Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance Author(s): Archon Fung Reviewed work(s): Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, Special Issue: Collaborative Public Management (Dec., 2006), pp. 66-75 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4096571 . Accessed: 09/02/2012 18:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Blackwell Publishing and American Society for Public Administration are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Public Administration Review.

http://www.jstor.org Archon Fung HarvardUniversity

Articleson Varietiesof Participationin Complex Governance Collaborative Public Management

ArchonFung is anassociate professor 7Themultifaceted challengesof contemporarygovernance In this article, I develop a framework for understand- of atthe John F. publicpolicy Kennedy demand a complexaccount of the ways in which those ing a range of institutional possibilities. Such a frame- Schoolof Government,. who are to laws and should work is a of the answer E-mail:[email protected]. subject policies participate necessary-if incomplete-part in making them. ?his article developsa frameworkfor to a larger question regarding the amounts and kinds understandingthe range of institutional possibilitiesfor of appropriate participation in governance. Though I public participation. Mechanisms ofparticipation vary do not develop this framework into a general "theory along three important dimensions: who participates, how of the public" (Frederickson 1991), this approach participants communicate with one another and make suggests that such a general theory may remain elu- decisions together,and how discussionsare linked with sive. Whether public institutions and decision-making policy or public action. Thesethree dimensions constitute processes should treat members of the public as a space in which any particular mechanism of consumers, clients, or citizens depends partly on the participation can be located. Different regionsof this context and problem in question. institutional design spaceare more and lesssuited to addressingimportant problems of democraticgovernance There are three important dimensions along which such as legitimacy,justice, and effectiveadministration. forms of direct participation vary. The first concerns who participates. Some participatory processes are How much and what kind of directpublic open to all who wish to engage, whereas others invite participation should there be in contempo- only elite stakeholders such as interest group represen- rary democracy? The multiplex conditions of tatives. The second dimension specifies how partici- modern governance demand a theory and institutions pants exchange information and make decisions. In of public participation that are appropriately complex many public meetings, participants simply receive in at least three ways. First, unlike the small New information from officials who announce and explain England town or even the Athenian city-state, there is policies. A much smaller set of venues are deliberative no canonical form of direct participation in modern in the sense that citizens take positions, exchange democratic governance; modes of contemporary par- reasons, and sometimes change their minds in the ticipation are, and should be, legion. Second, public course of discussions. The third dimension describes participation advances multiple purposes and values the link between discussions and policy or public in contemporary governance. Master principles such action. These three dimensions-scope of participa- as equal influence over collective decisions and respect tion, mode of communication and decision, and for individual autonomy are too abstract to offer extent of authority-constitute a space in which any useful guidance regarding the aims and character of particular mechanism of public decision can be lo- citizen participation. It is more fruitful to examine the cated. Here, I will show how regions of this institu- range of proximate values that mechanisms of partici- tional design space are suited to addressing three pation might advance and the problems that they seek important problems of democratic governance: legiti- to address. I will consider the illegitimacy, injustice, macy, justice, and effective governance. and ineffectiveness of particular clusters of governance arrangements here. Third, mechanisms of direct par- Participatory Designs: The Democracy Cube ticipation are not (as commonly imagined) a strict If there is no canonical form or institution of direct alternative to political representation or expertise but public participation in contemporary democratic instead complement them. As we shall see, public contexts, then one important task is to understand the participation at its best operates in synergy with repre- feasible and useful varieties of participation. In what sentation and administration to yield more desirable remains perhaps the most cited work in the literature practices and outcomes of collective decision making on participatory democracy, Sherry Arnstein develops and action. an influential typology in her essay "A Ladder of 66 Public Administration Review * December 2006 * Special Issue CitizenParticipation" (1969).2 She arguesthat partici- appropriate that the tool include the alternative- pation is valuableto the extentthat it "isthe redistri- often the norm-of no citizen participation to enable bution of powerthat enablesthe have-notcitizens ... comparisons and juxtapositions. to be deliberatelyincluded in the future."She positsa "ladder"of empowermentwith eight rungs:manipula- ParticipantSelection tion, therapy,informing, consultation, placation, part- In what follows, I suppose that the principal reason nership,delegated power, and finally,citizen control. for enhancing citizen participation in any area of contemporary governance is that the authorized set of Arnstein'sclassification still providesa usefulcorrec- decision makers-typically elected representatives or tive to naiveand untemperedenthusiasm for public administrative officials-is somehow deficient.3 They participation.As an analytictool, however,it is obso- may lack the knowledge, competence, public purpose, lete and defectivein two main ways. First,it improp- resources, or respect necessary to command compli- erly fusesan empiricalscale that describesthe level of ance and cooperation. Whether the direct participa- influenceindividuals have oversome collectivedeci- tion of citizens in governance can remedy one or other sion with normativeapproval. There may indeed be of these deficiencies depends in large measure on who contextsin which public empowermentis highly participates: Are they appropriately representative of desirable,but thereare certainlyothers in which a the relevant population or the general public? Are consultativerole is more appropriatefor membersof important interests or perspectives excluded? Do they the public than full "citizencontrol." Second, there possess the information and competence to make have been many advancesin the theoryand practice good judgments and decisions? Are participants re- of participationsince Arnstein'sessay was published. sponsive and accountable to those who do not partici- A largebody of work in politicaltheory has distin- pate? Therefore, one primary feature of any public guishedbetween aggregative and deliberativedecision decision-making device is the character of its making(Cohen 1989; Gutmannand Thompson franchise: Who is eligible to participate, and how 1996). Practitionershave developedmany techniques do individuals become participants? In the universe of to recruitparticipants such as randomselection direct participation, there are five common selection (Fishkin1995), to facilitatemeetings, and to design mechanisms. entireparticipation processes suited to civil disputes, regulatorychallenges, and even law making(Connor The vast majority of public participation mechanisms 1988; Creighton2005). use the least restrictive method of selecting partici- pants: They are open to all who wish to attend. Actual Out of these manyways in which people come participants are a self-selectedsubset of the general togetherto discusspublic matters,three questions population. Though complete openness has an obvi- of institutionaldesign are particularly important for ous appeal, those who choose to participate are fre- understandingthe potentialand limits of participa- quently quite unrepresentative of any larger public. tory forms:Who participates?How do they commu- Individuals who are wealthier and better educated nicate and make decisions?What is the connection tend to participate more than those who lack these betweentheir conclusionsand opinions on one hand advantages, as do those who have special interests or and public policy and action on the other? stronger views (Fiorina 1999).

