adriatic where a modified plan was presented. It promised access to the Adriatic sea through Croatian territory for a future Muslim state. The Bosnian Muslims rejected this plan. Perhaps US support for the Muslims’ demands was partly behind Muslim rejection of the plan. The US delegate in the ICFY, Charles Redman, who participated in the

Bosnian parliamentary session that was deliberating on the proposal, did not oppose the

Bosnians’ decision. In fact, Redman, in ICFY meetings requested that further concessions be granted by the Croats and Serbs in favour of Bosnian Muslims. (181)

Apparently, the Bosnian Muslims were also not interested in accepting the proposal of the Adriatic meeting, for recently they had met with military success especially in central

Bosnia. (182)

Fighting in Bosnia escalated and the success of a negotiated settlement was in jeopardy.

Prominent American officials were now increasingly concerned about continuing US inaction, which they were convinced would not only hurt the NATO alliance but also increase the vulnerability of the new democracies in Eastern Europe. France was unhappy because of US refusal to pressurize the Bosnian Muslims to accept an agreement. Paris now forced its European partners to persuade the US to support the European Union’s efforts to secure a political solution of the conflict. (183)

In January 1994 the NATO heads of state and government met in Brussels to debate the

Bosnian conflict. American President Bill Clinton played a prominent role in the meeting.

It was decided at this meeting that the Bosnian Serbs would be pressured to accept the following demands with regard to the areas under the control of the Bosnian government which the Serb forces had besieged: (i) to re-open the Tuzla airport, (ii) to allow UN troops to bring relief to the victims of ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica; (iii) to end the siege of the Bosnian capital. A strongly worded warning was issued to the Bosnian Serbs and their supporter Serbia that air strikes would be carried out against them by the NATO alliance, if they did not stop their aggression. The Bosnian Serbs, however, stuck to their recalcitrant stand and rejected the demands as “unacceptable”. (184) The fact is that the Serbs were quite complacent about not being subjected to air strikes, owing to the previous differences between the US and its European allies. (185)

The Mortar bomb attacks on the besieged city of Sarajevo in early February and the extensive coverage given it by the media now increased public pressure on Western governments to stop their dilly dallying and take effective action to end the war. After a intense debate NATO issued a deadline of midnight February 20-21, 1994 to the Serbs and the Muslims to withdraw, or submit their heavy weapons to UN “control”. They were warned that otherwise air strikes would begin against any remaining heavy artillery.

Since the UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi’s expressed satisfaction over the partial withdrawal of heavy weapons by the Serbs, the air strikes were postponed. (186)

A scholar has pointed out that the aim of the air strike threat was not really to give any favour to the Muslims. Its actual objective was to convey the impression to the Muslims that Washington was their only supporter in the west. The US thus hoped that the

Muslims would become more amenable to signing a deal for partitioning of Bosnia. In this task the EC and the UN mediators had both failed. (187)

The US had now begun to encourage an alliance between the Muslims and the Croats for resolving the Bosnian conflict. This, Washington hoped would end the war in central

Bosnia, and offer a counterweight to Serb military power. Through this alliance Bosnia could be divided into two instead of three entities. (188) The Bosnian and Croatian foreign ministers met in Germany to mend relations between the two countries and reach an agreement on the formation of a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia. Both sides were under intense American pressure during these negotiations. Croatian President Tudjman the supporter of Bosnian Croats was threatened with sanctions (189) and the Bosnian government led by Izetbegovic was warned that if it did not accept the American plan, the Washington would not intervene to stop the fighting in Bosnia. (190) Further meetings were held in Vienna in March and an agreement was reached on a constitution, that had been drafted by US diplomats. An agreement between the two warring parties was signed in Washington, DC on March 18, 1994. The Muslims and Croats areas were united into a single entity that would have close economic and military ties with Croatia.

The agreement was presented for approval to the assemblies of the three ethnic groups.

The accord was approved by the Bosnian Croat Assembly in Mostar on March 26, while the Bosnian Muslim Assembly gave its approval on March 30, it was however, rejected by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale on March 24. (191)

The Washington peace plan did not clearly delineate the status of the Serbs in Bosnia-

Herzegovina. The agreement only recognized the Bosnian Croats and Muslims as the constituent peoples of the Republic. (192)

While the US succeeded in putting an end to the fighting between the Croats and

Muslims and persuaded them to launch a joint Croat-Muslim military struggle against the Serbs, the fighting around Gorazde in April 1994 receded all hopes of bringing about a cease-fire in the region. NATO carried out some limited air attacks on the Serbs but the latter did not stop their aggression. There was again pressure on the Clinton administration to find a political settlement of this conflict. (193)

The Clinton administration which was already confused by its internal division over a possible solution of the conflict was now becoming apprehensive about the lack of progress in the ICFY negotiations. They were also worried about UN opposition to the use of force against the Serbs. The US was also under pressure from its European partners. The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, had recently urged the US administration to pressurize the Bosnian Muslims to end the conflict. Thus, by 1994, a host of factors together compelled the Clinton government to give serious consideration to the use of force as a tool to end the conflict. It began looking into the options of applying more massive air power against the Serbs, lifting the arms embargo on the

Bosnian government, or launching a direct military intervention. (194) To bring about a permanent ceasefire as well as a political settlement, a new forum for negotiations, the

Contact Group, was set up on April 26, 1994 in London. Russia, the US, France,

Germany and the UK were represented in this forum. Thus the peace offensive was to be led the US, in partnership with Russia. The ICFY’s role as mediator now ended. In May

1994, the Contact Group presented a formula for the settlement of the conflict. It awarded

51% of Bosnian territory to the Muslim Croat federation and 49% to the Serbs. (195)

Washington meanwhile, continued to seek the application of more intense military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and the tightening of sanctions against Serbia. (196)

Rumania, Greece and Macedonia were put under pressure to stop the smuggling of oil and other essential goods into FRY. These actions began to seriously hurt the Yugoslav economy and compelled Milosevic to seek peace negotiations with the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. (197)

The parties in conflict were not in agreement about the map which was being prepared by the Group. On their part the US, the Russian Federation and the Europeans were also busy in making territorial distributions favourable for their respective clients, while ostensibly making an effort to make an arrangement acceptable to all parties. (198)

A new partition plan was presented by the Contact Group in July, 1994.This plan conferred more territory on the Bosnian-Croat federation than the Owen-Stoltenberg plan had, but it was less than what the Vance-Owen plan had offered. The US government expressed reservations about the new plan. (199)

Internal pressure increased on the US government to lift the arms embargo against the

Bosnian Muslims. The House of Representatives in June 1994, voted to lift the embargo on arms by a considerable majority, where many members belonged to the President’s own party. However, in July the Senate failed to approve the lifting of the embargo by only one vote. (200)

While the Bosnian Assembly approved the Contact Group’s partition plan, the Bosnian

Serb Assembly refused to ratify it. The latter’s insistence was that the Bosnian Serbs should be allowed to create a confederation with the rump Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. (201) The Contact Group and Russia’s unwillingness to use force encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to reject the plan. (202) Subsequently Serbia’s President

Slobodan Milosevic criticized the Bosnian Serbs opposition to the plan, and in early

August the FRY announced that it was closing its border with Serb-held Bosnia-

Herzegovina. (203) This change in attitude came because the Contact Group promised to table a Security Council resolution to ease the embargo against rump Yugoslavia if the

Group’s plan was accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. In early August, the US Secretary of

State Warren Christopher had indicated that sanctions on FRY would be eased if

Belgrade imposed a blockade against the Bosnian Serb-held areas. (204) This was an incentives for FRY to abandon their clients the Bosnian Serbs.

The rejection by the Bosnian Serbs’ of the Contact Group’s plan once again increased the pressure on the Administration to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian

Muslims. However, Clinton still hesitated to adopt unilateral measures that would violate the Security Council’s resolution. It feared that a wrong precedent would be set for violating future UN embargos. Instead Washington proposed that it would table a UN resolution for removing the embargo on arms, if Bosnian Serbs did not endorse the plan by October 15. Moscow which was against this proposal threatened to use its veto in the

Security Council. Thus, the US which was in a dilemma about lifting the embargo unilaterally, now decided to take covert action. In fact Clinton’s national security advisor acknowledged later, during the congressional inquiries into the administration actions, that Washington already knew in 1992 about the Iranian involvement in smuggling arms to the Bosnian government but had desisted from taking any action against it. Bosnian government officials too admitted that by 1993, it had been receiving weapons and money for buying arms from Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Pakistan via Turkey.

Arms were also being supplied by Hungary and Argentina. Though the US publicly upheld the arms embargo, it was undoubtedly aware of these clandestine transactions but chose to ignore them. In early 1995 there were reports that covert arms shipments, breaking the embargo had increased. There were also allegations of US involvement, or at least its looking the other way to allow these covert activities. (205)

The Serb attack on Bihac and the NATO air strikes to defend the safe area that followed was the first effort of the US government to use air power for achieving wider political objectives. American allies were not happy about the air strikes. (206) US policymakers also feared that their governments’ decision to use military power to force the warring parties to arrive at a compromise position could harm NATO cohesion, without really altering the course of the war. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, for instance held the view that Washington should not have recourse to force to achieve a settlement, instead he supported the use of diplomacy and incentives to soften the Bosnian Serbs.

(207)

However, the US which had looked the other way when the Bosnian Muslims were getting arms through third parties, now started to openly, endeavour to strengthen the

Croatian army and promote a Muslim-Croat military alliance for developing a counterbalance to Bosnian Serbs forces on the ground. By the end of 1994, the plan to lift the arms embargo was considered a great risk owing to the possibility of escalation of the fighting that would in turn compel the UN to pull its troops out of Bosnia. (208) The US strategy could than backfire.

A four month cease-fire agreement was brokered by former American president Jimmy

Carter. It gave an opportunity to the US to try to coordinate diplomatic and military resources in order to achieve a lasting peaceful settlement of the conflict. (209) The US strategy required that direct negotiations be held with the Bosnian Serbs, and to give some political concessions to them in the settlement. It was also necessary for the US to exert pressure on the Bosnian Government to accept the settlement, which could mean a de facto, perhaps a permanent, division of the state. Such a division they had rejected earlier. (210)

The military aspect of the US strategy meant its direct and indirect role in arming, training, and supporting the Muslim and Croatian forces to retaliate against the Bosnian

Serbs. (211)

The Clinton government came under increased pressure, when in congressional elections in November 1994 the Republicans met with success. Clinton had to take major steps to resolve the crisis, in order to avert defeat in the forthcoming presidential elections in

1996. The Clinton administration then resumed direct negotiations with the Bosnian

Serbs leadership in December 1994. A succession of events reflected a new US policy.

These were: the visit of the US ambassador to Germany to Pale, the US President’s support for the Carter’s mission to Bosnia and his direct talks with the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding a cease-fire deal. Another event indicating an alternation in policy was the removal of the US ambassador to Bosnia who was known to be a strong supporter of the Bosnian Muslims unwilling to give any concessions to the Bosnian Serbs and his replacement by a deputy who favoured direct talks with the Serbs. (212)

On its part the Contact Group presented proposals based on the July peace plan that divided Bosnia between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs which upheld for an eventual confederation between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY. (213) However, the

Bosnian Serb parliament again rejected the proposal of the Contact Group on political grounds. They contended that it required them to become part of a united Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and staunchly declared that no external pressure could compel them to accept it. (214)

The avert differences among the great powers and within the US administration itself on the issue of more concessions to the Serbs and lifting the sanctions against Belgrade, emboldened Milosevic to end his cooperation to halt the war. He now wanted more concessions from the Contact Group. (215)

Despite of ceasefire, fighting did not cease in Bosnia, and when the period of the ceasefire ended, the Bosnian Serb forces launched vicious attacks on Sarajevo and

Srebrenica and by July 1995 they were able to take over the UN declared ‘safe areas’ of

Zepa and Srebrenica, where more than 7,000 unarmed Muslim refugees were massacred in cold blood by Serb forces. NATO responded by carrying out a series of air raids on

Bosnian Serb military positions. (216)

While NATO raids were continuing, a meeting was held in August 1995 between

Milosevic and an American delegation in Belgrade. The delegation included Richard

Holbrooke and the two sides discussed the new US sponsored peace plan. This new plan envisaged that the Bosnian Serbs would keep the Muslim enclaves of Zepa and

Srebrenica, which they had earlier occupied, and they would be given some more land around the so called “Brcko corridor” which connected the two parts of their territory. As compensation the Muslims would get land around Sarajevo. (217) Serb leader Karadzic

(later known as the butcher of Srebrenica, and accused of war crimes) however was against talks on the basis of the 51-49 division of land. (218)

After Srebrenica and Zepa, fell to the Serbs, the Bosnian government army alongside the

Bosnian Croat militia and Croatian forces were able to wrest several areas occupied by the Serbs. The latter was now under immense pressure, NATO air strikes were going on, the US indicated that it would no longer oppose the lifting of the arms embargo on the

Bosnian government forces; there was fear that the UN troops would be withdrawn; and that the US would seek an intensification of the air raids against the Bosnian Serbs. This scenario compelled the Bosnian Serbs to become amenable to enter into diplomatic negotiations to end the crisis. (219)

This carrot and stick policy paved the way for the success of the Bosnian peace plan formulating by the US. On September 8, 1995 a meeting was held in Geneva, chaired by

US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and attended by representatives of the

Contact Group, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnian and Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY who represented the Bosnian Serbs. The representatives of all sides agreed upon the basic principles for a peace settlement, under which the Muslim-Croat federation would be given 51 percent of the territory while the Bosnian Serb republic Srpska got 49 percent of

Bosnia’s land. (220) By recognizing the title of Republika Srpska for the self-declared state of the Bosnian Serbs, the agreement made a major concession to the aggressor Bosnian Serbs. Permission was given to both entities to establish special relations with

Serbia and Croatia respectively. By inserting these clauses in the agreement, Washington acknowledged the Bosnian Serb claim to an autonomous status within Bosnian and

Herzegovina. It was but natural that the government in Sarajevo should be unhappy by this major concession to the aggressor, but they had to bow to the wishes of the superpower. (221)

At the end of the September, another meeting was held in New York. This was attended by the Yugoslav, Bosnian and Croatian foreign ministers, who worked out some more essential modalities for the political set-up in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was to be a collective presidency, a federal parliament, a cabinet and a constitutional court. It was also agreed, that free and fair elections would soon be held in the country under international auspices. (222)

The accord did not address all important issues. These were left for future discussions.

These included the question of how the new central government of Bosnia would work and the details of the relationship between the two entities. There were disagreements over how to perform the functions related to statehood, including foreign trade, customs and border administration, citizenship and passport controls as well as representation in international organization. (223)

American efforts to put an end to hostilities to achieve a lasting peace met with success when Holbrooke on October 5, 1995, brokered a cease-fire agreement between Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs. The cease-fire took effect on October 10. The brokering of this agreement was important for the credibility of the US. (224) The super powers’ image was much improved by this accomplishment. The differences between the

US and the Russian Federation on the issue of the latter’s role in a future peacekeeping force in Bosnia were still not sorted out. Thus, in late October a summit was held in New

York between President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The two leaders signed a partial agreement on Russia’s participation in a future peacekeeping force in Bosnia, but it would be independent of the NATO peace keeping force. (225)

The ceasefire and a basic settlement among warring groups had been achieved. However, the American diplomatic skills were still being tested in the Dayton peace talks which began on November 1, 1995. Richard Holbrooke chaired the meeting amidst conflicting demands of the parties involved. Among the participants were the EU envoy, the Contact

Group, the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. An invitation had not been extended to the

President of the Bosnian Serbs and the Serb military commander owing to their alleged involvement in war crimes. Milosevic represented them. However, it was feared that if

Milosevic did not succeed in persuading the Bosnian Serbs to accept the agreement, the whole exercise would be fruitless. (226) It would be pertinent to recall that they had already rejected two peace plans for Bosnia presented in 1993 and 1994.

Making discussion about the framework of Bosnia’s future constitution was a daunting task, despite the fact that all parties concerned had already agreed that Bosnia should comprise two autonomous parts, which would have a common parliament, a collective presidency and a constitutional court. The Bosnian Serbs, represented by Milosevic insisted that their part should be given the right to secede. The Muslim and the US were not ready to accept this demand. (227) On the other hand, President Tudjman warned to use force in Eastern Slavonia, the eastern part of the country, which was held by the local

Serbs of the Krajina. Also, the Croats were not very keen to be in a federation with the

Bosnian Muslims. The idea of the Muslim-Croat federation underpinned the US peace plan, and withdrawal of the Bosnian Croats would have been fatal for the plan. Earlier, the Bosnian Croats had blocked agreements that would have strengthened the federation.

(228) The Muslims had been unhappy with Tudjman’s decision to give the Bosnian

Croats the right to vote in Croatian general elections in October 1995. The US warned the

Croatian President that for a lasting peace the Croats to concede territory to the Muslims and to sincerely support the federation. (229) Another matter that caused worry in

Washington was an escalation of tensions after horror stories about the massacre of thousands of Muslim males, by Bosnian Serbs, began appearing in the media. (230)

However, despite all these glaring issues, it was clear that all parties were thoroughly exhausted by this war. Further, military pressures, the economic incentives offered by the great powers, and calculations of long-term political gains convinced them to remain on the negotiating table. The Bosnian Muslims realized since the Serbs were in a stronger military position, they could not expect a better deal than the 51 percent territory offered to them, which would be protected by NATO. Moreover, they were sure that large-scale

American and EU assist would be given to them for reconstruction. The Federation would be supported by the international community, the arms embargo would be lifted, which would help in equipping and training of government forces. The Bosnian Muslims were confident that if they agreed to the American proposals, Washington would ensure

Serb compliance with both the military and political aspects of the Dayton Accords. (231)

The Serbs on the other hand felt that through this deal they would be able to avoid further territorial losses, for they had been losing territory with the Croat and Bosnian attacks in the Krajina and western Bosnia. Thus, Milosevic could now present himself to the world as a peacemaker. His consideration was that an accommodating posture now would later save him from war crime allegations in Bosnia. Another important incentive was that trade sanctions against FRY would be lifted. (232)

The Croat interest was that the Dayton accords would them allow to keep a larger share of Bosnian territory (close to 25 percent). Above all, the creation of the Bosnian

Federation would allow them to establish even closer political, economic, and military relations with Croatia proper. Besides, Croatia and the Bosnian Croats would also be given substantial financial aid from the West, and President Franjo Tudjman’s international repute would be enhanced. Most importantly the European Union would seriously consider granting membership to Croatia. (233)

A lasting peace in Bosnia necessitated compromises and concessions by all three warring parties and they did understand that the final agreement may not be fully satisfactory for all of them. According to one author the Americans “were expected to make it ‘sweet and sour’ for all the three parties so that none gets it too good and none all bad”. (234)

President Izetbegovic aptly remarked at the initialling of the accords at Dayton that the agreement was an “unjust peace, but more just than a continuation of war”. (235) He knew that a prolongation of war would leave the Muslims bereft of even more territory. It was apparent that post Dayton Bosnia would not be the tolerant, multi-racial and multi- religious state that most Muslims wanted. Nevertheless, least it would exist as a single country. (236)

The Serbs were not contented with Dayton Accords. They felt it had given undue concession to the Muslims and had not allowed them to break the country up and allow them to join Greater Serbia. The Croats regained all the areas they had lost, and most of it had been cleansed of other ethnic groups. (237)

The agreement which was initialled on November 21, 1995 in Dayton (US) and formalized on December 14 in Paris is a lengthy document which includes 11 annexures and maps. It drew up the arrangements for military security and how the warring sides would be separated to avoid another conflagration. It distributed territory between the

Croat–Muslim Federation and the Srpska. The agreement gave an outline of the constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the political set up and the policing of the country. The procedures for dealing with issues such as human rights, refugees, minorities and war crimes were also defined. (238)

The US did not play an active role in the early period of the crisis for its attention was mostly focused on Eastern Europe and the Gulf war; moreover, there were no American interests at stake in the Balkans. The region lacked any resources that would attract the

US. But the fact is that it was the US’s decisive role that led a resolution of the conflict.

When all peace talks being conducted by others or even the US failed, the Dayton negotiations under the US supervision restored peace. Washington’s strategy of applying force for securing agreement had not been adopted in the previous peace talks. One can claim with certainty that if the US had been fully involved in the onset of the crisis and had genuinely backed EU peace efforts and also heeded the Congressional resolution to remove the arms embargo on the Bosnian government (Muslims) instead of providing arms secretly and from other channels, thousands of people could have been saved and likewise hundreds would not have undergone atrocities.

The European Response to the Bosnian Crisis At the outset, the European Union did not pay much heed to the Balkan crisis, for it was preoccupied with the transformation of East and Central Europe. Also, at that time its focus was on economic matter. However, a qualitative transformation of the Community into the European Union had begun with the implementation of the treaty on European

Union in 1992. (239)

However, despite an embryonic common foreign and security policy, EC member did try to form a coherent and effective policy vis-a-vis the Yugoslav issue. This was necessary because of physical closeness to the region, the existing economic and commercial relations, and the dangers that unfolding events in Yugoslavia posed to Europe’s peace, stability and security. (240)

At the beginning of the conflict, European powers were very keen to preserve the country’s unity and that is why they did not support the Croatian and Slovenian demands for independence. They thought that backing the status quo in Balkans would be more in their interest. (241) To achieve this objective they made use of financial and economic levers in dealing with the conflict. (242)

Soon however, it became evident that blindly favouring the unity of Yugoslavia and outrightly rejecting the right of self-determination could result in a violent dismemberment of the country, which in turn would destabilized the whole region. (243) The Danish and German governments, were the first ones to realize the gravity of the situation and to openly support recognition of the secessionist units of the Federation.

Their contention was that the grant of independence to the two republics was very much in according to the principles of self-determination contained in the Helsinki Accords on

European security and cooperation of 1975. (244) However, their partners in the

European Union were not ready to support the breakaway Republics in their declaration of independence. The perception widely prevailed that Yugoslavia’s separations movement would not only ignite a conflagration in highly vulnerable east-central Europe and further the chaos in the Soviet Union but also fire the imagination of the nationalists in European Community member states. France was faced with a nationalist movement in Corsica, Spain was dealing with the nationalist movement in Catalonia and the Basque region, Britain was dogged by the unresolved issue of Northern Ireland, while Italy had to contend with an incipient anti-centralist political movement in the industrial north. (245)

Another reason why most European countries were keen to support the integrity of

Yugoslavia, was the economic interests of EC member countries. European capitals calculated that this conflict in the region or even a peaceful disintegration of Yugoslavia would result in the latter defaulting on its external debt. The European Community was apprehensive that if the Yugoslav Federation defaulted, it would lead to a flight of capital from Europe that would have an adverse impact on the German Deutsche Mark, the

Italian lira and the Austrian schilling. The inevitable impact would be the strengthening of the position of the US dollar, which would cause a rise in European interest rates, and adversely affect European economic activity. (246) Moreover, the EC also foresaw that a worsening of the situation in the Balkans would result in an influx of refugees in members countries. (247) Italy, which had already been flooded by tens of thousands of

Albanian refugees, did not want to accept more refugees from Yugoslavia. (248)

Germany was the only country which loosened its restrictions on immigration to allow more refugees from former Yugoslav to enter the country. EC member states preferred to give humanitarian assistance to the war affected people, and thereby keep their own soils sanitized from unwanted foreigners. (249)

The biases rooted in history and cultural were also quite prominently reflected in EU decision making on the Yugoslav crisis. Croatia and Slovenia were very close to

Germany in the economic and political realms before and during the Second World War.

Serbia had been allied to France and Britain during this war. Serbia pinpointed this relationship between Croatia and Germany, highlighting the fascist aspect. (250)

The Community had the choice of using economic, financial, diplomatic and political instruments for dealing with the Yugoslav crises. However, the Community (not its member states) lacked military muscle so it was not able to exert political pressure on the belligerents. (251)

The EC was the main trading partner of Yugoslavia, so after deliberations, it was decided that financial and economic tools would be used to stop the conflict. To preserve

Yugoslavia’s unity the EC released a 730 million ECU ($ 900 million) loan to Yugoslavia over five years. Besides it also threatened Belgrade that a military attack on

Slovenia would result in a withdrawal of EC loans and assistance. In the beginning, the

Community used a kind of ‘carrot and stick’ policy to persuade the federal government to shed its bellicosity towards the federating units. It was told that continuity of EC assistance packages would depend on its political behaviour towards the Republics seeking secession. (252)

The EC’s objective in offering this aid package was to restore the rotating federal presidency, encourage the republics to enter into a dialogue, assist in economic reforms that would lead to an equitable distribution of wealth to the republics and promote respect for minority rights. (253)

The troops of the federation attacked Slovenia in June 1991 and undermined the EC’s efforts to keep Yugoslavia united. The EC imposed sanctions on Serbia in November

1991. It cancelled the preferential trade benefits conferred on it and withdrew the trade deal with it. The EC realized that the use of economic tools was not helping in the resolution of the crisis for Serbian nationalism had become so strident that it overshadowed Yugoslavia’s economic interest. (254)

As pointed out by a scholar that if the EC recognized the independence of Croatia and

Slovenia and enticed them with the prospect of eventual membership of the European Union and combined it with strict discouragement of Serbia’s irredentist claims for the creation of Greater Serbia, it would have been more successful in settling the crises. (255)

The diplomatic instruments the EC used consisted of visits by ministerial troika, observer missions, presentation of peace plans. The most outstanding mediation and diplomatic initiative of the EC in the Yugoslavia crises was the Brioni agreement. (256) On July 7,

1991 it sent its ministerial troika to Yugoslavia to mediate a ceasefire agreement between

Croatia, Slovenia and the federation. The two secessionist republics under this deal agreed to postpone the implementation of their declarations of independence for a period of three months, and to participate in the negotiations for resolving the conflict. (257) It was decided in Brioni that a European observer mission comprising 50 civilian and military forces would be stationed to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. The

Brioni agreement also gave a detailed description of the tasks of the EC observer missions. (258)

The Brioni Agreement was not completely successful. For instance, in Slovenia, the ceasefire took place, the dialogue process began, and the three month suspension of declaration of independence was observed which was why its ultimate independence was secured. Slovenia was treated with respect because it cooperated with the EC. The Brioni agreement also provided the base for Community to carry on its mediation role. (259)

Besides the Community’s troika which was working to achieve a lasting ceasefire, the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of which Yugoslavia was a member also made efforts to resolve the crisis. At its Prague meeting on July 4, 1991 the

CSCE decided to send Yugoslavia a “good offices” mission. The mission’s tasks also included the formation of a ‘new constitutional order’ in Yugoslavia. The Federation however, rejected this proposal because they saw it as interference in their internal affairs. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union wanted the CSCE to sponsor a mission, whose task would be limited to facilitating political negotiations among the opposing parties.

The Soviet Union was particularly concerned that this procedure not be applied so as to become a precedent in other cases. It was worried that the Soviet republics seeking secession especially in the Baltic region would want the same procedure. (260)

The Yugoslavia crisis of June 1991 displayed the limitations of the role the CSCE in conflict resolution which could be held back by one influential member state. Decision- making in CSCE was by consensus. Thus the consensus rule and the 1975 Helsinki principle of non interference in the internal matters of member states could undermine the initiatives of the CSCE. In combination, these two made the institution not very effective for the purposes for which it was created. The European Community was therefore handed over this task. In its concluding documents the CSCE registered its appreciation on the EC member countries’ willingness to organize the mission. The EC’s aim was to get the two sides to agree on long-lasting ceasefire and to monitor the agreement’s implementation. (261)

The case of Slovenia was much simpler than that of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This was so because Slovenia had no borders with Serbia nor did it have a Serb minority like in Croatia. Thus Serbia and the federal army felt it was not feasible to engage in a prolonged war in Slovenia and welcomed the chance given them by the EC to withdraw from the Slovenia. (262)

After its withdrawal from Slovenia, the rump FRY began to occupy Croatian and later

Bosnian lands through the Federal Yugoslav army (YPA). It was now apparent that the

YPA was exclusively a Serbian army. It also inducted Serb irregulars, to fight side by side with the army. The war against Croatia was thus waged. (263) Milosevic had arrived at the conclusion that after Slovenia’s successful secession, Croatia would not remain in the federation. As justification for military action against Croatia, Dobrica Cosic, the

Yugoslav President accused Croatia of wanting to set up a second Ustasha state.

Therefore, the YPA and the Serb militia had the right to free the Serb population held hostage by ‘Croatian fascism’. Thus, Croatia was attacked by the federation army and local Serb insurgents in July 1991 on different fronts. (264)

Since it was EC’s backyard and conflict and instability in the region would inevitability impact upon the member states of the Community, the latter started two-track diplomacy to overcome the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. Observers were sent to monitor the ceasefire between the Croatian and the federation forces. The EC also called a peace conference in The Hague in September 1991 chaired by former British Foreign Secretary of Lord Carrington. (265) However, its failure at Hague the EC constituted the Badinter

Commission of international jurists, for arbitrating on the issue of secession. The

Commission reached the conclusion that the declarations of independence by the

Federating units were not secessionist moves but was a result of the demise of the federation. The Commission recommended that the breakaway states be internationally recognized as independent countries. (266)

It had become quite clear by fall 1991 that Yugoslavia’s unity could not be maintained through force. However, the conflict had to be urgently resolved to restore stability to the continent. It appeared that the EC’s European Political Cooperation (EPC) had not been able to bear pressure from the complexities of the situation and the respective national interests of the member states. A very serious difference was on whether there should be military intervention or not. While EC member states had agreed on the point that its peace keepers should be sent to Yugoslavia, there was disagreement on the degree of intervention and type of the military force that was to be used. (267) The possibility of such an intervention also raised questions about the relationship between the European

Community, its member states and another European institutions, the Western European

Union (WEU). Thus, a special joint meeting of the Community and the WEU foreign ministers held in the Hague to discuss ways to increase the effectiveness of the EC’s ceasefire monitoring operation. At this meeting there was a qualitative change in the relationship between the EC and the WEU. It soon became apparent that the WEU had now started serving as the military wing of the Community. The WEU had been asked to draw up options for the WEU-EC cooperation. Amongst the options presented was the provision of armed escorts for the monitors; the dispatch of a peacekeeping forces that would be lightly armed. These peace-keeping forces to be dispatched to Croatia would comprise 5000-6,000 men. Another option was to send 25,000-50,000 troops to police the truce. The only member state of the EC and WEU which rejected all the military options was the UK and this was because of its experience in Northern Ireland. (268)

The French were vacillating between supports for military intervention to strengthen the security of Europe and the latter’s self-sufficiency in defence, aimed at lessening

European dependence on the US, but did not like the idea of fighting their old ally Serbia.

Denmark, Portugal and Spain did not mind participating in a peacekeeping mission, but were not keen to take part in a wider military operation. (269)

German government had a different stance on this issue. Its contention was that since the

YPA had attacked Croatia the situation had changed and now the conflict had been transformed from political one to a military one. Therefore, the international community had but two options to bridle the Serbian aggression: a) to contain Serbia militarily and

/or rollback Serbian irredentism b) to internationalize these ‘civil wars’ so as to intensify the international pressure in favour of Croatia and Slovenia. If both these breakaway republics were recognised as fully sovereign states, they would be able to get international support under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Recognition would also change the status of YPA into occupying force. The international community would then be in a better position to reject Serbian territorial expansion. (270) Bonn pointed out that since the Federation’s forces and the Serb militia had violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of victims of war it would be counterproductive to pursue the path of negotiations with the Serbian government. (271) Lord Carrington also failed to suggest any instrument which EC could use to pressure Serbia into halting its military campaign against Croatia, or to make it respect the several ceasefires which they accepted and then broken, often on the same day. The German government therefore contended that Hague

Conference could only produce results when a durable ceasefire was in place in Croatia.

(272)

However, there was one brake on German enthusiasm and this was its constitution which forbade German troops involvement in foreign land. (273) Thus it called for the internationalization of the crisis. Germany’s European partners France and Britain did not endorse the German approach. It almost seemed as if they were waiting for Serbia to defeat Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN and EC arms embargo made it difficult for Croatia and Bosnia to defend themselves against Serbian aggression. The arms embargos against the victims continued, although the EC member states knew that

Serbia was unwilling to resolve the crisis by peaceful means. Serbia’s refusal to accept

EC proposals presented at the Hague Conference in October 1991 for stopping the

Balkan war confirmed Belgrade’s intentions. Germany and Italy now began distance themselves from the appeasement policy of France and Britain and again at the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1991 Germany exhorted its fellow member states to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. (274)

There was also tremendous on pressure on the German government to adopt a policy favouring diplomatic recognition of the two breakaway republics. Further there was a strong feeling in Germany that Yugoslavia’s unity could only be maintained through force which would only lead to more bloodshed. Also, there was no doubt that the federal government in Belgrade was no longer representing the whole country. (275)

There was some progress on the matter of recognition /non- recognition when the EC foreign ministers on December 17, 1991, reached agreement on criteria for EC recognition of the post communist countries of Eastern Europe. For the breakaway

Yugoslav republics some additional criteria were agreed upon. Among the general criteria were the protection of human rights and minorities and the promise that any change of boundaries would only take place through peaceful means. Countries were also required to make a firm commitment eschew the proliferation of nuclear weapons and conventional arms. An additional condition regarding Yugoslavia was that it should support the UN in the deployment of a peacekeeping force and also facilitate the proposed EC peace conference. Greece, European Community member state was adamant that the Yugoslav republics abandon any territorial claims on their EC neighbours. This actually referred to the issue of Macedonia. Greece did not want the name to be used, for it accused Macedonia of having territorial claims over Greek

Macedonia. Thus, each European Community member state had its own axe to grind. The member states agreed that if the secessionist republics stood the test of there criteria the EC countries would recognize them on January 15, 1992. Germany, however, decided not to wait for all this and on December 23, 1991 it extended recognition to Croatia and

Slovenia. Bonn’s European allies were very upset by its unilateralist attitude, but they thought that they must no longer delay recognition. Thus, they recognized the two secessionist republics on January 15, 1992. (276)

The Badinter Commission also considered the issue of international recognition of

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence. Despite the fact that the Bosnian Government had promised to accept the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the draft convention drawn up the Hague

Conference on Yugoslavia (4 November 1991) for the protection of human rights and the rights of national and ethnic groups, etc, the Commission did not recommend recognition of Bosnian independence by the European Community. The logic it put forth was that it could not be proved that the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina want it to be a sovereign and independent state because the Serbian members of the Presidency had dissociated themselves’ from the Bosnian Government’s declaration of independence.

The Commission also pointed out that the ‘Bosnian Serbs had voted for a united

Yugoslav state and not an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Commission opined that none of the Bosnian ethnic groups had a majority which was a requirement for self- determination for eventual independence. It therefore asked the Bosnian Government to hold a referendum of all the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina without discrimination, on the issue of independence to be carried out under international supervision. This would prove whether a majority was in favour of independence. (277)

The EC’s monitoring mission for Croatia was now expended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to keep a check on compliance of the cease-fire and other EC sponsored agreements. (278)

To restore peace in Bosnia, in February 1992, the EC invited Bosnian leaders

Izetbegovic, Mate Boban, Radovan Karadzic to Lisbon to take part in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. (279) Jose Cutilheiro the mediator appointed by the EC presented a plan for the restructuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three autonomous regions. Each of these regions would have a majority of one of the three ethnic groups of the republic. All three regions would have a co-equal role in the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to the plan envisaged the country’s external borders would remain unchanged and the parties would refrain from encouraging or supporting the claims of neighbouring states to any parts of its territory. (280) The three main nations, and other ethnic or religious groups residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would also be given equal rights in the central structure as well as the newly designated regions. This proposed arrangement effectively upheld that the three constituent regions/states would be established within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the census of 1981. Some minor territorial adjustments would be allowed to accommodate the claims of the respective ethnic groups. The plan was emphatic about the protection of human rights, private property, market economy, universal suffrage, freedom of political and trade union activity, secularism and monitoring of human rights by the international Community.

(281)

The plan excluded the delimitation of the new internal borders of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Thus, there were very remote chances that the plan could provide the foundation for a peaceful transition of the country to independence. (282) On March 18, the leaders of all three ethnic/national groups agreed on this plan, but only a few days later (283) Izetbegovic backed out of his earlier commitment to the EC plan. (284)

Just as Lord Carrington had failed in the matter of Croatia’s secession Cutilheiro too failed completely with regard to Bosnia. Ferocious fighting began when Bosnian president Izetbegovic announced that a referendum would be held to determine support for independence. On February 29 and March 1, 1992 the people of Bosnia voted for independence in a referendum. The Serb minority boycotted the referendum. The EU and the US recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence in April, 1992. (285)

The Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA/JNA) now launched an attack on Bosnia and

Herzegovina. As pointed out earlier, the Croats, Muslims and even many Bosnian Serbs fought side by side against the YPA, to defend the newly independent Bosnian state. The

Croatian government supported the Muslim-Croat alliance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it not only provided weapons but also gave refuge to many Bosnian Muslims who had fled country. (286) The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) again played a dirty game under the instructions of Belgrade. The JNA pretended that it did not side with any party, but it slyly allowed, the infiltration of paramilitary troops called the ‘Tigers’, the ‘Eagles’ etc from Serbia, though it had formally withdrawn from Bosnia in May 1992. The JNA gave heavy military equipment to the Bosnian Serbs, and the Serb militia had the financial and military backing of Belgrade. (287)

In this situation, the UN/EC arms embargo that had been imposed on Sep 25, 1991 on all warring parties actually benefitted the Serbs and punished the Muslim and Croat forces which were the weaker and vulnerable party. The only punishment given to the aggressor was the economic sanctions imposed by the EC in November 1991. (288)

As pointed out by a scholar the military mobilisation by YPA in early 1992, the recalcitrance of the Bosnian Serbs and the hesitant role of the international community on this issue, were a major cause of the war in Bosnia. (289) The insistence of the EC that a referendum, (as recommended by the Arbitration/ Badinter Commission) be held if

Bosnia’s independence were to be recognized had dire consequences. It resulted in an acceleration of the Bosnian Serbs campaign to keep out of an independent Bosnian republic. (290) It also affected the Lisbon peace plan. Any chance that recognition might be withheld to buy time and negotiate a political settlement now vanished. (291)

After unsuccessful efforts to arrest the deterioration of the situation in Bosnia, the EC persuaded the UN to divide the responsibilities. The UN now took up the task of negotiating and monitoring cease-fires, while the EC was in the forefront of the efforts to find a political solution to the Bosnian war. The escalation of violence led both the UN and the EC to hold overlapping talks for halting the war. EC negotiator Lord Carrington, without consulting the UN, brokered a cease-fire agreement in July 1992. The agreement required that Serb forces withdraw their heavy weapons under the supervision of

UNPROFOR. This step was criticized by the UN, and now joint EC-UN operations were held under direct UN supervision. (292)

The close coordination between the EC and UN led to the London Conference of 26-28

August 1992, which was jointly sponsored by the UN and EC. Its aim was to secure a ceasefire and a peace agreement. This conference was held after media directed the worlds’ attention to Serbia’s atrocities on Muslims, including its Concentration and

Extermination camps. The international community was now under much pressure to adopt stronger action against the Serbs. At the London Conference, the Serbs and their backers Serbia were recognized as the aggressors and the Croats and the Muslims as the victims. The London Conference formed a forum of the International Conference on

Former Yugoslavia in Geneva. The participants agreed upon a set of thirteen principles, of which the most important ones were the principle of not recognizing the territories gained through force, an end to the use of force, preserving the integrity and inviolability of borders, and the resolving of issues of succession through arbitration and not by force.

