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Peace Process Stumbling Blocks : عوﺿوﻣﻟا مﺳا a More Extremist Israeli Government After ﻋﻧوان اﻟﻣوﺿ

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Peace Process Stumbling Blocks : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϡγ΍ A more extremist Israeli Government after : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Lieberman 06/04/2016 : έηϧϟ΍ΦϳέΎΗ ϥϳΩϟ΍ϝΎϣΟΔΑϫΩ : ΏΗΎϛϟ΍ϡγ΍ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ 9/28/2021 5:09:58 PM 1 / 2 Political party ³Yisrael Beiteinu´headed by Avigdor Lieberman, joined the country's coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Lieberman was appointed Defense Minister upon the resignation of former Defense Minister Moshe Ya¶alon, who cited the ministry¶s "lack of faith" in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Accordingly, the Israeli Government is now composed of six parties, increasing Netanyahu's Knesset majority from 61 to 67 seats.The changes in the Israeli Government¶s composition raise a series of questions about the reasons behind Lieberman¶s party joining the Government, the resulting repercussions on the Israeli political scene, the identity and future of the ruling coalition and the government¶s stance on the settlement of the Palestinian cause, especially after appointing an extremist Defense Minister who is a staunch supporter of displacement, excessive violence and use of power.Reasons behind Lieberman¶s appointmentMany factors pushed both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Lieberman, the leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, to make this move, including:1- Achieving stability in the coalition government:After negotiations between Netanyahu and opposition leader, Isaac Herzog, failed, and due to limited representation of his ministerial coalition in only 61 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, the Israeli Prime Minister sought to bring Lieberman into his Government to guarantee its sustainability and pass the desired laws and legislations. The situation prior to Lieberman¶s appointment had limited space for governmental maneuvers and put Netanyahu at the mercy of coalition members pushing for their interests. The coalition¶s destiny as a whole was therefore endangered or at least challenged the legislative bills submitted by the Government to the Knesset.It is worth noting that the electoral system in Israel is based on proportional representation allowing the establishment of coalition governments where small political parties manipulate large parties. Hence, Israeli coalition governments have long been unstable, short-lived and failed to finish their determined mandates. Certainly, the decision of including Yisrael Beiteinu in the government coalition does increase not only its share in the Knesset but also the ruling right-wing¶s share. The Government used to comprise of five parties, three of which are from the far-right wing, Shas, Yahadut Hatorah and Yisrael Beiteinu, the right-centrist Kulanu party and the extremist ³Likud´where radicalism is strongly expressed in the speeches of its leader, Netanyahu.With the inclusion of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, the share of the Government in the Parliament increased to 66 seats and Netanyahu gained the power to pass laws and limit the risk of their rejection. However, this move has reduced the Prime Minister¶s negotiation capability and tarnished his image in the eyes of the international public. In fact, the domination of the far-wing and the exclusion of left-wing parties from the Government are expected to aggravate criticism against Netanyahu.2- A Lifeline for Lieberman¶s Party:Netanyahu¶s request from the ³Yisrael Beiteinu´party to join the governmental coalition represented a lifeline for the party and its leader, Lieberman, after the party had lost the seats won in the previous elections of 2015. The party was criticized back then for lack of voters¶support and institutional foundations. Some critics even argue that Yisrael Beiteinu would have had the same fate as the Kadima party, which disappeared just before the 2015 elections due to its anticipated incapacity to win the necessary votes that would allow it to enter the Knesset or the Yisrael Ba¶Aliyah Party whose popular base consisted of Russian Jews in Israel and receded from the political scene in 2003.To escape this fate, Lieberman joined the government as Minister of Defense, Israel's second-most powerful office. This appointment represents an opportunity for his party to gain a new share in the political arena while it controls the war machine and the prospective escalation of military operations in the region, especially under Lieberman¶s extremist wing.Lieberman served as Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in 2009 after he won the third-biggest parliamentary bloc in the Knesset and joined the coalition government lead, at that time, by the Likud. Lieberman remained in the position of Foreign Minister until 2015; he adopted many far-right initiatives including a statement during the last elections in which he advocates the µbeheading of Israeli Arabs who are disloyal to the State of Israel.' Lieberman has even supported the idea of targeted assassinations against Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip.The Future of the Peace ProcessAfter Lieberman had been sworn in as the new Israeli Defense Minister with the Knesset vote approving his appointment on 30 March 2016, he sought to ease concerns regarding his anti-Palestinian tactics confirming his support to the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Lieberman also pledged his commitment to a responsible, reasonable policy.However, these statements do not rectify Lieberman¶s extremist positions. He had already resigned from several governments protesting their lenient stance towards Palestinians or the lack of progress in negotiations. However, his recent pledges do not go in line with the current administration¶s composition that is the most far-right government in the history of Israel.Therefore, the presence of Lieberman in the Israeli Government will not modify Netanyahu¶s policy against the Palestinian cause but would rather add to its extremism. The new Minister of Defense is a right-wing extremist politician who just joined a strong right-wing government and who is supportive of the policies of the other extremist parties in the Government. Lieberman¶s vision towards the peace settlement included several points like displacing the Palestinians of 1948 and occupying Jerusalem.Lieberman¶s vision is a major blow to Palestinian demands and goes in line with the stances of the other parties in the government coalition that aims to deny Palestinians their right to a State. For example, before joining the Israeli Government, the Yisrael Beiteinu party stipulated not giving Palestinians a State. The same applies to the Shas party that believes in the idea of a ³unified Israeli land´and refuses the establishment of the State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders or even within the West Bank, rejecting thus the return of refugees and considering the status of Jerusalem non-negotiable.It is hence clear that the far-right is dominant in Netanyahu¶s Government. The policies adopted by this Government would impede the peace settlement. In fact, the Government might accept to return to the negotiations table without presenting any concessions, just to improve Israel¶s reputation on the international scene and to ease the pressure imposed by the international community in light of the right-wing dominance in the Government. Netanyahu will keep on stalling and obstruct any initiatives to solve the conflict, such as the present French initiative, arguing the ³absence of a negotiating partner´and will sustain his escalated expansionist policies backed by Lieberman¶s presence. In this regard, Lieberman is expected to increase hostilities against the Gaza Strip and expand settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem. He would strengthen sanctions against the residents of the West Bank by setting checkpoints and confiscating permits that allow Palestinian workers to work in Israel.In conclusion, the appointment of Lieberman will prolong the life of the coalition Government led by Netanyahu. It will back the position of the Yisrael Beiteinu and present Lieberman the golden opportunity to retrieve his place on the political scene. However, this appointment carries serious threats of increased extremism and instability in the region where the extreme right-wing is expected to escalate its policies against the Palestinian cause, stumbling thus the peace process between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. 9/28/2021 5:09:58 PM 2 / 2.
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