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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan Fourth in a Series of Joint Urban Operations and Counterinsurgency Studies Russell W. Glenn • S. Jamie Gayton November 2008 Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption 5 applies. Distribution Statement C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors, and to NATO, AUS, NZL, and ISR Government Agencies and their contractors. Other requests for this document must be referred to United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations Office, 115 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA, 23435, Attention: Kristi Dibe, Phone: 757-203-3555. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO Preface his report presents the fourth in an ongoing series of joint urban operations observations, insights, and recommendations drawn from contingencies worldwide with a predominant emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq. hose preceding this efort are (1) People Make the City: Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq,1 (2) A Tale of hree Cities: Analyzing Joint Urban Operations with a Focus on Fallujah, Al Amara, and Mosul,2 and (3) Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges: hird in a Series of Joint Urban Operations Obser- vations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq.3 In an efort to provide insights and propose valuable recommendations to those deployed or preparing to be deployed, this fourth study investigated two areas that previous studies and interviews identiied as consistently challeng- ing policymakers and practitioners during a counterinsurgency (COIN)—intelligence (intel) operations and measuring progress—while encompassing a number of subjects pertaining to COIN more generally. he appendixes provide the following: • a consolidated listing of all major observations and recommendations from all four studies • individual issue-discussion-recommendation (I-D-R) entries for each of the aforemen- tioned areas (COIN, intel, and metrics) derived during the 2007 efort • a consolidated compilation of all intel-related I-D-R from People Make the City, A Tale of hree Cities, and Continuing Counterinsurgency Challenges, for ease of reference for those particularly interested in that subject area. As did its predecessors, this work beneited greatly from the insights and suggestions ofered by the many interviewed in support of its underlying research.4 he resulting analysis and recommendations constitute a synthesis of their invaluable input from written sources, 1 Glenn, Paul, and Helmus (2007). 2 Glenn and Helmus (2007). 3 Glenn (2007c). 4 hat the interviews represent some coalition members more than others is a relection of author accessibility and resource constraints; it in no way indicates a judgment regarding the quality or importance of one country’s participation compared to another. iii UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO iv Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan previous work in the urban operations and COIN realms, and our irsthand experiences. It does not seek to be a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of afairs regarding intel, metrics, or COIN issues, but rather seeks to identify key insights regarding the three areas (each has merited volumes of works in its own right) and make recommendations based on interviewee inputs and the authors’ previous research into related subjects. I-D-R entries include observa- tions that we believe will assist in building the body of COIN knowledge. hese entries may represent the views of one or multiple individuals. hey include those that will require adap- tation when applying them to situations other than their immediate circumstances and with which the authors may not always be in total accord. hey are nonetheless included—after careful consideration—when we believed them to present perspectives worthy of readers’ relec- tion. We posit that a reasonable observation should not be rejected outright simply because it comes from a single individual or is somewhat distant from currently accepted thought. he document will be of interest to individuals whose responsibilities or interests include planning, policy, doctrine, training, and the conduct of COIN operations undertaken in or near urban areas in both the immediate future and the longer term. his research was sponsored by the Joint Urban Operations Oice, J9, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Oice of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staf, the Uniied Com- batant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand. org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is avail- able at www.rand.org. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// REL TO USA/AUS/NZL/ISR/NATO Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures ........................................................................................................... ix Tables ............................................................................................................ xi Summary .......................................................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................ xix Abbreviations .................................................................................................. xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction and Background ............................................................................... 1 Background: Western Baghdad, Late Summer 2007 ........................................................ 5 CHAPTER TWO Intelligence ......................................................................................................11 Two Initial Observations Regarding COIN Intelligence Challenges .....................................11 Meeting Expanded Intelligence Demands ...................................................................13 he Need for More Intelligence Capability at Lower Echelons .........................................16 Extending Tour Lengths for Intel Personnel ..............................................................18 Databases: One Key to Unlocking the Door to Knowledge ...............................................19 Police Have Long Relied on Databases .................................................................... 20 Intel Organizations Tend Not to Share Well ............................................................... 22 Procedures Inhibit Sharing Beyond Military and Intel Organizations ................................ 23 Hardware and Software Incompatibilities Require Addressing ........................................ 26 Intel Organizations and Procedures: A hird Hurdle Between the Present and More-Efective Operations ................................................................................................. 28 he Greatest Obstacle to Efective Intel Operations Is Mindset ....................................... 30 Soldier or Marine as Sensor: Improving the Input ..........................................................32