From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons Maurer School of Law: Indiana University Digital Repository @ Maurer Law Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 2005 From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons William D. Henderson Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected] Richard D. Cudahy U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Energy and Utilities Law Commons Recommended Citation Henderson, William D. and Cudahy, Richard D., "From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons" (2005). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 308. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/308 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FROM INSULL TO ENRON: CORPORATE (RE)REGULATION AFTER THE RISE AND FALL OF TWO ENERGY ICONS Hon. RichardD. Cudahy* & William D. Henderson** I. IN TR OD U CTION ................................................................................... 36 II. INSULL AND ELECTRICITY .............................................................. 39 A. Insull's Origins and Early Career, 1859-1892 ................................. 39 B. Insull's Early Years as a Utility Operator, 1892-1912 ...................... 41 1. Chicago Edison ............................................................................ 41 2. Insull Creates and Perfects a New Industry: Electric Utilities .......... 45 3. Insull and the Movement for State Regulation of Electricity ........... 46 C. Middle West Utilities and the Coming of the Holding Company Era, 19 12- 1926 ........................................................................................ 5 1 D. The Rise and Fall of Insull as an Icon, 1926-1932 ............................. 55 1. The Public Utility Holding Company .......................................... 56 2. The Frank Smith Episode and the FTC Investigation .................. 59 3. Cyrus Eaton, the Great Crash, and Control of the Insull Empire .... 62 4. The Collapse of the Insull Empire .............................................. 65 E. Insull's Crim inal Trials ..................................................................... 69 III. POST-INSULL UTILITY REGULATION: THE RISE AND FALL OF NEW DEAL REFORMS ....................................................................... 72 A. The New Deal Reforms and the Regime of State Regulated Utilities ....73 B. Exhaustion of Economies of Scale and the Environmental Movement ..78 C. PURPA, the Energy Policy Act, and the Deregulatory Ethos ............. 79 D. Enron Moves into the Limelight ....................................................... 83 IV. NSULL AND ENRON: REFLECTIONS ON TWO ENERGY ICONS ...91 A. Leverage, Disclosure and Risk .......................................................... 93 B. Politics, Speculation, Regulation ....................................................... 98 Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; B.S., U.S. Military Academy; J.D., Yale Law School. Associate Professor, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law; B.A., Case Western Reserve University; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. The authors thank Alfred Aman, J. William Hicks, John Moot, and John Wasik for comments on various drafts of this Article and Joseph Efeyemineni Abugu, Bradley Klein, Jody Madeira, and Shawn Zawisza for their excellent research assistance. In addition, we would like to acknowledge the substantial editorial contributions of Lauren Mohr and Terry Allen of the Energy Law Jour- nal. ENERGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:35 C. How Do W e Regulate Electricity? ................................ ........................ 104 V . C ON C L U SIO N .......................................................................................... 110 1. INTRODUCTION For most Americans, the sudden and horrific collapse of the Enron Corpora- tion will go down as the most shocking and significant corporate event of their generation. Yet, remarkably, it is a surprise to many people that the New Deal regulatory framework - which was recently reformed and toughened in response to the Enron debacle - was itself created in the wake of a strikingly similar cor- porate crash. In late 1931 and early 1932, investors, business executives, and or- dinary citizens looked on in horror as Samuel Insull's grand and seemingly in- vulnerable electric utility holding company empire foundered without warning and slipped into receivership. This debacle wiped out the holdings of 600,000 shareholders and 500,000 bondholders,1 most of whom believed that they had entrusted their savings to a safe and secure electric utility enterprise. As Insull (much like Enron seventy years later) was vilified in the press, candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt seized upon this business disaster to press his case for corporate reform during the 1932 presidential campaign. Though Insull and his crash are today largely forgotten, we are still subject to its regulatory af- termath-measures that were adopted "in direct response to Insull's real or al- leged doings .... , This legislation, a substantial part of the New Deal regula- tory agenda, includes the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Federal Power Act of 1935, and the legislation creating the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Ru- ral Electrification Administration. 