Identification and Evaluation of Sources This Investigation Will

History Internal Assessment Section 1: Identification and evaluation of sources This investigation will explore the question: “To what extent were Field Marshall Douglas Haig’s failures responsible for the 1916 Battle of the Somme military tragedy?”. This topic can be expanded to explore numerous factors which influenced the Somme but for the purpose of this investigation it will concentrate on the role Douglas Haig played in the outcome of the battle. The first source that will be evaluated in depth will be an extract from the book “Haig as a military commander”, written by General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, published in 1973. This source is of particular value as it was written by General Marshall-Cornwall who served directly under Haig as a Junior officer during the Battle of the Somme and claims to have witnessed first-hand, poor advice given to Haig and the effects this advice caused. This knowledge obtained formed his notion that Haig “trusted too completely some of his immediate subordinates”. Furthermore, being published fifty-seven years following the Somme, Marshall-Cornwall would have been able to use hindsight to formulate his view on the subject and derive his conclusions relating to Haig’s role and impact on the Somme, something many primary sources lack. However, this source also has its limitations that impact its value. Assessing the content of his personal recollections to understand events and his experiences at the Battle of the Somme, the information could not have been completely accurate and would be largely incomplete. The arguments he deduced from his experiences would have been based on facts constituting a minor aspect of the overall reasoning behind Haig’s decision making, therefore analysing the topic from a narrower viewpoint rather than developing analysis from a range of different perspectives. The second source that will evaluated in depth will be an extract from the book “Not for Glory”, written by PW Turner and RH Haigh, published in 1969. The book is a based on personal accounts of Western Front veteran Gilbert Hall and illustrates his experiences during the war. The extract focuses on the Somme in particular as well as includes the authors’ views regarding Douglas Haig’s methods to achieve military success. The extract provides an insight into Haig’s inability to lead the war effort and its purpose is to stress how his attitude 1 in the face of war was responsible for the Battle’s failure. The distance the two authors have from the war having not experienced the events for themselves as well as incorporating the opinions of Gilbert Hall creates a more objective and balanced argument. This balance is displayed in the extract through the comparison of the British approach to that of the Germans, with the British adopting old-fashioned tactics for a war of attrition whereas the Germans focused on their own artillery success. This source too has its limitations as Gilbert Hall’s personal involvement could lead to skewed information considering the time between the events occurring and when PW Turner and RH Haigh established his memoir. These potential mistruths could have altered the accuracy of the authors’ arguments or led to incorrect conclusions due to omissions of material. Word count: 509 2 Section 2: Investigation Field Marshall Douglas Haig, commander of the British Army at the Battle of the Somme, is renowned for his questionable military tactics leading up to and including the opening day of conflict on July 1st 1916. A total of 57,000 British casualties were suffered1 on the opening day, marking it the greatest catastrophe in British military history. The initial stage of momentous artillery bombardment, commencing on 24th June 1916, was enacted to devastate German defences and enable Anglo-French forces to advance with greater ease. Succeeding the bombardment, the infantry offensive was ordered to advance towards German trenches in lines, only to walk into heavy gunfire, with the Germans being able to recover quickly having suffered little damage in their deeply dug bunkers. Historiography surrounding whether Field Marshall Douglas Haig can be held accountable for the formation of a stalemate lasting near to five months resulting in an immense casualty toll amounting to approximately 420,000 British troops, 200,000 French and, controversially, 465,0002 German troops, is overwhelmingly critical. This criticism includes evaluating Haig’s ability to coordinate and implement successful military tactics in addition to assessing his leadership qualities. The extent of which Haig was entirely to blame is debated, with the German’s “cold military professionalism”3, as well as other influences, impacting the Battle of the Somme and contributing to the tragic events that occurred. In order to decipher what extent Haig’s failures were responsible for the Somme tragedy, these viewpoints must be explored further to establish a conclusion. When