(293) The conference had done all the right thing but even after four months had passed no actual implementation took place. The Serbs broke all the commitments they had made at the conference. The siege of Bosnian cities was tightened, heavy weapons were not handed over to international control, rather these were being used with more impunity, the no-fly zones were violated, the refugees were not allowed to return. Even humanitarian convoys were not allowed to deliver humanitarian aid. Serbia’s brazen attitude was owing to the fact that the international community lacked the will to use force to compel the Serbs to fulfil their commitment. (294) The European Community, with all its noble principles continued to appease the aggressor, hoping that it would be converted to the path of the peace.

The International Peace Conference was held in Geneva in September 1992. After prolonged deliberation, in January 1993, the UN mediator Cyrus Vance and the EU negotiator David Owen presented a plan. The plan envisaged 10 autonomous provinces under the umbrella of a weak central government. Territory was to be divided according to the respective majority areas of Serbs, Muslims and Croats and Sarajevo was to make a demilitarized zone. At that time the Serbs, were in occupation of 70% of Bosnian land, so they were to return a substantial portion of this land. While they were to keep a considerable area, there was to be no connecting corridor. After cease-fire the militias of the warring factions would withdraw from their positions. The UN would take over for safe-keeping, all heavy weapons that would be surrendered by the militias. Around

25,000 peacekeeping troops would be deployed to stop the outbreak of more hostilities.

The UN would take up the trusteeship of Sarajevo for two years. (295)

This plan had several loopholes. It conferred formal acceptance on the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines but boundaries were not precisely defined on the map. According to a scholar, this plan only incited a renewed and fierce competition for territory and after the indiscriminate arms embargo it proved to be the second most important contribution of the West to the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (296) The alliance between the

Bosnian Muslims and Croats forces, which had hindered the irredentism of Serbia, collapsed with this plan. (297) Also the role assigned to the peacekeepers had ambiguities, including their numbers and the duration of their stationing. This plan was received with scepticism by all and it soon lost all appeal, particularly to the warring parties. (298)

The Bosnian Serbs had initially opposed the plan, for it expected them to return the large areas completely cleansed of all Muslims that they had occupied. Also, the plan hindered their main aim: the formation of a sovereign Serbian state in the Bosnian territory. The

Bosnian Muslims too rejected it for 43% of the country’s land would be transferred to the

Serbs, who were the aggressors. Undoubtedly the plan legitimized the spoils of war.

However, the Bosnian Croats accepted the plan for it gave them quite a substantial portion of territory. Since there was immense pressure from the international community and threats of economic sanctions, as well as complete isolation and air strike against what was left of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the plan was signed on May 2, 1993 in Athens by the belligerents. (299) The Bosnian Serb parliament did not ratify it and later 96% of the Serbs voted against the plan in a referendum. (300) The failure of the

Vance-Owen plan resulted in more ferocious fighting. The parties at war were determined to establish their hold on more territory before the signing of any peace agreement. (301) In this situation both the US and German governments showed willingness to remove the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims (302) but the two very important member states of the EU-Britain and France firmly opposed it saying that it would put in danger the UN peace keeping force to which they had contributed a large number of men. (303) Besides, the American-sponsored ‘Joint Action Program’ signed in May 1993 in Washington by the US, Russia, Britain, France and Spain in struck a further blow to the Vance-Owen plan by withdrawing their proposal of carrying out air strikes against the Serbs. Even the idea of enforcing the Vance-Owen plan was given up.

An alternative that was now decided upon was that the Bosnian Muslims numbering about two million would be huddled in a number of so-called ‘safe areas’, in which there would be no guarantee of their safety. There only protector would be from UN troops were allowed to return fire if they themselves came under attack. The Bosnian Muslims were left to their own devices. (304)

With the failure of the Vance-Owen plan, the EU mediator Owen and the new UN envoy

Thorvald Stoltenberg presented another plan for restoring peace in Bosnia in August

1993. This was the third peace plan for Bosnia. This plan envisaged a ‘Union of

Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. It would actually be a union of three mini-states within the borders of Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs would be given 50% of the land, Croats

20% and the Muslims would get 30% of the territory. The Muslim territory would be in the form of two separate land locked areas. The Central government would have even lesser powers than in the Vance-Owen plan. Its mandate would be limited to foreign policy and foreign trade. Sarajevo, the capital would be run by the UN for a transitional period of two years. The Bosnian parliament rejected Owen-Stoltenberg plan, but it was approved by Croats and Serbs. There assessment was that in the long term the plan would prove useful in setting up a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. (305) Owing to disagreement between the warring parties the ‘Action Plan’ was launched on France and

Germany’s initiative. It was largely based on the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, with the difference that it granting 33.3% of the territory to the Muslims and in return for this slight territorial concessions, some of the sanctions against Belgrade would be lifted. The

EU approved of this Franco-German initiative in November 1993 the US strongly opposed it because it rewarded the aggressor. (306) The so-called Action Plan failed because there was no strong diplomatic pressure or credible threat of use of force against the Bosnian Serbs to make them accept the plan. After the failure of this effort the EU’s role as the most prominent actor in conflict resolution in Bosnia ended.

In early February 1994, the shelling of a Sarajevo market place which the UN had designated as ‘safe area’ made it quite evident that the lives and properties of the Bosnian

Muslims were not all safe. (307) The Sarajevo incident again demonstrated that there were serious disagreements among the EU member states on the use of military power.

France, Belgium and the Netherlands fully favoured this option. Greece was against it.

Britain was cautious, while Germany hesitated because of its constitution. The US supported the French government position and so did the UN Secretary General. The latter was of the view that there should be air strikes if the siege of the Sarajevo continued by Serbs forces. (308) An ultimatum was issued to the Serbs. Russia came in useful at this point for stationing of its troops in the area provided some cover to the

Serbs to pull back its troops from the area. The presence of Russian forces in this area convinced the Serb troops to accept a demilitarized zone around Sarajevo. (309) However, the US as pointed out earlier was now ready to get directly involved in resolving the conflict. On US initiative the Contact Group was formed and in this only three member states of the EU (France, Britain, and Germany) were included. They represented themselves. Thus, the EU as a foreign policy actor was marginalized. (310)

The smaller member states such as the Netherlands, which had contributed large numbers of troops to UNPROFOR as well as Italy and Greece owing to their own particular interests, in the region were very unhappy over the formation of the Contact Group-a elitist club. They felt that it negated the Treaty on European Union. (311)

Developments during the end of 1994 and throughout 1995 created a situation in which

US involvement became inevitable. Thus the ‘hour of Europe’ which had just begun, came to an end. (312) The US adopted diplomatic initiatives and thence onward EU mediation efforts lost significance and credibility. For many months shuttle diplomacy was carried out, leading to an agreement between the warring parties of Bosnia in

Dayton, Ohio. (313) It was no doubt a triumph of American diplomacy. On December 14,

1995 the Dayton agreement was formally signed in Paris. This was to demonstrate to the world Europe was not out entirely of the picture. (314)

When the crises erupted in the Balkans the EU had shown ample willingness to play a decisive role in resolving conflicts. However, its efforts proved fruitless. Eventually it became a subordinate or facilitator of the US campaign for restoring peace in the region.

Its major member states such as France, Britain and Germany continued to harp on “sustained negotiations” even when these appeared hopeless. The belligerent parties, particularly Serbia and the Serbs were not serious about the restoration of the peace and they would only bow to use of force. This became clear soon after the crises began in the

Balkans. Negotiations and the threat of use of force had to be combined to achieve results.

The European countries only joined in military action after the US compelled them. The conflict in the Balkans was lack of harmony, and common interest and perceptions among EU member states. They were afraid of using force. It was EU failure which led the US to adopt a leading role in political and security matters in post cold war Europe and the world.

REFERENCES

1.The Europa World Year Book 1 (London: Europa Publications, 2003), 800.

2.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The

Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1996), 200.

3.Ibid. 4.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over? (Karachi: Qirtas, 2000), 12.

5.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press,

1994), 8.

6.Ibid.

7.Ibid, 9-10.

8.Ibid, 10.

9.Ibid, 10-11

10.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 14.

11.Ibid, 14.

12.Ibid, 14-15.

13.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 13.

14.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 15,7

15.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 16.

16.Ibid.

17.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 15.

18.Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition

Betrayed (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 19.

19.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History , 17. 20.Ibid, 20.

21.Ibid, 20-22.

22.Ibid, 22.

23.Ibid, 23-24.

24.Colliers Encyclopedia 4 (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1986), 405.

25.Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, 53.

26.Ibid, 57.

27.Robert J. Donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 36-37.

28.Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, 29.

29.Robert J. Donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 52.

30.Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, 66-67.

31.Ibid, 46,82.

32Ibid, 64-65.

33.Ibid, 63-64.

34.Ibid, 65.

35.Encyclopedia Americana 4 (USA: Grolier Incorporated, 1985), 297.

36.Ibid. 37.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 24.

38.Robert J. Donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 96.

39.Collier’s Encyclopedia 4, 407.

40.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 153,155.

41.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 26-27.

42.Mark Biondich, ‘Croatia’, in Richard Frucht (ed.), Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands and Culture (Caliofornia: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 426.

43.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 27.

44.Ibid, 28.

45.Robert J. Donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 137-138.

46.Ibid, 143.

47.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 29-30.

48.Ibid, 30.

49.Ibid.

50.Ibid, 30-31.

51.Robert J. Donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 153.

52.Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, 191.

53.Ibid, 193. 54.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 31.

55.Ibid, 31.

56.Ibid, 32.

57.Noel Malcom, Bosnia: A Short History, 193.

58.Ibid, 194.

59.Ibid, 195.

60.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 33.

61.Ibid, 33-34.

62.Ibid, 34-35.

63.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 196.

64.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 37.

65.Ibid.

66.Ibid.

67.Ibid, 38.

68.The Europa World Year Book 1 (London: Europa Publications, 2004), 824-825.

69.Ibid, 825

70.Ibid, 825. 71.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 205-206.

72.Ibid, 206.

73.Ibid, 207.

74.Bosnia Civil War, visit at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O46-

BosnianCivilWar.html.

75.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 207.

76.Ibid, 208.

77.Bosnia Civil War, visit at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O46-

BosnianCivilWar.html.

78.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 208.

79.Ibid, 208-209.

80.Ibid, 210-211.

81.Ibid, 213.

82.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 90.

83.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 211.

84.Ibid, 212.

85.Ibid, 213.

86.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History , 242-243. 87.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 79.

88.The Europa World Year Book 1 (2004), 826.

89.Ibid, 826-827.

90.Ibid, 63-64.

91.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 303.

92.Ibid, 244.

93.Ibid, 305.

94.Ibid.

95.Ibid, 305-306.

96.Ibid, 306.

97.Ibid, 307.

98.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Journal of European Studies 10, no.2 (1994): 22.

99.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 311.

100.Ibid, 312.

101.Ibid. 102.Ibid, 314-315.

103.Ibid, 313.

104.Ibid,

105.James E.Goodby, “Peace Keeping in the New Europe”, The Washington Quarterly

15,no 2 (1992):161.

106.David Binder, “US Policy Makers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition in

1992”, New york Times, 29 August, 1993.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, JR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 235.

110.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (NewYork: M.E.Sharpe INC, 1999), 144.

111.Ben Fawkes, The Post Communist era:Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe

(New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 95.

112.David Binder, ‘US Policy makers on Bosnia Admit Errors’,

113.Ibid.

114.Ibid.

115.Lenard J. Cohen, “The Disintegration and Yugoslavia”, Current History 91, no. 568

(1992): 374. 116.David Binder, ‘US Policy makers on Bosnia Admit Errors’,

117.Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, JR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 236.

118.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

24.

119. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 120, 186.

120. Ibid,186.

121. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 311.

122.Sabiha Hasan, ‘From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia’,

24.

123.Ibid.

124.US Depatment Despatch, vol 3, no 15, April 13,1992.

125.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 151-152.

126.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 205.

127.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 157.

128.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 205-206.

129.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 181,157.

130. Ibid, 172-173. 131.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

28-29.

132.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 189.

133.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

28-29.

134.Ibid.

135.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 200.

136.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

28-29.

137.Ibid.

138.Ibid.

139.Ibid.

140.The Europa World Year Book 1 (2003), 801.

141.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 296.

142.The Europa World Year Book 1 (2003), 801.

143.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

29.

144.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 318. 145.Dawn, 18 November, 1992.

146.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”

24-25.

147.Ibid, 31.

148.Ibid, 31-32

149.George Schild, “The USA and Civil War in Bosnia”, Aussen Politik 47, no.1 (1996):

24.

150.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, Journal of European Studies 11, no.1 (1995): 16.

151.Ibid.

152.Ibid, 16-17.

153.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 233.

154.Ibid.

155.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 89.

156.Ibid, 90.

157.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 16.

158.George Schild, The USA and Civil War in Bosnia, 26.

159.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 320-321.

160.Ibid, 321.

161.Ibid, 321.

162.George Schild, The USA and Civil War in Bosnia, 27.

163.Ibid.

164.Ibid.

165.Ibid.

166.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 254.

167.Ibid.

168.Ibid, 264.

169.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 20-21.

170. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 250.

171.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 20-21.

172.Ibid, 21.

173.Keesing’s Record of World Event (England:Longman,July 1993), 39564. 174.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 267.

175.Ibid.

176.Ibid, 268.

177.Ibid, 268-269.

178.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Bosnian Conflict: Ineffectual Western Responses” Journal of European Studies 11, no.1 (1995): 72-73.

179. Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 278.

180. Ibid, 278-279.

181. Ibid, 280-281.

182. Ibid, 282-283.

183. Ibid, 284-285.

184. Keesing’s Record of World Event (January 1994) , 39827.

185.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 27.

186. Keesing’s Record of World Event (Febuary 1994), 39870-71.

187.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 28.

188.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 291. 189.Ibid, 293-294.

190.Sabiha Hasan, “From Bush to Clinton: An Appraisal of American Policy in Bosnia”,

Part II, 29.

191.The Europa World Year Book 1 (2003), 802.

192.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 295.

193.Ibid, 299.

194.Ibid, 299-300.

195.Ibid, 300-301.

196.Ibid, 301.

197.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 117-118.

198.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 302.

199.Ibid, 303.

200.Ibid, 305.

201.Europa World Year Book 1 (2004), 826.

202.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 305.

203.Europa World Year Book 1(2004), 826.

204.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 306.

205.Ibid, 307-308. 206.Ibid, 311.

207.Ibid, 312.

208.Ibid, 313.

209.Ibid, 317.

210.Ibid.

211.Ibid, 317-318.

212.Ibid, 319-321.

213.Europa World Year Book 1 (2004), 826.

214.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 322.

215.Ibid.

216.Europa World Year Book 1(2004), 826.

217.The Economist, 19 August, 1995, 41.

218.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 334.

219.The Economist, 19 August, 1995, 41.

220.Dawn, 9 September, 1995.

221.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 355-356.

222.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 319-320. 223.Steven L. Burg and Paul S.Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 359.

224.Dawn, 6 October, 1995.

225.Ibid, 24 October, 1995.

226.The Economist, 4 November, 1995, 57-58.

227.Ibid.

228.Ibid.

229.Ibid.

230.Ibid.

231.Janusz Bugajski, “Policy Forum: Bosnia after the troops leaves”, The Washington

Quarterly 19, no 3 (1996): 61-62.

232.Ibid. 62.

233.Ibid. 62.

234.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 344.

235.Lenard J Cohen, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile peace in a Segment State”,

Current History (March 1996): 109.

236.The Economist, 25 November, 1995, 11.

237.Ibid.

238.Lenard J Cohen, “Bosnia and Herzegovina” Current History (March 1996): 108. 239.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), The Role of Europe in Conflict Resolution,

Conflict Management, Peace-Building and Peace-Keeping from the Balkans to South

East Asia (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 2005), 99.

240.Trevor C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and

Yugoslavia, 1990-1992”, International Affairs 68, no2 (1992):248.

241.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 253.

242.Trevor C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation”, 248.

243.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 253.

244.Ibid, 255.

245.Ibid, 254.

246.Ibid, 261.

247.Ibid, 261.

248.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 181.

249. Ibid, 182-183.

250.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 100-101.

251.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 262.

252.Ibid, 262. 253.Ibid, 262.

254.Ibid.

255.Ibid, 26.

256.Ibid, 263.

257.Ibid, 263.

258.Ibid, 263.

259.Ibid, 264.

260.Ibid, 256.

261.Ibid, 256-257.

262.Ibid, 264.

263.Ibid, 189.

264.Ibid, 191-192.

265.Ibid, 265.

266.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 101.

267.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 266.

268.Trevor C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation”, 259-251.

269.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 266-267. 270.Ibid, 270-271.

271.Ibid, 271.

272.Ibid, 271.

273.Trevor C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation”, 251.

274.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 271-272.

275.Trevor C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation”, 252.

276.Ibid, 253.

277.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 279.

278.Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 174.

279.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 281.

280. Ibid.

281.Ibid.

282.Ibid.

283.Stanley Hoffmann, “Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European

Institution”, in Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars (New York:

A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996), 100.

284.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over?, 59. 285.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 102.

286. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 205-206.

287.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 102.

288.Ibid.

289.Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 234.

290.Ibid, 234.

291.Vincent Rigby, “Bosnia-Hercegovina:The International Response”, January 1994 available from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374- e.htm.

292.Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals ,282.

293.Maria Nota, European Intervention in the Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995, (Master’s thesis, University of Macedonia, 2011), available from www.dspace.lib.uom.gr/bitstream/2159/14456/3/NotaMariaMsc2011.pdf.

294. Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 103.

295.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Bosnian Conflict: Inefectual Western Responses”, Journal of

European Studies 11, no.1 (1995):71-72.

296.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History , 248.

297.Ibid.

298.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Bosnian Conflict: Inefectual Western Responses”,72.

299.Maria Nota, “European Intervention in the Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995”.

300.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Bosnian Conflict: Inefectual Western Responses, 72.

301.Brig. G. M. Mohatrem, Bosnia: Is the Horror Show Over? , 96.

302.Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History , 249.

303.Alan.F.Fogelquist, “The Yugoslav Breakup and the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina:

Implications for Kosovo?”, April 1995, available from http://eurasia- research.com/000327BHkosova.htm.

304. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 304.

305.Noman Sattar, “Diplomacy and Peace Making in the Crisis in erstwhile Yugoslavia”,

Journal of European Studies 10, no2 (1994):45-46.

306. Maria Nota, “European Intervention in the Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995”,

307.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 103. 308.Simon Dukemm,The Elusive Quest for European Security:From EDC to CFSP

(London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 211.

309.Maria Nota, “European Intervention in the Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995”,

310.Ibid.

311.Christoph Schwegmann, “The Contact Group and its Impact on the European

Institutional Structure”, (Occasional Papers, The Institute for Security Studies Western

European Union, June 2000), available from http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ016.pdf.

312.Maria Nota, “European Intervention in the Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995”,

313.Ibid.

314.Franz Lothar Altmann, “EU Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making Attempts in the

Balkans”, 104.

CHAPTER III

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT; THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLICIES OF THE US AND THE EU

The Muslims, Jews and Christians all considered Palestine as a holy land. The modern state of Israel was created in Palestine in 1948. The ancient Hebrews called it Canaan.

The nomenclature Palestine is derived from the Philistines, a people who lived in the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C. In 1000 B.C, a Hebrew kingdoms was established in this area which later split into the kingdoms of Judah and

Israel. These kingdoms were subsequently invaded by Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians,

Egyptians, Romans, and Alexander the Great of Macedonia. After these successive invasions very few Jews were left in Palestine by A.D 135. The Jews became a diaspora community living as scattered group in various places after they were exiled from

Babylon. Palestine, the birth place of Jesus Christ became a center of Christian pilgrimage after the Byzantine emperor Constantine adopted the faith. The Arabs invaded and occupied Palestine, which had been part of the Byzantine empire, in 634–640 A.D. Except for periods when Christian Crusaders caused a disruption, Palestine remained under Muslim Arab rule until 1948. (1)

The Jewish diaspora was spread across various countries of Europe. Though the majority of them were highly educated and prosperous they were never fully accepted by their host societies. They were discriminated against in the political and social spheres and during periods of turmoil in Europe their lives and properties were often endangered. In Russia particularly, the Jews were sporadically targeted in what were known as pogroms. In present times such occurrences would be called ethnic cleansing. Several Jewish families fled to the US and some to Palestine after many such episodes in 1881. A movement named the Hovevei Zion (Love of Zion---the area in and around the Holy City of

Jerusalem which had become part of the Kingdom of David) was begun in 1882. It gave the clarion call for mass scale Jewish emigration to Palestine. This movement reflected the age-old Jewish yearning for the messianic return of Zion to the Jews and was also a response to the wave of nationalism in 19th century Europe. The leader and the main proponent of this movement was Leon Pinsker, who asserted that anti-semetism was a deeply ingrained sentiment in Europe which was not likely to ever die and this made the acceptance and assimilation of Jews in European societies an impossibility. Ahad Ha’Am

(1875-1927) another Jewish leader opined that mass scale migration of European Jews to

Palestine was not a practical option. He instead suggested the setting up of a spiritual centre in Palestine which would inculcate in the Jewish people a firm belief in their religion and identity. Ha’Am supported the revival of Hebrew and its development as a modern language. Thus Ha’Am’s emphasis was on cultural, rather than political Zionism. Zionism took the form of a modern political movement when in 1896 Theodor Herzl published the book Der Judenstat (The Jewish State). Herzl called for the establishment of a national state for the Jewish people, preferably in Palestine, ‘the promise land’ which was to be gained through an international political agreement. With this objective in mind he convened the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897.The Congress created the World

Zionist Organization which clearly adopted the goal of setting up a national state for the

Jewish people that would be guaranteed by “public law”. Dr. Chaim Weizmann who became leader of the movement after Herzel’s death exhorted the Jews to concentrate on their cultural revival and to promote the settlement of the community in Palestine. He also requested the important powers to make diplomatic efforts to create a legal foundation for the Jewish settlements. The Zionist movement rejected outright a British proposal of 1903 that a Jewish state could be set up in Uganda. In 1905, after the revolution’s failure in Russia, there was a second wave of migration to Palestine. They formed settlements called the ‘kibbutz’, cooperative farms owned and cultivated communally by Jewish settlers. There was an interruption of Zionist efforts to create more settlements during the First World War. (2)

Factors Leading to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

During the first world war three important promises were made by the British. Sir Henry

McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt promised Sherif Hussein of Mecca that Britain would provide support for his ambition of Arab statehood. This was clearly an instigation to unfurl the banner of revolt against the Ottoman empire. At the same time, Britain and France by signing the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 decided to divide the region up between themselves. Through the Balfour Declaration in 1917 Britain declared its support for setting up a Jewish state in Palestine, promising that the human rights of the non-Jewish citizens would be fully protected. (3) Under the Mandatory system of the newly created League of Nations, Britain was given the mandate to govern

Palestine, The kingdom of Iraq and the Emirate of Transjordan. All these territories had belonged to the Ottoman empire. The Jewish population of Palestine increased sporadically throughout the twenties, thirties and forties. The Nazi government oppression of the Jews in Germany triggered a new tide of Jewish immigration to

Palestine. The Arabs opposed the increased Jewish immigration to Palestine. Palestine, they asserted was an Arab country. The Arabs carried out violent protests against the blatant British support for creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine 1921 and 1929 and in

1933-1936 the Arab areas rebelled against the British. With war clouds looming over

Europe in 1939, the British government tried to reconcile the claims of both protagonists, but did not succeed. Thus when the British government issued the White Paper in 1939 imposing a limit on Jewish immigration as well as purchases of land by the Jews, the latter began violent anti-British protests and terrorist attacks. The White paper had been issued by the British to gain Arab support in the war with Germany. This was the time when the Jews were in a desperate position in Europe. Hundreds of thousands became victims of the Holocaust in Nazi occupied Europe during the second world war. (4)

Those who had escaped the Holocaust took refuge in the US and the countries not under

Nazi occupation.

In this situation, there was immense American pressure on Britain to take solid steps to resolve the crisis. On the initiative of Britain an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was set up in 1945 which presented its report the following year. The report’s recommendation was that Britain immediately allowed 100,000 Jewish refugees to settle in Palestine. (5)

With rising tensions between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, Britain sought to get rid of its mandate in the country. It placed the issue before the newly established United

Nations Organization. At this point in time there were around 1,200,000 Arabs and

600,000 Jews in Palestine. The UN General Assembly in its Resolution 181 (November

1947) presented a partition plan for Palestine. The plan envisaged the division of

Palestine into an Arab-Palestinian and a Jewish state, with special status for Jerusalem city. There would be an economic union between the two states. (6)

The plan had yet to be implemented, when Britain gave up its mandate on May 14, 1948.

The Zionist leadership thought it opportune to immediately proclaim the state of Israel.

Israel expelled, around a million Palestinians from the coastal areas of Palestine. On

April 9, 1948, a month before the announcement of the state of Israel, the Zionist terrorist outfit the Irgun gang, supported by the stern gang, another militant Zionist organization

(led by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, both of whom later became the Prime

Ministers of Israel) attacked Deir Yassin, a small Arab village near Jerusalem whose population was only 700. The militants blew up the houses in the village, killed around 300 of the unarmed people and dragged the rest on gunpoint to the streets of Jewish occupied Jerusalem. There were strong condemnation of this act from all over the world and was described by the British minister of colonies as a ‘barbaric’ act. Israel continued to expel the Muslims with impurity. (7) The Arabs could no longer stay aloof. There was now an open conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. They fought intermittently until March 1949, but it was Israel which gained from this war. It besides occupying the whole area which was allotted to the Jewish state under UN partition plan it also seized territories of other Arab countries. (8) An American Dr. Ralph Bunche mediated armistice agreement under UN auspices. The agreements were signed between Israel and the Arab States Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria in the first half of 1949. Israel withdrew from the territory it had wrested from the Arabs in southern Lebanon, northern

Sinai and the Gaza Strip but kept control over two-thirds of Palestinian territory. (9) The armistice agreement drew the borders of the Gaza Strip and transferred it to Egypt, while

Green Line in the West Bank of the river Jordan separated Israel from Jordan. In 1952

Jordan annexed the West Bank and all its residents were given citizenship of Jordan. The

UN’s suggestion that Jerusalem and the area surrounding it be internationalize was rejected by Israel and Jordan. In May 1949 Israel was accepted as a member of the

United Nations. (10)

The US Role in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

 Transjordan was declared a Hashemtie Kingdom when the Abdullah son of King Hijaz seized the area in 1921. It was accorded recognition as an autonomous emirate within the framework of the British Mandate and in 1923 its status was endorsed by League of Nations.

Zionists all over the western world began frenetic activity to canvass the urgent need to create a Jewish state in Palestine. Their zeal brought good results in the United States.

The elites in governing and business circles, the media, the Congress and the White

House were all being converted to the cause of Israel. (11) Further, the Holy Land and the role of Judaism in its history already held a lot of fascination for the scholars, the religiously inclined people and even some politicians. Therefore, the idea that the

‘promised land’ should be given back to the Jews began to be accepted in the US. No one thought much about how it would impact upon the indigenous people. It must be kept in mind that the US had eschewed interference around the world, and kept its security role limited to the American and the Pacific region until the second world war. President

Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which promised British support for the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine, but he hardly did anything to advance this objective. Indeed, the most important US contribution during this period was the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to the region in 1919 by the Paris Peace

Conference. The mission was led by two Americans Henry Churchill King and Charles

Crane. The upshot of their report was that the local population was completely against continued Zionist inroads in Palestine and pointed out that creating an independent

Jewish state in this Arab land could create complications. No one paid heed to their warning. (12)

Wilson’s lead was followed by subsequent US Presidents. President Warren G. Harding, signed a joint resolution with the Congress endorsing the idea of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Other Presidents such as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt made no significant change in American policy on Palestine.

(13) During Franklin D Roosevelt presidency a rebellion broke out against Britain in

Palestine to register Arab anger against mass Jewish immigration. (14) Many Jewish refugees who wanted to escape Nazi atrocities were unable to find countries that were willing to accommodate them. A large number wanted to go to the United States, but could not obtain visas. In 1924 the US Congress had imposed quotas on immigration limiting the number of immigrants, and even discriminating against groups that were perceived as indescribable because of their ethnic background. (15)

In response to increasing political pressure President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for holding an international conference for easing the emigration of Jewish refugees from

Germany and Austria, and to set up an international agency to work for blanket solution to the refugee problem. In early July 1938, 32 countries sent their delegates to a meeting in Evian (France). However, most of the delegates of the participating countries, including the United States and Britain, presented excuses for disallowing another influx of refugees. This was the time of the Great Depression, and many Americans were apprehensive that refugees would be in competition with them for jobs and also take a chunk out of the social programs set up to support the unemployed and the poverty- stricken. Even the Wagner-Rogers bill, aimed at bringing into the country 20,000 endangered Jewish refugee children, failed to get support of the Senate in 1939 and 1940.

Racism was quite widespread among Americans and this included the prevalent anti-

Semitic attitudes of the US State Department officials. Such attitudes were reflected in the failure to admit more refugees. (16) There was immense pressure by the Jews on American ruling circles and on January 27, 1944 the US House of Representatives tabled two resolutions calling on the US government to use its good offices in support unhindered Jewish immigration to Palestine and remodeling the country as a Jewish commonwealth based on democratic values. A few days later the resolution was also introduced in the Senate. (17) Washington did not cave in to these demands owing to the objections raised by General Marshall, then chief of staff, who taking into consideration of reports from the Middle East, expressed the belief that the war efforts of the Allies would be harmed by the resolution. (18) Later, President Roosevelt, who wanted the

Jewish vote in the November 1944 election, endorsed the Zionists’ demand for creating a

Jewish state, however, he also wanted to protect American oil interests in Middle East, so he assured Arab leaders that its implementation would not be done without prior consultation with the Jews and the Arabs. (19)

After Roosevelt’s death Truman became President and the State Department gave him a briefing about the Palestine issue and gave him the advice that he should adopt a balanced policy vis-à-vis the two sides, on the same lines as Roosevelt. (20) However, internal political pressure, a sincere sympathy for the condition of Europe’s Jewish refugees, his belief that Washington was committed to uphold the Balfour Declaration and Truman’s own upbringing which made him adhere to Christian values, were very crucial in the manner in which he made decisions. (21) He exerted pressure on the British government to open up Palestine to Jewish immigration. He thus went against the advice of the State Department and the War Department not to endanger American interests in the Arab world, which would surely push them towards the Soviet camp. (22) A Joint Committee of Inquiry was formed by the British and American governments in

November 1945. The committee published its report in April 1946. This report endorsed the American President’s demand of allowing 100,000 German Jews to enter Palestine.

The report did not support the idea of partitioning Palestine. They recommended the continuation of the British mandate until it was replaced by a UN trusteeship. (23)

However, the Congress’ position was now changed, and Washington now agreed to introduce along with Britain, partition as a solution to the Palestinian issue in the United

Nations in 1947. (24) The Americans lobbied in the UN very aggressively and began to pressurize those countries which were against the partition. It was not only the small

(some of them newly independent) countries that were under pressure, big countries such as France were also pressured into voting for partition. The partition plan was approved in November 1947, but the Arab and many Muslim countries rejected it overwhelmingly.

(25) As soon as Israel declared its formation, the US recognized it as an independent state. (26) The Arab-Israeli war broke out soon and one of its most important results was that 800,000 Palestinian refugees were displaced mostly by Israeli military forces. These homeless people now waited for the UN to help them. The US actively participated in drafting Resolution 194 which stated that those Palestinian refugees wanting to go back to their homes and coexist peacefully with their neighbors should be allowed to do so “at the earliest practicable date”. However, the Truman administration did nothing much to help in the enforcement of the UN resolution. (27)

Among the methods used by the Israelis to get rid of the Palestinians the most prominent were terror and expulsion. In Deir Yassin terror and death were used, while in Ramleh, Lydda and Safed expulsion prevailed. UN mediator Ms. Bernadette took note of the expulsion of Palestinians and she emphasized upon the need for repatriation. Taking into consideration the General Assembly resolution 194 (III) passed on December 11, 1948, called for the repatriation of Palestinians and compensation for them as a matter of right.

Israel ignored the UN resolution; in fact it blatantly defined it by allowing the entry of

Jews into Palestine. This made the return of the Palestinians impossible. (28)

Palestine and the US Policy in the Cold War Era

From 1948 until the 1967 war, the United States saw the Palestinian issue only as a refugee problem. (29) In fact until the mid-1970s, all American proposals with regard to the Palestinians involved humanitarian aid, partial repatriation to Israel in accordance with UN resolution 194 and their re-settlement in Arab states. Even these proposals were not pursued vigorously. Washington did not support the establishment of a Palestinian state. The US also did not support the relinquishment by Israel of the Palestinian territories it had captured during the 1948 Arab-Israel war. Throughout the 1950s and

1960s maintained this policy, perhaps one reason for this was that the division of

Palestine between Israel and Jordan had become a fait accompli. (30)

The international community and the US did not give the Palestinians a great deal of consideration for they were a stateless people. After Israel wrested territory from Jordan,

Egypt and Syria in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the UN Security Council resolution 242 passed on November 22nd,1967 called for peace in the region and the territorial integrity of states but treated the Palestinians only as a ‘refugee problem’. In 1969, when the administration of Richard Nixon presented the Rogers Plan for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians had still not graduated from the status of refugees. (31)

The Palestinians did not have a proper organization or a united political military command to carry out their struggle for self-determination. There were several militant and political organizations claiming to represent the Palestinians but had yet to develop a common platform for enunciate their national aspirations and for presenting the philosophy of their struggle for statehood. (32) After Egypt was invaded by Britain,

France and Israel in 1956, the Palestinians began to think on lines of forming an organization to represent them. In the initial phases it lacked the requisite impetus, more so because at that time Arab unity was the prevalent philosophy in the Middle East. In this environment the germination of Palestinian nationalism was not easy. The first

Palestinian national organization named Al-Fatah was formed as early as 1959. However, it remained a secret organization, for its founders wanted to avoid a clash with Nasser’s

Pan-Arabism. Fatah’s militant cells operated secretly in Arab countries such as the

Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. (33)

By the beginning of the decade of the sixties, two important events in the Middle East eased the path of the incipient Palestinian movement. First of all the Syrian-Egyptian union called the United Arab Republic (UAR) collapsed in 1961. Second, the North

African country, Algeria after a prolonged armed struggle against France gained independence in 1962. These events and other factors made Nasser realize that the absence of a Palestinian component in the Arab-Israel conflict enfeebled the Arab line of defense. Thus Nasser sort of formally gave the go ahead to the Fatah leaders to start an organized political and military struggle against the Zionist state. As a result in 1964 the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed. It had the financial backing of the

Arab League, and was given political support by many Arab leaders. In the early years the PLO an umbrella organization of several Palestinian groups, was dominated by the

Arab regimes. Its various groups and branches had to seek the goodwill and patronage of their host governments. Also, its militant wing the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was considered part and parcel of the Arab armies, with its headquarters in Baghdad, since

June 1967. (34)

Though, it appears paradoxical the defeat of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war of June

1967 threw the Palestine resistance into the limelight, for at that period of humiliation for the Arabs, it appeared that the only force which was consistently fighting against Israel was the Palestinians. At that time there was a proliferation of Fedayeen organizations, many of them sponsored by Arab governments which were keen to arrest the growing power of Al-Fatah. Syria backed the creation of Al Saiqa in 1968. The year after, Iraq backed the formation of the Arab Liberation Front. Yasser Arafat was recognized as the undisputed leader from 1968 onwards, but he was unable to keep under control the various Fedayeen groups. There was a rebellious streak in many of the groups, the foremost among them being the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(PFLP), under George Habash. The PFLP had been set up in 1967 but was split when

Habash’s close associate Nayef Hawatmeh, fell out with him and formed the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Another breakaway group was the PFLP (General Command), which boldly carried out guerilla operations inside Israeli held territory. Later, it became the “Suicide Squad”. With deep ideological cleavages and other differences the PLO could not develop a clear cut and united line of action for achieving its political aims. Of these groups some adopted such a violent path that a section of the international community got the chance to brand the PLO as a criminal organization. (35)

Despite all these issues, the PLO by 1968 became quite independent of the Arab states and began to speak on behalf of the Palestinians on the international stage. It was acknowledged generally as the representatives of the Palestinian. (36) Despite these developments, the US continued to treat the Palestinians as an insignificant factor. In efforts to stop the Soviet inroads in the Arab world, well until the 1980’s the US policy makers hardly paid much attention to the political potential of the Palestinian factors, there concentration was on seeking allies among the Arab states . (37)

While the cold war lasted, US policy makers became divided into two distinct schools of thought, with regard to policy on the Middle East. One school, who were often dubbed the globalists, was inclined to perceive happenings in the Middle East in the perspective of US-Soviet rivalry. On the other hand, the other school, who became known as regionalists, focused more on the importance of regional developments in a localized context. The regionalist school therefore considered Arab animosity towards Israel as owing to the events of 1948, when with the creation of Israel, the Palestinians were thrown out of them homeland. The globalist school on the other hand saw the Arab rancor as having been encouraged and inspired by the Soviet Union. They also tended to blame the Soviets for all the events which harmed the west’s interest in the Middle East.

Since the Middle East was considered one of the most important battlegrounds of the cold war the globalist group dominated in policy-making. The grievances of the Palestinians which were a major cause of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict were therefore not factored into any analysis of the situation. It was thought that if the status quo was disturbed, only the Soviet Union would benefit from it. (38)

Thus, While Henry Kissinger remained influential in policy making as national security adviser under President Richard Nixon between1969-74 and as Secretary of State in the eras of both Nixon and Gerald Ford who remained in office from 1974-77 the

Palestinians were seen as proxies of the Soviet Union. Kissinger’s Middle East policy was inspired solely by his view of US-Soviet relations. He considered his uppermost goal in the Middle East as maintaining the military superiority of Israel. It did not matter if in the process Arab concerns were ignored or if only half-hearted efforts were made to wean the Arabs from the orbit of Soviet influence. (39) The crisis in Jordan in 1970 was a landmark in US-Israeli relations. Israel was now considered as a strategic asset by

Washington, because it was willing to intervene at US request and this appeared to uphold Kissinger’s conviction that it was in US interest to keep Israel strong. The US had given military loans to Israel for the fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970 to the tune of $25 million, $85 million, and $3o million, respectively. In the three years after the crisis i.e. for fiscal years 1971-73 military credits to Israel arose to $545 million, $300 million, and

$307.5million, respectively. During the October 1973 war and the following year military aid rose exponentially, to $2.2 billion. During a visit to Washington by then Israeli Prime

Minister Golda Meir in December 1971, the first long-term agreement for delivery of arms was signed between Israel and the US. The US agreed to provide the US new

Phantom and Sky hawk fighter planes over a three year period. (40) Most importantly, the US had stopped objecting to Israel’s undeclared possession of atomic weapons.

