Morality & Foreign Policy Militarism and the Crisis of American Diplomacy
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- 1 - Epistulae NATIONAL HUMANITIES INSTITUTE No. 20 • July 7, 2015 Morality & Foreign Policy Militarism and the Crisis of American Diplomacy By Chas W. Freeman The late Arthur Goldberg, who served on our interests and resolves problems with foreigners Supreme Court and as U.S. ambassador to the with minimal violence. It is the nonbelligerent United Nations, once said that “diplomats ap- champion of domestic tranquility and prosper- proach every question with an open . mouth.” ity. It promotes mutually acceptable varieties of No doubt that’s often true at the U.N., where modus vivendi between differing perspectives parliamentary posturing and its evil twin, declar- and cultures. atory diplomacy, rule. But the essence of diplo- Diplomacy is the translation of national strat- macy is not talking but seeking common ground egy into tactics to gain political, economic, and by listening carefully and with an open mind to military advantages without the use of force. It what others don’t say as well as what they do, is the outermost sentry and guardian of national and then acting accordingly. defense. Its lapse or failure can bring war and all Diplomacy is how a nation advances its its pains to a nation. But diplomacy is not just an alternative to Ambassador Chas W. Freeman chairs Projects war. It does not end when war begins. And when International, Inc. A popular public speaker and war proves necessary to adjust relations with author of five books, he is a career diplomat (re- other states or peoples, it is diplomacy that must tired) who has served in numerous key positions translate the outcome of the fighting into agreed in the Defense and State Departments, including adjustments in relationships, crafting a better Assistant Secretary of Defense for International peace that reconciles the vanquished to their de- Security Affairs from 1993-94, U. S. Ambassador feat and stabilizes a new status quo. By any mea- to Saudi Arabia (during operations Desert Shield sure, therefore, excellence in diplomacy is vitally and Desert Storm), and principal American in- important to the power, wealth, and well-being of terpreter during President Richard Nixon’s path- the nation. breaking visit to China in 1972. Another version At its deepest level, diplomacy is a subtle stra- of this article has appeared in The American Con- tegic activity. It is about rearranging circumstanc- servative. It is based on a speech delivered to the es, perceptions, and the parameters of interna- 2015 meeting of the Academy of Philosophy and tional problems so as to realign the self-interest of Letters. other nations with one’s own in ways that cause Luke Sheahan, Editor [email protected] Epistulae (ə-pis´-tŭ-lā), Latin (n., pl.): letters or correspondence. An occasional publication of the National Humanities Institute, Epistulae seeks to provide clarity and insight on significant issues of our time. While addressed to the educated public, it aspires to high scholarly standards. P.O. Box 1387, Bowie, MD 20718-1387 301.464.4277 www.nhinet.org - 2 - them to see that it is in their interest to do what has come to see us as implacably hostile to its one wants them to do, and that it’s possible for rise and is focused on countering our perceived them to do it without appearing to capitulate to efforts to hem it in. Japan is reviewing its inner any foreign power or interest. Diplomacy is about samurai. Some say all these adversities are upon getting others to play our game. us because we are not sufficiently brutal in our Judging by results in the complex post-Cold approach to foreign affairs and that, to be taken War environment, diplomacy is something the seriously or to be effective, we must bomb, strafe, United States does not now understand or know or use drones to assassinate those with whom we how to do. Here I shall discuss some of the beliefs disagree and let the collateral damage fall where and practices that account for America’s bungling it may. But what we have actually proved is that, of foreign policy in recent years. I will end by if you are sufficiently indifferent to the interests offering a few thoughts about how we might do of others and throw your weight around enough, better. you can turn off practically everybody. Since the fall of the Soviet Union liberated Outside our own country, American military Americans from our fear of nuclear Armageddon, prowess and willingness to administer shock and the foreign policy of the United States has come awe to foreign societies are nowhere in doubt. In to rely almost exclusively on economic sanc- Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many tions, military deterrence, and the use of force. other places, Americans have provided ample Such measures are far from the only arrows in evidence of our politico-military obduracy