Orthodox Jewish Scientists

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Proceedings of the Associations

Of ORTHODOX JEWISH SCIENTISTS

New York, N. Y. 5726—1966 232../ Contents

IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS Medical Experimentation on Humans in Jewish Law 1

CYRIL DOMB Systematic Methods of Torah Study 9

LEO LEVI On the use of Electrical Equipment on Shabbath and Yom Tov . . . 31

AZRIEL ROSENFELD On the Concept of "Sabbath Work" 53

HUGO MANDELBAUM Torah, Facts and Conclusions 61

ALVIN RADKOWSKY Judaism and the Technological Dilemma 68

LEE M. SPETNER A New Look at the Theory of Evolution 79

EDWARD H. SIMON On Gene Creation 87

L. CARMEL The Problem of Evil: The Jewish Synthesis 92

G. N. SCHLESINGER Divine Benevolence 101

RABBI A. Y. BLOCH z.l. An Unpublished Responsum on Secular Studies 106

These Proceedings are published by the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists at 84 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011. Subscription is by membership only. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of the Association.

IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS

Rabbi Jakobovits, formerly Chief Rabbi of Ireland, is spiritual leader of the Fifth Avenue Synagogue in New York City.

The widespread allegations of unethical practices in medical experimenta- tions on humans have recently been substantiated and carefully documented in a report published in the New England Journal of Medicine.1 The article, which was extensively quoted in the daily press, cited twenty-two examples, out of fifty originally submitted, of "unethical or ethically questionable studies" involving hundreds of patients. In the view of the author, "it is evident that in many of the examples presented, the investigators have risked the health or the life of their subjects." In many cases no "informed consent" was obtained either at all or under conditions which would render such consent meaningful. Some of the experiments were performed for purely academic purposes or "for frivolous ends," occasionally on healthy subjects or organs "with nothing to gain and all to lose." All the examples are taken from "leading medical schools, university hospitals, private hospitals, governmental military departments and institutes, Veterans Admin- istration hospitals, and industry." Most people involved in these studies were "captive groups"—charity ward patients, civil prisoners, mental retardees, members of the military services, the investigators' own laboratory personnel, and the like. Such practices obviously raise grave ethical and moral problems. At issue here is not only the impropriety of physicians or researchers admin- istering possibly hazardous treatments without the proper consent of the subject. Equally questionable is the right of the subject to submit to such experiments even with his consent. On the other hand, a certain amount of experimentation is patently indispensable for the advance of medicine and in the treatment of innumerable patients. How far, and under what circumstances, can such experimentation be ethically justified? The author, therefore, scarcely comes to grips with the gravamen of the problem when he suggests that "greater safeguard for the patient than consent is the presence of an informed, able, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator, for it is recognized that patients can, when imperfectly

1 informed, be induced to agree, unwisely, to many things," or when he recommends "the practice of having at least two physicians (the one caring for the patient and the investigator) involved in experimental situations," or even when he proposes the presentation of difficult ethical problems "to a group of the investigator's peers for discussion and counsel." These suggestions are valuable as far as they go. They certainly would help to prevent some current abuses, such as the excessive zeal of young am- bitious physicians seeking promotion by proving themselves as investigators, or the inordinate rewards, functioning as bribes, held out to participating prisoners, not to mention more common pressures, inducements and mis- representations which destroy the whole concept of free consent. But these suggestions are inadequate on two major counts. First, they limit the problem to securing the subject's free and informed consent, whereas in fact the subject may have neither the right nor the competence to grant any consent, even if freely given. Second, they assume that the physician or the investigator or their peers can pass such critical ethical judgments, whereas in fact the assessment of ethical and moral values is completely outside the purview of medical science, being properly within the domain of the moral, not medical, expert. No amount of medical erudition or expertise can by itself provide the ethical criteria necessary for verdicts that may involve life-and-death decisions or the sacrifice of one life or limb for the sake of another. Competent medical opinion is essential to supply the factual data on which such decisions are based; but the decisions themselves, since they involve value judgments, require moral specialists or the guidance of independent moral rules. Ability, conscientiousness, compassion and responsibility are no substitute for competent and reliable knowledge of what is right or wrong, ethical or unethical, particularly when human life is at stake—possibly both the life of the subject and the lives that might be saved through the experiment. At least this certainly is the Jewish view. It emphatically maintains that moral questions of such gravity cannot be resolved simply by reference to the fickle whims of the individual conscience or of public opinion, but only by having recourse to the absolute standards of the moral law which, in the case of Judaism, has its authentic source in the Divine revelation of the Holy Writ and its duly qualified interpreters. What cannot be stated with the same certainty and precision is the definition of the Jewish attitude to the problem at hand. Since this is a rather new question, there are as yet too few relevant rabbinic rulings published for a firm opinion to be chrystalized and authoritatively accepted. All that can here be attempted is to scan the sources of Jewish law for views and judgments bearing on our issue. But it must be stressed that the resultant conclusions are entirely tentative, and any verdict in a practical case would be subject to endorsement or revision by a competent rabbinical authority duly considering all the facts and circumstances involved.

2 To this writer there appear to be ten basic Jewish principles affecting the issue and ultimately determining the solution. We will list them seriatim, adding to each item the relevant sources and considerations.

1. Human life is sacrosanct, and of supreme and infinite worth. Life is of itself the summum bonum of human existence. The Divine law was ordained only "that man shall live by it."2 Hence any precept, whether religious or ethical, is automatically suspended if it conflicts with the interests of human life,3 the exceptions being only idolatry, murder and immorality (adultery and incest)—the three cardinal crimes against G-d, one's neighbor and oneself—as expressly stipulated in the Bible itself.4 The value of human life is infinite and beyond measure, so that any part of life—even if only an hour or a second—is of precisely the same worth as seventy years of it, just as any fraction of infinity, being indivisible, remains infinite. Accordingly, to kill a decrepit patient approaching death constitutes exactly the same crime of murder as to kill a young, healthy person who may still have many decades to live.5 For the same reason, one life is worth as much as a thousand or a million lives6—infinity is not increased by multiplying it. This explains the unconditional Jewish opposition to deliberate euthanasia as well as to the surrender of one hostage in order to save the others if the whole group is otherwise threatened with death.7

2. Any chance to save life, however remote, must be pursued at all costs. This follows logically from the preceding premises. Laws are in suspense not only when their violation is certain to lead to the preservation of life, but even when such an outcome is beset by any number of doubts and improbabilities.8 By the same token, in desperate cases even experimental and doubtful treatments or medications should be given, so long as they hold out any prospect of success. (But see also #9 below.)

3. The obligation to save a person from any hazard to his life or health devolves on anyone able to do so. Every person is duty bound not only to protect his own life and health,9 but also those of his neighbor.10 Anyone refusing to come to the rescue of a person in danger of losing life, limb or property is guilty of transgressing the biblical law "Thou shalt not stand upon the blood of thy neighbor."11 It is questionable, however, how far one must, or may, be prepared to risk one's own life or health in an effort to save one's fellow; the duty, and possibly the right, to do so may be limited to risking a less likely loss for a more likely gain.12 In any event, when there is no risk involved, the obligation to save one's neighbor from any danger is unconditional. Hence the refusal of a doctor to extend medical aid when required is deemed tantamount to blood- shed, unless a more competent doctor is readily available.13

3 4. Every life is equally valuable and inviolable, including that of criminals, prisoners and defectives. In the title to life and in its value, being infinite, there can be no distinction whatever between one person and another, whether innocent or guilty (except possibly persons under final sentence of death14), whether healthy or crippled, demented and terminally afflicted. Thus, even a person's inviola- bility after death and his rights to dignity are decreed in the Bible specifically in relation to capital criminals, created like everyone else "in the image of God."15 Insane persons can sue for injuries received, even though they cannot be sued for inflicting them because of the legal incompetence.10 The saving of physically or mentally defective persons sets aside all laws in the same way as the saving of normal people.17

5. One must not sacrifice one life to save another, or even any number of others. This follows from the preceding principle (see also #1 above). The Talmud deduces the rule that one must not murder to save one's life (except in self-defense) from the "logical argument" of "how do you know that your blood is redder than your neighbor's?", i.e. that your life is worth more than his.18 This argument is also applied in reverse: "How do you know that his blood is redder than yours?" to explain why one must not surrender one's own life to save someone else's.For reasons given above (#1), there also cannot be any difference between saving one or more lives.

6. No one has the right to volunteer his life. In Jewish law the right to expose oneself to voluntary martyrdom is strictly limited to cases involving either resistance to the three cardinal crimes (see above) or "the sanctification of G-d's Name," i.e. to die for one's religious faith. To lay down one's life in any but these rigidly defined cases is regarded as a mortal offense,20 certainly when there are no religious considerations involved.-1 The jurisdiction over life is not man's (except where such a right is expressly conferred by the Creator), and killing oneself by suicide, or allowing oneself to be killed by unauthorized martyrdom, is as much a crime as killing someone else.22

7. No one has the right to injure his own or anyone else's body, except for therapeutic purposes. Judaism regards the human body as Divine property,23 surrendered merely to man's custody and protection. It is an offense, therefore, to make any incisions24 or to inflict any injuries on the body, whether one's own or another person's.2n One may not as much as strike a person, even with his permission, since the body is not owned by him.26 Such injuries, including

4 even amputations,27 can be sanctioned only for the overriding good of the body as a whole, i.e. the superior value of life and health.

8. No one has the right to refuse medical treatment deemed necessary by competent opinion. In view of the ban on the voluntary surrender of life (#6 above), the patient's consent is not required in Jewish law for any urgent operation.28 His lay opinion that the operation is unnecessary, or his declared desire to risk death rather than undergo the operation, can have no bearing on the medical expert's duty to perform the operation if he considers it essential. His obligation to save life and health is ineluctable (see #3 above) and is altogether independent from the patient's wishes or opposition. The conscientious physician may even have to expose himself to the risk of mal- practice claims against him in the performance of this superior duty.

9. Measures involving some immediate risks of life may be taken in attempts to prevent certain death later. Jewish law specifically permits the administration of doubtful or experimental cures if safer methods are unknown or not available. In fact, the authorities encourage giving a terminal patient a possibly effective drug even at the grave risk of hastening his death should it prove fatal, if the alternative to this risk is the patient's certain death from his affliction later. In that case, the chances of the drug either bringing about his recovery or else accelerating his death need not-even be fifty-fifty; any prospect that it may prove helpful is sufficient to warrant its use, provided the majority of the specialists con- sulted are in favor of its employment.29 The same considerations would of course apply to doubtful surgical operations in a desperate gamble to save a patient.

10. There are no restrictions on animal experiments for medical purposes. The strict Jewish law against inflicting cruelty on animals30 is inoperative in respect of anything done to promote human health.31 This sanction clearly includes essential animal vivisection too,32 provided always that every care is taken to eliminate any avoidable pain and that such experiments serve practical medical ends, and not purely academic investigations into animal psychology or other purposes without any bearing on human welfare.33 From these principles we may now tentatively reach the following conclusions in regard to medical experimentation: 1. Possibly hazardous experiments may be performed on humans only if they may be potentially helpful to the subject himself, however remote the chances of success are.

5 2. It is obligatory to apply to terminal patients even untried or uncertain cures in an attempt to ward off certain death later, if no safe treatment is available. 3. In all other cases it is as wrong to volunteer for such experiments as it is unethical to submit persons to them, whether with or without their consent, and whether they are normal people, criminals, prisoners, cripples, idiots or patients on their deathbed. 4. If the experiment involves no hazard to life or health, the obligation to volunteer for it devolves on anyone who may thereby help to promote the health interests of others. 5. Under such circumstances it may not be unethical to carry out these harmless experiments even without the subject's consent, provided the anticipated benefit is real and substantial enough to invoke the precept of "Thou shalt not stand upon the blood of thy neighbor." 6. In the treatment of patients generally, whether the cures are tested or only experimental, the opinion of competent medical experts alone counts, not the wishes of the patient; and physicians are ethically required to take whatever therapeutic measures they consider essential for the patient's life and health, irrespective of the chance that they may subsequently be liable to legal claims for unauthorized "assault and battery." 7. Wherever possible, exhaustive tests of new medications or surgical procedures must first be performed on animals. These should, however, be guarded against experiencing any avoidable pain at all times.

6 NOTES

1. Henry K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clin- 19. Hagahoth Maimuni, Hil. Y'sodei ha- ical Research," in New England Torah, 5:7; see Jewish Medical Journal of Medicine, vol. 274, no. 24 Ethics, p. 98. (June 16, 1966), pp. 1354-1360. 20. Maimonides, Hil. Y'sodei ha-Torah, 2. Lev. 18:5. 5:4.

3. Yoma 85b. 21. See Jewish Medical Ethics, p. 53. 4. P'sahim 25a and b; Yoreh De'ah, 195:3; 157:1; based on Deut. 6:5 22. Based on Gen. 9:5 and commentaries. and 22:26. 23. Maimonides, Hil. Rotzeah, 1:4. 5. Maimonides, Hil. Rotzeah, 2:6. 24. Lev. 21:5 and commentaries. 6. Cf. "Whoever saves a single life is as he saved an entire world" (Sanhed- 25. Hoshen Mishpat, 420:1 ff, 31. rin 4:5). 26. Tanya, Shulhan 'Arukh, Hoshen 7. Yoreh De'ah, 157:1, gloss, end. For Mishpat, Hil. Nizkei ha-Guph, 4. further details, see my Jewish Med- ical Ethics, 1962, p. 45 ff. 27. Maimonides, Hil. Mamrim, 2:4.

8. Orah Hayyim, 329:2-5. 28. Jacob Emden, Mor u-K'tzi'ah, on Orah Hayyim, 228; see my Journal 9. Yoreh De'ah, 116; Hoshen Mishpat, of a Rabbi, 1966, p. 158 f. 427:9-10. 29. Jacob Reischer, Sh'vuth Ya'akov, 10. Hoshen Mishpat, 426:1; 427:1-10. part 3, no. 75; Solomon Eger, Gil- 11. Lev. 19:16 and Rashi a.l. yon MaHaRSHA on Yoreh De'ah, 155:5; see Jewish Medical Ethics, p. 12. Beth Yoseph, Hoshen Mishpat, 426; 263, note 69. Tcr details, see Jewish Medical Ethics, p. 96 f. 30. Hoshen Mishpat, 272:9, gloss; based on Ex. 23:5. 13. Yoreh De'ah, 336:1. 31. Even ha-'Ezer, 5:14, gloss. 14. See Orah Hayyim, Mishnah B'rurah, Biur Halakha, 329:4. 32. Sh'vuth Ya'akov, part 3, no. 71; J. M. 15. Deut. 21:23 and Nahmanides a.l.; Breisch, Helkath Ya'akov, nos. 30 see also Hulin lib. and 31. See also Journal of a Rabbi, p. 170. 16. Baba Kamma 8:4. 33. See responsa cited in preceding note, 17. See note 14 above. and my "The Medical Treatment of Animals in Jewish Law," in The 18. Yoma 82b; but see also Keseph Journal of Jewish Studies, London, Mishneh, Hil. Y'sodei ha-Torah, 5:5. 1956, vol. v, p. 207 ff.

7 SYSTEMATIC METHODS OF TORAH STUDY

CYRIL DOMB

Prof. Domb is Professor of Theoretical Physics at King's College, University of London, and Honorary President of the Association of Ortho- dox Jewish Scientists of Great Britain.

1. Introduction The ideas formulated in this paper were first put forward at the Annual Convention of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists of Great Britain in 1962, and subsequently in lectures to the affiliate Associations in the United States and Israel. They crystallized into a published paper in April 1965 (P.A.I. Views, Nisan 5725), and following standard scientific practice, reprints were distributed to people who might be interested. It is gratifying to report a substantial reaction and correspondence which drew attention to the work of Torah scholars of which I was unaware, and helped to elucidate some of the points raised. In the past, Torah scholars have been reluctant to venture into print without the most careful deliberation, following the Rabbinic dictum IPIJIB 13»N\y 1TT VT> JihJitt l3>N\y un by nptn. However, in our own day the facilities for printing and publication have increased enormously, and a new type of published article, serving primarily as a basis for discussion, can be envisaged. By this means the scope of the traditional method of education through pilpul talmidim, discussions among students, can be greatly extended, and ideas and suggestions subjected to a much greater variety of criticism than was previously possible. In the present revision of the paper, the most useful observations and comments have been included in discussion sections following the original text. From these sections it will be seen how Torah students all over the world have been thinking about the same problems; and the plea to be made in Section 7 for an adequate Torah information service will perhaps receive suitable reinforcement. Jewish tradition has always stressed the all-embracing applicability of Torah. It seems to me that inevitably a converse proposition must be valid— that every experience or training in life can be utilized for Torah purposes. The present paper is an attempt to suggest practical methods by which scientific training can be adapted to the service of Torah.

9 2. Orthodox Jewish Scientists and Torah Study As Orthodox Jewish scientists, we have all undergone scientific training in our respective subjects; we have been educated and have learned to educate ourselves in these secular fields. We are also Orthodox Jews, and presumably this means that we all have regular shi'urim—that is, we have a regular program in which we try to improve our knowledge of Torah. But I suggest that there is a great disparity between the way in which we treat our scientific studies and the way in which we treat our Torah studies, which regrettably is very much to the detriment of the latter. We take our scientific studies seriously; we have notebooks and filing cabinets, and when we lecture we use blackboards and lantern slides and all the other aids provided by modern technology. We also solve problems which help us to understand what is going on in science. (Anyone who has had to teach mathematics knows perfectly well that it is impossible to make much progress merely by passively reading books. You have to work out solutions for yourself which increase your understanding.) We have textbooks at all levels which help us to learn particular branches of a subject, and we also have research literature which helps us to keep at the forefront of progress. One of the most important parts of training in research is to know how to find one's way around the literature. Given any research problem, a competent scientist can within a short period of time dig up all the relevant literature on the subject; even if he does not understand it, he has a mastery of the system by which it is classified. I suggest that by contrast, our Torah study is largely an armchair study. We listen passively; we rarely put pencil to paper; we study a bit of one massekhta here and a bit of another there without any coherent plan. In fact, by and large our approach can reasonably be described as "batlonish." Our motivation may be a worthy one, to fulfill the mitzvah of regular study of Torah, but we often lack the element of worrying out and getting to the bottom of a difficulty which is envisaged by our Rabbis when they say Ji>aa\y mm mi yn. To make real progress, you have to harass yourself with a problem until it almost drives you to distraction. Every scientist has had this experience in his scientific work. You have problems which drive you almost crazy, and do not let you sleep at night. I wonder how many people have had the same sort of feeling about a Torah problem. And how often do we look back at what we have learned in a given year, and assess whether we have made any progress, whether we have something positive to show? My purpose in this paper is not to give a musar talk, but to put forward a number of practical suggestions. I would particularly like to examine the traditional Jewish sources on this subject, because I think that an objective

10 study of tradition will show how enlightened in matters of education, and how systematic in approach, our Rabbis were—but unfortunately, we often ignore their instruction. I would like to try to persuade people to follow the genuine tradition and to explore avenues by which the ideas of hazal can be fulfilled in our own day; I suggest that we should try to exert our influence on general Jewish education in this direction. Finally, we should try to make use of any modern technological help which is available and mobilize it to assist in the study of the Torah. I think that the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists is particularly well qualified for this task.

3. Language Let me start right at the beginning; I shall make a few suggestions which seem to be logical, and shall then try to show how they are borne out by traditional sources. Since the T'nakh and many major Jewish works are in Hebrew, it is common sense that the first thing one must do is learn the Hebrew language. This is precisely what the Rabbis tell us to do. On the verse in the Sh'ma', oi DD>31 UN omN on*mtn, the Sifrei states (partially quoted by Rashi): na^Di vmpn iiwbn my iro PIN pnrnnvo IIQN INDQ mp> min naba u>ni \y*npn yivfr my ino v* ow rmn The first task of a father is to speak to his child in Hebrew and to teach him the Torah, and if he does not do this it is as if he buries him, because he fails to give him the key to the traditional sources, which are the life- blood of Jewish studies. A knowledge in I'shon ha-kodesh precedes and is an essential requisite to limmud Torah. Here I may interpolate that it is irrelevant whether you are a Zionist or not, and whether you like Ashkenazi or Sefardi pronunciation; these are trivial points about which a great fuss has been made, but they are really of very small importance in comparison with the real problem of acquiring a basic knowledge of the Hebrew language. There are moderately good textbooks available for teaching Hebrew, but I think that they could be substantially improved with a little effort.

Second only in importance to I'shon ha-kodesh is I'shon aramith, Ara- maic. I suggest that this is our true "mamme loshen." People try to talk about Yiddish as "mamme loshen," but this is valid historically only for the Ashkenazi communities in the past few hundred years. I am sure that Ram- bam did not speak Yiddish, and probably Rashi also did not. On the other hand, Aramaic can legitimately be called "mamme loshen" because (as the Maharsha points out in M'gillah 3a) three of our Mothers did come from Aram Naharaim; Rivkah, Rahel and Leah certainly spoke Aramaic, and I suggest that even Sarah spoke Aramaic. There is a tradition that even at

11 Mount Sinai the natural language that was spoken among the people was Aramaic, and that therefore the discussion and interpretation were given in Aramaic. Echoes of these ideas are found throughout traditional Jewish literature, and are reflected in the halakhah. Now anyone who has learned Gemara must have become familiar with the following difficulty. You suddenly come across an Aggadic passage where the Gemara plunges wholeheartedly into Aramaic, and you find yourself completely lost. You look to Rashi, who is normally the great help to understanding everything in the Talmud, but Rashi says nothing. He automatically assumes that we know Aramaic, and takes it for granted that this is an elementary requisite for any person who is going to start studying seriously. Where does Rashi assume that one has acquired one's knowledge of Aramaic? There is a halakhah that enables one to acquire a good working knowledge of Aramaic, but unfortunately it is somewhat neglected nowadays. The Gemara states in B'rakhoth 8a

oirm mm n-)pn o>3v *mun oy vnvvno oV?>y> obiyt? that every week a person must go over the complete text of the Sidra twice, and the Targum once; and this is brought as a din in the Shulhan 'Arukh. Tosafoth immediately asks what is meant by Targum; does it simply mean translation? Perhaps if we live in an English-speaking country, Targum means the translation in English. Tosafoth, for very good reasons, rejects this interpretation. I suggest as an additional background reason that there is no better method of acquiring a good basic knowledge of Aramaic than by reading the Targum. You are familiar with the Torah text, and this means that you are reading sentences the translation of which you know at least roughly. There are of course certain passages in which the Targum deviates from the direct text, and these are likely to need special attention, but Rashi usually comments on them. Again, those who have studied Rashi extensively will know how often, when he is in difficulty over a new word, he refers back to the Targum somewhere in the Torah or the T'nakh; but this extremely good approach has unfortunately not been followed. There must be many people who have had experiences similar to mine, who have learned Gemara for ten, fifteen or even more years and yet cannot express even a simple sentence like "I am going home tonight" in Aramaic, because they have no basic grasp of the language.

I should perhaps elaborate a little on the way in which one should carry out sh'nayim Mikra v-ehad Targum, because it is instructive to look at the discussion in the Gemara on this topic. One of the Talmudic Rabbis, who was a leading Rosh Yeshivah, had duties which kept him busy during the yarhei kallah, and he found it very difficulty to snatch time to go through the Sidra; he therefore wanted to go through all the Sidras together on 'Erev Yom Kippur. He was informed, however, that this was not 'im ha-tzibbur;

12 the correct interpretation is from the time of Minhah on the previous Shab- bath until the reading of the Sidra on the following Shabbath—i.e., we have a whole week in which to complete each Sidra. I think that there is an important pedagogical principle involved here, namely that if you try to absorb too much at once, little will remain. I therefore suggest that if you divide the week so that you cover one parashah a day with the Targum, you will not find it excessively difficult, and you will find that you can make quite rapid progress. I started this myself only a year or two ago, and found to my great satisfaction that I soon began to follow clearly portions of the Shabbath service which are in Aramaic; I learned, for example, that the phrase u-masge I'me- 'vad tav'van u-k'shot is simply the Targum of v-rav hesed ve-emeth. I learned differences between the meanings of roots in Hebrew and Aramaic; for example, RH"M in Hebrew means "to have mercy," whereas in Aramaic it means "to love" (va-ye'ehav Yitzhak is rendered as u-r'ham Yitzhak). But perhaps more important, I learned the precise meaning of key phrases in the Gemara which I had been familiar with from childhood. In Sukah, for example, gud ahith m'hitzatha means "stretch and pull down the partition," and gud asik m'hitzatha means "stretch and raise the partition." But even regular occupation with the Targum is no substitute for a text- book, and there is a real need for someone to undertake the task of producing such a work, following accepted standards of good mathematical texts with graded examples. There are one or two excellent preliminary introductions, "An Introduction to the Aramaic of the Babylonian Talmud" by Hyman Klein, and Eshnav ha-Talmud by E. Z. Melamed, which are by no means as well known or as widely read as they should be; and there is also Dikduk Aramith Bavlith by J. N. Epstein, which is more in the nature of a treatise. A suitable welding of this and other available material should not be too difficult a task.

Discussion

Comment from a letter by Rabbi M. Eisemann (Philadelphia): "The first point which Prof. Domb makes is the importance of learning Loshon Hakodesh as a preparation to learning Torah. He bases this on the Sifre which states the obligation of the father to teach his son Loshon Hakodesh as soon as he can talk. I can hardly imagine that he is trying to Pasken from a Sifre when both in the Rambam and Shulchon Oruch we have Hilchos Talmud Torah. Both bring the Sifre and both omit the part about teaching Loshon Hakodesh! This obviously means that le'halocho we do not Pasken this Sifre. Such a conclusion is elementary and the problem is to find out why they do not Pasken this way. There exists a Teshuvo from the Satmarer Rav Shlito to explain this. Whether his explanation is the right one or not

13 (and there is no reason to doubt this), the fact remains that it is not brought le'halocho . . In reply I must first point out that it has never been my intention in any paper I have written to lay down a p'sak din for all Israel on Talmud Torah or any other subject. Secondly, we would be ill advised to ignore everything outside the Shulhan 'Arukh as far as practical conduct is concerned. The whole of Pirkei Avoth is of major importance for wide, general principles of moral conduct and education. I have been told by many talmidei hakhamim that all statements there, even if brought in the name of an individual, are indisputably accepted by all authorities. One of the most important sources on Talmud Torah is the sixth Perek (B'raitha shel Kinyan ha-Torah), which includes a vital list of 48 methods of acquiring Torah knowledge. Yet hardly any of this is quoted in the Shulhan 'Arukh.

Rabbi Eisenmann's challenge has served the useful purpose of stimulating me to seek further suport for the procedure I had outlined among recognized Torah leaders. Let me first point out that in addition to the Sifrei, the obligation to teach I'short ha-kodesh is mentioned in the Tosefta at the beginning of Hagigah, and in the Y'rushalmi at the end of the third Perek of Sukah: mill y\vb 1>1N lilb ymThe importance which Ram- bam attaches to this subject can be gauged from his comment on Thv mstfl vnt >171 in Avoth: wTtpn iwb un!? ywo. I cannot conceive that Rashi would have included the Sifrei in his commentary on such an important verse in the Torah unless he intended to recommend it as a practical guide. It is also quoted by the Mord'khai at the end of the third Perek of Sukah, and by the Halakhoth G'doloth in the section on Hilkhoth Lulav.

In more recent times, Rabbi Z. H. Chayes z.l. points out (Responsa Im- rei Binah, note at end of No. 2) that knowledge of the Hebrew language, i.e. how to speak Hebrew, is a separate mitzvah. He draws attention to the Y'rushalmi (Shabbath 1, 3, end):

• ..vmpn iai»i yiicj mp wrm >» ba w ova >>JI min o*»yn mnv ft nv>aio Rabbi B. H. Epstein z.l. refers to the matter in his commentary on D'varim 11, 19, and considers that the Bavli text in Sukah 42a should also contain the reference to I'short ha-kodesh. He mentions that he has published a special monograph Safah l'Ne'emanim (Warsaw 5653) in which he discusses in detail the importance of this mitzvah, and suggests possible reasons for its omission from the halakhic codes.