3 As noted by one Insull historian, "It is no ex- aggeration to see in the legislative innovations' 4 of the New Deal a phoenix arising from the ashes of the Insull empire. At least superficially, the Insull failure and the Enron collapse seventy years later appear to have followed virtually identical scenarios. 5 For example, both companies rose to dizzying levels of economic power and political and public adulation. Virtually overnight, both icons plummeted ignominiously into bank- ruptcy, giving rise to frantic hand wringing and finger pointing by politicians and 1. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 22 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1982) [hereinafter SELIGMAN]. 2. FORREST MCDONALD, INSULL 335 (Univ. Chi. Press 1962) [hereinafter MCDONALD]. 3. Id 4. ROBERT GRANT & JOSEPH KATZ, THE GREAT TRIALS OF THE TWENTIES: THE WATERSHED DECADE INAMERICA'S COURTROOMS 245 (Sarpedon 1998) [hereinafter GRANT & KATZ]. 5. See, e.g., John Micklethwait &Adrian Wooldridge, A CorporateCrisis? No, Just Business As Usual, WASH. POST, June 23, 2002, at B I (discussing corporate crises in the aftermath of the Insull and Enron deba- cles and noting that "the echoes of the current crisis are uncanny"); Peter G. Gosselin, Enron a Rerun of His- tory, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at Al (opining that "Lay, Skilling and Enron could rightfully claim to be In- sull's historical heirs"); Rebecca Smith, Enron 's Rise and Fall Gives Some Scholars a Sense ofDeja Vu, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al (discussing the Insull debacle and noting that "many students of corporate history get a sense of deja vu as they watch the Enron saga unfold."). 20051 FROM INSULL TO ENRON the press. Apparently, everyone had been duped. Yet, a careful examination of the rise and fall of Samuel Insull reveals many interesting (and sometimes ironic) differences from the Enron debacle. Perhaps most striking is the fact that all of the Insull criminal and civil proceedings, which dragged on until Insull's death in 1938, ended in acquittals for Samuel In- sull and his large coterie of executives. In contrast, the federal laws that were passed in the aftermath of Insull have been successfully deployed to obtain sev- 7 eral criminal convictions of Enron figures (with possibly more to come) and numerous civil settlements. 8 Another fortunate and arguably related distinction between the Insull and the Enron eras is that, notwithstanding similar stock mar- ket collapses in 1929 and 2000, the country has thus far averted a severe eco- nomic depression in the wake of Enron. Thus, Insull's most consoling legacy may be that the full force of history has not repeated itself in full. There is nothing like a narrow escape from ruin to produce sober, level- headed reflection on matters of public policy. This Article suggests that our ru- minations on government regulation are more likely to draw the right conclu- sions if we understand the historical continuum that connects Insull with Enron. The setting for our analysis is the growth and maturation of the electric power industry over a span of 120 years. At two junctures - separated by a nearly sev- enty-year interval - the collapse of two energy titans, Insull and Enron, helped to galvanize major changes in the regulation of financial markets. Since the Enron experience is current and ongoing, as well as the subject of numerous discussions and analyses in a continuing torrent of books and articles, 9 its specific facts will be dealt with in a summary fashion. The Insull story, by contrast, is not well known to the modem reader, and will be described in some detail. The central lesson that emerges from a comparison of the Insull and Enron eras is not so much that we need to strengthen laws
Recommended publications
  • A Case of Corporate Deceit: the Enron Way / 18 (7) 3-38
    NEGOTIUM Revista Científica Electrónica Ciencias Gerenciales / Scientific e-journal of Management Science PPX 200502ZU1950/ ISSN 1856-1810 / By Fundación Unamuno / Venezuela / REDALYC, LATINDEX, CLASE, REVENCIT, IN-COM UAB, SERBILUZ / IBT-CCG UNAM, DIALNET, DOAJ, www.jinfo.lub.lu.se Yokohama National University Library / www.scu.edu.au / Google Scholar www.blackboard.ccn.ac.uk / www.rzblx1.uni-regensburg.de / www.bib.umontreal.ca / [+++] Cita / Citation: Amol Gore, Guruprasad Murthy (2011) A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY /www.revistanegotium.org.ve 18 (7) 3-38 A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY EL CASO ENRON. Amol Gore (1) and Guruprasad Murthy (2) VN BRIMS Institute of Research and Management Studies, India Abstract This case documents the evolution of ‘fraud culture’ at Enron Corporation and vividly explicates the downfall of this giant organization that has become a synonym for corporate deceit. The objectives of this case are to illustrate the impact of culture on established, rational management control procedures and emphasize the importance of resolute moral leadership as a crucial qualification for board membership in corporations that shape the society and affect the lives of millions of people. The data collection for this case has included various sources such as key electronic databases as well as secondary data available in the public domain. The case is prepared as an academic or teaching purpose case study that can be utilized to demonstrate the manner in which corruption creeps into an ambitious organization and paralyses the proven management control systems. Since the topic of corporate practices and fraud management is inherently interdisciplinary, the case would benefit candidates of many courses including Operations Management, Strategic Management, Accounting, Business Ethics and Corporate Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Official Versions Vs Facts