analysing historians who are critical of Haig, it is clear the common belief is that his intentions were justified, in that a breakthrough of the German lines at this location was crucial to success on the Western Front. However, many historians are widely skeptical of his conventional, conservative approach to the battle as well as question the justification of the tremendous death toll. A source of value is a quote from soldier and military historian B.H. Liddell Hart who was vastly critical of Haig, stating he “was a man of supreme egoism and utter lack of scruple” 4. Hart argues that Haig’s “overweening” attitude towards the Somme 1 (Staff, 2009) 2 (Staff, 2009) 3 (Turner & Haigh, 1969) 4 (Mearsheimer, 1988) 3 offensive led to the sacrifice of “hundreds of thousands of men”5 alongside betraying the government through trickery “that was not merely immoral but criminal.”6 This view is validated by soldier and Victoria Cross Medalist Captain Charles Hudson who did not believe “that the enormous casualties were justified”7. Furthermore, Haig’s persistence with the artillery bombardment is seen by Hudson to have been an example of this overused method which “failed again and again”8. The description of Haig’s stubborn attitude towards the strategies implemented was the reason for a lack of other methods being utilised on the battlefield as critics believe “the infantry was doomed”9 following the unsuccessful artillery bombardment. These arguments regarding Haig’s ineptitude stem from a broader scope looking at the overall strategy of the British military. The tactics embraced were systematic and were persisted with “long after they had ceased to serve any worthwhile purpose”10. In Haig’s case, according to historians P.W Turner and R.H. Haigh, Haig and his Chief of Staff, General Sir William Robertson felt “that they must have some spectacular victory to prove how right they were.”11 Ultimately this influenced Haig’s decision making and planning the Somme offensive and consequently resulted in the tragedy that “was excessive loss of British lives, insubstantial accomplishment, and waning moral”.12 Despite the view that Haig’s incompetent military strategy was a substantial factor for the Somme tragedy, the historiography regarding this issue is not wholly supportive of the idea that Haig’s failures were solely to blame. It is evident that there were aspects of the Battle outside of Haig’s control, for example throughout the course of the First World War, over one billion shells were fired and it is estimated that up to thirty percent did not explode.13 Haig potentially would have overestimated the damage inflicted on German defences therefore altering the precision of his tactical nous. This flawed assumption concerning the effectiveness of the artillery bombardment was a major contributor to the subsequent devastation as Haig firmly believed the Germans had been obliterated and an offensive would 5 (Mearsheimer, 1988) 6 (Mearsheimer, 1988) 7 (Hudson, 2007) 8 (Hudson, 2007) 9 (Bourne, 1989) 10 (Prior, 2004) 11 (Turner & Haigh, 1969) 12 (Prior, 2004) 13 (WW1 bombs still a serious danger, 2014) 4 be virtually unstoppable. Furthermore, military historian Gary Sheffield believes that because of the nature of trench warfare that had developed on the Western Front, Haig had no other option at his disposal other than a frontal attack14. In addition, the Allies were under immense pressure, especially the French at Verdun, and although Haig wanted the attack to be postponed until a time he thought it would be feasible, the Allies were on the brink of collapsing and facing German domination on the Western Front. As a result, “the whole planning of the Somme was ham-fisted and clumsy” and Haig’s efforts were no match for the indomitable German forces. The evidence and reasoning proving that the British were underprepared for the Somme perhaps highlights an issue concerning British attitudes towards the war. A large focus on attrition warfare where “the British still regarded war as an extension of a game of rugger”15 is argued by PW Turner and RH Haigh to be a fault which led to the inevitable Somme tragedy and that Haig had to continue this philosophy due to the resources at his disposal and positioning of trenches that had been developed over the course of the previous two years. This ideology the British carried into the war was “proved totally ineffectual against the cold German professionalism that manifested itself in the form of accurate shell, machine gun and rifle fire.”16 It is clear when assessing whether Field Marshall Douglas Haig’s failures were responsible for the Battle of the Somme military tragedy that historian interpretation of events provides justifiable analysis to reach a conclusion on this topic. Studying the historiography of this historical battle, it can be deduced that Haig’s fundamental strategy was a resounding failure which ultimately led to the most disastrous day in British military history.

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