This section describesan institutionaldesign space Two alternative participant selection methods address that maps arenasof decisionmaking along these three this difficulty. Some mechanisms that are open to all dimensions.In consideringthis space,it should be selectivelyrecruit participants from subgroups that are noted that actualdecision-making processes are fre- less likely to engage. For example, some community quentlycomposed of multiplepoints. Administrative policing and urban planning initiatives employ rulemaking,for example,often comprisesmoments in community organizers to publicize meetings in which interestedindividuals and stakeholderscom- low-income and minority communities. Selective ment on proposalsin public hearingsand moments in recruitment may also occur passively, providing which regulators(experts) make decisions on their structural incentives that make participation more own. Decision makingin a complexurban develop- attractive to those who are ordinarily less likely to ment project,for example,often resultsfrom interac- participate in politics. Some venues that address crime tions among multiple arenas,such as planning or sewers, for example, are particularly inviting to agencies,stakeholder negotiations, neighborhood disadvantaged citizens because those issues are less councils,and public hearings.The spaceis also delin- urgent to the wealthy. Those who have special interests eatedto include arenasin which thereis no public in some question-for example, senior citizens in participationat all--for example,areas in which discussions about the future of Social Security-may public officialsin insulatedagencies operate without nevertheless exploit the open-to-all character of directpublic oversightor input. This spaceis a tool public meetings to stack participation in their favor. for consideringgovernance choices, and so it is Randomly selectingparticipants from among the Varieties of Participationin Complex Governance 67 general population is the best guarantee of descriptive participation implicitly presume that it should representativeness. Initiatives such as deliberative approximate some deliberative ideal: participants polling, Citizens Juries, and Planning Cells randomly engage with one another directly as equals who reas- select participants to discuss public issues (Fishkin on together about public problems. But the vast major- 1995; Gastil 2000; Leib 2004; Smith and Wales ity of institutionalized public discussions do not occur 2000). in this way, nor is it clear that they should. For ex- ample, if the main reason for direct participation is A fourth method engages lay stakeholdersin public one that John Dewey once gave-that the man who discussions and decisions. Lay stakeholders are unpaid wears the shoe, not the shoemaker, knows best where citizens who have a deep interest in some public it pinches-then participants need do no more than concern and thus are willing to invest substantial complain to policy makers (Dewey 1981-90, 264). time and energy to represent and serve those who have similar interests or perspectives but choose not to There are six main modes of communication and participate. Many neighborhood association boards decision making in participatory settings. The vast and school councils, for example, are composed of majority of those who attend events such as public lay stakeholders. Finally, some governance processes hearings and community meetings do not put forward that have been described as regulatory negotiation, their own views at all. Instead, they participate as grassroots environmental management, and collabora- spectators who receive information about some policy tive planning bring together professionalstakeholders. or project, and they bear witness to struggles among These participants are frequently paid representatives politicians, activists, and interest groups. There are few of organized interests and public officials. public meetings in which everyone is a spectator. Almost all of them offer opportunities for some to These five mechanisms of have popular participation express their preferences to the audience and officials been conceived as that "mini-publics" intentionally there. Think of the citizens and activists who line up citizens in discrete bodies to discuss or decide gather at the ubiquitous microphone to pose a pointed ques- matters of concern These public (Fung 2003). tion or say their piece. Other discussions are organized devices contrast with two more familiar mechanisms in ways that allow participants to explore, develop, of individuals who in the selecting occupy positions and perhaps transform their preferences and perspec- state: elections that select competitive professional tives. They encourage participants to learn about who our interests politicians supposedly represent issues and, if appropriate, transform their views and and civil service mechanisms that select professional opinions by providing them with educational materi- the administrators who staff our technical, expert als or briefings and then asking them to consider the public bureaucracies. They also contrast with the merits and trade-offs of several alternatives. Partici- at public (perhaps "macro-public") large-the pants usually discuss these issues with one another diffuse of mass public sphere media, secondary (often organized in small groups) rather than simply and informal venues of discussion associations, listening to experts, politicians, or advocates. that has been analyzed by Jiirgen Habermas and others. These mechanisms (1989, 1996) eight Mechanisms employing these first three modes of for or the actors who identifying selecting participate communication often do not attempt to translate the in discussions or decisions about directly public views or preferences of participants into a collective matters can be from most arrayed schematically view or decision. At most public hearings, for exam- exclusive to most in a encompassing single ple, officials commit to no more than receiving the dimension (figure 