Morton Halperin a former staffer in the National Security Council claimed Kissinger was not at all unhappy about Israel having nuclear weapons. He had conveniently ignored reports that in 1969 Israel had stolen weapons grade uranium from a nuclear plant in

Pennsylvania. (41)

After the Yom-i-Kippur/Ramadan war of 1973 in which Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel, Kissinger began to acknowledge the need to address the

Palestinian issue in political terms. However, since he saw the Palestinians, particularly the PLO, as terrorists and Soviet proxies that wanted to destroy both Israel and Jordan, he did not consider them as appropriate partners for negotiations. In a wily move he had allowed secret contacts with the PLO in 1973 and 1974, but the objective of the move was not to help resolve the Palestinian issue but to gain time. He just wanted to soothe the

Palestinians so that they would keep quiet while the peace process progressed at the

Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli fronts. (42)

Kissinger’s response to the Palestinian problem was deeply affected by pressures from

Israel. The thrust of Israeli policy since the very beginning was to deny the primacy of the Palestinian issue in the Arab-Israel conflict. In fact it ignored the separate identity of the Palestinian people. For instance, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had issued a statement in 1969 that received great publicity, in which she said that the Palestinians did not have an identity distinct from that of other Arabs. This attitude sharply contrasted with what was happening on the international stage. The UN was increasingly recognizing the identity of the Palestinians and their rights. Thus, many UN resolutions were passed that supported the Palestinian position. The US oblivious to these developments stuck to its stand that the Palestinians were like any other Arabs. (43)

In the aftermath of the 1973 war, Kissinger at first considered negotiating a partial

“disengagement agreement” between Israel and Jordan. This agreement would be nearly on the same lines as those he mediated between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and

Syria respectively on the other hand in 1974. At this juncture, the Arab states came together to stop the return of occupied territory to Jordan. They declared that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Thus Kissinger had to drop any scheme of Israeli disengagement with Jordan. In 1975, as part of the second Sinai disengagement agreement with Egypt, Israel extracted a promise from the US, it would neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO, unless the organization first acknowledged

Israel’s right to exist and accepted in its entirely UN Resolution 242. This was made US law in 1985, and another stipulation was added saying that the PLO must also repudiate terrorism before Washington would consider negotiating with it. Although, no formal recognition was extended to the Palestinians’ national aspirations, successive American

Administrations from the mid-1970s onwards tried to accommodate the imperative need to take on board the Palestinians in the quest for a political settlement while at the same time keeping in view Israel’s stubborn stand that the Palestinian be kept out any such process, until they recognized Israel’s existence. (44)

Jimmy Carter who was US president from 1977 to 1981 did not support the idea of independent Palestinian statehood, though he considered the notion of some sort of a

Palestinian “homeland” as acceptable. Carter appeared resolved to involve the

Palestinians, represented by the PLO if necessary, in the peace process. Departing from the position of his predecessor Carter and his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, along with other State Department staff were amenable to the idea of treating the PLO as the

Palestinians’ political representative. Vance held long negotiations with Israel and the

Arab states to reach a formula that would allow the PLO to attend a peace conference. It would however, be part of a united Arab delegation. (45)

The efforts made by the Carter administration to achieve some genuine progress on the

Palestinian issue were defeated owing to strong opposition by Israel, as well as by the

PLO’s refusal to accept Resolution 242. The final hindrance was the trip to Jerusalem by

Anwar al-Sadat in November 1977 which drew the entire protagonist’s attention away from organizing a comprehensive peace conference. It ultimately resulted in the 1978

Camp David Accords and the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Though, the accords envisaged the setting up of a Palestinian “self-governing authority” in the West

Bank and Gaza, it was quite apparent throughout the negotiations that the Israeli leadership, including prime minister, Menachem Begin, would not give up Israeli hold over any portion of these territories nor would they allow genuine Palestinian self- government. (46) It is an irony of history that the American president most determined,

(until that time) to find some political solution to the problem of the dis-enfranchised

Palestinians had to face the Israeli leader most tenacious about frustrating the Palestinian aspirations. It was Carter who introduced new ideas and new terminology in the

American foreign policy lexicon for instance, “Palestinian rights” and “Palestinian homeland”. However, he was thwarted by the dogged determination of Begin and by the pressures exerted by Begin’s supporters in Washington. (47)

The gains the Palestinians had made over the seventies and especially the heed paid to them by President Carter suffered were nearly reversed with the induction of the Reagan administration which backed Israeli’s attempts to annihilate the PLO, to keep the PLO out of peace negotiations, and in over all downplaying the relevance, in fact the very existence of Palestinian nationalism. (48) Reagan was known as a tenacious cold warrior and always suspected Soviet intentions in strategically important regions of the world. He saw Israel as a natural ally of Washington in its struggle to contain the Soviet Union and its allies in the Arab world. (49)

In his initial years in office, Reagan had some sharp disagreements with Israel over latter’s actions that Washington considered irresponsible or too aggressive. One instance, was Israel’s strong opposition on the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981, its bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981, its annexation of Syria’s Golan

Heights in December 1981 and its heavy bombings of Beirut during its invasion of

Lebanon in 1982. A few mild sanctions were imposed, but these were actually to show the world that it was even-handed. Reagan’s criticism of Israel was seldom harsh.

Similarly the State Department did not adopt a stand on the issue of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza nor on its right to build Jewish settlement there. (50) During the first two years of the Reagan administration the number of Jewish settlers in the West

Bank grew by 70 percent and the Israelis with impunity laid plans to settle around three hundred thousand Israelis in the territory by the end of the decade. To subvert the PLO’s influence, occupation authorities also took ruthless measures to suppress signs of

Palestinian nationalism. The mayors of many big Palestinian towns who had sympathies for PLO and had been installed through democratic elections several years ago were dismissed, the democratically elected councils in Palestinian rural areas and urban centres were disbanded and replaced with appointed council that were more pliant; Palestinian universities were shutdown; Palestinian newspapers were either censored or shutdown; the distribution of books in the West Bank and Gaza was stopped. Israeli settler organization played the role of vigilant against Palestinians. Palestinian civilians were randomly shot and there were grenade and car bomb attacks on Palestinian property.

Obsessed with cold war-related developments the Reagan administration did not speak out on Israeli atrocities. (51)

After Israel invaded Lebanon in early June 1982, a plan was presented by President

Reagan in September. The Reagan peace plan confirmed the objectives of the Camp David Accords with regard to autonomy for the Palestinians residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and expressed disapproval over the establishment of further Jewish settlements in these territories. The plan proposed that after a transitional period, the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be granted self-government. This administration would be run in association with Jordan. The plan proposed that Israel would withdraw from the territories it had occupied and in return it would be able to live in peace.

Jerusalem a city that is holy for the Muslims, Christians and Jews would not be divided.

Its final status would be decided through negotiations involving all parties. The idea of an independent Palestinian state was rejected by the plan. The Israeli Labor Party’s leader

Shimon Peres expressed support for the plan, but Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his Likud Party opposed it. The PLO and the Arab states also rejected it. Later, the plan was shelved. (52)

On September 6, 1982 the 12th Arab summit held in Fez. The Arab leaders avoided openly rejecting the Reagan Plan, but they endorsed instead, eight resolutions based on

Saudi King Fahd’s plan. The plan called for the setting up of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab heads of state and government recognized the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians and called for complete

Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the removal of all Israeli settlements from these territories. (53) Just a few days after the Fez plan was presented, the situation in Lebanon worsened, when Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on September

14. The multinational force had been permaturely withdrawn from the Lebanon. Israel forces quickly moved into West Beirut despite the ceasefire agreement. The Phalangist forces were allowed by the Israeli army to enter the Camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut where they killed hundreds of Palestinians civilians in cold blood. (54) The American government, as part of the ceasefire agreement, had officially guaranteed the security of the Palestinian in the camps after the evacuation of the PLO in August 1982. But with the withdrawal of the multinational force there was no one to enforce the guarantee. (55) The

Reagan administration reacted to the massacres by reorganizing the multinational force and sending the US marines back to Beirut. (56) However, despite the sense of outrage in the international community, the massacre never really an impact on Israeli’s policy.

(57) President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive in October 1983, that formalized the administration’s decision to take to higher levels the cooperation with

Israel. The US-Israel strategic alliance was confirmed with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the two sides. (58)

The Fez plan presented by the Arab leaders was rejected by the US. The latter disagreed with that proposal for Palestinian state led by the PLO, the demolition of Israeli settlements, and an total withdrawal of Israel. (59) This was unfortunate, for it signaled a marked change in attitudes in the Arab world and might have served as a foundation for discussion with the American government. While the Plan did not make specific mention of the right of Israel to exist, it did urge that all states in the region should be allowed to live in peace. It accepting the legitimacy of partition, and thereby meant implicit recognition of Israel. In other words, it advocated a two state solution for Palestine. (60)

Refusing to accept the reality, the US prohibited the inclusion of a PLO representative in the Arab League delegation that arrived in Washington to discuss the plan with the US leaders in October 1982.Washington snubbed the PLO, even though the latter had implicitly recognized Israel for the first time. (61)

Very little interest was shown in the peace plan by the Reagan administration and it came to nothing. Jordanian King Hussein and the PLO signed a memorandum in February 1985 envisaging a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the setting up of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation to administer the territories. The Palestinians would retain their identity and autonomy within the context of this confederation. Under these initiatives it was proposed that a dialogue would be held between the US and a joint

Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It would then lead to an international peace conference and eventually direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. (62) This Initiative too came to nothing when in February 1986; the US refused to negotiate with members of the PLO members, ostensibly because its official covenant expressed the resolve to destroy Israel.

Washington insisted that there should be direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, without the participation of any PLO representative. (63) Besides, the Reagan administration just did not like the idea of a conference being convened in which the

Soviet Union would also participate and be able to pressure Israel into making unilateral concessions. (64) On its part the PLO refused to accept the US formula unless the

Palestinians’ right to self-determination was recognized. Washington wanted unconditional and clear acceptance of UN Resolution 242, unambiguous recognition of

Israel’s right to exist, and repudiation of terrorism. (65)

After Jordan-PLO initiative failed to take off the US made some superficial efforts to bring some betterment in the living standards of the Palestinians in the West Bank and

Gaza. According to a scholar this was actually done to undermine the PLO’s influences in the territories. In December 1987 the Palestinians began an unarmed movement of defiance against Israel which they called the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza. Its message to all and sundry was that the Palestinians did not just want some cosmetic improvements in their quality of life: They wanted their own state. The international and

American media could not ignore the unarmed youth who were in the forefront of the movement---the young boys and girls who were fighting the Israeli forces with bricks and stones. For the first time, the western media depicted the Palestinians as a distinct nation having their own aspirations and struggling for freedom from an occupying power. (66)

The US now had to rethink its policy on the question of Palestine. The peace process had to be restarted. In February 1988, Secretary of State Shultz presented a plan for a peace settlement. The plan envisaged negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-

Palestinian delegation, for a period of six months. In these talks a three year transitional autonomy arrangement would be worked out for the West Bank and the Gaza strip. A permanent settlement would be negotiated by the two sides, during the transitional period. These two sets of negotiations would run simultaneously with and if necessary, with reference to an international peace conference, that would involve the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as all the protagonists in the region, including the Palestinians in a joint delegation with Jordan. The foundational principle of the international conference would be that all the participants would accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 however; none would have any power to dictate a settlement. (67) These conditionalities became a point of contention between the

concerned parties. The Palestinians were not ready to accept the second class status accorded to them and insisted that only the PLO had the right to represent them. Shultz’s did not budge from his refusal to allow the Palestinians to speak for themselves.

According to a scholar, it was this myopia of American leaders which assured the failure of the proposal. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir rejected outright the idea of an international conference. The Israeli’s were adamant that there should be “peace for peace” and not “land for peace” as upheld by resolution 242. (68) There was a total collapse of the plan when in July 1988 Jordan officially gave up most of Jordan’s legal and administrative obligations with regard to the West Bank, (69) thus giving the PLO a much stronger claim than before to be seen as the sole legitimate representative of the

Palestinian people. (70) In late 1988, the PLO declared that it had accepted the two state formula which meant an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza that would coexist alongside Israel. It acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, accepted the legality of UN Resolution 242, and declared its renunciation of terrorism. (71) These compromises by the PLO, particularly its acceptance of the exact formula that

Washington had been demanding since 1975 as a basic condition for dialogue, resulted in the start of a US-PLO dialogue in December 1988. The American administration was not very enthusiastic about it and it was therefore conducted at a low level. However, now that the self-imposed ban by Washington on contact was removed the Bush senior administration had more space to maneuver through the peace process. (72) During the

Bush administrations, first one and a half year, official contacts took place between PLO representatives and a few American officials. These were held in the American embassy in Tunis. The talks were suspended in mid 1990. (73) The concentration of the US side was on putting pressure on the PLO to accept Israeli plans for holding elections in the occupied territories. The PLO would be kept away from these elections and the end result would be just a form of autonomy. Thus the concept of self-determination and an independent state for the Palestinians were ruled out from the very beginning. Most

Palestinians saw the proposal as unfavorable for their sides. (74) The US stopped the talks when the PLO did not condemn a commando attack in Israel on May 30. (75)

US Policy in the Post Cold War Era

The Cold War ended and the West had won this contest without firing a shot. This event and the Gulf crisis 1990-91 increased the US prestige in the international community.

The US had now emerged as the unchallenged superpower and was now powerful than before. It could pressure both sides and determine how the peace process would proceed.

The Palestinians were more vulnerable to pressure, for their political position had weakened as a result of their impolitic support for Iraq during the war. (76) Israel too had its vulnerability for it was in dire need of a US loan of $10 billion to settle new immigrants from the Soviet Union. (77) Thus, the US launched another Middle East peace initiative in 1991. Actually, earlier in 1990, Washington had promised a peace process for the Middle East to cajole the Arab countries to participate in the US-led international coalition against Iraq or to at least stay on the sidelines. In March 1991,

President Bush declared the basic objective of US policy on the Middle East: the attainment of Arab-Israeli peace on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and through an exchange of ‘land for peace’. In this regard, James Baker, the US Secretary of

State made a tour of the Middle East. He told the Arab leaders that the US would propose several confidence-building measures as a prelude to the Arab-Israeli peace talks that would be convened under the co-sponsorship of the USA and the Soviet Union. The

Peace Conference was held in Madrid, Spain. Participating delegation came from

Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel. The Palestinian representatives constituted part of the Jordanian delegation; Israel was adamant that they should not participate as a separate entity. (78) These negotiations were divided into a set of bilateral talks, for Israel separately met with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians and five multilateral exchanges that dealt with practical issues such as water, environment, the refugees, regional security and economic development. As far as the bilateral talks were concerned the biggest achievement was that the parties agreed that their discussions would continue.

In the multilaterals talks several countries participated, but they were unable to reach any substantive agreements. These meetings concentrated on technical matters such as how to improve the quality of life of the refugees and take into account the situation of regional water resources. (79) Interestingly in this moot the US did not play the role of mediator.

It only remained a convener. The American delegation and Baker avoided direct mediation at the Madrid Peace Conference and the Palestinian-Israeli track. (80) High hopes had been pinned on the Madrid Peace Conference. It was an unprecedented development that bitter enemies had come together on the negotiating table, putting their hostilities aside to work out a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, owing to infighting and mistrust between the parties, Madrid is remembered only as another on a long list of conference that had ended in failure, having done very little to resolve the long standing Arab-Israeli dispute. But one thing was different; this time the

US had succeeded in gaining the trust and confidence of all parties that participated in the conference, which had never happened before. Washington had convinced all sides to meet and talk. Previously, any serious dialogue had always been ruled out, on one ground or another, especially between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This Israeli-Palestinian dialogue which had begun in Madrid, at least helped in creating the environment for the secret talks that led to the signing of the Oslo Accords. However, according to an analyst the Madrid Peace Conference was not really aimed at clinching an agreement between the two sides but about improving Washington’s standing in the Middle East and affirming the American position of the main mediator in the Middle East conflict. (81)

Bill Clinton initially began his tenure with attention focused domestic issues and hardly much interest in foreign affairs. This attitude did not allow Washington intervention in the peace process which at that time was stagnating. The US perhaps would not have been unaware of what was happening in Oslo, but the new President kept his administration aloof throughout the process, and while American negotiators mediated many interim agreements, it was a basically detached approach to the peace process until

1998. A very important cause for behind this aloofness was that there was a personality clash between Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s term from 1996 to 1999. The Clinton administration’s basic attitude to the process was that the US should make an effort to keep away from negotiations, avoid adopting a position on any issues on the negotiating table and remain neutral between the parties.

This attitude only contributed to further stagnation. (82)

The breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations that took the world by surprise in

September 1993 was achieved in Oslo and not in Washington. The negotiations that led to the adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-government in West

Bank, and Gaza were held directly between Israel and the PLO in the Norwegian capital.

It is said that these events took place without American assistance or even knowledge.

While Israel acknowledged that the Palestinians had their national rights, the PLO promised to eschew terrorism. Later Clinton essentially played the role of master of ceremonies when the Oslo accord was initialed in the White House. (83) In May 1996 a

Likud Party government’s ascent to power with Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister dealt a heavy blow to the peace process at the Norwegian capital. Netanyahu was bitterly opposed to the Oslo accords. He perceived it as incompatible with not only Israel’s security but also its historic right to the Biblical homeland. His three years tenure as prime minister was devoted to efforts to stop the exchange of ‘land for peace’ the philosophy that underpinned the Oslo accord. This back tracking of Israel from the historic compromise achieved in Oslo made it imperative that the American role in the

Middle East be reassessed but no genuine reassessment took place. (84)

President Clinton himself became actively involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, but he could achieve very limited results. There was the Hebron Protocol of 15 January

1997 (85) that envisaged an Israeli departure from 80 percent of Hebron within 10 days.

It also provided for an Israeli evacuation from the countryside of the West Bank in three stages. The last stage would be completed by mid 1998. The two sides also agreed that within a two month period after the signing of the protocol, they would enter into

Permanent Status Negotiations, which would be completed by May 4, 1999. (86) The

Wye River Memorandum initialed on 23 October 1998, (87) included developing a join

Israeli-Palestinian security plan to wipe out terrorism; the exit of Israeli troops from an another 13 percent of the West Bank territory (along with a promise to make additional withdrawals in future); a conveyance of around 14 percent of the land of West Bank from the joint control of Israel and Palestinians to solely Palestinian control; the promise by the

Palestinians that the anti-Israeli provisos in its national charter would be deleted; Israel's pledge that it would provide two corridors of safe passage connecting the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; the release by Israel of 750 Palestinian prisoners; and the building of a

Palestinian airport in Gaza. (88)

The formation of Ehud Barak’s government in May 1999 held out the promise of a fresh start in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Bill Clinton saw

Barak’s ascent to power as providing him a chance to once again encourage Israel to accept the risks involved in bartering territory for peace. (89)

The Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations reached a crucial stage, when the Camp

David summit was held in July 2000. The summit failed in achieving its goal. There are two completely different versions regarding the causes of its failure. The version from

Israel is that Barak had offered a very generous package at Camp David, but Arafat had, without any logic rejected it. The PLO and its leader had instead chosen to revert to violence. The Palestinians on the other hand said that the Israeli premier had tried to trap

Arafat. With the support of the Americans Israel had tried to impose a basically unfair and faulty final status agreement on the Palestinians. (90)

Robert Malley, a Special Assistant on Arab-Israeli Affairs, and Hussein Agha, pointed to the complicated and often anomalous role that the US played at this summit. It was the main broker of the supposed peace deal, and it was custodian of the peace process. At the same time it was strategic ally of Israel. One cannot help but arrive at the conclusion that

Clinton’s strong obvious bias towards Israel damaged his trustworthiness as an honest broker. This was an important factor contributing to the failure of the Camp David summit. (91)

The main objective of the summit was to secure a final peace agreement by settling all outstanding issues, especially the matter of Israeli settlements, the delimitation of borders, Jerusalem’s status and the disposition of Palestinian refugees. However, the entire blame for failure to reach agreement was placed by Clinton on Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians. (92)

The fact is that to a great extent, it was Washington’s unwillingness to pressurize Israel to halting settlement construction in the occupied territories; in preventing delays by the

Israeli government in implementing troop withdrawal called for in the Oslo Agreements; its general unconcern about other Israeli practices in the occupied areas; and its withdrawal of support for many of the UN resolutions that had provided the Palestinians with international legal support. Also, the stand that the parties should be responsible for further progress in the peace process without US intervention actually placed the

Palestinians in a disadvantageous position for it allowed Israel to maintain the status quo.

With no pressure, from the US, it was free to consolidate its control over the occupied territories, and even to expand them. These were the major factors in the failure of the

Camp David summit. (93)

In the seven years that followed after the signing of the Oslo accords, there was an almost fifty percent increase in the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, Gaza and East

Jerusalem. They now numbered around, 250,000 to 370,000. Israeli settlers had been encouraged by comparatively dovish Barak government as well as by the openly hawkish, pro-settlement Netanyahu government. Though the Clinton administration often issued critical statements against the Israeli settlements that were perceived as a factor hindering the peace process, they failed to take any action against Israel unlike Bush Sr. who withheld or threatened to withhold aid. (94)

After the Camp David debacle, there was another Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In October 2000 Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State and the

CIA Director, held a meeting with Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak in Paris where the two leaders signed a temporary arrangement under which Barak agreed to withdraw troops to the positions held before September 28, and Arafat promised to make an effort to curb

Palestinian intifada. The American officials were also keen that the two sides sign a cease-fire or an agreement on security cooperation, but Arafat said he could not agree to it unless the document also provided for an international inquiry into the causes of the outbreak of violence, Barak rejected this demand. (95)

Again, with the failure of these talks’s violence escalated. Clinton then held a meeting in

Sharm-el- Sheikh in October 2000 with Arafat and Barak. Israel and the Palestinian

Authority agreed verbally to resume bilateral security cooperation, and Israel promised to relax restrictions on the Palestinians. Both sides promise to control violence. Israel, also agreed to the formation of a U.S. presidential commission that would look into the causes of the upsurge in violence after the Camp David summit and accordingly to make recommendations. A commission was set up led by retired American Senator George

Mitchell, which gave in its findings in a report in 2001. (96) This summit too failed in stopping the violence and to quell Palestinian militancy Israel re-imposed the internal closure, closed the crossings into Egypt and Jordan, once again shut down the Gaza airport, and resumed military strikes. (97) In late December 2000, just before he was about to leave office Clinton made a last-ditch effort to bring about peace. He suggested some “parameters” for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The idea was that eighty percent of Israeli settlers would be allowed to remain in the West Bank, and Israel would remain its control of the Jordan River valley and also an early-warning capability in the

West Bank. Another provision allowed Israel to make emergency deployments whenever it felt that its security was threatened. The plan provided for a demilitarized state of

Palestine where an international force would be posted to ensure the security of its border and to deter external aggression. Palestine would exercise sovereignty over its airspace, but special arrangements would be made to meet Israeli training and operational needs.

(98) In the Holy City Jerusalem, the neighborhoods where Arabs were living would be run by Palestinians while the areas where Jews were in a majority, would be under Israeli administration. The Temple Mount would be under Palestinian sovereignty while the

Western Wall and the “holy place” of which it is a part would be held by Israel.

Palestinian refugees could be allowed to return only to the West Bank and Gaza. These proposals were accepted by Israel with certain reservations, but Arafat totally rejected them. (99)

While President Clinton was making efforts to promote peace, number of settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories grew by 90 percent. The biggest increase in settlement was during the administration of Ehud Barak. By the end of 2000, there were 225,000

Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. The most ‘generous’ offer to the Palestinians by Clinton, (not Barak) had been a withdrawal of twenty percent of the settlers. This would leave more than 180,000 Jews in 209 settlements, accounting for about 10 percent of the occupied areas, including the land to be “leased” and parts of the Jordan River valley and East Jerusalem. (100)

In his book entitled Palestine Peace not Apartheid former US President Jimmy Carter pointed out that the percentage figures were misleading, for these included only the actual area of the settlements. There is a track with a radius of around four hundred meters surrounding each settlement within which Palestinians are not allowed entry.

Additionally, there are large portions of territory that have been allocated for exclusive use by Israel, roads that inter-connect the settlements and the latter to Jerusalem, and the main arteries that provide the settlers with basic amenities like water, sewage, electricity, and communications. These measures in width from five hundred to four thousand meters, and Palestinians are prohibited from using or crossing many of these connecting links. These settlements which are like a honeycomb and the pathways inter connecting them have effectively divided the West Bank into at least two territories that are non- contiguous. There are also several fragments that are mostly not fit for human habitation or are unreachable. Israeli control of the Jordan River valley means that the Palestinians cannot have any direct access eastward into Jordan. Israel has built about a hundred military checkpoints that totally surround Palestinians territories and block roads going into or between Palestinians communities. Besides, there are innumerable other roads that are closed permanently with huge concrete blocks or mounds of mud and rocks. (101) In such a situation no Palestinian leader worth the name could accept such humiliating terms and survive. Most unfairly official statements emanating from Washington and Jerusalem placed all the blame for the failure of talks on Arafat. (102)

Clinton’s failure in achieving a significant breakthroughs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite major effort, was inevitably influenced the Bush Jr. administration, which in the beginning decided to avoid meddling in the conflict. Keeping in mind their predecessor administration’s dismal failure in July, October, and December 2000, Bush had no interest in trying to solve the conflict. (103)

In the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Taba in January 2001, there was no representation from Washington. The mediation efforts of the CIA which had begun as part of the October 1998 Wye agreement were also stopped. Also after the retirement of

Special Middle East Envoy Dennis Ross in January 2001, no other envoy was named, until late May, when as a result of an escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

William Burns was appointed. (104)

Bush administration tried to find a way to implement the Mitchell report (April 2001) and Tenet plan (June 2001) which were actually only attempts to bring about a cease-fire and to reverse conditions to as they were the year before . (105)

The new Secretary of State Colin Powell said quite clearly at a press conference, that there would first have to be a cease-fire and then a settlement freeze. The Mitchell Plan in contrast had envisaged that the two would have to take place simultaneously. Thus the

US had accepted the Israeli demand and Tel Aviv was pleased that it would no longer be under pressure to halt the building of more settlements. The Bush administration also endorsed Sharon’s demand that the Palestinian would first have to unilaterally give up violence before Israel agreed to a ceasefire. Thus Washington gave full freedom to Tel

Aviv to continue to consolidate its occupation of the Palestinian territories. Negotiations now became conditional on a halt to violence from the Palestinian side. (106) The fact was totally ignored that most of the time the Palestinians were responding to provocation from the Israeli’s.

There was now no proper framework in which the Israel-Palestine conflict could be resolved. Arafat was considered persona non grata by the Bush administration, which refused to meet with Arafat. Also there was very little opposition to continued Israeli settlement activity in the Palestinian areas. The Israel besieged Arafat’s compound in

Rammallah in 2002 with impunity, providing further proof that the US looked away, if not endorsed Israel’s activities. (107) Thus, a UN Security Council resolution tabled in

March 2001, calling for a UN observer force to protect Palestinians in the occupied territories was vetoed by the US. There was insistence from the US side on four conditions: First that there would be no mention of Israeli settlement activity; second, that the word “siege” would not be used to describe Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories; third, there would no reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention that regulates an occupying power’s behaviour towards civilian population of the occupied territory, and fourth, there would be, no mention of the principle of land for contained in

UN Resolution 242. As a pointed out by a scholar this negativism revealed the Bush administration’s bias toward Israel and also its fundamental disinclination to involve itself in any serious mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (108)

The justification given by the Bush administration of its veto of the UN resolution was that since the 1993 Oslo accord was a bilateral agreement between the Palestinians and

Israel, any UN or other external involvement in issues that had to be negotiated would be tantamount to interference that could prejudice the outcome of negotiations. Similar logic was used by the US to argue that the Oslo accords had made the Geneva Convention irrelevant and should therefore not be invoked for opposing Israeli settlements. (109)

That the Bush administration considered the Palestinian-Israeli issue of much less importance then other issues in the Middle East and the broader region had become very apparent through its consistent reluctance to get involved in any mediation efforts.

Condoleezza Rice the National Security Advisor in early 2002, made this amply clear when she declared, that Washington’s priorities were the war on terror and the ouster of

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and therefore it had no time for “marginal issues” such as the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict. (110)

The Impact of 9/11 on American Policies towards the Palestine issue

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, American policymakers believed that putting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the back burner, or at least making a serious attempt to do so, would erode backing in the Arab and Muslim world for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and make it easier to build an international coalition to wage the war on terror, which might even include the ‘rejectionist’ states like Iran and Syria. (111)

Washington now fully focused on Iraq, totally ignoring the urgent need to address the

Palestinian issue. (112) However, international pressure mounted on the US government to take steps to reduce tensions between Israel and the Palestinian authority. It began to realize that this was also necessary for building a coalition against Iraq.

President Bush began exerting pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to curb some of its oppressive attitude in the Occupied Territories and to take all possible measures to contain the violence of the second Intifada. Bush also asked Sharon to arrange a meeting between the Israeli foreign minister and Palestinian leader Yasser

Arafat, even though the US President did not hide his disapproval of Arafat’s leadership.

In early October 2001, Bush expressed public support for a Palestinian state that would coexist alongside Israel. This was seen, by observers as a truly surprising development, for even President Clinton, who had worked hard for a two-state solution, had avoided uttering the words” Palestinian state” in public until his very last month in office. (113)

The Palestinians were in truly dire straits when Israeli forces attacked Arafat’s compound in Ramallah, which since 1995 had been under the Palestinian Authority. Keeping in view the importance of Arab support for war on terrorism, in March 2002, the US gave support the UN Security Council’s call for Israeli withdrawal from Ramallah, and exerted pressure on Israel to put an end to its siege of Arafat’s headquarters. The US called upon

Israel to withdraw its forces from West Bank towns. (114)

Bush delivered a major speech on the Middle East in June 2002. Two aspects of the speech were very important. First in this speech Bush asserted that Arafat had to relinquish power before the peace process could revive. As prominent scholar David

Landau pointed out in his article this move was meant to sound the death knell of Yasser

Arafat’s political career, the seemingly immortal leader of the Palestinian national movement. President Bush’s statement made the Israeli’s very happy, for they had been calling for Arafat’s removal from the political scene for the past many months. Second,

Bush called for the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. He said that to achieve this objective Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories, had to be frozen and Israeli forces had to be withdrawn to their positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. (115)

The Palestinian state that would come into being would have a democratic government and a market economy. It would have new constitution based on the principle of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and a new system of security. Such reforms were seen many analysts as hard, in fact impossible to achieve while Palestinian cities and towns were besieged by Israeli forces or were under military occupation. Bush condemned violence by the Palestinians but avoided mention of Israel’s atrocities on the

Palestinians, which included demolition of homes, assassination of leaders, and killing of civilians. He conveniently ignored the fact that the Palestinian were mostly resorting to violence because they were under occupation and oppression of an alien nation. The fact is that more Palestinian civilians were being killed by Israeli soldiers than Israelis were dying from suicide bombing by Palestinian were also ignored. (116)

There was a strong reaction to Bush’s startling speech. It appeared too many that Bush was advocating a coup against Arafat. This open interference in Palestinians politics only renewed support for Arafat. Some analysts opined that Bush had not advanced the cause of peace, but rather had caused a setback to it. It was clear that he had unfairly placed all burdens on the Palestinians, treating the Israelis as entirely blameless. This was obviously done to avoid any political risks at home. Not surprisingly, his speech was welcomed by the Israelis and their supporters in the US. (117)

When violence escalated to unprecedented levels and international pressure mounted on the Bush administration, latter, agreed to form the Quartet for peace in the Middle East comprising European Union, Russia, and the UN to draw a “Road Map” leading to a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. (118) The Quartet presented a

“road map” for an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement in September 2002. It would proceed in three stages (1) A reform of the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian elections and Israeli withdrawal to the lines of September 2000, (2) the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional boundaries and the drafting of a Palestinian constitution in 2003; and (3) during 2004 and the first- half of 2005, negotiation on the final-status. (119)

After the first draft had been prepared, the US had compelled the Quartet to redraft the

‘road map’ to address Israeli’s concerns. The Bush team then overruled the Quartet demand to finalize a road map draft at the end of the year. The US representatives cited continued strong Israeli objections as well as the need to wait until after Israel had held its elections in January 2003 and the impending war in Iraq. (120) Even after the road map was introduced, Bush did nothing to make sure that Israel complied with the provisos of the plan. This was so because of his reluctance to stand up to Sharon, and also due to immense domestic political pressure from the pro-Israel lobby. For the implementation of the plan pressure was mostly exerted on the Palestinians. The latter were told to choose a new leadership and to control militancy by Islamist organizations, but no effort was made to stop Israel from tightening control over the occupied territories.

The US did nothing to persuade Israel to stop building the “separation wall “in the West

Bank. (121) This wall was supposed to protect Israeli citizen from terrorist attacks by

Palestinian militants.

Since the end of the second world war the US has been playing an increasing and very important role in Middle East, particularly with regard to security issues. Initially this involvement was driven by oil, later by containment of the Soviet Union and, over time, by its expanding strategic relationship with Israel. There has been no doubt that the US has a marked bias in favour of Israel. Very seldom has it exerted pressure on the Jewish state to stop building settlements and road blocks in the West Bank. President Bill

Clinton and George Bush Jr. publicly favored the creation of a ‘viable’ Palestinian state, but both hesitated to use American diplomatic clout and financial leverage to make the creation of the state possible. The simple reason is that the political cost of such an attempt would have been too high for them to bear. (122)

The White House kept on condoning the illegal actions of Israel. The US Congress too made a strong contribution to the perpetuation of violence in the area. No doubt there are debates at the political level and in the media in the US concerning Israeli policies in

Palestinian territories, but owing to powerful political, economic, and religious interest groups in the US, the Israeli government actions are hardly ever questioned or condemned, The Israeli side of the question is always given prominence in American media, and most Americans do not know or understand the situation in the occupied territories. (123)

American discourse on the Middle East has always ignored the Palestinian perspective, and this of course has a powerful impact on policymaking. There is very little understanding or concern in the US on the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The latter are seen as being driven solely by ‘hatred’ of the Jews rather than by real injustices. This line of thinking has prevailed even after the Palestinians had begun to be accepted by internationally as legitimate partners in the peace process, The intense negativity vis-a-vis the Palestinians after the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David talks and the Al-Aqsa

Intifada are striking. (124)

The combination of unhesitating American support for Israel and the latter’s occupation of Palestinian territory over several decades has fed anti-Americanism all over the Arab and Islamic world. The threat to the US, in fact the West from international terrorism is owing to this festering sore. It has become more difficult for the US to address other problems in the Muslim World such as Iran’s nuclear program. The Arab leaders who might have been sympathetic to US goals are owing to the unpopularity of the US are afraid to openly side with the superpower. (125) The fate of Hosni Mubarak is an example of how the people in an Arab country can treat those leaders they consider as

American puppets. This is a dilemma that has hindered American efforts to deal with the several regional challenges in the broader region.

The European Union’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Some of the EU member states have some connection or the other with the Middle East conflict owing to the historical role played by them in the area. The Middle East and

Europe have geographical proximity, and the industrialized countries of Europe have been dependant on Middle Eastern oil. Conflicts in the Middle East impact upon

European security. (126) The EU has been able to develop a general stand on the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict over the decades. The need to resolve the conflict is considered essential for ensuring the stability of the EU’s neighbourhood in the Mediterranean. Since the end of the cold war various events in the EU with regard to the conflict, as well as in the Middle East in general, have highlighted the importance of this issue. To resolve the conflict is also important in the context of the implementation of the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP) as the conflict hinders the realization of broader aims of good governance, stability, and prosperity in the region. Since it has become more and more aware of the strategic implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU has begun to aspire to become an actor in the conflict resolution process. (127) By the time the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 broke out, the European role in the region was almost completely eclipsed by that of the US. Anglo-French clout in the Middle East had actually begun to diminish after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. This blatant aggression had been put to an end by the join diplomatic intervention of the two superpowers----the US and the Soviet Union. (128)

As American influence in the region progressively increased, those at the helm in

Washington convinced their European allies that the US must be in the forefront in defining the West’s strategic and political goals in the region and that the Europeans must only play second fiddle to them. The European must concentrate on rendering political support and if the need arose economic aid. The joint goal should be the protection and promotion of Western interests. Though several decades have gone by since the start of the Middle East conflict, the European approach towards the region has, mostly depended on civilian or soft power instruments. These include diplomacy, trade and financial aid to the principal actors. (129)

A collective attempt towards developing a coherent policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict was first made by the members of the European Community (EC) in response to the 1973 War. At that time there were nine member states of EC and they issued a declaration at the end of the war in November 1973 that called for a resolution of the conflict based on

UN Security Council Resolution 242. The EC went a little beyond the UN Resolution for it stressed upon the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians. This sort of clashed with the

US position on the conflict. The most obvious reason why the Community shifted its policy was that the Arabs imposed an oil embargo on supporters of Israel. This embargo had created a serious energy crisis for the industrialized countries of Europe. It suddenly struck the European countries that they were very vulnerable to the use of the ‘oil weapon’ by the oil rich countries of the Arab world, for they were highly dependent on

Middle Eastern oil for their energy supplies. As a long term response to the conflict in the

Middle East, the Europeans initiated the Euro-Arab Dialogue. (130) This was not really liked by the US. Thus, the Euro-Arab Dialogue avoided discussion on the Arab-Israel conflict and focused on economic and technical cooperation. The Americans had reservations on this French led initiative which purported to engage the Arabs in a dialogue. The timing of the initiative clashed with American efforts to calm down the situation in the Middle East, by encouraging some confidence-building measures between the two sides. Parallel to this was building a coalition of western oil importing states that would come together in a new international energy agency, to counter balance the

Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that had emerged as a cartel.

The European initiative at this juncture was seen by the American policy makers as a threat to Washington’s diplomacy in the region. This disagreement between the western allies was resolved by agreements signed at Gymnich and Ottawa in 1974. By signing these agreements, the US had agreed that European Political Cooperation began in 1970 between European Community member states, could develop, while at the same time making sure that the trans-Atlantic alliance was not damaged. The European on their part assured the US that they would desist from issuing any statements or taking any joint actions that could hurt American interests, particularly in the Middle East. (131) Europe’s incipient independent stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict now began to fade and they began to faithfully follow the American line. (132)

The events that followed in the Middle East encouraged the EC to develop good relations with Arab countries. In this regard the Palestinian issue was given special attention and continued declarations were issued on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (133) In the Euro-

Arab dialogues first General Committee meeting held in Luxembourg in May 1976, the

EC clearly acknowledged that in order to resolve the Arab-Israel issue, it was essential to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The EC also upheld the necessity of

Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories and the inclusion of the PLO which represented the Palestinians in any international endeavor to bring about peace in the region. (134) They now used more harsh language to criticize Jewish settlement in the

Palestinian territories and the issue of Palestinian people’s rights became almost pivotal in EC discussions. It was most significant that European countries like the West

Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg that had been traditionally patrons of

Israel began to soften towards the Arabs. (135) In the communiqué released after the second meeting of the General Committee of the Dialogue held in Tunis in February

1977, the EC expressed apprehensions about the Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories and asserted that the Fourth Geneva Convention must be applied to these areas. Lebanon’s independence and territorial integrity was also supported. At this time, the country was embroiled in a civil war that had been made more complex by the presence on its soil of the PLO, which had resulted in political interference and military invasion of the country by the two regional powers, Israel and Syria. (136) In June 1977, the EC adopted another resolution that stressed that an all-embracing settlement that should necessarily recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to have their own homeland. It was also emphasized that any negotiations on the Palestinian-Israeli issue should include Palestinian representation. (137)

The EC adopted a more unambiguous position at the 32nd UN General Assembly session in November-December 1977. Belgium was holding the EC rotating presidency at that time and on behalf of EC member states, its representative described the Palestine problem as the pivotal issue in Middle East conflict and stressed the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to their homeland. (138)

This increased sympathy in the EC countries’ towards the Palestinian cause could be attributed to a certain extent to the withdrawal of the Labour Party from the ruling coalition in 1977 and the entry of the right-wing Likud. The Israeli Prime Minister had been openly hostile towards European political leaders. This development had impacted adversely on West Europe’s ties with Israel. (139) The EC who supported the Camp

David process but not wholeheartedly, in the following months began distancing itself from the process for it was now becoming convinced that this process would not contribute to the resolution of the Palestinian problem which was now increasingly being viewed by its member states as the crux of the Middle East problem. France and Britain especially, persuaded their fellow member states to present an autonomous European peace initiative for the Middle East that would be distinct from the US-led Camp David process. The idea was welcomed in Europe but had to face the disapproval of both Israel and the US. A strong diplomatic offensive was launched by Israel to block the European initiative, and the US tried to make sure that the EC declaration would not in any way hinder the Camp David process. Washington made efforts to make light of European aspirations to act independently in the Middle East. (140) The evolution of the EC position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue led to the adoption by the heads of state and government of the Venice Declaration in June 1980. This document is still perceived as the basis of the European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Declaration accepted Israeli’s right to existence and security, while recognizing ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’. No longer was the Palestinian problem defined as a refugee problem, but as a matter of self-determination for the dispossessed Palestinians. The EU said it was willing to participate in the framework of an overall settlement in an arrangement upheld by firm and binding international guarantees and asserted that the

Palestinian Liberation Organization should take part of any such negotiations. The

Venice Declaration also highlighted that the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were illegal; it also stated that it was inadmissible that any unilateral initiative should be allowed to alter the status of Jerusalem. (141) The Venice Declaration, solidified the EC position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and once again made the divergence between the US and EC positions obvious. The fact is that the lines on which the EC policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict was evolving had already become a source of tension by the US and

Israel. The Israelis were now convinced of the anti-Israeli tilt of the Europeans. (142)

Though the PLO was pleased with the Declaration, it was disconcerted that the EC had held back official recognition of the organization as the representative of the Palestinians.

