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Spontaneous Hypnosis in the Ÿ Or En Sic Context Spontaneous Hypnosis in the ÿ or en sic Context John 0.Beahrs, MD "Hypnosis" denotes either specific phenomena (altered volition, perception, cog- nition, and recall) or interpersonal transactions that often elicit them. Basic research leads to paradox: hypnosis is validated, and shown to be dissociative in essence, at the same time that neither its phenomena nor transactions can be separated from those of everyday living without logical absurdity. This paradox can be resolved by assuming that consciousness and volition are complex, occurring simultaneously at many levels in the same waking individual. Hypnotic-like phenomena and transac- tions occur spontaneously, in either covert or overt forms. The former are pervasive, whereas the latter are often associated with psychological trauma. Forensic impli- cations are twofold: for criminal responsibility, and the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Hypnotic-like states and transactions are rarely affirmed as an insanity defense because at some level these subjects are aware of what they are doing and why. Diminished capacity and mitigation of sentence are more appropriate defense strategies. Several conflicted traditions of case law have evolved to protect eyewitness testimony from hypnotic-like distortions in cognition, perception, and memory that can occur either during or outside of formal hypnotic procedures. These include the admissibility of posthypnotic testimony, due process safeguards at eyewitness identification procedures, and the admissibility of expert testimony on the findings of eyewitness research. These areas are inseparable from one another and demand a systematic coordinated approach. The word "hypnosis" is used to denote nomena include a shift toward either certain unexplained phenomena, subjective nonvolition (a hand "just interpersonal transactions that often lifts"), altered perception that can in- elicit them, or a formal ritualistic pro- clude positive and negative hallucina- cedure. These are its phenomenal, trans- tions in any modality, a partially re- actional, and formal/procedural defini- gressed cognitive style often termed tions, respectively. The defining phe- adaptive regression, and memory changes that include amnesia, hyperm- nesia, and a variety of distortions such John 0. Beahrs is associate professor of psychiatry, The Oregon Health Sciences University and Portland VA as pseudomemories and enhanced con- Medical Center.Address reprint requests to John 0. fidenc~.'-~Hypnotic transactions in- Beahrs, M. D. Mental Health Clinic, I 16A-OPC Port- land VA Medical Center Portland, Oregon 97207 volve a relationship between two or Presented at Annual Scientific Meeting, American more individuals within a meaningful Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, San Francisco, California, October 23. 1988 context, such that communications The views presented in this paper are the author's own, from one are received by the other in a and do not represent those of the Veterans Administra- tion. way that leads to one or more of the Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1989 171 Spontaneous Hypnosis characteristic phenomena that we call versus voluntary action, and the gamut hypnoti~.~-~In its most restricted sense, of altered states of awareness. formal/procedural, "hypnosis" refers to This paradox arises from two parallel a deliberately structured setting in which traditions of hypnosis research whose a "hypnotist" agrees to hypnotize a will- findings appear to contradict one an- ing subject, implements a formal proce- ~ther.~'~'~The first, loosely termed "state dure to achieve specific goals, and know- theory," has shown that hypnosis in- ingly labels the process as "hypnosis." volves parallel processing of simultane- Phenomenal, transactional, and formal/ ously conscious elements. Using a real procedural elements of hypnosis overlap versus simulator design, Ornelo found to varying degrees but are sufficiently hypnosis to involve a type of "trance distinct in principle that any discussion logic" in which a subject tolerates con- of hypnosis must keep clear the sense in tradictory perceptions. Extending earlier which the word is used at that particular work of Janet, ' Hilgard's12 discovery of time. a "hidden observer," with more accurate perception of the hypnotic context, led The Paradox of Hypnosis to formulating a "neodissociation" the- Research ory. Watkins and Watkins13 elicited Pursuing definitions of hypnosis to multiple hidden observers in single sub- their logical conclusion, coupled with jects. basic research findings, leads to a fun- An important branch of "state" re- damental paradox elsewhere termed an search focuses on the effects of hypnosis "A/Not-A ~bsurdity,"~.7. whose reso- on perception