1). testimony of participants and considering their views in their own deliberations. Communication and Decision subsequent The second crucial dimension of institutional design Some venues, however, do attempt to develop a col- specifies how participants interact within a venue of lective choice through a combination of three meth- public discussion or decision. Informed by the politi- ods of decision making. The most common of these is cal imaginary of the Athenian forum or the New aggregationand bargaining. In this mode, participants England town meeting, many treatments of citizen know what they want, and the mode of decision mak- ing aggregates their preferences-often mediated by 7 U), 0 , a) + a the influence and power that they bring-into a social C OT V o C CD 0 -0 V5-0 E 0 .r- U) 4- oC:C D CD C . choice. The exploration and give-and-take of bargain- CDCz O Q a) w 0"~ O o allows to find the best available alter- w< IE caU C8cO 0_n ing participants native to advance the joint preferences they have. A - State- Minipublics -Public- decision at a New town in More More England meeting operates Exclusive Inclusive this mode when the townspeople have polarized over some heated issue prior to the meeting and use the Figure1 ParticipantSelection Methods final vote simply to reckon their antecedent views. 68 Public Administration Review * December 2006 * Special Issue Deliberationand negotiationis a second mode of deci- the continuum:Participants have no realexpectation sion making. Participantsdeliberate to figure out what of influencingpublic action at all. Along this spectrum they want individually and as a group. In mechanisms of influenceand authority,five categoriesof institu- designed to create deliberation, participantstypically tionalizedinfluence and authorityemerge. absorb educational background materialsand exchange perspectives,experiences, and reasonswith one another In many (perhapsmost) participatoryvenues, the to develop their views and discover their interests. In the typicalparticipant has little or no expectationof influ- course of developing their individual views in a group encing policyor action. Instead,he or she participates context, deliberativemechanisms often employ proce- to derivethe personal benefits of edificationor perhaps dures to facilitate the emergence of principled agree- to fulfilla senseof civic obligation.Forums that princi- ment, the clarificationof persisting disagreements,and pallyaffect participants rather than policy and action the discovery of new options that better advance what employ the firstthree communicative modes (listening, participantsvalue. Two featuresdistinguish the delibera- expressingpreferences, and developingpreferences) tive mode. First, a process of interaction, exchange, ratherthan the threemore intensivedecision-making and-it is hoped--edification precedes any group modes describedin the previoussection. choice. Second, participantsin deliberation aim toward agreement with one another (though frequently they do Many participatorymechanisms exert influence on not reach consensus) based on reasons, arguments, and the state or its agentsindirectly by alteringor mobiliz- principles. In political theory, this mode has been elabo- ing public opinion. Theirdiscussions and decisions rated and defended as a deliberativeideal of democracy exerta communicativeinfluence on membersof the (Cohen 1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1996), while public or officialswho aremoved by the testimony, scholars of dispute resolution have described such pro- reasons,conclusions, or by the probityof the process cesses as negotiation and consensus building (Fisherand itself. For example,although the 9/11 Commission Ury 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Susskind, (NationalCommission on TerroristAttacks upon the McKearnan, and Thomas-Larmer1999). )was createdby the U.S. Congressto offerrecommendations to lawmakers,its principal Many (perhaps most) public policies and decisions are sourceof influencewas arguablythe enormouspublic determined not through aggregation or deliberation interestand supportthat its final reportgenerated. but rather through the technical expertiseof officials Providingadvice and consultationis a third common whose training and professional specialization suits mechanismthrough which participatoryforums exert them to solving particular problems. This mode influenceon public authority.In this mode, officials usually does not involve citizens. It is the domain preservetheir authorityand powerbut commit them- of planners, regulators, social workers, teachers and selvesto receivinginput from participants.The stated principals, police officers, and the like. purposeof most public hearingsand many other public meetingsis to providesuch advice. These six modes of communication (first three) and decision can be on a making (second three) arrayed Lesscommonly, some participationmechanisms dimension that from least intensive to single ranges exercisedirect power (Fung2004; Fung and Wright most where indicates the intensive, intensity roughly 2003). It is usefulto distinguishbetween two levels level of and commitment investment, knowledge, of empowerment.In some venues, citizenswho of required participants (figure 2). participatejoin in a kind of cogoverningpartnershipin which they join with officialsto make plans and Authority and Power policies or to developstrategies for public action. The third important dimension of the design gauges Each public school in Chicago,for example,is jointly impact of public participation. How is what partici- governedby a LocalSchool Council that is composed linked to what authorities or pants say public partici- of both parentsand communitymembers and the pants themselves do? Venues such as the New England school'sprincipal and teachingstaff. At a higher town lie at one end of the The meeting spectrum. (though not necessarilymore desirable)level of decisions that participants make become policy. Far bodies more common are venues that lie at the other