Handbook of Legal Terms
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Parties to Crime and Vicarious Liability
CHAPTER 6: PARTIES TO CRIME AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY The text discusses parties to crime in terms of accessories and accomplices. Accessories are defined as accessory before the fact – those who help prepare for the crime – and accessories after the fact – those who assist offenders after the crime. Accomplices are defined as those who participate in the crime. Under the common law, accessories were typically not punished as much as accomplices or principle offenders; on the other hand, accomplices were usually punished the same as principal offenders. Accomplices and Accessories Before the Fact Under Ohio’s statutes, accomplices and accessories before the fact are now treated similarly, while accessories after the fact are treated separately under the obstruction of justice statute discussed later. Under Ohio’s complicity staute: (A) No person acting with the kind of culpability required for an offense…shall do any of the following: Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; Aid or abet another in committing the offense; Conspire with another to commit the offense… ; Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. (Ohio Revised Code, § 2923.03, 1986, available at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2923.03). Note that parts of the complicity statute – (A)(1) and (A)(3) – mention both solicitation and conspiracy. These two crimes are discussed in Chapter 7. The punishment for complicity is the same as for the principal offender; that is, if Offender A robs a liquor store and Offender B drives the getaway car, both offenders are subject to the same punishment, even though Offender A would be charged with robbery and Offender B would be charged with complicity (Ohio Revised Code, § 2923.03 (F), 1986, available at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2923.03). -
Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Criminal
Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Criminal Release 20, September 2019 NOTICE TO USERS: THE FOLLOWING SET OF UNANNOTATED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING MADE AVAILABLE WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE PUBLISHER, MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY, INC. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE FULL ANNOTATED VERSION OF THESE MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IS AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE FROM MATTHEW BENDER® BY WAY OF THE FOLLOWING LINK: https://store.lexisnexis.com/categories/area-of-practice/criminal-law-procedure- 161/virginia-model-jury-instructions-criminal-skuusSku6572 Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. Instruction No. 2.050 Preliminary Instructions to Jury Members of the jury, the order of the trial of this case will be in four stages: 1. Opening statements 2. Presentation of the evidence 3. Instructions of law 4. Final argument After the conclusion of final argument, I will instruct you concerning your deliberations. You will then go to your room, select a foreperson, deliberate, and arrive at your verdict. Opening Statements First, the Commonwealth's attorney may make an opening statement outlining his or her case. Then the defendant's attorney also may make an opening statement. Neither side is required to do so. Presentation of the Evidence [Second, following the opening statements, the Commonwealth will introduce evidence, after which the defendant then has the right to introduce evidence (but is not required to do so). Rebuttal evidence may then be introduced if appropriate.] [Second, following the opening statements, the evidence will be presented.] Instructions of Law Third, at the conclusion of all evidence, I will instruct you on the law which is to be applied to this case. -
V STATE of MICHIGAN SUMMONS CASE NO. Instructions
Original - Court 2nd copy - Plaintiff Approved, SCAO 1st copy - Defendant 3rd copy - Return STATE OF MICHIGAN CASE NO. JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT SUMMONS 2018 MZ COUNTY PROBATE Court address Court telephone no. Court of Claims, Hall of Justice, 925 W. Ottawa Street, Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373-0807 Plaintiff’s name(s), address(es), and telephone no(s). Defendant’s name(s), address(es), and telephone no(s). OAKLAND COUNTY WATER RESOURCES MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER, as County Agent for the County of Oakland, QUALITY GREAT LAKES WATER AUTHORITY, v CITY OF DETROIT, by and through its Water and Sewerage Department, AND CITY OF LIVONIA Plaintiff’s attorney, bar no., address, and telephone no. Peter H. Webster (P48783), Dickinson Wright PLLC, 2600 W. Big Beaver, Ste. 300, Troy, MI 48084, (248) 433-7200; Steven