(143) According to a scholar since the EC’s position on the Arab-Israeli issue was increasingly being perceived by Israel as biased, it decreased the chances for the EC to be selected as a mediator in the conflict. While the US too was in a similar position, i.e. it was biased in favor of Israel, the EC was in more of a dilemma than the US, the reason being that the EC also did not have the capacity for conducting ‘strong mediation’. The outcome of this situation was that during this period, the EC policy was based on declaration, they hardly took any actions. (144) The European countries did not condemn

Israel’s sneak attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981. However, when Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon, the Community rejected the Israeli claim that it had acted in self-defence. The EC demanded that Israel immediately withdraw its troops to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon. The EC member states imposed an arms embargo on Israel and delayed the implementation of the Financial Protocol it had signed with Israel. (145)

The new administration of President Reagan made no bones about its opposition to

Europe conducting independent diplomacy in the Middle East. The Middle East diplomacy of Europe was now limited to carrying out fact finding tours of the Middle

East. The European Community supported the American and Saudi plans to resolve the conflict. (146) When Israel invaded Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, with the backing of some conservative Arab states presented the Fahd Peace Plan. Lord Carrington, the British

Foreign Secretary who was on a visit to Saudi Arabia representing the Community, saw the plan as a positive development vis-à-vis the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian issue and the reason was that it implied recognition of Israel. Israel however did not see much positivity in the Saudi plan and perceiving Carrington’s statement as the official view point of the European Community, warned that Israeli policy towards the EC would be reviewed. (147)

The Europeans strongly condemned Israel for the brutal manner in which it suppressed the Palestinian uprising. The European Parliament in March 1988, withheld approval of three protocols on EC-Israel trade and financial relations. The EC also permitted the imports to the Community of agricultural and manufactured products from the occupied territories and decided that the bulk of its assistance would be disbursed directly to the

Palestinians. (148) The EC also began place emphasis on the urgency of holding a

Middle East peace conference with participation by the Soviet Union, the US, the regional powers, and the EC. For the fruition of this effort and to help end the bloodshed, the EC formed a contact group comprising foreign ministers. Thus, from the 1970s until the cold war’s demise, the EC concentrated on adopting common positions on the conflict. Unfortunately, because of lack of both capabilities and divergences between the positions of member states, the EC could not take much effective action to implement its policy position. (149) In France, a very important EC member state, socialist President

Francois Mitterrand came into power in 1981. He was seemed as a friend of Israel and supporter of the Camp David process. This brought about a change in France’s Middle East policy. However, the new French policy was not pro-Israeli rather it was a dithering and at times contradictory policy that also confused the other member states who began to think that the times were not conducive for a renewed European initiative on the

Middle East. (150)

European countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, have a very sensitive relationship with Israel, and this is owing to the occurrences of the second world war. The governments of these two countries therefore hesitate to criticize Israeli policy. For these countries it is convenient to change their national positions on the issue when common

European positions are adopted. Israel cannot blame them for disloyalty and it allows them to improve relations with the Arab world. They can them claim that is the price they have to pay for pressuring the higher objectives of trying to reach a unified European position. In this way they can also avoid alienating domestic public opinion. The UK too has made use of this excuse. Atlanticest Britain has accorded much higher priority to transatlantic relations than its Middle East policy, though it has a long history of involvement in the region. In fact it is the country most closely involved in the Middle

East in comparison to France or Italy. London has adroitly avoided any direct confrontation with the US by evoking the same principle: Europe’s need to adopt an independent role in the peace process. Italy, on the other hand favoured European involvement in the peace process in the broader scheme of the EU’s ‘Mediterranean policy’, which the Italians perceive as one of the top European priorities. It stance has been that EMP must not suffer any neglect in favour of a policy wholly focused on enlargement problems and on the ‘northern dimension’. However, Italy’s divisive domestic politics has made its Middle East policy somewhat inconsistent and unclear.

This picture appears to confirm that the EU member states have really not abandoned their own foreign policy agendas. They also set their own priorities within these agendas with regard most global and regional issues, but particularly in their Middle East policy.

(151) The Americans have been determined to have sole and total control over the

Middle East peace process, and the limited instruments for implementing foreign policy provided by the earlier European Political Cooperation(EPC), and the present Common

Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) have both contributed to watering down the EC/EU’s role in the Middle East. (152)

The EU and Israeli-Palestinian Issue in the Post Cold War Era

The years 1989-91 were turmoil ridden for Europe. This was the time when communism vanished from Central and Eastern Europe, Germany was reunified and the Soviet Union disintegrated. While Soviet power began to decline rapidly, the United States quickly emerged as the only single superpower. The international community’s in the Middle

East now had nothing to do with bipolarity in the international system or superpower rivalry in the region. The post-Cold War interventions now assumed a unipolar form, with the US, the unchallenged dominant power in the region, whose will mostly prevailed. The Gulf War of 1991 also played an important role in altering the political balance in the region. It apparently provided a new opportunity for progress in the peace process after a rather long hiatus. Exploiting this favourable moment, the US decided to launch a peace initiative to find a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arab countries. The Israelis and the Palestinians too were more willing that peace talks be held.

The Scud missiles that Saddam Hussein’s forces fired into Israeli territory led to a rethinking on Israeli’s security. Though the Scud missiles did not cause much damage the

Israeli government became alert to the possibility that it could be invaded, (153) and therefore must ensure its military security. Israel was now forced to think about the possibility of starting talks with the Palestinians. On the other hand, Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein, during the war, had led to the political isolation of the

Palestinians. Therefore, Arafat too realized that he would have to agree to start direct negotiations with the Israelis. In this changed political and strategic scenarios, the

Americans could, with greater confidence launch the American peace initiative in the form of a Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. (154)

Though the letters of invitation to the Conference were sent by both the United States and the Soviet Union as co-conveners of the moot, no one doubted that it was basically an

American initiative. With the Soviet Union weakened and demoralized by the loss of its satellite states in East and Central Europe and its failure in Afghanistan, the USSR was no longer in a position to challenge the US. The United States was now the sole guarantor and manager of security in the region, and considered it its natural right to take on a primary role in the peace negotiations. The European Community, the Gulf Cooperation

Council and the United Nations were invited as observers. The European Community had been insisting for a long time that a Peace Conference should be held for securing a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. However, at least two of the main players the United States and Israel (155) had, until 1991 not been prepared to hold a conference. Therefore, bilateral contacts between the parties remained the mode of

addressing the conflict, although this strategy had yielded very few successes. (156)

The European Community possessed neither the instruments nor the strength of will to

push forward its strategy. European Political Cooperation (EPC) which could not step

beyond the pale of intergovernmental cooperation was proving to be very inefficacious

apparatus for promoting the community as an international actor. The member states,

where often in disagreement about any possible European action. Since the performance

of EPC during the Gulf War had been quite unsatisfactory the notion of a European

Middle East peace initiative was finally given up and support given for the US-sponsored

conference in Madrid. (157)

However, the EC was emphatic about being included in the conference as a full

participant and not an observer, but this was adamantly opposed by Israel. The European

governments were not trusted by Israel and the latter did not want the EC as an additional

mediator. As far as Israel was concerned, the EC had made at least three strategic

mistakes that had preordained that it would be acceptable as a mediator in the peace

process these were as follows:

 The EC had urged that Israel make concessions to the Palestinians before direct peace

negotiations were held between Israel and the Palestinians;  It had extended concessions to the Palestinians which was prejudicial Israeli interests in

advance of direct peace talks ; and

 It was emphatic about the United Nations being the suitable forum for talks leading to a

comprehensive peace settlement. (158) Even though it was fully aware that this was not

unacceptable to Israel.

Thus, Israel rejected the EC’s full participation in the Conference. This suited the US

which wanted the process firmly in its own hand. The EC was therefore consigned to a

very insignificant role, and was kept away from the most critical talks. (159)

At the inaugural of the conference in October 1991, Hans Van Den Broek, whose country

was holding the six monthly rotating presidency, in his address to the participants

underlined the strong bonds existing between Europe and the Middle East, stressed upon

a peaceful solution to the conflict, which he said was important not only for the region as

a whole but also for European security. Van Den Broek also underscored the importance

of regional cooperation. He pointed out that the pattern set in by the Conference on

Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) could not only serve as an example but also

as a source of inspiration for the Middle East a turmoil ridden region. The CSCE he said

had begun modestly, but then produced significant results. Though these words were very

impressive and there was some validity in the suggestion that Europe could serve as an

archetype of coexistence and integration for other conflict-ridden regions, the reality was

that integration in the Community in the realm of foreign policy was not a great success. (160) Hans Van Den Broek outlined the Community’s concerns regarding the situation in the occupied territories and pointed out that a very important confidence building measure would be to discontinue settlement activity by Israel in the occupied territories.

(161)

In the aftermath of the Madrid Peace Conference, negotiations began at two levels. There would be bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and negotiations at the multilateral level between Israel on the one side and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon on the other side. The multilateral talks began in Moscow in 1992 and the EU was assigned a role in these. It headed the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG).

(162) As a scholar pointed, the US was willing that the EC should play a role in making a financial contribution to the peace process and was also allowed to present itself as a role model of regional economic cooperation, but it was not to have a political role in the process. (163)

These negotiations did not produce any substantial results. However, a momentous development at that time unknown to the world was that secret direct bilateral contacts between Israelis and Palestinians were initiated in the Norwegian capital. (164) A non-

EU country had succeeded where the EU and its member states had failed. The signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and PLO in 1993 further consolidated the

EU’s role as a financial sponsor of the peace process. Just after the Oslo Peace Process began, (165) the EC disbursed an aid package amounting to 35 million European Currency Units (ECUs). An additional 500 million ECUs was promised over a period of five years. The EU pledged to support efforts by the international community to develop the occupied territories. (166)

When the Gaza–Jericho Agreement was signed in May 1994, Manuel Marin the Vice

President of the European Commission told Arafat that the European Commission would donate 10 million ECUs for creating a Palestinian police force. The EU no doubt believed that large-scale foreign economic assistance would spur economic development in the

Palestinian areas which would be the best guarantee for Israel’s security and keep, the peace process on the right course. (167) One of the multilateral financial instruments was the REDWG, that purported to redefine economic relations in the region, especially by focusing on the states of Israel and Palestine in the economy of the region. The REDWG was focused on the region, but several of the projects were specifically meant to develop the Palestinian economy and to establish links between the Palestine’s economy and rest of the region. In this regard Egypt, Israel and Jordan were most important. The EU expressed its wish to coordinate and the manage aid to the Palestinian Authority after the

Declaration of Principles was signed. The EU proposed that it would operate through a sub-committee within REDWG. The EU’s wish was not fulfilled for the US convened a conference of donors, where the World Bank was made the coordinator. It was apparent that the EU was being kept away as far as management and coordination of assistance to the Palestinians was concerned. If they had been given charge of the assistance the

Europeans would have got political leverage. However, the EU continued to be the main financial patron during the Peace Process beginning in 1991 until 2000. To support the Oslo Accords the EU adopted a new budget line. The Union funded most important infrastructural projects, e.g the airport and seaport in Gaza, and also steps to advance the peace process, especially through civil society and people to people contacts, and building of institutions in the territories run by the Palestinian Authority. (168) At this point in time, the EU also decided to adopt a more all-embracing policy towards the

Mediterranean region and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also called the Barcelona Process, in

November 1995. There was a definite link between EMP and the Peace Process. (169)

Seven Arab states, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan plus the Palestinian Authority and four non-Arab countries of the region Turkey, Cyprus,

Malta and Israel plus the EU countries were brought together on this platform. Libya and

Mauritania were there as special guests. (170)

One of the prime objectives of the Barcelona Process is to encourage democratic development and the values related to it. It is also meant to create an environment where extremism is not allowed to germinate. Promoting economic welfare in the EU’s southern and eastern neighborhood would lead to the rise of a stronger middle class that would demand democratic rights and governance with citizen’s involvement and in turn promote peace and stability to the region. To boost democracy, the EU’s strategy is to cooperate with NGO’s, the civil society, the minorities and the disadvantaged sections of society and the trade unions. This strategy is supposed to complement cooperation with the governments, which are part of the Barcelona Process. (171)

The methodology adopted in the process was that bilateral association agreements or what were called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreements were signed with the participating states including the Palestinian Authority. The Barcelona Process has established a regular political dialogue between the EU and its non-European

Mediterranean partners. The main financial instrument adopted by the EU for the implementation of the partnerships is the MEDA program. (172)

The EU has now become the largest donor of economic and technical assistance to the

Palestinian Authority, for it provides almost half of the total foreign aid it receives. Some joint EU actions were also taken under CFSP, such as monitoring of the Palestinian elections in early 1996 and training the Palestinian police. (173) From the mid-nineties onwards the EU began to accept the fact that the US was and would remain in the foreseeable future the real power broker in the region. The Union therefore began to focus on conflict prevention and backing of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the parties to the conflict instead of conflict resolution. After the Treaty of

Amsterdam came into effect in 1998 which made CFSP more all-encompassing, the EU began to facilitate the peace process by arranging regular meetings between the parties.

EU Troikas made frequent visits to the Middle East. They conveyed to the protagonists the EU stand on various issues. (174)

In June 2000 a summit of the EU leaders held in Portugal placed emphasis on the conflict prevention and CBM promotion dimension of the Middle East policy of the EU.

Ambassador Miguel Moratinos had been appointed as EU Special Envoy to the Middle

East way back in 1996. A wider mandate was now conferred on him. He was now supposed to develop close contacts with the parties to the conflict and also other important regional and international players in the peace process. The Special Envoy, was present during negotiations, also advised the two sides. In this way he kept them diplomatically engaged. (175)

The European Council comprising the heads of state and government, have, a various occasions issued a number of statements and declarations on the peace process in the

Middle East. In 1999, they issued successively the Berlin, Cologne, and Helsinki

Declarations and in 2000, the Feira, Biarritz and Nice statements. At the summit in Berlin in March 1999 the European leaders issued a bold statement supporting the rights of the

Palestinians to have an independent state. In this statement the EU countries committed to give unconditional support to the Palestinian right to self-determination, which would include the option of a state. The EU said the statement, was looking forward to the early satisfaction of this right, and appealed to the parties to make efforts in good faith for a negotiated solution based on this right that should not be subject to veto. The statement’s objective was at that time was to compensate Arafat, who had postponed a unilateral declaration on an independent Palestinian state in May 1999. (176) This had been done on the request of American President Bill Clinton.

Just after the launch of the Barcelona Process, the Peace Process faced some serious reversals. The first shock came when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s who had shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Yasser Arafat was assassinated and Binyamin

Netanyahu was elected as the new Israeli Prime Minister in May 1996. Netanyahu, the leader of the Likud Party, did not favour the Oslo Peace Process or its implementation.

Beginning from 1996 until 2000, the Peace Process slowed down owing to missed deadlines and unending violence from both sides. This situation reinforced the mistrust between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and strengthened the extremists on both sides. The EMP could not remain unaffected by the hindrances that confronted the peace process. It became difficult to continue cooperation in the political and security arenas.

Thus great difficulties arose when a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was being drafted. Though a lot of efforts were made the Marseilles Conference held in

November 2000 could not adopt the Charter. (177) The Arab countries were not in a compromising mood because they insisted that Israel be condemned by European Union member states for excessive use of force against the Palestinians who were waging the intifada. This EU member states were hesitant to do and therefore, no agreement could be achieved on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter. It was apparent that economic cooperation alone could not lead to political settlement. (178)

The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process in the Post 9/11 Era The EU was confronted with new challenges with the collapse of the peace process in

2000. At that time, the EU was trying to develop the European Security and Defense

Policy (ESDP) as an important feature of the CFSP pillar. With, the crisis in the Peace

Process, EU had to alter its role. The focus now shifted from diplomatic and financial support to the Peace Process to helping out in crisis management and contributing to efforts on conflict resolution. When the Camp David talks collapsed in 2000, the EU initially responded by frenetic diplomatic activity aimed at reviving the Peace Process.

Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP played a significant role in almost persuading Israel and the PA to agree to a definitive agreement in Sharm al-Sheikh and

Taba between October 2000 and January 2001. (179) The EU leaders in a meeting of the

European Council issued a declaration in mid December, 2001, in which they called upon

Israel to stop extra-judicial killings, dismantle closures and freeze settlements in

Palestinian lands. On the other hand the Palestinian leadership was asked to dismantle the militant wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and to issue a statement saying that the intifada had ended. This declaration however, did not reduce tensions because in spite of

Arafat condemnation of terrorism and his announcement to halt all Palestinian military actions, Israel did not end the siege of Arafat’s headquarter. (180)

The debacle at Taba, however, resulted in an intensification of violence in the Palestinian territories and both sides blamed each other. Faced with a difficult situation, the EU tried to keep a balance and condemned the violence from both sides. The international fact- finding commission which was set up to propose urgent measures to be taken by both sides to stop the violence included Javier Solana. The Mitchell Commission presented its report in May 2001 but there was no mechanism which could monitor the enforcement of its suggestions. (181) The events of September 11, 2001 had immediate and long term effects on the region. The Bush administration gave full support to the newly elected government of Ariel Sharon. This hawkish government wanted to relocate the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict within the context of the ‘war on terror’. The reoccupation of

Palestinian towns and the siege of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in his compound in

Ramallah lead to a further deterioration of relations between Israel and the PA. (182)

The EU too was angry with Israel as the latter’s security forces went about systematically destroying the Palestinian infrastructure, most of which had been built with funds from the EU. (183) According to a scholar, what was most annoying was that new administrations in both Israel and the United States began their favourite occupation of criticizing the EU for being biased in favour of the Palestinian. (184)

In an earlier development the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine had presented a peace plan for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in

Spain in 2002. The Council approved of the plan, but suggested that the Palestinian

National Authority (PNA) ought to get a fresh mandate from its people by holding new elections. After elections were held and seen as free and fair by the international community, the Palestinian state would be created and without delay granted recognition by the UN. A noteworthy point is that the proposed plan rejected the Israeli stand that a peace process could only start after a lasting ceasefire is in place. (185)

The European Union’s member states knew that the peace process could only move forward if the US was on board and willing, and therefore they called for greater involvement of the US in this Plan presented by France. The plan, however, fell through owing to disunity among EU member states. The UK, Germany, the Netherlands had withdrawn backing for the plan, reportedly under pressure from Washington. (186)

The EU which claims to be a champion of human rights and places great emphasis on observance of human rights in its relations with other countries, was not united on the resolution presented (and adopted) by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in April

2002 that censured Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands and its assault on

Palestinian towns and camps. It also asseverated the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to resist Israeli occupation, and demanded that Israel should vacate the occupied areas in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the UN and the UNHCHR. (187)

After much disagreement among EU member states in 2002 on a common strategy for the peace process, and after the CFSP High Representative and the Spanish delegation (Spain was holding the rotating presidency) were stopped by Israel to meet Yasser Arafat in his compound in Ramallah, the EU finally took the decision to give up the idea of launching an independent peace plan and instead to support the American peace initiative that resulted in the formation of the Quartet for peace at Madrid. (188)

The EU member states hoped that by becoming part of the Quartet the EU would get more visibility as well as influence in the peace process. It was also thought that participation in the Quartet would enable the EU to influence American policies on the

Israeli-Palestinian issue. (189)

Thus, the EU had now become part of a multilateral initiative alongside of Russia, the

UN and the US. It was now generally believed that peace efforts by major actors should be coordinated to achieve better results. This is why the Quartet had been formed. It was a historic occasion when President Bush delivered a speech on the Palestinian issue on

June 24, 2002. As pointed out earlier, it was the first time that he mentioned a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state conditional on democratic reform.

With endorsement of a two-state solution by the US, in its second meeting the Quartet could now seriously discuss the idea of an exhaustive course of action that would get rid of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, put a stop to the violence and bring about a peace settlement. The Road Map to Peace was announced by the Quartet on September 17,

2002. There was criticism of the Road Map, particularly by Israel, which is why it was revised several times. While Europe had played a prominent role in setting up the Quartet and in preparing the Road Map, but since the US took up its revision and it inevitably began to control its agenda and administration. The requisite coordination between the

EU and the American administration became more problematic when France and

Germany, two very important EU member state quarreled with the US over Iraq. The US in fact waited until after the Iraq war in March 2003 to announce the Road Map. Goaded by Israel, Washington became adamant that it would not make public the document, until the Palestinians elected and installed a Prime Minister, who would start reforming the

PNA. The Road Map was formally launched at the Aqaba Summit in June 2003 by

President Bush in the absence of other members of the Quartet. (190)

Although the European countries had been involved in the affairs of the Middle East or the ‘Near East’ as it was also called, since at least the early 19th century, Europe as represented by the European Union only became a formal international actor after the emergence of European Political Cooperation. It is interesting to note that political integration began when events in the Middle East started to strongly impact on European economic interests. The fact that the Middle East possessed large reserves of oil became an important consideration for the energy dependant European countries.

The bipolar system thrown up by the cold war, had, in the early years prevented Europe from developing its own policies towards the Mediterranean region. Later, the West

European realized that they had lost their international credibility by continuing to toe the

America line. Despite serious efforts by the European Community, the US wish to dominate Middle Eastern affairs, including the peace process, kept the European role in the region secondary. The EU has its own problems vis-a-vis its role as an international actor and that is the limitations of it Common Foreign and Security Policy and its hesitation in developing its own military capabilities. Dependence on NATO has undermined its credibility as an international actor and it is being seen as a ‘soft power’, unlike the US. Besides there are differences in perceptions on issues between member states, which often makes consensus difficult. Often it has itself avoid taking up responsibilities involving complexities. Above all, however, the US is not willing to cede what it considers its own especial preserve in regions of geo-strategic important matters of war and peace, changes in political structures and central of resources.

Further, the two important protagonists i.e. Israel and Arabs had clashing views about EU participation in the peace process. While the Arabs wanted the EU’s involvement in resolving the conflict, Israel has been rather suspicious about the EU’s role because of some of the statements and declarations issued by the Union, which were seen as being against Israel’s security interests. The EU has provided a huge amount of aid to the

Palestinian Authority, it also has close economic and political ties with Israel, but its influence on Israel is limited.

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3.See Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: HMSO, 1993), 4. 4.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 4.

5.“Anglo-American Committee of Inquire”, available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

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6. See Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 8.

7.Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, An A to Z of the Middle East (London: Zed Book Ltd,

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8.See Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 8.

9.George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (London: Cornell University

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10.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 7.

11.Asaf Hussain, The United States and Israel: Politics of a Special Relationship

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12.Johan J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,

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13.Khalil T. Azar, American Foreign Policy & its’ Link to Terrorism in the Middle East

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14.Ibid. 15.“The Evian Conference”, available from http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/ article.php?ModuleId=10007698.

16.Ibid.

17.Thomas Kolsky, Jews against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism 1942-1948

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 92.

18.George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (London: Cornell University

Press, 1962), 387.

19.Asaf Hussain, The United States and Israel, 43.

20.Ibid.

21.Elizabeth Stephens, United States Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the ‘Special Relationship’ (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 19.

22.Rateb Al-Sweiti, “Role of American Policy in the Palestinian Catastrophe between

1939-1948: Prevention of Palestine Independence and Creation of the Jewish State”, available from http://scholar.najah.edu/sites/default/files/journal-article/role- american-policy-palestinian-catastrophe-between-1939-1948-prevention-palestine- independence-and.pdf. 886.

23.Ibid, 904.

24.Ibid, 886.

25.Khalil T. Azar, American Foreign Policy ,17-18. 26.Asaf Hussain, The United States and Israel, 51.

27.Khalil T. Azar, American Foreign Policy, 20.

28.Rateb Al-Sweiti, “Role of American Policy in the Palestinian Catastrophe”, 919.

29.John V. Canfield, Middle East in Turmoil, Vol 1 (New York: Nova Science Publishers,

Inc, 2001), 1.

30.Kathleen Christison, “United States” in Philip Mattar (ed.), Encyclopedia of the

Palestinians (New York: Facts on File, Inc, 2005), 508.

31.Ibid.

32.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, “The Palestine Liberation Organization”, Pakistan Horizon xxviii, no.4 (1975): 81.

33.Ibid.

34.Ibid.

35.Ibid.

36.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their influence on US Middle Eastern

Policy (England: University of California Press, 1999), 115.

37.Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 509.

38.Ibid.

39.Ibid. 40.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 132-133.

41.Ibid, 133.

42.Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 509.

43.Ibid.

44.Ibid, 510.

45.Ibid.

46.Ibid.

47.Ibid.

48.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 195.

49.Samuel Segev, “The Reagan Plan: A Victim of Conflicting Approaches by the United

States and Israel to the Syrian Presence in Lebanon”, in Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof,

Alexej Ugrinsky (eds.), President Reagan and the World (New York: Hofstra

University,1997), 41.

50.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 201-202.

51.Ibid, 204.

52.Visit at http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000463

53.Samuel Segev, “The Reagan Plan”, 48-49.

54.Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East

Policy from Truman to Reagan (London: University of Chicago, 1985), 422.

55.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 216.

56.Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 422.

57.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 216.

58.Ibid, 218.

59.Fred John Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press,

1985), 438.

60.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 212-213.

61.Ibid, 213.

62.Ibid, 234.

63.Colonel Larry D. McCallister, “U.S. Engagement Activities and the Peace Process in the Israeli-Arab Conflict” available from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2

64.Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States & the Middle East since 1945

(Washington D.C: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005), 88.

65.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 235. 66.Cathy Hartley, Paul Cossali, A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations (London: Europa

Publicatin, 2004), 399-400.

67.The Middle East and North Africa, 49th edition (London: Europa Publication, 2003),

69.

68.Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns,

Problems, possibilities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 90.

69. Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 237.

70. The Middle East and North Africa, 69.

71. Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 511.

72. Ibid.

73.William B.Quandt, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks from Oslo to Camp David II” in

Tamara Cofman Wittes (ed.), How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross- Cultural

Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace,

2005), 21.

74.Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine (New York: Olive Branch

Press, 1989), 303.

75.Timothy J. McNulty, “U.S-PLO Statement on Violence Falls Short” Chicago Tribune, 12

June, 1990 available from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-06-

12/news/9002170875_1_israeli-crimes-and-massacres-plo-statement-abul-abbas

76.Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 512.

77.William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Since 1967(Washington D.C: Brooking Institution Press, 2001), 307.

78.Taylan Ozgur Kaya, The Middle East Peace Process and the EU: Foreign Policy and

Security Strategy in International Politics (London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), 95-96.

79.Don Peretz, “US Middle East Policy in the 1990s” in Robert Owen Freedman (ed.),

The Middle East and the peace process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords (Gainesville:

University Press of Florida, 1998), 350.

80.Anthony Wanis-St. John, Back Channel Negotiation: Secrecy in the Middle East Peace

Process (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 71.

81.Fernando Rodriguez, “The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference: US Efforts towards Lasting

Peace in the Middle East between Israel and its Neighbors” (2011) University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. Paper, available from http://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2327&context=td, 44- 45.

82. Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 512.

83.Avi Shlaim, “The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” available from

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Palestinian%20Conflict.pdf.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86.P R .Kumaraswamy, The A to Z of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Maryland: Scarecrow

Press, Inc, 2006), 106.

87.Avi Shlaim, “The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”

88.Visit at http://www.answers.com/topic/what-is-the-wye-accord

89.Avi Shlaim, “The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

90.Ibid.

91.Ibid.

92.Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 513.

93.Ibid, 512-513.

94.Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 300. 95.The Middle East and North Africa (2003), 539.

96.Visit at http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1644149_

1644147_ 1644137,00.html.

97.The Middle East and North Africa (2003), 539.

98.Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006),

150.

99. Ibid, 150.

100. Ibid, 150-151.

101. Ibid, 151-152.

102. Ibid, 152.

103.Robert O Freedman, “The Bush administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The

Record of the First Three Years” Jerusalem Viewpoints (April 2004), available from http://jcpa.org/jl/vp516.htm

104.Robert Owen Freedman, “The Impact of September 11: The Bush Administration, the European Union and the Arab-Israel Conflict” in Robert Owen Freedman (ed.), The

Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,

2002), 346. 105.David Newman, “The Consequence or the Cause? Impact the Israel-Palestine Peace

Process” in Mary Buckley, Rick Fawn (eds.), Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11,

Afghanistan and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2003), 157.

106.Kathleen Christison, “All those old Issue: George W. Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli

Conflict” Journal of Palestine Studies, 33, no.2 (Winter 2004): 38.

107.Daniel J. Graeber, “The United States and Israel: The Implications of Alignment”, in

Jack Covarrubias and Tom Lansford (eds.), Strategic Interests in the Middle East:

Opposition and Support for US Foreign Policy (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited,

2007), 129.

108.Kathleen Christison, “All those old Issue” 36.

109.Ibid, 37.

110.Ibid.

111.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

204.

112.Robert O. Freedman, “The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”

113.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

204. 114.Mohamed A. El-Khawas, “Post-Gulf War, Post-Desert Fox, and the Post-Saddam

Phase: US Policy against Iraq and its impact in the Middle East”, in John Davis (ed.),

Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War (Epub) from Forty One to

Forty Three (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 180.

115.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

211-212.

116.Mohamed A. El-Khawas, “Post-Gulf War, Post-Desert Fox, and the Post-Saddam

Phase”, 180-181.

117.Ibid, 181.

118.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

211-212.

119.Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003 (New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 2004), 203-204.

120.Kathleen Christison, “All those old Issue”, 39-40.

121.Ibid.

122.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

7-9.

123.Jimmy Carter, Palestine peace not Apartheid (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2006), 209.

124.Kathleen Christison, “United States”, 515.

125.John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy,

8.

126.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The

Quicksands of Politics (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

127.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How much of an Actor?” European Security 17, no.1 (March 2008)): 105.

128.Dr, Saad Abdulaziz Alaoudah, Managing the Conflict between Palestine and Israel:

The Role of the European Union ( UK:Author House, 2010), 33-34.

129.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 11.

130.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

106.

131.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood,

21-22. 132.Emad Gad, “Egyptian-European Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation” in Gerd

Nonneman (ed.), Analysing Middle East foreign policies and the relationship with Europe

(New York: Routledge, 2005), 72.

133.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

106.

134.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 27.

135.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The

Quicksands of Politics (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 37.

136. Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood,

27-28.

137.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

106.

138.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 28.

139.Ibid, 29.

140.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

39.

141.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 106.

142.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 106-

107.

143.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Post-September 11 International Scenario and the

European Union, Jean Monnet Project Papers (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe,

2004), 146.

144.Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 106-107.

145.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 32.

146.Ibid, 31.

147.Shameem Akhtar, Western Europe and PLO: Convergence and Divergence, Pakistan

Horizon xxxv, no.4 (1982): 104.

148.Rosemary Hollis, “Israeli- European Relations in the 1990s” in Efriam Karsh and

Gregory S. Mahler (eds.), Israel at the Crossroads (London: British Academic Press,

1994), 222.

149.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

107.

150.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

39. 151.Ibid, 12-13.

152.Ibid, 44.

153.Ibid, 47.

154.Ibid, 48.

155.Ibid.

156.Ibid, 49.

157.Ibid.

158.Ibid.

159. Ibid.49-50.

160.“Approaches Towards the Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Question of Palestine”, Issue 7, October 1991, available from http://unispal.un.org/

UNISPAL.NSF/0/F952A47244AA95DA852560EF0068E15F.

161.Ibid.

162.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

53.

163.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

107. 164.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

53.

165.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

107-108.

166.Francois D’Alancon, “The EC Looks to a new Middle East”, Journal of Palestine

Studies 23, no 2 (Winter, 1994): 41.

167.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

55.

168.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

108.

169.Ibid, 109.

170.Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, “The European Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict” in

Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), Relations between the European Union and the Muslim

World in the Contemporary Geopolitical and Economic Scenario (Karachi: Area Study

Centre for Europe, 2003), 99.

171.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 62.

172.Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, “The European Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, 99-

100. 173.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 62.

174.Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, “The European Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”,

101-102.

175.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 63.

176.Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, March 24 and 25, 1999 available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html

177.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

109.

178. Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

65.

179.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

110.

180.Preliminary Draft - European Commission, available at ec.europa.eu/smart- regulation/impact/background/.../laeken_concl_en.pd

181.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 111.

182. Ibid, 111.

183.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

65.

184.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”,

111.

185.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Vicissitudes of the Palestinian Quest for Statehood, 76.

186.Ibid.

187.Ibid, 78.

188.Costanza Musu, European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,

66.

189. Ibid, 66-67.

190.Meliha Benli Altunisik, “EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 111-

112.

CHAPTER- IV

THE POST COLD WAR CRISES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT:

THE RESPONSES OF THE EU AND THE US

South Asia is a distinct geographical entity which comprises seven states---India,

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. India the biggest among the South Asian countries is bounded on the north by China, Nepal and Bhutan, on the northwest by Pakistan, on the north east by Myanmar, on the east by Bangladesh, and on the south across the Indian ocean by Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Besides the size of its territory, India hold an important position in South Asia owing to its large population, ample natural resources, growing economy and industrial, military and technological strength. Pakistan on the other hand has a greater strategic significance as compared to India, mainly because it is located close to the energy-rich Gulf and Central

Asian regions. (1)

The two biggest countries of South Asia India and Pakistan share a common history and culture, but relations between the two have been defined by territorial and other disputes which resulted in military showdowns over the decade. (2)

By the late eighteenth century, most of South Asia came under the direct control of Great

Britain. The British Raj over the Indian subcontinent lasted for nearly two centuries. The

Muslim League, headed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, became convinced over the years that the Muslims and the Hindus could not co-exist, for the latter that were in a majority were not ready to accommodate the Muslims. He therefore demanded a separate country for the Muslims of the subcontinents. The campaign gained momentum in early 1940s, and by the end of the second world war, the inevitability of India’s partition became obvious.

The partition of India created two sovereign countries India and Pakistan. Pakistan gained independence from British rule on August 14, 1947 while India became independent the next day. (3) Ever since India and Pakistan became independent states Kashmir has been the root cause of nearly all disputes between the two countries. India and Pakistan have fought three full fledged wars, two of which were directly related to Kashmir. At least two low-intensity wars too, were owing to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

A Brief History of the Kashmir Dispute

Jammu and Kashmir located on the north-west of the subcontinent is a land locked territory. The total area at the time of partition was 86,024 square miles. (4) Due to its geographical position it has strategic importance. It is bounded on the north by

Afghanistan, on the east by China, on the south by India and on the west by Pakistan. (5)

Kashmir was ruled at various times by the Hindus, Buddhists, Mughals and Afghans. In

1819 Ranjit Singh occupied Kashmir and annexed it to his Sikh empire. In 1846, after the

British defeated the Sikhs and annexed Punjab, they sold Kashmir to Ghulab Singh of

Jammu for Rs. 7.5 million. This was done under the Treaty of Amritsar. By this treaty

Ghulab Singh was acknowledged Maharaja of the Jammu and Kashmir State. (6)

Ghulab Singh’s successors were Rambir Singh (1857-1885), Partab Singh (1885-1925) and Hari Singh (1925-1949). The rule of these ‘maharajas’ was tyrannical and oppressors. Around 77% of Kashmiris were Muslims and they rose against Mahraja Hari

Singh's rule. (7) A mass uprising was ruthlessly put down by him in 1931. In 1932 all

Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (renamed the National Conference in 1939), the first political party of Kashmir was established under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.

(8) However, when the British government proclaimed the Indian independence Act in

July 1947 the British paramountcy in around 600 princely states of India ended. The states now had the option to become part of India or Pakistan or remain independent. (9)

However, their rulers were advised to take into consideration geographical contiguity, economic imperatives, as well as the composition of the population. (10) All the states except for Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir opted for India. The Hindu majority

Junagadh and Hyderabad had expressed the desire to remain independent or accede to

Pakistan, but India did not allow them to exercise their choice and forcefully took control of both states. The Indian government’s plea was that states’ intentions were not in accord with the wishes of their people nor did they take into account the principle of partition of the subcontinent on the basis of ‘Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas’. Kashmir had a Muslim majority and a long common border with Pakistan; however it was ruled by Hindu who conveniently ignored the principle of geographical contiguity an important feature of the partition plan nor did he take into consideration the aspirations of the people of state for joining Pakistan. He began conspiring for the accession of the state to India, and succeeds in doing so in October 1947. (11) A crisis loomed in Jammu and

Kashmir.

The situation deteriorated when the Maharaja used his forces to crush the freedom movement. The tribesmen of the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan then crossed the border into Kashmir on October 22 to help their Muslims brethren to wage a holy war (Jihad) against the Dogra forces’ atrocities. (12) The Maharaja appealed to

India for military assistance. The Indian government now exerted immense pressure on the Maharaja to sign the ‘Instrument of Accession’ to join India. The Maharaja did so on

October 26th, 1947. The very next day India dispatched its troops to Srinagar, (13) and established military control over the greater part of Jammu and the Kashmir vale. India which did not have viable land access to the state of Jammu and Kashmir got Gurdaspur in East Punjab through the Radcliffe Boundary Commission award announced on August

16, 1947 a day after independence. Gurdaspur district was a Muslim majority area contiguous to Pakistan. India now had a land link to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(14) It has been highlighted by Professor Alaister Lamb that the last British Viceroy

Lord Mountbatten had exerted influence on the chairman of the Boundary Commission,

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, persuading the latter to favour India. Some documents relating to the transfer of power have revealed that Lord Mountbatten compelled Radcliffe to alter the delimitation of the boundary, so that India would be able to get land access to Kashmir.

(15) Alastair Lamb’s research also revealed that the Indian troops poured into Kashmir before the Maharaja had actually signed the Instrument of Accession. (16) Thus, the accession was achieved through force.

As the Indian troops entered Kashmir an Indo-Pakistan war broke out on October 27,

1947. The legality of the accession was used by India to justify its action. Pakistan challenged the accession as a violation of the wishes of the majority of the people of

Kashmir. The UN mediated to end the war in January 1949. (17)

India placed the Kashmir issue before the United Nations Security Council on January 1,

1948 while it simultaneously took control of the state. The Security Council debated the issue and decided to form UN Commission for India and Pakistan. Two resolutions were passed by the Commission on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 mandating a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. These gave the Kashmiri people two options: to either join India or Pakistan. (18) The Indian leaders never honored their repeated promises that the people of Kashmir would be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in a free and fair plebiscite. (19) India’s promise to hold a plebiscite was actually a diplomatic tactics to ease the international pressure on it.

Under the Instrument of Accession, the Jammu and Kashmir state was not required to adopt any Constitution that India promulgated in future. So, India had to talk with

Kashmiri leaders on the constitutional issue. By the Instrument of Accession Kashmir’s relations with India were restricted only to the realms of security, external affairs and communications. (20) Hari Singh abdicated after signing the Instrument of Accession.