end of empowerment,participatory occasionally exercisedirect authority over public decisionsor resources.The New Englandtown meeting provides C Ca, a classicexample of directparticipatory authority. In a, a, ca,: c c (L) a,0 cz . (W urbancontexts, neighborhood councils in some U.S. -o (Co1) c a,zO cities controlsubstantial zoning authorityor financial c, a, >3 n- )w) oQ m oz resources,allowing them to control,plan, or imple- Least Most ment sublocaldevelopment projects (Berry, Portney, Intense Intense and Thomson 1993). Thesetypes of influenceand authorityare idealized points on the spectrum Figure2 Modesof Communicationand Decision depictedin figure3. Varieties of Participationin Complex Governance 69 The Democracy Cube example, seek descriptive representation through Putting these three dimensions of participant selection, random selection and attempt to shift the mode of communicative mode, and extent of influence yields a communication from preference expression to prefer- three-dimensional space-a democracycube-of institu- ence development by providing background materials tional design choices according to which varieties of and facilitating conversations among participants. participatory mechanisms can be located and contrasted In a small town in Idaho, officials have adopted a kind with more professionalized arrangements.Figure4 plots of two-track policy process in which they seek wide two familiar mechanisms of governance on this three- public advice on issues that may prove controversial or dimensional space. In the typical public agency, trained for which they lack a sense of public sentiment. On experts use their technical expertise to make decisions this participatory track, they have rejected the ordi- that they are authorized to execute. The typical public nary public hearing format in favor of a model devel- hearing is open to all who wish to attend. Though oped by the Study Circles Resource Center, in which many in the audience listen to educate themselves, a participants-recruited with diversity in mind-are few participants express their views in the hope that organized into small groups for parallel discussions of these preferenceswill be taken into account and thus some controversial issue. These conversations are advise the deliberations of policy makers. These two facilitated, and participants are usually given back- mechanisms lie on nearly opposite sides of the cube in ground materials that pose policy alternatives and terms of who participates, how they communicate, and their respective trade-offs. These Study Circles have the extent of their influence on public action. The next facilitated the development of public consensus and three sections will use this rubric of a three-dimensional support on previously divisive issues such as school institutional space to explore the kinds of participatory funding bonds, student discipline policy, and growth mechanisms that are suited to addressingproblems in management (Goldman 2004). contemporary governance. Many other civic innovators have attempted to im- Legitimacy prove on the standard public hearing process (Gastil A or action is when citizens have public policy legitimate and Levine 2005). Figure 5 below depicts the institu- reasons to or it. The standard good support obey poll tional design differences between conventional public "Is run for question, government hearings and initiatives such as the benefit of all or for a few big Deliberative Polls and Study interests?"captures one aspect of A public policy or action is legiti- Circles. Almost all of them at- If is legitimacy. government really mate when citizens have good tempt to improve the representa- run for the benefit of a few big reasonsto support or obey it. tiveness of participants either then that is one interests, strong through random selection (e.g., not reason many citizens should Citizen Juries, Planning Cells) or it. Some of stem from support problems legitimation targeted recruitment (e.g., 21st Century Town Meet- unintentional rifts between officials and the broader ings)-these are marked by arrow 1 in figure 5. All of For issues that public of their constituents. emergent them also aim to make discussions among participants across the arise between elections or for issues that cut more informed and reflective, indicated by arrow 2 in and of and platforms ideologies parties candidates, figure 5. When they address problems of official mis- elected officials and administrators be unable public may understanding and misperception, such mechanisms to and will. The for this gauge public opinion potential need not possess formal powers of either cogovernance as the circles in which disconnection grows political or direct authority. decision makers operate become more distant from those of ordinary citizens. Justice Injustice often results from political inequality. When A number of initiatives seek to address these two some groups cannot influence the political agenda, forums that are problems by designing participatory affect decision making, or gain information relevant more inclusive and on the representative participant to assessing how well policy alternatives serve their dimension and more intensive on the communicative interests because they are excluded, unorganized, or dimension. James Fishkin's Deliberative Polls, for too weak, they are likely to be ill served by laws and policies. Some iniquities stem from electoral dynamics, such as the role of and other resources 4-SoC c c money private in campaigns, special relationships between some 0oE o n o E6 interest groups and candidates, and persistent legacies & O. <0 0 0< of racialized and gendered exclusion from political offices and Others stem from of Least Most organizations. aspects Authority Authority the interest group system and the ecology of second- ary associations-for example, when concentrated Figure3 Extentof Authorityand Power interests organize themselves more easily than diffuse 70 Public Administration Review * December 2006 * Special Issue Authority& Power