E. Chester (P32984), Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC, One Michigan Bldg., 120 N. Washington Sq., Ste. 900, Lansing, MI 48933, (517) 483-4933; Randal Brown (P70031), 735 Randolph, Ste. 1900, Detroit, MI 48226, (313) 964-9068; Michael Fisher (P37037), 33000 Civic Center Drive, Livonia, MI 48154, (734) 466-2520 Instructions: Check the items below that apply to you and provide any required information. Submit this form to the court clerk along with your complaint and, if necessary, a case inventory addendum (form MC 21). The summons section will be completed by the court clerk. Domestic Relations Case There are no pending or resolved cases within the jurisdiction of the family division of the circuit court involving the family or family members of the person(s) who are the subject of the complaint. -
Bond University Research Repository Challenging Conceptions Of
Bond University Research Repository Challenging Conceptions of Accessory Liability in Private Law Ridge, Pauline; Dietrich, Joachim Published in: Cambridge Law Journal DOI: 10.1017/S0008197319000345 Published: 01/07/2019 Document Version: Peer reviewed version Link to publication in Bond University research repository. Recommended citation(APA): Ridge, P., & Dietrich, J. (2019). Challenging Conceptions of Accessory Liability in Private Law. Cambridge Law Journal, 78(2), 383-408. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197319000345 General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository coordinator. Download date: 09 Oct 2020 CHALLENGING CONCEPTIONS OF ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN PRIVATE LAW PAULINE RIDGE* AND JOACHIM DIETRICH** This article concerns recent challenges to the utility of ‘accessory liability’ as an organising principle or concept in private law and argues that accessory liability is a coherent body of law with common features that is worthy of separate, holistic treatment. We defend a conceptual framework for accessory liability which is dynamic in its operation and which does not dictate the precise legal content of accessory liability in different contexts. Such a conception of accessory liability has come under challenge from recent cases and commentary which either minimise the scope and analytical relevance of accessory liability altogether in equity and tort law or propound a conceptual framework for accessory liability that is fixed in its application and uniform in its content across the whole of private law. -
Classification of a Sample of Felony Offenses
NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMMISSION CLASSIFICATION OF A SAMPLE OF OFFENSES (Effective 12/1/17) CLASS A FELONIES Maximum Punishment of Death or Life Without Parole First-Degree Murder. (14-17) CLASS B1 FELONIES Maximum Punishment of Life Without Parole First-Degree Forcible Sexual Offense. (14-27.26)/First-Degree Second-Degree Murder. (14-17(b)) Statutory Sexual Offense. (14-27.29) First-Degree Forcible Rape. (14-27.21)/First-Degree Statutory Rape (14-27.24) CLASS B2 FELONIES Maximum Punishment of 484* Months Second-Degree Murder. (14-17(b)(1) and (2)) CLASS C FELONIES Maximum Punishment of 231* Months Second-Degree Forcible Rape. (14-27.22) First-Degree Kidnapping. (14-39) Second-Degree Forcible Sexual Offense. (14-27.27) Embezzlement (amount involved $100,000 or more). (14-90) Assault W/D/W/I/K/I/S/I. (14-32(a)) CLASS D FELONIES Maximum Punishment of 204* Months Voluntary Manslaughter. (14-18) Child Abuse Inflicting Serious Physical Injury. (14-318.4(a)) First-Degree Burglary. (14-51) Death by Vehicle. (20-141.4(a)(1)) First-Degree Arson. (14-58) Sell or Deliver a Controlled Substance to a Person Under 16 But Armed Robbery. (14-87) More than 13 Years of Age. (90-95(e)(5)) CLASS E FELONIES Maximum Punishment of 88* Months Sexual Activity by a Substitute Parent or Custodian. (14-27.31) Assault with a Firearm on a Law Enforcement Officer. (14-34.5) Assault W/D/W/I/S/I. (14-32(b)) Second-Degree Kidnapping. (14-39) Assault W/D/W/I/K. -
Coming to Watervliet Twp. Industrial Park
I Coming to Watervliet Twp. Industrial Park $ 80 million gas plant means 350 jobs On Thursday, May 11, Berrien employ at least 50 people once it is use it intends to process 20 million have anymore information than was about the location and the area sur- Watervliet Township, the City of County Brown field Authority appr- operational. The economic impact of bushels of com annually into etha- released at this time. rounding their proposed new site. Watervliet, and the Coloma Water- oved the sale of 34 acres of land in this plant could generate an addi- nol. County Commissioner Victoria Township resident Bob Becker vliet Economic Development Corp- the Watervliet Red Arrow Industrial tional 300 jobs in the local agricul- "What's not to like Chandler told the audience that summed it up, "Why not this