It is fitting also to quote from the writings of the outstanding nineteenth century educator Rabbi S. R. Hirsch z.l. (Horeb, vol. 2, p. 409; translation

14 by Dayan Dr. I. Grunfeld, Soncino 1962):* "The indispensable basis of all is knowledge of the language, the mother tongue and the tongue of the Torah. From an early age every child in Israel should become familiar con- currently with the language of his country and with that of the writings which are to guide his life—namely, Hebrew. In and from these writings he should derive his understanding of things and their relations, from them his ideas should be illustrated and clarified, from an early age his spiritual life should be developed by them. Anyone who realizes how a man's whole way of thinking takes its stamp and coloring from the language in which he speaks and thinks will agree with our Sages in regarding it as a matter of some consequence that the child should learn the holy language of the Scripture at an early age.** With it you place in his hands the key to realizing that the Scriptures ought to be the basis and source of his life, and also making them actually his constant companions in life. Begin, therefore, with the language, and let him first read the Torah more with a view to enriching his knowledge of the language. But at the same time enrich him with such knowledge of the subject matter of the Torah as he can grasp ..." Finally, I was encouraged by the remarks of a gadol of our own day, Rabbi Meshullam Rath z.l., who passed away a few years ago in Jerusalem. Rabbi Meshullam was asked by Rabbi Meir Shapiro z.l., the founder of the famous Lublin Yeshivah, and later by Rabbi Isaac Herzog z.l., the late Chief Rabbi of Israel, to prepare a comprehensive syllabus for Torah study. This was published p'osthumously as a pamphlet entitled L'Amelim b'Torah (ob- tainable from ris>n ,25 onb n>a'm /"ovmn bNn\y> ann). Between the ages of 5 and 7 are included Jinay Tta>r»ai nNnp "rtlTl the section for ages 9-11 contains rpniNn pwbfl pTTp*T, and the following footnote expresses far more forcibly than I have done the significance of the Aramaic language: OW»M... tnbp)iN OMJI na*r roanb NSNNA npnp*n JI>»*IN p\yb Jiy>*T> o»wrT»m >»bvnvm >baan *n»bnn >*m roanb on... bN>ny p irm> np>Jii mb>£>n n«a IWN *tab» nnn by JPHMNTI nawn nyvp *TN» nsiro b"t cpyuanpn o>ptnan va manvo vtnobip n»ai iwba onu by tN nay iiwb Nin ON a"m> b>b bv "mi ba„ Jib>an ntna by nbn b"t o»ro*T»n am 'nn ptpton oann opv ly ,*T>ny pwba Nanbw inN rottNa nn>n n\yN ri>anN iivyb pvtpn o"y mn ntron mnnbyji ba n'MNb ny>spi no nat?a b"t yaynntt pNan onann npya i»*rp taai) ib\y nban inca a"nai n"op '>v N"n yay> nb>Nv 't?ai v?"nn ">v nyn>o yovob ND>N NJivaa NJiabn ronai ronai (w"iy> a"m> b>b Juruna .o>an nioipoa N3Hb Naw Ji>»nN iwb

* Many of the above sources were obtained from the review of Horeb by Yonah Emmanuel in Ha-Ma'yan, vol. 5, No. 4. ** The Sifrei is here quoted in a Hebrew footnote.

15 4. Sequence of Study In regard to the order of learning, our Rabbis have instructed us to commence with T'nakh, proceed to Mishnah, and thence to Gemara. Five years are needed to complete each of the first two stages, and the serious study of Gemara does not therefore commence until the age of fifteen years. Although this simple and logical program has been reemphasized by g'dolim in all generations (including our own), it is still largely neglected. It suffices to quote the words of Maharal on this subject (taken from Tif'ereth Yisrael, Chapter 56). "However, in these times everything that can possibly be opposite to the right order is usual among us. When a little boy is eight or nine years old he begins to learn Gemara, at a time, surely, when the level of understanding required is far beyond his capacity. It is certain that a person will never be able to retain in his mind concepts which he cannot relate to his own understanding, particularly concepts in Torah, which is divine and above all else. It follows that nothing is so easily displaced from a person's mind as Torah (as has been explained above). As we learn in Hagigah 15b, "Gold and glass cannot equal it, nor can vessels of fine gold be offered in exchange for it"—these refer to the words of Torah, which are as hard to acquire as gold, and as easy to lose as glass! If this is so, of what value to the boy is this Gemara? For surely the most important knowledge which remains with a man for his whole life is what he learns as a child; and all this opportunity is wasted if a child young in years acquires knowledge which bears no relation to his intellectual capacity, and which cannot therefore last. That is why the learning of childhood does not have its proper effect, as we can observe with our own eyes. No sooner do they leave their teacher's house than they know nothing at all. And then this custom has an even worse consequence—that when the child grows older and is due to learn Gemara he ought to start on a firm foundation of Mish- nah, which is the pillar on which the Gemara rests ... He who lacks the Mishnah has no foundation." I will not develop this argument further since it has been so admirably formulated in the article by Rabbi S. A. Halpern, "Talmud Without Tears" (Yeshurun, Vol. 1, 2; reprinted in Intercom, Vol. XII, No. 2). I have never been able to fathom why this system has been rejected almost completely by the Torah world. The excuse usually offered, that this program was not meant for our own day, cannot be taken seriously. During a recent visit to Israel I heard the argument advanced that we do not nowadays accept the system of Maharal. The obvious answer to this is that the system was not first advanced by Maharal; he is merely explaining the system of hazal. Even an adult is bidden to divide his study time into three parts and devote a third to each of the above subjects: Mikra, Mishnah, Gemara.

16 Here there is an escape clause based on a view of Tosafoth that the Talmud is a mixture of all three elements, aiid one can therefore fulfill one's duty by spending all available time studying it. However, even this can only be valid if the references and comments on T'nakh in the Talmud are given serious attention, and not merely glossed over. The great Talmudist Rabbi Ya'akov of Lissa (author of Havath Da'ath and N'thivoth ha-Mishpat), in his ethical will, urges his children to organize separate shi'urim in Mikra, Mishnah and Gemara. He adds that they should pay no heed to his own current practice, since in his early youth, when laying the foundation of his Jewish knowledge, he followed the practice which he recommends to them. Recently a comprehensive booklet was prepared describing all the public shi'urim currently in progress in London. There were 44 shi'urim in Talmud and only one in T'nakh—which was for ladies!

The logical reason for this plan of hazal is clear. The Torah is a complete unit (Tosefta Sanhedrin 7,5: she-kol ha-Torah 'inyan ehad). In studying Baba Kama you come across material connected with Sh'vi'ith, in studying B'rakhoth you find reference to Oholoth, in studying Kiddushin you are involved in a discussion relating to M'nahoth. If the knowledge of unfa- miliar topics is acquired ad hoc without reference back to its source of origin, it is almost impossible to attain a proper understanding of the issue under consideration. In this connection I think that the Association of Orthodox Jewish Sci- entists could make a useful contribution. It should be possible to select from the Mishnah and other sources of the Torah she-b'al Peh (Tosefta, Sifra, Sifrei, M'khilta, and Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds) a limited number of texts which embody the major principles of each massekhta. Our Rabbis already give us hints of how this should be done. Often we come across the prefix k'lal gadol amru, "a major principle was stated," or k'lal amru, "a general principle was stated." Such a principle is basic to the understanding of the whole massekhta. Thus in Ma'asroth two such principles are laid down in the first Mishnah which define the substances to which the law of ma'aser applies; the succeeding mishnayoth of the chapter consist of examples of the application of these principles. Our selection might then consist of the first Mishnah with one or two illustrative examples chosen from those which follow. One cannot become a baki without familiarity with all of the mishnayoth; but it should be possible to acquire an understanding of this aspect of the laws of ma'aser with much less.

Similarly, in his introduction to Tohoroth, Rambam stresses the importance of the first chapter of Kelim, which he urges us to learn by heart. Many of the other chapters of this massekhta, on the other hand, are concerned with detailed particular applications, and could be passed over in a preliminary study.

17 I would suggest that we aproach this problem as a five year course of introduction to Torah she-b'al Peh, involving perhaps a diploma at the end of the course. Seventy different credits would be needed to secure the diploma, 63 of them corresponding to the 63 massekhtoth of the Mishnah, and the remaining seven dealing with Talmudic principles, like hazakah, middoth she-ha-Torah nidresheth bahem, g'rama, migo, b'reirah, bittul. I have tried to show what is needed by preparing Introductions to Sh'vi'ith and Kilayim. The question may well be asked whether it is reasonable to suggest that scientists, many of whom are far from being talmidei hakhamim, can be trusted with a task of this kind. The answer is that the major work has already been done by g'dolim of our own and previous generations. It was magnificently started by Rambam, whose Mishneh Torah is a model of systematic exposition. His lack of reference to sources was remedied by subsequent commentators; the Tur and Shulhan 'Arukh discuss the views of other Rishonim; and in recent times the 'Arukh ha-Shulhan gives an excellent review of all major opinions on subjects discussed in the Shulhan 'Arukh. Currently we are privileged to witness the appearance of outstanding systematic works like the Talmudic Encyclopedia, but an Encyclopedia is still not a basis for elementary study. Our task is one of selection and presentation. We are called upon only to decide what is a principle and what is a detail, and although even this may give rise to discussion on borderline cases, there should be a wide area of general agreement. Hence the task which I have suggested can reasonably be classified as m'lakhah rather than hokhmah, and even with our limited Torah knowledge I think that we could tackle it.

Discussion

Further comment from Rabbi M. Eisemann: "Much more serious is his quote of the famous 'ben chomesh lemikro' and his flippant dismissal of the explanations which he was given in Eretz Yisroel as to why things are different today. Apart from the fact that this is also not brought le'halocho in the form in which it is in the mishno in Ovos, the whole argument is based on a wrong understanding of the word 'mishno' and an ignoring of the change from oral to book learning. Let me quote two passages from the big- gest and most complete compilation of Hilchos Talmud Torah, namely that of the Shulchan Oruch Horav: o>pit?a oyo \?y» VTttba y>NI ... nvsno ub ms nun nobn *mb b>njp\y» p ivrpwoi... aroi\y rmn nripb naba TN\Y... o>3\Y \yor» p NTVW *ry ibiD oi>n bD mini mnpb mpwnn tobo b*N yn\y p in \y\y tv nun omya obis O>n>23 oy nbiD nroavy mm Nnp>w ny pwnn on \y*npn itvyba :mn o>nat?» vnv o»3\y n\yy p rpn>\y

18 •robb o>ans vn Nb a"i vmpn n\yba i«y vaN n>n ianb b>rni»\y» sivnpn V7) *tb >a... o>»y\n Jimp^a rmnpn pn xnb»n >m>a mpwmn jmipin onoib vm ,ub\y nun laua NbN o*v»*a o>aina o>»y\?m mp»n ba *n»ba o>i\y 'n o>ptny m vm .na bya N-»p»n baa o>oy\?nv na by a M>i\Y»n F»»ba o>3W 'N a"nNi ,*TN» Jim o>oya jnpwjin oy ym y*T>b wnw *nobna 'n a"h*o ,o>»yv> >ba mpit?a mabn inv N>n naina na bya\y nnnn ba\y mn imai... mabnn bw o>»y*?n msp irmb>\y KbN ,na bya\y minn ba m»b>\y uab 7ab» iiavb VN uoab an oy jnpi»y Jiiabna oa moipon ana *n»bna a\?>n vanb •nabb ,i»sya v*Vb bai>v nwyob mabna ypyn by irr>»y>i **. o>ptnan bai> un... o>ptnai nabiia ivy *p*i» n\yy»b nabn ba nmnbi vanbi oy uttbb way una Kb pbi... o>pt?iam rmbJin ba i»sya *n»bb pn a"NY>» ,b*r>>va ifcsya *n»b>w o>amt? >a... on>»>aa y'ttin ba pw>Jin ... o>auia o>»y\3ni nnipin i>n Nbvy on>»>a "It now becomes obvious what a vast difference there must be in the philosophy of education today when compared with a time when there were no written texts and even the chumoshim did not exist with vowels and trop. At that time the whole stress was to give the child a rote knowledge of the vast body of the literature so that, having mastered this, he would be able to strike out on his own. Today when the literature, including the Torah Shebe'al Peh, is written, and therefore accessible, the purpose of teaching is to give the talmid the 'how' rather than the 'what.' The author states quite clearly why today the custom has changed.

"Now to the meaning of the word 'mishno,' and I quote from the same author:

jwmnam nvwnn baav o>»y\? >ba jiipioa mabn inv> ,ni\y»a w>bv>... -np*n on>N3Ji baa ,niina\!> mso ynnn vni>a inv> o*toioNn Jin»>»i •. • iawn> Tuva bbaa w> n>ai vy"Nim y"\ym -nun on>p In other words, we are dealing with a simple misunderstanding of the word 'mishno,' which in its true meaning covers all written and straightforward material available, including as quoted, what we call gemore, etc., and ex- cluding only what the mishno calls talmud, namely the analysis and pilpul involved in understanding and legislating. So even if he had been right in the application of the old 'ben chomesh lemikro' rule to our present conditions, he would still have been completely off the mark in saying that 'serious learning of the gemore before fifteen' is against the ideas of Chazal. "Last but not least in this connection ... the Rambam paskens (Talmud Torah 2:2) .. . '. . . and he (the teacher) sits and teaches them the whole day and part of the night,' which was the condition under which the rules laid down in the mishno applied . . . Given a situation where it seems that much of the child's day is taken up by non Torah studies, we are certainly

19 faced with the problem which the Shulchan Orach Horav states in these words: ha nb>nn -nob> Nb >*N ,-nobb bam van b>*n>va losyb toibwai... >o >a p M\YYB >N\SN U>N... -nobJin ba YNW nawon ba Nnpon napa run iotaK..vnob im wbvb a»n p^bi ,mn> noa y*n> ON v\?n ipt?a\y :mp>t?9n jnabn oyu onNaon o>pxnan ...va Nnp)v».. mabnn i>ao WN Jnabnn oy\? yv> wn "Obviously, as I said before, the situation which obtains in our schools, where at least half the day is taken up with secular studies, makes it imperative that the pupils be given the training for deep and analytical learning which they will then be able to use on their own, because if the terribly limited time were taken up by the more or less superficial learning required to cover the vast ground of all the literature, then by the time they left the yeshivo they would not have the equipment to enable them to remain anything but an Am Ho'oretz for the rest of their lives . . Again I wish to affirm that criticism of this kind is welcome. I think it is in order to quote from Baba Metzi'a 84a Rabbi Yohanan's assessment of the fruitful results of informed criticism, and the sterility of docile argument, in his remarks to Rabbi El'azar ben P'dath: "When I made a statement to Bar Lakisha he asked me 24 questions and I gave him 24 answers, which consequently led to a fuller comprehension of the law; while you say 'A Baraitha has been taught which supports you.'" May I first point out that in the time of Maharal perfectly good printed texts were available, and in this respect his period is no different from our own. But Maharal's analysis of the statement in Avoth embodies two major educational maxims which can be formulated in modern terminology as follows: (a) A child should be taught only material which is within his intellectual capacity; (b) Principles must be thoroughly understood before pro- ceeding to details. Neither of these maxims is in any way invalidated by the remarks of the Shulhan 'Arukh ha-Rav. But it has been gratifying to find support for the views which I put forward from Torah authorities of our own day. Firstly, in the pamphlet by Rabbi Meshullam Rath z.l. quoted previously we find the following complaint: -NNN o^ptnani o>\jnooni moani Nip-an mom nwob VN IWNI .imNoi oipi» vn* N>tnob*niNa o>wovo o>mnNni omv v>ab v*n»i bn^o i>Na inn by nbiyn >aa onato v>ovo> nys bai nan bN bpn io njnna nobn TVT JIN by W>N nm ib v *uai Nim v^nb yv o*>\?a *ny> /miNon bN o*rpion 101 ,>no nvn b\y na*n vao wN'vnyi oimt? pviai onrmNn >biabaa vyN vobn atyi .mm b\t> nn>oNb anpbi au>»bi vnobi nmb *TSI>a

20 tnyittipi M by >NE>P inns* laa i^Nai .(RV'aip JIIIK 'p»a) b"tn umn m >a */*nt>n bipbpi biaba by m» ipym unburn nyv imN py»a iVN ty /ma nwxn n>b\ mm najivmw on>> nann ub .bN*>\i»a nfomn Jimia ibib*n — ojuoai no>pni vmyav r>>»an bw votpn *n»bn *npa nnnb ,ni\tn>b rnpy vtnnb nbn mriN .b"t owywiti wjmto Rabbi Rath mentions in a footnote the following list of authorities in support of his statement: tnwin by vvmi V'i pna btr>v jnnan 'pa b"irm ^wan rvn * 'p»a b"t n"biyn ,innn iN\yai pnnNi 'a 'n*< *mai ,ib msoro 'pb mrunai rmayn nay o>*noyn >11 'pa b>\?ay\y '» ii>on mi ,niyiav> >ipt ,\y"y vya snaw '>n n»i n"»*i '>P f'i> upa n"an ,vbmrip» niaia 'p&b WNin by p"i> >nyo nap ntttpna b"t p"i> inapiri bya Kobyn p"iaN n»bv> ,a"*P vn* mn JV'iw bya ,p"a 'pabi VtoV apy> ,o"a»yin by m\y»n naaitt nap nmpna b"t aiabi N"n yay> nb>N\s> JV'iw 'pai 'a nbyn o>a\y niaia ny b*no iapa b"t notpna b"t '>bN Dai N3b>ii» iiNjin f«>thm 'a bioix via 'pai ,a"3p '>p ,O*TN nnbui 'pa N)b>n« i»bt '*> Nbaan i*T>»bm n"iN y"\y by iryiva *WH ,o»ab\f pi man tiyi ,rai a"a 'i tyw miayn \yn\tn TIP> 'P bya .YTPTI bipbpi biaba by H>anaa mil*

Secondly, a few years ago Rabbi Chayim Friedlander sh'lita, a leading Torah teacher in B'nai B'rak, started a new Talmud Torah, Torat Emet, which endeavors to follow the procedure outlined by hazal. Rabbi Fried- lander has published a pamphlet (available from P.O.B. 353, B'nai B'rak) entitled Leket Divrei G'dolim b'Seder ha-Limmud, in which most of the authorities referred to above are quoted in full. In an introduction he mentions that Rabbi Israel Salanter z.l. divided the mitzvah of limmud Torah into two parts, study of Torah and knowledge of Torah; to fulfill the second part, it is essential to heed the advice of hazal, reinforced by generations of subsequent g'dolim. I sincerely urge all who are concerned with Torah teaching to pay detailed attention to the contents of this pamphlet. In addition to the continued reiteration of the importance of T'nakh and Mishnah (and all interpret Mishnah in the literal sense), they will find other educational principles of major significance. Among these is the vital necessity of adequate repetition: "Rabbi Joshua ben Korhah says that one who studies Torah and does not repeat is like a farmer who sows and does not reap" (Sanhedrin 99a); what better method is there of stimulating repetition than suitable periodic exami- nations? Also emphasized is the need to differentiate clearly between p'shat and Midrash in the study of T'nakh, and to make sure of adequate familiarity with p'shat before embarking on Midrash.

21 Finally, Rabbi Eisemann mentions that the statement in Avoth is not quoted in the halakhic literature. I would suggest that this is because it is not intended to provide rigid, inflexible rules (e.g., no Mishnah may be opened before the age of 10, no Gemara before the age of fifteen), but rather to provide guiding principles to be borne in mind when planning a Torah program to suit one's own particular circumstances. Thus different points of view are expressed among g'dolim quoted in the pamphlet, some suggesting concentration of Mishnah study on Mo'ed, Nashim and N'zikin, which have practical application nowadays, while others consider that all six s'darim must be covered. Similarly, if only limited time is available, careful selection will be necessary. But I would certainly oppose the idea that the limited time should be devoted exclusively to Gemara. To me it seems that ipkha mistabra; one should insure that whatever Torah is studied in the time available should have a sufficiently broad and solid foundation to survive permanently.

5. Aids to Study. Background Knowledge. An element of intellectual snobbery is present in certain approaches to Torah study in which serious attention is paid only to analytical and logical arguments. However, an objective assessment of Torah literature must lead to the conclusion that all other branches of human knowledge have a contribution to make. Anyone who studies Z'ra'im cannot fail to be impressed by the profound agricultural knowledge which our Rabbis possessed. Simi- larly, in Hulin we find a detailed familiarity with the anatomy of animals and birds; in connection with the calendar, a thorough grasp of relevant astronomical data.

Of course, the thrust and parry of logical argument have an immediate and intrinsic appeal. But other aspects of Torah are no less important, and they can be equally stimulating if proper methods of acquiring and dissemi- nating information are used. The different categories of "work" on Shabbath are of paramount importance, but to understand them properly, technical information is usually necessary. We can learn from the example of Tosafoth Yom Tov (Shabbath 13,2) in connection with the "work" of weaving: "But I could not accept this interpretation, for when I wished to understand it, I endeavored to see how weaving was carried out in practice. When I did so, I could not reconcile the interpretation with practice. I could obtain agreement between the words of Abaye and the mechanism of weaving only by adopting an alternative interpretation ..." Visual aids of all kinds could well be exploited—carefully labelled diagrams in textbooks, blackboards and colored chalks in shi'urim, the preparation of three-dimensional scale models, and even the use of lantern slides.

22 I recently came across striking support for this idea in the new translation of Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah published by Mosad ha-Rav Kook, edited by Rabbi Yosef Kafah. Certain aspects of kilayim cannot be understood without diagrams, yet the reproductions given in most standard books are so poor as to be of little help. Rabbi Kafah states that he took particular care to use a manuscript authenticated by Rambam himself and tried to reproduce the original diagrams as clearly as possible. They are beautifully clear and well marked, and with the added help of a new translation in easy flowing Hebrew, many difficult portions become easily intelligible. The details of the construction and erection of the mishkan are considered of such importance by the Torah that no less than four complete sidroth, T'rumah, T'tzaveh, va-Yakhel, and P'kudei, and part of another sidra, Naso, are devoted to them. Rashi spends much time and effort trying to make them clear to us. They are of major halakhic significance, since the laws of Shabbath are based on the different m'lakhoth in the mishkan. Yet most people have no clear picture of the mishkan, and their minds register a blank when words and phrases like k'rasim, lulaoth, yadoth m'shulavoth, serah ha-'odef are enunciated. A few years ago I decided that it was time I made a serious effort myself to understand this portion of the Torah. First it was necessary to acquire a copy of Baraitha di'M'lekheth ha-Mishkan; I then found a small booklet by Rabbi Blumenthal, Ha-Mishkan v-Kelav, which was of invaluable help. Fi- nally I persuaded some friends to help me in constructing three-dimensional models of certain portions of the mishkan. It is a help if the model is as faithful as possible to the original, and in the construction of a keresh and its associated adanim by Dr. David Glick (an engineer by profession), knowledge of metallurgy was used to provide a low melting point alloy with approximately the specific gravity of silver. When I was in Israel recently I was thrilled to see the beautiful model constructed by Mr. Moshe Levin which demonstrates clearly how much art- istic creativity went into the design of the mishkan. Few have the skill and ability needed to construct such a faithful representation, but even simple models enable one to grasp the essential features. A knowledge of the topography of the Beth ha-Mikdash is essential not only for a proper study of massekhtoth like Tamid, Middoth and Yoma, and topics in Kodashim and Tohoroth, but also for an adequate appreciation of our daily prayers, so much of which is based on the regular routine of the Beth ha-Mikdash. Rabbi Meir Shapira had a full-scale model of the Beth ha-Mikdash installed in the main hall of the Lublin Yeshivah. When I talked in Jerusalem about this topic, a young Israeli physicist brought me in contact with his grandfather, Rabbi Moshe Rosenblit of Meah Shearim, who

23 had ingeniously designed a model of the Beth ha-Mikdash to be assembled from independent, prefabricated units. He hoped to persuade a manufactu- rer to put such units into production so that every Jewish school could re- construct its own model. It would be a service to Torah study to bring this idea to fruition. My brother-in-law, Rabbi A. S. Chaitowitz, kindly prepared for me a large-scale model of the rriizbeah (in the Beth ha-Mikdash). Following the instructions of R. 'Ovadiah Bertinoro on Mishnah Middoth, 3,1, he decided to make a model and fill it with concrete. Firstly, one gained from this a true impression of the size—some 1,000 people could stand on the top. Secondly, with the aid of the model basic items like hut ha-sikra, tapuah, y'sod, sovev were easily identified, and phrases which I had repeated mechan- ically every day, like 'alah va'kevesh u-fanah la'sovev and sh'yarei ha-dam hayah shofekh 'al y'sod d'romi, were clearly intelligible.

6. Serious Study If we are to take our Torah study seriously we must let our thoughts dwell actively on the background of any given subject and must not be satisfied with passive translations. We then find quite often that the picture which emerges differs substantially from the conventional view. I can illustrate this point by referring again to the k'rashim of the mishkan. If we think about the k'rashim we may be puzzled about the form of construction and function of the adanim. Let us first make a simple calculation of the weight of a keresh. The dimensions are given in cubits as 10 x 1 Vz x 1, and the volume is therefore 15 cubic cubits. Taking even as small a value for a cubit as 50 cm, and as low a density for shittim wood as .5 (the value for cedar), we still find for the weight of a single keresh 938 kg. or about one ton. The adanim were made of silver, whose specific gravity is 10.5, and their outer dimensions are given as 1 x 1 x 3A cubits. There is some debate about the precise size of the holowed out portion, but this only results in a small correction. Taking the hollowed portion as Vi x XA cubit, we find a total volume of s/s cubic cubit and a weight of 820 kg., or approximately .8 ton. Our first reaction to these simple facts (remebering that the mishkan contained 48 k'rashim and 96 adanim) is to revise our mental picture of the mishkan as a kind of high-class sukah, and to realize that it was a very solid and substantial structure. We can understand the significance of the Midrash on Sh'moth 39,33 (see Rashi), o>vnpn TAW nana OIK OW io>pnb n>n Nbv> i»>pnb YBM I>N Nbw, which suggests that the k'rashim stood up of their own accord, as no single person was able to stand them up because of their weight. The Midrash clearly appreciated the magnitude of this weight. But we also see that the

24 adanim lower the center of gravity of a keresh and hence render it much more stable against forces like the wind. It would be interesting to calculate the stability of such a system in any winds likely to occur. We also see that the problem of removing and manhandling a weight of 150 tons was no mean task, and we understand why 3,200 of the children of M'rari were required for this operation. And we also begin to recon- sider our picture of the wagons ('agaloth; Ba-Midbar 7) used in transporting the mishkan. Perhaps the term ha-bakar used in reference to the cattle which transported these heavy loads is to be interpreted as a whole team of oxen. Let us think further about the adanim, each of which we are told weigh- ed 3,000 sh'kalim (kikar la-aden). Using the dimensions given above, we should be able to give a direct estimate of the weight of a shekel. A simple calculation shows that one shekel ha-kodesh is approximately 273 grams; therefore One ordinary shekel is approximately 136 grams. But when we refer to the figures given by archeologists (11.39 grams—Biblical Encyclo- pedia), we find a discrepancy of a factor of 12. This is a point which requires serious thought. No doubt possible solutions suggest themselves, but each needs detailed investigation. It came as a surprise to me to find that amidst all the thought and speculation on the size of the shekel, none of the experts seems to have thought of carrying out such an elementary calculation. I think this illustrates how little attention is paid to internal evidence.

Let me take as another example a statement of the Gemara in Kiddushin 30a: "The rishonim were called sof'rim because they counted all the letters of the Torah; the vav of gahon marks half the number of letters of a sefer Torah, darosh darash half the number of words, v'hithgalah of verses." From this simple statement we learn how much methodical care was taken from the earliest times to preserve accurately the text of the Torah, and we have an answer to all the suggestions of emendation. "Rav Yosef asked, 'Does the vav itself belong to the first or second half?'." Not an intellectual question, but a factual inquiry of the highest importance, since the accuracy of a Torah text may depend on it. "Let us bring a sefer Torah and count! Did not Rabbah bar bar Hanah say, 'They did not move from there until they brought a sefer Torah and counted.'" A mundane task to count some 300,000 letters, but our Rabbis did not hesitate when the purpose was of such significance. However, the Gemara answers that it will not help, since we do not nowadays have accurate information on "full" or "shortened" spellings of words. Similarly, the Gemara states later, we do not have precise information on the terminations of verses. My own reaction as a scientist to this statistical information was to in- vestigate at least by how much our present s'farim are in error; and more particularly, to concentrate on word counts, about which the Gemara says nothing, and for which the possibilities of error seem far fewer. When I

25 lectured on this topic in Israel I suggested mobilizing my family for a week- ly task of counting each sidra; but I was advised to consult Mr. Eliner first, and he drew my attention to the preface by Rabbi Brecher to the Yiddish translation of the T'nakh (Y'hoash) where the statistics are recorded. I expected a possibility of an error of five or six, corresponding to words like Poti-Fera' which may be single or double; but to my great surprise, the error is 907Vz. Clearly there is a real problem here, and we all know from our scientific work that a major task is to differentiate between genuine and artificial problems. There are several possible suggestions—perhaps the term teivah needs further clarification, perhaps hyphenated words need special consideration; each needs serious investigation, and the investigation itself may lead to further topics for inquiry. These are two examples of how scientific training can be mobilized for the service of Torah; I am sure that there are many others.