    1 This text below is inspired by a translation from a French text that was published on the website of Paul Jorion in late June 2017, ie about only 2 weeks after this website would go live. I answered here a very straight question: “how do you differ from the official version?” And here is my “story”, the only one that have conveyed since 2012. It was then meant to summarize how my website differs from all the reports that the bank and the authorities have made on the “London Whale” case. It was 143 pages long for Paul Jorion. Now it is 29 pages long. What I have added are further details on key topics like ‘profits’, like ‘orders’, like ‘valuation’, like ‘mismarking’…. Needless to say, this account vastly differs from any media reporting although some outlets are closer than others. This text below thus predated by a month or so the decisions of the DOJ as disclosed on July 21st 2017. It may well have been the “recent statements and writings” that would shake the tree. It contradicted ahead of times the WSJ subsequent article of August 3rd 2017. Yet it corroborated the statements of Dimon on August 8th 2017 to some extent and clarified ahead of times the context of the ultimate decision of the SEC in late August 2017. But, back in June 2017, this text was also displaying my ‘story’ as an anchor amid all the changing stories that would have been conveyed since 2012 and onwards… In sharp contrast to what all the authorities and the bank would do between 2012 and 2018, I will deploy only one “story” to tell all along, be that on the public stage or confidentially towards the authorities.
    [Show full text]
  • 2 Bureaucratic Autonomy: Logic, Theory, and Design 18 2.1 Introduction
    Charting a Course to Autonomy: Bureaucratic Politics and the Transformation of Wall Street by Peter Joseph Ryan A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the GRADUATE DIVISION of the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY Committee in charge: Professor Paul Pierson, Chair Professor J. Nicholas Ziegler Professor Neil Fligstein Spring 2013 Charting a Course to Autonomy: Bureaucratic Politics and the Transformation of Wall Street Copyright c 2013 by Peter Joseph Ryan Abstract Charting a Course to Autonomy: Bureaucratic Politics and the Transformation of Wall Street by Peter Joseph Ryan Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Paul Pierson, Chair Over the past three decades, federal regulators have been at the heart of transformations that have reshaped the financial services industry in the United States and by definition, global markets. It was, for example, the Federal Reserve that initiated and developed risk- based capital standards, rules that are now at the heart of prudential regulation of financial firms across the globe. Federal regulators played a central role in preventing regulation of the emerging ‘over-the-counter’ derivatives market in the late 1980s and early 1990s, actions that later had dramatic consequences during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The Securities and Exchange Commission took critical decisions regarding the prudential supervision of investment banks, decisions that greatly contributed to the end of the independent invest- ment banking industry in the United States in 2008. Finally regulators played an important role in setting the agenda and shaping the outcomes of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, the most sweeping and comprehensive piece of legislation affecting the industry since the New Deal.
    [Show full text]
  • Do You Work in a Creative Industry? in the Digital Age, the Answer Is ‘Yes,’ Whatever Your Profession
    Do you work in a creative industry? In the digital age, the answer is ‘yes,’ whatever your profession. All you need to do is understand your potential – and then unlock it. WORDS BY Monisha Rajesh ILLUSTRATIONS BY Malika Favre he digital revolution has “Creativity isn’t restricted to types of profession popped the cork on creativity. – it appears in every discipline,” Dr Root-Bernstein Filmmakers no longer need to continues. “Look at lawyers and accountants. Why rely solely on studios to release did we have the Enron scandal? Why are we their movies when YouTube having these problems with banks? This is people and Vimeo reach an audience of being creative, looking for loopholes and trying millions. Writers can choose traditional publishers, to push boundaries.” or newer options like Amazon and eBooks. In his book, Dr Root-Bernstein describes the Musicians can skip six months in a studio for five creative process as requiring 13 tools that include minutes in a bedroom with a laptop. We have more observing, abstracting, imaging, and kinesthetic outlets for creativity than ever before, but how (i.e. multi-sensory) thinking amongst others. do we harness the tools at our fingertips to make the “Like carpenters’ tools, you have to learn when it’s most of our potential? Does it take a certain type appropriate to use each one,” he says. “Everybody of brain to produce these results, or can we learn has these tools to some degree but none of them are to be creative, no matter what field we work in? taught in any curriculum.