IndividualEducation

Communicative Influence E Advise/ConsultC

Co-Govern - a Fn a) o 0 Direct Authority CLo 2)

Technical Public Expertise Participants Hearings Deliberateand Negotiate

Aggregateand Bargain

DevelopPreferences

ExpressPreferences

Listenas Spectator

Communication& Decision Mode

Figure4 DemocracyCube ones (e.g., producers versus consumers) (Stigler 1971; elected to the city executive based partly on its prom- Wilson 1980). While many strategies to increase ises to empower the city's community organizations political equality focus on directly improving the and social movements. Over the next two years, the nature of the electoral or group system, participatory party developed a highly innovative mechanism called mechanisms can increase the justice of democratic the OrfamentoParticipativo (participatory budget). governance in two ways. They can either replace The mechanism shifts decisions about the capital por- authorized decision makers whose actions have be- tion of the city's budget from the city council to a come systematically unjust with direct citizen partici- system of neighborhood and citywide popular assem- pation, or they can create popular pressures that blies. Through a complex annual cycle of open meet- compel authorized officials to act justly. ings, citizens and civic associations in the city meet to determine local investment priorities. These priorities One celebrated example of the first kind of justice- are then aggregated into an overall city budget. enhancing reform is the budgeting process of the city Though it is a procedural reform, it was born of a of P6rto Alegre in Brazil (Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002; substantive political objective: to invert public spend- Baiocchi 2003; de Sousa Santos 1998). In 1989, the ing priorities by shifting them away from the wealthy left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores(Workers' Party) was areas of the city to poorer neighborhoods. It has

Authority& Power

IndividualEducation

CommunicativeInfluence

Advise/Consult / r tudy Co-Govern o ' c• > DirectAuthority a a erative a 0oils nE "•e• o "

TechnicalExpertise Participants Deliberateand Negotiate Aggregateand Bargain

DevelopPreferences

ExpressPreferences

Listenas Spectator Communication& Decision Mode

Figure5 Legitimacy-EnhancingDeliberation

Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance 71 Authority& Power

IndividualEducation

CommunicativeInfluence

Advise/Consult E 0 •0 Co-Govern E aa ao------W ... Direct Authority oa a

Technical Expertise Budgeting Participatory Participants Budget Deliberateand Negotiate Aggregateand Bargain