Discussion

I am grateful to Rabbi S. A. Halpern, Dr. I. Yehuda, Rabbi S. Baum- garten, Rabbi E. Karnovsky, Rabbi Dr. E. Wiesenberg, Dr. D. Glick and others for correspondence and discussion which has led to the possibility of finding a consistent and reasonable description of the k'rashim and adanim. Firstly, it is worth noting that many rishonim were concerned about the weight difficulty. Thus, to quote from Ba'alei Tosafoth on the Torah: ". . . In the wilderness there were large forests from which the wood called shittim was taken, as it is written 'And Israel dwelt in Shittim,' 'And Joshua the son of Nun sent two men forth from Shittim,' the place taking its name frcii the forest ... It is a very light and smooth wood, as is evidenced from the fact that 48 k'rashim and their adanim, and the 'amudim and adanim of the courtyard, and the nine 'amudim of the mishkan, and five of each outer curtain, and four of the inner curtain, and their adanim and pegs were all drawn by eight oxen given to the sons of M'rari, as explained in Naso; since the k'rashim were each ten cubits high, 1 Vi cubits wide, and one cubit thick, we must conclude that the wood was very light, like the wood called 'madre' b'la'az." A similar comment on the lightness of the wood is made by Hiz- kuni. I shall return to the identification of shittim wood later. A comprehensive criticism of the conventional measurements used in describing the adanim has been given by Ya'akov Yehuda, the town architect of Safad. Adopting the figures given in the second paragraph of this section, which are based on the usual interpretation of Rashi, we find that only V* cubic cubit of the bottom cubit of the keresh remains attached, and 1V4 cubic cubits are cut away. Mr. Yehuda writes (private communication; to be published): "From elementary technical principles of construction it is difficult to understand why two thin protruding segments consisting of only

26 I6V2 percent of the base area of the keresh should be left to bear the whole of the weight, and put a particular strain on the region of section; it is un- reasonable to remove 83.4 percent of the volume of the lowest cubit of the keresh merely to create protrusions to insert into the adanim." He then goes on to estimate the weight of each of the adanim based on the above measurements, and arrives at a figure of 725.8 kg., very comparable to my own estimate above. He regards this figure as quite unacceptable, and therefore turns to examine more closely the texts of the rishonim. Ramban subjects Rashi's comments to the severe criticism that they do not seem to make sense, and that he has not interpreted the text of the Ba- raitha di'M'lekheth ha-Mishkan correctly. One of his suggestions is as follows: "But in my view this Baraitha did not provide a measurement of the portion cut away since the Torah gave no measurement of the thickness of the sides of the adanim." In order to defend Rashi against the attacks of Ramban, an insertion in brackets by an unknown author occurs in most of our texts, beginning "he wishes to say . . ." and ending "study this well and you will find that the complaint of Ramban is removed and his difficulty disappears." Mr. Yehuda suggests that this unknown author has been responsible for the spread of the conventional view. He quotes an alternative version of the Rashi text which might be interpreted in accordance with Ramban; and he points out that the suggestion of Ramban follows the idea that the Torah does not provide sur- plus information. If the weight of each of the adanim is given, it is possible to calculate the thickness. Similarly, although the length and breadth of each keresh are given, the thickness is not mentioned, since it can be derived from the interior width of the mishkan (ten cubits) and the width of its wall (eight k'rashim = 12 cubits; therefore thickness of two k'rashim — two cubits). Performing this calculation, Mr. Yehuda deduces that the thickness of the adanim is only 6 mm., so that the portion taken away from each keresh is very small (hence the term horetz = scrape away). The adanim thus have little influence on the center of gravity of the k'rashim, and should perhaps be regarded as protective shoes. To make a more precise estimate of the weight of the k'rashim, we must try to identify shittim wood. This is universally rendered "acacia," but a brief investigation shows little support for such an identification either in the Talmud or in the traditional Jewish commentaries. The Talmud (Rosh ha- Shanah 23a) fists ten types of erez and gives their Aramaic equivalents; the Aramaic equivalent of shittah is tornitha, which Rashi translates "pinier b'la'az." This is clearly associated with pine; a dictionary of Old French (Godefroy) translates "coniferous," and quotes from a 1611 dictionary: "The rosen tree, or any other whose fruit resembles a pine apple, as the great cedar, cypresse, etc."

27 We have quoted the commentary of Tosafoth that shittim must be extremely light. The French "madre" (Old English "maser") is usually taken as maple, but sycamore is also possible, and may be better here from the point of view of lightness (density ~.4). Acacia certainly does not satisfy this requirement; all varieties seem to be heavy, with densities varying from 0.8 to 1.0. Pine is a light wood (density ^-.5), but among the varieties of coniferous tree a particularly light wood which seems to meet all the requirements admirably is cypress (cupressus sempervirens lin, density This is native to the Middle East, grows very high, and has sufficient girth for a complete keresh to be cut out of a suitable tree. Regarding the durability of the wood, the following quotation from Turner, physician at Syon in 1548, should suffice (see "Timbers of the World," Alexander L. Howard, Mac- millan 1932): "The timber is light brown in color, hard and close-grained. The wood is easy to work, and gives off a penetrating, agreeable odor. It is very durable, lasts indefinitely under water, and longer than oak when used for vine props. In France and Italy it is considered excellent for furniture; and the doors of St. Peter's at Rome, which lasted from the time of Cons- tantine to that of Pope Eugene IV, nearly 1,000 years, were said to be made of cypress." Shakespeare also refers to this wood in "The Taming of the Shrew" II,i,353: "In ivory coffers I have stuffed my crowns; in cypress chests my arras counterpoints, costly apparel, tents, and canopies." It is interesting to note finally that Immanuel Low translates tornitha as cypress on linguistic grounds (see Pflanzennamen, p. 388). With this low density wood, taking a cubit as 48 cms., the weight of a keresh is now about 500 kg. or 1,000 lbs. This is still a considerable weight to maneuver and pass from one wagon to the next (Shabbath 98a). Using the new values for adanim and k'rashim we can revise our estimates of the total weight assigned to the children of M'rari:

50 k'rashim 10 x IV2 x 1 25 tons 70 'amudim 5x1x1 (equivalent) 11.7 100 silver adanim (taking 1 kikar = 48 kg.) 4.8 65 copper adanim 3.1 44.6 tons This corresponds to a weight of 11.2 tons per wagon drawn by two oxen. To find how reasonable such a load might be, an inquiry was made of the brewers, Messrs. Whitbreads, who use horse-drawn drays in the City of London. They limit the maximum load to four tons, although more might be possible. Road conditions in the wilderness were far worse; however, the pace of movement was much slower, and special oxen would have been selected. The figure above would thus seem to be near the limit of what is practicable. According to the view of Rabbi Judah that the k'rashim tapered

28 to a finger's breadth, an appreciable reduction of weight would be possible (8.4 tons if they tapered from the base, 9.8 tons if from the midpoint). However, an increase in wood density of a factor of three, as is necessary for acacia, would seem to make the load quite unmanageable.

In regard to the problem of word counts in the Torah, although I have received many suggestions of possible solutions, it is difficult to judge whether any of them is at all promising. Computer help could be valuable, and I understand that Dr. G. Weil of Strasbourg has already explored this avenue in other connections.

7. Information Retrieval I referred in the second section of this paper to the problem of "finding one's way around the literature." We are fortunate enough to witness in our day a great increase in Torah literature, including regular journals devoted to halakhah; but the distribution of information is still primitive and hap- hazard. We need a classification and abstracting system by means of which the serious Torah student can keek abreast of developments in other parts of the Torah world. In comparison with the flood of scientific literature in recent years, the problem should not prove difficult; and it is again a task for which members of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists should be particularly well qualified. The task of systematically ordering traditional Torah literature is monu- mental, and it is only extensive projects like the Talmudic Encyclopedia or the Responsa indexing of Dr. M. Elon which are making any impact. A substantial time must clearly elapse before projects of such magnitude are completed. However, current Torah literature should be much more manageable, and present-day resources should surely be adequate to produce a regular journal of Torah Abstracts. The basic work should be in the hands of professional Torah scholars, but the Association could be of help in classifying and in providing general technical advice.

ON THE USE OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ON SHABBATH AND YOM TOV LEO LEVI

Dr. Levi is a consulting physicist and Assistant Professor of Physics at the City College of the City University of New York, New York, N. Y. 1. Introduction The problem of using electrical equipment on Shabbath is one of great practical importance today. But, even beyond this, we must expect its importance to grow with the ever-increasing role technology plays in our daily lives. The use of electrical equipment being of relatively recent origin, we cannot hope to find any direct references to it in the Talmud or even in the classical codes. It would, however, be hasty to conclude that there are no interdicts involved. The following is written as a survey of Talmudic sources which would seem to preclude such a permissive attitude in the vast majority of cases. In section 2 we list such Talmudic sources and their major interpretations and in section 3 we present an extensive sampling of references to specific equipment found in the recent responsa literature. Although no effort at com- pleteness has been made, a number of good review articles are quoted, en- abling the interested reader to delve further into this fascinating subject. Both the format of this article and the qualifications of the writer preclude the possibility of presenting here a summary of practical halakhah on these matters. The reader's attention is drawn to a recently published work0 which presents practical Shabbath laws in a highly systematic and convenient form. Together with other modern questions, it treats extensively the use of electrical equipment. In view of its excellent Rabbinical endorsements, the reader may find it highly useful. It is, incidentally, more lenient in many cases than the authorities quoted here.

2. Talmudic Sources and Their Interpretations In this section we present relevant Talmudic passages. We divide these into four categories, devoting a section to each. To facilitate referencing, each passage is numbered.

31 2.1 "Adjusting a Device" (tikkun keli) Among the 39 "cardinal categories" {avoth) of "work" (m'lakhah) which are forbidden on Shabbath, two apply to making a "device" (keli), completing it or making it operative: "building" and "striking with a hammer" (makkeh b'patish). The following nine Talmudic passages are relevant to outlining both the extent and the limitations of this group of laws. (1.1) Anything that involves completing "work" is classified under the the category "striking with a hammer." 1 (1.2) Inserting the pin into the handle of a spade is classified as "building" (Rav) or as "striking with a hammer" (Sh'muel).2 (1.3) Returning the shaft into a lamp is forbidden by original Torah law, whereas assembling a white-washing rod is forbidden by Rabbinic law. This is based on the Baraitha which states that replacing the boards and legs of a bed is forbidden by Rabbinic law; replacing them firmly, by original Torah law.3 (1.4) On Shabbath it is permitted to remove the door of a box, but not to replace it; for, although neither "building" nor "tearing down" applies to "devices," we fear lest he replace it firmly.4 (1.5) On Yom Tov it is forbidden to re-attach (removable) covers of boxes [although "building" does not apply to devices—Rashi; lest he attach them firmly—Tosaphothl.5 (1.6) Beth Hillel permit erecting a sectional lamp on Yom Tov, saying that the category of "building" does not apply to devices.6 (1.7) The Law requires the Levites to play musical instruments as part of the daily service in the Temple and this overrides Shabbath. That it overrides even an original Torah prohibition is illustrated by the law permitting a Levite to repair a torn string by unwind- ing a length from the upper pin and wrapping it around the lower pin.7 (1.8) 'Ulla heard someone knocking on the door on Shabbath and severely reprimanded him. Rabbah replied that only musical sounds were forbidden.8 [In this connection, compare the opinion of Rabbah in (4.5c), below.] (1.9) One may not clap or dance on Yom Tov, because he might come to repair a musical instrument.9 The apparent contradiction between (1.2,3), on the one hand, and (1.6) on the other, has given rise to much discussion. The distinctions made include

32 firm attachment and expert techniques as prerequisites to classifying any work on a "device" in the category of "building." 10 On the other hand, even firm attachment may be permissible, when the part is attached and detached in routine use, such as in a screw-on bottle top.11 On this basis, one great authority1 la states that making an electrical contact does not constitute "adjusting a device," because the contact was initially made for continual making and breaking. However, many authorities forbid closing a circuit on (or switching on) electrical equipment on Shabbath, on the ground that this constitutes "adjusting a device." 12a> 13a> 14> 15a> 16a-17a Especially, one of the most outstanding of the recent authorities1611 goes to great lengths to explain how closing a circuit constitutes "adjusting a device" and probably falls into the category of "building" in the sense of original Torah law. The fact that parts of the circuit are attached to the ground aggravates the "work" involved, but is not essential to this classification. The argument seems to be based on the thesis that a combination necessary to make a device operative—even if temporary—is legally equivalent to a firm attachment. (This has been disputed.18) The Rabbinic prohibitions against playing an instrument—or operating any device intended to generate sound—were established to guard against forgetful adjustment of the device. They have direct application to many electrical devices. (See sect. 3.3, below.) The major decisors20 seem to include in this prohibition even non-musical devices whose function it is to generate sound, although the matter cannot be considered fully decided. (Compare, e.g., the popular "Shabbath knocker.") 2.2 Sparks and "Producing" (molid) Frequently the use of electrical equipment involves sparking, especially in devices such as commutator motors or when opening an inductive circuit. In such cases the question arises whether making sparks is considered kindling a fire. We cite the relevant Talmudic passage:* (2.1) (Although it is permitted to light a new fire by means of an existing fire on Yom Tov,) it is forbidden to do so by means of (sparks obtained from) wood, stones, dust, bricks, or water,

* Another passage22, which states "sparks have no substance", has been quoted in a collection of responsa (ascribed to the Rosh, 13th century)23 to permit extinguishing sparks on Shabbath. However, on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence,24 this collection (published in 1793) has been claimed to be a forgery. The passage quoted clearly refers to muktzah and is irrelevant here.

33 because this involves "producing". [If one fills a clear (spherical) glass bottle with water and places it in the sun, it can be used to start a fire—R. 'Ovadiah of Bartinoro.] 21 Study of the commentaries shows that this passage is open to at least three essentially different interpretations: (1) There may not be forbidden "work" involved, kindling being permitted on Yom Tov. There is, however, a Rabbinic law forbidding the use on Yom Tov of anything produced on that day.25 Because of this law, the spark may not be used to kindle a fire. (2) Even though there is no "work" involved, there is something akin to "work"—"producing", and this is Rabbinically forbidden.26 (3) Kindling is not generally permitted on Yom Tov. The Torah permitted only kindling a fire from an existing one.27 According to the first two interpretations, the prohibition is based on Rabbinic law; according to the last, on original Torah law. According to the first and last interpretations, there is no indication of whether causing the sparks is considered "kindling" (hav'arah). [According to (1), the question of "kindling" may be irrelevant on Yom Tov, and (3) may refer to the fire being lit by means of the sparks.] Opinion (2), however, if taken literally, could mean that there is no "work" at all (not only no forbidden "work"). In that event, (2.1) would imply that causing a spark is not to be classified as "kindling". Some au- thorities14, 16a-28 do indeed interpret it that way. One of these gives the short lifetime of the sparks as the reason for this.14 Conversely, we find the opinion that making sparks is considered "kindling", but not "producing" (only the fire eventually lit by the sparks is "produced".).15a-b-c-d Whether a glowing filament is considered fire is a question treated in the next section. We shall see there that many authorities do consider it a form of fire, and as a result forbid lighting an incandescent lamp on Shabbath as falling into the category of "kindling". On Yom Tov, when it is permitted to light a fire from an existing one, lighting an incandescent lamp is then forbidden as "producing".15e-f-29a-30-31a Others hold that fire is not produced in the lamp, but rather at the generating station, and therefore tend to permit lighting an incandescent lamp on Yom Tov.12b-32 This opinion seems to be based, however, on the highly questionable premise that electricity is a form of fire. Finally, one opinion would classify the production of electric current as "producing".33a

34 2.3 Fire: "Kindling" (hav'arah) and "Extinguishing" (kibbuy) "Kindling", "extinguishing" and cooking are three of the cardinal categories of "work" on Shabbath. Since electricity is often used to generate heat and light, the definitions of these terms become important. Is a flame an essential element in a fire? Is combustion? heat? light? The answers to these questions may have important bearing on the use of incandescent and fluorescent light sources, vacuum tubes and heating elements. We again list relevant Talmudic passages below. Note that (2.1), too, may have some bearing on the definition of fire. (3.1) All agree that it is permitted to roast an egg in the sun (i.e. by means of solar radiation) [because this is not the usual way of cooking—Rashi]; and all agree that it is forbidden by means of heat originating in a fire. In contradiction to the opinion of the Sages, R. Yosi holds that the heat of "hot spring water" (hamei T vary ah) originates in fire (that of gehinnom).34 (3.2) Cooking in the "water of hot springs" is not forbidden by original Torah law.35 (3.3) In connection with tzara'ath, a burn caused by "hot spring water" is not classified as a burn.36 The following passages treat the "metal coal" (gaheleth shel matekheth) and the burning charcoal (gaheleth shel 'etz). (3.4) In contradiction to the Mishnah, R. Y'hudah said that in order to facilitate the many ablutions of the Kohen Gadol, it was cus- tomary to heat chunks of metal before Yom Kippur and to put them into the water on Yom Kippur. He permits such "extinguishing" because he holds that (heat) derived from fire is not like fire; the Sages hold that it is like fire.37 (3.5) In order to protect the public from damage, it is permitted to extinguish on Shabbath a metal coal lying in a public place, but not a charcoal.38 (3.6) (On Yom Tov) it is forbidden to sweeten mustard by means of a (hot) charcoal; by means of a "metal coal", however, it is permitted.39 (3.7a) It is not permitted to roast the Pessah lamb on a metal spit, because the spit would be heated by the fire; this heat would then be conducted to the point of contact with the flesh; consequently, part of the lamb would be roasted by means of the hot metal instead of the fire.40

35 (3.7b) R. Yohanan says: If an oven is heated by burning wood inside it, and this wood is then removed and the lamb roasted in the oven, it is forbidden. This method is excluded because the Torah repeats the commandment that the lamb be roasted in fire.41 (3.7c) Rebbi says that roasting the Pessah lamb on coals is classified as roasting it on fire, as required by the verse.41 (3.7d) According to Rav Hisda, a burn resulting from a "metal coal" is considered a burn in connection with tzardath, because the word "singe" (mikhvah) is repeated in the verse. A burn resulting from a charcoal, on the other hand, requires no special verse.41 (3.7e) The burning of an adulterous daughter of a priest was done by means of molten lead. This is consistent with the verse, which is phrased so as to include all (heat) originating in fire. It excludes only lead mined (in a molten state).41 (3.7f) Ravina contradicts the interpretation of (3.7d), saying that a burn resulting from a coal requires no special verse—possibly implying that a "metal coal", too, requires no special verse.41 (3.7g) According to Rebbi we must say that the scriptural term "coal" includes both glowing and dark coals, and the term "fire" both glowing coals and a flame.41 (3.8) The verse forbidding "kindling" on Shabbath is interpreted to refer specifically to the kindling in connection with the execution of an adulterous daughter of a priest.42 We conclude our listing with two citations from the code of Rambam (Maimonides): (M3.1) Melting any amount of one of the metals—or heating a metal until it becomes coal—are derivatives (toladoth) of "cooking" (i.e., forbidden by original Torah law).43 (M3.2) Heating a metal in order to "harden" it (tziruf) in water is a derivative of "kindling". [It is "cooking"—Ravad.] Extinguishing a "metal coal" is not forbidden by original Torah law; but if the intent was to harden it, it is forbidden, since iron workers do thus: they heat iron until it becomes coal and extinguish it in water to make it firm—and that is "hardening" it, which is forbidden by original Torah law as a derivative of "extinguishing".44 With this wealth of material concerning what is and what is not fire, it should be easy to arrive at a clear-cut definition. Unfortunately, the matter is considerably complicated by the fact that the definition of "fire" might be different in different applications;45 when special verses are cited to broaden

36 or narrow the definition of "fire", it is not clear whether or not the broadened definition is applicable in other areas.46 From (3.1) it would appear that solar heat (which is heat originating in incandescent gases, generated by nuclear reactions) is not considered fire as far as cooking on Shabbath is concerned. This seems to be confirmed by (2.1), which implies that a new "fire" is being lit when solar radiation is used. If we assume that "hot spring water" derives its heat from very hot— possibly incandescent—material in the earth's crust, and that the Sages were familiar with this fact, (3.2) and (3.3) imply that such material, too, is not "fire". [According to Tosafoth, the evidence from (3.3) is questionable.45! If our extrapolations are valid, this would seem to have immediate implications concerning cooking on electrical heating elements. We must, however, be very cautious, since we have not yet clearly covered incandescent material. Especially, when considering the "kindling" aspect, we must remember that the definition of fire may be different in this connection. One recent authority interprets Rashi's commentary [cited above in connection with (3.1)1 in so narrow a sense that cooking on an electrically heated element on Shabbath would be forbidden by original Torah law since it is now usual to cook in this manner.13b On the other hand, one 17th century authority goes so far as to say that original Torah law does not forbid cooking on Shabbath on a fire lit by solar heat by means of a lens.47 Both opinions—especially48- 49 the latter—seem very difficult to maintain. The discussion of the "metal coal" seems more directly relevant to the question of causing incandescence. It is identified by Rashi38 as "iron waste material", but in (3.7e) molten lead is implicitly classified as "metal coal". This broader definition is also implied by Rambam's code, as cited above (M3.1, 2). It is also not clear whether metal must be incandescent to qualify as "coal". From (3.7g) it would seem that coal must incandesce to qualify as fire* and this seems to be also the intent of Rebbi in (3.7c).51 On the other hand, molten lead is implicitly classified as "metal coal" in (3.7e); since the melting point of lead is 327 °C, but it becomes noticeably incandescent only above 700°C, the lead of (3.7e) is not likely to have been incandescent. Incandescence seems to be non-essential also according to very early authorities,5253' 54 who explain, in connection with (3.5), that the metal coal is more dangerous than the charcoal because it does not glow. Cooling it is

* Note that the heat of a "metal coal", even if non-incandescent, may be derived from a real (flaming) fire, whereas that of a glowing charcoal is derived from non-fiery combustion, so that it may be possible to classify a dark metal coal legally as "fire", even though a glowing charcoal is not "fire".50 This comment is, however, irrelevant to our problem, where the heat of the "metal coal" does not originate in a real fire.

37 then "hardening" the metal, which they classify under ''adjusting a device" (tikkun keli). With respect to extinguishing a "metal coal", most authorities seem to agree that it is forbidden by Rabbinic law only44-55-59 (except when it is done for hardening purposes). This is based on (3.5-3.6). In interpreting (3.5), these authorities hold that the distinction between the metal coal and the charcoal is that the former is forbidden only by Rabbinic law and the latter by original Torah law.* The opinion of the above early authorities on this question is not so clear. According to one early commentary,57 they too agree that only a Rabbinic prohibition applies; others,60-62 however, interpret them as classifying extinguishing a "metal coal" as forbidden by original Torah law. Rambam, in his commentary on (3.5),63 says: "(Extinguishing a 'metal coal') is not 'extinguishing', because the fire itself is not attached to the iron; it is only that the iron was hot and now, after extinction, it is cold." Causing a metal to incandesce presents another problem. When the heating is done to soften the metal or to harden it, Rambam clearly classifies the act as "cooking" or "kindling", respectively (see (M3.1-3.2) above). Incidentally, one contemporary authority1681 has pointed out that the increase in the resistance of the filament when it is heated is essential to proper operation, and should perhaps be classified as "hardening". Although Ram- bam is not specific about heating a metal for purposes other than hardening, he implies that such heating should not be classified as "kindling"; he is, indeed, interpreted in this manner.120'64 Perhaps the validity of this interpretation is reinforced by the wording of Rambam's commentary63 quoted at the end of the preceding paragraph, which may mean that no fire is transferred to the metal. On the other hand, the Maggid Mishneh44 states as a matter of course that a "metal coal" is classified (by the Talmud) as real fire.]; This opinion seems to be endorsed by a great number of recent authorities.12a> 14,15g-30> 31-33b Is combustion an essential element of "kindling"? One 18th century authority68 holds that combustion is not essential, bringing proof from Ram- bam's statement cited above (M3.2). This is disputed by a later authority,6611

* A reason given for this distinction is based on the assumption that "extinguishing" is "work" because it causes charring. It follows that extinguishing a "metal coal", which does not involve charring, is not work. [Rashi on (3.6)] t He does not give a source, but it would seem that he is referring to (3.7f). This passage seems to imply that Ravina classifies heating metal as "kindling", and several recent authorities interpret it in that way.65- 66a On the other hand, one very highly regarded authority67 seems to take this interpretation as only a possibility.

38 who holds that the eventual consumption of the fuel is essential to the "cardinal category" (av) of kindling, causing fire without combustion being a "derivative category" of "work" (toladah)**. Another states that kindling the fire—not maintaining it—is the "work".30 This matter is analyzed also by several other authorities.18,19a If the "kindling" in (3.8) refers to the melting of the lead, as at least one authority holds,660'69 this too would be strong evidence for classifying metal heating as "kindling"; however, this interpretation is open to question, especially in view of a far earlier authority70 who seems to say that it refers to kindling the fire on which the lead is to be heated. An interesting sidelight is the question of using incandescent lamps for religious functions requiring lamps. This is treated below (sect. 3.4). We conclude that, despite the wealth of source material on the subject, a far more intensive analysis is necessary before we can arrive at a clear decision on the question of the original Torah law about causing incandescence in a metal on Shabbath, when the source of heat is not fire and the purpose is not hardening. 2.4 Indirect and Unintentional Action (g'rama, eno mithkaven) Many electrical devices perform "work" which the operator of the device would be forbidden to do on Shabbath. Under what conditions, if any, is one permitted to set such a device into operation on, or for, Shabbath? The extent to which indirect work may be forbidden on Shabbath is evidenced by the following two Talmudic passages. [See also (4.5b).l (4.1) It is forbidden to place a vessel containing water under a lamp to catch and extinguish the sparks on Shabbath; it is forbidden to place it there even before Shabbath.22 (4.2) Adding oil to a burning lamp on Shabbath is in the category of "kindling" according to original Torah law; similarly, removing oil from it is in the category of "extinguishing".6 On the other hand, there are passages stating explicitly that it is permitted to cause extinction of fire: (4.3) According to one reading, it is permitted to remove an (unlit) piece of wood from a burning wood pile on Shabbath.6a (4.4a) To prevent the spread of a conflagration*, it is permitted to put up

** As noted above, Toladoth, too, are forbidden by original Torah law. * This refers to a conflagration threatening financial loss only; when human life is endangered, it nuy be permitted to put out the fire directly.

39 a wall of new earthenware vessels filled with water, so that they will burst and extinguish the fire when it reaches them.71 (4.4b) It is permitted to pour water on the unignited portion of a burning garment.71 (4.4c) It is permitted to turn over a table, so that a lamp burning on it will drop to the ground, even though this may extinguish the lamp.71 (4.4d) Under ordinary wind conditions it is permitted—but severely frowned upon—to open or close a door which has a burning lamp behind it.71 (4.5a) It is permitted to start the following processes shortly before Shabbath, even though they are then completed on Shabbath: soaking ink, spices and vetches; placing flax into the oven and wool into the dyeing vat; and setting animal traps.72 (4.5b) If someone sets a trap (on Shabbath) and an animal is caught in it, he is liable under original Torah law.73 (4.5c) One may put into a water mill before Shabbath only an amount of wheat whose milling will be completed before Shabbath. This is because of the noise, according to Rabbah; and because of the "Shabbath of devices" (sh'vithath kelim), according to Rav Yosef.74 More material on the subject of indirect and unintentional action is available in connection with the laws concerning damages. (4.6) If one is unaware of a rock placed on his person and gets up, causing it to drop—in connection with damages, he is liable; in connection with Shabbath, not.75 (His intention is essential in connection with Shabbath, but not in connection with damages.) When other agencies are involved, the laws become more complicated. (4.7) If a person blows on a fire (to make it burn), but it burns only because of the additional blowing of the wind, he is not liable for damages, even though a similar act, winnowing on Shabbath, does make him liable as a Shabbath transgressor. The distinction is this: On Shabbath, "planned work" (m'lekheth mahsheveth) is forbidden, while, in connection with damages, indirect action does not make one liable.76 This law must be evaluated in connection with the laws of "fire damages", according to which a man is liable for damages caused by a fire lit by him, even though its progress was due to winds.

