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Connecting the Dots a Social Network Analysis of Law Enforcement’S Role in the Decline of Jemaah Islamiyah

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Connecting the Dots a Social Network Analysis of Law Enforcement’S Role in the Decline of Jemaah Islamiyah Connecting the Dots A Social Network Analysis of Law Enforcement’s Role in the Decline of Jemaah Islamiyah Peter T. Carey GOV 679H Undergraduate Honors Thesis Department of Government University of Texas at Austin May 2010 Thesis Supervisor _________________________________ Professor Patricia Maclachlan Department of Government Honors Thesis Advisor Professor Kenneth F. Greene Department of Government Connecting the Dots A Social Network Analysis of Law Enforcement’s Role in the Decline of Jemaah Islamiyah The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organization in Indonesia was founded in 1993, carried out a series of deadly attacks such as the Bali bombings between 2000 and 2005, and subsequently suffered a cataclysmic decline; it carried out only one attack between 2006 and 2009. Existing arguments about why terrorist organizations end fall short of considering all the possible mechanisms that can be influential in a group‟s demise. I argue that one of these existing mechanisms, law enforcement, is one of the driving forces behind JI‟s decline. I strengthen this claim by drawing on social network analysis to quantify how law enforcement changes and disrupts a terrorist organization such as JI. An evaluation of the specific circumstances that facilitated the success of law enforcement efforts against JI has implications for broader counterterrorism efforts, suggesting cases in which similar law enforcement tactics may be effective in weakening other terrorist organizations. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………4 List of Figures……………………………………………………………………...….5 List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….6 Chapter 1 The Declining Strength of Jemaah Islamiyah……………......………..7 Chapter 2 The Rise and Fall of Jemaah Islamiyah……...……………...……….33 Chapter 3 Jemaah Islamiyah‟s Attacks and the Evolving Law Enforcement Response……………………………………………………........…..59 Chapter 4 Supporting the Law enforcement Narrative of Jemaah Islamiyah‟s Decline through Social Network Analysis……...……………..……..91 Chapter 5 Conclusion: Why Law Enforcement is Effective against Jemaah Islamiyah and Implications for Counterterrorism…………………..127 Appendix 1 Jemaah Islamiyah Attacks in Indonesia: 2000-2009…………...…..143 Appendix 2 Coding Jemaah Islamiyah for Capability: 2000-2009……………...144 Appendix 3 Indonesia Regional Security Ratings: Terrorism………………..….145 Appendix 4 State Terrorism Vulnerability Index: Indonesia………………...….146 Appendix 5 Node Attribute Codebook and Dataset………………………….….147 Appendix 6 Relationship Codebook……………………………………………..150 Appendix 7 Individual Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness Calculations……..152 Works Cited……………………………………………………………………...…165 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..169 3 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my primary thesis advisor, Professor Patricia Maclachlan, for her continual patience and constructive criticism throughout the entirety of this project, and for inspiring me to pursue this topic when I was a student in her International Relations of East and Southeast Asia class. Professor Kenneth Greene was influential in laying the foundation for this thesis, and his guidance in the early stages is greatly appreciated. Professor Ami Pedahzur directed me toward the newest relevant research, and I truly would have been lost without his direction. Finally, I would like to thank my family, for without their loving support this thesis and many other things in my life would not be possible. 4 List of Figures 1.1 Number of JI Attacks per Year: 2000-2009………………………………….12 1.2 Annual Casualties of JI Attacks……………………………………………...13 1.3 Coding Jemaah Islamiyah for Capability: 2000-2009……………………….15 1.4 Koschade‟s Jemaah Islamiyah Graph – Bali Operation October 6, 2002- October 11, 2002……………………………………………………………..28 4.1 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 1985-1989………………………..112 4.2 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 1990-1994……………………..…113 4.3 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 1995-1999……………..…………113 4.4 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2000………………….…………..114 4.5 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2001…………………...…………114 4.6 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2002……………….……………..115 4.7 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2003………………….…………..115 4.8 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2004……………..……………….116 4.9 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2005……………...………………116 4.10 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network 2006………...……………………117 5 List of Tables 4.1 Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Network Overall Structural Criteria…….