Majid Al-Qaisi TEAMWORK

REPORT

ISIS War: The Second Wave Changes in the group’s strategies and confrontation mechanisms

Defense, Security and Counter-Terrorism Studies Program Head of the Program Retired Major General Majid al-Qaisi TEAMWORK

Retired Major General Majid al-Qaisi Head of the Defense, Security and Counter-Terrorism Studies Program at the Center of Making Policies for International and Strategic Studies

Major General Majid al-Qaisi is an officer in the Iraqi army for the period (19822016-). He graduated from the Iraqi Military Academy, the Military Staff College, the Indian Military Academy (IMA) and Al-Bakr University for Higher Military Studies.

The Center of Making Policies for International and Strategic studies The Center of Making Policies for International and Strategic Studies is an independent research group of experts and researchers in various political, economic and social disciplines. The Center is concerned with providing a series of strategic analyses of current events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and pays special attention to Iraq. It also seeks to provide alternatives that enrich decision-making circles.

Istanbul - Turkey Email: [email protected] Tel: +90 212 441 05 56

Introduction ...... 01

A Shift in Survival Strategies ...... 02

End of the "Caliphate" and Return of the “Organization” ...... 03

ISIS Post-Military Presence Strategy ...... 07

Seizing Opportunities Strategy ...... 09

The Cornerstones of ISIS Strategy ...... 10

The Security Forces Strategy to Confront the Group ...... 12

Current ISIS Strategy Objectives ...... 14

Conclusions ...... 15 MAKING POLICIES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Introduction: The war against ISIS – or the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria - in Iraq has developed significantly and passed through several stages depending on the group’s formation phases. The most important of these stages was the formation of the terrorist group in April 2013 when it announced the establishment of the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Levant)" and expanded geographically in June 2014 beyond its military and logistical capabilities to control large swaths of Syria and Iraq. In 2015, the group began a defense stage instead of attack to strengthen its control of the areas and cities it occupied, especially after the US-led coalition launched its air strikes against it. However, despite the intensified air raids, the group managed to occupy Ramadi in May 2015. The group’s military influence gradually began to decline by the beginning of 2016 until it became unable to expand geographically and started losing cities one by one, starting with Tikrit, Sinjar, Baiji, Fallujah, Mosul, al-Shirqat, Hawija and the cities of the Euphrates basin between Qaim and Ramadi. The battle of Mosul, which was fully restored by the Iraqi forces in July 2017, constituted the collapse stage of the Islamic State’s military presence; the group got confused and the morale of its fighters collapsed. The strikes against ISIS “known in Arabic as Da’esh” were strong and harsh because they depleted the group’s military, material and human capabilities due to the military superiority of the Iraqi forces that has managed to reorganize itself after 2014, besides the air and military capabilities of the international coalition forces, which was attended by more than 72 countries, including major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and Germany. The group’s loss of major cities of strategic importance in Iraq and Syria made it revert to its old strategy, which is compatible with its combat doctrine using the guerilla style and tactics, which is characterized by adaptation and survival in remote areas in order to win the battle of its existence and survival, benefiting from the circumstances of the Syrian war and Iraqi political conflicts. Through this, it aims to drain the security forces, drain the state economically and create a state of chaos and instability to be able to survive.

01 A SHIFT IN SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

A Shift in Survival Strategies: Since its emergence in 2013, the ISIS group has adopted a strategy of offensive war and has been able to expand from the Syrian battlefield to the Iraqi one and occupy cities and territories of strategic importance. In mid-2015, it adopted a defensive position when the international coalition began to intensify its air strikes. Through that defensive operation, it aimed to raise the morale of its fighters after it experienced human and material losses as a result of the coalition’s air strikes. The number of destroyed targets hit 2,600 in the period between September 2014 and January 2015, killing 10,000 fighters. The strategy the group adopted is a hybrid one. Its most important components include: First: Conventional war used by regular armies in progress, attack and defense. This style was a result of the accession of former army officers to its ranks; this accession exceeded the lines of sectarian and ideological rift. Second: Guerilla warfare; a technique that was inspired from revolutionary movements and rebellion in order to drain the security forces. Third: the integration of tactics and techniques used by terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, most notably suicide bombers and suicide fighters, and the use of tunnel war used by non-governmental organizations derived from the 2006 Lebanon war between Hezbollah and Israel, i.e. underground fighting. Fourth: Psychological warfare is a form of war that aims to instill fear among the group’s enemies. It relies on spreading horror and fear by spreading and commercializing scenes of murder expressing the excessive violence of this group. Through this it was able to occupy cities without big losses due to the collapse of morale and the deterioration of the psychological state of the group’s enemy, i.e. the security forces. It can be said that Mosul fell to the group by media before its military fall on June 10, 2014. The group was also able to impose its state and laws on the local population using the same strategy of psychological war and media. It was almost the only group among the previous terrorist organizations that used this strategy (psychological warfare) brilliantly and was superior to countries in this field. The psychological and media warfare operations were used in a central way. Central control of the media and psychological operations protected the organization from making mistakes, not to mention the precise control of its publication and the timing of publication in a way serving its military strategy. The group’s military strategy varied from the integration of military methods and tactics to media strategy and psychological warfare. The stabilization of this strategy was closer to realism, which made it