    [Show full text]
  • The Financial Collapse of the Enron Corporation and Its Impact in the United States Capital Market by Prof
    Global Journal of Management and Business Research: D Accounting and Auditing Volume 14 Issue 4 Version 1.0 Year 2014 Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA) Online ISSN: 2249-4588 & Print ISSN: 0975-5853 The Financial Collapse of the Enron Corporation and Its Impact in the United States Capital Market By Prof. Edel Lemus, M.I.B.A Carlos Albizu University, U nited States Abstract- The purpose of this article is to review the collapse of the Enron Corporation and the collapse’s effect on the United States financial market. Enron Corporation, the seventh largest company in the United States, misguided its shareholders by reporting $74 billion profit of which $43 billion was detected as fraud. Moreover, according to the association of fraud examiners $2.9 trillion was lost because of employee fraud. For example, as presented by Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield (2013), in a global survey study that was conducted in 2013, it was reported that 3,000 executives from 54 countries were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Therefore, the world of accounting is dominated by the top four accounting firms known as (1). PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), (2). Deloitte & Touche (DT), (3). Ernst & Young (EY) and (4). KPMG which represent a combined income of $80 billion. Keywords: enron corporation, bankruptcy, securities and exchange commission (sec), generally accepted accounting principles (gaap), sarbanes-oxley act of 2002, section 404, corporate governance, auditing, and economic crime. GJMBR-D Classification : JEL Code: M49 TheFinancialCollapseoftheEnronCorporationand Its ImpactintheUnitedStatesCapitalMarket Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of: © 2014. Prof. Edel Lemus.
    [Show full text]
  • Lifting the Veil of Sarbanes-Oxley
    LIFTING THE VEIL OF SARBANES -OXLEY REVELATIONS THROUGH DECEMBER 1, 2002 By ∗ Byron F. Egan, Dallas, TX Sabrina A. McTopy, Houston, TX On July 30, 2002 President Bush signed the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 (H.R. 3763) (the “SOB ”) intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws. This is the “tough new corporate fraud SOB” being trumpeted by the politicians and in the media. Among other things, the SOB amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “ 1934 Act ”) and the Securities Act of 1933 (the “ 1933 Act ”). Although the SOB does have some specific provisions, and generally establishes some important public policy changes, it will be implemented in large part through rules t o be adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( “SEC” ) in various designated periods of time after July 30, 2002 – generally, 30 days (August 29, 2002), 180 days (January 26, 2003) and 270 days (April 26, 2003). As is always the case with broad gr ants of authority to a regulatory body, the rules may well contain some surprises. Further, the SEC will have opportunity through rulemaking under the SOB, as well as action on corporate governance proposals of the stock exchanges, to delve much farther i nto corporate governance than it has in the past. SUMMARY To What Companies Does SOB Apply . The SOB is generally applicable to all companies required to file reports with the SEC under the 1934 Act (“ reporting companies ”) or that have a registration state ment on file with the SEC under the 1933 Act, in each case regardless of size (collectively “ public companies ”).