DevelopPreferences

ExpressPreferences

Listenas Spectator Communication& Decision Mode

Figure6 ParticipatoryBudget Reform

achieved this substantive goal remarkablywell. The incentive, which mitigates the participation bias favor- poor residents of P6rto Alegre enjoy much better pub- ing the better-off, the participatory budget is plotted as lic services and goods as a result of the participatory having an open structure of participation with targeted budget. The percentage of neighborhoods with run- recruiting (structuralincentives that target the poor). ning water has increased from 75 to 98 percent, sewer coverage has grown from 45 to 98 percent, and the As a general matter, participatory mechanisms that number of families offered housing assistance grew enhance justice by altering who makes particulardeci- 16-fold since the initiation of the participatory budget. sions and policies occupy a region of the democracy cube near that of the participatory budget in figure 6. In the framework of the democracy cube, the partici- On the dimension of who participates, they respond to patory budget increases justice in public governance by the failure of experts or politicians to respect political changing the actors who are authorized to make deci- equality by shifting decision making toward citizens. sions. The participatory budget shifts the site of deci- Institutions of open participation with incentives for sion making from bodies-expert financial bureaus the disadvantaged to participate-exemplified by the and an elected city council- participatory budget-offer one that once were corrupted by strategy for equalization. Participa- mechanisms that clientelism to a structure of Participation tion mechanisms that employ open citizen participation that employ random selection or random selection or even lay stake- affords more equal opportuni- even lay stakeholder involve- holder involvement may also en- In if ties for political influence. ment may also enhance political hance political equality they are 6, the "who"of figure participa- equality if they are properly properly implemented. tion shifts from a closed group of experts and professional implemented. On the influence and empowerment politicians to open forums for dimension of institutionaldesign, direct citizen engagement. Though the structure is mechanisms that increasejustice in this way can only do formally open and participants select themselves, ac- so if they exercisedirect authority over relevantdecisions. tual participation patterns in the participatory budget Because they typicallyaddress structures of corruption do not exhibit the familiar patterns of overrepresenta- and exclusion that generatebenefits for the advantaged, tion of those who are wealthier, better educated, and the recommendations offered by merely advisorymecha- otherwise advantaged. Indeed, those who have lower nisms are typicallyignored. incomes are more likely to participate (Baiocchi 2003). The explanation is that the participatory budget pro- On the third dimension of communication and deci- cess addresses public problems that are much more sion, justice-enhancing participatory mechanisms urgent for the poor-sanitation, basic urban infra- need not be fully deliberative. The distinctive feature structure, housing, and other "rice and beans" issues- of the participatory budget is that poor people and than for the wealthy. Because of this structural other previously excluded groups are included in 72 Public Administration Review * December 2006 * Special Issue sublocal processes of fiscal allocation and planning. officers to look beyond standard, comfortable, but Justice results from the proper counting of their voices ineffective approaches such as preventative patrolling, rather than from deliberation. emergency response (answering 911 calls), and retro- spective investigation of crimes (Goldstein 1990). Effectiveness Second, when citizens engage in searching delibera- Even when public decisions are just and legitimate, tion with police officers, they often develop different state agencies may be incapable of implementing priorities and approaches than professional police those decisions. Public hierarchies may lack the infor- officers would have developed on their own. Third, mation, ingenuity, know-how, or resources necessary neighborhood residents provide distinctive capabilities to address social problems effectively (Cohen and and resources that make different kinds of public Sabel 1997). Nonprofessional citizens possess distinc- safety strategies possible. For example, residents can tive capabilities that may improve public action. In monitor hot spots such as parks, liquor stores, or the provision of public services such as education and residential drug houses with greater scrutiny and human development, for example, the involvement of frequency than a handful of thinly spread police of- clients in coproduction may dramatically increase the ficers. Finally, the discipline of deliberative problem quality of some services. Properly structured public solving focuses and coordinates a host of other rel- participation may belie the common view that direct evant but previously unharnessed city resources such democracy, whatever its other merits, is highly inef- as city attorneys, building regulation, streets and ficient. In areas such as public safety and environmen- sanitation, and the parks department to address public tal regulation, citizens may possess essential local safety concerns. In the rubric of the democracy cube, knowledge that comes from close exposure to the the Chicago community policing reforms enhance context in which problems occur. In all of these areas effectiveness by creating institutions in which a core of and others, public participants may be able to frame active residents who have taken a deep interest in problems and priorities in ways that break from pro- public safety in each neighborhood constitute lay fessional conceptions yet more closely match their stakeholders who deliberate with one another and values, needs, and preferences. Similarly, nonprofes- cogovern the use of policing and other city resources. sionals may be able to contribute to the development of innovative approaches and strategies precisely Some features of participatory forums that enhance because they are free from the received but obsolete the effectiveness of governance may not lend them- wisdom of professionals and the techniques that are selves simultaneously to enhancing justice. In particular, embedded in their organizations and procedures. making public action effective can require extensive involvement from relatively small numbers of citizens Beginning in 1994, for