40 (4.8) Fire is compared to an arrow77 [and ascribed to the originator at the time it originates:—Nimukei Yosef]. (4.9) If a person places an object on a roof and it drops due to an ordinary wind, causing damage, he is liable under "fire damages".78 (4.10) If a person drops an object from a roof while there are protective pillows on the ground, and he then removes these pillows (while the object is dropping), he is not liable (since this is damage by indirect action).75 A murderer is executed by the religious court (beth din) only if he murdered by direct action. What is considered direct action in this connection is illustrated by the examples in the following Talmudic passages: (4.11a) A special verse makes the murderer liable to capital punishment if he confines the victim in a situation where the lethal agent is already active. If he restrains the victim under water, in the sun's heat, in the cold, in the presence of insects, he is liable. If he confines the victim so that he dies of starvation, in a place which later becomes hot or cold, or in the presence of a lion, he is not liable.79 . (4.11b) If he threw a rock upward, or against a wall, and it killed on its return, he is liable, unless the rock dropped along a vertical path.79 (4.11c) If he killed by diverting a water stream, he is liable only if the water acted directly.79 (4.1 Id) If he made a snake bite the victim, the liability is disputed. The dispute is based on the question of whether the venom is stored in the tooth or ejected by an independent act of the snake.80 The wealth and complexity of the above material, which is, incidentally, far from complete, makes it obvious that the question of indirect action is very difficult to clarify. One book on the use of electricity on Shabbath19 is devoted primarily to this question. We shall here, however, be very brief, outlining only some of the basic principles used to organize the above material. First, we must reconcile the severity of (4.1) and (4.2) with the relative laxity of (4.3) and (4.4). Ad (4.1): Why should an act performed before Shabbath be forbidden, when the "work" is done automatically on Shabbath?*

•Almost all authorities agree that we are permitted to have our inaminate possessions perform "work" on Shabbath (sh'vithath kelim lav d'Oraitha). The one dissenting opinion refers to "work" done by a human (a non-Jew) by means of our possession.81

41 (1) The Tosaphoth explain the prohibition as a safeguard against doing this on Shabbath itself; then it may result in extinguishing by direct action, if a spark happens to be falling at the time the water-filled vessel is being lifted.82 (2) Rabbenu Tam, on the other hand, explains the action as being more direct than those of (4.4).82 Ad (4.2): Why should the removal of oil which, admittedly, speeds the extinction, be considered identical with the act of extinguishing, when other acts speeding extinction, such as (4.3) and (4.4), are not so considered? (1) The Tosaphoth explain here that the removal of the oil causes an immediate dimming (presumably due to the lowered oil level), which is direct action.83 (2) Rosh, on the other hand, explains that the removal of part of the burning body itself is identical with extinguishing, while any action involving other bodies only is not considered direct action.84 Perhaps we can summarize the difference between these two explanations by saying that (1) holds temporal immediacy and (2) spatial immediacy to be decisive in determining whether an action is "direct". Ad (4.4, 6). The lack of intent (mithkaven) and certainty of consequence (p'sik resha) seem to be factors in (4.4c, d) and (4.6). These con" cepts play fundamental roles throughout Shabbath law and the conditions under which they apply require fundamental clarification in general before their application to electrical equipment can be treated. Ad (4.5c, 8): The fact that it may be forbidden to initiate before Shabbath an action which continues on Shabbath* obviously has profound implications for the use of many electrical devices. The codification of (4.5c) is still subject to dispute among the decisors.85 It is of interest in this connection that the Shulhan Arukh permits winding a clock before Shabbath so that it strikes the hours on Shabbath.86 (Winding a clock on Shabbath may be forbidden by original Torah law.86a) On the basis of (4.1) and (4.8), some authorities have expressed great hesitancy concerning the permissibility of the popular "Shab- bath clock", which is set before Shabbath and switches on lights at a certain time on Shabbath. [See sect. 3.1 below.]

* We refer here to prohibitions based on the fact that Shabbath "work" is being initiated, and exclude precautionary decrees designed to prevent accidental "work" on Shabbath, such as (4.1) (1) and the use of a lit oven.

42 Ad (4.9-11): Criteria of direct action on Shabbath can to some extent be deduced from the multitude of related laws in connection with damages and murder. However, the criteria are obviously not identical [cf. (4.6, 7)], and great care must be exercised in applying to Shabbath law any of the conclusions reached in connection with damages and murder. One widely accepted authority classifies switching on a light as direct action under (4.11c).31

3. Responsa Concerning Some Specific Devices To illustrate the breadth of the responsa literature in connection with electrical equipment, we provide here a cursory annotated bibliography, classified according to the equipment.* The material may be conveniently divided into the following four categories: (1) Automation Equipment. This classification includes equipment set into motion before Shabbath to perform "work" on Shabbath. (2) yVon-m'lakhah Equipment. Equipment not primarily performing "work", but whose operation may involve "work" as a by-product, is included here. (3) Sound Equipment. This section includes equipment whose function it is to generate sound. (4) Equipment Doing Forbidden "Work." This section covers equipment which involves incandescent elements in an essential manner. 3.1 Automation Equipment. The so-called "Shabbath clock" is the classical prototype of modern automation equipment. It is a clock set up before Shabbath so as to perform "work" at a specified time on Shabbath. This device is quite universally accepted, and it might surprise the reader to hear that no less a personage than a former Chief Rabbi of Palestine could not see his way to permitting its use to switch on a light on Shabbath. In deference to the great authorities who did permit it,87-88 he did not explicitly forbid its use.12d Reviews of this question have been written.1511'17b The question of placing food on a cold electric oven, which is subsequently turned on (on Shabbath) by a Shabbath clock, has given rise to much debate. An extensive review of this has been published.89a The conclu-

* In addition to the sources quoted here, the reader is advised to refer to Ref. (0) for many further relevant sources.

43 sion seems to be that the food must be placed on the oven before Shabbath, and the heating element and controls covered.16b The question of resetting the clock on Shabbath has been analyzed. It might be possible to permit delaying extinction,8915 if it were not for the danger of accidentally throwing the switch. However, if delaying involves resetting the clock, this is equivalent to setting it initially and forbidden on Shabbath.130 According to another authority, throwing a switch while the light is off, so that the operation of the Shabbath clock will later cause a light to go on, is forbidden as "kindling". Both it and its converse (throwing a switch so as to prevent the "Shabbath clock" function from turning on a light) are forbidden because of muktzah.15c•g

3.2 Non-m'lakhah Equipment

In the category of electrical equipment designed to do permitted "work", the fan, elevator, train and refrigerator have been discussed. In connection with the electric fan, the only problems would seem to be those of "adjusting" (making electrical contact) and sparking; with certain induction motors, even sparking could be eliminated. Thus, one authority permits having a fan turned on by a non-Jew on Yom Tov;15a another permits it even on Shabbath, since he does not classify sparking as "kindling".14 The question of using an elevator on Shabbath is complicated by the fact that its operation is usually accompanied by the switching on and off of indicator lamps.14,12e On the other hand, a fully automatic elevator, stopping automatically at every floor, has been permitted if certain precautions are taken.90 The use of an electric train on Shabbath is generally considered forbidden even though it is running for non-Jews. One authority basis this prohibition on its work-day nature ('uvda d'hol) and on the possibility that the Jew's presence might make it necessary for the operator to increase the "fire".33a

The opening of a refrigerator on Shabbath has become a matter of major practical importance in many Jewish communities. The question raised is the following. The typical electric refrigerator has a thermostat controlling the starting and stopping of the compressor motor. When the temperature at the thermostat (inside the refrigerator) rises above a certain level, the motor starts, causing the refrigeration unit to operate to lower the temperature. When the temperature has dropped to a certain second level, the thermostat switch stops the motor. Opening the door admits warmer air and therefore raises the temperature inside the refrigerator more rapidly; consequently, it causes the motor to be switched on earlier than it would have started had the door remained closed.

44 Questions of "unintentional" and "indirect action" are involved here (sect. 2.4). The fundamental question hinges, of course, on the problems of sparking (sect. 2.2) and "adjustment" (sect. 2.1). It has been suggested that all these problems could be avoided if the thermostat were replaced by an automatic timing device. Some authorities permit opening the refrigerator while the motor is running (so that there is no additional or earlier starting of the motor), while others permit opening the refrigerator at any time. An extensive review of the literature up to the year 5718 (1958) has been published,91 and more has been written since. 15i-92'97

3.3 Sound Equipment Today's civilization abounds with equipment designed to produce sound. There are electric bells, phonographs, radio and television, public address systems, telephones, and hearing aids. All of these have given rise to halakhic investigations. These devices differ essentially from those of the preceding section in that they involve, in addition to "adjustment" and sparking, also the prohibition against using sound producing instruments, discussed in connection with (1.8), sect. 2.1. When the sound is musical there is little doubt, in view of the clear-cut prohibition against using musical instruments on Shabbath. Whether the same interdict applies to instruments producing non-musical sounds is an old dispute which does not yet seem to have found an accepted settlement. [See end of sect. 2.1 above.] Even if the instrument is turned on before Shabbath, it should perhaps be classified with the water mill of (4.5) (sect. 2.4); if so, its usability would be subject to the same dispute. The bell has been treated both as applied to burglar alarms ("it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to set it")98 and in connection with opening doors which automatically operate a bell. Combining the facts that the operation of this bell—and certainly the production of the sparks—is unintentional, indirect and short-lived, one authority permits entering such a door on Yom Tov, if it is "unavoidable" ;15j another forbids such an automatic bell on Shabbath, if it is electrical, but permits it if it is mechanical.890 The phonograph and radio are frequently used for music, so that there is little basis for permitting their operation on Shabbath.12f The question of turning on a television set before Shabbath for viewing on Shabbath is decided in the negative.89d One authority classifies making a phonograph record as "writing".33

45 Another permits turning on a radio before Shabbath for the sake of a sick person for whom the music may be of therapeutic value, since then only the law of (4.5c) is concerned, and this may be set aside on occasions involving great financial loss and, a fortiori, for a sick person.15k The use of the public address system, too, has increased very much in recent times and the question of its permissibility has often been raised." A treatment of this device has to consider each of its three major components. (1) The microphone which converts sound waves into electric fluctuations; (2) The amplifier which increases the amplitude of these fluctuations; and (3) The loudspeaker which converts the amplified electric fluctuations back into sound waves. If the public address system is turned on before Shabbath and is used for non-musical sounds, the case may be somewhat less severe than that of the radio and phonograph. However, as noted before, many authorities forbid the use of sound devices even when they are non-musical. In addition, as long as the systems are such that there is danger of an adjustment becoming necessary during use, it is very difficult to find a basis for permitting their use. The advisability of using a public address system in the synagogue for services is made even more questionable by the fact that the sound produced by it is not the original sound at all, but merely a copy of it. The voice is not that of the speaker but that of the (mechanical) loudspeaker, so that the listener may not be hearing the reading and prayers themselves at all. The telephone involves a system very similar to that of the public address system. Here an electrical connection is made by lifting a receiver. An additional connection is made by the operator or by dialing. In addition, the use of the telephone is often accompanied by the switching on and off of indicator lamps121,14,33a and ringing of a bell.lla The hearing aid also operates on the same principle, using the same three major components as the public address system. It is, however, considered more leniently by some, because there is danger to the deaf person not equipped with a hearing aid. (This carries some weight even though there is no danger to his life.) In addition, avoiding the embarrassment experienced by the deaf person has been classified as a matter of "human dignity" (k'vod ha-b'rioth) ,17a The fact that these devices are generally made with transistors and do not contain incandescent elements further alleviates the situation.153

46 On these bases, some Rabbinical prohibitions may be overruled. Con- sequently, some authorities permit the use of hearing aids both on Yom Tov and on Shabbath,14,17a another only on Yom Tov15d—but in any case, of course, only if the device has been switched on before Yom Tom or Shab- bath, respectively, and the controls have been made inaccessible to avoid accidental adjustment. In addition, the question of carrying the device is an entirely separate one which must be resolved before the wearer may leave his house (unless his town is m'urav). It has been suggested that the battery be sewn to the clothing of the wearer.14

3.4 Equipment Doing Forbidden "Work" The situation is much more severe when the intended function of the device is "work" forbidden by original Torah law. Since the evidence of sect. 2.4 indicates very strongly that switching on an electrical device must in general be considered direct action, operating such a device must be considered equivalent to doing the "work" performed by the device.

The incandescent lamp, treated in many responsa, is representative of this class of devices. (Cf. sect. 2.3 as to its "work" character.) The problem of the heating pad is also raised. It is found, however, not to fall into this category, since its heating elements do not become very hot.15b Assuming that an incandescent lamp is fire according to original Torah law, a number of secondary questions arise. May it be used as a Shabbath lamp (ner Shabbath)? Hanukah lamp? havdalah lamp? There appears to be general agreement that an incandescent lamp cannot serve as a Hanukah lamp.l2gi 19b>29b-33a As to its usability as a Shabbath lamp, there is some disagreement, which has been reviewed recently.89® Some authorities permit its use, while others disqualify it on the basis that

(1) Only a device using a wick and fuel is a lamp in the sense of halakhah;100 and

(2) there is no kindling when an electric light is switched on.12s [Opinion (1) was stated in connection with gas light, but seems to be at least equally applicable to an incandescent electric lamp. Opinion (2) seems to be based on the assumption that electric current is itself fire.]

Some authorities permit using an electric lamp for havdalah.12bi 31b An- other is doubtful about this, especially when the lamp envelope is diffusing.190 Rabbinic law forbids an individual to read by the light of a lamp on Shabbath, since he might come to adjust it.101 Some authorities would apply this to an electric lamp also. This is, however, disputed.290

47 4. Conclusion The above survey should suffice to show that very general and profound questions of halakhah are involved in the use of electrical equipment on Shabbath. These must be resolved before any clear-cut and indisputable decisions will be possible. I personally look on these problems as a welcome by-product of our modern civilization. We may hope that the new problems will lead to a fuller clarification of halakhoth which have been neglected in the past. If any of the readers of this paper are encouraged to delve further into this study— with the necessary seriousness and intensity—I should feel amply rewarded in my efforts here. To conclude on a wistful note: The highest fulfillment of Torah study is that it lead to action.102 When there are no new questions, the opportunities for this are limited and the Torah scholar may become isolated from the daily life of the community. Perhaps these modern problems may force even more of our scholars into closer contact with the world around them, which was created to be a stage for the Torah.103

Acknowledgement I am happy to have this opportunity to acknowledge the constructive criticism of this work by, and the many stimulating discussions with, Rabbi Chaim Lenchitz of Brooklyn, N. Y.

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a .21 nvoa> .42 navy .22 49 y"*> .nbb i»bt *v»N>3vy .68 vn \?"a nav 'bn caoi .43 •pinN t7iv?3ip n"*n ">v n'MN 'ai 'N 'bn a">a ovy .44 o>nt?a 'tnn» oj y»vy» p .69 >ona n"*tn .'n *45 >oiy»b n"*tt> .n"y .n"y o>noa n"bs 'y .46 (N"y navy .yiKn .70 .nwup jnabn .t>>Nn apy> .47 :.a"p navy .71 \?"ap '>p .r'tm ,n>s>3>ii .N"n Vtti n"« N"a navy .72 .pt73>mtt nn»vy vn» "i .48 n"*m :t"> navy Nam Nnatnn .73 a"> 'a "v naw 'bn .nm> VTNIA VN .Np3>ap» N3na ions .49 .n"> navy .74 .a"avyn ,obvyn> .o»n nimiN :vd p"a .75 n"3i '>t> .'t7 p"a .76 n"*r .n"y o>nt7a N"vy*mn 'y .50 :.a"a p"a .77 mm r'Nai ia*ui :'> p"a .78 Mn n"*w .ov .51 :.t"y ,:vy in*rn3t7 .79 .a"» nav N"awa Nam vna .52 .n"y H"n v?"a intro^ .80 .ow .yiN> >Nn "i .53 .a"o nav .n"i .54 ">v .npn *nybN "i .81 N"B ovy .>"vn .55 naaon n"*T a"p '>t7 ow'u .56 n"*m navy .82 .a" a naw .N"avn .57 panpom n"*rn .a"a nu>a .83 ow .>vno .58 a"a ns>a vy"NI .84 ovy ,«iwnn by yi *59 'n 'v a"3*v ">x> n"iN y"vy .85 ovy .yaoi .60 vt? n"bvy '>t> ovy .86 ow .N"av?n .61 VV? p»v OV> MM N3VY» (a) ovy .yin >«nn .62 btOV 1\"W /|nNt3NV?N3 \)'"> "1 .87 pan "in nm^na Nam .63 /pbpm) .a"n ,p*n> va .nniNon 'v by >iba 'n ">x> 43 ,ni>a 'a .r'awn o"ina i\"w .p>\y nvyo '*i .88 a">a navy 'bn •navwn naa*>o .64 t"3p >>v .n"iNn .p>v N"n ,pti» .*>y*Tbya n>b*n "1 ,89 naw .ma a>b nnN n*tm> .65 .r'n .n">vyn ,piv i>3 .rn 'a 'ma n"*r n"y o>nt?a .n»N O>*T»V .a"avyn ,pn> V3 >saN .aNWNaNPtt oniaN .66 \3"o-a"» V'n (a) N"n n"IN •IO n"v> r'n (b) >"pv v?"ai '»t7 (a) n"a*> r'n (c) n"bi '>P (b) n"3 rn (d) N"px> v?"ai '>t» (c) 3"p-n"»p vn (e) ^an 'v iano) inan o"> 'i .67 nvyn >"> .anaa .VP^N N"> "I .90 •mabn >v?ipb 'v .(o»n r'a\yn mm na^ n"y o»nt>a

50 .v>"ir>» .b>aay bNiavj ") .98 *'H oyia .pm o»n .91 n"* ">v n"n .vmn ,1110*011 a"ava"tn 'y .n">\yri ,ob\yiv "i .92 ") nat ,87" 106 'y ,\>'">vn *T»y-a"y 'y ,ob\yn> onaa "y ,*iaa>n bNinvy 'y .ow .N>N*Tn nmiy "i .93 UNPENS byiiyvy fn 'n *T"irn"y •P n"iv .nmoa >ibn v> "I .100 .... ">X3 .rvavyn ,obvnv .nbn 'y .ov> o»p>ba pn*> "i .94 vvp 'h 'v n"*iy '>p n'MN yv .101 .'a oyia >a*no "i .95 n")3 fa max .102 V'rr'i 'y .a"vm ,ob\*nv rtNiaa\y muin b>ava 103 'y .o\y .>*ma >ibn bNi\y> '*) .96 "it JIVJIIN .iai*T n>\yKi \y>i >"w*ia Nam) Na>pv natb mato /raviN '*) .97 (n>\yNia a"a\yji ,ob\yiv .aiarm n"Knn

ON THE CONCEPT OF SABBATH WORK

AZRIEL ROSENFELD

Rabbi Dr. Rosenfeld is Research Professor of Computer Science at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First Inter-City Conference of the Association in June, 1954.

The basic Sabbath commandment lo tha'aseh kol m'lakhah (Exod. 20,10 and Deut. 5,14; see also Exod. 23,12, 31,14-15, 34,21, 35,2, and Lev. 23,9) is usually translated as "Thou shalt do no manner of work." In order to apply this general prohibition in practice, a definition of the concept of "work"— m'lakhah—for Sabbath law purposes is needed. This paper reviews some of the Talmudic source material related to the problem of defining "Sabbath work." A list of thirty-nine specific types of m'lakhah is given in the Mishnah (Shab. 7,2; Danby's translation): The main classes of work are forty save one: sowing, ploughing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, winnowing, cleansing crops, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, shearing wool, washing or beating or dyeing it, spinning, weaving, making two loops, weaving two threads, separating two threads, tying [a knot], loosening [a knot], sewing two stitches, tearing in order to sew two stitches, hunting a gazelle, slaughtering or flaying or salting it or curing its skin, scraping it or cutting it up, writing two letters, erasing in order to write two letters, building, pulling down, putting out a fire, lighting a fire, striking with a hammer and taking out aught from one domain into another. The major portion of this list can be broken down into sublists containing connected series of m'lakhah activities: "sowing. . .baking" (sidura d'path, "the order of [making] bread," Bab. Shab. 74b); "shearing . . . tearing" (manufacture of cloth); and "hunting. . .cutting" (manufacture of leather, modified to include also seder s'udah, "the order of [preparing meat for] a meal," Jer. Shab. 7,2). [This third sublist should perhaps also include "writing" and "erasing" as an important end use of leather; note also that the Talmud (Bab. Shab. 75b) replaces "salting" or "curing" by "ruling" (lines, perhaps preparatory to writing, though all the standard commentators take

53 it to mean preparatory to cutting) ] The juxtaposition of "puting out a fire, lighting a fire, striking with a hammer" suggests a fourth short sublist based on metalworking. It is worth pointing out that very similar lists of acts can be found in the Talmudic literature in non-halakhic contexts; see, for example, Tosefta B'rakh. 7,2: [Adam] plowed, sowed, reaped, bound, threshed, win- nowed, cleaned, ground, sifted, kneaded, baked, and [only] then ate: ... he sheared, washed, pounded, dyed, spun, wove, sewed, and [only] then dressed". The Mishnah's list of types of m'lakhah has formed a part of the Oral Law from very early times. One source states it to have been given to Moses at Sinai (Bab. Shab. 70a, 97b: "the 39 types of m'lakhah which were told to Moses at Sinai; compare M'kh., va-Yak., beginning: "... which Moses told them verbally"). Another source seems to ascribe it to the Sof'rim (Jer. Sh'k. 5,1: "Why [were the sages called] sof'rim? Because they made the Torah into numbers (s'furoth): . . . ; 39 types of m'lakhah"). On the other hand, some of the details of the Mishnah's list may have been disputed as late as Tannaitic times (see, e.g., Bab. Shab. 74a, 75b).

Even without appealing to the Oral Law, it is possible to compile a relatively specific list of types of "Sabbath work" from the Torah itself. One potential source for such a list is the specific acts which are prohibited on the Sabbath by the Torah (in some cases, by implication). These include

a) "You shall rest on the seventh day [even] in the plowing season and the harvest season" (Exod. 34,21. See Bab. Shab. 70a; compare however, Bab. R.H. 9a.) b) "A man who was gathering (?) wood on the Sabbath day . . . must be put to death" (Num. 15,32-35; see Bab. Shab. 96b) c) Tomorrow is a holy Sabbath to the L-rd; bake what you will and cook what you will, and keep whatever is left over until morning" (Exod. 16,23) d) "Light no fire ... on the Sabbath day" (Exod. 35,3; though at least one Tanna (R. Yosi, Shab. 70a) because of this special verse, held that lighting a fire is not technically a m'lakhah) e) "Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day" (Exod. 16,29; see Rashi and Tosafoth on 'Eruvin 17b s.v. lav, where "go out" is construed to imply "take out")

There are of course other Biblical passages relating to Sabbath prohibitions, particularly of business transactions—e.g., Isaiah 58,13, Amos 8,5, Nehemiah 10,32 and 13,15-20; but these are primarily rabbinical prohibitions. Another, and perhaps more plausible, Biblical basis for a list of types

54 of "work" is the class of activities (or in some cases, products of activities) which the Torah calls m'lakhah. (This approach may even be hinted at by the Talmudic suggestion (Bab. Shab. 49b) that the 39 items on the Mishnah's list correspond to 39 occurrences in the Torah of words derived from the root m'lakhah.) In fact virtually all of the major parts of the Mishnah's list can be accounted for in this way: 1) "No m'lakhah may be done . . . except that which can be eaten" (Exod. 12,16). 2) "To do all the m'lakhah of a craftsman . . . and of an embroiderer . . . and a weaver, doing all [types of] m'lakhah" (Exod. 35,35; this and the fourth quotation suggest the k'lal u-ph'rat u-k'lal format in which the general term at the beginning and end is defined as including things similar to the particulars). 3) "Or in any m'lakhah of leather" (Lev. 13,49; see also v. 51). 4) "And in all [types of] m'lakhah: ... in gold, silver and copper; cutting [and] setting of [precious] stone[s]; carpentry;. . . and in all m'lakhah" (Exod. 31,3-5 and 35, 31-33. "Writing"—i.e., engraving— may also be implied in these verses). 5) "How do we know that 'taking out' is called m'lakhah? . . .'And Moses demanded. . . "let no man or woman do any more m'lakhah for the sacred offerings", and the people stopped bringing' (Exod. 36,6)." (Jer. Shab., beginning; compare Bab. Shab. 96b and Tosafoth ad loc., s.v. u-mimai. See also Jeremiah 17,22: "Do not take load[s of goods] out of your houses on the Sabbath day, and do no m'lakhah").

Also of interest in this connection is the midrash (M'kh. d-R. Shim'on, end) which derives the Sabbath prohibitions of business transactions, court actions, marriage, divorce and bookkeeping from the fact that they are referred to in the Bible as m'lakhah (Exod. 22,10; I Chron. 26,29; Ezra 10,13; Gen. 39,11). However, there is of course no intent to imply that these activities are m'lakhah in the technical sense. It will be noted that most of these examples of acts called m'lakhah in the Torah are associated with the building of the tabernacle. (Although leather working is not called m'lakhah in this connection, it too was certainly involved in the construction of the tabernacle, which had two leather cover- ings.) One Talmudic source, in fact, takes the acts performed in [building] the tabernacle, whether or not explicitly called m'lakhah in the Torah, as defining "Sabbath work" (Bab. Shab. 49b): "One is culpable only for [performing] m'lakhah of a type which was performed in the tabernacle. They sowed, and you must not sow; they reaped, and you must not reap . . . ".

55 This association of Sabbath m'lakhah with tabernacle m'lakhah is derivable (see Rashi ad loc, s.v. k'neged) from the juxtaposition in the Torah of passages dealing with the Sabbath and the tabernacle (Exod. 31; Exod. 35, beginning). [It could perhaps also have been derived from the Torah's use of the term m'lakhah in both connections; however, this g'zerah shavah is used instead (M'kh. d-R. Shim'on on Exod. 12,16 and 20,10; Sifra on Lev. 16,29) as a basis for the requirement that "Sabbath work" be m'lekheth mahsheveth, apparently used here in the sense of work requiring skill. Similarly, the hekesh "Keep My Sabbaths and fear My sanctuary" (Lev. 19,30; 26,2) is applied instead to the converse question of whether the building of the tabernacle was permitted even on the Sabbath; see Sifra ad loc, M'kh. Va-Yak. (beginning), and Bab. Y'vam. 6a. Mention should also be made of the interesting view of R. Hai Gaon (see Otzar ha-G'onim on Shab. 49b) that the definition of "Sabbath work" is to be derived from the tabernacle service rather than the construction of the tabernacle.l

The relationship between "Sabbath work" and "tabernacle work" is also used, in some sources, as a basis for the detailed composition of the Mishnah's list of types of m'lakhah: "Whatever was [performed] in the tabernacle is listed even though things similar to it are [also listed]" (Bab. Shab. 73b-74a). [This explanation is given there to justify the presence of winnowing, "cleansing crops", and sifting as three separate items on the list, even though all three are basically acts of separation. Similar reasoning can perhaps be used to explain the contrast between the detailed break- down "weaving" [the warp], making two loops, weaving two threads [of the woof]" and the extremely general "building", which could easily have been broken down into (e.g.) foundation, walls, and roof.] Another source seems to suggest that the makeup of the Mishnah's list has an economic basis: "The dyers of Jerusalem made wringing out [of the goods] a separate work [specialty?]; according to [this] there are 40 categories of work" (Jer. Shab. 7,2). A different economic motif may be reflected in the reason given by the Talmud for the absence of "pounding" (grain in a mortar) from the list: "Since a poor man eats his bread unpounded" (Bab. Shab. 74a). There seem also to have existed combinations of these viewpoints; compare the variant readings in Bab. Shab. 96b: "Whatever was [performed] in the tabernacle is significant and is [therefore listed]"; "What- ever was significant in the tabernacle is [listed]"; "Whatever was [performed] in the tabernacle and is significant (economically?) is [listed]". Relevant to our suggestion above that the Mishnah's list reflects the uses of the term m'lakhah in the Torah, note also the alternative criterion proposed in Shab. 96b: "Whatever is written [in the Torah] is [listed]". Whatever the basis for the composition of the Mishna's list of types of m'lakhah, it must be realized that no such list, unless impractically long

56 and detailed, can in itself provide a complete definition of "Sabbath work". However, the list given in the Mishnah is not merely a list of specific types of "work", but rather of prototypes (avoth m'lakhoth). [The word av may be used here in a sense corresponding to its use in the term binyan av. By contrast, in the phrase avoth ha-tum'oth (Mishnah Kelim 1,1) "av" seems to mean "source" (i.e., "progenitor"); while in avoth n'zikin (Mishnah B.K. 1,1) it could have either meaning. The Talmud's use of "av" in connection with sh'vi'ith and 'avodah zarah (Bab. M.K. 2b-3a; Sanh. 62a) seems to be analogous to its use in our Mishnah.] The Talmud has little difficulty in classifying a wide variety of activities and occupations under one or another of the Mishnah's 39 prototypes. These include the cultivation of crops other than grain, the production of milk and milk products, and the manufacture of pottery and basketware (see Bab. Shab. 73b, 95a, 74b; Jer. Shab. 7,2 passim). Indeed, R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish are said to have found the round number of 39 specific types of m'lakhah in each of the 39 categories (Jer. Shab. 7,2, beginning).

The basis for the Talmud's classification of an activity under one or another of the 39 headings is the nature of the effect which results from the activity. A good illustration of this principle is provided by the Tal- mud's question (Bab. Shab. 73b): "Are not winnowing, 'cleansing crops' (i.e., picking the remaining bits of chaff from the grain), and sifting one and the same?" — in other words, is not the effect the same in each case, namely that of separating out undesirable components of a mixture? Explicit definitions of several of the Mishnah's classes of "work" acts in terms of their effects are given in the Talmud (Jer. Shab, 7,2; compare Bab. M.K. 2b) for the classes whose prototypes are sowing ("improving the fruits") and plowing ("benefiting the ground"). On several other occasions the Talmud even seems to use "effect names" in place of the Mishnah's "prototype names" in referring to classes of "work" acts—for example, "taking life" for "slaughtering" (Bab. Shab. 75a), "unloading" for "threshing" (Bab. Shab. 95a); see Rashi s.v. m'farek), and "uprooting a thing from its place of growth" for "reaping" (Bab. Shab. 107b). Further examples of the effects associated with the Mishnah's prototypes can be obtained by examining the numerous instances where the Talmud identifies the classes to which specific "work" acts belong.