The Constituent Assembly of India introduced Article 306A to the constitution which affirmed Indian jurisdiction in Kashmir over certain fields. When India declared itself a republic in 1950, Article 306 A provided the basis of Article 370 that treated Jammu and

Kashmir as part of the Indian Union. (21)

India’s official stance on Kashmir began to change in 1953. Kashmiri leader Sheikh

Abdullah, who had been a close personal friend of Prime Minister Nehru was imprisoned and substituted by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad. Bakhshi came out strongly in favour of

Kashmir’s union with India. (22) A puppet assembly was elected in 1953 which passed legislation that made Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India. Of course the majority of the Kashmiris rejected it outright. The UN Security Council in its resolution of January 24, 1957 rejected this legislation, since it did not represent the wishes of the

Kashmiri people. On its part, Pakistan rejected the Indian action and emphatically declared that the Kashmiris be given right of self determination. The UN forum was frequently used by Pakistan, to express its view point. It was obvious that India was fully aware that it could never hope to win a plebiscite. (23)

Since 1954, India had been following the policy of gradual integration of the state with the Indian federation under the constitution of India. In December 1964 through Article

356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution providing for extension of presidential or federal rule in Jammu and Kashmir, fundamental part of the terms of Article 370, giving Jammu

Kashmir certain special rights and privileges, were modified. (24)

During the cold war years, owing to bloc politics and because of the hostile attitude of the

Soviet Union towards Pakistan the Kashmir conflict defied resolution. Pakistan was openly pro-west and had joined the western sponsored alliances CENTO and SEATO and permitted the US to build a base on its soil. Pakistan’s insecurity was obviously due to open Indian hostility and its stubborn stand on Kashmir. The Soviet Union had begun to view Pakistan as a direct threat to its own security. The Soviet Union and India found that they shared strategic objectives in the region and internationally. The Soviet Union used its veto power to block UN efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The other veto welding powers in the UN Security Council, including the two European countries, the UK and

France initially supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir but later the Sino-Indian war of

1962 made the US and the European powers wary of supporting Pakistan on this issue.

These powers now focused attention on reducing tensions between Pakistan and India, so that the latter would be able to divert all its economic resources and military strength on its confronting communist China. (25)

Although Pakistan was officially an ally of the west India owing to its bigger territory, population and potential as a power which could challenge China, became a favorite of the west. India’s significance for the west in the regional as well as global contexts was strengthened because India was a leader and founding member of the Non-Aligned

Movement, which influenced cold war issues. (26) Thus Pakistan was in a state of shock when India was generously showered, with political financial and military support by the west during and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Thence onwards Pakistan began to redefine its foreign policy. It pragmatically adopted the policy “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” and established close relations with the People’s Republic of China. This policy caused much resentment and suspicion in the western bloc. (27)

It is claimed by some Pakistani scholars that Pakistan having been persuaded by the west to desist, had lost the opportunity of freeing Kashmir, while India was preoccupied in its war with China. War broke out again between the two hostile neighbours in September

1965 over the Kashmir issue, which ended after the two parties agreed to a cease-fire on the basis of a UNSC resolution. This was followed in 1966, by the Tashkent Agreement, brokered by Soviet Union. (28)

During the 1965 war, Pakistan that was hopeful that its western allies would support it over Kashmir issue, realized that the military aid that it had been given by the West was just meant against communist expansionism, and not to fight its eastern neighbour. (29)

The feeling of vulnerability became more acute in Pakistani government circles.

The Tashkent Agreement did not as envisaged reduce tensions between India and

Pakistan and the former was on the lookout for an opportunity to inflict damage on

Pakistan and this was provided by the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. In the full fledged Indo-

Pakistan war that broke out in December 1971 after India violated the international border in the west, ended in tragedy for Pakistan, which lost its eastern wing. The Simla agreement signed between the two countries in 1972 resolved some of the issues related to the 1971 war, but a particular clause of this agreement was regarding the Kashmir issue. The two governments agreed to change the Cease-fire Line recognized by the UN in 1949 into a Line of Control. They agreed to respect the Line of Control on either side and pledged to resolve their differences through bilateral talks. This was a significant clause, for India always invokes it, whenever Pakistan tries to internationalize the

Kashmir issue. (30) Both, India Pakistan disagree with this interpretation of the clause.

(31)

Pakistan says that the disputed character of Jammu and Kashmir has been recognized by

UN resolutions and these were accepted by both India and Pakistan and approved by the international community. Islamabad has also insisted that:

 The Line of Control is not an international boundary and India has accepted this

position.

 The majority of the populations in Indian occupied Kashmir are against

Indian rule, which has been imposed by the stationing of more than 700,000

Indian troops in the territory. This fact is not hidden from the international

community due to international media,

 Pakistan and India in their Joint Statement of January 6, 2004, made a

commitment to seek a final solution of the Kashmir conflict. (32)

Pakistan’s principled stand on the Kashmir issue as defined by the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs is based on the UN Security Council Resolutions. The resolutions stated that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided keeping in view the desires of the Kashmiri people. On several occasions, Pakistan has reiterated the need for intensive and result oriented negotiations to resolve the Kashmir issue. Islamabad views the Kashmir issue as a trilateral problem and therefore has always emphasized that the Kashmiri people should be taken on board in the Indo-Pakistan talks over Kashmir so that a durable resolution of the conflict is reached. (33)

The Simla agreement did not succeed in the long term in defusing tensions, for it gave no solution for the issue. In 1987, the people of Jammu and Kashmir rose against the Indian occupation in the aftermath of the rigged state elections. India tried to suppress this

Kashmiri Intifada with massive use of force. The uprising continued all through the

1990s. Between 1989 and 1996 approximately 25,000 people lost their lives in the dispute. (34)

India has not shown much interest in third party mediation for resolving the dispute. It always rejected offers by Western powers to facilitate talks. Since 1947 the successive

Indian governments rightly gauged that they would not get unstinting support for their position on Kashmir in international fora such as the UN. Mediation New Dehli thinks would bring favourable results for Pakistan. Kashmir, since the last few decades is seen a matter of Indian national prestige. Allowing the induction of a third party mediator would demonstrate that India would accept its inability to resolve the issue itself. (35)

Pakistan has constantly requested the international community to step in to play an active role in resolving Kashmir issue and to convince India to end its oppression of the Kashmiri people, to respect human rights in the valley, and to start a genuine dialogue with Pakistan to settle the issue permanently. Pakistan has also been asking the international community to convince India to cut down its military presence in this disputed area. (36)

The Kashmirs’ freedom struggle in the late eighties and nineties was inspired by the uprising in Eastern and Central Europe against Communist rule and also the Intifada by the unarmed Palestinians who fought Israeli security forces in various periods. The Indian allegation that Pakistan was involved in the Kashmir uprising was a blatant in truth, for it was a completely indigenous phenomenon. The Kashmir were had lost patience with

India which had adopted extremely repressive policies in the disputed territory and showed no sincerity in finding a solution to the issues. They were also disappointed by the international community’s passive role. The UN never exerted pressure for the implementation of its resolutions on the Kashmir conflict. (37)

New Dehli perplexed by its failure to crush the movement, like in the past put the blame for its continuation on Pakistan. The latter has never denied its interest in Kashmir, that it is morally bound to give political support to the people of Kashmir, who for more than six decades have been striving to free themselves from an illegal foreign occupation. (38)

The US Role in Kashmir Issue

After the outbreak of the cold war, the US directed all its efforts towards the worldwide containment of communism. The US involvement in Asia was mostly restricted to the Pacific Rim countries, notably China, Japan and the Philippines, and the oil rich Middle

East. (39)

Nevertheless, the valley of Kashmir has a certain strategic significance owing to its location. China, Russia, India and Pakistan had considered it of vital importance. In the cold war milieu Kashmir’s proximity to American adversaries China and Russia gave the valley a strategic and political value in the eyes of Washington. Americans were apprehensive that the communist powers, might attempt to take advantage of the unstable and uncertain situation in the region, and exploit the Kashmir dispute for their own purposes. The American officials’ interest in Kashmir was certainly increasing. (40)

While dealing with the Kashmir issue at the UN and other foras, American diplomats worked closely with their British colleagues. In the early years, after the second world war, Washington understood that Britain as the erstwhile imperial power and leader of the Commonwealth was much more familiar with South Asia than the US. The arrogance of being a superpower was not allowed to hinder Washington from benefiting from the wisdom of the older power. (41)

Washington’s willingness to follow the British lead could be clearly seen when it became known that of India was placing the Kashmir issue at the UN and the State Department, at London’s request, sent a message to the government in New Dehli urged it not to take any provocative action. The State Department sent a similar message to the Pakistan government, though the British had not requested it. (42)

Washington, the American mission to the UN, and the American embassies in the Indian and Pakistani capitals became quite closely involved in the Kashmir issue after the

Indians had registered their complaint. (43)

On January 15, 1948, a formal Security Council debate on Kashmir began, when the

Indian representative Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated his country’s position on the issue.

His speech was followed by that of the Pakistan foreign minister, Sir Mohammed

Zafrulla Khan. Naturally both diplomats presented their respective country as the aggrieved party. Ayyangar, alleged that the invasion by the Pakistani tribal and Pakistan’s participation had triggered the conflict. Thus, he insisted, that the Council must take steps to immediately assure the expulsion of the intruders and thus put an end to the fighting.

Zafrulla placed the Kashmir issue into the broader context of Indo-Pakistan relations rooted in Hindu-Muslim in undivided India. He bitterly accused India of wanting to finish off Pakistan and of perpetrating a campaign of genocide against the Muslims of South

Asia. The stands of the two representatives were at the opposite poles the Council it was now obvious would face great difficulties as it made efforts to resolve the dispute. (44)

While, initially it had been reluctant to play a leading role, the US decided to cosponsor with the UK and some others countries, the resolutions, the Security Council adopted in the next three months as it made efforts with very little success to bridge the difference between Pakistan and India. The first of these resolutions passed on January 20, just five days after the debate started, established a commission to gather firsthand information about the situation and to use “mediatory influence” to “smooth away difficulties”.

Accordingly, the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was formed. (45)

Although its allies the US also sponsored the ‘basic’ resolution of April 21, 1948 which clearly asserted that Kashmir’s future should be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite supervised by the UN. The resolution was very important for it contained the essence of the UN stand on the issue and it served as a base for subsequent UN mediator through the UNCIP and individual UN representatives. The UN resolution was completely compatible with the neutral US approach that a fair and impartial formula should be prepared for tackling the issue to make it acceptable for both sides. The

Truman Administration exercising its influence encouraged the two countries to accept the resolution. The American embassies in Karachi and New Dehli played a crucial role in this regard. India and Pakistan agreed to the resolution. (46)

Comprising five members America, Argentina, Belgium, Colombia and Czechoslovakia the UNCIP team arrived in South Asia in July 1948. J. Klahr Huddle, the American member was seen as being more active in comparison to other members of the

Commission. (47)

While the Indian and Pakistani governments were quite disdainful of the UNCIP’s efforts, the Commission on August 13 succeeded in working out a fresh resolution. This called on Pakistan and India to accept to a cease-fire, which would become effective within four days of the two governments’ agreeing to its terms. (48) Another resolution was adopted by UNCIP on January 5, 1949. This resolution gave an outline of the plebiscite process. The UN Secretary General would, as a first step nominates a plebiscite administrator endowed with full powers. Both sides accepted the resolution, registering only few reservations. With the adoption of this resolution the basic structure for resolving the Kashmir conflict through the UN’s mediatory efforts had been established.

(49) When the members of UNCIP began in 1949 to negotiate with India and Pakistan the implementation of their resolutions, they were unable to narrow the differences between New Dehli and Karachi on following key issues; these were i) disarming and disbanding the Azad Kashmir armed forces; ii) the withdrawal of Pakistani military; iii)

When and on what scale was the withdrawal of the major part of the Indian army to take place; iv) In the period before the holding of the plebiscite how would Azad Kashmir the portion of Kashmir taken over by Pakistan, be governed as well as control of the remote, thinly populated areas in the north and northwestern parts of Kashmir also under

Pakistan’s control. While these major questions were left outstanding, UNCIP was able to establish a small, multinational force, the United Nations Military Observers Group in

India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the cease-fire line across the de facto two parts of Kashmir, which was four hundred miles long. As requested by the UN, the US provided the largest contingent in UNMOGIP. The UN observer group continued its monitoring responsibilities until the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. (50)

Since UN mediation had failed to deliver, US policymakers now began once again in earnest, efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute under UN auspices. The Commander-in-

Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz was designated as arbitrator. President

Truman personally appealed to Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistani Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to accept the proposal for arbitration of the truce terms. (51)

This was the first time that an American president openly involved himself in efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Truman explained this unprecedented step to Nehru and

Liaquat, by stressing the urgency of settling the Kashmir issue for the sake of peace and progress in Asia. The press was informed by important officials that the president had intervened because it was American interest to halt the spread of Communism in Asia.

An unresolved dispute in the continent would only serve the interests of the enemies of the free world. (52)

India however, refused the offer of arbitration, because of the finality involved in this instrument of conflict resolution. With the failure of the mediation and arbitration proposals, the UNCIP returned from South Asia and presented a report to the UN

Security Council. In this report the Indian stubbornness had been openly criticized. (53)

The policymakers in Washington too, primarily blamed India for the impasse. They were visibly incensed by New Dehli’s rejection of the Commission’s proposals and also its unrestrained expressions of disdain on American policy on Kashmir. India openly alleged that American policy was biased in favour of Pakistan. The Pakistani diplomats were not given very high marks for cooperation with UNCIP, but their attitude was found to be much less problematic. (54)

Thus India and the US were quite openly at loggerheads over Kashmir. However, their differences over Kashmir cannot be seen in isolation. In the background foreign policy differences had arisen between the two countries on several international issues.

Containment of Communism had become the main objectives of American policy by

1949. India seeing itself as an influential and rising power did not endorse this approach which was dividing the world into two blocs, India, instead favoured of policy nonalignment. Pakistan, on the other hand, was turning more and more towards the West.

(55)

While India was not willing to accept arbitration, it was not averse to dealing with a representative appointed by the Security Council. General A.G.L. McNaughton of

Canada, at that time President of the Security Council, was the first one. McNaughton’s worked on the issue for only a few weeks in December 1949. He did not go beyond negotiations with the UN delegations of Pakistan and India. The American representatives at the UN headquarters in New York helped him in the framing of proposals for overcoming the impasse over demilitarization. India lost no time in rejecting these proposals and on very familiar grounds. They were angered by the international community’s habit of equating India with Pakistan. The latter accepted the proposals albeit with same minor alterations in wording. Policy making in Washington saw India’s rejection as what was now becoming habitual intransigence. (56)

The prominent Australian jurist Sir Owen Dixon succeeded McNaughton in early 1950.

Dixon kept Washington posted about the progress of his mission. However, there was no indication that he was receiving any direct advice from the Americans. Dixon soon realized that India was adamant about refusing to accept his demilitarization formulas. He therefore arrived at the conclusion that it would be impossible to hold, a free and fair plebiscite in the length and breadth of the state. He then proposed other plans. His preference was for limiting the plebiscite to the Valley and to divide the rest of the state between the two protagonists India and Pakistan. The division would be in accordance with the ethnic and religious composition of the population. Dixon’s mission was doomed to fail, because India stubbornly rejected all proposals including a plebiscite.

(57)

After the failure of McNaughton’s efforts and before Dixon took over, the US State

Department came out with an authoritative memorandum which set forth the salient features of Washington’s approach on the Kashmir dispute. The document was prepared by two assistant secretaries, George C. McGhee, who was responsible for US policy on

South Asia, and John D Hickerson, who headed the department’s bureau that was concerned with international organizations. The memorandum was comprehensive and represented an important benchmark in American efforts to resolve the problem. This memorandum was approved by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and it provided policy- makers with guidelines about how Washington should handle the matter. (58)

The two assistant secretaries emphasized in the memorandum that a resolution of the

Kashmir issue was essential for maintaining peace and security in South Africa. They mainly blamed India for delaying a settlement by its intransigence. The memorandum significantly quoted an opinion of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State

Department, that the Maharaja’s signing of the instrument of accession had not really settled the accession issue. (59)

McGhee and Hickerson arrived at the conclusion that India was quite determined to avoid a plebiscite in the territory despite its earlier commitment. It was apparent that the US would support any arrangement acceptable to both protagonists. This could be a Kashmir wide plebiscite, which could result in the state going to either of the two claimants or lead to a de jure partition of the territory between them. The two assistant secretaries did not consider the partition of the Valley itself as feasible. (60) McGee and Hickerson recommended some methods to persuade India to stop its intransigence These would include pressure by Britain and other Commonwealth countries; statements favouring the proposed solutions by other Security Council members in council debate, and firm and frank expressions by Washington of its views on proper occasions. Some concession they said, had to be made to “Indian aversion to an over-all plebiscite”. (61)

Subsequently, the State Department in a message to the American embassy in London emphasized that Britain, as the former imperial power should take on more responsibility for promoting a settlement. The US now wanted that Britain should assume the leading role in preparing a solution to the Kashmir issue. The basic line Britain should adopt should be that contained in the McGhee-Hickerson memo. Britain, the message conveyed, should also closely consult the Security Council members. (62)

Henderson, the US ambassador to India had not hidden his deep suspicion of India’s motives. He arrived at the conclusion that the growing resentment in India about the allegedly pro-Pakistan attitude of the US on the Kashmir issues had actually been quietly promoted by Prime Minister Nehru himself. Nehru, Hendrson opined preferred that

Britain and other Commonwealth countries take the lead in resolving the issue. He noticed that there had been no criticism in India about the Dixon report. Henderson pointed out that if Dixon had been an American, the Indian press would have accused

Washington of playing power politics in Kashmir. Washington apparently paid heed to the ambassador’s brief. For the rest of 1950, the US did not show much enthusiasm for participating in any other major international initiative on Kashmir. (63)

However, during this period Henderson paid a visit to Kashmir. No other American ambassador had been to this territory before. He found that almost all the military officials of UNMOGIP and other foreigners in Kashmir were unanimously of the opinion that the people of the Valley would prefer Pakistan rather than India if they were given the chance to vote freely. Some were of the view that a majority of Kashmiris would rather become independent if the option were offered to them. Henderson held two meetings with Sheikh Abdullah. The latter had by then became prime minister of the state, and he promoted the idea of independence. He also dismissed Dixon’s for a partial plebiscite plan as impractical. (64)

On March 30, 1951 the US and Britain sponsored a resolution in the Security Council.

This was done by Washington despite Henderson’s warning. The resolution rejected the

Indian plan for deciding the status of Kashmiri by the so-called Kashmir Constituent

Assembly. The resolution observed that “the decision about the status of the state would be made in accordance with the will of the Kashmir people as expressed in a free and impartial plebiscite based on the democratic method and held under the UN auspices.

India at once reacted in an adverse manner. Prime Minister Nehru condemned the resolution as “highly objectionable”. (65) India’s insincerity about resolving the Kashmir issue now becomes quite obvious.

The resolution also decided to replace Dixon by another representative and laid down that if disagreement between the protagonists persisted, both would have to accept arbitration. The resolution stipulated that President of the International Court of Justice would be empowered to appoint the arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators after consulting the Indian and Pakistani governments. India outrightly rejected the resolution. Despite Indian rejection, Dr. Frank P. Graham a former American Senator was made mediator in 1951.

Dr. Graham, as the third successive UN mediator, worked very hard to reconcile the respective position of India and Pakistan, particularly on arrangements and preparations for demilitarization followed by the holding of a plebiscite. (66)

An important development in this period was the appointment of Chester Bowles as US ambassador to India, replacing of Henderson. Bowles firmly believed that India was very important for broader US interests that extended well beyond the South Asian region.

The ambassador shuttled between Karachi and New Delhi and during his sojourn in the

Pakistani capital the government indicated to him that Pakistan was ready to make substantial concession with regard to its military presence in Kashmir, if the Indian side agreed to the stationing of a plebiscite administrator. Though Bowles appealed to Nehru to accept this offer, the latter rejected it outright. (67) Graham also did not succeed in persuading the two sides to agree on the demilitarization issue. There was frustration in

Washington as it had fully supported the mission. (68)

The new administration of President Eisenhower did not rank South Asia high on its list of priorities; nevertheless, it did acknowledge the threat the Kashmir dispute could pose to American interests. (69) John Hickerson and Henry A.Byroade, senior officials of the State Department, favoured the partitioning the state. Hickerson, who had been one of the architects of American policy on Kashmir in the Truman administration, had been retained Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs under Eisenhower. The formidable John

Foster Dulles was now the US Secretary of State. The two officials wrote a memo to

Dulles on March 14, 1953, recommending that the administration send a private

American citizen to the sub-continent to explore the idea of partitioning Kashmir. (70)

These recommendations were forwarded to the White House and the US Secretary of

State warned Eisenhower about an imminent war between India and Pakistan over

Kashmir. Eisenhower chose Paul Hoffman to carry out the mission in South Asia.

Hoffman met Nehru in April 1953 and discussed several options, which included a full plebiscite, a limited plebiscite involving the Kashmir Valley, and also joint Indo-Pakistan control of the Valley. Nehru however, was not very enthusiastic about any of these options. His meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and other senior officials went quite well. In the end both countries expressed readiness to engage in bilateral negotiations to resolve the conflict. (71)

With agreement on bilateral negotiations, Washington did not think it necessary to take any further diplomatic initiatives on Kashmir. However, before Nehru and Bogra began negotiations in July and August 1953, US Secretary of State Dulles embarked on a historic journey spanning three continents. The result was that a Western security system was set-up and Pakistan became a part of it. This new set up had a great impact on the

American role in the dispute. (72) In his meeting with Nehru in New Delhi, Dulles supported the proposal for partition that Hoffman had neglected. Nehru was appreciative of this idea but insisted that it should be based on the status quo. This sort of partition, which would allow India to retain the Kashmir Valley, remains to this day India’s real objective, though its formal stand is that all of Kashmir, including the Pakistani held part is an integral part of India. Pakistan however, expressed reservations on the idea of partition. (73) Dulles dismissed suggestions from the Pakistani side that Washington put pressure on India by withholding economic assistance. (74)

In August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was removed from the post of prime minister and put in jail. (75) These events were related to his meeting with Adlai Stevenson a leading personality of the Democratic Party, which gave rise to speculation in New Delhi that the

US was encouraging him to make a bid for Kashmir’s independence. (76) Abdullah’s overthrow upset Pakistan. Tensions between the two countries began to mount and Bogra requested that a summit meeting be held, Nehru accepted it. The meeting was accordingly held in New Delhi in 1953 where both sides agreed that a plebiscite should be held but not under the supervision of US Admiral Nimitz. (77) Nehru had not wanted

Nimitz as administrator of the plebiscite, he preferred the representative of a small, neutral country such as Switzerland or Sweden to replace Nimitz. (78) Nimitz resigned as a plebiscite administrator and there was now a palpable change the State Department’s position. The Secretary of State now had doubts that the UN would be able to play a significant role settling the dispute. It now seemed to him that bilateral negotiations offered the best chance of success. He approved of the idea that India and Pakistan were to hold direct meetings. (79)

American diplomatic efforts on Kashmir were overshadowed by the decision of the

Eisenhower administration to make Pakistan a pivot of the anti-Communist alliances of regional countries. Subsequently the arrangement was given formal shape, when in 1954 the US convinced Pakistan to sign a security treaty with Turkey. Thus the Turko-Pakistan pact, along with the US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) 1954, its membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) also in 1954 and its inclusion in the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO) in 1955 turned Pakistan into a very close ally of the US in Asia. (80) It became known as the “most allied ally” of the

US.

On its part, Pakistan was eager to play this role and not because it felt that it was seriously threatened by Communism but because it wanted to strengthen its defences against a hostile India. The alliance would give Pakistan easy access to American political and economic support. (81) India was openly resentful over these developments.

India’s own scheme for South Asia, in fact the broader region had been upset. American military assistance to Pakistan, and disturbed the neutrality of the subcontinent and destroyed Nehru’s efforts to form zone comprising countries not aligned to either of the cold war blocs. Nehru was now also apprehensive that this alliance might make Pakistan more confident, perhaps even aggressive with regard to the Kashmir issue. Eisenhower’s assurances that American would take action against Pakistan if it dared to misuse American supplied arms and his offer to consider sympathetically an Indian request for

US military aid, did not reassure Nehru. (82)

The US-Pakistan agreement (MDAA) ended the last sustained effort for the resolution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral means. The Indian Prime Minister held that American military assistance had directly impacted on the demilitarization issue, India would now have to maintain a greater military presence in Kashmir since it was now faced with a stronger force. Pakistan’s military strength had been undoubtedly enhanced. Nehru refused to hold any further meetings with Bogra. They conferred again in May 1955, after a gap of nearly two years. India also made no move to select a new plebiscite administrator before the agreed April 30 deadline, despite the fact that Pakistan had given its consent to the proposal that Nimitz be replaced by the representative of a small, neutral country. The Kashmir dispute was back to square one, when the cease-fire became effective in January 1949. In the meanwhile, however, the Indians had strengthened their position in the state. (83) Nehru now also demanded that the American military officers be withdrawn from the UN observer force stationed for monitoring the cease-fire line in Kashmir, implying that their neutrality was in doubt. (84) The UN and

Washington agreed that the best solution in the situation was to replace the American observers as their terms expired by officers of other countries. The US ended its participation in UNMOGIP in December 1954. (85)

Thoroughly upset by the US-Pakistan bilateral agreement, the Indian government now began looking towards Moscow as a balancing force in the sub-continent. Moscow now thoroughly into the game declared that the people of Kashmir had already decided to become a part of the Indian Union. Nehru was very happy to get unstinting support from the Soviet Union. He did not stop Soviet leaders from launching invectives against the

US from Indian soil. (86)

Undoubtedly, Pakistan was keen to use its membership in the western alliance to strengthen its position on Kashmir. At the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi in March

1956, the foreign minister of Pakistan persuaded the participants to declare in their joint communiqué that the UN resolutions on Kashmir had not become defunct. And this was the truth. The communiqué also backed the need to settle the Kashmir dispute as early as possible, either through the UN or by direct bilateral negotiations. Dulles attended the meeting as head of the American delegation. In a separate statement he reiterated

Washington’s support for a plebiscite. India expressed its strong displeasure at this communiqué. (87) The US diplomacy on Kashmir now became a balancing act.

Washington wanted to convince Pakistan that its alliance with the US would strengthen or at least shore up American resolve to press for a settlement on Kashmir that would uphold Pakistan’s position. (88)

However, India could not be ignored Prime Minister Nehru to was keen to improve

India’s relations with the US. He paid a visit to Washington after Eisenhower’s was re- elected in 1956. In this meeting, Kashmir issue only figured marginally. After Nehru’s visit, Eisenhower gave his approval to a National Security Council document which laid stress on strategic significance on India to the US. (89) Indo-US relations that had begun developing on promising lines after the parallel deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, again faded when Pakistan once again introduced the Kashmir issue in the UN Security

Council in early 1957. There were five sponsors of the resolution, including the US. The draft resolution reiterated the call for a plebiscite declaring that the vote of Kashmir

Constituent Assembly in 1954 to reaffirm the State’s accession to India had no internationally binding status. This resolution adversely impacted on the new improvement in US-India relations that had begun after Nehru visit to the US. (90) The

Soviet Union abstained from voting on the resolution for India had been apprehensive that a veto would push the issue to the General Assembly. (91) The Americans also sponsored another resolution in February 1957 that requested, the president of the

Security Council, Gunnar Jarring to visit the subcontinent and work out, with the Indians and Pakistanis, formulas for demilitarization and other measures that would help in feasible settlement of the dispute. The draft included a reference to Pakistan’s proposal for the stationing of UN forces in Kashmir temporarily. This was entirely unacceptable to

India. The Soviet Union vetoed this resolution. (92) Undoubtedly, if this resolution had been passed by the Council and implemented accordingly, the Kashmiris would have voted freely for their cause. (93) A modified draft that did not mention a UN force and avoided the use of the term plebiscite was approved in March. This time the Soviet Union abstained because of Indian satisfaction over the revised draft. (94)

The UN envoy Gunnar Jarring arrived in the subcontinent in March to carry out his mission as mandated by the UN. His visit came just some days after the incumbent pro-

India National Conference Party had won election to the Kashmir assembly. Not surprisingly the candidates fielded by the National Conferences were elected unopposed for several of their opponents had been disqualified or put in jail. Jarring begin shuttling between India and Pakistan. He met the two prime ministers and their respective senior officials. In his report to the Security Council, Jarring told both sides that a way out of the impasse was the use of some form of arbitration to divide the state and secure the withdrawal of troops. Once again Pakistan approved the proposal but India stuck to its traditional negativism. (95) Owing to Jarring’s failure the issue was referred back to the

Security Council. This time, the US sponsored a draft resolution requesting Frank

Graham, United Nations Representative, to once again enter into consultations with India and Pakistan and then make appropriate recommendations for carrying out demilitarization. The resolution was passed by the Security Council in early December.

The Soviet Union again abstained. However, by this time, it had become apparent to all that the Security Council could not resolve the issue. There was no surprise or disappointment in any quarter, when Graham failed in his mission. (96) Indian stubbornness on refusing to budge from its stand was an obvious reason that all attempts to resolve the issue had failed.

The US began an effort to get rid of persistent the stalemate in April 1958. This new initiative aimed at US mediatory efforts to persuade the two protagonists in the sub- continent to revive negotiations that would simultaneously address three major issues, Kashmir, the issue of sharing the Indus waters and the accelerating arms race between

India and Pakistan. (97) President Eisenhower took it upon himself to initiate the process by personally requesting the heads of government of both states to start negotiations. A couple of alternative plans were recommended to the two leaders: tripartite negotiations or re-launch of shuttle diplomacy by the American special representative. The British

Prime Minister pitched in by writing to Nehru and Iskander Mirza in support of the US

President’s initiative. (98) The text of the package enumerated and explained at some length the principles on which the partition of the state would be based if the arrangement was mutually acceptable. It envisaged that the partition line should not be based on the existing cease-fire line. There was a need to adopt a fresh approach to this dispute, and an important way to do it was to dissociate from its long and acrimonious history underpinned by the UN resolutions. This seemed to be favourable to India, which had effectively discarded the resolutions several years ago. However, the criteria that were to be used in determining the new line were a queer mixture. Some of them could be interpreted to favour Pakistan; others seemed decidedly pro-Indian. Again Pakistan immediately accepted Eisenhower’s proposal in principle, while India, sticking to its regular pattern rejected it. (99)

With Democrat President John F. Kennedy in power, a non interventionist approach was adopted on Kashmir during the first six months of the administration. (100) The Kennedy basic policy goal was to develop good relations with India without hurting ties with

Pakistan. (101) President Ayub Khan on his visit to the US in July 1961, tried to impress upon the US President the need to use American economic aid to pressurize India to adopt a more reasonable stance on the Kashmir dispute. Kennedy did not agree to it.

(102) After an interval of four months, Nehru arrived in Washington. On this occasion the American ambassador to India Galbraith offered what he called a “nonterritorial approach”. According to Galbrath’s plan, India and Pakistan should keep the territory they held, but free movement of goods and people between the two sides of Kashmir.

This plan was acceptable to India simply because it allowed India to retain the Kashmir

Valley. (103)

Pakistan, in January 1962 asked the US to support its request for a Security Council meeting on the Kashmir issue. US ambassador to India J.K Galbraith warned his government that to reintroduce the Kashmir dispute once again at the UN body would be sure to harden the respective stands of the two protagonists and prejudice developments leading towards a solution. Kennedy now got greatly interested in this matter. He exhorted Nehru and Ayub to accept head of the World Bank Eugene Black, as a mediator. India rejected the proposal but Pakistan accepted it. (104)

After failure of this proposal, Washington backed a resolution tabled by Ireland in June

1962. It called for resuming bilateral talks between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. (105) The Indians strongly objected to this resolution for it referred to the earlier UN resolutions on Kashmir, which India considered irrelevant. (106)

Meanwhile, there was a dramatic change in the regional strategic scenario owing to the

Sino-Indian war in October 1962 in which India was battered by China. Faced with the

Communist giant Nehru to put aside his nonaligned policy and also pocketed his pride.

He now turned to the west for military assistance. The US decision to give arms to India made Pakistan very unhappy. It felt very vulnerable because it feared that India would use these weapons against it. (107) After India’s humiliating defeat in the war, President

Kennedy sent Averell Harriman as his envoy, alongwith British Commonwealth

Secretary, Duncan Sandys to South Asia. The envoys too persuaded Nehru to reopen the

Kashmir issue. Thus both countries began bilateral talks on the Kashmir dispute. (108)

From December 1962 to May 1963, six rounds of bilateral negotiations were held, but these broke down without producing any solid results. The thinking that now prevailed to

Washington was that the best way to resolve the issue was to partition the Valley. (109)

Just as the fourth round of talks started, Kennedy at a meeting in the White House, authorized greater American involvement in the talks. In effect, this meant more pressure on both countries to accept a partition of the Valley. Kennedy also wrote letters to Nehru and Ayub reinforcing his government’s plea to settle the issue. (110)

Though the fourth round of talks between India and Pakistan were a failure, the US and

Britain outlined the basic elements of a Kashmir settlement. These were as follows: (i) both India and Pakistan would have a substantial territory in the Valley; (ii) they would be given assured access to and through the Valley to enable them to defend their respective positions to the north and east; (iii) outside the Valley, India’s interest in

Ladakh and Pakistan’s interest in developing water storage facilities on the Chenab River should be recognized; and (iv) the two countries must have position in the Valley that would enable them to make clearly defined arrangements to exercise their sovereignty and maintain law and order. There would be political freedom and some self-rule for residents. The free movement of Kashmiris throughout the Valley and relatively free access to other parts of Kashmir as well as to India and Pakistan would be assured.

Tourism would be developed and development funds would be made available by external sources. (111) The US-UK plan for partition of Kashmir was rejected by both

India and Pakistan. The bilateral negotiations also failed for both sides could not agree on making an offer that the other would consider as a basis for serious discussion. Both countries claimed that they wanted to resolve the conflict, but according to their own terms. Pakistan wanted some form of self-determination for the people of the Valley.

India did not want to disturb the status quo. They preferred converting the cease-fire line with some minor changes into an international boundary. There was a lack of flexibility on both sides. (112) The two countries also rejected the American proposal for mediation.

(113)

Johnson who succeeded Kennedy as president, following Kennedy’s assassination also perceived the Kashmir issue as a serious threat to peace and stability in South Asia. The persistence of the conflict was a major cause for complications in America’s ties with

India and Pakistan. However, many American policymakers seeing the vicissitudes of the

Kashmir dispute and efforts to resolve it had realized that there was not much room for maneuver for the US at the unilateral or the UN level to resolve the issue. The US relations with Pakistan worsened when it ignored Pakistani concerns, by supplying arms to India to prop it up against China. On the other hand, Pakistan’s growing relations with

China generated resentment in the US. Although the US had helped New Delhi during the Sino-Indian war, giving it arms and ammunition, Nehru was still not interested in becoming a part of the US led endeavor to contain Communism in Southeast Asia. This point became a sore point in US- India relations. (114)

Furthermore, the US at this point in time was getting more deeply involved in Vietnam so it was avoiding involvement in the Kashmir issue. In the Indo-Pakistan war that broke out in 1965, US policy makers desisted from any sort of intervention, for both protagonists had violated their promise to use American arms against each other. (115) There were resentment against the US in both India and Pakistan. The Indians were angry that the US had failed to fulfill its claim that the American arms given to Pakistan would not be used against India. The suspension by the US of arms deliveries to both countries posed a greater problem for Pakistan than India. Pakistan was deeply hurt that the US had betrayed it in its hour of need. (116)

While US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk cautioned that the west’s position in Asia may be at stake, Johnson prefers to use the UN platform for bringing an end to the fighting.

Eschewing unilateral strategy, the US as president of the Security Council for the month of September 1965, played a major role in the handling of the crisis by the UN. The US administration welcomed the Soviet offer of its good offices to the two protagonists to help them to work out a settlement of the Kashmir issue. However, the Tashkent

Declaration that the two countries signed through Soviet mediation in January 1966 did not resolve the status quo ante bellum along the Kashmir cease-fire line and the international border of the two countries. The Tashkent agreement was welcomed by

Washington and President Johnson termed it a constructive development. (117)

The US as mentioned earlier, at that time was deeply embroiled in the Vietnam War and was in no mood to waste its energies in what it considered a dispute of less importance.

This was a big change from American attitude on Kashmir in the fifties and early sixties.

However, Washington continued to assist the South Asian countries in promoting economic development and overcoming humanitarian challenges. It is clear however, that

South Asia had lost much of its political value for in US with regard to its broader cold war objectives. (118)

The Taashkent Declaration as well as the American economic cooperation with India and

Pakistan did not succeed in creating a harmonious atmosphere between the two hostile states. Tensions in the Kashmir Valley increased after the unashamedly rigged elections held by India in 1967 and the Indian Government sponsored party formed the government in Jammu and Kashmir. The emergency was lifted in the state in January

1968. Several politicians including Sheikh Abdullah were released. However, these developments led to a mass movement in the Valley against India domination. Sheikh Abdullah demanded that a legitimate solution of the Kashmir issue be found based on the exercise of the free will of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan fully backed this indigenous movement. (119)

In the meanwhile, both sides launched vituperative propaganda campaigns against each other and boundary and air violations also gained momentum. The crises which brewed in the aftermath of the 1970 General Elections in Pakistan were skillfully exploited by

India. It led to a full scale war between the two sides in 1971. (120) The fighting was first limited to the eastern wing of Pakistan but India soon triggered battles along the international border in the Western wing of Pakistan. India taking advantage of

Pakistan’s difficult position in the east seemed determined to besiege Azad Kashmir. At this juncture, the Nixon administration became fully alert to the dangers of the situation.

Washington warned New Delhi that it would be considered responsible the escalation of hostilities in the region; it changed the status quo in Kashmir against the UN resolutions.

The US requested the UN Security Council to take prompt action for securing a cease- fire, withdrawal of forces and a removal of the current threat to international peace and security. The American sponsored draft resolutions in the Security Council demanded that both countries accept a cease-fire and withdraw forces to their sides of the border.

The Soviet Union, which had recently signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India with a specific clause about mutual help in case of aggression, vetoed the resolutions, for these were seen as sympathetic to Pakistan. Surprisingly, the US did not intervene to stop the secession of East Pakistan and India got a free hand in helping to create Bangladesh. (121)

The Simla agreement signed by the two countries in 1972 effectively eclipsed the

Kashmir issue from the international stage for nearly twenty years. Both countries agreed in Simla to resolve all their disputes including that on Kashmir through bilateral negotiations. They also promised to respect the new dividing line in Kashmir without prejudice to their existing claims. (122) Washington welcomed the Simla agreement, and the State Department called it an important step towards securing a durable peace in

South Asia. Policymakers in Washington were fully cognizant that the agreement provided them with a very credible and respectable rationale for remaining on the side lines. The very unhappy experience of the US during its efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue had convinced those at the helm in Washington that it was best to keep out of the muddle. By this time they had understood that it was better to leave the two countries to their own devices. The subcontinent’s psyche was probably too difficult for the

Americans to understand. American administrations that followed stuck to this approach.

They confined their involvement go gently nudging the two sides from time to time to move forward towards a settlement. As often happened, when the two sides failed to make any progress, Washington was not too deeply concerned. (123) Washington was alert whenever a crisis situation arose.

However, there was a dramatic change in the situation when India conducted to first nuclear exploration in May 1974; it further upset the balance of power in South Asia. In the aftermath of the nuclear explosion the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah signed the ‘Kashmir Accord’ in February 1975, reaffirming the accession of the state to India. This accord stipulated that any decision taken by the

Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir which could estrange the Indian Union could be overruled by the Parliament of India. This accord was seen in Pakistan as a shameful attempt to deprive the Kashmiri people of their right of self-determination.