example, the Chicago Police who are willing to invest many hours and to acquire Department shifted its organizational structure from a substantial expertise in specific policy areas. The most classic hierarchy designed to execute traditional polic- active residents in Chicago's community policing ing strategies to a form of accountable autonomy (Fung program invest many hours per month and gain a 2004). Now, rather than insulating professional opera- facility with police procedures, the courts, and city tions from public scrutiny and influence, residents in services. Therefore, participatory institutions geared each of 280 neighborhood police beats meet with the toward enhancing effectiveness are likely to draw a police officers who serve their areas in open "beat meet- relatively small number of lay stakeholders who have a ings." The program has been quite well received by city sufficiently deep interest in the problems at hand to residents. In surveys, more than 1 in 10 residents claim make the required sacrifices. On the other hand, to have attended a community policing beat meeting. participatory mechanisms that produce justice often However, on most beats, a few residents are heavily do so by organizing extensive participation that involved, while others participate only occasionally. includes many diverse perspectives. Like the P6rto Alegre reforms, residents from poor neighborhoods participate at rates greater than those On the communicative and decision-making dimen- from wealthy ones because the institution addresses a sion, institutions such as the Chicago community problem-crime-that plagues the disadvantaged policing program operate through a kind of problem- (Skogan and Hartnett 1999). solving deliberation in which citizens engage in a searching discussion of alternative strategies, settle on Case studies have shown that when these deliberative those that seem most promising, and compose beat processes are well facilitated and supported by the plans or neighborhood action plans that render those police department and community organizations, they strategies into sublocal policy. Finally, on the dimen- produce innovative and effective problem-solving sion of influence and authority, these community strategies that harness the distinctive capacities and policing reforms shift substantial authority to the local knowledge of residents.4 Four factors make this citizens who participate. This sort of empowerment is structure of citizen participation effective. First, the important because citizens may be reluctant to make dramatic shift to participatory policing has forced the required sacrifices of time and energy unless they Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance 73 are confident that their deliberations will be translated nance. Specifying and craftingappropriate roles for into action. Furthermore, deliberation and action are participation, however,demands forward-lookingem- so deeply intertwined in these processes that merely pirical sensitivity and theoreticalimagination. advisory deliberations would be ineffective. For example, residents in community policing delibera- Acknowledgments tions often try one strategy, observe its effects, learn I would like to thank John Gerring, Philippe Van from success or failure, and shift course. These three Parijs, and Kenneth Winston and for their thoughts institutional design characteristics-lay stakeholder on participatory institutions in complex governance. participants who deliberate about how best to solve David Barron, Mark Warren, and the participants at public problems and are empowered to act-mark a two workshops-"Representation of Marginalized substantial shift from traditional policing in which Groups," held at the 2005 Midwest Political Science expert administrators address crime and disorder Association meetings, and "Theorizing Democratic through technical procedures and possess direct au- Renewal: The B.C. Citizens Assembly and Beyond," thority to act on their decisions. held June 10-11, 2005-provided important correc- tives and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chap- Conclusion ter. This work is an outgrowth of research conducted Citizens can be the shock troops of democracy. Prop- at the John F. Kennedy School of Government by a erly deployed, their local knowledge, wisdom, com- team that included Abigail Williamson, Joseph mitment, authority, even rectitude can address wicked Goldman, Elena Fagotto, and Christopher Gibson. failures of legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness in Tissa Hami provided editorial assistance. This work representative and bureaucratic institutions. The con- has been made possible through generous support temporary ways in which citizens make these contri- from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, butions, however, assume neither the forms, purposes, the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and nor rationales of classical participatory democracy. Innovation, and the A. Alfred Taubman Center for These accounts fail to capture what is most attractive State and Local Government. about the cases (and many others besides) described here. Their appeal does not lie primarily in shifting Notes sovereignty from politicians and other political profes- 1. I usethe phrasecitizen participation throughout sionals to a mass of deliberating citizens (Pitkin and this article. By citizens, I do not mean to indicate Shumer 1982). Less still does their attractiveness individualswho possess the legal status of formal reside in their potential to educate, socialize, train, or citizenship but rather individuals who possess the otherwise render the mass of citizens fit for democ- political standing to exercise voice or give consent racy. Instead, these cases mobilize citizens to address overpublic decisions that oblige or affectthem. pressing deficits in more conventional, less participa- Therefore, undocumented immigrants whose tory governance arrangements. childrenattend publicschools are citizens in this sensebecause they can make claims over the ways Reaping-indeed, perceiving-these pragmaticbenefits in which schools treattheir children, just as native- for democracy,however, requiresa footloose analytic born American parents can make such claims. approachthat jettisons preconceptions about what par- 2. For those who count, the SocialScience Citation ticipatorydemocracy should look like and what it should Index lists 491 works citing Arnstein's piece, do in favor of a searchingexamination of the actual comparedfor example to 131works that cite forms and contributions of participation.Toward that Benjamin Barber'sStrong Democracy (1984). end, I have offered