    [Show full text]
  • Enron Scandal: the Fall of a Wall Street Darling
    Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling The story of Enron Corp. is the story of a company that reached dramatic heights, only to face a dizzying fall. Its collapse affected thousands of employees and shook Wall Street to its core. At Enron's peak, its shares were worth $90.75; when it declared bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, they were trading at $0.26. To this day, many wonder how such a powerful business, at the time one of the largest companies in the U.S, disintegrated almost overnight and how it managed to fool the regulators with fake holdings and off-the-books accounting for so long. Enron's Energy Origins Enron was formed in 1985, following a merger between Houston Natural Gas Co. and Omaha-based InterNorth Inc. Following the merger, Kenneth Lay, who had been the chief executive officer (CEO) of Houston Natural Gas, became Enron's CEO and chairman and quickly rebranded Enron into an energy trader and supplier. Deregulation of the energy markets allowed companies to place bets on future prices, and Enron was poised to take advantage. In 1990, Lay created the Enron Finance Corp. To head it, he appointed Jeffrey Skilling, whose work as a McKinsey & Co consultant had impressed Lay. Skilling was at the time one of the youngest partners at McKinsey. Why Enron Collapsed Skilling joined Enron at an auspicious time. The era's regulatory environment allowed Enron to flourish. At the end of the 1990s, the dot-com bubble was in full swing, and the Nasdaq hit 5,000.
    [Show full text]
  • Clear Vision for Your Documents
    Clear vision for your documents Document management from Spielberg The problem – or why DMS pays you back Put an end to lengthy searches 2 It can become costly • One in every 20 dOcuments gOes missing • every year, the number Of files increase by 50% • each dOcument stOred cOsts an average Of 30 dOllars The benefits of an intelligent document compliance with statutory requirements, management solution are self-evident since we help your organisation to minimise REASONS FOR A DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: if you think, for instance, of the impro- the financial or legal risks which can be ved efficiency: documents are located, caused by lost, damaged or improperly • Shorter response times to stored and distributed more quickly. used information. Thanks to Spielberg inquiries What’s more, staff do not waste time solutions, complying with the data • No unnecessary duplication of or money on duplicating or distributing protection requirements on retention data documents. Digitising avoids all these periods and destruction of documents • Higher data integrity unnecessary steps and gives your staff becomes much easier. • Compliance with all statutory more time to concentrate on the essentials. requirements On top of this, document storage costs Whether you choose FileDirector SBE or are reduced because a considerably smaller FileDirector Enterprise — Spielberg has storage area is required. the right solution for you. Talk to us about how we can make your documents more SPIELBERG HAS THE SOLUTION: What is less well-known, but nevertheless secure, while saving you money. • FileDirector Enterprise for at least just as relevant, are factors such SMBs and large companies as better security control, or new options You can find detailed information on our • FileDirector for monitoring use of documents.
    [Show full text]
  • CRIMINAL JUSTICE in AMERICA FIFTH EDITION Cja Unit1a:Layout 1 7/10/2012 2:10 PM Page 1
    CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA FIFTH EDITION cja_unit1a:Layout 1 7/10/2012 2:10 PM Page 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA FIFTH EDITION Developed by Marshall Croddy Bill Hayes cja_unit1a:Layout 1 7/10/2012 2:10 PM Page 2 601 South Kingsley Drive T. Warren Jackson, Chair Los Angeles, California 90005 Marshall P. Horowitz, Chair, (213) 487- 5590 Publications Committee www.crf-usa.org Jonathan Estrin, President Marshall Croddy, Vice President Developed by Subject Matter Consultants Marshall Croddy and Bill Hayes (Various Editions) Richard Chrystie, Deputy District Attorney, Board Reviewers Los Angeles County Marshall P. Horowitz, Lisa Rockwell, Val Cole, Deputy District Attorney, Patrick Rogan, K. Eugene Shutler, Los Angeles County Douglas Thompson, Lois Thompson Star French, Deputy Probation Officer, Editor Los Angeles County Bill Hayes John Hud, Criminal Defense Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Contributing Writers (Various Editions) Daniel E. Lewis, Attorney, Los Angeles Bill Hayes, Marshall Croddy, Todd Clark, Julia Rider, Luce, Forward, Hill, Jeffer & Teri Engler, Lucy Eisenberg, Damon Huss, Mangels Sandy Kanengiser, Carlton Martz, Betsy Devallis Rutledge, Special Counsel to the Salzman, Eden Kusmiersky, Coral Suter, District Attorney, Los Angeles County Charles Tremper, Michelle Ng, Roy Kim, Richard Simonian, Superintendent, C.K. Shruti Modi, Anjelica Sarmiento, Sophia Khan, Wakefield School, Fresno County Probation Marianna Muratova Department Researchers Captain Robert Taylor, Commanding Officer, (Various Editions) Juvenile Division, Los Angeles Police Rick Bhasin, Luke Delgado, and Michael Sokolson Department Kerry White, Head Deputy District Attorney, Production Juvenile Division, Los Angeles County Andrew Costly, Designer Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Criminal justice in America / developed by Marshall Croddy and Bill Hayes ; edited by Bill Hayes ; written by Bill Hayes ..