com- oration (CWAEDC). Park to NextGen Energy LLC, an tural and service sectors. future public hearings would be held munity? We have close proximity to Six years ago, the Brownfield about Watervliet?" ethanol production company out of The company indicated that it by NextGen that would, hopefully, 1-94, the rail service is right there, Authority acquired the property Southfield, MI. NextGen intends to selected this location because of the As expected, the discussion of this answer all questions and take care of and what's not to like about Water- after the closure of the Fletcher construct and operate a 50-million- park's established infrastructure, rail recent development came up at the any concerns. vliet?" Paper mill in Watervliet. Through its gallon-per-year ethanol production access, proximity to 1-94, and avail- Watervliet Township Board meeting When questions arose about why The Watervliet Red Arrow Indus- partnership with the state, the plant within the park. -
If You Have Issues Viewing Or Accessing This File Contact Us at NCJRS.Gov
If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. I I -tJ• I " - -r, T __ : -~ :. ... -!I.o _ • - _:. .. I -- - .. .. .~ ~ f • # 1 LEAA Activities July 1,1969 to June 30,1970 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 146878 U.S. Department of Jus!lce National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the (lfficlal position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this DP 'gI "" material has been gr~~t~ic Domain/LEAA U.S. Department of Justice to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the ~ owner. For sale by the Superintendent o( Documents, U.S. Government Prlntlns Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.50 per 2 volume set. Sold In sets only. Message from the Administrators The year 1970 demonstrated that the federal-state-local government partnership represented by the block grant approach offers the most effective means of improving the criminal justice system in the United States. This approach recognizes the importance of local commitment, priorities and decision making as how best to control crime, tempered with adherence to statutory requirements of comprehensiveness, plan balance and full local involvement in the formulation and benefits of the program. Some problems have arisen-some states and local units of government resent any direction from Washington-such as our emphasis on ccirrer.t,ions improvement in fiscal 1970. -
FELON's RESPONSIBILITY for the LETHAL ACTS of OTHERS Norval Morris T
[Vol. 105 THE FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LETHAL ACTS OF OTHERS Norval Morris t Far from shrinking under protracted criticism, the felony-murder rule has recently demonstrated a tendency to expand. In particular, courts in Pennsylvania and California have greatly extended the scope of this doctrine. Though their purpose of deterring the commission of certain felonies is commendable, the means selected appears to be socially unwise and is based on reasoning not free from substantial analytic and historical errors. Throughout the Anglo-American system of criminal justice, those who engage in certain felonies and kill the subject of their felonious designs, or those who kill while forcibly resisting lawful arrest, may be convicted of murder. Where, however, death is caused by the retaliatory or defensive action of a victim of an intended felony, or by a police officer or other person assisting him, the criminal responsibility of the felon for that death is less clear. In such circumstances an innocent bystander, a policeman or one of the felons may be killed by an act of justified resistance to the felony or by an act intended to prevent the criminal's escape. Are the felons, by virtue of their felony, murderers? Likewise, if during the course of a felony one of the felons from extraneous motives kills one of his fellow conspirators, the criminal liability of the surviving conspirators, other than the actual killer, is uncertain. Decisions in Pennsylvania and California have held the surviving felons guilty of murder in the first degree in all the above situations. It is proposed to review these cases, to search out the suggested basis of liability, and to urge the repudiation of this extension of the felony- murder rule. -
Wilson-Bey & Marbury V. US, on Rehearing En Banc