…118 6 Chapter 1 The Declining Strength of Jemaah Islamiyah Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was founded in 1993. The organization carried out numerous terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2005, the most devastating of which was the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people and injured hundreds more (Rabasa 2006: 153). But after reaching the peak of its operational capability in 2002, JI‟s membership began to decline along with its ability to carry out attacks on the same scale as the Bali bombing. JI nearly fizzled out of existence (Pavlova 2006: 777). There is wide consensus that JI is weaker today than it was at the height of its operational ability in 2002-2005, but the extent of this decline and its causes are less clear (Rabasa 2006: 147). Why has JI weakened over time? Answering this question has important policy implications not only for Indonesia and Southeast Asia, but also for counterterrorism efforts around the world. A study of JI‟s decline will hopefully reveal the changes within the organization that weakened JI. By understanding how the organization responded to both internal and external pressure, we may be able to identify the circumstances under which this pressure may effect similar changes in other terrorist organizations. Although terrorism will likely persist for quite some time, this is not necessarily the case for individual terrorist organizations. An understanding of the forces that weaken terrorist organizations, such as JI, allows governments to craft more effective counterterrorism policies that may hasten the demise of similar terrorist organizations. 7 The extensive body of literature about JI is extremely helpful in understanding the narrative history of the organization and how it changed over time. While many of these sources note the improving counterterrorism efforts of Indonesian law enforcement, they fail to convincingly argue that law enforcement is one of the primary forces weakening JI. Making the argument for the importance of law enforcement in JI‟s decline combines general arguments about why terrorist groups decline and ultimately end with the specific circumstances of JI‟s decline. Applying these arguments to the case of JI leads to valuable insights about the effectiveness of law enforcement that have broad implications for counterterrorism. I argue that law enforcement, specifically arresting and killing JI members, is one of the driving forces behind JI‟s decline since the peak of its operational capability in 2002. I strengthen this claim by drawing on social network analysis to show how law enforcement changes and disrupts a terrorist organization like JI. The remainder of this chapter lays the groundwork for the social network model of JI‟s decline. First, the problematic task of measuring the strength of JI is accomplished. Five indicators of JI‟s strength over the past decade all point in the same direction, illustrating the trend of declining strength since 2002. Next, the existing arguments about how terrorist groups decline and end are outlined, along with their shortcomings for explaining the decline of JI. I argue that law enforcement was effective in capturing and killing JI members, thus disrupting the relationships that allow the operational network to function. The basic concepts of social network analysis are presented, along with their applicability to the argument that law enforcement was one of the driving forces behind JI‟s decline. Social network 8 analysis identifies the central members of a terrorist network and quantifies the structural changes in the organization after members are arrested or killed by law enforcement. The real-time application of social network analysis allows law enforcement to target the most influential members of a terrorist organization, maximizing the disruptive effects of arrests. Finally, an outline of the following chapters previews the development of the argument for law enforcement‟s influential role in JI‟s decline. Defining and Measuring the Strength of Jemaah Islamiyah Over Time The narrative story of JI illustrates the significant changes in the organization since it was officially founded in 1993. After its founding, JI evolved into a highly organized group with a defined leadership and an estimated membership of as many as 5,000 individuals by 2002 (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002). At the peak of its influence JI maintained active cells in Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia (Rabasa 2006: 147). This once robust transnational organization soon began to weaken as these overseas cells disbanded or were broken up by law enforcement in the years after the 2002 Bali bombings, and today JI maintains a significant presence only in Indonesia (ICG 3 May 2007: 1). Estimates of its membership in 2009 were as low as 200 members (ICG 24 July 2009: 3). JI weakened over time, but measuring the decline of terrorist organizations is a difficult undertaking, especially considering the limits of unclassified information. In the existing literature about why terrorist organizations end,
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