    [Show full text]
  • Responses by the Federal Communications Commission to Worldcom's Accounting Fraud
    Federal Communications Law Journal Volume 58 Issue 3 Article 21 6-2006 Responses by the Federal Communications Commission to WorldCom's Accounting Fraud Warren G. Lavey Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Lavey, Warren G. (2006) "Responses by the Federal Communications Commission to WorldCom's Accounting Fraud," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 58 : Iss. 3 , Article 21. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol58/iss3/21 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Responses by the Federal Communications Commission to WorldCom's Accounting Fraud Warren G. Lavey* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 615 II. How DID THE FCC RESPOND IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS FOLLOWING WORLDCOM'S DISCLOSURE? .................. .. .. .. .. 619 A. WorldCom's Disclosure of Accounting Fraud..................... 619 B. FCC's Public Statements Responding to WorldCom's D isclosures............................................................................ 624 C.
    [Show full text]
  • The Enron Corpus: Where the Email Bodies Are Buried?
    The Enron Corpus: Where the Email Bodies are Buried? Dr. David Noever Sr. Technical Fellow, PeopleTec, Inc. www.peopletec.com 4901-D Corporate Drive Huntsville, AL 35805 USA [email protected] Abstract To probe the largest public-domain email database for indicators of fraud, we apply machine learning and accomplish four investigative tasks. First, we identify persons of interest (POI), using financial records and email, and report a peak accuracy of 95.7%. Secondly, we find any publicly exposed personally identifiable information (PII) and discover 50,000 previously unreported instances. Thirdly, we automatically flag legally responsive emails as scored by human experts in the California electricity blackout lawsuit, and find a peak 99% accuracy. Finally, we track three years of primary topics and sentiment across over 10,000 unique people before, during and after the onset of the corporate crisis. Where possible, we compare accuracy against execution times for 51 algorithms and report human-interpretable business rules that can scale to vast datasets. Introduction The 2002 Enron fraud case uncovered financial deception in the world’s largest energy trading company and at the time, triggered the largest US bankruptcy and its most massive audit failure [1]. For the previous six years, Fortune magazine had named Enron “America’s most innovative company.” By 1999, Enron was brokering a quarter of all electricity and natural gas deals [1]. Piggybacking on the internet bubble, Enron devised methods to sell everything and own nothing. Problematically, the company could assign its own revenue (mark-to-market) and then bury its losses using off-book debt in shell companies (or Special Purpose Entities called Raptor and Chewco).
    [Show full text]
  • Distributed Ledgers for the Prevention of Accounting Fraud
    ALBERT-LUDWIGS-UNIVERSITÄT FREIBURG Distributed Ledgers for the Prevention of Accounting Fraud Blockchains Between Expectations and Reality Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. vorgelegt von Nadine Rückeshäuser aus Bad Soden am Taunus Sommersemester 2017 II Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Fakultät Kollegiengebäude II Platz der Alten Synagoge Dekan: Prof. Dr. Alexander Renkl Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Günter Müller Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Dieter K. Tscheulin Datum der Einreichung: 19.05.2017 Datum des Promotionsbeschlusses: 03.07.2017 Acknowledgments III Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to several people, who guided and supported me throughout the journey of writing this dissertation and contributed in many different ways to it. I want to express my sincere gratitude to them. I want to express my deepest gratitude to my doctoral supervisor Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Günter Müller for his excellent guidance and caring over the past 2 years, proving me with an excellent atmosphere for doing research. I also want to emphasize his role for my personal development, for which I am truly indebted and thankful. What I have learned goes far beyond specialized knowledge and technical competences. Overall, I found my time as doctoral student at the Institute of Computer Science and Social Studies as espe- cially pleasant, very productive and creative. Thank you for all the encouragement! I want to show my gratitude to Professor Dr. Dieter K. Tscheulin, who was the second reviewer of my dissertation as well as an examiner at my Rigorosum.
    [Show full text]