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geographically expanded in a short time and provided the group with the opportunity to seize land and cities and recruit local and foreign fighters.

End of the "Caliphate" and Return of the “Organization”: The battle of Mosul, which was restored by the Iraqi forces in cooperation with the international coalition, was a major setback for the group and an end to its assumed “imaginary” state. The organization's defeats in Raqqa, Deir al-Zour and western Anbar regions continued. It suffered from heavy losses as a result of ground and air operations between September 2014 and December 2017 that continued for 1,059 days of fighting involving 23,000 air strikes in Iraq and Syria at a cost of $ 12.6 million per day. This forced the group to abandon cities and returned to work as an organization, shifting from conventional warfare to another type of military operation in an attempt to win the battle of existence and survival after losing the battle of existence and military empowerment. In order to deal with another field position in this context, it returned to its pre-2014 strategies after the disintegration of its strong military power and losing (7) states in Iraq and (6) states in Syria and a common Iraqi-Syrian state on the Euphrates, which included the Syrian city of al-Bukamal and the Iraqi city of Qaim. Before discussing the strategies of the organization, it is useful to address the distribution of the remaining enclaves and the group’s bases in Iraq and its geographical locations in Syria.

First) Iraq: The group is still in the western Badia “desert”, east of the border with Syria, northern parts of Rawa, al-Qaim, south-west of Mosul and west of Shirqat. It is an entirely desert enclave. This area is considered the old haven for this group because of what it provides to it with its caches, valleys and plateaus that are good to be used as weapon stores and training sites. The natural tunnels there also help the group’s elements to travel long distances without being monitored by fighter or unmanned aircrafts. Iraqi forces control city centers, while the group’s members are located in the desert adjacent to the cities. The organization was born in the desert and returned to it after losing urban areas to the security forces. This was recognized by the group’s former spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani on May 23, 2016, when he mentioned desert sanctuaries and guerrilla warfare. “Does America count defeat lies in the loss of a city or loss of land? And will we be defeated if Mosul, Al-Raqqa or all the cities were taken from us?, he said referring to the possibility of returning to the desert in case of losing the war in urban cities.

03 END OF THE "CALIPHATE" AND RETURN OF THE “ORGANIZATION”

The second enclave of the group is located between the eastern part of Tikrit and al-Adhaim to the south and from the south of Tuz Khurmatu to the west of Kirkuk, Hawija and Hamrin hills region, which is a rugged terrain area. This enclave adjoins the cities were occupied by ISIS, such as Tikrit, Shirqat and al-Adhaim, and is linked to the city of Kirkuk, which is of great strategic importance. The organization attempts to take advantage of the complicated situation in Kirkuk to create a harmonious environment for it to launch attacks on the city's peripheries. The group of ISIS choice of desert areas is for reasons consistent with its combat doctrine as well as its psychology, which is characterized by its ability to adapt and survive.

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Second) Syria: In Syria, the group maintains, to the moment, spatial control of its forces in various enclaves, the largest of which is the one located between the south of al-Hasakah and the north of al-bukmal and from the border with Iraq to the desert areas south-east of Palmyra. This enclave is located between the areas of influence of the American-backed Syrian Democratic forces, which controls the most important and largest energy centers in Syria, such as the Omar oilfields and Koneko Gas Fields, and the area of influence of Russian-backed Syrian forces and its Iranian-supported armed groups. The area of this enclave is about 6,000 square kilometers and includes areas of al-Hajin, Abu Hamam, al-Ashara, al-Dashisha and al-Soor, which are close to the Iraqi border.