(124)

Significant changes in internal politics occurred in both countries. The Congress Party for the first time in the history of Independent India lost power after defeat in General

Election in March 1977. In Pakistan, the first elected government in the country’s history that of Z. A. Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup. These regime changes in both countries were followed by a short period of détente. (125)

Kashmir Issue in the Post Cold War Era

Indo-Pakistan relations soured once again when the people of Kashmir rose against their occupiers after a rigged election in 1987. The freedom fighters in Kashmir were also influenced by developments in the international scene. The withdrawal of the Soviet

Union from Afghanistan in 1989 after prolonged resistance by the Afghans inspired the

Kashmiris to believe that bold action on their part could also end Indian control over

Kashmir. This was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the emergence of several independent republics in Muslim Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe countries that had broken free of their shackles by the sheer force of will of the people. These momentous events were an inspiration to the Kashmiris who wanted to get rid of the Indian domination. New Delhi and the state government handled the situation in a brutal manner. (126) New Delhi dispatched more then 6, 50,000 military and paramilitary troops to the valley to suppress the movement. (127)

Washington did not pay much attention to developments in Kashmir, for it was preoccupied with the Afghanistan war which at that time was at a crucial phase, i.e. it was nearing the end. The US in the early 1990s was engaged in the Iraq-Kuwait war, though the Kashmir issue had always been a threat to peace in South Asia, it was not on the top of the list on Washington’s South Asia agenda. Both the George W. Bush Sr. and first Administration of Clinton were concerned about the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and made efforts to discourage them in the nuclear race. But they were more concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear programme than that of India. In October 1990 the

Bush government cut off economic and security assistance to Islamabad. (128) India that had already conducted nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974 did not come under the US sanctions. (129)

In the meanwhile, as the security situation in the Valley deteriorated, owing to the battles between the stone-throwing Kashmiris and the Indian security forces and the latter’s atrocities the exchange of allegations between India and Pakistan reached dangerous levels. Pakistan was accused by India of directly inciting rebellion, violence and terrorism. The Indians alleged that the Pakistanis were giving the militants financial assistance, training and arms. Pakistan dismissed these allegations as false and insisted that India was actually trying to divert international attention from its brutalities in Kashmir. Pakistan demanded that India should hold a plebiscite to determine the future of the state in accordance with the UN resolutions. (130)

The American administration gathered that Pakistan was not involved in the happening in

Kashmir. When Indian foreign secretary S.K Singh visited the US in January 1990, he also admitted to state Department officials that the Kashmiri uprising was largely indigenous. (131) However, the situation worsened when tensions between the two sides began to rise and both courtiers began military deployment in early 1990.

At the juncture, Clark the US Ambassador to India and Oakley the US envoy to Pakistan advised the State Department to appeal to the Soviet Union and China to wield their influence on both countries to reduce tensions. (132)

The US also sent Robert Gates, its Deputy National Security Adviser to India and

Pakistan in May 1990. In his meeting with the Pakistani President and the Chief of the army staff, the American official urged that Pakistan avoid supporting the Kashmiri insurgents and also desist from military deployments. Gates offered the support of

American intelligence that would monitor the establishment of a confidence-building regime by India and Pakistan. This would involve limiting military deployment by both sides along their common borders. He also warned that Pakistan would not be supported by the US if war broke out. Gates was not satisfied with Pakistani assurances that it was not helping the Kashmiri insurgents. In his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Gates emphasized upon the importance of desisting from any provocative actions, and urged that India should stop its involvement in Pakistan’s Sind province and make an effort to improve its own human rights record in Kashmir. The offer of American intelligence support that was made in Islamabad was also extended to New Delhi. (133)

After Gates visit to South Asia, India and Pakistan made moves to adopt many confidence-building measures that effectively defused the crisis. However, Islamabad and

New Delhi rejected a role for US intelligence. The Gates mission was the first of a series and timely American diplomatic interventions that pulled India and Pakistan from the brink of war. However, like the Gates mission, the succeeding ones too did not offer any fresh solutions for the Kashmiri issue. The US only limited itself to pressuring India and

Pakistan to take steps for reducing tensions which would pave the way for an eventual resolution of the issue without direct international intervention. (134)

Washington was not untouched by the human rights situation in the Valley, which was becoming from bad to worse. The assessments and reports of the State Department issued in the early nineties did not mince words in discussing the dismal human rights situation in Kashmir. They highlighted many allegations of abuses by Indian security forces made by human rights groups. Among the abuses enumerated were torture of detainees, mass scale killing of demonstrators, large-scale arrests, gang rapes, imprisonment without trial and extrajudicial killing of prisoners. The reports pointed out that the Indian government had refused to give permission to international human rights groups such as Amnesty

International and the Red Cross to visit Kashmir. The annual reports did not ignore the abuses by militant which included the killing, kidnapping and harassment of government officials and political opponents. (135)

Though, the Bush administration condemned the failings of the Indian government with regard to human rights abuses in Kashmir, it did not cater to calls by some legislators that

American economic aid and military training for India be cut off. (136) The issue of terrorism had become a serious concern and the American government repeatedly urged

Islamabad to halt this alleged support for terrorism. Islamabad always refuted such allegations and stated that its activity in Kashmir was limited to political and moral support of the insurgents. Therefore, any military assistance to insurgent forces had been given by private sources. (137)

The US State Department in early 1990 revoked the visa of Amanullah Khan, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which had been designated by it as a terrorist organization. There were some members of the Congress who even wanted to place Pakistan on the list of countries who were sponsors of terrorism. If this step had been taken, stringent sanctions would have been imposed on Pakistan. The US instead put Islamabad on the terrorism “watch list”. However, the director of CIA issued a public warning to Pakistan that it “stood on the brink” (138)

President Clinton too expressed concern over the Kashmir issue. In his speech before the

UN General Assembly session in September 1993 he referred to the ethnic conflicts

“from Caucasus to Kashmir” which he called a threat to international peace. (139) In

October of the same year, Robin Raphel Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian

Affairs, reiterating the traditional US stand on Kashmir said that the US did not accept the Indian position that the instrument of Accession proved that Kashmir was an integral part of India. (140)

This US reservation on the prevalent situation on Kashmir stated clearly after a long time compelled the Indian government to begin bilateral negotiations to defuse the situations.

Negotiations were held in January 1994 at the Foreign Secretaries level but failed to produce any positive result. The Indian side remained as rigid as ever throughout the meetings which suggested that it had entered the diplomatic exercise only to remove the international pressure on itself. (141)

In order to draw international attention to the severe violations of the human rights in the occupied territories, Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto placed a draft resolution at the

United Nations Commission for Human Rights in March 1994 and also requested that a

UN fact finding mission be dispatched to the state. This resolution was strongly opposed by India. This draft was withdrawn by Pakistan at the request of China, Iran and several other Muslims countries. The US had clearly told Pakistan that it would abstain if the resolution was tabled for voting. (142)

To stop any further international involvement in the conflict, New Delhi opted to start a political process in Kashmir. The elections held in 1996 brought back into power Farooq

Abdullah and his party the National Conference. Washington approved of the elections as a positive step. (143)

Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and Kashmir Issue

However, in May 1998, a dangerous situation occurred in South Asia when India conducted five serial underground nuclear tests in Rajasthan. The international community as well as the US showed a sharp reaction to the event. Sanctions were imposed on India by US. The main concern of the US and other powers at this time was

Pakistan should not conduct a nuclear test. (144) The US administration sent a high level team to Islamabad led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and offered Pakistan economic and military aid in return for desisting from a tit-for tat response. However, the

Pakistani civilian and military leadership did not feel reassured by the American offer, since its past record of sticking by its allies was not very good. Pakistan’s own experience in this regard was not too good. In 1965 as well as 1971, when Pakistan faced very difficult situations; the US had had reservations about supporting the country, despite its status of a formal American ally. (145) US policy towards Pakistan has been considered as ambiguous on many scores by some scholars, Stephen P.Cohen, an expert on Indo-

Pakistan military affairs has opined that what the US offered to Pakistan in return for not carrying out nuclear tests was less than what it offered to North Korea. Cohen pointed out that the security guarantees to Pakistan, were not such as would make them feel comfortable with a hostile nuclear power next door. Similarly, in 1990 Robert Oakley, the former US ambassador to Pakistan said in an interview that owing to its nuclear programme, US military and economic assistance to Pakistan had been withheld by the

Pressler Amendment. No sanctions were imposed on India when it conducted nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974. The sanctions imposed in 1990 had already weakened Pakistan’s military capabilities, while it also undermined its confidence in the US. Oakley has pointed out that in this scenario while India became stronger, what could Pakistani rely upon? The only answer was “Missiles and nuclear capability”. (146)

Pakistan which had expected that the G8 would take tough action against India was badly disappointed for they had made it clear that no punitive steps would be taken against

India, given their economic and trade ties with it. As a reaction to this stand there was great resentment in Pakistan. It was argued in government circles, that if the nuclear powers were more concerned about safeguarding their economic interests, then Pakistan too should feel no compunctions about giving priority to its security interest. Clinton imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan. (147)

After nuclear test in South Asia, the Clinton administration began diplomatic offensive in international forum. An article was added to the UN resolution 1172 which urged India and Pakistan to begin bilateral negotiations and nudging them to “find mutually acceptable solution that address the root cause” of their conflicts including Kashmir. This international, particularly American interest in a settlement of the Kashmir dispute was welcomed by Pakistan. India however, responded negatively to it. (148)

The Kargil Conflict

Soon after the nuclear explorations, tensions were re-ignited between two neighbours and the outcome was the Kargil conflict, a low intensity but dangerous war in May 1999, it brought them to the brink of an all-out war. The situation was fraught with dangers owing to the nuclear dimension. This dispute was part of the Kashmir issue that could be seen as the most important factor behind the nuclearization of South Asia. (149) In early May

1999, the Indian political and military leadership was stunned to know that infiltrators had crossed the Line of Control (LoC) on the Indian side and had occupied 29 peaks in the Kargil Heights. Angered by this unexpected intrusion, India dubbed the Kashmiris struggle for liberation, as a proxy war, remotely controlled by the Pakistani intelligence outfits. India alleged that the regular forces of Pakistan were involved in the operation. It also emphasized that it was a blatant violation of the inviolable LoC. Pakistan stoutly denied any involvement and insisting that the operation was solely conducted by

Kashmiri Mujahideen. Regarding LoC, Pakistan countered that LoC was only a temporary arrangement before a final settlement of the Kashmir issue is found. Therefore, the Kargil conflict could not been seen in isolation, its connection with the Kashmir issue could not be doubted. Also, India seemed to have forgotten that it had repeatedly violated the LoC, first in 1972 in Chorbatla area, then in Siachen in 1984, Qamar sector in 1988 and Neelum valley in 1994. Besides Siachen, India had taken over 50 square miles of territory in Azad Kashmir through violations of the LoC since 1972. (150) The loss of 29 peaks across a 40 km stretch of territory that overlooked the national highway that joined Leh with Srinagar the capital of the state, was undoubtedly a great setback to Indian security in the area. Leh is the staging post for the Siachen Glacier, which had been occupied by India in 1984. The Mujahideen’s move had gone undetected by the Indian intelligence control over. Kargil, Drass and Batalik along the LoC gave the occupiers a strategically important position for effectively stopping the Indian army’s movement from Srinagar to Leh. It also had the potential to restrict the Indian deployment in

Ladakh. Thus, to dislodge the Mujahideen at the earliest was of critical importance for

India. Thus, a massive attack was launched by India, involving 30,000 personnel who were given air cover by MiGs, Mirages and assault helicopters. (151) Tension had escalated so much by the end of the June 1999, Indian mechanized and artillery divisions had moved to forward positions all along the international border in Gujarat, Rajasthan,

Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir. Perturbed by the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan war,

President Clinton sent the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, Gen.

Anthony Zinni, to Islamabad in the last week of June. In meetings with the Pakistani civilian and military top Brass, Zinni persuaded them to end the conflict in Kargil heights. (152) There were immense American and international pressures on Islamabad, to end fighting and resume talks with India, in the spirit of Lahore Declaration of

February 1999. Washington, in particular warned Islamabad that the next installment of

International Monetary Fund loan to Pakistan could be postponed if the fighting did not stop. The government, headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, sought talks with India, but these did not succeed in reducing tensions for India demanded that the infiltrators withdraw from the area. (153) Since, the impasse was becoming dangerous, then Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington where he met with US President Bill Clinton on July 4. The meeting ended in an agreement under which Pakistan would ask the Mujahideen to withdraw from Kargil. On its part, Pakistan undertook to respect LoC would the US

President assured his guest that India too would be asked to do the same. The two leaders were in agreement that the conflict was dangerous and could escalate into a full-fledged war. It was therefore essential that, LoC should be respected by both parties in accordance with the Simla Agreement of 1972. President Clinton also assured the

Pakistani leader that he would take a personal interest in resolving the Kashmir issue.

After the agreement, the Pakistani government reportedly held talks with the Mujahideen groups, who finally agreed to withdraw from the height. (154)

The Clinton administration began to focus its South Asia policy on persuading India and

Pakistan to adopt measures for reducing the danger their respective nuclear programs, posed to the nonproliferation regime. Another important aim was to nudge the two protagonists into resuming their dialogue began in Lahore in 1999. The two countries were encouraged by the superpower to adopt a more positive attitude towards each other and Washington affirmed that it was prepared to play a role in resolving the Kashmir dispute if the both parties wished it to. (155) Clinton reiterated this position on his trip to

South Asia in 2000. In both countries, Clinton emphasized that the line of control be respected, that restraint be exercised, violence eschewed and the dialogue resumed. (156)

It was quite clear by his utterances during the South Asian trip that Pakistan and India would basically have to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. The US could only mediate if both parties agreed to it, but it would be preferable for them to themselves make the necessary efforts. Incidentally, since the military coup in Pakistan in October 1999, the latter’s relations with the US were not very cordial and Clinton made his displeasure about the political situation in Pakistan quite obvious by making his trip to the country very brief and by adopting Terre tone in his official exchanges. (157)

The Post 9/11 US Role vis-à-vis the Kashmir Issue

September 11, 2001, brought about a sea change in Pakistan’s international standing.

Pakistan, after 9/11 faced a very difficult situation with regard to its border with

Afghanistan and relationship with India. While Pakistan benefitted from a revival military and economic ties with Washington, as the latter needed Pakistan’s support for its military campaign in Afghanistan, there was also a downside to the renewed strategic importance of Pakistan, India seized the opportunity to enhance its already growing links with Washington by playing up the common fight against (Islamist) terrorism that emanated from Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. After 9/11, India skillfully exploited the opportunity to draw a parallel between American efforts to crush the terrorist stronghold in Afghanistan and India’s own fight against Muslim Kashmiri militants. It utterances became more and more bellicose and it threatened that it could launch a punitive attack against Pakistan, whom it alleged was backing cross border operations. (158) India became bolder and more aggressive when some militants attacked the State Assembly building of Indian Occupied Kashmir in October 2001. India blamed the attack on terrorists based in Pakistan. In a letter to President Bush, Prime Minister

Vajpayee warned that India would have no choice but to take matters into its own hands if Washington did not soon persuade Islamabad to rein in groups based on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control from perpetrating terrorist acts. (159) The US President condemned the attacks and called on the two countries to “stand down” in Kashmir.

Secretary of State Colin Powell was sent to the two countries to stop an escalation of tensions. Powell tried to convince Islamabad and New Delhi to exercise restraint. (160)

The US also put Jaish-e-Muhammad, a Pakistan based jihadi groups in its terrorist list.

(161) This was followed by a terrorist strike on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in

December. Predictably, the situation worsened. Although, no jihadi organization claimed that it was responsible for the attack, the Indian government immediately blamed

Pakistan. It accused the Inter-Services Intelligence and two Pakistan based organizations,

LeT and JeM for the attacks. India mobilized its forces on the Indo-Pakistan border and to pressure Pakistan to withdraw its support to the Kashmiri freedom movement. Pakistan too re-deployed its forces from the Afghan border to the LoC. (162) This redeployment of Pakistani forces was seen by the US as posing a serious threat to its efforts to counter terrorism. The White House pointed that the apparent aim of the attack on the parliament was to harm Pakistan and US-Pakistan relations and also to strike at Indian democracy.

(163) The Pakistani President and the Indian Prime Minister were urged by President

Bush on phone, to exercise restraint. (164) Bush asked Pakistan to take firm action against terrorist organizations. The Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were put by the US on its list of terrorist organizations. Their assets in the US were frozen. (165)

General Musharraf, under immense American pressure, in his January 12, 2002, speech issued an unambiguous condemnation of the October and December terrorist attacks in

India. (166) He promised that Pakistani soil would not be used for terrorist activities and imposed a ban on the two groups India alleged had carried out the attacks. (167) Musharraf’s speech was well received in Washington and soon after Secretary Powell was sent to the Sub-Continent on a crisis management mission. Powell’s impressed upon

India and Pakistan the need to defuse the situation, after the easing of tensions to restart talks. He reiterated that the American government was not inclined to act as a mediator, but agreed to provide the impetus for starting the dialogue. The Secretary of State, however, did not succeed in securing a firm promise from both countries to reduce their military presence along the frontier. (168) There was a further escalation in tensions following the May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian military base at Kaluchak in Jammu.

The Indian Prime Minister warned that a decisive battle could take place. Pakistan responded by hinting that it would not eschew the nuclear option. (169) There was now great consternation in international circles. It was believed in American official circles that war was now imminent. The US government now advised its citizens residing in

India and Pakistan to leave the countries. There was a travel advisory against visiting

India and Pakistan. Several other countries followed suit. The American decision to reduce its diplomatic presence strongly impacted upon the situation. The Indians were especially perturbed. The Indian government now wanted to seriously seek a way out from the crisis. The influential Indian business community with strong commercial links with the US and may have played a crucial role in making their government adopt a more moderate posture and avoid adventurism. The element of coercion in American diplomacy evoked resentment in India. (170)

High level American officials had been involved in efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in South Asia. Deputy Secretary Armitage was sent to South Asia and he shuttled between the two capitals. Armitage made suggestions to senior officials in Pakistan and

India about various techniques of preventing infiltration across the LoC. These included the formation of a monitoring force. He also offered to share intelligence gathered by the

US agencies with both sides. The Pakistani President promised that all out efforts would be made by his side to stop cross border activities permanently. Armitage’s visit helped cool tempers and made it easier for the two protagonists back down from their confrontationist postures. (171) Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and Powell were again dispatched to South Asia on separate missions in June and July. (172) Secretary Powell signaled his government’s readiness to facilitate the start of negotiations and reiterated that the Kashmir dispute had to be settled by the two countries bilaterally, but taking into account the will of the Kashmiri people. This was not a departure from the previous US stand. (173) Armitage once again went to South Asia in August for another round of shuttle diplomacy. In exchanges with the Pakistani leadership, the American side continued to pressure the Pakistani regime to halt infiltration and to stick to the promise that the President had publicly made to Armitage. However, American officials had to tread carefully so as not to jeopardize the help that Pakistan was rendering to the US in netting Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives that had entered Pakistan from Afghanistan.

Thus, the US officials in their exchanges with Pakistani leaders had a delicate task aimed at halting infiltrations without ruffling feathers in Islamabad so as not to upset Pakistani’s cooperation with the US in Afghanistan. Therefore, Washington also sought the cooperation of other countries to bring pressure on India and Pakistan to defuse tensions.

The visits of American officials to South Asia were also meant to compel the two countries not to attack each other. The two could not attack each other’s territories while these dignitaries were present on their soil. These American initiatives notwithstanding it was not until October 2002 that India withdrew its forces fully from the borders, Pakistan reciprocated, finally ending the dangerous situation. (174) Britain and the Russian

Federation too had contributed to defusing tensions in South Asia.

The American government’s stand on the Kashmir issue since the beginning has been that it is a disputed territory and that it is neither the integral part of India nor Pakistan.

But unlike the fifties and sixties, the US role in more recent decades has been lower key.

The US has scrupulously avoided a third party role in this dispute and emphasized that the two countries resolve this conflict through bilateral negotiations in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. US offered that it would play a facilitating role in resolving the conflict if both parties asked for it. However, in situations of extreme tensions or a serious threat of the outbreak of war, the US diplomacy became more active.

The EU’s Role in Kashmir Dispute

During the cold war years, the Kashmir issue defied resolution, owing to east-west politics and especially the Soviet Union’s hostile attitude towards Pakistan, which had joined the western alliances and provided its soil for the building of US bases. These

Pakistani policies were perceived by Moscow as a direct threat to its interests and its security and in retaliation it had vetoed UN Security Council resolutions aimed at resolving the Kashmir issue. Britain and France, the European veto powers had initially backed Pakistan’s stands on Kashmir, but later the change in the regional scenario, particularly the Sino-Indian war of 1962 made these two more circumspect. Britain and

France now adopted a neutral position. They became more concerned about counting communist China through India. (175) The ambiguity of their respective positions became quite apparent during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, over Kashmir issue and also the Bangladesh crisis that resulted in the 1971 war. Although, the European countries professed to be concerned about Pakistan’s integrity, they never took any strong steps to protect it. Moreover, soon after Bangladesh was created, Britain and some other

European countries totally ignored sentiments in Pakistan and hastily recognized

Bangladesh as an independent country. Pakistan, angered by western policies withdrew from the western military alliances CENTO and SEATO and the British Commonwealth.

(176) Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the European

Community member states, particularly the UK spearheaded the campaign to strengthen

Pakistan’s economy and military, to enable the country to play a frontline role in the fight against Soviet expansionism. Thus, at that time Pakistan was showered with attention by the West. The strategic importance it had gained during the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan started declining after the signing of the UN–brokered Geneva Accords in

1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that followed the accords.

(177) The US and Europe now saw faults in Pakistan, a particularly contentious issue was

Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which it was feared would lead to the creation of the

“Islamic” bomb.

Between 1989-91, a series of upheavals brought great changes in Europe and the world.

Communism was uprooted from Europe, the huge multi-ethnic Soviet empire unraveled, the cold war ended and the bipolar world order was replaced by a unipolar one. Now the concept of adversary regimes became outdated and as a logical corollary non-alignment was also rendered nearly irrelevant. Democracy and market economy became the widely accepted norms. India too adopted market economy. It brought India much closer to the west. The European Union and its position on regional, especially on Indo-Pakistan conflicts began to show marked bias in favor of India, one of the reasons being the huge potential market the country offered the union. It now became quite apparent that the balance in the South Asia was being held by India. In this regard US support was of great help. The US openly backed India’s intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. On the other hand, Pakistan was given the advice that it halts its support to Kashmiri militants.

After the cold war ended, the West’s policy in South Asia was mostly focused on the preservation of status quo and peace. It also encouraged a bilateral resolution of the Indo-

Pakistan conflicts. (178)

Europe’s biggest concern as regards the Kashmir dispute has been the abuse of human rights in the territory rather than backing either the Pakistani or the Indian stands on the dispute. Another concern has been militancy and terrorism, particularly after 9/11. In

April 1991, the British Labor Party national executive was asked to approve the Labour

Party’s annual conference resolution passed in 1990, which supported the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir and condemned the violations of human rights by the Indian forces in the territory. Also, a member of the British Labour Party and shadow Foreign Secretary, Gerald Kaugman visited Srinagar in August 1991, to assess at first hand the situation in Kashmir. At the end of his visit, he said in New Dehli that the prevalent situation in the Valley was of concern to the international community and also opined that since there was no UN or other document favoring independence for Kashmir as a third option, the matter should therefore be discussed in international fora. (179)

A European parliament delegation visited Pakistan in November 1991. At a meeting with

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the delegation acknowledged that the right of the self determination was a basic human right, globally applicable. India did not allow the delegation to take a tour of the Valley. (180) In the same month, the Netherland’s ambassador, Rupert Van Sehaik speaking in the UN General Assembly’s Social

Committee asked the Indian regime to give permission to humanitarian and International

Human Rights organization to freely visit the Valley. Pakistan too faced pressure from the west for its alleged interference in Kashmir. (181) On several occasions, the EU and its member states have emphasized that all externally-sponsored aggression in Indian held Kashmir should be halted. Thus, the EU has been performing the balancing act in the sub-continent, particularly with regard to Kashmir. (182) A noteworthy aspect of EU policy on Kashmir in the post-cold war era is that it has been wary of supporting freedom movements and sub-nationalism around the world for in EU member state such as Spain there are militant movements for independence of regions like the Basque. Also, in East and Central Europe most of which is now part of the EU, there are disgruntled ethnic minorities of neighboring countries. Supporting the principal of self-determination would open a pandora’s box in Europe, which would have harmed European security. At a media conference in New Delhi in January 1992, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas

Hurd said that his country would continue to exert pressure on Pakistan to stop its support for Kashmiri militants. However, at the same time he demanded that New Delhi must allow human rights organizations to visit the territory to conduct on the spot surveys of the prevalent human rights conditions in the valley. (183)

A strongly-worded resolution was adopted in March 1992, in a plenary session of the

European Parliament in Strasbourg. The EU member states exhorted the UN Security

Council to properly assess the unstable conditions in Kashmir and exercise its power to settle the issue. (184) A resolution, was adopted by the Parliament, warned both countries to eschew terrorism, repression and violation of human rights, for these could adversely affect their relations with the EU. The resolution was welcomed in Islamabad. (185)

Clearly, Pakistan was perceived as sponsoring the uprising in the valley. This situation was seen by some in the country and abroad as a failure of Pakistan’s policy on the

Kashmir issue, in particular its endeavors to internationalize the dispute. (186)

The majority of the EU member states favoured a bilateral resolution of the Kashmir issue. Thus, the German Foreign Minister Dr. Klaus Kinkel at a press conference in

Islamabad in October 1992 emphasized that it was not the UN resolutions but the Simla agreement that provided the appropriate basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd too expressed similar views. While he asked Pakistan to stop support to Kashmiri militants, he at the same time urged India to take the initiative on an appropriate and practical political process in Kashmir.

Furthermore, the British Foreign Secretary suggested that the two states to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance with the Simla accord. He summarily dismissed any legal claims dating back half a century, in other words he advocated that the various UN resolutions be discarded. (187)

Four European Ambassadors from Greece, Germany, Belgium and the EU arrived in

Indian held Kashmir in February 1994. In Srinagar they met with government officials,

Kashmiri leaders upholding Kashmir’s secession from Kashmir and human rights groups.

Their aim was to examine closely the realities on ground in Kashmir. They submitted a joint report to the EU on their return home. Some of their conclusions were follows:

 The militants could not have operated on the present scale and with the

intensity if they did not have help from outside. This was obvious because of

the type of weapons being used by the militants and the training they had

received.

 The ambassadors came to know that the local people were being intimidated

by the militants and were fatigued of the prolonged disruption of normal,

everyday life.

 The ambassadors found that the ordinary people were facing extreme

hardships owing to the intrusion of the security and paramilitary troops into private houses, as well as damage inflicted on private property and the threat

to life posed by the militants. (188)

Some scholars considered this report as an important pointer to the EU’s long term policy, which was emerging as an economic and political force, not only in Europe, but globally. (189)

Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a meeting in

April 1994 in Bonn. At this meeting, Chancellor Kohl emphasized the urgent need to find a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In September of the same year, a German parliamentary delegation paid a visit to Indian held Kashmir and expressed concern regarding the violation of human rights by the Indian military. The German President

Roman Herzog too during a visit to Pakistan in April 1995, stated that Kashmir issue could not be resolved militarily, a political solution would have to be found on which all parties agreed. (190)

In the late nineties tensions again increased in occupied Kashmir and there were serious armed clashes between Indian and Pakistan forces, including intermittent heavy artillery shelling across the LoC. This tense situation perturbed the international community and in 1997, British Premier John Major offered his government’s good offices to resolve the

Kashmir issue. During his visit to Pakistan in January 1997, the British Premier emphasized that three parties were involved in the Kashmir dispute. These were: India,

Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. However, he did not clarify how the people of

Kashmir would express their will. (191) Again in the same year in October, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary on his visit to Pakistan said that his government would be willing to play a role to resolve the Kashmir issue, owing to its historical role in the subcontinent as a colonial power. (192)

A fourth-member delegation of the European parliament, visited Pakistan in May 1997.

Anita Pollack who was leading the delegations conveyed the concern of the parliament about the violation of human rights in the valley. The Dutch member of the delegation

Jan Wiegbenga suggested to his hosts that the issue could be raised in the international court of Justice at The Hague. (193)

During the sixth round of the EU-Pakistan political dialogue held in Islamabad, the

Kashmir issue came under discussion. The EU side expressed concern about the Indo-

Pakistan clashes at the LoC. The EU urged that the two sides eschew a military settlement of the dispute and advised restraint and necessary measures to prevent an all- out war. (194)

The EU’s Responses on Nuclear Tests

The May 1998 Indian serial nuclear explosions undermined the hope greater international cooperation on disarmament and arms control issues as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also a setback to concentration on development of the third world.

Europe immediately condemned the Indian nuclear tests and expressed concern about peace in the subcontinent. However, after this first reaction, the European Union’s main object became quite apparent. It was undoubtedly to secure its trade, economic and political interests. The EU member states were therefore careful not to estrange India.

(195) In their formal statement, the EU foreign ministers denounced the Indian action, which defied the international non-proliferation regime and posed a threat to global peace and security but they omitted mention of any possible sanctions against India. Likewise, the G-8 of which the major EU countries are also members condemned the Indian nuclear tests, but concentrated on convincing Islamabad not to follow suit. (196) It was not unnatural for the Pakistani government to express distress over the failure of the G-8 to impose any sanctions against India. (197) However, some EU member states did show some understanding for Pakistan’s apprehension for its security. Germany, generally more sensitive about matters related to peace and nuclear armaments, announced the day after the Indian nuclear explosions that it held, canceled the overseas development aid dialogue with New Delhi. (198) British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a conversation on phone tried to persuade his Pakistani counterpart to desist from exercising the nuclear option and gave him the assurance the security interest of Pakistan would be safeguarded and that India would be forced to sign the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the NPT.

(199)

While the West was putting pressure on Pakistan to exercise restraint in the face of the

Indian provocation, no sold guaranties to address Pakistan’s security apprehension were forthcoming, nor were there any concrete offers of help to resolve its economic problems.

(200)

Pakistan, taking into consideration its national interests, went ahead with its own serial nuclear test on May 28, 1998. Predictably, the EU likes the US and Japan condemned the action. However, in view of the serious economic problems that the country was facing sanctions were not imposed. The European commission recommended that loans to

Pakistan by international lending agencies should not be suspended but delayed. (201) At a summit in Cardiff, Wales in June 1998, EU leaders pressed New Delhi and Islamabad to become signatories to the non-proliferation treaties and also take necessary measures to decrease their mutual tensions. The European leaders warned that they would be forced to adopt stringent measures if the two countries failed to follow their advice. It must be noted that soon after India conducted its tests, it began adopting a particularly vicious and bellicose attitude towards Pakistan. This situation was a worrisome one for Islamabad and one of the reasons why the nuclear option was considered the appropriate one was because of Indian bellicosity. (202)

France with its Gaullist tradition of independence in foreign policy matters adopted a comparatively milder approach to the nuclear drama. It expressed concern about the control and command system of nuclear armaments in both countries and the danger of the outbreak of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange. The French leadership opposed the imposition of economic embargos to pressurize India and Pakistan into signing the CTBT and NPT. (203)

The EU has constantly drawn the attention of India and Pakistan to the lesson to be learnt from European history, when after the second world war, a battered and demoralized

Europe through sheer will power and the determination to henceforth avoid war transformed into a united Europe. Political wisdom instead of narrow national interests inspired the European countries to settle their differences. The EU has often stressed the advantage of diverting resources from defence to the social arena which, with the resultant widespread prosperity automatically assure peace in the subcontinent. (204)

It must be noted that over the years, European states like the UK have begun to consider the UN resolutions on the Kashmir dispute as out dated and time-barred. Also the major

European countries have not displayed commitment in unison the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination. Nor has the EU in its collective position on the dispute shown any inclination to support Pakistan’s point of view. As mentioned earlier, ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the member states of the EU have been very cautious about supporting movements for self-determination all over the world except in rare cases such as East Timor. East Timor which had a majority Christian population got full support from the west in its bid for independence from Indonesia and this resulted in a backlash in the form of allegations of selectivity in the application of the principal of self- determination and the human rights regime. (205)

The main reason why the EU is reluctant to press for settlement of the Kashmir issue is that its member states do not want to annoy India, for India has the second biggest population in the world and has the fifth largest economy in the world. Further, India’s growing middle class, estimated at around 300 million people is a feasible market for their high-end goods. (206) Besides, Kashmir is remote from Europe and poses no direct threat to European interest. It does not possess any strategically important natural resources like oil that would attract the Europeans. Only the outbreak of a full-fledged

Indo-Pakistan war would be deemed as a threat, considering that there are nuclear arms in the region, and this could jeopardize global security. (207)

The Kargil Conflict and the EU’s Response

The EU, setting aside its cautious attitude with regard to Indo-Pakistan conflicts, expressed its deep concern over the escalation of tensions over Kargil in 1999. Pakistan was blamed squarely for seriously jeopardizing peace and stability in the region. Pakistan had been trying to internationalize the Kashmir dispute, but Kargil had the effect of isolating Pakistan in the international community. This reaction was not surprising for just before the outbreak of the Kargil conflict, Indian premier Vajpayee had visited

Lahore amidst much publicity. He had held meetings with his Pakistani counterpart

Nawaz Sharif in a very cordial atmosphere. The Lahore Declaration signed at the end of this summit in February 1999, had greatly raised the hope that the Indo-Pakistan tensions which had escalated after their nuclear test in 1998 would be reduced through dialogue and negotiations. (208)

The EU called on both countries to show restraint in their words and actions. They also emphasized that the armed infiltrators should be withdrawn from Kashmir. The EU urged both countries to halt confrontation, respect the LoC and end cross border penetration.

(209)

The European countries believed Indian allegations that Pakistan was not only funding armed intruders but was also sending its regular forces into the valley. This perception created difficulties for Pakistan; for the latter lost whatever international support it had for its stand that in Kashmir, it was genuine freedom fighters who were struggling against

Indian occupations that Pakistan had very little control over them. (210)

The alignment of the Indian and European perceptions was reflected in the joint declaration released after the EU-India summit held in June 1999, in which both sides resolved that they would together “counter terrorism and meet all other challenges arising from it both in the regional and international context” . Thus, the EU was not at all hesitant in the post Kargil situation to show its suspicions on Pakistan’s role in occupied

Kashmir. (211) In the aftermath of the Kargil crisis, the EU postponed its cooperation agreement with Pakistan, linking the matter with the situation in Kashmir. (212)

The EU’s Responses on Post 9/11 Disputes

There was a radical change in the international scenario after 9/11. The EU which had stopped its political dialogue with Pakistan after the military coup in October 1999, now eagerly sought Pakistan’s support for the anti-terror coalition. The EU enthusiastically resumed its relations with Islamabad but was careful not to step on India’s too, for the latter too had offered its full support to the US led coalition against terrorism. (213) As pointed out earlier, tensions between India and Pakistan heightened after the terrorist attack on the Kashmir assembly in October 2001 and the Indian parliament in December in the same year. India campaigned very successfully to point Pakistan as the villain state-sponsor of terrorism and violence, and many in the world believed the Indians.

Pakistan had to make serious effort to counter the allegations. (214) The joint declaration against terrorism issued at the end of the second EU-India summit held in November

2001 in New Delhi nearly endorsed the Indian position. In generalized terms the declaration highlighted the responsibility of all countries to avoid giving moral, material, or diplomatic support to acts of terrorism and emphasized that no country should allow its soil to be used for sponsoring terrorist act against other countries. (215)

With Pakistan on the defensive, India thought it opportune to deploy its forces on the international border and the Kashmir LoC. The EU was concerned about these developments, which undoubtedly threatened regional and international peace and security. Two nuclear armed states on the brink of a show-down posed a serious problem for world peace. (216) The European Parliament adopted a resolution in October 2001 stressing the need for a meaningful dialogue to settle the Kashmir dispute and asking both states to make all out efforts in this regard. The EP asked the Council of Ministers to offer its good offices to facilitate a resolution of Indo-Pakistan conflicts. (217)

The US and the European Union exerted intense pressure on the Pakistani government to eradicate militant organizations, with the result that President Pervez Musharraf in a televised speech in January 2002 gave the undertaking that Pakistan’s territory would henceforth not be used for terrorism. (218) The EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana in a statement expressed appreciation for Musharraf’s speech and the actions that government had taken immediately to crack down on militants groups. (219) In February

2002, the European parliament adopted a resolution against the terrorist attack on the

Indian parliament and called on the two countries to reduce tensions and withdraw troops from the international border. New Delhi and Islamabad were also urged to start talks once again to avoid a military confrontation. They were asked to begin a dialogue in the light of the Simla Agreement, the Lahore Declaration and the relevant UN resolutions.

The resolution was welcomed by Islamabad with some reservations. (220)

The EU intensified its diplomacy aimed at decreasing tensions in the region. The exhorted India to apply restraint, while the Pakistani regime was asked to crack down on militants in its territory. To highlight the seriousness of the situation, the European

Union’s External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten held a meeting with the Pakistani leaders in May 2002. Patten emphasized that the international community as well as

Pakistan should observe the Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001. This resolution he said was very important particularly in the context of the Indo-Pakistan tensions. The resolution requires all countries to ensure that intentionally or unintentionally terrorism was not supported by them. Thus, those who financed planned or facilitated terrorist acts should be effectively stopped by all states. (221)

Patten, then went to India and after meeting the Indian foreign minister he declared that to normalize the situation Pakistan must make sure that there was no infiltration of militants from Azad Kashmir, as a first step. (222) However, Patten did not take into account the fact that India had deployed almost 700,000 forces in Indian held Kashmir that were, besides patrolling the border around the clock but were also planting land mines on border crossings. (223)

In order to stop all sources of terrorist financing the EU in May 2002 blacklisted the

Islamist Kashmiri group Laskhar-i-Taiba, whose financial assets were to be frozen, in fact taken over by governments across the EU. (224)

After a flurry of diplomacy by the international community, the two sub-continental powers began to withdraw their forces from the international border in June 2002. They also resumed their dialogue. Later, in July 2002 the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana visited India and Pakistan. After meeting Indian leaders in New Delhi, he impressed upon the two protagonists to take substantive steps to reduce tensions over disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. He placed the onus on Islamabad putting a permanent stop to the penetration of militants across the LoC. Solana’s comments supported the Indian point of view. (225)

However, at a joint press conference with the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad, Javier

Solana appreciated Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism. He however, did not approve of the idea of a proactive role for the EU in defusing tensions between the two countries.

(226)

Thus, message conveyed to the South Asians, was that the EU preferred not to play the role of a mediator in the conflict. Newsmen who attended the joint press conference opined that Solana’s response to most questions and his general response showed that his negotiations with the two countries had not produced the desired results and that he did not entertain any hopes for a prompt de-escalation of tensions in the region. (227)

In October 2002, after election in the valley, India announced that it would withdraw its forces from the international border. Pakistan reciprocated the next day by withdrawing its troops to its original position. The EU expresses appreciation of these measures, which it hoped would help in the normalization of relations. (228)

Briefly put, the EU’s stand on the Kashmir issue is that the UN resolutions passed more than six decades ago were now out dated and India and Pakistan must therefore resolve their dispute bilaterally according to the Simla Agreement and the Lahore declaration.

The EU which has adopted a common foreign and security policy could not develop a coherent, proactive or unified approach over the Kashmir issue. This was in contrast to its policy on the Middle East. Nevertheless, the EU emphasized on the need for a mechanism to establish a regular political dialogue with India and Pakistan. This was conveyed by the EU troika.