It would seem from the foregoing that the Mishnah's list of m'lakhah prototypes provides an adequate basis for the desired definition of "Sabbath work": An act is m'lakhah if its effect is similar to that produced by one of the prototypes. However, a serious objection to this conclusion can be raised. The Talmud makes special allowance for the possibility that types of m'lakhah may exist which cannot be classified into any of the Mishnah's categories. This is done by regarding the 38th category, "hitting with a

57 hammer", as being prototypical of any otherwise unclassifiable "work" act (Jer. Shab. 7,2, beginning: "Those, [acts for] which they could not find [a basis in any of the categories], they based on 'hitting with a hammer' "; compare Bab. Shab. 75b: "[for doing] anything which involves 'comple- tion of work', one is culpable under [the heading of] 'hitting with a hammer' "). This principle evidently presupposes that there is some way of deciding to begin with whether or not a given act is "work". Thus the comprehensive list of examples of "work" effects given by the Mishnah still does not provide an intrinsic definition of "Sabbath work".

It would perhaps be possible to formulate such a definition if general characteristics could be found which all of the 39 categories of m'lakhah effects had in common. However, it is far from obvious how to do this. True, many of the 39 have effects which involve changes in the psysical properties, or in the shape, of an object. Those resulting in physical property changes might include sowing, plowing, kneading, baking, washing and dyeing, slaughtering, salting and curing, and making and extinguishing fire; while shape changes are produced by reaping, threshing, grinding, shearing, tearing and sewing, flaying, scraping, cutting, and perhaps "hitting with a hammer" in the sense of metalworking. On the other hand, many of the categories cannot readily be accounted for on this basis.

A possible further m'lakhah characteristic which might be used to explain most of the remaining categories is that of producing a change in the name of an object. For example, the act of "binding sheaves" changes "grain" to "sheaf"; the acts of winnowing, "cleansing crops" and sifting nominally "destroy" an object (the mixture) and "create" new objects (the separated components); the acts of beating [wool], spinning, and weaving (with its suboperations) successively change "fleece" to "fibers" to "thread" to "warp" and "woof", and finally to "cloth"; similarly, the acts of tying, writing and building, "create" objects, (the knot, the letters, the structure), while the opposite acts "destroy" them. Some of the categories listed in the preceding paragraph may also actually belong under the heading of name changes.

Even this additional principle, however, does not suffice to account for all 39 categories of "work". In particular, two of the categories, hunting (= capturing) and "taking out", have yet to be explained. (There is an intriguing parallel here between m'lakhah effects and the laws governing acquisition of stolen property by a thief, where the Talmud uses the terms shinui ha-guf (physical change), shinui ha-shem (name change), and shinui r'shuth (change of domain or possession); "hunting" and "taking out" are perfectly described by this last term.) In order to formulate a concept which can account even for these two types of m'lakhah, it is necessary to examine another important aspect of the "Sabbath work" laws.

58 Before one is culpable for an act of "Sabbath work", certain general conditions must be satisfied. Some of these conditions relate to the manner in which the act is performed; in particular a) It must be performed in a "normal" manner (k-darko; e.g., Mishnah Shab. 10,3 and 12,5) b) It must be intentional (a mith'asek is not culpable; e.g., Mishnah K'rith. 4,3 and Bab. ad loc) c) The effect must be immediate, direct result of the act (this excludes grama; e.g., Mishnah Shab. 16,5) d) The effect must be an inevitable, or at least highly probable, consequence of the act; otherwise, the act is permitted, provided that there was no intention of producing the effect (eno mithkaven; e.g., Bab. Betzah 23b, 36a) However, these criteria are not directly relevant to the problem of defining "Sabbath work", since they do not refer to the type of effect which is produced. Rather, they serve to define the situations in which an individual is culpable for having brought about a "work" effect; they are act criteria rather than effect criteria. Another possible "Sabbath work" act criterion is that of skill. The Biblical phrase m'lekheth mahsheveth, "skillful workmanship" (Exod. 35,33), is in fact used several times in the Talmud in connection with "Sabbath work"; but it is generally used to justify the criteria of intent and directness (see, e.g., Bab. Hag. lOa-b, K'rith. 19b). However, as mentioned earlier, the midrash (Sifra on Lev. 16,29; compare the variant readings in M'kh. d-R. Shim'on on Exod. 12,16 and 20,10) seems to derive from it a skillfullness criterion on the basis of which such activities as making beds, cleaning vegetables, and washing out cups are permissible on the Sabbath. On the other hand, skill cannot be the sole criterion for defining "Sabbath work"; for example, sounding a shofar and removing bread from an oven, while not actually permitted on the Sabbath, are not "work" since they merely require "wisdom" (i.e., skill; Bab. Shab. 117b). In fact, skill cannot even be a general requirement, since many acts are "work" even though they involve no skill whatsoever (e.g., making a hole in the ground is "plowing", heating water is "baking", etc.). More pertinent to the problem of defining "Sabbath work" are the criteria imposed by the Talmud on a "work" effect: 1) It must ultimately be constructive; one who acts destructively (m'kalkel) is not culpable unless his intent is to make possible a subsequent constructive action (Mishnah Shab. 13,3). Authorities differ as to whether this principle applies even to such inherently

59 destructive "work" as slaughtering and lighting a fire (Bab. Shab. 106a). 2) According to some authorities, it must be of use to the person who performs the act; one is not culpable for a "work" act if he has no use for its effect (enah ts'rikhah l-gufah; e.g., Bab. Shab 94a-b). 3) It must be quantitatively sufficient to serve some useful purpose (e.g., Mishnah Shab. 7,3; 8, passim) [The requirement of mithka- yemeth (lit. "permanent"; Mishnah Shab. 12,1) is interpreted by commentators to mean "quantitatively sufficient to be kept without further addition", rather than as a criterion of permanence in the literal sense—although such a criterion certainly does apply to such "work" acts as sewing (Bab. Shab. 74b) and writing (Mishnah Shab. 12,5).] These criteria can be summarized as requiring that an act of "Sabbath work" have utility. An intrinsic definition of "Sabbath work" can thus perhaps be formulated along the following lines: An act is "work" if it results in a significant increase in the utility of some object. This concept can now be used to account for the two "exceptional" types of m'lakhah—hunting and "taking out." In fact, culpability for these activities is strongly dependent on considerations of utility: "If he hunted them to make use of them he is culpable, but if not to make use of them he is not culpable" (Mishnah Shab. 14,1); "If ... it is not in such quantity as is fit to keep stored,. . . only one who [usually] keeps [the like of] it stored is culpable [for taking it out]" (Mishnah Shab. 7,3).

The foregoing discussion is certainly very far from a complete treatment of the problem of defining "Sabbath work". One may truly say that "ha-m'lakhah m'rubah"—the subject is both broad and deep. It can only be hoped that these remarks qualify as "Torah she-yesh 'imah m'lakhah" and will be of some utility to investigators in this field.

60 AND CONCLUSIONS

HUGO MANDELBAUM

Dr. Mandelbaum is Professor of Geology at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. This paper was presented at the National Convention of the Association in August, 1964.

A genuine discussion of the harmony between observation and revelation within the thought world of Torah Judaism has to be cognizant of three spheres in which misunderstanding may arise. a) The discussants are not in complete mastery of the known facts (this includes the area of problems beyond the present frontiers of science); b) The discussants do not comprehend the process of synthesis by which science arrives at factual units of higher levels; c) The discussants do not comprehend the true character of the Torah and its interpretation. To this third sphere belongs an attitude which is not infrequently encountered when the question of Torah knowledge versus empirical knowledge and the formulation of physical laws by mathematical deduction is discussed: The Torah is the source of all knowledge, science included. No other source is of a comparable level of trustworthiness. It is the intent of this paper to demonstrate that our Torah does not have as its purpose the transmission of scientific facts—neither formulations of single facts, nor functional relationships among phenomena. Language as a tool for transmitting knowledge must possess two essential qualities: it must be able to express the subject matter adequately, and it must be comprehensible to the person to whom it is addressed. Further- more, it is in the nature of the process of transmitting knowledge that this process is selective. Out of the totality of facts and functional relationships that comprise the subject area of a message, a selection must be made which is determined by the purpose of the message and by the ability of the audience to comprehend. Language, therefore, is a matter of definition. It must define, i.e. limit the knowledge it wishes to convey, and it must give precise meaning—definition—to what is transmitted. To study the meaning

61 of recorded language, we must therefore know the purpose of the message which guided the selectivity on the part of the originator, and we must consider the state of comprehension on the part of the audience. This principle is stated by Hazal: dibrah Torah ki-l'shon b'nei adam—the Torah spoke in the language of men. A trivial example may make this principle clear. In the Torah we read (B'reshith 28, 11) vayalen sham ki va ha-shemesh—he (Ya'akov) stopped there for the night, because the sun had set. The purpose of the clause "ki va ha-shemesh" is (I'fi ha-p'shat) to state the fact that the sun had set (to force Ya'akov to sleep at that particular place, according to the Mid- rash). The mechanics of the sunset, the universal forces involved in the celestial movement, the mathematics of prediction, etc. are irrelevant in this connection. Furthermore, the "entering of the sun", ba ha-shemesh, is to be understood as a common expression. This expression need not be conceived as containing the total knowledge of the celestial mechanism. To do so would lead to absurd conclusions. One cannot derive from this phrase, for instance, that the Torah endorses the Ptolemaic world system.

In the following paragraphs, the contention that the Torah is not concerned with the revelation of scientific facts will be illustrated by a few simple examples.

1) Length of time between one molad and the next

The time from one molad (new moon) to the next is halakhah I'Mosheh mi-Sinai—"law revealed to Moses on Sinai"—and is given as 29 days, 12 hours, 44 minutes, and 3H seconds. Those who understand the elements of astronomy know that the time interval between one occlusion and the next varies by as much as 13 minutes, owing to the varying speed of the sun and the moon along their elliptical paths. To find the accurate average by observation requires not only sustained observation but also accurate tools for timing. In the halakhah I'Mosheh mi-Sinai we have a remarkable scientific fact. As such, it is the basis for the computation of the calendar al pi ha-heshbon. But to call this the revelation of scientific knowledge misses an essential point. The value, given accurately to one helek (316 sec.), is just that accurate and no more. The computation of the length of an elliptical path leads to an irrational number as answer. Any rational number used for practical purposes is only an approximation. It is irrelevant in this connection whether this approximation is very close or not. What is halakhah I'Mosheh mi-Sinai is not the true average length of the time interval in question (which cannot be given by a rational number), but the specificaton of the approximation which is to be used for the calculation of our calendar. It would not reflect on the truth value of the halakhah if the approximation were given to the nearest minute only. The given value

62 does not state what is, but rather which value should be used. It neither intends to be, nor should be considered as, revelation of a scientific fact. It would therefore also be irrelevant if physical theory should require secular changes in the length of this interval due to tidal friction, for instance. No such change could be construed as in opposition to the "revealed" constant length of the month.

2) Length of the solar year Similar situations arise in connection with the length of the solar year as applied in the realm of halakhah. The halakhah uses the length of a quarter year, a t'kufah, in several connections. The time at which to start saying v'then tal u'matar in the golah, and the time to say birkhath ha- hamah (every 28 years), is determined 'al pi halakhah by the t'kufah of Sh'muel. The cycle of leap years (19 years) is based on the t'kufah of Rav Ada bar Ahavah. Four t'kufoth of Sh'muel (one year) are 365V4 days. Four fkufoth of Rav Ada bar Ahavah are 365 days, 5 hours, 25 minutes, 50/114 seconds. Both values are practical approximations. The latter one is especially interesting, considering the fractional second which is given. The nineteen year cycle, which our halakhah utilizes to equalize the lunar calendar with the solar year, comprises 7 leap years of 13 lunar months. 19 lunar years are, therefore (19 X 12) + 7 lunar months or 235 months, each of which is 'al pi halakhah I'Mosheh mi-Sinai 29d 12h 44m 3VSs. Multiplying this value by 235 we arrive at 6939d 16h 33m 3VSs. Dividing this time into 19 equal parts results in 365d 5h 55m 50/114 sec. In other words, the t'kufah of Rav Adah bar Ahavah is calculated on the basis of the halakhah concerning the length of the time interval between one molad and the next, and the halakhah that our calendar 'al pi ha-heshbon shall be based on the 19 year cycle to equalize lunar and solar years. The fractional part of a second does not represent an extraordinarily precise knowledge of natural phenomena, but is the logical outcome of the halakhah concerning the mahzor katan, the 19-year cycle. There is a small discrepancy between the true length of the solar year and that used as the basis of the calendar calculation (namely, 4 min. 21 sec.). This discrepancy, as small as it is, has added up in the course of 1500 years to approximately 4 Vi days. This causes some difficulties with regard to the compliance of our calculated calendar with other requirements of halakhah. But again, this discrepancy cannot be construed as contradiction to a fact given as halakhah in Torah she-b'al peh, nor as contradicting the truth of the calculated astronomical length of the solar year. In this case, moreover, the fact with regard to b'rakhoth the view of Sh'muel is accepted as halakhah, while with regard to the calendar that of Rav Ada is accepted, shows that both are considered suitable approximations, not revelations of facts. M'tziuth, a fact, cannot be the subject of an argument. Both Sh'muel and Rav Ada bar

63 Ahavah were surely aware of the fact that closer approxinations were known at their time, but they were unsuitable for the halakhic problem at hand. The problem of the true length of the solar year does not belong to the domain of halakhah. It is therefore not treated in the Talmud, although our hakhamim were very well versed bi-sh'vilei d'rakia'—in the "heavenly paths."

3) Length of the circumference of a circle According to the practice of halakhah, the circumference of a circle is to be taken as three times its diameter. The source for this halakhah is M'lakhim 1, 7, 23 which describes the yam shel Sh'lomoh as being ten amoth in diameter and thirty amoth in circumference. It is quite obvious that both measurements are approximations. Measurements taken by any real measuring device are by their very nature approximations. Furthermore, a hand cast metal vessel of that size, adorned as it was with ornaments, can hardly have a diameter or a circumference which are well defined. However, Torah she-b'al peh bases on this pasuk the halakhah that wherever the ratio of diameter to circumference has a bearing on a halakhic problem, this ratio should be taken as 1:3. It is certainly not heretical to maintain that the ratio l/7r is smaller than Vz, nor that 7r is an irrational number which cannot be expressed by any rational fraction. On the other hand, it is neither a lack of accuracy nor a lack of knowledge when the value of this ratio is given in T'nakh as V3. Those who drew up the blueprints of the Beth ha-Mikdash knew better than that. What is essential from our point of view is that the ratio reported in the pasuk is not a statement of a scientific fact, but a value sufficiently accurate for the purposes of halakhah.

4) Length of the diagonal of a square Another example is the classical problem of the length of the diagonal of a square: kol amah b'ribbua' amah ut'rei humshei b'alakhsona—the diagonal is 1-2/5 times the side of the square. Again, this is a fair approximation of the irrational number 2 = 1.414 ... , but it is not a scientific fact that is reported, Rather, this specifies the practical procedure for determining this length if required by the halakhah. The problem of the irrationality of the length of the diagonal in units of the side, a problem that both excited and bothered the Greek philosophers, nowhere enters the discussion.

There is no need for an apologetic attitude about these matters. The purpose of Torah is not to teach what is, but what ought to be—how we should live, behave, act according to the Divine Law. Our hakhamim were great not because they were masters of scientific knowledge or erudite scientific deduction. Their greatness is based on their mastery of halakhah, of the in- tricacies and internal unity of Torah; they were great because of the heights of

64 unblemished morality which they reached and exemplified for us. If they ever knew or discovered such basic relationships as the Pythagorean Theorem, they surely did not report the fact; if they did not, they are no less great. Their greatness lies on an entirely different plane. In this connection it is interesting to note parenthetically the comment of the Rashbam (on B'reshith 37, 7.) in the lack of explanation 'al pi hap'shat in the Talmud as due to the piety ("hassiduth") of our hakhamim.

The Rashbam also quotes a ma'amar hazal which is of great interest for our discussion: amru, ha-osek b'mikra, midah v'enah midah; ha-osek b'talmud, en lakh midah g'dolah mi-zu. (They said, he who occupies himself with the interpretation of the text of the Torah ('al pi ha-p'shat) will never reach absolute certainty as to the validity of his interpretation, such as one obtains when deriving halakhah from Torah she-bi'khthav 'al pi midrash hazal.) With regard to the validity of such interpretations, the Ralbag to the first chapter of B'reshith states en lanu m'sorah k'vu'ah—we have no fixed tradition (compared to that which we have in the realm of halakhah). Per- mission is granted to search and expound, but "the Torah has seventy faces". A phrase may receive various interpretations, all of which are, relatively speaking, valid; but none can be claimed as precisely representing objective factual truth. It is not possible to construct on the basis of such interpretations a picture of the world as it is. The purpose of Torah is not to report scientific facts; the language of the Torah is not a scientific language, i.e. mathematical or quasi-mathematical; dibrah Torah ki-l'shon b'nei adam.

It is no reflection on the emunah of a person if he concedes that he cannot reconcile the meaning of a word or a phrase with facts of which he has knowledge, and therefore concludes that he does not know its true meaning. The state of affairs is such that we lack either knowledge of the meaning of Torah (the p'shat was not revealed as Torah she-b'al peh), or knowledge of facts. This reflects only on us but never on the truth of either Torah or science. These considerations are particularly applicable to the report of ma'aseh b'reshith.

One example may suffice (B'reshith 1, 7). Our authoritative commentators do not a^ ree on the interpretation of mayim me'al la-rakia' and mayim mi-tahath la-rakia'—the waters above and below the firmament. An attempt to interpret this pasuk as a state of the universe is made by the Ralbag: "Be- tween each sphere is matter which does not retain its form. This is the reason that the motion of the upper spheres does not communicate itself to the lower ones. This is what is called mayim—"water"—in this parashah, because of the similarity between "water" and this matter, namely the absence of con- servation of form (i.e., shear resistance)". Here is a very interesting example of dibrah Torah ki-l'shon b'nei adam; since there is no word for "ether" available, a suitable word of I'shon b'nei adam is substituted, namely mayim. In

65 this connection the Ralbag declares that the statement in the Midrash Tan- huma, to the effect that the mayim ha-'elyonim are suspended through the support of G'd's Word (b'ma'amar), is exceedingly strange, because the very nature of the mayim ha-elyonim is different from that of the mayim ha- tahtonim. Only the latter are heavy and need to be supported. We today who do not have the horror vacui, and think in terms of celestial motion, may equally term the explanation given by the Ralbag as "exceedingly strange". But neither we nor the Ralbag are for this reason removed from the realm of Torah, even if we declare that we find it impossible to construct our world picture on the basis of any interpretation of the p'sukim of ma'aseh b'reshith. The overall meaning of the first chapter of B'reshith is to relate the fact that ha-Shem created this world. But how He created it requires interpretation, or perhaps is not related there at all. On the surface, the chapter does not tell us anything about the composition of the basic chemical elements, about subatomic particles, about galaxies, genes, etc. etc. All these are referred to, according to the Ralbag, in the first sentence: In the beginning ha-Shem created shamayim va-aretz—the heavens and the earth. Why is this type of knowledge not mentioned b'nigleh, openly, so that it can be lifted from the pages of our books? The answer to this question cannot be directly derived from traditional sources, but must remain unauthoritative, speculative in its scope, and debatable in its character. The purpose of Torah is to teach us how to live. We have no unfailing guide by which to choose between right and wrong. Even after labelling one action right, the other wrong, we have no compelling power to do the right. The endowment of man with b'hirah, free choice, requires at the same time the enumeration of the good, the tov, and the divine command to make the good the guideline for one's life. Quite in contrast to this, ha-Shem gave man an excellent tool to find true relationships among natural phenomena, to explore the universe and to draw valid conclusions. He endowed man with senses for gathering information, and with an intellect by which he can transcend the boundaries of sense information, by which he can refine, through instrumentation, the information gathering apparatus, and by which he is able to create the most powerful tool of investigation, mathematics, to master the chaos and transform it into a unified whole governed by law and order. Parallel to the injunction tze u-l'mad —go and study—is the command to go and observe. There is no need to include natural laws within revelation. These laws are open for inspection. Moreover, no harm is done if we should err, as we have done many times. Hassiduth is affected only by our state of 'am ha-aratzuth in the realm of Torah, not by laymanship in the sciences. There is no harm in the fact that scientific conclusions change with the increase of the store of observed facts and with the development of new instrumental and mathematical tools. Nor can the fact of such changes be interpreted as a discredit of scientic endeavor.

66 Ha-Shem has placed the quest of knowledge into our soul; he has touched with the seal of his hand, emeth hothamo shel ka-Kadosh barukh Hu, our innermost heart. We are urged to uncover the blueprints of ma'asei b'reshith and to utilize gained knowledge for the benefit of yishuv ha-olam; lo tohu b'ra'ah la-sheveth yllzarah-^Me, created ktoHre dweltrin. We are keenly aware of the limitations of our senses and the tools which we have created for refined observations. We are keenly aware that there may exist realities of which our finest tools have not given us as yet, or perhaps will never give us, any indication of their existence. We are aware that our intellect is limited. With all refinements of logic and mathematics we are not able to penetrate beyond physical reality, or even to penetrate into the true essence of physical reality. Nevertheless we rely, and are entitled to rely, on the conviction that we are able to penetrate from the threshold of detailed observation into the realm of the unifying law, and that such discoveries are realities of a higher order, not just chimeras of a deceitful mind. Jewish philosophy has always been realistic and positivistic in this respect. We believe the ha-Shem gave man his senses to communicate with a real world which He has created. We believe that the same sekhel that enables man, applying middoth sheha- Torah nidresheth bahem, to derive by logical conclusions the halakhah l-ma aseh—the same sekhel provides man with truthful realities in the study of natural phenomena, not with deceitful hallucinations. We believe that the laws and functional relationship which can be derived from observation by "scientific" methods are intrinsic properties of the nature of ma'asei b'reshith. Any change which we observe, whether rapid or secular, is "lawfully" determined and is part of the law and order of ma'asei b'reshith. Although these beliefs are not amenable to scientific proof, no phenomenon contradicting them is on record, except those which are expressedly termed nissim. It would be contrary to the concept of the relationship of ha-Shem to man, as taught by our Torah, to maintain that ha-Shem gave us the means of observation and the sekhel to draw conclusions merely in order to produce hevel va-rik—in order to laugh, hass v'shalom, at our foolish endeavors.

In conclusion: Torah teaches us how to live. Facts reported in Torah are not intended for the purpose of revealing observable phenomena. Ha-Shem gave us tools by which to explore His creation. We have faith that the use of these tools will provide the keys of an understanding of the reality of creation and to the conquest of its forces for the benefit of a better mankind. Ac- cordingly, increasing our understanding means increasing our ahavath ha- Shem. As the Rambam says at the end of Hilkhoth T'shuvah: 'Al pi ha-de'ah tih'yeh ha-ahavah, im m'at m'at, im harbeh harbeh. L'fikhakh tzarikh ha-adam I'yahed 'atzmo I'havin u-Vhaskil b-hokmoth u-th'vunoth ha-modi'im lo eth Kono. Our love of ha-Shem is proportional to our knowledge; a man should therefore set himself the task of acquiring wisdom which will make his Creator known to him.

67 JUDAISM AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMA

ALVIN RADKOWSKY

Dr. Radkowsky is Chief Scientist of the Office of Naval Reactors.

Introduction Paradox is imbedded in the fabric of Israel's existence, the ever-young, ever-old—exclusive, universal—most blessed, most unfortunate people. Para- dox is found even in the great, sublime concept of the Master of the Universe as projected, for example, in the Hymn of Glory, often recited in synagogues on the Sabbath:

jmv»*rbaa ton pn jrmnn ana T>b>\yon —words setting forth the prophetic vision depicting the Most High now in age, now in youth, now a G-d of mercy, and a G-d of strict justice, yet an un- paralleled unity in all of His aspects. It is interesting and instructive that the real advance of modern science began only when it was realized that apparently contradictory experiments could be harmonized by recognizing that the experimenter was observing different aspects of a single unity. Thus, in regard to the fact that in some circumstances light and elementary particles (e.g. electrons, protons) seemed to act like waves and in other cases like particles, Niels Bohr gave the famous analogy of a man describing a spherical lens. Looking from the outside he would describe it as convex, while from the inside he would conclude it was concave, yet he was observing the same lens. It is conceivable that the proto-concept, so important to modern science, of discerning unity in apparent diversity, may have arisen out of the age-old syncretisms of Judaism. In any case it is the author's hope to indicate how the philosophic insights provided to us by Judaism may help to resolve the paradoxes and dilemmas of modern life. Since the Scientific Revolution began, usually dated about two or three centuries ago, the advances of science have been marked by tremendous exuberance and optimism. An ever-fruitful field seemed to have been found for the exercise of the imagination both to bring about the accomplish- ment of what had appeared to be fantastic dreams and to set new goals, the realization of which resulted in still further advances. But in recent years,

68 almost suddenly, a tide of apprehension and pessimism has set in. Even science fiction writers are complaining of a lack of suitable material, not so much that science has overtaken and passed science fiction, but because the world of the future begins to look foreboding and menacing. Now there looms ahead a nightmare future, suchjisjdescribed in George Orwell's novel, 1984, in which man is tolerated only as a subject on which to inflict sophisticated torture. There are three basic areas in which science and technology appear to present challenges or threats to mankind: The first is connected with the current theory, or doctrine, of evolution, according to the popular conception of which all life, including man, is purely naturalistic in origin, and all living beings are more or less complex chemical entities molded into their present forms by inevitable, deterministic processes acting over long periods of time. As a result free will, individuality, and imagination are in effect illusions. The second challenge is presented by the development of super- weapons such as hydrogen bomb missiles which portend the possibility of universal annihilation. Finally, there is the challenge presented by the rapid development of automation which, at least according to some predictions, might make man relatively inefficient and in fact unnecessary. To put it more bluntly, science and technology seem to be saying to man: first, you are an illusion; second, in any case you're going to be wiped out physically; third, even if you should survive we're going to make you obsolescent. Let us see how Judaism can cope with these problems. In fact we find complete, satisfying answers in the very first book of the Torah, in Genesis. Thus the resolution of the first dilemma is provided in the words: (V.l) ... ni)3*ri OTN o>nb-N jm ova OTN jmbin iap m "This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that G-d created man, in the likeness of G-d he created him"—in other words man is not merely an assembly of complicated steroid compounds, but a being of Divine origin and thus capable of conscience, imagination, and unlimited creativity. Next, the threat of physical annihilation: The answer is given in G-d's promise to Jacob: (XXVIII. 15) ban prnavn -jay nam "And behold I am with thee and shall guard thee wherever thou goest."

69 Here too we associate the concept of hashgahah p'ratith, the loving, personal solicitude of HaShem for each individual. As to the final problem, man's potential obsolescence, consider G-d's command to Jacob: (XXXV.l) rm-on b-Nb nun o\m\yyi "and erect there an altar to the Alm-ghty that appeared unto thee . . . ". This duty and opportunity of worship and service to G-d is the principal and ultimate justification of man's existence and provides him a role which no automaton, however "advanced," can ever fill. We have cited three aspects of the modern predicament. Actually the first is the most basic since it leads directly to the other two. Thus, the denial of the Divine origin of man and consequently his spirituality and special vocation undermines the entire foundation of religion. The consequent implication that there is no real imperative for morality except on a pragmatic basis must lead to the second dilemma, all-out wars of greater and greater violence and extermination. Finally, if man is merely a complex mechanism which came into being by random processes, it should be possible by purposeful design to do much better, that is to make an automaton which can do anything that man can do far more efficiently. Let us therefore consider these various challenges or threats somewhat more deeply with greatest emphasis on the first and most fundamental problem area, relating to the origin of the universe and specifically of life and of man.

Section I. Is Man an Illusion? The current theories of the origin and development of life are usually styled more less loosely as Evolution. Evolution today is accepted by almost all so-called informed minds and is taught, or shall we say propagandized, on all educational levels from nursery school to university. We are not attempting to give here a complete critique of Evolution. What we should like to show is that Evolution lacks most of the characteristics of a science and in fact leads to serious conceptual difficulties or antinomies. Rather than being a science Evolution is a doctrine, conviction, or religion with many deeply committed practioners who find it a satisfying justification for an atheistic or agnostic world outlook (Weltanschauung). The most glaring deficiencies in Evolution from a factual standpoint are the lack of a demonstrable theory of the origin of life, the lack of a convinc- ing means of propagating genetic variation, and various lacunae and inconsistencies in the fossil record, "descent of the species." (Compare the article by Dr. Lee Spetner in these Proceedings.) As would be expected in a field

70 which is doctrinal rather than scientific, in which conclusions are based rather on intuition than on objective evidence, and depend on the "lucky chance", or coincidence, biologists who venture to question the accepted tenets of Evolution are subject to ridicule, ostracism, and withdrawal of support. Complaints of this nature have appeared in such responsible Journals as The American Scientist, the official publication of the Scientific Research Society of America (Sigma Xi). (Cf Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 91 and 122, Jan. 1952 and Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 100, Jan. 1953.) As to the origin of life, one of the major advances of biology during the last century was the demonstration that spontaneous generation does not occur. Yet the accepted theory of the mechanistic origin and evolution of life necessarily requires such spontaneous generation to have occurred somewhere, sometime, although it happens no longer. So the self-styled rationalists insist that we must accept on faith that at one time in the history of the universe conditions were sufficiently different to have resulted in life forming spontaneously. A typical so-called scientific attitude is given in a popular article on The Origin of Life (George Wald, Scientific American, Vol. 191, No. 4, p. 8, Oct. 1954). "I think a scientist has no choice but to approach the origin of life through a hypothesis of spontaneous generation." (Emphasis supplied. Note the compulsion to believe.) In a subsequent issue a reader cited the probability of forming a simple protein molecule as being about 1 in 10243 billion years. Wald's reply granted that the probability was low but asserted that it was not that low. He concludes with the following strikingly revealing statement: "If they (living organisms) did not exist, I would regard them as impossible, yet here we are; so we must be much more probable than appears on the surface." In this statement in essence any different from the positivist attitude of unbelievers in all generation—that in effect the universe has "just happened" to be? In further connection with the spontaneous generation of life the eminent physicist, Eugene Wigner, a recent Nobel prize winner, has questioned the compatibility of the postulated elementary cell multiplication with the principles of quantum mechanics which form such a fundamental part of today's physics. While the lack of a rational explanation of the origin of the life is a formidable defect in Evolution theory, it is by no means the only one. For example, using recent developments in deciphering the genetic code, Dr. Spetner (loc. cit.) has shown mathematically that the development of organisms by the accepted mutation process would be too improbable by many orders of magnitude. He has also demonstrated many gaps and inconsistencies in what is known as the fossil record.