and the traditional quiver of statecraft. Yet Ameri- willingness to inflict huge casualties on foreign- cans no longer aim at leadership by example or ers we judge oppose us. As a nation, we nonethe- polite persuasion backed by national prestige, less seem to doubt our own prowess and to be patronage, institution building, or incentives for obsessed with proving it to ourselves and others. desirable behavior. In Washington, the threat to But there is no credibility gap about American use force has become the first rather than the last toughness to be remedied. That is not the issue. resort in foreign policy. We Americans have em- The issue is whether our policies are wise and braced coercive measures as our default means of whether military campaign plans dressed up in influencing other nations, whether they be allies, domestically appealing rhetoric equate to strate- friends, adversaries, or enemies. gies that can yield a world more congruent with For most in our political elite, the overwhelm- our interests and values. ing military and economic leverage of the United In recent years, the United States has killed States justifies abandoning the effort to persuade untold multitudes in wars and counterterrorist rather than muscle recalcitrant foreigners into drone warfare in West Asia and North Africa. line. We habitually respond to challenges of Our campaigns have spilled the blood, broken every kind with military posturing rather than the bodies, and taken or blighted the lives of with diplomatic initiatives directed at solving many in our armed forces, while weakening our the problems that generate these challenges. This economy by diverting necessary investment from approach has made us less – not more – secure, it. These demonstrations of American power while burdening future generations of Ameri- and determination have inflicted vast amounts cans with ruinous debt. It has unsettled our allies of pain and suffering on foreign peoples. They without deterring our adversaries. It has destabi- have not bent our opponents to our will. Far from lized entire regions, multiplied our enemies, and yielding greater security for us or our allies, our estranged us from our friends. interventions – whether on the ground or from South America no longer defers to us. Rus- the air -- have multiplied our enemies, intensified sia is again hostile. Europe questions our judg- their hatred for us, and escalated the threat to ment, is audibly disturbed by our belligerence, both our homeland and our citizens and friends and is distancing itself from our leadership. A abroad. disintegrating Middle East seethes with venge- It is a measure of the extent to which we now ful contempt for the United States. Africa ignores see the world through military eyes that the us. Our lust for India remains unrequited. China response of much of America’s political elite to - 3 - the repeated failure of the use of force to yield in negotiations directed at translating military desired results has been to assert that we would outcomes into mutually agreed political arrange- have succeeded if only we had been more gung ments that will establish a stable new order of ho and to argue for the use of even greater force. affairs. Not so the wars of the United States. But what we have been doing with our armed In our civil war, World War I, World War II, forces has not halted dynamic change in the and the Cold War, the U.S. objective was not ad- global and regional distribution of economic, justments in relations with the enemy but “uncon- military, and political power. There is no reason ditional surrender,” that is a peace imposed on to believe that greater belligerence could yield a the defeated nation without its assent and entail- better result. Most Americans sense this and are ing its subsequent moral, political, and economic skeptical both about the neoconservative agendas reconstruction. The smaller wars of the twen- the military-industrial-congressional complex tieth century did not replace this idiosyncratic seeks to impose on our nation and the wisdom of American rejection of models of warfare linked to staking our future on the preservation of a rap- limited objectives. We fought to a draw in Korea, idly crumbling post-Cold War status quo. where to this day we have not translated the 1953 Every nation’s political culture is a product of armistice into peace. We were bested in Vietnam. its historical experience. The American way in na- In Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Iraq in tional security policy, like that of other countries, 2003, we imposed regime change on the defeated, is steered by unexamined preconceptions drawn not terms for war termination and peace. from the peculiarities of our history. In the ag- So Americans have no recent experience of gregate, these convictions constitute a subliminal ending wars through negotiation with those we doctrine with the authority of dogma.