EU polices now focus more on crisis management rather than conflict resolution. The EU has expressed anxiety regarding the continuing upheaval in the valley and human rights violation by Indian forces. What is worrisome is that both states have nuclear capability. However, the EU has avoided putting pressure on India to resolve the conflict, for EU and its member states do not want to alienate India which has a large potential market for the EU’s high end products. Another noteworthy point is that Kashmir does not have vital resources like oil and gas that would attract the Europeans. The European states, however, get apprehensive whenever there is the danger of outbreak of a full fledged war between India and Pakistan. The European and international community consider Indo-

Pakistan tensions as a great threat for international security. Although, Pakistan has expressed interest in the EU as a mediator in on Kashmir but the union has avoided direct involvement in the conflict, though it would agree to offer its good offices if both countries put up a joint request.

 REFERENCES

1.Manas Chatterji and B.M.Jain, “Introduction:Historical and Contemporary

Perspectives on South Asia” in Manas Chatterji and B.M.Jain (eds.) Conflict and

Peace in South Asia 5 (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008), 5.

2.Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with Her Neighbours (Delhi: ISHA Books,

2008), 214.

3.Ibid, 214-215.

4.The American Desk Encyclopedia (London: George Philip Limited, 1998), 440.

5.Fatima Agha Shah, “The European Union and the Kashmir Issue”, Journal of

European Studies 25&26, no 2&1(July 2009&January 2010):128.

6.Sibtain Tahira, “Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute”, in Dr. S.M.Haider (ed.) Kashmir

and South Asian Security (Rawalpindi: Friends Publication, 1992), 77-78. 7.Ibid, 79.

8.Ibid, 81-82.

9.Ibid, 84.

10.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Kashmir Problem: British Role in Historical Perspective”, in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.) Post Cold War European Order and South Asia

(Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, 1996), 141.

11.Ahmed Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S. Security Concerns in South Asia”, South

Asian Affairs 1, no.1 (September 1996): 1.

12.Sibtain Tahira, “Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute”, 93.

13.Dr.Pervaiz Iqbal Chema, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”, in Dr. S.M.Haider (ed.)

Kashmir and South Asian Security, 30-31.

14.Lt.Gen (Retd) Nishat Ahmed, “Kashmir in the Pakistan-India Military Equation,” in Suroosh Irfani, (ed.) Fifty Years of the Kashmir Dispute (Muzaffarabad: University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 1997), 33.

15.Syed Imdad Shah, “The Kashmir Problem: British Role in Historical Perspective”,

142.

16.Aftab Ahmed, ‘Indian Expansionism and Kashmir’, in Suroosh Irfani (ed.) Fifty

Years of the Kashmir Dispute, 42.

17.Ibid.

18.Sardar Khalid Ibrahim Khan, “Kashmir Dispute: A Modus Vivendi”, in Pervaiz

Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri (eds.), The Kashmir Imbroglio: Looking

Towards the Future (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 190.

19.Aftab Ahmed, ‘Indian Expansionism and Kashmir’, 42. 20. Ibid, 42-43.

21.Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (New Delhi: Vistaar

Publication, 2003), 59, 61.

22.Aftab Ahmed, ‘Indian Expansionism and Kashmir’, 43.

23. Ibid, 43.

24.Naveed Ahmed Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations in the Contemporary

Regional and International Setting: Political, Security, Economic and Development

Aspects, Jean Monnet Project Paper,(Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe,

University of Karachi, 2003) 92.

25.Ibid, 92-93

26.Ibid, 87-88.

27.Ibid.

28.Rubab Hasan, “Kashmir Issue and the Major European Countries, in Naveed

Ahmad Tahir (ed.) Pakistan and Post-Ideological Europe: Prospects For Cooperation in the 21st Century (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi,

2000), 59,61.

29. Naveed Ahmed Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 87.

30.Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy’ in Dr. S.M.Haider (ed.)

Kashmir and South Asian Security, 48-49.

31.Sibtain Tahira, “Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute”, 85.

32.Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Kashmir dispute, available from http://www. mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article.aspx?id=37&type=4. 33.Ibid.

34.Sten Widmalm, Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent

Separatism in India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 135.

35.Ibid, 136.

36.Mohammad Arif, “The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Relations: 1972-

1992”, Pakistan Horizon 24, no 1&2 (1993): 42-43.

37.Naeem Ahmed, “India’s Changing Policy on Kashmir”, Pakistan Horizon 53, no 4

(October 2000): 32.

38.Kashmir, visit at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict.

39.Ahmad Ejaz,“Kashmir Dispute and U.S”, 2.

40.Ibid, 3.

41..Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir,

(Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press,2009), 13.

42.Ibid, 14.

43.Ibid.

44.Ibid, 17.

45.Ibid.

46.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 3.

47.Ibid.

48.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 23.

49.Ibid.

50.Ibid.

51.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 4. 52.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 27.

53.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 4.

54.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence “,25.

55.Ibid.

56.Ibid, 28.

57.Ibid, 29.

58.Ibid.

59.Ibid.

60.Ibid.

61.Ibid, 29-30.

62.Ibid, 30.

63.Ibid.

64.Ibid.

65.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute”, 6

66.Ibid.

67.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 33,35.

68.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 6.

69.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence “, 36.

70.Ibid.

71.Ibid,37.

72.Ibid, 38.

73.Ibid.

74.Ibid, 39 75.Ibid, 41.

76.Ibid, 40.

77.Ibid, 42.

78.Ibid, 43.

79.Ibid, 44.

80.Ibid, 44.

81.Ibid, 45.

82.Ibid, 45-46.

84.Ibid, 46.

85.Ibid, 47.

86.Ibid, 49.

87.Ibid, 50.

88.Ibid, 51.

89.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 52-53.

90.Ibid, 53.

91.Ibid. 54.

92.Ibid. 54-55.

93.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 8.

94.Howard B. Schaffer Limits of Influence, 55.

95.Ibid, 55-56.

96.Ibid, 56-57.

97.Ibid, 57.

98.Ibid, 58-59. 99.Ibid, 59-60.

100.Ibid, 66.

101.Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991

(Washington DC: National Defense university press, 1992), 182.

102.Ibid, 191.

103.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 69-70.

104.Ibid, 71.

105.N.Jayapalan, India and her Neighbours (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and

Distributors, 2000), 52.

106.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 72.

107.Ibid, 75.

108.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 14.

109.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 82, 84.

110.Ibid, 87.

111.Ibid, 88-89.

112.Dennis Kux, India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past still Prologue? (Washington

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 28-29.

113.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 90.

114.Ibid, 97-98.

115.Arvind Goswami, 3 D Deceit, Duplicity &Dissimulation of U.S. Foreign Policy

Towards India, Pakistan & Afghanistan ( Bloomington: Author House, 2012), 320-

321.

116.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 114-115. 117.Ibid, 113, 116-117.

118.Ibid, 118.

119.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 18.

120.Ibid,18.

121.Ibid, 19.

122.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 122.

123.Ibid, 123.

124.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 21.

125.Ibid, 21-22.

126.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 124.

127.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 23

128.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 126.

129.James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Facts On File, 2009),

242

130.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 127.

131.Ibid.

132.Ibid, 129.

133.Ibid, 131.

134.Ibid, 132.

135.Ibid, 132-133.

136.Ibid, 134.

137.Ibid, 135.

138.Ibid, 135-136. 139.Ahmad Ejaz, “Kashmir Dispute and U.S.”, 24.

140.Ibid, 23.

141.Ibid, 24.

142.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 145-146.

143.Ibid, 146.

144.Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War

(London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003), 205,208.

145.Zafar Khan, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Testing May 1998: External and

Internal Pressures”, IPRI Journal xii, no1 (Winter 2012): 33-34.

146.Barbara Crossette, Nuclear Anxiety: The Rivalry, South Asian Arms Race:

Reviving Dormant Fears of Nuclear War, New York Times, 29 May, 1998, available from http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/29/world/nuclear-anxiety-rivalry-south-asian- arms-race-reviving-dormant-fears-nuclear-war.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

147.Tehmina Mahmood, “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Explosions: An

Analysis”,Pakistan Horizon 52, no1 (January 1999): 45-46.

148.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 155-156.

149.Tehmina Mahmood, “Kargil Crisis and Deteriorating Security Situation in South

Asia”, Pakistan Horizon 52, no 4 (October 1999): 31.

150.Ibid, 32-33.

151.Ibid, 36.

152.Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for

Resolution”, India Review 2, issue 3 (2003): 101.

153.Tehmina Mahmood, “Kargil Crisis”, 37-38. 154.Ibid, 39.

155.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 166.

156.Ibid, 167.

157.Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute”,102.

158.Shahid Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi:Oxford University Press,

2010),328.

159.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 173.

160.Dawn, 16 October, 2001.

161.The News, 10 October, 2001.

162.Sohaib Khaliq, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy in new Strategic Environment”, IPRI

Journal xii, no 1(Winter 2012): 51,47.

163.The News, 22 December, 2001.

164.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 175.

165.The News, 22 December, 2001.

166.Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute”,104.

167.David.S. Chou, “U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan in the Post Cold War”, available at www.2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/8-3/832.pdf.

168.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 176.

169.Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute”, 105.

170.Howard B. Schaffer, Limits of Influence, 176-177.

171.Ibid, 177.

172.Ibid, 178.

173.Ibid, 180-181. 174.Ibid, 178.

175.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 92-93.

176.Ibid, 88.

177.Ibid.

178.Ibid, 89.

179.Mutahir Ahmed, “The European Union’s Response to the Kashmir” Journal of

European Studies 11&12, no 2&1 (July1995&January 1996):55-56.

180.Ibid, 56.

181.Ibid.

182.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 94.

183.Mutahir Ahmed , “The European Union’s Response to the Kashmir”, 56.

184.Ibid, 57.

185.Ibid.

186.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 94.

187.Mutahir Ahmed, “The European Union’s Response to the Kashmir”, 57-58.

188.Ibid, 58-59.

189.Ibid, 59.

190.Rubab Hasan, “Kashmir Issue and the Major European Countries”, in Naveed

Ahmad Tahir (ed.), Pakistan and Post Ideological Europe: Prospects for Cooperation in the 21st Century (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 2000), 66-67.

191.Ibid, 62.

192.Ibid, 63.

193.Ibid, 68-69. 194.Ibid, 69.

195.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 109-110.

196.Ibid, 110-111.

197.Ibid, 112.

198.Ibid, 110.

199.Ibid, 112.

200.Ibid, 111.

201.Ibid, 113.

202.Ibid, 113.

203.Ibid, 114.

204.Ibid, 94-95.

205.Ibid, 95.

206.Ibid, 91.

207.Ibid, 96

208.Ibid.

209.Dawn, 3 June,1999.

210.Rubab Hasan, “Kashmir Issue and the Major European Countries”, 69-70.

211.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 94.

212.Dawn, 24 June 1999.

213.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 97-98.

214. Ibid, 99.

215.Dr. M. Saeed Chaudhry, “European Union and Kashmir” in Pervaiz Iqbal

Cheema & Maqsudual Hasan Nuri (eds.), 86. 216.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 99.

217.Mahdi Masud, “The Kashmir Issue-EU’s Stand”, Journal of European Studies 18

& 19, no 2 & 1 (July2002 &January 2003):31.

218.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, A Survey of EU-Pakistan Relations, 100.

219. Ibid, 101.

220.Ibid, 103.

221.Ibid, 104-105.

222.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Post-September 11 International Scenario and the

European Union (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 2004), 274.

223.Ibid.

224.Ibid, 266.

225.BBC News, “EU Wants Fresh Action on Kashmir”, 26 July, 2002, available from

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2154279.stm.

226.Dawn, 28 July, 2002.

227.Ibid.

228.Naveed Ahmad Tahir, The Post-September 11 International Scenario and the

European Union, 276.

CONCLUSION

With the end of the cold war in 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall and the re-unification of

Germany, the international scenario was completely transformed. With these momentous events, the US was able to establish its untrammeled power across the globe. This situation came to be known as the ‘new world order’ or the ‘Pax Americana’.

Washington’s first post-cold war triumph was the US-led coalition’s easy victory over

Saddam Hussein in March 1991. Other events followed which further confirmed the position of the US as the sole superpower, in July 1991 the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the formidable Communist giant Soviet Union disintegrated in December of the same year and the West led by the US triumphed over communism. Democracy and market economy were acknowledged the world over as the panacea for all the woes of the globe.

(1)

The so-called ‘New World Orders’ upheld new modes of cooperation with other countries with the avowed aim of deterring aggression and achieving international stability, prosperity and above all peace. The US intervened to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims by the Serbs had taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of human beings. Another American led intervention in 1991 saved the Albanian Muslims of Kosovo from further atrocities by Serbia and eventually allowed the enclave to assert its independence from rump Yugoslavia. Many considered the US intervention in Kosovo as being against the norms of international law.

However, the shocking events of September 11, 2001 gave a big jolt to the New World

Order’s principles of global cooperation. The US became more militaristic and unilateralist. The US National Security Strategy 2002 reinforced the element of unilateralism in American foreign policy. Washington’s response to 9/11 had a very strong military aspect as signified in the term “War on Terror”. President George Bush made it clear that he had no need to rely on his NATO allies. The State Department and the Pentagon formulated the doctrine of pre-emption to overcome an enemy which was ubiquitous, had no clearly spelt-out territory, no visible institutions of power or authority and neither an international legal personality. (2)

The post-9/11 instances of American unilateralism are the US invasion of Afghanistan in

October 2001 and its war against Iraq in 2003. This war was waged without a UN mandate. The war against terror has not ended, though the US-led forces will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. The reasons given by the US for its interventions in

Afghanistan and Iraq were that these two countries were allegedly promoting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This twin menace were a threat to

American and international security. Other examples of the US unilateralist approach were its revocation of the ABM treaty and rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. These actions seemed to confirm not only unchallenged American predominance in the world order but also its utter arrogance and willfulness. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement in this regard reflected a certain helplessness as well as bitterness. He pointed out that the

‘New’ world order was completely American-centric. In this order there was only a single Master and Sovereign. Putin found this a very dangerous and unacceptable situation. (3) The sole superpower was bent upon being seen as the leader of the world and saw even its allies as subordinates who had obey its commands, without complaining. As for the other lesser powers, they were in no position to even let out a whimper against Washington’s actions.

Washington’s determination to hold on to its predominant role in world affairs is very evident in the matter of the Iranian nuclear issue and the Middle East. This means that the

US is not ready to give even a little space for other powers, even its allies, to act and take the lead where the US has important stakes. As for the EU itself, as regards its own failure in the Yugoslav crisis, an important question that arises is whether the EU had the capabilities to take the lead in such highly sensitive and complicated issue, if the US left the initiative in its hands. (4)

Though, the EU and the US share concerns over global challenges and some of the threat perceptions, the US and EU very often adopts different policies to handle a situation.

Washington’s emphasis is on security, preservation of national sovereignty, and promotion of national interests. It ensures these objectives through high defense spending and unilateralist behavior. During the Bush administration Washington showed a marked preference for military means over diplomacy. The Bush administration’s contention was that unilateralism (including the doctrine of pre-emption) and interventionism had always been an important aspect of American policy. This is quite true. The examples of

Reagan’s ‘pre-emptive’ air strikes against a recalcitrant Libya in 1986, Clinton’s attack on Afghanistan by a cruise missile and the air strike on the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan in 1988 can be cited in this regard. It later became known that the

Sudanese factory had been actually manufacturing medicines, but terrible damage had already been inflicted. However, this attitude had never been officially pronounced as part of the American national strategy. The Bush doctrine of pre-emption was quite different from what had been applied in the past. The US insists that it does not need more concrete evidence, than that gathered by its own intelligence services to undertake pre-emptive military action. Such action could also be directed against a non-state actor.

Non-state actor is a phenomenon that has emerged in recent decades and is particularly applied to terrorists of the Islamist variety. There are also other non-state actors, such as

NGOs, multinationals etc. Although President Obama’s National Security Strategy of

2010 has not introduced any fundamental changes to President Bush’s doctrine on the use of force, the document did depart from the earlier doctrine in that it sent a clear message in favour of multilateralism.

The EU on the other hand, projects itself as a civilian power that prefers using diplomacy and economic instruments to gain its foreign policy aims. There have been numerous debates on how the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would impact on the civilian nature of the EU, but the latter has clarified in its Security Strategy that it perceives the use of force only as a last resort. It is also noteworthy that the EU’s emphasis on effective multilateralism highlighted the difference between the Union’s policies and the Bush foreign policy. The EU doctrine diplomatically avoided referring to ‘rogue’ nations and also distanced the Union from the American penchant for regime change. It expressed preference for the milder goal of encouraging good governance and democracy by using its soft power. Also, ‘pre-emption’ as envisaged by the EU is more about timely diplomatic intervention than military strikes. Though, the doctrine acknowledges that those responsible for breaking the international rules and norms deserved punishment it also stressed that military force should only be employed as a

“last resort”. The more cynical analysts opine that the preference of the EU for ‘soft power’ is because it lacks military teeth. (5)

After terrorist attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001 the Europeans became part of the US-led coalition which attacked Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden the alleged mastermind behind these terrorist incidents.

Things were quite cosy between the trans-Atlantic allies at this point in time, though the

Europeans were not very happy about Bush pinpointing, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North

Korea as the ‘Axis of Evil’. Serious problems arose in US-Europe relations as well as intra-EU relations when Bush decided that the Iraqi regime had manufactured and hidden

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and had not cooperated enough with the UN arms inspection teams and therefore needed due punishment. The serious divisions among the

EU member states and those that were about to enter the EU, highlighted the fact that though the Union professed to have a common foreign and security policy, it had failed to develop a uniform approach on the war. The urgent need for a common strategic vision to create internal cohesiveness at the EU level now became very apparent. Thus, the first step taken in this connection was the forging and adoption of the European Security

Strategy in December 2003.This document provides a framework for the Union's security–related policies and actions. The EU's common interests, strategic goals and capability requirements are determined by the security environment and assessments of the threat it is faced with. The European Security Doctrine has listed the following new threats to Europe:

i. Terrorism;

ii. The spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD);

iii. Regional conflicts around the world;

iv. Failed or failing states;

v. Organized crime that is internationally networked. (6)

After a review of its implementation was carried out in 2008, three more threats were added i)thew threat of the cyber crimes, which had become an unprecedented ‘economic, political and military weapons ii)The dependence of the EUarea on imports of energy making it vulnerable to pressures from energy-exporting or transit corridor countries iii)Global climate change which can multiply other security threats. Akey aspect of the strategy is therefore, emphasis on an effective multilateral system, based on cooperation between member countries, as well as cooperation at the global level. (7)

Owing to its size, economic prowess and international standing, the EU is now considered a new power centre in a world with increasingly multipolar characteristics.

Yet, when compared to the US, a country of continental proportions, the EU cannot be defined as a state or a super state. It is but a unique association of twenty eight sovereign nation-states which have willingly given up some of their sovereign functions to the supranational institutions of the Union.

Ever since the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of

Rome in 1957, its member-states began incremental integration and cooperation in the fields of economy and trade and over the decades added more areas to this venture. They succeeded in creating a single market, monetary union and common citizenship. By the eighties, the European Union had already emerged as a giant economic bloc but after the signing of Maastricht treaty in 1993, which added Common Foreign and Security Policy to its functions, it has also become an important political actor in world affairs. By setting up a Common Foreign and Security Policy under one of two separate institutional processes founded by the Maastricht Treaty, the EU began efforts to have a unified voice on the international stage.

The predecessor of CFSP was the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was launched more modestly in 1970 outside the institutional framework of the Community.

European Political Cooperation was more of an informal consultation process between member states on foreign policy matters; the eventual aim was to create a common position to foreign policy issues. This included the promotion of global cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These aims were carried over into CFSP; in fact more dimensions were added to it.

Although, European Political Cooperation did succeed in some areas for example in June

1980, when the member states issued the Venice Declaration, reflecting a common approach on Middle East issues particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They also adopted a common line in 1975 at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE) which had been convened at a pan-European level to improve relations and mutual understanding between the two rival blocs. (8)

The Community members, under EPC failed dismally in adopting a unified stand against

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, though later most of them cooperated with the US in developing a common western strategy on evicting the communist giant from the country. On the UK-Argentine war over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands

(1982), the First Gulf War (1990-91) and the Balkans crisis (1990-91), member-states viewpoints differed a great deal. Thus, on the whole the EPC was not a resounding success, but as a result, the Community member states recognized the need to develop a real common foreign policy.

The CFSP, which replaced the EPC, was established by the Treaty on European Union or as it is often called--the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993. Unlike EPC,

CFSP was part of the main structure of the three pillared framework. It was the first time that a pronounced security and military dimension was developed over time. CFSP, like

EPC, is based upon inter-governmental cooperation. CFSP could employ two important tools (i) common positions: member countries have to adopt national policies that do not clash with the Union’s position on any international issue, (ii) joint actions: these are operational actions taken by member states under the CFSP umbrella. (9) The failure of the EU to respond appropriately to the Bosnian and later Kosovo crises impressed upon the member states the need to develop a security and defence dimension for CFSP.

Under the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) an effort was made to strengthen the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on CFSP. To give CFSP more visibility the post of a High

Representative for EU Foreign Policy was created by the Amsterdam Treaty. CFSP decision-making under Maastricht had been completely based on consensus of the member states but now the EU could adopt CFSP-related measures through Qualified

Majority Voting (QMV) but the option of “constructive abstention” was given to those member states which did not want to be part of a certain action, because they felt that their national interests would be compromised by their participation. Thus, the willing member states retained the freedom to take a common action without being hindered by others. The Amsterdam Treaty added a new foreign policy instrument namely ‘common strategies’ which could now be employed by member states where required. The

European Council comprising the heads of state and heads of government, the institution that defined the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, now also had the right to define on the basis of unanimity, common strategies in fields where the member states had important common interests. The Council of Ministers was given the responsibility to implement these common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by qualified majority vote. (10)

The Treaty of Nice of 2000 introduced ‘enhanced cooperation’ in CFSP. This meant that when member states of the Union are not able to realize the objectives of CFSP consensually, at least eight like-minded members may carry out ‘enhanced cooperation’ among themselves. This was a major development in CFSP introduced by the Treaty of

Nice. However, enhanced cooperation was allowed only to implement a joint action or a common position, already agreed upon. (11)

Further, the Lisbon Reform Treaty that was signed in December 2007 but implemented in

2009 tried to further enhance the EU’s international profile, besides revamping the

Union’s voting and decision making procedures to accommodate 12-13 new members.

The treaty had introduced a full time presidency of the European Council and a High

Representative for foreign and security policy with a higher profile. The HR would be supported by a European External Actions Service (EEAS). Now the distinction between external relations and foreign policy has been blurred, because the High Representative would also hold the post of External Relations Commissioner. (12)

The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which is now a major dimension of CFSP, allows the EU to respond in a proactive manner to international crises through a combination of civilian and military crisis management and conflict prevention operations. In such operations the EU’s civilian expertise in areas such as policing, the rule of law, and civilian administration come in useful. The purpose of the military operations is to help stabilize and make more secure post-conflict areas and vulnerable and fragile states. (13)

A widespread belief was that since the cold war had ended Europe no longer faced any security threats. But the vulnerable and conflict prone states of the former Soviet bloc free of the restraining hand of the Soviet Union, the Balkans crisis and the Iraq war reminded the Europeans that they now faced bigger security threats than ever before.

Instability and strife in their backyard it was now evident could develop into a serious threat to their peace and stability as also to international security. Further, the Gulf War had fuelled Islamist extremism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world, and this was a worrying matter for the Europeans.

The concept of a common defence policy for Europe can be traced back to 1948 when, to give a sense of security to the countries of Western Europe against resurgence of

Germany, the UK, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty of Brussels. The most important part of the treaty was a mutual defence clause which laid the foundations for the formation of the more inclusive Western European Union (WEU). Until the late

1990s, the WEU along with NATO was the main forums for consultation among the Europeans on security and defence matters. It is important to remember that the WEU did not have a Common European army or defence forces. (14)

Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent events in the Balkans, the EU member states understood that they needed to take over their own responsibilities in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management though NATO was there to take care of bigger over all threats to trans-Atlantic security. It was agreed at the WEU Council in

1992 that under certain conditions military units could be deployed. These were identified as the, “Petersburg Tasks” which by the Treaty of Amsterdam were integrated in the EU treaty. (15)

Member states’ heads of state and government at a summit at Cologne in 1999, reaffirmed the Union’s resolve to develop capabilities for autonomous action, supported by credible military forces. A very important development was the “Berlin Plus

Agreement” which gave the EU, access to NATO assets and capabilities, but only under certain conditions. (16)

The Lisbon Treaty further developed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The treaty dissolved the WEU and introduced a mutual assistance and solidarity clause. It allowed the HR/VP to exercise the option to bring all the necessary EU assets together and to apply a "comprehensive approach" to EU crisis management. (17)

The reality on the ground is that in defence matters, the possibility of the European Union emerging as a truly autonomous actor is quite remote. France has ambitions for the EU to develop European security structures independent of the US. In the other words it has favoured the ‘Europeanization’ of Europe’s foreign, security and defence policies.

Germany too has similar ideas and the two also have a common basic approach towards security issues. The UK, on the other hand, ever since the second world war, when it together with the US fought back Nazi Germany, has special ties with Washington and therefore has an approach that has been described as “Atlanticist”. It never encourages moves that would undermine the importance of NATO. Sweden, Austria, Finland and

Ireland are member states that continue to hold on to their neutral status. Thus, while they adhere to all EU treaties, military interventions and the use of “hard” tools for tackling crisis situations makes these countries thoroughly uncomfortable. Though, they do not hinder other countries from adopting such measures, they themselves avoid participation in interventions that involve military means.

Following the international financial crisis that began in 2008 and the austerity drive by

European countries to counter it, there has been a decline in defense budgets and therefore it is unrealistic to expect an enhancement of European military capabilities. It is now important that European governments utilize whatever finances are available for defence in a prudent and efficient manner. Being part of a Union that has strong supranational elements, member states are obliged to adopt the laws, rules and regulations of the Union in many policy areas, but security and defense policy are based on intergovernmental cooperation and the European Union cannot force member states to cooperate in this realm. Matters related to national security are considered as the responsibility of each member state, and in this regard the states, being sovereign and independent retain the ultimate decision-making authority. If certain decisions pertaining to security and defence are taken jointly, member-states if they feel that their national interest would be compromised can use their veto power, or refrain from being part of an action. Thus, the sovereignty of member states in this field is an overriding principle and is likely to remain so in the future.

The United Kingdom and France are the most powerful EU actors as far the military is concerned. Both have the capability of carrying out nuclear strikes and conducting expeditionary operations on their own. Germany, because of its role in the second world war was hesitant about military involvement, but in recent years its participation in the

International Security Assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, though under the name of

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) shows that it has overcome its hesitation in this regard. Germany has the economic strength and the capability to develop its military power if it so wishes.

However, when it is a matter of collective action involving conventional forces, such as the 2011 intervention in Libya, the limits of EU’s military prowess is revealed. If such a brief and localized operation could not be carried out without the United States, the conclusion one can draw about the state of affairs is that no single EU member countries can carry out effective intervention by itself. This was also apparent in some British and

French operations in trouble spots in Africa.

It is the military might of the United States which protects the EU area against outside threats. It is an undeniable fact that the military strength of NATO depends greatly on

U.S. military and arms. The United States as has often been pointed out is the indispensable member of NATO.

The mechanisms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to CFSP, can only facilitate consensus among member states. Ultimately, it is the mandate provided by the member states which allow the High Representative to carry out CFSP related duties. The HR can make efforts to encourage consensus, but has no powers of enforcing it. Despite all the reforms introduced by various treaties CFSP remains a common policy. With twenty eight member-states, or even when there was a lesser number, there was not, and could not be a single foreign policy. The fact must be accepted that the EU is not a sovereign state, and its member countries continue to maintain their own foreign ministries which formulate and implement national foreign policies. Although members states agreed to give up their sovereignty in the fields of economy, trade, monetary union and some other areas but in the matter of foreign and security policies countries are very sensitive and surrendering sovereignty in this area would not be easy. The fact that member states continue to have their own foreign policies is reflected in the manner in which the EU responded to the first and second Gulf Wars, the Bosnian crisis, the Middle East peace process, the conflict in Georgia and most recently their individual stands on the Ukraine crisis.

It is noteworthy that as compared to the cold war period, when international affairs were relatively simple, for all member states of the European Community faced a common adversary that posed a serious threat to their security and interests, after the cold war ended foreign, security and defense policy issues became much more complex for the nature of threats to the EC area had completely changed. For instance for Germany, the advancement of democracy in the former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern and Central

Europe is of great importance owing to their proximity to the country. Any political instability and threats to peace in the region pose the greatest danger to Germany. As for

Italy, France and Spain, owing to their geographical nearness to the Southern

Mediterranean region, the influx of immigrants, particularly illegal ones and the emanation of terrorism from North Africa and the Middle East are issues of foremost importance. The UK which is separated from continental Europe by the English Channel, and owing to historical reasons is close to US. This fact has been explained earlier. The new member states from Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltic states in particular are uncomfortably close to the Russian Federation. They along with the Scandinavian countries prefer that the US should keep Russia under pressure at all times.

It was hoped that the demise of the Cold War would usher in an era of peace and stability around the world and particularly in Europe, and that a new just and equitable world order would emerge. Nearly a quarter of a century down the lane, all such hopes have evaporated. Conflicts and wars are a frequent occurrence and the sole superpower which is the arbiter of the international order has failed to bring justice, peace and equality in the world.

The Gulf war (1990-91)

The Gulf war (1990-91) proved to the world that with the end of the cold war, the supreme power would be the US. Its diktat cannot be challenged by anyone. The first

Gulf war (1990-91) was in a way a landmark event, heralding a new era in international relations. With the end of the Cold War, certain regions that had been considered important by Washington lost some of their significance for the sole superpower, but the

Gulf region is still very important for it. One can cite several reasons for the Gulf region’s continuing importance for the US; first, the Gulf's importance can be evaluated in relative terms. Soon after the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union’s descent into chaos began, Washington propounded a new national defence strategy. The US restructured its forces to respond in particular to two major regional conflicts simultaneously. While during the Cold War the United States was deeply involved in building its defences in West Europe, with the Soviet threat having subsided, it now turned its attention more to two other major conflict prone regions--the Gulf and the Korean peninsula. This change in strategy began during President George Bush Sr.’s administration and was further refined in the Clinton era.

Over the decades, the importance for the world of oil from the Gulf region was increasing, because of greater consumption of energy, particularly in the developed world. In 1973, the Arabs decided to use oil as a weapon against the countries that had overtly supported Israel during the Arab-Israeli war. The embargo imposed by the Arab oil exporters on exports of oil to certain countries and the resultant sharp rise in oil prices was traumatic for the economies of the US, West Europe as well as the international economy in general. They now had to find ways to protect themselves from any future stoppages of oil supplies from the Gulf.

An important concern for the US after the end of the cold war was that Iraq and Iran had emerged as the region’s strongest military powers and that they could pose a direct threat to American interests in this region. Israel a special ally of the US was perceived as being most vulnerable to pressure from these powers, for the Zionist state was located in the midst of the Arab world. Thus, the reason why the US played a lead role during the Iraq-

Kuwait crisis was to protect its own interests.

It is strange that a most dangerous situation was arising, but Washington did not warn the

Iraqi government to refrain from attacking Kuwait, a small, but sovereign country. At this juncture, the vibes from Washington made Saddam confident that the US would remain neutral in the event of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It must be noted that just the opposite happened when Saddam Hussain in 1994 once again made troop movement towards the

Iraq-Kuwait border, Bill Clinton then President, lost no time in warning Saddam against crossing the border. A red alert was issued and naval ships and troops were at once sent to the region. This showed Washington’s firm resolve to launch an air attack on Iraq, if the latter violated Kuwait’s sovereignty and integrity. Cowed down by this response Iraq quickly stopped its troops movements and Kuwait’s territory remained unviolated. Thus, in the light of what happened later, the US attitude in 1990 was very curious, for Iraq had unambiguously declared its intention to attack Kuwait. To throw Iraq out of Kuwait, the

US applied immense diplomatic pressure by getting the support of the international community for UN resolutions and by forming a broad anti-Iraq coalition. The success of

Washington in forming this broad coalition was seen as a great achievement of the Bush administration. The coalition’s political legitimacy was unquestionable. Also, the oil-rich members of this coalition contributed military forces, and pitched in to share the costs of the operation to liberate Kuwait. This coalition was also meant to deter an Iraqi attack on

Saudi Arabia.

The American leadership had played a most crucial role in applying a policy of pressure and incentives. The weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the coalition partners and those who were not a part of this coalition were exploited, but the aim was fulfillment of

American interests. This is how China, the Soviet Union and Jordan were made to acquiesce to US will. Saudi Arabia, which felt vulnerable vis-à-vis Iraq, (whose military strength had been deliberately over-rated and over-stated) was also drawn into the coalition and made to pay for the operation through similar tactics.

The inclusion in the coalition of Muslims countries in good numbers was meant to show to the world that the Muslim world fully backed the US in its action against Iraq. Skillful use was also made of the UN forum to exert pressure on Iraq.

However, it cannot be said that only the US interests were being served in the Iraq-

Kuwait crisis; there was the moral side of the issue. The naked aggression of a dictator had to be challenged by the international community. If there had been no American initiative, a broad-based coalition could not have been put together and Iraq would have stayed put in Kuwait. However, the masses in the Muslim world saw the matter in a different light. They perceived it as a crusade against the Muslim world by the West. The

West was seen as having double standards---Iraq was punished for attacking Kuwait but

Israel went scot-free when it attacked Iraq to destroy the latter’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and when attacked Lebanon in 1993. Several other similar cases were cited to highlight the West’s selectivity in such matters.

The Gulf crisis became the first test of the European Community which was about to be transformed from the EC to the EU, with a common foreign and security policy.

However, the common response of the Community to the Gulf War was rather disappointing; and this was not because the machinery of the EPC was weak or out of order. Rather it was because of the differences in the thinking of the member states with regard to various aspects of the crisis. The fact is that the domestic reaction in member states was an essential determinant in their respective stands on the Gulf crisis. In Italy, the coalition government partners had sharp disagreements over the line to be adopted on the crisis. It was quite apparent that internal political pressure impacted upon the position adopted by the Italian government that was holding the presidency of the Community in the second half of 1990. Initially, Rome decided to contribute only two frigates and a support ship to the coalition forces. This demoralized its fellow member-states. Above all, Italy prevaricated on convening EC meetings for holding a debate on the crisis. The early statements of the Italian Prime Minister were also vague. Endorsement for an international policing operation was given by the Italian Parliament in January 1991. (18)

The French government too did not adopt a clear stance on the crisis which evoked criticizm from the public in the country. France was keen to preserve economic ties with the Middle East. Being the first country in the sixties to extend a hand of friendship to the

Arabs it did not want to spoil its rapport with the Arab world. Thus, ambiguity marked

French policy on the crisis. While, it demonstrated solidarity with the anti- Iraq coalition it was also loath to part with its traditional independence in the foreign policy arena. (19)

As for Germany, it was pre-occupied with problems relating to its reunification.

Therefore, its diplomatic contribution in defusing the crisis was low-key. Not wanting to depart from the German constitution prepared after the second world war under the supervision of the Allied powers which disallowed the country from taking such military action, Germany did not contribute any forces to the coalition. (20) The UK, a close

American ally was the most enthusiastic coalition partner. It contributed a substantial military force to the coalition against Iraq and played a significant role in the military operations. The British government’s response, in view of its traditional policy was not unexpected. (21) The Spanish people protested against their government’s decision to use conscripts for the three warships that were being sent to the Gulf. The people of Spain being in close proximity to the Middle East and North Africa were afraid that their country’s traditional policy of friendly relations with the Arabs would be adversely impacted if Spain participated in the military operation. Here, it is important to mention that the broad messes in the Arab world were not too happy about the war against Iraq.

(22) During the Gulf crisis, Ireland, found refuge in its neutrality. (23) In Greece, communists and socialists protested against their country's inclusion in the coalition. (24)

The Gulf crisis reinforced the skepticism among some member states that it would be a formidable task to develop a common foreign policy at the European Community level, despite the member-states’ resolve to do so.

The Western European Union (WEU) was not activated in the war, but its member states individually participated, after entering into bilateral agreements with Washington.

Kuwait, that was invaded and occupied by Iraq, thus looked towards NATO led by the

United States, to take decisive action to rout Iraqi troops from the country. (25)

In brief it can be said that the EC could not present a unified response to the crisis because member states disagreed on the political and moral aspects of the crisis. There were differences in their respective national interests and the mechanisms of EPC were also not very strong for dealing with such a serious crisis.

Similar issues arose before and during the second US-led war against Iraq in 2003. The clash between the EU member states on the issue was very obvious. As pointed out earlier, two of the major powers of the EU—Germany and France were vehemently against the war and insisted that Saddam’s regime must be given more time to comply with the UN resolution 1441 (2002) regarding weapons inspections.

To narrow the differences between the member states on the Iraq crisis an emergency meeting of the European Council was convened in Brussels on February 17, 2003. The heads of state and government were able to agree on some matters and issued a joint declaration. However, this meeting was not successful in resolving the basic differences between member states. There were still glaring differences between them. There were the pro-US states such as the UK, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the

Netherlands. On the other hand, were France and Germany which were supported by

Belgium, Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden. The positions of Austria, Finland and

Sweden were understandable. These were permanently neutral states, and were not in favour of war. Luxembourg’s stance was abstruse. The declaration adopted by the summit emphasized that the UN should have a central role in resolving the crisis. It stated that force should only be used as a “last resort”. (26) It was not surprising that these open differences among the member states on supporting the US decision eroded the tenability of CFSP. This was a very embarrassing situation for the EU for in 2004, the Union was going to admit ten new East, Central and Southern European countries. Interestingly, the

East and Central European countries who had joined the fray over the Iraq crisis, had declared themselves to be enthusiastic supporters of the US in the latter’s resolve to wage war.

President Bush Jr. managed to get the Congress’s approval in October 2002 authorizing him to take military actions against Iraq if efforts to resolve the crisis through diplomacy under the UN framework met with failure. (27) The UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1441 (2002) giving Saddam Hussain a last chance to comply with the commitment to disarm or face “serious consequences”. (28) The wording of the resolution did not say that Iraq would be attacked, but it did convey a strong message to the Iraqi regime that compliance with the UN resolution was a must. In case this was not done, the regime itself would be responsible for the consequences, this could be taken to mean a military strike. There was stark international division over a new resolution specifically allowing the use of force. France and Russia declared that they would veto such a resolution. Here it must be noted that in the UN Charter, the use of armed force is legal in only two situations; these are described in two articles of chapter VII. Under

Article 42, the Security Council is empowered to take action by air, sea or land forces if it becomes essential for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The use of armed force is again allowed under Article 51, by a country or by a group of states collectively if self defence is involved. This had happened after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, when the UN Security Council had passed resolutions, invoking Article

42 of the Charter. These resolutions went step-wise, first demanding that Iraq vacate the occupation of Kuwait but if the latter refused to obey then the Security Council stated that “all necessary means” could be used to restore international peace and security in the region. After war ended, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 which defined the terms of the ceasefire, which besides other things demanded the surrender or elimination of Iraq’s WMD. (29) A no fly-zone and a UN weapons monitoring regime was imposed on the country. These terms were accepted by Iraq, but later there was controversy about compliance by Iraq. The later, UNSC resolution 1441 (2002) declared Iraq as being “in material breach of Resolution 687 (1991) and other previous resolutions”. (30) In the context of the 2003 Iraq crisis the US insisted that since Iraq had been and continued to be in material breach of the resolution, it automatically revived the authorization of force contained in the 1990 Resolution 678. Seeing that it had failed in convincing the others to back a resolution authorizing force, the US finally abandoned the demand for the passage of a new resolution and launched its military strike in March 2003. The avowed aims of the war were to cleanse the country of WMD and free its people from the oppressive

Saddam regime.