71 We shall pass over the questions of the validity of interpretation and the authenticity of the fossils themselves, except to remark that as a child in school the author was forced to learn about the four ancestors of man, including the Piltdown man. Some years ago the world was informed that the Piltdown relics were a clumsy fabrication but that everything else presented as evidence of Evolution was absolutely genuine. Without in any way impug- ning the motives or ethics of those who work in Evolution, everyone must grant that we have here a subject which differs from all other sciences in that experimental material is not subject to verification by experiments which can be repeated at will by all other scientists. Regrettably, the entire field of an- tiques, fossils, and ancient art has been plagued repeatedly by forgeries and imitations for a variety of motives with resultant controversies and exposures. A summary of the situation by a prominent scientific writer is given in the Scientific American of April 1966 which, quoting a book by Carl G. Hempel (Aspects of Scientific Explanation . . . ), states "the Darwinian account is not and never was an 'explanation' at all but rather a hypothetical historical narrative describing the putative stages of the evolutionary process." What is often not realized is that a somewhat similar situation of lack of a satisfactory, consistent theory also obtains in regard to the origin of the earth and solar system. Thus a recent scientific article attempts to supply a new hypothesis to acccount for the origin of the moon but concludes: "Against this hypothesis is the argument that it requires a series of improbable events to have occurred in sequence. But in the solar system the earth- moon association is completely unique and the recognized difficulties in all proposed modes of origin seem to demand an 'unusual solution'." (On the Origin of the Moon, Ralph L. Baldwin, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 71 No. 7 p. 1966, April 1, 1966.) In the author's opinion the truth is that there is now no logically acceptable method of accounting for either the origin of the planets and satellites or of life and of living organisms. Further, the evidence obtained from ex- ploration of space as well as from terrestrial observation suggests that life on earth is an absolutely unique phenomenon, at least from a practical point of view, that is in the portion of the universe accessible to mankind in the foreseeable future. But let us for the moment grant all the much popularized claims of Evo- lution and theories of planet formation and see where they would lead. We shall find that on a cosmic scale we have been led to a striking antinomy or catastrophic inconsistency in our concept of science itself. According to current evolutionary doctrine there must be innumerable planets in the universe which would have the physical environment to result in the generation and development of life as we know it. In fact on the assumption of the existence of extra-terrestial intelligent beings large Government projects have been set

72 up in an attempt to detect the messages which may be radiated to us from outer space. A Russian scientist recently suggested that the two small moons of the planet Mars, which seem to have some bizarre characteristics, may be really ancient satellites launched by the Martians. The eminent physicist, Dyson, has suggested that the peculiar shape of the-outer nebulae, the so- called island universes, in which the stars on the periphery are arranged in spiral shapes, may be the result of operations by the beings in these remote regions who have advanced to the point at which they can manipulate and position those stars which are, so to speak, in their neighborhood. Pursuing this type of argument, the recently discovered quasars are interpreted as being many billions of light years away, so that by this time the hypothesized in- habitants of such galaxies must be ahead of us by billions of years and on the basis of continuous Evolution would be expected to have attained inconceivably great powers as compared with "earth-man." Thus, unless we pos- tulate an artificial upper cut-off or limit to Evolution which would make the whole process trivial, there must inevitably be inconceivably great, illimitable intelligence at large in the universe. But this conclusion introduces a formidable new "Uncertainty Principle", which throws into question the validity of the procedures of our science, of observation and induction. For example, with specific reference to the above suggestion of Dyson, what is the use of trying to observe the far off stars through our telescopes and other sophisticated instruments and to attempt to draw scientific conclusions when perhaps all we are seeing is the results of the whims or sports of some "supermen," several millions or billions of years ahead of us on the evolutionary scale? It is like trying to do a careful analytical chemical weighing when someone may be shaking the scales. In fact, since we have no means of drawing a line between the effects produced by the "supermen" and those of inanimate Nature, we are reduced back to the viewpoints of the ancient pagans who ascribed natural phenomena to the uncoordinated and capricious actions of superbeings whom they sometimes called demons, sometimes gods. As a result these ancient peoples lacked a logical basis for scientific development. In contrast Judaism has a sound conceptual basis for scientific evolvement as a result of a Weltanschau- ung in which creation was the work of a Divine Intelligence who guaranteed that the world would run according to an invariant unified set of natural laws (except for the rare exceptions of nes nigleh, or overt miracle).

We find this in the Alm-ghty's promise to Noah:

Nb nmm mv> «pro >(>iT> om vspi yinti *ry which can be paraphrased to state that the seasons and all other phenomena of nature will take place according to immutable universal rules. This may also be alluded to in the praise we give each morning:

73 jvvm-o *T>»JI or baa "DIPI vnnttti "Who reneweth in His goodness the works of Creation every day," in that the laws of Nature are renewed at every instant so as to continue in effect. As our sages have emphasized, when we use the anthropomorphism of Divine Intelligence or mind of G-d, we are, of course, not speaking literally but rather trying to convey a meaning within the framework of man's limited understanding. However, within this framework we do imply that the laws of the universe are amenable to man's intelligence; man can attain at least a partial comprehension and mastery of the laws of nature. We are not in the fix of the color-blind attempting to understand art or the deaf trying to grasp the significance of music. With adequate effort we can look, appreciate, and utilize. We may not enter the Holy of Holies but like lay Israelites we can traverse the first eleven cubits of the Temple which were accessible to non-priests. As Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch z.t.l. points out, the very use of the plural term Elokim in Genesis involves taking the powers of the large numbers of godheads who were supposed to rule the many opposing and differ- ing phenomena of the universe and assigning all of these powers to the One Unique G-d. We see that this step was of fundamental importance not only from the standpoint of religious law but also for the conceptual existence of a body of legislation of natural laws without which there would be no possibility or need for science. On the other hand once we know that the laws exist we automatically endow each human being with enormous potential and dignity in that he may learn the laws and thereby acquire vast, almost unlimited powers. At the same time we learn to look at the religious and natural laws as being correspondingly basic and immutable, and fulfilling a complementary relationship. So, far from encumbering man, it is truly the yoke of the Torah which makes it possible for man to be free, both spiritually and physically— free from superstition and enslavement to base instincts on the one hand, and free from subjugation to the forces of nature on the other. And since it is the revelation of the Torah which gives us the potential to mastery and the to speak, subdue nature, it follows that the fruits of this mastery and the power gained ought properly be devoted to service to G-d, Who created all, problem, solution, and problem solver. One final point should be made in connection with origins. To date human minds have not produced any theory which is scientifically sound or free from grave logical objections. There is no alternative other than creation by a purposeful Divine Intelligence as related in the Torah, as interpreted by our sages of blessed memory, Hazal. In this connection it is well to mention a saying by Rabbi Simon Schwab: "Attempts to understand the Torah without Hazal are like studying astronomy without a telescope." We have not at-

74 tempted here to present a connected accounting for various paleontological and geological data. Let us emphasize that mankind does not now and probably never will have all the answers or explanations for all observed and reported events and phenomena. How could we expect to in this or in any field? Even in Torah knowledge we are at best extremely deficient. For example, we are told that when Moses died 300 halakhoth, or laws, were lost during the grief of the mourning period. Our sorrows each year during the s'firah period may be primarily for the many parts of our Oral Torah which were lost as a result of the death of so many of Rabbi Akiva's students. In the Sayings of our Fathers, Pirkei Avoth, we read Kb o>yvnn jnb\y» Kb u>i»a v* —we are told that "We cannot understand either the prosperity of the wicked nor the tribulations of the righteous." Any student of the Talmud is aware of the many famous temahs, exclamations of perplexity, of the Tosafoth and other commentators. Perhaps incomplete knowledge and understanding are natural attributes of man's existence in a fundamental sense, and directly associated with man's finiteness. As the Nobelist P. W. Bridgman pointed out in Reflections on Thermodynamics, we can never expect "a logical clean-cut scheme of unlimited physical applicability on the macroscopic level"; when we push the analysis in every line as far as we can, even logic itself, we do not attain sharpness and freedom from fuzziness. By analogy in quantum mechanics a basic part of Heisenberg's famous uncertainty principle is the fact that it is not possible to measure simultaneously the position and momentum of an elementary particle. Some scientists, such as Einstein, felt that this represented a defect in the theory since as a result our knowledge is in a certain sense incomplete. Yet it is this situation which according to the Copenhagen school results in the stability of the atom, inexplicable according to classical physics in which attainment of complete knowledge by the observer is assumed possible. It is also true that our perplexities and challenges of today are not as new and unprecedented as we are inclined to think. The atheist does not date from Marxism, or even from Shelley. In fact in the Songs of David we find: o>mb-K I>N nba bii i»k "The fool saith in his heart 'There is no G-d'." The "fools" in this phrase unfortunately include most of the leading savants and sophisticated scholars from the generation of the Deluge to Sartre and his existentialist school. Be- fore Evolution was formalized, these so-called Minim, or freethinkers, assumed that either the world had always existed or somehow just came into existance by chance, which is all that Evolution reduces to when subjected to rigorous analysis.

75 Section II. The Threat of Annihilation

The second threat posed by technology, that of physical annihilation, does indeed seem to grow ever more serious. A recent survey indicated that by 1970 sufficient nuclear power stations would be in existence to produce 25 tons (25,000 kilograms) of plutonium a year, at least 5 tons of which would be in small nations. This indicates a possible proliferation of atomic weapons since it is well known that a nuclear device can be made with less than 100 kilograms of plutonium. Frightening and bewildering as this danger must be to the rest of mankind, it is, of course, no novelty to the Jewish people. Throughout their history, from the very first patriarch, the Children of Israel have been faced with the threat of extermination. Who is not familiar with this somber theme undulating throughout our entire history and expressed with exquisite clarity in the Hagadah: O*T>D Nin im wnpm wmbDb onoiy *vm boav N!?N "But in every generation they rise up against us to destroy us, and the Holy One Blessed be He saves us from their hands." So here again we find that the problem or threat is not new, but only more extensive and pervading than in the past. And, as always, the answer to death is to live—to live according to the canon of the G-d Who desires life; "For thus said the L-rd to the House of Israel 'Seek me and live'." (Amos V.4).

Section III. The Challenge of Automation

The field of automation is a new and rapidly growing one. The author recently made a survey of the present state of computer technology and learned that the speed and capacity of computers have been growing by a factor of 20 every seven years since World War II. The latest digital computer will be equivalent to about 20 million skilled operators working on high speed desk calculators. At the start of their development computers were often referred to as "brains." Since this aroused widespread apprehension the manufacturers quickly explained that the computers could not think but merely obeyed commands built into them. Thus up to now the worries caused by automation have been felt mainly by the relative unskilled who might be displaced by computer actuated machinery. More recently such developments as the perceptron, or learning machine, and the demonstration of the ability of computers to develop solutions to relatively simple mathematics problems have led to widespread speculations and concern as to what relatively advanced human activity may eventually be replaced by computers.

76 Interestingly enough, even here our sages seemed to have had some pre- monition of the fundamental problem. While many of our most advanced mathematicians have been learnedly debating how far it will ultimately be possible to go technologically in producing computers which will speak, think, learn, and even reproduce themselves it turns out that right in the Shulhan 'Arukh we find consideration of one facet of the problems presented by an artificial man, which would be manufactured by what is called the Sefer Y'tzirah. And where does the discussion of the role of such a creature take place? Precisely and crucially in the laws of prayer and service to the Most High—in the question of whether the automaton can be counted to a quorum of ten (minyan). This is the area where we previously indicated that man has assurance of his unique and permanent role and preciousness. At this late stage in history we find ourselves asking the same question and receiving the same answer, essentially, as the patriarch Abraham, the first of the wanderers, the first of the questioners. Ba-mah eda', "How shall I know?" he asked, which Rashi explains as "By what special merit shall my children be entitled to inherit the Land?" Abraham's question also has a deeper meaning. "Inheriting the Land," according to the Talmud (First Mish- nah of Helek, tractate Sanhedrin) symbolizes attaining the ultimate goal of mankind and eternal redemption. "All Israel has a share in the word to come, as it is written 'They shall inherit the land eternally . . .' " And the answer to Abraham's question according to Rashi is bi-z'khuth ha-korbanoth, by virtue of the sacrifices, and more generally the 'Avodah, or Divine service, the prayers which in exile constitute our burnt offerings. Significantly, Hirsch points out that the same word 'Avodah which is used for Temple service is also used to characterize man's initial assignment, Genesis II.5: "And there was no man to work (la-'avod) the ground" showing again a complementary association between secular and religious duties, both of which are essential to human destiny.

Section IV. Conclusion

To summarize, we find in the Torah not only the basis and imperative for scientific investigation but also the potential answers, in fact solutions, to the troublesome, fundamental problems raised by the ostensible successes of our science and technology. What is being advocated here is not that we should study and work in science less but that we should and work in both Torah and science more. It is noteworthy that the task of constructing the first sanctuary, the Mish- kan, or Tabernacle, in the desert involved all of the 39 principal handicrafts of man. In fact this is the basis for deriving the so-called labors which are prohibited on the Sabbath. Furthermore, it is clear from the character of those selected for the work that the building of the Tabernacle enlisted the utmost

77 skills, talents, and imagination of the most gifted and wisest men and women of the era. Similarly, centuries later, it was King Solomon, the reputed wisest of men, steeped in all of the secular and sacred knowledge of the day, who devoted the fullness of his abilities to the erection of the much grander Beth 'Olamim, the permanent sanctuary in Jerusalem. So too as we look forward to the final rebuilding of the Beth ha-Mikdash, the Holy Temple, we may take it for granted that somehow all of the fruits of man's development throughout history, be it in the sciences or the arts, will find application. In this Mikdash, which will have an expanded role of o>»yn bDb nbsii "A house of prayer for all peoples", in which the material and spiritual sides of man willl merge, resolving, at last, the oldest and most basic paradox—it is conceivable that not only will the farmer bring the first fruits of his agricultural efforts as an offering, but a way will be found for the scientist to dedicate his discovery, his new insight into the beauty and symmetry of the universe, the artist his new esthetic achievement or composition of sacred music. If this seems visionary or dreamlike, remember that we Jews, more than other nations, are "the stuff that dreams are made on". Indeed we find that it was a dream that set the entire tone and distinctiveness of our forefather Jacob's career, the patriarch who faced most intensely the conflict of body and spirit. And as man's imagination leads him to delve deep into the earth and strive into outer space it would be well for him to repeat and apply to our entire terrestial home: o>»Nyn nn tnmb-N n>i-oN >d nt mn oipon "How awesome is this place, it is surely the dwelling place of G-d and the gateway to the Heavens."

78 A NEW LOOK AT THE, THEORY OF EVOLUTION

L. M. SPETNER

Dr. Spetner is a member of the principal professional staff of the Applied Physics Laboratory of the John Hopkins University, Silver Spring, Mary- land. This paper was presented at the Annual Winter Meeting of the Association in January, 1965. An article based on this paper was published in the Jewish Observer, January 1966.

I shall try to discuss the theory of evolution primarily from a scientific point of view, although I shall find it necessary toward the end to touch lightly on some of the moral and religious implications of the theory, since evolution unlike almost any other theory in science has had a profound influence on moral and religious development in the short space of one hundred years. First I shall describe the "fact" of evolution, then I shall outline the most widely accepted "theory of evolution." I shall discuss the evidence for both the "fact" and the "theory," pointing out some of the embarrassing difficulties with the data. I shall then describe a new quantitative approach to some aspects of the modern theory, outline some preliminary results, and reach some appropriate conclusions. The "fact" of evolution is that living organisms have descended with modification from pre-existing forms. The lineage is continuous; all forms of life are related to all other forms of life. Life began as a simple form and gradually evolved to more and more complex forms. The evidence for the "fact" can be stated perhaps as follows (Kerkut, 1960, p. 134): "It is possible to date the rocks fairly accurately and in general the oldest rocks are at the bottom and the youngest rocks are on the top. There are sometimes cases where the rocks have been turned over so that the layers are sideways on or upside down, but careful study soon indicates this and allows one to determine their correct relative positions. If one studies the vertebrate remains, one finds that there are no vertebrate fossils in the oldest rocks. The next oldest rocks have some vertebrate fossils; these are fragments of simple fishes. The next oldest rocks have fish and amphibian fossils, the next have fish, amphibian and reptile fossils, while the most recent rocks will have fish, amphibian, reptile and mammal fossils. "The most important point is that one never finds a mammal fossil in rocks that are pre-reptilian; in fact the finding of a single mammal fossil

79 in such an early stratum would seriously question the correctness of evolutionary concepts. Such a fossil has never been found and the evidence now accumulating strongly supports the view that the fish gave rise to the amphibia, the amphibia to the reptiles, and the reptiles to the mammals." One often sees reference to the "large mass of evidence" for evolution, hence the "fact." Simpson (1960) feels that the evidence is so overwhelming that it is "now a matter of simple rational acceptance or superstitious re- jection." Romer (1964, p. 109) contends that the "evidence for continuity of fife and change in the fossil record is so great that lack of belief in the evolutionary story is almost impossible to any competent person familiar with the facts of paleontology .... all the known facts of paleontology are consistent with the theory (sic) of evolution, and impossible of rational interpretation on any other basis. Few accepted truths of any sort rest on firmer grounds." Romer's reference to the "theory" was perhaps unfortunate; he was really referring to the so-called "fact" of evolution. As Challinor (1959, p. 54) points out, "Palaeontology itself can hardly be expected to throw any light on the causes or mechanism of evolution." The general idea of evolution is quite old and in one form or another it can be dated back to the Greeks. The theory which is accepted today by most knowledgeable workers in the field is known as the Synthetic Theory of Evolution. The synthetic theory can be briefly described as follows: genetic variation arises from random mutation and recombination; the genetic variation is expressed in phenotypic variation which is acted upon by natural selection. The phenotypes which are most favored by the environment, or are more adapted to it, survive and produce more descendants. Natural limitations on total population tend to select against the more poorly adapted organisms and the result is that eventually the population consists almost solely of the better adapted organisms. The evidence for the synthetic theory is somewhat more influential than that for the so-called fact of evolution. First of all, mutations do occur and are observed. They can in fact be induced in the laboratory. Secondly, the effects of natural selection can be surmised by observing the operation of artificial selection and its remarkable results, such as the bizarre products of many years of efforts by patient and persistent pigeon breeders. The synthetic theory was put together about thirty years ago out of the best of the several unsatisfactory theories current up to that time. The theory is still being improved and polished; as it stands today it represents the product of perhaps hundreds of man years of effort by the great minds in the fields of genetics, paleontology, and population statistics, and is argued for force- fully by its more eloquent advocates. Almost every biological fact is shown, often with great ingenuity, to support the synthetic theory. The arguments

80 are always verbal, and often stretch the normal conventions of scientific logic. For example, Simpson (1953, pp. 278ff.) discusses the evolutionary trends in the Perissodactyls and the Labyrinthodonts. He attempts to show that these trends are adaptive as would be required under the synthetic theory. "In the first place," he says, "as a matter of scientific method, when there are two sets of similar phenomena, such as primary and secondary trends in Perissodactyla and Labyrinthodontia, and when the explanation is known in one case (as Watson submits that it is in the Perissodactyla and I agree),* the minimal and most likely hypothesis is that the same explanation applies to the second case. . . . Thus our ignorance as to whether the trends in question were adaptive or not certainly fails to suggest that they were not. In fact they involve sorts of characters that are often** adaptive, and it is quite easy to see that they could have been adaptive even though it cannot be proved that a given possibility is indeed the right one. ... It seems proper to conclude (?) that the labyrinthodonts provide another example, and an unusually good one, of primary trends adaptive to the environment and oriented by selection and of secondary trends similarly oriented and adaptive to the primary trends." With this style of logic it is possible to find support for the synthetic theory in almost any data. In fact Bertalanffy (1952) has said that, "a lover of paradox could say that the main objection to selection theory is that it cannot be disproved." Olson (1960) feels compelled to complain that "there is little or nothing that cannot be explained under the selection theory, and, at present, this theory appears to be unique in this respect." Thus we see that while the fact of evolution rests on the fossil evidence, the synthetic theory, which is primarily a combination of random mutation and natural selection, is little more than a reasonable hypothesis, which cannot be tested. But even the fossil evidence of the "fact" is not free of all difficulty. There are a few embarrassing details which tend to mar somewhat the neat picture of evolution presented in elementary texts and popular ex- positions. For one thing, while we would expect the evolutionary process to produce greater complexity as time goes on, one finds upon close examina- tion of the record that late forms are not uniformly more complex than the earlier forms. In the invertebrate order Graptoloidea, for example, the latest known forms are the simplest while the earliest forms are the most complicated (Challinor, 1959, p. 87). Furthermore, the notion of evolution (at least under the synthetic theory) requires that there be a gradual and almost continuous succession from one type of organism to another. While there are some lines that are fairly continuous over some extents of time, there are still real breaks in the record that one would expect not to be

* Simpson's parentheses. ** My italics.

81 there in the presence of all the available paleontological data. As Challinor points out (1959, p. 87), while the evolution of the graptolities was worked out in 1922, and thought to be well understood, it has since been found that the "links in the supposed evolutionary chains are not so secure as was thought, owing chiefly to the more exact knowledge now available of strati- graphical 'dates' of first appearances." New knowledge on first appearances has proved embarrassing in another area as well. The Amphibia gave rise to the Reptiles, and the link between the two is exhibited as the extinct animal which possessed both reptilian and amphibian characters, the Sey- mouria. "Unfortunately the Seymouria is found in the Permian while the first reptiles arose in the Pennsylvanian, some 20 or so million years earlier." (Kerkut, 1960, p. 136). Perhaps the important thing to point out is that while several more or less continuous lines of organisms (and not very many at that) are recorded in fossil frorm and are known, there are significant breaks between the larger groupings. For example, with all the data available, we still do not find the origin of any phylum, including the vertebrates for which the fossil record is perhaps considered most reliable. (Challinor, 1959, p. 89). Darwin realized that the general proposition of evolution, that is what is now called the "fact of evolution," must stand or fall on the fossil record, and one of his major worries was that the record as he knew it was " a most obvious and serious objection." Darwin met this objection by contending that the fault lay with the record rather than with his beliefs. He invoked "the extreme imperfection of the geological record" to explain his difficulty. In the hundred years since he proposed his theory, an enormous amount of new paleontological evidence has been produced, and in large measure much of the imperfection has been remedied. Nevertheless, as more data become available, in many ways the evolutionary picture gets more complicated rather than simpler. The amphibia according to Save Soderbergh (1934) and Jarvik (1942) must be considered to have been originated from the fish in more than one line; that is, the amphibia must be considered to be polyphyletic. As fas as the reptiles are concerned, Goodrich (1917) feels that the reptiles are polyphyletic, while Simpson (1959) and others feel conclusively that the mammals are polyphyletic. Complicated networks of "convergences" and "parallelisms" have to be invented in order to retain the evolutionary structure. If the evolutionary story is true then one would expect to be able to arrange animals and plants according to a phylogenetic relationship, where close relatives have many common characteristics and distant relatives have little in common. But the obvious data do not support this seemingly reasonable requirement. The principles of convergent and parallel evolution have to be so widely invoked that Simpson (1953, p. 176) is forced to point out that the occurrence of parallelism and convergence is frequent at all levels. Mayr (1963, p. 609)

82 states the situation even more strongly in saying, "If there is only one efficient solution for a certain functional demand, very different gene complexes will come up with the same solution, no matter how different the pathway by which it is achieved." Perhaps the most famous example of convergence is that between the cephalopod and vertebrate eyes, which are identical ". . . as to lids, pupils, irises, lenses, humors, and retinas including rods and cones." (Atwood, 1963). These two eyes which have so much in common must be understood to have each originated separately and independently through the process of random mutation and natural selection.

Now none of these difficulties, as annoying as it may be to the synthetic theory, is fatal to that theory. Explanations are given and even new principles introduced in order to make the data fit with the theory. There is one important point to note, however. All of the arguments in this area are verbal. Very little calculation has been done. Now of course, the field of population genetics abounds with calculation, but none of this, or rather little of it, is really crucial to the synthetic theory itself. Nobody has yet answered the question as to whether concepts such as convergence are reasonable or not. Up until very recently, such calculations could not be made, because we did not know enough about the mechanism of mutation and heredity. Since the early 1950's, however, the nature of the storage of the heredity information has become clarified, and one can at least begin to calculate the probabilities of the events that the protagonists of evolution have been postulating and compounding for so long.

It is now possible, on the basis of some reasonable simplifying assuptions, to calculate the probability that specific nucleotide changes are achieved through the process of random mutation (Spetner, 1964). The results of these calculations can in particular be applied to studies which Margoliash (1963) and others have made on the evolution of cytochrome C, and to the evolutionary studies of certain fibrinopeptides by Doolittle and Blomack (1964). Preliminary calculations show that unless one makes very restrictive assumptions about the genetic code and unless each nucleotide replacement is strongly selected for, the probability of certain observed changes taking place in the hundred or so million years during which the synthetic theory says they must have, is extremely small. The conditions for reasonable probabilities to result are so restrictive that with the wealth of biochemical data becoming available significant cross checks are likely.

Fortunately, one is not limited to biochemical data in applying the above mentioned calculations. The probability of a change can be calculated in terms of the information that is gained by the organism in the evolutionary step in question. In this connection the synthetic-theory picture of the evolutionary story can be viewed as an information-transmission process in which adaptive information is transmitted from the environment to the genetic

83 storage of the evolving organism through the mechanism of random mutation and natural selection. Since the probability of adaptive information being transmitted in a given time is a function of the amount of information, it is possible to make some upper-bound calculations of the probability of the acquisition of any morphological or physiological character provided one can estimate a lower bound to the adaptive information represented by the character in question. Now it turns out that these probabilities are very small for any reasonable amount of information to be transmitted in one evolutionary step, i.e., until natural selection can take hold. The amount of time available for the change to take place does not affect the result except in a very weak way. Increasing the time by a factor of ten will only increase the probability by a very small additive amount. In this respect the tacit argument resorted to by evolutionists for a hundred years, namely that anything can happen if you wait long enough, can no longer be blindly accepted. The entire structure of convergences and parallelisms as well as the profusion of "correlated adaptations" so vital to the synthetic theory may soon be subject to quantitative study for the first time. Morever, it is important that such studies be made. The theory of evolution is not just another scientific theory. It has had and continues to have profound philosophical overtones that overflow into the realm of the moral and ethical and affect the daily actions of many people. George Gay lord Simpson (1960), the most eloquent of leaders in the field of evolution, dogmatizes with great vigor and emphasis that "man's ancestors were apes" (italics his) and charges (and rightly so) that the apoligists' statement that man is not really descended from an ape but from an earlier common ancestor, is "pusillanimous if not dishonest." He goes on to say (ibid. p. 970) "this world into which Darwin led us in is certainly very different from the world of the higher superstition (i.e. religion). In the world cf Darwin man has no special status other than his definition as a distinct species of animal." I cannot agree with this approach to science, to life, and to the world. Our moral and ethical judgements cannot be reliably based on scientific hypo- theses which at best are tentative. (I doubt if Simpson would agree that the broad features of the evolutionary story are anything but final and conclusive). Nor can we restrain our moral judgements to mark time while we flounder through what is popularly called the "scientific method" in order to discover the ever elusive truth. The truths we need as the building blocks for a moral and ethical system must come, even for practical reasons, from a higher Source. There is no necessity to rely on a necessarily unfinished science to develop a moral code. We should never fear the pursuit of truth in science, remembering, however, that our results are always tentative, always vulner- able to new contradicting data. I shall close by again quoting Simpson (1960). "If man proceeds on the wrong evolutionary assumptions, whatever

84 he does is sure to be wrong. If he proceeds on the right assumptions, what he does may still be wrong, but at least it has a chance of being right."