a frameworkfor thinking about the 3. Many haveoffered intrinsic reasons to favorgreater major design variationsin contemporary participatory public participation in politics. This article does institutions. I have argued that participationserves three not assess those reasons but instead relies on the particularlyimportant democratic values:legitimacy, instrumental consequences of participation for justice, and the effectivenessof public action. Further- democratic governance. more, no single participatorydesign is suited to serving 4. Similar participatory and deliberative governance all three values simultaneously;particular designs are reforms have also emerged in diverse policy areas suited to specific objectives. I have attempted to identify such as primary and secondary education, environ- the distinct regions of the democracy cube that are suited mental regulation, local economic development, to advancing each of these. The reasoning in that diffi- neighborhood planning, and natural resource cult stage of the analysisproceeded inductively.I identi- management (Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen 2000; fied actual participatorymechanisms that advanced each Weber 2003). of these values, traced the institutional design character- istics that enabled them to do so, and mapped these References characteristicsonto the institutional design space. Far Abers, Rebecca Neaera. 2000. Inventing Local from unfeasible or obsolete, direct participationshould Democracy: GrassrootsPolitics in Brazil. Boulder, figure prominently in contemporary democratic gover- CO: Lynne Rienner. 74 Public Administration Review * December 2006 * Special Issue Arnstein, Sherry. 1969. A Ladder of Citizen Fung, Archon, and , eds. 2003. Participation. Journal of the American Institute of Deepening Democracy:Institutional Innovations in Planners 35(4): 216-24. EmpoweredParticipatory Governance.London: Verso. Avritzer, Leonardo. 2002. Democracy and the Public Gastil, John. 2000. By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Space in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton RepresentativeDemocracy through Deliberative University Press. Elections. Berkeley: University of California Press. Baiocchi, Gianpaolo. 2003. Participation, Activism, Gastil, John, and Peter Levine, eds. 2005. The and Politics: The P6rto Alegre Experiment. In Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategiesfor Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Empowered Participatory Governance, edited by Century. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, 45-76. Goldman, Joseph. 2004. Kuna, Idaho: A Case Study. London: Verso. Unpublished manuscript, John E Kennedy School Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. Strong Democracy: of Government. Participatory Politicsfor a New Age. Berkeley: Goldstein, Herman. 1990. Problem-Oriented Policing. University of California Press. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Berry, Jeffrey M., Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. 1993. TheRebirth of Urban Democracy Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Harvard University Press. Cohen, Joshua. 1989. Deliberation and Democratic Habermas, Jiirgen. 1989. The Structural Legitimacy. In Hamlin, Alan and Pettit, Philip eds. Transformationof the Public Sphere:An Inquiry into The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, a Categoryof Bourgeois Society. Translated by edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, 17-34. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. New York: Basil Blackwell. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cohen, Joshua, and . 1997. Directly- 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Deliberative Polyarchy. European Law Journal 3(4): Contributions to a Discourse TheoryofLaw and 313-42. Democracy. Edited by William Rehg. Cambridge, Connor, Desmond M. 1988. A New Ladder of Citizen MA: MIT Press. Participation. National Civic Review 77(3): 249-57. Leib, Ethan. 2004. Deliberative Democracy in America: Creighton, James L. 2005. ThePublic Participation A Proposalfor a Popular Branch of Government. Handbook: Making Better Decisions through Citizen University Park: Penn State University Press. Involvement. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, and Sara Shumer. 1982. On de Sousa Santos, Boaventura. 1998. Participatory Participation. Democracy 2(4): 43-54. Budgeting in P6rto Alegre: Toward a Redistributive Sabel, Charles, Archon Fung, and Bradley Democracy. Politics and Society 26(4): 461-5 10. Karkkainen. 2000. Beyond Backyard Dewey, John. ThePublic and Its Problems. Vol. 2 of Environmentalism. Boston: Beacon Press. The Later WorksofJohn Dewey, 1925-1953, edited Skogan, Wesley G., and Susan M. Hartnett. 1999. by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Community Policing, Chicago Style. New York: University Press, 1981-90. Oxford University Press. Fiorina, Morris P. 1999. Extreme Voices: A Dark Side Smith, Graham, and Corrine Wales. 2000. Citizens' of Civic Engagement. In Civic Engagement in Juries and Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies American Democracy, edited by Theda Skocpol and 48(1): 51-65. Morris P. Fiorina, 395-426. Washington, DC: Stigler, George. 1971. Theory of Economic Brookings Institution Press. Regulation. Bell Journal ofEconomics and Fisher, Roger, and William Ury. 1981. Getting to Yes: Management Science 2(1): 3-21. NegotiatingAgreement without Giving In. Boston: Susskind, Lawrence, and Jeffrey Cruikshank. Houghton Miffin. 1987. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Fishkin, James S. 1995. The Voiceofthe People: Public Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale New York: Basic Books. University Press. Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Frederickson, H. George. 1991. Toward a Theory of Thomas-Larmer, eds. 1999. The ConsensusBuilding the Public for Public Administration. Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Administration e&Society 22(4): 395-417. Agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Fung, Archon. 2003. Recipes for Public Spheres: Publications. Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Weber, Edward P. 2003. Bringing Society Back In: Consequences. Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 11(3): GrassrootsEcosystem Management, Accountability, 338-67. and Sustainable Communities. Cambridge, MA: - . 2004. Empowered Participation: Reinventing MIT Press. Urban Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Wilson, James Q. 1980. The Politics ofRegulation. University Press. New York: Basic Books.

Varieties of Participationin Complex Governance 75