The US with Britain in tow insisted that its action was backed by the legal mandate of the previous UN resolutions. France and Russia challenged the legality of the US led war on

Iraq. Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary General expressed doubt on the attack being in accordance with the UN Charter. It appears that after the end of the cold war, the UN had become the handmaiden of the sole superpower. It had lost whatever little independence and capability it had to assert itself as the international body deciding about matters of war and peace. French opposition to the US led Iraq war, according to one Saudi analyst had a “strategic” motivation. He argued that France was striving to subvert the US strategy to marginalise the European role in different regions including Africa, Eastern

Europe and the Middle East. (31) An Egyptian analyst opined that the French opposition to the American invasion of Iraq could be marking the start of a European “counter- project” against the grand post cold war American global project. He saw Europe moving beyond the realm of reaction to the sphere of action. (32) Since Germany, supported the

French stance this appeared to be a plausible analysis.

Another Arab analyst opined that France and Germany were averse to the Anglo-

American plans to invade Iraq basically because they wanted to protect their own interests in the region. However, they took care that their differences with Washington did not rise to pitch of hostility, where Franco-German opposition could be perceived as posing a threat to American interests. So when the US came to the decision to attack Iraq by circumventing the UN, Germany stopped its vociferous opposition and began to provide substantial logistic and military support to the US and the UK. He pointed out that this situation of opposition was only an aberration, for in the ultimate analysis, West

European and American policies on international issues such as those of Kashmir,

Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Iran hardly differ in the essentials. (33) He argued that there was no conflict on the issue between France and Germany on the one side and the US on the other side. The fact is that these two European countries had backed the American resolve to invade Iraq more than the other American allies. (34) He said that he had reached this conclusion after the US formally ended the war in Iraq on April 9, 2003. The scholar contends that by posing to oppose the invasion, France and Germany had prevailed upon Saddam Hussain to agree to the unconditional inspection of all weapons sites of Iraq. The Iraqi government therefore, thought that the Europeans would persuade the US not to attack Iraq if it fully complied with the UN resolution. The scholar pointed out that Tareq Aziz, the Iraqi deputy Prime Minister told his American captors that owing to assurances by European countries, Saddam Hussein until the last minute was under the delusion that there would be no invasion. As a result, the inspectors were allowed to roam freely in the country, taking photographs of the various presidential palaces. He even permitted American and French reconnaissance planes to fly over Iraq, enabling them to survey the country without any hindrance. Being fully reassured that the country possessed no WMD that could be used to make a sneak attack on their troops, the

Americans and the British fearlessly proceeded with the invasion. To uphold his argument the scholar pointed out that when the attack was launched, France and Germany made no moves to call for a Security Council meeting to debate the unauthorized invasion of a UN member state, neither did they call for an emergency meeting of the

General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” to take a vote for condemning the illegal invasion. (35)

These arguments are weighty indicating a deep conspiracy, but it is generally thought that after 9/11, while the US got the unequivocal support of its European partners for the US- led military operation to remove the Taliban government and destroy the al-Qaeda network, when the US appeared bent upon unilaterally extending its war on terror to Iraq, it resulted in the rift in US-Europe relations. Europe was understandably worried about the imminent attack on Iraq because it is close to the Middle East and North Africa, and has a sizeable immigrant population of Muslims. Its feeling of vulnerability was quite natural. Such a war could be expected to spread instability in the region, European statesmen apparently made a special effort to avoid conveying the impression that the

War on Terror was a civilizational clash between the Muslim world and the West.

For the reasons stated above the European were now quite disturbed by the Bush administration’s broadened agenda for the War on Terror, whose features had begun to emerge more clearly over the months. It was also quite apparent that while North Korea had been threatened for possessing of WMD, the US was not going to attack that maverick state for it would be like touching a hornet’s nest. The People’s Republic of

China would not have countenanced such a move and a broader war would have broken out in the region. The US therefore did not translate its verbal bellicosity into action in the case of North Korea. Besides, the latter possessed no oil, in which the West would be interested. The digression apart, the most important aspect of this American agenda in the

European perception appeared to be Washington’s determination to mould the world in accordance with its perceived national interests. To achieve its objective, it was ready to use any means. Thus, any country or international organizations which came in its way would be pushed aside. The US was not worried at all, if in the process the reliability and prestige of the collective international mechanisms for security such as the UN was damaged, even though it had taken the lead in establishing the organization after the end of the second world war. Likewise, it was not bothered if by its actions the post-war alliances came under strain. All it wanted was the promotion of American national interests. Thus, the annoyance of its European partners was very natural.

In the words of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, who spoke at the

Non-Aligned summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003 “The war against Iraq is no longer just a war against terrorism. It is, in fact, a war to dominate the world”.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Balkans region, initially the US did not play an active role in the Yugoslav crises, for its attention was focused on the Gulf region. No doubt it wanted Eastern and Central

Europe to move towards stability, but that was all. There were no major American interests at stake in this European backyard. However, extending recognition to the breakaway republics such as Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a major policy reversal, for previously Washington had emphasized that Yugoslavia should remain unified. Though Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been firm about wanting independence from Belgrade, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, was quite determined to keep the federation intact by force. After brief wars with Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia had successfully seceded. The US Department of Defence had been against deploying US forces in the war zone and its contention was that a vast numbers of troops would be required to conduct effective peace enforcement. During his election campaign

Clinton had criticized Bush Sr. for failure to protect human rights in the Balkans, but after he himself took over the reins of power he avoided pursuing a stronger policy even though the mayhem increased and the world watched with horror the ethnic cleansing that was being perpetrated with impunity, especially by the Serbs. Many Europeans saw a contradiction in Washington’s claim that it was maintaining the moral high ground while it was refusing to contribute troops to the UN forces that were supervising the distribution of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993, the US rejected the EU- supported Vance-Owen peace plan for ending the fighting. The Clinton Administration contended that accepting the plan would have meant accepting a re-tracing of the state borders done through sheer force. Transatlantic relations came under severe strain during

1993-5, mainly because of the US attitude as reflected in the actions mentioned above.

The US later, had no choice but to play a decisive role in resolving the bloody conflict in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international pressure to do so was immense, for the media was projecting fully the atrocities perpetrated on the Muslims. Also Clinton wanted to win the upcoming elections. All peace talks had failed and it was the Dayton agreement signed by all the involved parties under the supervision of the US that a ceasefire took place and a working arrangement for the warring parties’ coexistence was implemented.

It was quite evident that no one in the international community could withstand arm twisting by the US.

Earlier, the decisions by the US and the European countries to lift the arms embargo on the victims---the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the secret supply of arms to the

Bosnians through third parties had brought immense pressure to bear on the Bosnian

Serbs and their backer the Serbian government. If all these steps had been taken earlier, most likely thousands of lives would have been saved.

The conflict in the Balkans was a great challenge that the EU was confronted with after the cold war ended. The EU expressed eagerness to play a decisive role in this conflict for it was in Europe, and therefore for the incipient ‘European Union’ to tackle. Thus,

Luxemburg’s foreign minister, Jacques Poos stated boldly and quite prematurely that the hour of Europe had dawned. The instruments that EU made use of to resolve this conflict were arbitration, inspection, diplomatic recognition or withholding of recognition of the warring parties, economic sanctions and incentives.

It took more diplomatic initiatives during the joint UN-EU sponsored London conference in August 1992 that led to Geneva talks ending in January 1993. It was here that Lord

Owen the EU appointee and Cyrus Vance the UN representative produced a comprehensive EU-UN peace plan for Bosnia. However, these efforts proved to be fruitless owing to the recalcitrance of the warring parties and lack of American support for the plan. That the newly established CFSP had failed to tackle the Yugoslav war became more glaringly evident when in April 1994, the Contact Group comprising

Britain, France Germany, Russia and the US was formed. The EU as an entity was not included; rather it was the three big powers that were made part of it. This was a setback to the EU’s prestige, which now became just a facilitator of the US offensive to restore peace in this region. The EU was not in a position to either take or threaten to take military action, although individual member states did send troops under UN auspices for protecting the so-called safe areas for the victims of atrocities. Though the principles it proclaimed with regard to the conflict could not be questioned, the EU was held back by deep divisions among its member states. Two of its important member states---France and Britain kept insisting on “sustained negotiations” and wanted to shun the use of force which was absolutely essential to convince the belligerents, particularly the aggressors to fulfill their commitment with regard to the peace agreements. They participated in military operations only after the US made the decision to do so and persuaded the EU member states to join in. Evidently, it was lack of consensus and harmony that resulted in inaction. Their perceptions about the parties to the conflict and an absence of structural coordination in military terms hampered EU actions. Some member states were bent upon keeping Yugoslavia intact, whatever the costs, others knew that dismemberment was inevitable and the rest felt that they should stay away from the messy situation.

The end result of these differences was that the EU literally handed over the initiative to the US. It was now confirmed that the US was indispensable in political and security matters relating to Europe.

The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

During the cold war there was harmony in the interests of West Europe and the US on matters relating to the Middle East. Both were keen to keep their access to the regions’ oil resources and continue trade and also to minimize the involvement of Soviet Union in the politics of the region. Above all both wanted to protect Israel. However, differences arose when the Arabs resorted to oil diplomacy in 1973. Europe’s pronounced tilt towards the Arab stance showed how concerned Europe was about preserving its own vital economic interests. The physical closeness of the Middle East to Europe justified

Europe’s fears that a conflict-ridden and unstable region too close to it for comfort was a genuine threat to its own security.

Europe had already gone through the experience of terrorism. Terrorist attacks had been carried out by Palestinian militants to target Israelis, but these took place on European soil. Thus, in 1973 and again in 1977, the European Community issued declarations and statements unanimously calling for a negotiated and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. They acknowledged that the

Palestinian people had an identity of their own and a right to have their own homeland.

But these were just declaration; there were hardly any plans for resolving the conflict.

The Venice Declaration in 1980 went beyond what the EU had been saying earlier. The

Community dropped any remaining vagueness in its position on the conflict. The US and

Israel, were not pleased by this Community move. At the same time the Community lacked the capabilities for acting as a potent mediator. The Community’s policy was mostly reflected in statements and declarations and its diplomacy limited to sending fact finding tours of the crisis-ridden region.

The end of the cold war ushered in American domination of the region’s politics. The

Soviet Union, which used to balance out the West’s tilt towards Israel by its backing of the Arabs, first became a toothless giant and later disintegrated. Thus, there was no one to challenge the one sided approach of the US on the Middle East conflict. The Arabs were interested in Europe adopting a more active role in the Middle East conflict and the peace process to counter the US supremacy. The policy makers in the EU however, are wary of adopting a role that competes with or challenges that of the US. So the EU role in the peace process has been a supportive one, or seen in a more uncharitable light just an extension of the American one. The overriding concern of the EU is not to ruffle feathers in Washington, which is the most important and indispensable European ally. With its history of mistreatment of Jews, which can be traced back to hundreds of years, the

Europeans have, since the end of the second world war, become very careful about hurting the Jewish state’s sensitivities. Europeans are very afraid of being accused of anti-Semitism. At the same time, Europe wants to preserve whatever role it has in the peace process. While there are some differences in approach and on a few basic issues, there is undoubtedly a strong link between the American and the EU roles in the region.

At various time, Washington has impressed upon the European Union that it must not think of playing an independent role in the region. European policy makers have most of the time obediently accepted this American injunction and been content to play a complementary role. They know that their policies would be rendered ineffective if these were in collision with the policies of the sole superpower. At the Madrid Peace

Conference held in 1991, the EU was invited to the conference as an observer, while in the Oslo Peace Accord it was totally marginalized for non-EU Norway brokered the initial accord. Later, when the Americans took over, the EU slid into the role of financial backer. After the Declaration of Principles was signed the EU wanted to become a coordinator and the manager of assistance to the newly formed Palestinian Authority. The EU had offered to handle the matter through a sub-committee within the Regional

Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). However, the US to curb the EU’s role, called a donors’ conference and made the World Bank the coordinator. There was no doubt that the EU was being sidelined in the matter, and it was done to minimize

European influence in the Arab world. The position would have given them political leverage and this did not appeal to the Americans. Thus, from the mid-nineties onwards the EU seemed to have docilely accepted the fact that it was the US which was and would, in the foreseeable future, remain the real power broker in the region. The Union thus, concentrated its energies to the fields of conflict prevention and promotion of

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The more crucial arena of conflict resolution was left to the Americans.

Another hurdle in the EU playing a proactive role in the resolution of the conflict is the mistrust Israel has for the Europeans, despite close economic, political and trade links.

Israel gets the most advantages from being the especial; protégé of the US and wants to maintain this relationship; Tel Aviv would not like to spoil this for the sake of giving more leverage to Europe in the mediation and negotiations process.

In the Quartet framework formulated by the US, the EU was given an opportunity to play a more prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process, and it did make use of it. It used its diplomatic and financial instruments, such as the European Council Declaration of

December 8, 2009 in which it stressed upon the need to adopt a two-state solution for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document emphasized that the EU would withhold recognition if any changes were made in the pre 1967-borders in the area, including the Holy city of Jerusalem. The EU heads of state and government in this declaration also stated that the settlements of Israelis in Palestinian areas, the separation barrier erected by Israel in the West Bank avowedly for securing the lives of Israelis against attacks by Palestinian terrorists, the demolition of houses and the evictions of

Palestinians for building new settlements were all illegal acts under international law. All this was supported by the Quartet and this was perceived as the success of the EU policy.

The Declaration it was felt could contribute in a positive manner to the Quartet agenda.

Similarly, President Obama’s speech of May 2011 in which he endorsed the idea of a future Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders, was a major departure from the decades-old American policy. It was seen as the EU’s success in procuring acceptance for its ideas and even influencing the sole super power. Unlike the US, the EU since the past several years has extended support to the idea of creating a Palestinian state based on

June 4, 1967 borders.

However, in the Quartet as in other fora the US continues to play the dominant role and the EU’s position remains a supportive one.

Since the launch of the EPC and until the signing of the Lisbon treaty, EU member states have been striving to remove hurdles from the EU decision making process with regard to CFSP. The objective is to enable the EU to speak with a single voice on the international stage, but unfortunately concrete success has eluded it.

A crucial apparently unsolvable problem in this regard is lack of consensus among its member states on the issues involved in the Arab- Israeli conflict and this is apparently owing to different, often clashing national interests which hinder the formulation of an effective and consistent EU policy on the Middle East. Some member states such as

Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK owing to reasons that go back into recent or distant history have greater sympathy with Israel, while others such as France,

Ireland, Italy and Greece have a soft corner for the Arabs. Europe as stated earlier is very cautious about avoiding any statement or action that would appear anti-Semitic, Germany in particular owing to memories of the holocaust has to be very alert to Jewish and Israeli sensitivities. Thus, Berlin prefers either to abstain from voting on UN resolutions which condemn Israel or votes against such resolutions.

From the above survey we can safely deduce that to develop a common European approach on the Middle East conflict is not easy for the European Union. With the eastward enlargement of the EU, matters have become more complex, because the focus of the Central and East European member-states in the area of Common Foreign and

Security Policy is more on issues related to the Russian Federation’s peccadilloes in its former empire. The EU’s diplomatic role has therefore remained limited though its economic importance has increased.

When the rejectionist Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, the EU alongside the

US and Israel, pressured it to accept the existing peace agreements, Israel’s right to exist and to renounce violence if it wanted be recognized as the legitimate government of the

Palestinian territories. The EU’s avowed adherence to democratic norms and the principle of legitimacy were set aside, when Hamas refused to bow to pressure and aid to the

Hamas-led Palestinian Authority was stopped, though humanitarian assistance to the

West Bank and Gaza was continued through the channel of non-governmental organizations. Later, the EU faithfully followed the US line. It refused to endorse the

Saudi brokered agreement between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca in February 2007 and gave support to the Fatah leader and Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas‘s decision to form “an emergency government”. This government lacked any legal base. The objective of this move was to completely isolate Hamas. Analysts are of the view that by boycotting and isolating Hamas, the EU contributed to widening the internal Palestinian rift. The EU ignored the fact that it was unfairly ignoring an important political and social force, which Hamas had become over the past several years. This negative attitude provided the Islamist organization the incentive to become rmore radicalized. Stopping all communication with the opposing side is never a very good diplomatic move. The EU only lessened its own capacity to use whatever leverage and influence it wielded in the occupied territories.

The European Community, for several decades lacked the required capabilities for playing an effective role in resolving the Middle East conflict. However, the Treaty on

European Union (TEU), implemented in 1993, allowed the EU to develop its military dimension under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It was thus, able to carry out such crisis management missions as the civilian police mission in the

Palestinian Authority and the border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing between

Gaza and Egypt, but it still lacks strong military muscle for carrying out serious military operations. Individual EU member states such as France and the UK of course possess the capabilities for such tasks. At the time of military intervention to remove the Qaddafi regime in Libya, the EU remained disengaged owing to internal divisions on the moral and legal aspects of the use of force in third countries. At the defence related summit held in December 2013, the differences in thinking were quite apparent. The then 27 member states became divided into three groups. There were those who were willing to use force abroad, and those who were convinced that the EU should limit itself to its territorial defence. Lastly there were those who enjoyed the limelight, but were not ready to do much practically.

It must be noted that since the second world war, the US has played an important and steadily increasing role in Middle East. Initially, the motivation was the oil resources of the region, containing the Soviet influence and the spread of communism and, over time, its close relationship with Israel. American involvement in the region increased after the

9/11 events on the pretext that the region was spawning terrorism and building secret arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

A consistent aspect of US policy in the Middle East is that it has unhesitatingly favoured

Israel over the Palestinians. It is only on very rare occasions that it exerts pressure on the

Jewish state. Washington, by and far has been very indulgent towards Israel in the matter of it building illegal settlements, the so-called security wall and road blocks in the West

Bank. Although President Bill Clinton and George Bush Jr. endorsed the idea of the creation of a viable Palestinian state, they did not dare to use American diplomatic and financial pressure to make the idea a reality. The truth is that no US president to date has been brave enough to do justice in this regards; it also cannot be expected to happen in the near future. Robert Malley, Special Assistant to President Clinton on Arab-Israeli

Affairs, who was also a member of the US team at the Camp David summit, highlighted the complicated and often incongruous roles that Washington played at the 2000 Camp

David summit. It was at the same time the broker of the “peace deal”; the sponsor and supervisor of the peace process; Israel’s main strategic ally; and its political partner. A neutral observer inevitably arrives at the conclusion that Clinton’s commitment to Israel was so strong and obvious that his credibility as an honest broker was questionable.(36)

This was most likely the single most important factor that contributed to the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations.

Undoubtedly, it is Washington’s inability to take any genuine measures to halt the construction of more Israeli settlements in the occupied territories; to stop Israel from prevaricating in the implementation of redeployments called for in the Oslo Agreements, it’s evident insensitivity regarding the cruel practices of Israeli occupation authorities; and its withdrawal of support for several UN resolutions that had provided international legal support to the dispossessed Palestinians, which have together contributed to the continuing impasse in the region. The US did not think twice before vetoing a proposed

UN Security Council resolution that would have set up a UN observer force to protect the

Palestinians in the occupied territories. To endorse the resolution the US insisted on four conditions: i)no mention would be made of Israeli settlements; ii) the word “siege” would not be used to describe what Israel was doing in the occupied territories; iii) the world would not be reminded of the existence of the Fourth Geneva Convention that regulated an occupying power’s behaviour towards the civilian population in an occupied region; iv) mention of the land-for-peace principle embodied in UN Resolution 242 would be avoided. These four US conditions were revealed in a scholarly work which highlighted the Bush administration’s open bias toward Israel and its basic reluctance to get involved in any serious mediation efforts to resolve the conflict. The Obama administration which had expressed determination to revive the peace talks that began at the Annapolis conference in 2007 but had come to an abrupt stop when Israel attacked

Gaza in 2008, desisted from putting pressure on Tel Aviv to halt the construction of

Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Furthermore, despite the American President’s endorsement in May 2011, of the idea of a future Palestinian state within borders as they were before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, he now threatened to apply veto against the Palestinian President’s application for full UN member state status to the

Security Council in September 2011. This move by the Palestinian government was seen as a reaction to the growing sense of hopelessness among the Palestinians over the stalled peace talks and the stubbornness of Israel in continuing the building of settlements despite international pressure. Israel continued to be recalcitrant in the face of the approaching expiry of the deadline set by Obama in his address to the General Assembly session in September 2010.

Vehement political and media debates on Israel’s policies in the West Bank are continuing, but owing to powerful political, economic and religious lobbies in the US, the actions of the Israeli government are hardly ever questioned or condemned. The US media is either intimidated or influenced by the lobbyists of Israel, and the fact is that the majority of the American people are unaware of the atrocities perpetrated by Israel in the occupied territories. Those who are aware prefer not to speak out. (37)

The Palestinian perspective is given little or no space in the media or mainstream scholarly circles. This naturally impacts on policymaking in Washington. There is not much understanding in the US of the woes of the Palestinians or their just demands. The image prevalent in the US of the Palestinians as being solely motivated by hatred of

Israel and the Jews rather than by genuine grievances is not new. Though, several years have passed since Palestinians gained acceptance in international circles as legitimate participants in the peace process, the negative image of them as terrorists and a threat to peace still dominate the perceptions about them in the West. (38)

The persistent American support for Israel and the latter’s continuing occupation of

Palestinian lands has naturally increased anti-American sentiments throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, and this situation has only increased the threat from international terrorism. It has also made it more difficult for Washington to tackle other issues, such as

Iran’s nuclear programme. Arab leaders who would have perhaps sided with the US are hesitant to offer it overt support owing to the unpopularity of the US in the region. In the wake of the so-called ‘Arab spring’, however, some of the reluctance of the conservative

Arab monarchies with regard to removal of their rivals in the Arab world has apparently diminished. This can be gleaned from the events in recent years in Libya and Syria.

South Asia

The geo-strategic importance of South Asia cannot be doubted. Furthermore, the presence of nuclear weapons and the persistent conflicts between the countries in the region especially over borders, combined with domestic issues with international implications such as religious extremism (of the Islamic and Hindu variety) terrorism, separatism, illiteracy and abject poverty have turned this region into a powder keg. The most stubborn and prolonged dispute over Jammu and Kashmir between the two nuclear power states---India and Pakistan ever since their independence poses a great danger to peace in the region. Muslim frustration and anger that has given rise to militancy in the last two decades has also been directed towards India, which has stubbornly held on to

Jammu and Kashmir against the will of the large Muslim majority since 1947. Kashmir is one of the oldest issues on the international agenda of conflict resolution that has defied a solution. The fact is that the international community since the past four decades or so seems to have forgotten this dangerous issue, though it has brought the two nuclear powers to the brink of war on more than one or two occasions.

Although in the initial years after the creation of Pakistan and India as independent states the US took interest in trying resolve this issue but over the decades and with the changing international situation, the US left this issue for both countries to resolve as best as they could. Both India and Pakistan have their own contentions on this issue. India, except for the initial years when it accepted Kashmir as a disputed territory, has claimed it as an essential part of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s stand on Jammu and Kashmir is based on the UN Security Council Resolutions, which envisaged that a final decision about the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be made in accordance with the aspirations of the people of the valley. In the early years, Pakistan had considerable support for its stand on the issue, which dwindled with time, because countries took care not to take sides, annoying one side or another. India has mostly rejected third party mediation to resolve the conflict. This stands true of even offers by Western powers to facilitate talks.

As the cold war intensified, in the fifties and sixties the US concentrated all its efforts towards the containment of communism. The US involvement in Asia was focused on the

Pacific Rim countries, most prominent of whom were China, Japan and the Philippines.

American interest in South Asia, South East Asia and the Far East was in the context of the containment of communism. Owing to the proximity of Kashmir to China and the

Soviet Union, two of the most important rivals of the US in the cold war, the territory had assumed an increased strategic and political value for Washington.

Regarding matters related to Kashmir at the UN and elsewhere, American and British diplomats worked together closely. Washington understood that Britain as the former imperial power and leader of the Commonwealth was much more familiar than itself with the South Asian region.

The early US diplomatic efforts on Kashmir were eclipsed by the Eisenhower administration’s decision to make Pakistan the pivot of the anti-communist alliances in

Asia. Pakistan eagerly took a role, not because it had any serious apprehensions about the spread of communism in the Middle East or South Asia but mainly to reinforce the country’s defences against the threat from India. By entering the American sponsored military alliances it also gained political and economic support from the superpower.

Pakistan’s membership of SEATO and CENTO made it a close ally of the US in Asia.

India, which professed non-alignment was resentful of Pakistan’s adherence to these pacts and was also incensed with the US for drawing Pakistan into them. A major concern for India was the American military assistance to Pakistan, which was seen as compromising the neutrality of the subcontinent and destroying Prime Minister Nehru’s efforts to form a grouping of countries not aligned to either of the rival blocs in the cold war.

Irritated by the US-Pakistan alignment, the Nehru government sought friendship with

Moscow which it thought could become a balancing force in the region. There was an impact on the Kashmir issue owing to this change of equation in the region. Moscow stated that the people of Kashmir had already taken the decision to join the Indian Union.

(39) Moscow’s support on the Kashmir issue was warmly welcomed by New Delhi and it made no efforts to stop Soviet leaders’ invectives against the US during visits to India.

US-Pakistan relations began to sour when the US started to supply arms to India to bolster it against the Chinese threat. All the Western countries went out of the way to support India during and after the Sino-Indian war in 1962. As a reaction Pakistan came closer to China and this development in turn was resented by the US. While New Delhi gladly accepted Western support during the Sino-Indian showdown, particularly arms supplies, Prime Minister Nehru still expressed no interest in becoming part of the US-led alliances to contain communism in Southeast Asia. Thus, Indo-US relations remained within limited parameters.

One reason why the US avoided involvement in the Kashmir issue was that it was getting more and more enmeshed in fighting communism in Indo-China. A grey area in US-Pakistan relations was the matters of the usage of the arms supplied by the US. While

Pakistan thought it had the right to use these arms against India, Washington interpreted it differently---these were to be used only in the context of the containment of communism. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war Pakistan as well as India used arms supplied by the US, against each other.

Pakistan was particularly chastised for this. It is noteworthy that the US attitude during the Indo-Pakistan war was overtly hostile towards Pakistan. Since the US had distanced itself from the Kashmir dispute, the Soviet Union filled the vacuum by brokering a ceasefire and the Tashkent agreement between the protagonists.

The US had suspended arms deliveries to both countries, but this move was more detrimental to Pakistan’s interests than India’s. Pakistan was deeply hurt that though it was an ally of the US, the latter had abandoned it in the hour of need.

The Simla agreement signed by Pakistan and India after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, has effectively removed the Kashmir issue from the international agenda of conflict resolution. The two protagonists, it is said, had agreed at Simla, to resolve all their disputes including the Kashmir issue through bilateral negotiations. The US had welcomed the Simla agreement.

An important development was the first Indian nuclear test in May 1974 in Rajasthan, which further impacted on the course of the Kashmir issue. Following India’s de facto entry into the exclusive nuclear club, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the

Veteran Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah signed the “Kashmir Accord” in February

1975 that reaffirmed the accession of the state to India. Pakistan rightly perceived this accord as a shameful endeavor to deprive the Kashmir people of their right of self- determination.

Indo-Pakistan relations further deteriorated when the uprising or ‘intifada’ began in

Kashmir in the aftermath of the rigged election held in the valley in 1987. It is apparent that the Kashmiri freedom fighters drew inspiration from international developments. The

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 confirmed them in their belief that Indian occupation of their land could be ended by intrepid action. There was a similar impact of the decomposition of the USSR and the Yugoslav federation and the emergence of independent Muslims republics in Central Asia. The wish to get rid of the Indian occupiers now became an overriding wish of the Kashmiri people. The Indian government at the central and local level handled the situation in a brutal manner.

Very little attention was paid by the US to the Kashmiri struggle, which at that time was preoccupied with efforts to eject the Soviets from Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan in fact had entered the crucial and final phase. During the early 1990s the US was engaged in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, though Kashmir was in turmoil and the situation could have turned into a bigger and more dangerous Indo-Pakistan conflagration.

The successive administrations of Bush Sr. and Clinton were nevertheless worried about the South Asian nuclear issue and tried to discourage the two countries from manufacturing nuclear weapons. The US was more apprehensive about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, for it was a Muslim country with a standing in the Muslim world.

The government decided to suspend economic and military-related assistance to

Islamabad in October 1990.

As the situation in Kashmir further deteriorated, India and Pakistan exchanged vitriolic allegations, and relations further deteriorated. India alleged that Pakistan was stirring up the “rebellion” and encouraging violence and terrorism and claimed that Islamabad was providing money, training and arms to the militants. Pakistan refuted these accusations and contended that the Indians were actually trying to divert the attentions of the international community from its atrocities in the valley. It demanded that India should hold a plebiscite (according to UN resolutions) to determine the future of the territory.

When Indian foreign secretary S.K Singh paid an official visit to Washington in January

1990, he acknowledged in meetings with State Department officials that the uprising was basically home grown. This statement was soon refuted by the Indian government.(40)

The State Department in early 1990, cancelled the visa of Amanullah Khan, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which Washington had declared a terrorist organization. Some US Congress members even wanted the matter to go further, they held that Pakistan should be included on the list of states that sponsored terrorism and deserved severe sanctions. This did not happen; instead Pakistan was placed on the

“watch list” for terrorism. (41)

There was a shift in the US stand when at the UN General Assembly session of

September1993, President Clinton referred to dangerous ethnic conflicts “from Caucasus to Kashmir”.

The following month Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs stated that the US did not accept the Instrument of Accession that showed the Jammu and

Kashmir valley as an integral part of the Indian union. (42) This shift in Washington’s stance on Kashmir forced the Indian government to begin bilateral negotiations to diffuse the crisis. Thus Indo-Pakistan negotiations began at the Foreign Secretaries level in

January 1994 but these did not yield any positive results.

In March 1994 in an effort to draw the attention of the international community to the violations of the human rights of the people of the occupied territory, the then Pakistani

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto submitted a draft resolution to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) and asked the UN institution to send a fact finding mission to the territory. This resolution was strongly opposed by India.

On the request of China, Iran and several other Muslims countries, Pakistan withdrew the draft. The US had conveyed to Pakistan during the debate on the resolution that it would abstain if the resolution were presented for a vote.

India’s five nuclear implosions in Rajasthan in May 1998 altered the balance of power in

South Asia. There was a sharp reaction to this event from the international community and the US imposed sanctions on India. President Clinton and the European heads of state and government urged Pakistan to show restraint and to refrain from nuclear testing.

A high level team from Washington led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott arrived in Islamabad four days after India’s tests and made a vague offer to Pakistan of economic and military assistance in return for not conducting tests. However, security policy makers in Islamabad were not comforted by the US security assurances owing to its past record of casting aside Pakistan in its hour of need. This had happened in 1965 and 1971. Robert Oakley, the former US ambassador to Pakistan in 1990 said in an interview that Pakistan had been deprived of American military and economic assistance through the Pressler Amendment because of its nuclear programme. On the other hand, he pointed out, sanctions were not imposed on India when it conducted nuclear tests in

1974. These sanctions had badly weakened Pakistan’s military capabilities; besides undermining its confidence in Washington. While Indian military capabilities were strengthening, Pakistan had nobody to rely on. The only alternative it had, was to acquire missiles and nuclear capability. (43)

Pakistan had expected that the G8 would take tough action against India, but it was in for a shock. Instead of imposing any kind of punitive measures, G8 member states clarified that India could not be punished, for given their economic and trade ties with it, their economic interests would be jeopardized. It was natural that there was great resentment in

Pakistan against this injustice. It was contended that if the advanced countries gave preference to safeguarding their economic interests over the high moral ground then

Pakistan also reserved the right to prioritize its security interests.

After the South Asian nuclear tests the Clinton administration began a diplomatic campaign in international fora, calling upon the international community and encouraging it to “find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes” of conflicts including that on Kashmir. There was appreciation in Islamabad of this revival of international interest, particularly the United States’ in a settlement of the Kashmir issue.

Quite predictably, India responded negatively to this development. It is quite apparent that the US and other Western powers, including the EU and its member states refrain from arm-twisting of countries with whom they have strong economic ties, or with those who are strong and stable and at the same time possess some important natural resource such as oil, which is essential for the West’s economic survival. Countries such as Libya and Iraq which had energy resources, but were vulnerable and friendless otherwise met with a sad fate, because the arbiters of international affairs so willed it.

The tension which started between two neighbours after their nuclear explosions led to the outbreak of the Kargil conflict in May 1999. They were on the brink of an all-out war, which would be very dangerous because of the nuclear dimension.

Pakistan refuted any involvement and contended that the Kargil heights had been taken over by the Kashmiri Mujahideen. As regards the Indian stand on the Line of Control

(LoC), Pakistan argued that LoC was a temporary provision awaiting the final settlement of the Kashmir issue. The Kargil conflict therefore could not be seen in isolation from the

Kashmir issue nor could it be delinked from the previous attempts by India to alter the

LoC by military means. There had been repeated violation of the LoC, first in 1972 in the

Chorbatla area, followed by Siachen in 1984, Qamar Sector in 1988 and Neelum valley in

1994. Besides occupying Siachen, India, since 1972 has wrested 50 square miles in Azad

Kashmir by violating the LoC. (44)

Deeply concerned about the dangerous situation in the sub-continent, Clinton sent Gen.

Anthony Zinni, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, to Islamabad in June 1999. In his high level meetings in Islamabad, he pressured the government to end the conflict in Kargil. Pakistan thus came under immense international pressure to end fighting and to resume their talks with India in the spirit of Lahore Declaration, which had been signed by the prime ministers of the two countries only a few months before the outbreak of the Kargil conflict.

On his trip to South Asia in 2000 President Clinton impressed upon the leaders of both countries to honour their commitment to respect the line of control, show restraint in their behavior towards each other, reject violence, and restore their dialogue.

Clinton during his trip to the sub-continent, stated in clear terms, his administration’s policy on Kashmir. Washington expected Pakistan and India to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations; the US would not be a mediator in the dispute on Kashmir.

The terrorist attack in the US on September 11, 2001, worsened Indo-Pakistan relations.

India, it appears was determined to exploit the difficult situation in which Pakistan found itself in the aftermath of this event.

There were direct consequences for Pakistan of 9/11 not only with regard to its border with Afghanistan in the west but also in the context of its conflict with India. There was also a revival of US-Pakistan military and economic ties, for Washington required Pakistan’s support for its military campaign to wipe out the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in

Afghanistan. At this critical juncture terrorist attacks in India took place in 2001-2002.

India at once blamed Pakistan for these attacks, to embarrass and discredit it in the eyes of the US and the international community. It appeared that the situation would lead to a military showdown between the two countries. George Bush Jr. condemned these attacks and pressed the two countries to “stand down” in Kashmir. High level officials shuttled between Islamabad and New Delhi to defuse the crisis. In this regard Deputy Secretary

Armitage paid several visit to the sub-continent in 2002.

This diplomacy bore fruit for he was able to persuade the two sides to climb down from their confrontational positions. India had been particularly bellicose in the situation.

Secretary of State Colin Powell during his visit to South Asia signaled his willingness to facilitate the start of negotiations. However, he reiterated that the Kashmir dispute had to be resolved by the two countries themselves, keeping in view the will of the Kashmiri people.

India has a vital strategic position between Western Asia and Southeast Asia and it is now included among the important economic powers that have emerged on the international scene in recent years. It is part of BRICS the brief term for the group of emerging economic giants comprising Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and

South Africa. This is a great distinction for a country which is still struggling with poverty and development issues. This distinction has given it an influential place in global politics. The US policy in Asia like India’s is China-centric. The US and India are two of the biggest democracies, sharing economic interests and with common strategic perceptions in Asia. The common threat for both is the People’s Republic of China, which has emerged in recent decades as an economic and military giant.

In view of this commonality of interests the United States and India signed a 10-year

Defence Pact in Washington D.C on June 28, 2005. The objectives were to boost defence and military ties between the two countries.

Like Bush, the new US President Barrack Obama was convinced that India was a rising global power whose friendship had to be secured for the United States. Thus the manner in which Obama dealt with the Kashmir issue during his visit to India in 2010 made it apparent that his administration would follow in the footsteps of its predecessors with regard to the resolution of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Its involvement would extend only to a point acceptable to the Indian government. It would not allow the Kashmir issue to pose a hindrance in the future progress of Indo-US relations, which were held in such high esteem by Washington.

The US government’s stand on Kashmir in the fifties and sixties was that it was a disputed territory. It was neither an integral part of India nor Pakistan. But in more recent decades it seems to have distanced itself from this position and does not want to be seen as supporting the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris. Perhaps this is because the

West does not want to encourage disturbance of the status quo around the world, unless, it goes in favour of their strategic or economic interests. Thus, the US has avoided playing the role of mediator in this dispute and insists that both countries resolve this conflict through bilateral talks. The US has, an occasion offered to adopt the role of a facilitator in negotiations, but only if both parties agree to it. Of course, it goes against

India’s interests to agree to US involvement, for then it would have to make some concessions.

The EU’s stand on the unresolved Kashmir issue is similar. It too, recommends that India and Pakistan resolve their dispute on a bilateral level in accordance with the Simla

Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. On the occasion of the visit to the Valley in May

2011 of a five-member European Union delegation, which went there for information gathering on the EU’s behalf, the delegation ruled out a role for the Union in the resolution of the Kashmir issue. The members of the delegation declared that the matter had to be resolved by the "people living in the region". (45)

The EU could not or does not want to develop a coherent, proactive and unified common approach on the Kashmir dispute. It has done somewhat better in the Middle East. Of course the Middle East is of much more importance to it. However, it adopted the mechanism of regular political dialogue with India and Pakistan through its troika. The focus of its policy has been on crisis management instead of conflict resolution. India has been reluctant to allow the EU to peer into the facts on ground in Kashmir through its annual “fact finding missions”, for it considers these as interference in its domestic affairs. The EU has, from time to time expressed apprehensions on the situation in

Kashmir, especially with regard to the human rights violation by Indian forces in the

Valley. It is concerned that there could be an Indo-Pakistan showdown because of

Kashmir, which could prove to be very danger in view of the presence of nuclear weapons. The EU has avoided exerting pressure on India to resolve the conflict and of course the main reason for this timorousness is that its member states want to avoid annoying India that has a big emerging market of more than a billion people. Another fact on the ground is that Kashmir does not possess vital energy resources such as oil that could draw EU attention. European countries are however; worried that if ever there is a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan it could turn into a major security threat to the world. Although Pakistan would more than welcome a mediatory role by the EU, the latter has stressed that it would only launch upon such a role if the request were made jointly by both countries.

The European Union has been in the habit of drawing the attention of the South Asian statesmen to the lessons they can learn from European history, particularly with regard to the Franco-German conflict which began in the 1870s and escalated during the Second

World War. This enmity, they say was abandoned in favour of close cooperation and integration under the aegis of the European Communities. But the Europeans tend to forget that after the second world war, not only were France and Germany determined to overcome their enmity, the superpower, the US was firmly behind them in their endeavour to establish a lasting peace on the continent. This feature is completely absent in the case of India and Pakistan. There is a pronounced bias of the West towards India. If

Pakistan’s genuine interests are trampled upon in this situation, this is its misfortune, which hardly concerns the powers that be.

This thesis has reviewed in depth the respective roles of the US and the EU in different regions and it has highlighted that both powers’ policies have differed from region to region and are mostly inspired by the dictates of their own interests. The research also reveals that the EU has still been unable to formulate a common foreign and security policy, supported by military muscle. The EU has, over the years, emerged as a civilian power, that plays a supportive role in the global system designed and dictated by the sole superpower. Unless, a multipolar system emerges this situation is most likely to continue, and even then the commonality of interests of Europe and the US will compel them to work in tandem.

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34.Ibid.

35.Ibid, 249-251.

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41. Ibid, 135.

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4) GUARDIAN WEEKLY ( London)

5) KHALEEJ TIMES (Dubai)

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46.http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/a-depressing-anniversary-

/71082.aspx.

47.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

48.http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic- information/decisionmaking/treaties/index.en.htm.