85 REFERENCES Atwood, W. H. 1963. Comparative Anatomy. Collier's Encyclopedia. 2: 137-167. Bertalanffy, L. von. 1952. Problems of Life. New York, Wiley. Challinor, J. 1959. Palaeontology and Evolution. In Bell (1959) pp. 50-100. Bell, P. R. 1959. Darwin's Biological Work. Cambridge. Doolittle, R. F. and Blomack, B. 1964. Amino-Acid Sequence Investigations of Fibrinopeptides from Various Mammals: Evolutionary Implications. Nature. 202: 147-152. Goodrich, E. S. 1917. On the Classification of the Reptilia. Proc. Roy. Soc. (London) B. 89: 261-276. Jarvik, E. 1942. On the Structure of the Snout of Crossopterygians and Lower Gnathostomes in General. Zool. Bidrag, Uppsala. 21: 235-675. Kerkut, G. A. 1960. Implications of Evolution. London, Pergamon. Margoliash, E. 1963. Primary Structure and Evolution of Cytochrome C. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 50: 672-679. Mayr, E. 1963. Animal Species and Evolution. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Univ. Press. Olson, E. C. 1960. Morphology, Palaeontology, and Evolution. In Tax (1960). Romer, A. S. 1964. Palaeontology. Encyclopedia Britannica. 17: 108-112. Save-Soderbergh, G. 1934. Some Points of View Concerning the Evolution of the Vertebrates and the Classification of this Group. Arkiv for Zoologi. 26 A: No. 17. Simpson, G. G. 1953. The Major Features of Evolution. New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Simpson, G. G. 1959. Mesozoic Mammals and the Polyphyletic Origin of Mammals. Evolution. 13: 405-414. Simpson, G. G. 1960. The World into Which Darwin Led Us. Science. 131: 966-974. Spetner, L. M. 1964. Natural Selection: An Information-transmission Mechanism for Evolution. J. Theor. Biol. 7. 412-419. Tax, S. 1960. Evolution After Darwin. Vol. I. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press.

86 ON GENE CREATION

EDWARD H. SIMON

Dr. Simon is Associate Professor of Biology at Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana. This paper rtas presented at the National Convention of the Association in September, 1963.

Introduction

Evolution has three aspects: (1) Creation of life. (2) Creation of new genes. (3) Creation of new species. Though the first and third processes have been widely discussed from a variety of scientific and philosophic viewpoints, the second has been virtually ignored. Its importance is seen by considering the evolution of a higher form of life from a primitive organism. The many new characteristics that must be acquired in the process are all ultimately con- trolled by genes. Gene creation, then, is the raw material of evolution. An organism which gains a new gene simultaneously gains a new function. However, it is often difficult to distinguish between gain of a new function and loss or modification of an old one. Thus, the appearance of drug resistance is really a loss of sensitivity, and in many cases, the lost function can be identified. To date, unequivocal gain of function has not been observed in the laboratory.1 We will show that in terms of present biological knowledge it is virtually impossible to envision gene creation, and hence evolution, as a chance process.

The gene in chemical terms

Only in the last decade has it been possible to consider the problem of gene creation in quantitative, molecular terms. In this interval, it has become apparent that a gene is a segment of a molecule of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). DNA itself consists of two complementary chains made up of se- quential combinations of four non-identical subunits (bases) called adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. The chains are paired such that adenine is always opposite thymine and cytosine is always opposite guanine. There is no

1 An apparent exception are back mutations; however, they represent the regaining of an old function and not acquisition of a new one.

87 restriction on adjacent bases. Before each cell division the two strands of the DNA molecule separate and each directs the synthesis of its complement. On very rare occasions, the base pairing rules will be violated and guanine will be paired with thymine instead of cytosine. This mistake, resulting in a DNA molecule with a base sequence different from that of the parental strands, will be inherited, and is called a mutation (see Fig. 1). These errors occur at a fre- quency of about 108/base pair/division.2 Observable mutations almost in- variably involve loss of function. For evolution to occur, an organism must have some DNA which either does not control a function or whose function is expendable (for example, two stretches of DNA controlling the same function). DNA determines the structure and chemistry of an organism. The control is mediated by proteins, which are large molecules made up of many subunits called amino acids. Some proteins are structural in function; others, called enzymes, act as organic catalysts and control the rate of the specific chemical reactions which constitute the life process. In the last two years the manner in which DNA controls protein synthesis has become intelligible in molecular terms. Apparently, DNA serves as a blueprint for protein construction with three successive base pairs determining one amino acid. Altering one of the bases changes the blueprint and causes substitution of one amino acid for another in the protein. This usually impairs the protein's function and results in a detectable mutation. A blueprint for a small protein containing 100 amino acids would require three hundred base pairs. We wish to calculate the average time it would take a random sequence of 300 base pairs to evolve by chance mutation into a blueprint for an enzyme, assuming a population of bacteria in steady state growth at a rate of 1 division (generation) per hour, with an average mutation rate of 10_8/base pair /division. It is of interest to consider the orders of magnitude involved. There are 104 hours in a year; in that time, the assumed population of bacteria could undergo at most 104 linear generations. A world covered with an ocean a mile deep and containing 5 x 108 bacteria would contain 1033 bacteria. Under conditions of steady state growth, in 10 billion years ( an upper limit for the age of the earth) a total of 1047 bacterial divisions could occur.

Calculations l Assume that only one prescribed sequence of the 300 base pairs can

2 Mutation frequencies are hard to evaluate. Back mutation rates for individual base pairs range from 10—9 to 10—3, most falling in the range 10—7 to 10—9. Forward mutation rates vary from 10"° to 10—'s.

88 form a particular enzyme, and that no intermediate sequence will have any activity. Consider a bacterium with an "extra" sequence of 300 base pairs: in 1 generations one site would mutate, in about 6 X 108 generations io-8 all would mutate3. If all mutations were favorable and if they did not back 6 X 108 mutate, it would have taken or 60,000 years to form the gene, a 104 reasonable time in geological terms. 2 This is the same as 1, but considers back mutations. Since each of the 300 sites can be occupied by 1 of 4 base pairs (AT, TA, GC, CG), there are 4300 possible arrangements. Making the absurdly favorable assumption that a mutation occurs at each site at each generation, it would take on the average 10181 generations before the proper sequence appeared. However, up to three base triplets can determine the same amino acid; therefore, more than one sequence of bases can blueprint for a given enzyme. Similarly, proteins with more than one sequence of amino acids can have the same catalytic activity4. By making these corrections, the average number of generations can be reduced to 1057, which is still at least 1010 times too great.

3 Since mutations may occur in any order, the probability of the first mutation will be 300 X 10-8, the probability of the second 299 X 10-*, etc., and the time for all 300 1 300 1 mutations approximately X 2 — = 6x108. Note that the answer 10-« 1 N would be about the same even if half of the base pairs were initially in the proper configuration. 4 For a given enzymatic activity we assume that ten of the 100 amino acids are strictly determined, ten can be replaced by 1 of 3 amino acids, and 80 can be replaced by 1 of 7.

3 Assume that in every sequence there is one base pair which could be changed to give the organism some selective advantage, and that the population is large enough that a favorable mutant is always present. If the selective advantage is set at .001 (that is, for every 1,000 normal organisms "born" there are 1,001 mutants) it will take on the average 2 X 104 linear generations for the population to become predominantly mutant; if this process is repeated for each of the 299 remaining loci, it will take 300 cycles or 600 years to get the desired gene. The assumption is certainly too generous. Most enzymes are so specific in their action and so susceptible to the slightest alteration that it is most

89 unlikely that altering one amino acid in a random chain could confer even a modicum of specificity to the molecule. Besides, we are considering the further evolution of an already well developed organism, and the number of types of new enzymes that will be useful to it is relatively limited. In any event, even 6 X 10e linear generations is a long time for higher organisms, and we have neglected the complexities of sexual recombination in diploid forms. 4 Assume that it takes ten specific mutations before a random sequence of 300 bases becomes a blueprint for a useful enzyme. Ten is not a completely arbitrary number, since it probably takes between 8 and 12 amino acids to determine the so called active site of an enzyme. With a mutation rate of 10~8 per base pair per division it will take on the average 3 X 108 linear generations before the gene is formed3. This amounts to 3 X 104 years for bacteria and at least 3 X 108 years for higher forms. Again however, back mutations and wrong mutations must be taken into consideration. If only a few sites in an enzyme were needed for its function, then most of its amino acids could be altered without damaging it. In fact, changing almost any amino acid has a deleterious effect. Note too, that initially there can be 290 wrong and only 10 right mutations and that the discrepancy increases as "good" mutations accumulate. This correction has not yet been accurately evaluated, but it is obvious that the required time will be increased by many orders of magnitude. A key assumtion in this calculation is the mutation rate per base pair. It is possible that this rate could have varied in the course of geologic time. Since most mutations are deleterious, there must be a maximum mutation rate compatible with life. If this rate is exceeded, more than half of the off- spring will contain a mutation and the species will soon become extinct. For a bacterium, the rate will be approximately the reciprocal of the number of base pairs of the organism. Since most bacteria have about 107 base pairs, the maximum mutation rate is 10~7/base/per division. This is not high enough to alter our conclusions.

Conclusions These calculations do not PROVE anything. They do show, however, that with our present knowledge it is not easy to visualize evolution in molecular terms, since the best estimate for the time it takes to create a single gene by random processes approximates the age of the earth. Glib statements that "anything that can happen will happen" may be discounted. There were two main assumptions in the foregoing calculations. (1) The mutation rate. (2) The minimum number of amino acids which must be specified to

90 obtain enzymatic activity. It is unlikely that the first can be increased far beyond 10~7. As to the second, conceivably the number may be reduced from ten to two or three. Alternatively, small changes in a pre-existing enzyme may suffice to give it an entirely new specificity. At present there is no experimental basis for such assumptions. Finally, it should be stressed that an extremely simplified model has been examined. Most enzymes are 2 to 5 times larger than the one we considered. More important, most enzymes are involved in long reaction sequences, no one being of much use without the others. Perhaps the basic problem is not the creation of a single gene but of an entire sequence.

Figure 1

A. AT AT AT AT AT AT AT

GC GC GC GC GC GC GC —> + + + + CG CG CG CG CG CG CG

AT AT AT AT AT AT AT

B. AT AT AT AT AT AT AT

GC GT GC GC AT GC GC + + + + CG CG CG CG CG CG CG

AT AT AT AT AT AT AT

Fig. 1 . A mechanism of mutagenesis. A. The normal case. A segment of a DNA molecule is followed through two divisions. At each one the two strands separate, A pairing with T and G with C. The end result is 4 copies of the original segment. B. The mutant case. At the first division G pairs with T instead of C. This is an unstable arrangement; at the next division the G and T combine with their usual partners. The end result is a "mutant" sequence with an AT pair replacing the original GC.

91 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: THE JEWISH SYNTHESIS Some New Insights from a Kabbalistic Source

L. CARMELL

This paper was presented at the Annual Confer- ence of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists of Great Britain in January, 1965. To a considerable extent, it is a response to a talk given to the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists in 1963, by Rabbi Dr. G. N. Schlesinger. A summary of this talk has appeared in INTER- COM (Vol. VI No. 1, December, 1963).

The problem of evil is a basic one for every religious person. A person must come to terms with this problem if he is to have any real religious life at all. Whatever the terms he comes to—whether he believes that the solution is simply beyond our understanding, or whether he believes that it can be resolved intellectually—some modus vivendi must be arrived at regarding this problem. Otherwise we find ourselves in the situation of harboring sub- conscious resentments which remain at the back of our minds in all our religious dealings. It is not good to leave these problems to fester in the darkness. There is something in the climate of intellectual opinion which likes to say that basic problems are not to be dealt with. The implication is that they belong in the realm of private feelings or emotions, or that we lack the means of dealing with them meaningfully; in any event, we are discouraged from bringing them into the field of reasoned intellectual discussion. This was not the case in previous ages, and it need not be the case today. It is the pride of our religion that it is consonant in all its basic tenets with healthy human reason. There is certainly no reason why we of all people should accept the dethronement of reason which is prevalent in some quarters. I believe it is a good and valuable function of the Association to bring these problems into the open and to discuss them. Whether we shall come to definite solutions of problems which have baffled human understanding for millenia is of course another matter, but at least we can and must wrestle with them, and perhaps eventually arrive regarding them at what in other contexts is known as a "working hypothesis."

92 Evil and suffering At the outset we had better clarify what we are talking about. Is it the problem of evil or the problem of suffering? Now Dr. Schlesinger, without any comment, simply makes the equation "evil equals any human suffering"; and perhaps this is how we normally understand it. Psychologically speaking, the problem is accentuated for us at the present day because we are led to believe by all the subtle persuasions of the surrounding culture that human suffering is the ultimate of evil. In our world the gratification of desires, which is supposed to lead to physical and mental welfare, or "happiness", is widely considered to be the be-all and end-all of human existence. For anyone who believes this, the problem is indeed insoluble. Our world is full of suffering, and if all suffering is absolutely and irredeemably evil, the question is then virtually unanswerable: How could an all-mighty and all-good Cre- ator have allowed such a situation to come to pass? But even if we allow that there are more fundamental principles than material happiness, we are still led back to the same dilemma. Suppose that we were to assert that suffering is necessary as a corrective to moral evil; this would not get us very much further. The question would then merely be set one stage back: why did an almighty, beneficent G-d allow the possibility of moral evil? It must be clearly stated here that Judaism has never attempted to evade this issue. The prophetic awareness of G-d as the origin and ground of all things has always unflinchingly faced the clear implication that "from Him proceed the evil happenings and the good" (Lamentations 3:38). "I am G-d; there is none else: former of light, creator of darkness, maker of peace, creator of evil—I, G-d, make all these" (Isaiah 45:6-7). The prophet Isaiah had no compunctions in stating for all time that G-d is ultimately responsible for all that we recognize as evil. In this he was echoing the words of the Torah itself (Deut. 32:39): "I bring death and I bring life; I strike down and I heal . . . ".

It is true that our Sages thought the words of Isaiah perhaps a little too strong meat for everyday consumption, and modified them slightly in the introductory formula of the Blessing of Light in the morning prayers: ". . . former of light and creator of darkness, maker of peace and creator of all". Of course, if one is aware of the implications one can readily see that this is really saying the same thing: "all" means all the aspects of human existence, both good and evil. But this is a hint to us that this is a difficult problem to get to grips with. Our sages did not want to confront us daily with the idea of G-d as creator of evil; and one can hardly blame them. Still, this does not free us from considering all the implications and coming to terms with them to the very best of our ability.

93 Attempted Solutions Dr. Schlesinger in his talk propounded no less than seven attempted solutions to the problem, but discarded each and every one of them for varying reasons. He then propounded one of his own which aroused a great deal of discussion. I do not propose to deal with all of these seven or eight solutions. What I do intend to do is to take up one of them and to try and deal with Dr. Schlesinger's objections to it. The solution which I think is the most basic one, and which appears in our classical literature, is Dr. Schlesinger's third solution. This says that suffering is a punishment for human wrong-doing. According to this view, moral evil is directly or indirectly the source of all suffering. We still have to meet, however, the objection we have already referred to above, namely how can the Almighty allow the possibility of sin? Rabbi Saadya Gaon answers, according to Dr. Schlesinger, that if sin were impossible everyone would be entitled to the same reward, and as a consequence the reward would not be appreciated. This is the attempted answer which I would like to submit to further investigation.

Free will It seems clear that what Rabbi Saadya Gaon is saying in effect is that to understand the necessity of evil in the world we must understand the necessity of free will. This is what he means when he says there would be no differentiation of reward, and thus no effective reward at all, without evil and the need to combat it. I think we must realize that this argument has highly respectable antecedents. The Torah itself deals with this problem in the second and third chapters of Genesis, and tells us that the possibility of moral evil was implanted into the world by G-d Himself as part of a set purpose. From the context it is surely clear that that purpose was to provide an opportunity for spiritual and moral effort on the part of man—an opportunity for the exercise of his free will. Other forms of evil to which our world is subject, suffering, death and natural disasters, are shown to be derivative, providing the necessary background against which this main struggle is to be carried on. The reason why Rabbi Saadya refers particularly to the aspect of reward is no doubt because of his view that one of the purposes of the creation was to do good to the beings so created. (Emunot v-De'ot, first essay, end). Rabbi Saadya first propounded the idea—much used in our later classical literature and in the Kabbalah—that "it is the way of the All-good to bestow good," and the greatest good is that which is received in recompense for effort and service. Later Jewish thought elaborated on this theme. Rabbi M. H. Luzzatto

94 formulates the thesis very clearly. G-d's purpose in creation is to bestow the greatest possible good on his creatures. But to this end the creature must to some extent deserve his reward, for only then can it be considered in some sense his own, part of himself. To this extent he will therefore resemble his Creator, Whose goodness is, so to speak, part of Himself. (See Derekh ha-Shem, 1, 2:2). There is a variant of this theme which introduces the idea of nahama di-kisufa ("bread of shame"); if the good bestowed by G-d is not deserved, the recipient's pleasure will be lessened, or even negated, by the feelings of shame which always accompany undeserved favors. This idea will be discussed later on. Since it is recognized that the only way to deserve the good is by fighting the evil which was implanted in our natures for this purpose, the function of evil in the universe becomes clear. It is, so to speak, the resistant filament in the (spiritual) light-bulb, which the current of spiritual effort causes to glow with the light of free human goodness. So that the human choice may be a real one, there must of course be the possibility of succumbing to the evil instead of resisting it. The justification of evil thus runs as follows: There can be no ultimate good without service; there can be no service without freedom; and no freedom without the responsibility of evil. This line of thought would seem therefore to provide an adequate solution to our problem.

Evaluation by purpose We shall see in a moment that it does not; at any rate, not entirely. But before considering the objections, it should be pointed out that the basic premise here—the evaluation of a thing by reference to its purpose—is a sound one, and has good support in Halakhah. An act is good or bad according to its purpose. A murderer's cut is bad; a surgeon's cut is good. The laws of Shabbath teach us that every act must be evaluated by reference to its purpose. Two people cut twigs from a tree on Shabbath; one does it to prune the tree, the other because he wants the twigs. One has done the m'lakhah of "planting", i.e. the furtherance of plant growth; the other, "reaping". Two people demolish houses on Shabbath; one from destructive motives, the other to clear the site for building a new house. One is free from punishment so far as Shabbath is concerned—he has done no constructive act; the other has carried out an essential part of building construction—site-clearance. Similarly, since the evil in the world is there, from G-d's point of view, wholly and exclusively for the achievement of a greater good, it is on that wider view not evil at all, but an intensifier and amplifier of the good. This is why the Mishnah (B'rakhoth 9:5) exhorts us to bless G-d equally

95 for the evil as for the good, and the Talmud (B. B'r. 54a) first thinks it possible that we should say the very same blessing for both—"He Who is good and Who does good", but afterwards retracts and says that the similarity should be in the intensity of joy with which we should welcome both as mani- festations of G-d's will. This is in fact one of the great prophetic insights of the Torah and the Jewish sages. It is remarkable that the Jewish people, which during its long history has suffered more than most from the evil in the world, should have so stubbornly maintained this great insight. The Sh'ma' at the stake, the Kaddish of the bereaved orphan, as well as the gam zo I'tovah of everyday life, bear witness to the stubborn faith of a people determined to see everything in a wider, the widest possible, context. This, then, is the standard Jewish synthesis, in which the problem ceases to exist because all evil is seen as an aspect of good. The positive aspect of evil is seen in its provision of a basis for the exercise of free will, which in turn makes possible the achievement by man of his highest spiritual stature.

Is evil really necessary However, we must now come to the objection referred to by Dr. Schles- inger, which he felt was sufficient to dismiss this whole line of argument. There is one basic difficulty which arises whenever we attempt to deal with ultimates of this sort; one tends to take man's present nature for granted as one's- datum line in the argument. In discussions of this ultimate type, however, surely everything must be considered as in the melting-pct, and one feels the urge to consider whether it might not be possible to conceive of G-d's creating man with a somewhat different nature or psychology, and whether the arguments advanced would hold good in such a case. This is the argument advanced by Dr. Schlesinger against all solutions which see evil as contributing to a greater good. Rabbi Saadya's point about equal rewards being valueless, or Rabbi Luzzatto's point about undeserved rewards being unacceptable, may be perfectly valid psychological insights, says Dr. Schlesinger in effect, but do they not leave out of account the possibility that nature or man could have been constructed differently, so that the highest good could yet be obtained without resort to evil? This is particularly clear in the line of argument using the concept "nahama di-kisufa", i.e. that undeserved good causes shame to the recipient. The question can clearly be put: Could not G-d have constructed man in such a way that this shame should not be felt, and so obviated the necessity for effort, resistance, and, hence, evil? In its other form, the argument sought to equate "deserving a reward"

96 and its being a "part of oneself". But here too the equation does not seem to be logically necessary, although perhaps psychologically meaningful. It is true that given our present make-up, we cannot conceive of an ultimately satisfying state without reference to a sense of personal achievement. But one could surely conceive of a being—perhaps even more G-d-like—to which this restriction did not apply.

Nearness and likeness Further thought will, however, reveal that these objections are logically untenable. From certain arguments advanced by Rabbi J. L. Ashlag ("Has- Sullam", Commentary on the Zohar, Jerusalem 1945: Introduction) it becomes possible to state the solution in such a way that "nahama di-kisufa" is seen to be logically inherent in the Creator-creature situation itself. We must realize that there are two basic types of activity carried on in the world: "giving" and "taking". As Rabbi Dessler points out in his dis- sertation of this name (Mikhtav me-Eliyahu, Vol. I. p.32, translated into English in "Guardians of our Heritage", ed. Leo Jung, New York 1958, p. 691), they are really two diametrically opposed attitudes of life. Selfless giving is the most elevated of all human powers and the source of all goodness and happiness; while the egoistic urge to get as much as one can for oneself out of every situation is the source of most of the world's troubles. Rabbi Ashlag uses this same idea as the basis of his Kabbalistic system. (Although Rabbi Ashlag and Rabbi Dessler were contemporaries, there was no personal contact between them, and they seem to have come independently to the conclusion that this idea was of fundamental importance.) This idea is relevant to the Kabbalah because that system starts from the premise, to which reference has already been made, that the creation emanated from an act of selfless giving on the part of the Creator. "It is the way of the All-good to bestow good", and it is for the sake of bestowing on them the greatest possible good that He has granted existence and life to all sentient beings. Now there can be no greater good than nearness to Him, who is in Himself the abundance of all good (see Rabbi M. H. Luzzatto: M'Sillat Y'- sharim, Introduction). And so says the Psalmist: va-ani kirvat eloh-im li tov —"To me, nearness to God is (the highest) good" (Ps. 73:28). But what do we mean by "nearness to G-d"? It is obviously a metaphor, which we have to translate from physical to spiritual terms. "Nearness" in a non-physical sense means "likeness". The highest good is to be as like G-d as possible. How can this be? The basic attribute of G-d the Creator is, as we have seen, selfless giving. By making one's personality a giving, an outflowing one, whose innermost desire is to give bounty and happiness to others, one approaches "nearer" to the Almighty, because one becomes more "like" Him.

97 The paradox of creation Now this very fact poses a logical puzzle. Let us consider for one moment the Creator-creature situation, if we may call it so. A creature, by that very fact, owes his all, his very being to his Creator; his relationship is that of "taker" to "giver" par excellence. And the higher the quality of being that is given to him, the wider his knowledge, the greater the intensity of his life and happiness—the deeper the extent of his taking. But since taking is the antithesis of G-d-likeness, by that very act of showering bounties upon His passive creature the Creator is succeeding only in pushing him further away from Himself, and thereby alienating him from the highest good. This is the paradox of creation. And be it noted, this is a logical difficulty inherent in the very nature of creation itself when properly understood, and independent of any particular traits of psychology. The simple fact is that being a creature means taking, and taking leads away from the likeness to G-d, and so from the highest good. Whatever conceivable faculties or bounties that are bestowed on the creature, far from solving the dilemma, can only serve to intensify it. There is only one way out of this dilemma, and that is to arrange for the creature to be able to give; to give of his own accord, to give of himself— in short, to give himself back to G-d. And here is the last link in the chain of reasoning: Giving can only be conceived as a free act. If it were not free, but the inevitable result of some faculty implanted in the creature by the Creator, this would again be taking, not giving. Thus we have vindicated the logical necessity of human freedom, and hence its concomitant, the possibility of evil.

The chain of reasoning For the sake of clarity, let us recapitulate the steps in the argument which have led us to this conclusion—the links in the chain of reasoning.

A. The necessity of evil as a function of free will. (1) Free moral effort presupposes resistance, and hence the possibility of evil. (2) True freedom requires the ability to make this possibility an actuality. (3) Once the existence of moral evil is understood, the existence of suffering becomes explicable in various ways; e.g. as a direct

98 consequence of an evil choice; as an act of G-d in reaction to human evil, either by way of punishment or stimulus; or to provide opportunities for moral choices. (4) At this stage of the argument the existence of free will is conceived to be necessary to provide the experience of a "deserved" good; for good is experienced as the highest good only when it is deserved, and to be deserved it must be gained by free moral effort. (5) This argument is however seen to be defective, because the above is apparently only a psychological and not a logical necessity; G-d could have made the human mind differently. Hence the necessity for the second stage in the argument:

B. The necessity of free-will as a function of "giving", to resolve the Creator-creature paradox. (1) The highest good is "nearness" to G-d. (2) "Nearness" is a metaphor for "likeness". (3) The relation of creature to Creator is that of "talker" par excellence. (4) G-d Himself is the "giver" par excellence. (5) Creation for the highest good of the creature thus involves a paradox: the more the Creator gives to the creature, the more the latter becomes a "taker" and so the more he becomes unlike G-d, and hence the further he is pushed away from the highest good. (6) The solution to this is to endow the creature with the ability to give of itself, to give selflessly. (7) Selfless giving can only be by way of free service. (8) Freedom requires the possibility of evil ... A (1). (9) The possibility of evil requires the ability to actualize it ... A (2). (10) Hence for the attainment of the highest good to be logically possible, the existence of evil is a necessity.

The self and its destiny We can admire the economy of means by which this result is achieved. A self is created, endowed with great faculties, the power of intellect, the capacity for joy; but all this is taking. The dilemma is resolved by granting

99 the self freedom to give itself to its Creator, by searching out and fulfilling His plan for it, in unselfish obedience and love, and in unselfish consideration for and devotion to its fellow creatures. "To-self" is counteracted by "from- self", and if he pursues that course he rises to a higher human dignity by coming closer and closer to his Creator, until eventually he attains his full spiritual stature and destiny. The central importance of the to-self—from-self axis in our spiritual life is reflected in Hillel's famous advice to the proselyte —all Torah and Mitzvoth are a commentary on this fundamental spiritual decision: to turn the self inside out in thoughtfulness and care for others. The possibility of evil, the actual evil within us and around us which challenges the self to reject or accept its destiny, is the price we pay for creaturehood. It provides the resistance which G-d in his wisdom and love has provided for us to overcome, and so exercise our essential faculty of free giving. It is the necessary evil which is the logical and inevitable prerequisite of the highest good. But the relationship which holds between them is by no means one to one. On the contrary, in its relationship to the good which is ultimately to be attained, the evil in the world and in man must be compared to the few drops of water which prime the pump; the pilot light which lights the boiler; the few kilograms of radioactive material which trigger off the atomic explosion. The immensity of man's ultimate destiny cannot be conceived, but we have something to gauge it by. Take all the evil in the world— and in the aggregate it is truly a terrifying amount—and then remember that all of this is a mere pilot light to kindle the pure flame of the spirit. All this is necessary to provide that measure of resistance which will transmute the good "bestowed" into the good "freely attained". The ultimate prize itself must surely pass all understanding.

100 DIVINE BENEVOLENCE

G. N. SCHLESINGER

Rabbi Dr. Schlesinger is Reader in Philosophy at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. This paper is a reply to comments on two earlier papers: "Logical Analysis and the Beliefs of the Orthodox Jew" (INTERCOM, De- cember, 1963), and "The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering" (American Philosophical Quarterly, July, 1964).

The problem of evil exercises the minds of many; hence the numerous comments which my suggested solution evoked. Although most of these were critical, I find the response gratifying; among other things, it keeps the discussion going. It is not so important that I should succeed in making my views more acceptable. If I can contribute in a small way to re- establishing the idea that even the most basic aspects of our faith may be submitted to rigorous logical probing, I should regard this a significant achievement. Admittedly, the homiletic and poetic treatment of the founda- tions of emunah is of immeasurable value, and conceptual analysis, even at its best, cannot nourish religious feelings and inspire righteous acts, but can provide only partial clarity. Nevertheless, let the practice of the latter not be discouraged altogether. Why should it jeeringly be said that analytic reasoning in the domain of beliefs is dead but eloquently refuses to lie down? The argument in my first paper was directed against those who insist on rejecting all the traditional solutions to the problem of evil and Omni- potence. Granting all their assumptions, I claimed that on their own premises they have failed to construct a logically coherent case for themselves. I did not intend my suggestion to be prejudicial to other positive lines of approach such as the one pursued by Mr. Carmell.* Speaking at the 1965 Association Conference in Great Britain, he attempted to develop an idea found in earlier sources, claiming that evil is logically necessary, for the notion of creaturehood requires it. As it stands, Mr, Carmell's thesis would not seem unassailable, but he realizes this and calls his suggestion a "working hypothesis". It is to be hoped that he will develop it further and thus be instrumental to hizuk hcremunah.

* See the preceding paper in this issue.