05 END OF THE "CALIPHATE" AND RETURN OF THE “ORGANIZATION”

The US Department of Defense and the US Central Command’s reports estimate the number of fighters in this enclave at 3,000 persons. However, these reports did not take into account the number of fighters who were transferred along with their families from the borders of Arsal, in Lebanon, on August 26, 2017 to Deir al-Zour and al-bukamal, which is estimated by around 600700- fighters with their families. The report did not mention the fighters who were transferred from the Yarmouk camp, to the south of Damascus, after being taken over by the Syrian forces when about 1,220 fighters were moved to Deir al-Zour and al-Bukamal area (the current enclave near the Iraqi border). In this context, the number of ISIS fighters in the Syrian enclave is about 5,0005,500- deployed in the region between

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the south of Hasakah and north of al-buKamal and between the Iraqi border to the west of the Euphrates near Palmyra and al-Sukhnah cities. The number of ISIS fighters in this region constitutes a significant fighting force that cannot be ignored in a difficult geographical environment. This contributes to the delay in resolving the battle against the group and eliminating it.

ISIS Post-Military Presence Strategy: City Peripheries Attacks Strategy: Iraqi forces focused their plans on restoring cities’ centers. However, it did not give attention to the peripheries and open desert and mountainous geographical areas for military reasons related to the nature of these areas, besides the lack of adequate ground forces to secure these regions and other causes related to the intelligence effort and advanced monitoring means of these areas and the prosecution of the remaining ISIS elements who had fled to areas around Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Qaim, Rawa and Hit; as these liberated cities remain under threat. ISIS elements that have managed to infiltrate the peripheral areas and those adjacent to the main cities were able to restructure their group and move on to the strategy of setting up outposts in remote areas containing old weapons caches. Other fighters resorted to hiding near the Bedouin communities and villages, benefiting from the geographical environment of these areas, which are largely formed of plateaus and deserts and are close to major cities such as Tikrit, Baiji, Shirqat, Hawija, Rawa and Qaim.

Tactics Used in Attacking City Peripheries: Small Detachments Tactics: The group uses this tactic to hit specific targets such as roads linking cities and in attacking security forces deployed in rural areas and villages. This tactic is characterized by speed and evasion of direct confrontation with the security forces. The organization employs detachments composed of 15 to 20 elements in this tactic, as the attack on Kirkuk-Baghdad Road when eight members of Iraq’s security forces were found dead on June 27, 2018. The group also uses the ambush tactic using the detachments too, as what happened on February 18, 2018, when it ambushed the district of Hawija, killing 27 members of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Sleeper Cells Tactics: The other element that ISIS depends on inside city centers is sleeper cells. These cells do several tasks, including information collection, the construction of hosts and caches inside cities or planning to carry out bombings targeting government and even civil institutions. This tactic is

07 ISIS POST-MILITARY PRESENCE STRATEGY

considered one of the most important elements in the current strategy of ISIS. It had a significant role in the occupation of Mosul on June 10, 2014 when the group carried out large explosions inside Mosul during ISIS attack on the city from outside. That confused the security forces, which led to the occupation of the city in record time.

Mobile Violence Tactic: 1 It is a tactic used by ISIS to hit or strike targets simultaneously within different geographical locations. It uses this tactics to attack the main roads or the countryside using detachments to target the security forces. At the same time, it uses suicide attacks using car bombs or suicide bombers in other areas. The aim of this is to create confusion and loss of command and control of the security forces and to create fear and terror among civilians.

Transition from Central Command to Decentralization: There are major changes in the organization of ISIS in the light of losing the reality of the state and its return to work as an organization. ISIS military defeat does not mean its elimination as it still has a number of its senior leaderships, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; Abu Hassan al-Muhajir; the organization's official spokesman, Abu Saleh al-Obaidi; the head of the military council, Gulmorad Khalimov and the head of brigades and ISIS security officer, Ayad al-Jumaili. The group has entered a new era commensurate with the current phase, relying on guerrilla warfare. This is why it has re-established its military structure to cope with the attrition phase. It moved from the central command, which was planning military operations, to decentralized leadership, in which operations are planned at the level of groups, detachments and the foci scattered in the depths of deserts and plateaus, which is the current operational pattern followed by the organization. Hence, its operations have become more local in terms of scope and size since its military defeat. The group’s fighters will focus on their personal field experiences as the nucleus of the main organization in Iraq has become small and unable to continue to plan operations centrally, apart from the fact that the organization has lost most of its senior commanders who were responsible for military operations.

1- A special term designed by the researcher, retired Major General Majid al-Qaisi, Position Assessment, 2015.