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 01-CF-293 and 01-CF-633 LAKEISHA WILSON-BEY, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE., and SCKEENA MARBURY, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (F-504-00 and F-505-00) (Hon. Russell F. Canan, Trial Judge) (Argued En Banc March 20, 2006 Decided July 20, 2006) John O. Iweanoge, Jr., for appellant Lakeisha Wilson-Bey. Matthew M. Hoffman, with whom John Moustakas and Stephen R. Galoob were on the brief, for appellant Sckeena Marbury. David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Lynn C. Holliday, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Andrea Roth, with whom James Klein and Samia Fam were on the brief, for Public Defender Service, amicus curiae. Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN, and KRAMER, Associate Judges, and WAGNER and SCHWELB,* Senior Judges. SCHWELB, Senior Judge: Following a jury trial, Lakeisha Wilson-Bey and * Judge Schwelb was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument. His status changed to Senior Judge on June 24, 2006. 2 Sckeena Marbury, who are sisters, were both convicted of first-degree premeditated murder while armed, in violation of D.C. -
Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Alex Kreit [email protected]
American University Law Review Volume 57 | Issue 3 Article 2 2008 Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Alex Kreit [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Kreit, Alex. “Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton.” American University Law Review 57, no.3 (February, 2008): 585-639. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton Abstract This article considers what limits the constitution places on holding someone criminally liable for another's conduct. While vicarious criminal liability is often criticized, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally permissible as a general matter. Under the long-standing felony murder doctrine, for example, if A and B rob a bank and B shoots and kills a security guard, A can be held criminally liable for the murder. What if, however, A was not involved in the robbery but instead had a completely separate conspiracy with B to distribute cocaine? What relationship, if any, does the constitution require between A's conduct and B's crimes in order to hold A liable for them? It is clear A could not be punished for B's crimes simply because they are friends. -
The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law
South Carolina Law Review Volume 60 Issue 2 Article 1 2008 The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law John F. Decker DePaul University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S. C. L. Rev. 239 (2008). This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Decker: The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW JOHN F. DECKER* 1. INTROD U CTION .......................................................................................... 239 II. A FACIAL REVIEW OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE ................................. 244 A. Category I Statutes: "Specific Intent". .............................................. 245 B. Category II Statutes: "Statutorily PrescribedMental State" ........ 247 C. Category III Statutes: "Naturaland Probable Consequences........ 249 D. Statutes Requiring "Knowledge" Rather than "Intent" ................... 250 E. Statutes Lacking Any Mental State Requirement ............................... 251 F. Statutes Allowing for a Defense for the Victim of a Crime ................ 253 G. Statutes with Incidental Party Provisions......................................... -
674KB***Accessory Liability in Tort and Equity
(2015) 27 SAcLJ Accessory Liability in Tort and Equity 853 ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN TORT AND EQUITY Unlike the position in criminal law, there does not currently exist a general doctrine of accessory liability in civil law. Thus, a person may be liable as an accessory in equity for dishonestly assisting with a breach of trust, but there is no tort for dishonest assistance. Rather, one who participates in another’s tort will only be liable if he is a joint tortfeasor acting pursuant to a common design with the primary tortfeasor. This article examines the reasons for this divergence and evaluates the case for their assimilation. It observes that, contrary to common perception, the scope of participatory liability in both spheres does not materially differ. It also concludes that the case for assimilation is not made out if the overarching principle for civil accessory liability is defined principally by reference to criminal concepts of complicity. Such an approach overlooks the fundamental distinctions between civil and criminal processes and threatens to extend civil liability beyond acceptable bounds. LEE Pey Woan* LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford); Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 1 In civil as well as criminal law, a person may be liable when he participates in the wrong of another. Such liability is variously described as “accessory”, “secondary” or “derivative” because it is contingent upon a wrong being committed by the primary wrongdoer. In criminal law, a general doctrine of accessory or secondary liability exists which applies uniformly to all crimes.