101 I regret to say, however, that Mr. Hoffner's letter in INTERCOM (March 1965), in which he says no more than that all suffering is punishment, can have only a heartening effect on an apikoros, who could at once make the following points: (a) What about the sufferings of Job and of other righteous people (cf. Mishnah Avoth 4:19, where R. Jannai expresses the view that "It is not in our power to explain . . . the afflictions of the righteous")? (b) What about the sufferings of young babies and animals? (c) Mr. Hoffner seems to concede that Divine Goodness must be evaluated in human terms if any sense is to be assigned to the claim that He is Omnibenevolent. Thus he compares the Almighty to a father "whose love and goodness toward his child are not impaired by punishing the child when the need arises". But punishment as a deterrent in human society is justified only as long as more humane preventives have not been invented. Surely the Al- mighty could have devised fully effective and pleasanter means to prevent sin. (d) If it be said that other means could not be used since they would interfere with free will, then clearly the question to be posed is: insofar as punishment is an effective deterrent, it too interferes with free will; insofar as it is not effective, it constitutes useless suffering. (e) Besides, why did the Almighty not create zaddikim g'murim, perfectly righteous men, only? Does Mr. Hoffner think perhaps that zaddikim have no free will, or that the Almighty does not know in advance who is going to lead a righteous life? Dr. La Para of Lehigh University, approaching the subject from the opposite side, rejects all the traditional solutions together with my own attempted solution, which he calls "an instructive failure". He put forward his views in a lucid and carefully argued essay entitled "Suffering, Happiness and Evil" (SOPHIA, July 1965). I shall attempt to reply to two points raised by him. Dr. La Para is prepared to grant most of my major premises, which entail, to put it very crudely, that on the one hand the Almighty will not satisfy our human common sense based demands on His Benevolence until He has turned ours into the best of all possible worlds; and on the other hand, that the best of all possible worlds is a logical impossibility (as far as the maximum happiness of all creatures is concerned). He challenges, however, the conclusion I was trying to draw from this. His first point is that since we have agreed to apply, as far as possible, human ethical standards in our appraisal of Divine conduct, we should consider a comparable situation in human affairs: What is required from a human agent who can perform but a fraction of a given morally desirable act? Two cases must be distinguished. Case one is where the performance of a part of the

102 act achieves nothing; case two, where the partial act brings partial benefit. All will agree that in case one, the agent is exempt from all action, for why should he be required to do anything that is of no value in itself? In case two, however, even though he cannot accomplish the whole task, since a part of it has some value too, he is not absolved from carrying it out. The situation facing the Almighty, says La Para, is of the second type. Even if He cannot create a universe better than that which is not conceivable, He could have created a universe better than ours. In particular, He could have eliminated all suffering.1 This in itself would represent a very valuable advance upon our universe. The Almighty is "blameworthy" for not having accomplished it. The reply to this, very briefly, is: when the task is a finite one it is possible to accomplish it wholly and it is possible to accomplish it partially. An infinite task, on the other hand, just as it cannot be wholly accomplished, cannot be partially accomplished either. Let me explain again. Imagine that prior to the present universe there was another one, populated by beings with vastly greater stamina than ourselves, who often endured excruciating sufferings many times greater than any of us ever endured. Beyond a certain stage of misery people underwent very strange physical transforma- tions as well, and the dreadful experiences, accompanying these—dimly reflected in Kafka's description of the man turning into an insect—were basically different from those not associated with metamorphosis. To those who were horrified by the Almighty's permitting His creatures to undergo such degrada- tions, and who therefore argued against His benevolence or omnipotence, it was pointed out that they were moved by emotions rather than logic. Naturally our attention is attracted by the awfulness of metamorphosis; the best writers have reached their greatest heights when depicting the violent emotions associated with it, etc. etc. Logically, however, no experience has any special significance. Once we agree that the value of all moments of experience of each individual can fully be represented by points on a linear scale (of any two moments, the one preferable to the other being represented by a point lying to the right of the point representing the other), it follows that to be morally good is to cause everyone's pointer to lie as much to the right on his line as possible. Since the line extends indefinitely, in both directions, the Almighty is equally blameless wherever He lets anybody's pointer rest.

1 Exactly what La Para is demanding is not clear. The drying up of all mud pools would make the proverbial pig intensely dissatisfied, while to the proverbial Socrates the lack of opportunity to examine the ultimate meaning of life is a source of dis- satisfaction. Perhaps he insists on G-d satisfying the wants of all creatures according to their needs. But what are legitimate needs? They may be increased and decreased by an Omnipotent Being. The failure to satisfy higher needs should not be more excusable than the reducing of creatures to a level where they do not possess such needs.

103 However, there was one philosopher (a previous incarnation of Dr. La Para, in fact) who nevertheless insisted that the Almighty ought to eliminate at least all positive evil, by which he meant the moving of everyone's experience pointer permanently to the right of the "point of no metamorphosis". The Almighty could have silenced him by making him insensitive to the kind of evil he was complaining about. Instead, He complied with his wishes and created our universe, in which nobody's pointer crosses to the left of the stipulated point. Dr. La Para is again dissatisfied. It is not surprising. After all, positive and negative parts of the line exist only relative to some zero point which may be situated anywhere, and in the present situation we remain just as far from the infinitely remote right end of the fine as before. La Para's second point is that if we agree that every universe which the Almighty could create would necessarily be imperfect, it does not follow that whatever He does is of no moral consequence. On the contrary, the impossibility of a perfect world imposes upon Him the obligation to do specifically one thing and one thing alone: namely, not to create anything. Now La Para is aware of the fact that the absolute absence of any creation cannot be regarded as the best of all possible worlds. Just as there are infinitely many kinds of universes that represent a worse state of affairs than a complete void, so there are infinitely many which are better. Nevertheless, by again employing a human analogy, he claims that even if by creating any world in which there are living beings the Almighty renders Himself blameworthy, if He refrained from all such creation He should be free of all blame. He says (pp. 15-16): "... imagine that astrologers really can foretell what the conse- quences of our actions will be. Suppose, further, that their family astrologer tells a man and wife that if they so choose, they will conceive a child on March first. But this child, while he would have no effect on the happiness or suffering of his contemporaries, would himself lead a wretched life, one filled with physical and psychological torment. Alternatively, if the couple so choose, they will conceive a child on March second. Now this child, who also would not effect the happiness of those around him, would himself enjoy a life of sublime contentment and pleasure. If this couple decide to conceive a child on March first, they are obviously open to moral reproach. If, however, they decide to conceive a child on March second, they certainly would not be open to reproach. But if they decide to refrain altogether from having children, have they incurred any moral blame? Not at all. It would be ridiculous to say to this couple, "you are evil, for by refraining from conceiving a child on March second, you failed to bring about as much happiness in him as you might have". Similarly, if an omnipotent being once created a world, he could then be re-

104 proached for failing to make it as good a world as he might have. But it is ridiculous to imagine that an omnipotent being might be morally reprehensible because he refrained from creating at all." Let us not question La Para's appraisal of the moral choices open to the young couple. Be this as it may, it is hard to escape the impression that he subscribes to the absurdity that what is more desirable in infinitely many instances is less desirable. After all, he has agreed that there are infinitely many peopled universes which represent more desirable states of affairs than that in which nothing exists. Yet he claims that in any of these situations the Almighty is blameworthy, while when permitting a less desirable situation to prevail—the existence of nothing—He is free of blame. Possibly La Para has an answer to this. He may perhaps wish to explain away the seeming contradiction of his position by claiming that moral obli- gations do not exist as such, but only in relation to some subject. For every X, if X is a living creature my obligation toward him is to cause his "welfare pointer" to be shifted as much to the right as I can. For a nonexistent X, however, there is no one toward whom I may be said to have moral obli- gations. Thus, even if it is a certainty that for some X, by bringing X into being I can guarantee a life in which every moment is preferable to a state of non-existence, no one binds me to bring X into being. If so, then it should be pointed out that the standard of Divine conduct, while it may resemble in many ways the standard of human conduct, is not completely identical with it. It has commonly been conceded that such specific Divine undertakings as the creation of conditions which allow the exercise of humility, compassion, charity and justice, and in which beings capable of Divine worship and asserting their free will existed, might be legitimate Divine goals. What many skeptical thinkers have strongly urged is that these goals did not require the universe to be as it is. Nobody could argue, however, that they did not require any universe at all.

105 AN UNPUBLISHED RESPONSUM ON SECULAR STUDIES

The following responsum was written 32 years ago by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Bloch z.l., Chief Rabbi and Rosh Yeshivah of Telz, Lithuania, on the role of secular studies in Jewish education. Despite its fundamental importance, an earlier attempt to have it published was not successful. It is hoped that the reader will find it timely and of interest. It shows an uncom- mon breadth of vision regarding the value of certain types of secular studies, combined with an emphatic reminder that such studies can be no more than auxiliary to Torah study. The courtesy of Rabbi H. Mannes of Wickliffe, Ohio, who made available a copy of the responsum prepared from the original manuscript, is gratefully acknowledged. Several short representative excerpts from the responsum are given below in English translation. Phrases implying concepts which seem to be frequently overlooked today have been italicized for emphasis. 1) "In reference to your question . . . concerning secular studies . . . it is very difficult to give a clear halakhic decision, because such matters depend essentially on opinions and ideology related to the Aggadah portion [of Torah] . . . like matters of ideology and ethics, which—although they involve many laws-—nevertheless cannot he rigidly defined like the Halakhah portion, by issuing general decisions, since they depend strongly on the personality of the individual and his habits, as well as on the conditions of time, place, situation and environment." 2) "As regards true scientific matters . . . they should not be forbidden ... Of course, it is not proper to detract from Torah study and to make such studies fixed (keva'). However, it is possible to learn the first fundamentals at an early age before the time has come to devote oneself to Gemara—'At fifteen years to Gemara'—for then it is necessary to devote all one's time to Talmud, and to pursue them only occasionally, at a time when one must rest from one's studies." 3) "The study and reading of literature, as well as all the popular studies which have no practical value: it is certainly inappropriate to waste

106 time on these, when it is possible to attain a developed personality from our holy Torah; and all the more so since the literature of the nations contains stories of lust and forbidden matters." 4) ". . . teaches us that all those who esteemed secular studies . . . erred; for as a result, the students became fewer, and the last generation became estranged from Torah. It is now necessary to revolutionize the whole educational system, to uproot the ideologies . . . which esteem secular knowledge in comparison with Torah knowledge . . . ; to found schools in which holy studies will be primary . . . We can then be sure that the better [students] will desire to become great in Torah, and . . . [the others] will [at least] , . . obtain knowledge and understanding of Torah . . . and go out into a trade armed with Torah and derekh eretz; they may also learn there the knowledge which they need for practical life ..." L. L.

vax f^i vm M^^tt npnyn

R'yi o>ayn ninan *Ti»bb YAM nNiinn JIN nab JV'aya nbN\Y F'y a>\ynb ibNa o>3>3yi *TN& nvp OJQN ,bbaa oa\YN yma nmn *p3nn jiiyn mapum by *mo nam o»m ibNa tr^y >a ,nabna mm naiwn i»a maN >3>3yn\y im>»n >aiNn nn \y> Dai ,tvnnn pbn oy ini\yip»n oni yiapb VK vay V^bi v^y naa on2 \y>\t> <)N\y JIVTOI rny*T >i>jya 712171 D»lbJl >3 ,bab >1Nin pt?3 N>3inb 1i»n TlDbTl pbna lOD JlllQtJO a*»ni oiponi imn >N3*ia o»ibn a">i invon iam OTND ato oy INO .7l2>2t?711 ip>ya ntb pi* N"a ,iab niinn >3»n >"ay 0112b N"N PN onat 1»*ry bax ,n>bba nNim una o>yn> o>biaa ma i^ob \y> t"ay ,niin nyt •as»n >abi o-mn >ab Jiym bipwbi abb it>Di\y yii> nv?\y INW) a"nNi /|m ^ o>3iai f'yabw ni>bba niNim m>N -nab N3 nt>iN jiivna ui>a iam iy»bi .nya omm ana >ab iam mab n"ya Nai •y")aa

— N — way inabjn '»ait7ib>an 10a rm>»b o>oiin y*T» >j>jy nabb yam nabnnw >N*n mr) n^ioNb O»*T« Jimt>> by nana '»i3an JiiN\3>tna>nNa [.T> V'y] "Jii3>» it — Tail '>byo pnm„ :ION3 vyi nt7Nb N>n nuiwan -psa o»yisn onat?a Niipn V"i pbn 'a >abwiva n»i INao lanaary o>iat> bai t?non >iat7(i) [baN] ,nn>b p nat7i Ni>t? p iat>a rnomn nat? by NbN vn >iao by m i»N\y >NH ,JiuiNa Niipa fbNi ji>wi3N noan >ia*T pi \y"i»i niinn nna lariat Nb\y o>b\y»i o>v\y 10a

107 pi (N) on o»:nsn on9t7 bbaa >NII >i9t> baN ,o*TNni obiyn >3>aya nywb 15J1D ywnb 'iai mtn >» nana im>i ovy Nna nai« V>yb *pis onb \y> naana oan >9b\y o>vn> o3v» vay obiN .una Nb baN m\yyb i«bn Nb N>ama ,iay *rabnnb bbaa tnaai o>pi9b ona oa Jiyib o>i>n >pn nabb ia»m on?9i\y >"\yi v>y ,miinbi v*r»b -Tab nrm JIN vmnb VN nyib na onnN o>an nyib vy>\y b") a")ii ,m» yuab v* na yv oivm ma \Y> on ,ip\Y >ana mynba iasy UN OJH onnN N>aai ,Jii»iNn nyi *T»iba >V>Q*T o\Y o"aamb «"n>9 i»yi ,t7iip>9Nb naio .n> t"y >"wi natat ri"aya N>an\y not] fua ibnb vina :b"3 *|i\ya >3>ay by pi >Np*T oy ptp*m n"apn*t oiwa pi 'at HPN v*m iai m VN*T naiai 'N iNwa m opina nn ninnbi v^nb ^^ 1*<*r pi 'ai ,o>pns .onai o>aivwin n*»yb >biNi — am naa OIWQ own TIN naina ow ana 03 'a baN ,o>a\y *naa bbaa mw b"t> a"a bba o>a>a >i9t?a jmnb ntm\y .-mbrmb bbaa wan b"t> o>pbmn oy\?b ub\y o>i9t?n '>jb*r lobnnb n"*T 'tnna ov vw o> 'a uman inN iai toibn .ny nawa v>yb \y> bay — w"»y >"\yi piiNn :b"ti iJia\Y >"\yia v/"»y yv >9I*TA*T b"3 ban a»n o'bivn ibN PIN baa ,t"yb o>\SNN n>t?m own JIN van NV ona wyw nnN pi ma vabb VN CN .onnN own oa\y> ibN o>t>n>b m obiN aiiow Nin m iai unaw ,*nabna 001a iNboi nimn niDpwn onb iwaiw niwn ojiiw3)3 Jiipaiai nnnn Jiiapwn onawnoa iv?bpi niir»a imb iittbb o»bna nam IIPN n»Nn naam nbapn noba o> >mi — nnaNn niw>ri3i o*TNn nyi a\y»ni Nb\y t"a\y ,iiobna ot7>ia iNbaw oup Nab bPyi v^a ibN o>p*r o>3>ay tuanb N"N ,nnnn Jivbaw >"y mawna -Nm niinn >bia>b ^ina pv niyta v*vb o> n»i mym v>ia\y n>b vn nNii NH Nobya >NipNa pi my>apa ona *nabb imn Nb oa ('a .naio nn yiv nun imbb *npw n>n„ :a"9 niaN b"n IIDNW no •npwb t?np>DNb a'wnb VN nyib >taa >a mo u*mb 'iai "t?vp>9Nb Nnn ni>pwi mvmia ^vjab niy>ap>y :i»iba ,vp\y nm pi ,onnai by '>9 v'Vi ,vvt>nb ytn m pi\y — vp\y nin iiN>aa o"a»mb »"n>9a ,nvna

DKSD NNÛN 'OAN^ TIN O^JIVN D^QD^ CY-IA^ ^ NXU Ô^N^N (N DNAO ^DD MN^N1 DÔDN MIDKI ,nonai KI»D-P IBD 10a P'RND nv on? pkb> u^n 'ni i^xi ikdo lnnDJt^ Qneon ^nx nrî ,p"mia noxjty âx un: x1?® x1?* mr«a «iipa PI Dm KIP? p« pôi sip? IIDK KI^D p IBDA tan IDK^ ôr mi NEOA KJD pnnjD ÂAA DB> 31 1DK1 KHD pK ^DJ DHQD HT pKS^ V^D NNM HD^ IDID DIJ^D NEOA DJI nro IID?? P^N MAT .Diion nai an^^ dj T'Q '"xana i^yi ^mta

108 nytb m obiN ,a>\ynb y*T> *nnb nnnn 7lobo pit naiot b"t n:»> «>ai niynp o"o moiNn nyi o> nobb 0111 a>\yn\y no ypbt \yiao\y o"aoin yii nwon '»aa o\y b"t o"aoia vw ,nima '»nn\y nan* nobn OVT b"3 pbi ,mb m o>a»\y n3\yon nam INIIO boy nnN >0 >3ab ona i^vo^ ny\ya (o .'iai anynv no yi>b o*tpio >Nm m\yon nbnn by *noyb *TIIY>W noan :ioiba ibN myn nnwp mawno ban pi oann ny*T my*rn im "pish winn TIN mo bi\?>b o>owb lab 'mn ny\y nniNa nai IIN>2 imi ,ipwn >ai*to iann nN nambi n>amb oai nmmn o"aoin nata b"3 pi ,a^n w"»y ,'iai boy nnN no ym '>aa o"aoin onn mym yw ba\y b"3 onam 't>a pnnb \y111w no N>mnb -jvy bao 'mn imoao ba pi nbta) noan una ivn*TY> no inn ,^mao vn toiyn na\yno ina av>n> Nbi ,nr»oNn myi nuab yn ny\Y »ab iia oipo nnb nyioNn nyio mavmo

— a — yaun noan 10a ni3»o nai ina anyo\y NbN o>moN yto >3>3yb yyua i\yo\y>i o*TNb 7*11* inb \y> o*ya noann na*r nm ,nonai nNiain noani pirn N>anb o>an*n o>3>jy ona \y> o>i ,o>3>3y noaa niinn myn>b a"a -nNni o>3i\yNin natio noaai noman lyw b"nn 'vn iNiaon naioNn niiywn by nvmn ip\y nyt ona iaaiy oânn onpinnvy NbN b"t o>m nobn nt?Nb ya nm .m\y>naon niytn in ini ivpm >"ay o>)nao mba — noNa noann na*r pi nobbi pnn io lan nN nab >jina NbN ona ib\ya> bab o>o\y nNi>i nun >bya >"y nbNa yio nax? lanb vnt INOI iaaiy\y onatn inoi noann oiiy mo iinab o>y*n> OJ>N\!> o>o>onn :onnN o>Nm oi\y> ma OA PIN baa ,m»\yan 'myio onanon m\yn labb v?bpi nun tob iaa\y nnN pi oniN nobb iyob aiv? v*< •>y*Tipn naoo nîoNn '>ism nbymn nN mo *yivJob yn>\y nno b^N oniN nob>vi> |a n>amb y*r> iai yinm iaiyni\y mv»naon niytn nN pnibi .b"ti noani nîoNn nmoN 0(1)100 NbN .yap ibN omob ni\yybi i"n nimn 10 b\?ab >N*ra 13>NY> pio >iNiiy iotb y>mv> 010 omyD »o>a mji^Nin nibnnn *nobb ivyaN u>yo ba n\yy>\y vnn tN\y — 'o^b o>3\y i"\? p — 'o^b it?onnb .miobo vya^nb lb vymv; nyvya o>piab ona i»y> pn ;*Tiobnb myi — .i"t7a pnb ma ian>\y nt?na Tii^b Nb ON — mnpib ba\? omvyyb NbN ,Ti3nn o>3aa PN omob i>oynb yn "t 13N umiain >a n>bba nainb omvyyb yn a">i ,'n nimb ninavbi on omobn INV»I ,-nobm n^vyo Nipo /n nun i3>)a nN Tiobb

109 oa — .mv Nbi i>aim iya*> >ab N"ab ona "ptb w>i nain Nbi mwi — .m a>Nna oaiiw "T Nann nta w>

— a — noiani yawnn naan iaa NIAIONI niy*Tb ma»w onb I>NW yta >a>ay oiwa ona w> baN ,IIP>N ona ^ «IN ITPOYTI maw DA obbaai bNi ip>y oniN nwy "oa mart,, :'an by naoa iaNa on»byi ,mm bi\?a ,onnN onat ona aiyn Nbw ona NbN fNwa '>n> Nbw ,ba\3 owyn nabb,, :b"n ,o>ayaa naan *nabNi *jbN bNiw> naan >n*rab naNn Nbw nywa iaiab> :N"D nna :>abwiva IIONW no pi ,oama iwa>b Nbi "ona :m>n w> nbNa obiN .w"»y .nb>b Nbi ov Nb ia>NW

>i)'") »a ^NI ,ow >abwiva iNiaaai n"n nmaa nrnwan maab 'N p yaw >a ib a>wn inaN "IT y"y'D nv?it>a )>w> baN i»by pbin •iani> 'ia naan *nabb ivnn*T ia>sa*ra oiaya >ab rob 7*113 onb w>w nbNb 'a mnaa) 'tnna ow obiN .mabab o>anpw >aaa a"*> rpab n>ai> n-ma oiwa iit?>N Na>b*r w iNwat ow naiat (:*TT? nun biua oiwa ona w» a"a n>YP iaa nN W>N *nab> Nbi o>oan Nin naa nyt yraiNa >ibn t">abi ,nanai mabab o>avipa Nb ON /pisn ->TTN*t Nn by o\y nND w>-> >abwn>n >iat b"a pi ,niaaiN una 'a o»na ninai bNyaw> "i >anni ,nb>b Nbi ov Nb ia>Nw nywa iaiab> obiN — .nb>bi oai> ia mam amai iit?N nnya ,niaaiN n b"»p Nb baN ,Nin niaaiNa -pis INW on b"tn yowo ow mata .ws mnaa >baaa naiota >an

ronnN o>N)n oaw> nbNb oa obiN

>pbn niaab <^NI /Wtip mabb ma>vmai ^ma nanp in nnb w> 'N yaw *>Na ty pa ipia .-Tii viTât? naiaia otabb o>anifw nun nwNi npiani plan iNKa Nbi o*i3>v?aN ty naaa ,n"y iNâ Nbi 'naia Nipa 'iai mnoi nNaiv? niabna o>N>pa i>n Nbw piN baai ;Nipa i>niaa nNi i>aa nN loboi omat r'a nawaa >>v i"i>a*r nî — ^bw nabw nun Nnn Nbi ,nb Nin \?>wan >N*TI lainai] .ow w"ai t"\?a w> otabb yn nbnnabw ana vai [.-inn asa >3b nnn>a pn onNwa a"bNW o*rabb wnt .niaaiN iaa pi nnn nab bia PN omab nN a>wnnb I»N 'a >nbw 'naN*rai n"nb vaa biab '>nnw ^ bw na>Nwn 'a nnn NbN >aa nN *taib >a>Ni obiyaw maaiN ba >3N n>aa

110 Nini (:>> invvy) o"i Nin >Niim 'I*T ^N*r b"i onam una — 'iai Nin n ION o"o ,i»imp mb\y nuoiN m nN nobb a>m ION >a ,mn obiya oa onb it>n> Nbi nimb pi obnb iosya ima Nba obiyb N"N :o\y pvmp mb\y 'noNT> vnn ,ma ynab N"N Q>b).1»On ni — Qvna ITIiOINV 'O n\J>N Nbai O^ia w>H) >NTI nima o»bm nimb O>INIW pi\ya >bya can omobb nima bm nimb N"N >a >N*TI mi) .nnb nima obnb ai ii>t?m nNio\y noa nimb iba it?onj\y Nb ON noNa >iao vn oow obiyn 'mn M\Y ma >bba pm nt?b baa "T nam \Y> nm ba by ,nnm by HP>N ma yn ON pbi ,nim nai nisoni ,nimb ibn> u>oa\y bmwnb inn >>>moi in ma by (a) .3"o na iy ma

— *T — ona yhv o»3ionn oniobn ba a"n ,ona nNnpm nnap mob i\YAN\Y nywa mb iom mbab >Nia 13>N >a >NII (\Y>opNia) >\yio\Y nbym nat o>oyn rniaoa vy>\y oa noi /pn imnno mv>Nn mnnann a>\ynb upbb \Y>\ya v?>v?i vuai oipoa am wanb >Nia 13>N PIN baai .nt?>Ni p\yn '>by\y ,a"ya\y mini anaaw nun o»n o>o iipoo nnu oipoo o>}v>a ."na Nbia*r na fani na fan,, :IION

noa obiN ,bbaa v^yn mab pi Nin b>yb mnavy no ba ViNa nn>ai nnyn >jm30i mn >bm by i>voy nbuion nyvm namb imiN mobo nnwnn mn ,nbN ba nN 'n nNin ivm nnN .mvN iv?yon3 t">y\y o>oyn moan nobb a"a py nbN ba iy\? >a naano ni\yyb v\yay vim ,nimn 10 innNn inn ipnmn onoibn -nnb omnn yn oa i\yin\y:ny mapvnn nN npyb ,amm Timn baa naiwna aivb pbi 'pn imim noan bio o>oyn noan nN a>\y ,ip>yb \ynpn mob 'm> onaw iao ma *rt?»b obiyo umiaN *p*Tb 'om nobb nobn ma n?»b oa/nobm n^\yo vnpn >ana i3>3ab*tobb nmoNa nimn oyi3a ^yob nîa^n nânn 711 >"ay omwiaoi o>biyon\y IDN o>n\?aio my ,nav> iiNoni mm ny*r o^nnb o> ^nan ib>it7> Nb\y ibNbi ,mbm nia>vy>b iab>i nnna bmb iaN\y> onavi na'oon pjy D^pî a»aia m^np DEJ'sj iidob' u^VD^ ioai (a nw »:BD «mi IOXJ Dn^yB' onai 'JO nr p« 'n Dy linn ny DVPI minn IID^ nnc IJDD ân ^y nnxoo (ny prmjD) nay* ^ni JIH^ mxn ^y ^SXEJ' mnjn ny^ diÔ ^"NT ICXID nffi .00 naa> 'Dina Kpi^n ij^.oa nroai lajô nivo 5115a pay^

111 -n,, '>rp\y moi minn mini Jiy>*r» JIN ibN *n>3bjr>jm ibip> *pb ow vrob>\y IWDN O>I — .N"*TI niuii o>)>vo JIUOINB INSM -"VIW V^VTII imn HI biN o»wi»wn o»ni onb Jiisimn jiiyvtn DJIN -wnb jnbjuisn o>vy>aio\y o>vn> INS»> ONI — \y">i muib pn *TN *n»bb N>n 15N i3Jinn >D ,inyba mb 711 INSQ> o>»yn >yioi JiittbJi .NIH mi '>byi JIN Jiivwan 'n JINN i3>ii

•pan JIN ipnb *Tin>n ,inn jmna JIN ipJib i3Ji>w nbN bi iiiui'i o>y»t>an bn ,obiy» I3>JIIIN lib ibbt?w by o»N3 by 13>31 ion>by 'n Jim NnJi n nn nisob onnyi

112 THE ASSOCIATION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH SCIENTISTS

The Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists is an organization devoted to the orientation of science within the framework of Orthodox Jewish tradition. Founded in 1948, the Association serves the Jewish community in areas to which the Orthodox scientist is particularly qualified to contribute. The Association also provides an intellectual meeting ground for persons who, by virtue of their professional qualifications, interests, and activities, can contribute to the constructive incorporation of scientific knowledge and thinking into the Torah way of life. It unites the common interests of Or- thodox Jewish scientists throughout the world. The specific aims of the Association include:

Education and Guidance Assistance to individuals and institutions in the solution of practical problems encountered by Orthodox Jews and their children in the study or practice of scientific pursuits; support for the educational ideal of a true synthesis of Jewish and secular studies.

Ideology Study of the applicability of scientific method and knowledge to the strengthening of Torah ideology; contribution to the solution of ideological problems relating to apparent points of conflict between scientific theory and Orthodox Judaism.

Halakhah Provision of consulting services to Rabbinical authorities concerned with the implications of technological developments for Jewish religious law. Persons who are interested in furthering the aims of the Association and are actively engaged in or have been trained in a scientific profession, are invited to apply for membership. Nonscientists with special interest in the Association may also be admitted to membership at the discretion of the Association's Board of Governors. Application forms may be obtained from the Association's national office, 84 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10011.

Chapters Boston, Mass. Elizabeth, N. J. Pittsburgh, Pa. Chicago, 111. Los Angeles, Calif, St. Louis, Mo. Cleveland, O. New York, N. Y. Toronto, Ont. Detroit, Mich. Philadelphia, Pa. Washington, D. C.

Affiliates Agudat Anshei Mada' Shom'rei Torah (Israel; founded 1962) Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists, Graduates and Professionals of Great Britain (founded 1962) Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists, Graduates and Professionals of Australia (founded 1966) w.

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