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Seizing Opportunities Strategy: The ISIS group relies on the employment of political disputes, disturbances in societies resulted from the wrong governments’ policies, conflicts and wars to flourish. It takes advantage of these conditions to survive, geographically expand and find places of influence. In Iraq, the group exploited the previous wrong policies and the dissatisfaction with these governments, corruption and sectarianism, to occupy 40 percent of Iraq's territory in the summer of 2014. In Syria, it exploited the ongoing war to occupy half of the country’s territory. After the liberation of all the major cities in Iraq, Iraq’s entry of the stage of the past elections, the accompanying political differences and preoccupation of the political blocs and government with elections’ results, the group was able to launch attacks and terrorist operations targeting strategic areas such as Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Tikrit and Anbar. It also carried out about 20 terrorist operations on Baghdad-Kirkuk Road and the region of Hawija and Mosul, taking advantage of the political tension that accompanied the electoral process. In Syria, the group still in control of a 6,000 square kilometer enclave extending from al-Bukamal to the south of Hasakah and from the border with Iraq to the southwest of Palmyra, exploiting the conflict and differences between the United States and its local allies of the Syrian Democratic Forces – which controls the centers of Syrian power in the region of Deir al-Zour - and Russia and its allies of the Syrian forces and the Iranian-backed armed groups. The group managed to carry out attacks in the depth of the Levantine’s Badia and the power fields to the south-east of Palmyra and on the strategic road linking Damascus with the eastern regions on the Euphrates River. This region has become a separation zone between the USA and Russia and between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian forces and its allies, taking advantage of disputes between the two main players in eastern Syria. It can be said that the survival of this enclave in eastern Syria and the Euphrates valley within the Syrian terrirory and near the border with the Euphrates is due to the following reasons: First: The lack of a US-Russian decision to eliminate ISIS in the areas of Deir al-Zour, al-Bukamal and al-Mayadin. Second: the conflicting interests between the USA and the Syrian Democratic Forces on the one hand and Russia and the Syrian forces on the other, as the USA considers its control over the Syrian oil and gas fields as a pressure on Damascus and Russia in any upcoming political process in the country. Any military operation by Russia and Syrian forces to eliminate this enclave will make the lines of contact with the Syrian Democratic Forces direct ones; something the USA does not want. Many confrontations between the US-backed and the Russian-backed

09 SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES STRATEGY

forces have taken place in al-Hajin area in the Euphrates Valley, the most prominent of which was the one when the Syrian forces suffered air strikes that killed 300 Russian and Syrian soldiers in February 2018, according to a statement issued by Moscow on 172018/2/. That took place when the forces were moving towards al-Hajin city, which is occupied by ISIS and close to the Syrian oil and gas fields. In accordance with the rules of this game in eastern Syria, ISIS was able to survive and position itself near the Iraqi border, and was able to expand to west of the Euphrates to reach al-Sa’afa, a city near Palmyra.

The Cornerstones of ISIS Strategy: The Caliphate’s Cubs: ISIS is the only group that has developed plans for its long-term existence. This organization has recruited children; most of whom are of unknown parentage, and has raised them up ideologically and militarily to become little fighters belonging to the group and full with its ideas to constitute a great future threat. They are considered the group’s second generation. The other danger lies in the lack of accurate data on their numbers. There are no real figures on the number of children of the so-called "Caliphate’s Cubs". The Syrian Human Rights Observatory estimates that there are 1,100 children belonging to the so-called "caliphate", while the Quilliam Institute, a London-based counter-terrorism organization, estimated that 30,000 women got pregnant within the areas of ISIS control in Iraq and Syria in the period from 2015 to 2016. A report issued by the United Nations in 2016 estimated the number of ISIS children in Mosul in 2015 at about 800 - 900 children. ISIS Members opened 24 schools in Syria and 8 schools in Iraq (Mosul) to military train children and recruit them in two stages for the age group 510- years old, and set up well-organized training camps in Raqqa and Mosul. The main objective of the group is to prepare the Caliphate’s cubs to maintain its existence and create a new generation and terrorism characterized by excessive violence based on ideological and military construction.

Local Recruits: One of ISIS objectives when it occupied the cities was to recruit local fighters unknown to the security services apart from the people of these cities, besides building areas of mobilization, warehouses and large reservoirs to collect sources for its long-term battle. It recruited young people between the ages of 1620- years to form a future base and ensure its existential battle. The local recruits carried the group’s doctrine and

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received military training in camps in Mosul, Raqqa and some other cities. They form the nucleus of sleeper cells, which pose a great danger to the security and stability of the liberated areas. Thus, in practice, the group has prepared terrorists and distributed them in several areas, so it can repeat its old strategies in Mosul when it practically fell in 2014 thanks to the sleeper cells that were distributed in the city at the time. The lack of a database of these people makes the task of security forces stationed in these cities to detect them quite difficult. The group has not only recruited young people, women have also joined its ranks. ISIS women's battalion in Mosul and Raqqa has played a major role in recruiting and planting women in cities. Reports talk of the presence of about 20,000 families of 100,000 members in displaced camps allocated to them and distributed between Mosul, Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates.