and recall that can so lution is essential to understanding the directly impact eyewitness testimony implications of hypnosis research. First, (reviewed by Diamond, Orne, and hypnosis is defined in terms of clear other^'^-'^). In laboratory analogue stud- operational variables like subjective ies of hypnotically "refreshed" recall, nonvolition. Second, basic research at- new information is minimal, and mem- tempts to find what distinguishes hyp- ory gaps are filled in by confabulated nosis from what it is not. Data converge "pseudomemories." The process can al- toward either of two dominating conclu- ter the content of prehypnotic memory, sions: either all waking consciousness consolidate thought patterns, and im- can be viewed as "hypnotic," or what we part false subjective certitude; and the had already called "hypnosis" is insepa- new "perception" is generally consistent rable from the waking continuum; with the known facts of a case, all of hence, the word appears to lose meaning which make cross-examination difficult as denoting anything special. Yet, if we and can compromise justice. attempt to discard the term as "unpar- The second research tradition, "non- simonio~s,"~we are left with those pro- state" (skeptical, social-psychological), found subjective distinctions that led to shows that it is impossible to separate its use in the first place-involuntary hypnosis from the continuum of waking 172 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1989 Beahrs experience as a reliably separate ical importance to the law. The ever- "state. "9. I7 Barber" showed that maxi- present nonhypnotic component estab- mally nonhypnotic control variables like lishes criminal responsibility, and the voluntary task motivation and hypera- ever-present covert hypnotic elements lertness could yield hypnotic phenom- are of grave concern for the reliability of ena as reliably as a formal induction. eyewitness testimony. Other nonhypnotic control variables that yield hypnotic effects are imagina- Types of Spontaneous Hypnosis tion, relaxation. and role behavior-so Both hypnotic phenomena and hyp- pervasive that if they are called "hyp- notic transactions occur widely outside nosis" then all waking experience is hyp- a professional setting, or in structured notic. Extending this tradition, Spanos" settings whose overt purpose is not to reports that the form of hypnotic struc- achieve or utilize hypnosis per se. Such tures like hidden observers is inextrica- "spontaneous hypnosis" can be conven- bly dependent on the psychosocial con- iently categorized along two overlapping text in which the phenomena are elic- dimensions: first, whether or not it is ited: contextual effects dominate over overt, readily distinguished from the any that can be linked to "hypnosis" per overall waking continuum; and, second, se. whether phenomenal or transactional The paradox can be resolved by a new elements predominate. This leads to and initially uncomfortable type of four overlapping types of spontaneous causal reasoning.' This assumes that hypnosis: (1) overt phenomena or consciousness and volition are highly "states" of relative nonvolition and/or complex. The hypnosis-nonhypnosis altered perception, cognition, and recall; distinction is most meaningful, but (2) overt transactions or "influence com- never complete. Some levels of con- munication;" (3)covert phenomena, usu- sciousness will meet criteria for hypno- ally termed "unconscious;" and (4) cov- sis, others will not. One or the other may ert transactions. predominate in a given individual at The "states" range from transient phe- different times. If there is sufficient dis- nomena like depersonalization, time dis- continuity between the two, true for tortion, parapraxes, amnesia, and auto- some but not all individuals, we can talk maticity, to severe or recurrent states of hypnosis as a "state." State theory is like the conversion and dissociative dis- validated as a usefill approximation. orders,', '8-20 with multiple personality a There must always at all times, however, pr~totype.~Is remain significant elements of menta- Influence communications with a tion that meet criteria for "hypnotic" clear hypnotic character are manifold. and, conversely, support the nonstate Most truly spontaneous are the recipro- findings that hypnosis is not truly sepa- cal influence of people in love, whose rable from the waking continuum in any hypnotic character was explicitly recog- special sense. These elements are of crit- nized by Freud." Psychotherapeutic Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1989 173 Beahrs transference can be formulated simi- must be received at levels of awareness 1arly.hnd suggestive persuasion domi- usually termed "unconscious," a cardi- nates the advertising industry. More om- nal principle also deliberately
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