Volition in Prospective Memory Title: Volition in Prospective Memory: evidence against differences in recalling free and fixed delayed intentions Authors: Mikkel C. Vinding 1) Jonas Kristoffer Lindeløv 2,3) Yahui Xiao 4,5,6) Raymond C. K. Chan 4,5,6) Thomas Alrik Sørensen 2,3,4) Affiliations: 1) NatMEG, Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden 2) CNRU, CFIN, Health, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark. 3) Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark. 4) Sino-Danish Center for Education and Research, Aarhus, Denmark & Beijing, China. 5) Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. 6) Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. Contact information: Mikkel C. Vinding Department of Clinical Neuroscience Karolinska Institutet Nobels väg 9, D3 171 77 Stockholm Sweden Email:
[email protected] 1 Volition in Prospective Memory 1 Abstract 2 Human volition can be defined as the extent to which actions are generated by internal states or as a response 3 to externally dictated instructions. Whether actions are voluntary or not influence the cognitive process of 4 action generation and perception of action. The influence of volition on deciding actions at a later point in time 5 is a less explored dimension. A voluntary decision on future action requires that the intention must be stored in 6 the prospective memory until the intended action is performed. It is unknown if the distinction between freely 7 chosen actions and externally dictated actions has a cognitive relevance for delayed intentions.