Veterans “ISIS Old Fighters”: During the battles to liberate the cities in Iraq and Syria, and when the group was aware that the battles are not in its favor and in light of its pragmatism, ISIS tended to withdraw the important field leaders outside the combat zones and rely on its second-line elements to defend the cities and areas besieged by the security forces. It used this tactic after it suffered from losses among the ranks of its fighters and field leaders. This is why the elements that moved to other places in the desert, hills and cities are the most important elements of its current strategy, given the field experience they obtained and their ability of planning of military operations, which gives more continuity to this group in the current battle. The contradicting information about how to identify the organization's fighters’ number, and the lack of accurate information on its causalities’ number, made it difficult to know the real numbers of remaining fighters and their distribution in Iraq and Syria. In 2014, the US intelligence estimated the number of ISIS fighters at more than 31,000 fighters, including more than 15,000 foreign fighters, while it was announced in February 2017 that the international coalition killed more than 60,000 members in the liberation of cities in Iraq and Syria. However, studies and position reports issued in 2015 indicate that the number of ISIS members exceeds 100,000 fighters. If we discuss the figures announced by the US intelligence – about 30,500 fighters – and compare it to the territory occupied by ISIS, which is estimated at 200,000 sq km in

11 THE CORNERSTONES OF ISIS STRATEGY

Iraq and Syria, this would mean that each fighter has 6,300 square kilometers. In military art, a fighter cannot cover and protect this large area that was occupied by ISIS. Going back to the studies that stated that ISIS members’ figures exceeds 100,000 fighters, this means that each fighter has 2 km square according to population density and the declared area of 200,000 sq km, which is a virtual one, here the figures seem acceptable in military’s art. The most important question to be asked is where have the 35,00040,000- fighters disappeared after the liberation of the cities. This means that they were distributed to other countries and territories.

The Security Forces Strategy to Confront the Group: After the Iraqi forces, in participation of the international coalition, managed to liberate all the cities and eliminate ISIS military presence, a new stage began; that is the transition from military strategy to security one, which should be suitable to the current stage and ISIS potential threats. Thus, the Iraqi forces’ current strategy consists of multiple dimensions to form mechanisms to confront the terrorist group.

Confrontation Mechanisms: First, controlling the border with Syria, which is about 605 km long. The coalition forces trained border forces to be deployed along the borders with Syria. Moreover, the Iraqi border guards occupied observation and monitoring sites in cooperation with the Popular Mobilization Forces. The Iraqi forces also built an iron fence in areas considered dangerous and a threat of the movement of ISIS members to the Western Badia and nearby cities Inside Iraq. Second) Air strikes: Iraqi F16 aircrafts carried out air strikes inside Syrian territory in al-Hajin and al-Bukamal area, targeting command and control headquarters and weapons stores after the halt of the military operations of the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS, which is located in the areas between al-Bukamal and southern parts of al-Hasakah. The first such strike was in April 2018, while the biggest strike by an Iraqi aircraft was on June 23, 2018, when it killed 43 ISIS members. These air operations outside Iraq’s border came in a political decision to move the battle to the Syrian battlefield, which is a field of influence on Iraq, given that ISIS group expanded to Iraq in 2014 across the borders with Syria. Third, the Iraqi forces conduct many operations in the areas to the north of Qaim, Tharthar, the Western Badia and south of the strategic Iraq-Jordan highway to track ISIS members in the Western Badia, which forms a threat to the cities of Upper Euphrates within the Iraqi territories. It also carried out

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several searches and inspections in areas near Kirkuk, Hemrin, south of Tuz Khurmatu and west of Mosul, after ISIS started to launch its operations on highways and some peripheral cities. However, these operations achieved only limited results due to the geographic complexity of these areas, the lack of sufficient combat force, the difficulty of keeping remote areas and the lack of advanced observation and monitoring devices. The coalition forces also decreased the level of its air and ground forces; something affected Iraqi forces’ performance in achieving big goals to eliminate the terrorist strongholds in the western Badia, the areas to the southwest of Samarra – Mutaibija – and Hemrin Region. Iraqi forces launched a large-scale military operation to clear and inspect the areas adjacent to Baghdad-Kirkuk Road from five axes and in coordination with the Peshmerga forces after ISIS executed the Iraqis it abducted on that road. Fourth, activating the intelligence effort across the borders, especially that ISIS main leaders have moved to Syrian regions close to the border with the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi intelligence has been able to identify leaders in Libya, Afghanistan, Europe, Asia and others who have been distributed in Iraq and Syria, which represents a continuation of ISIS threat, especially this is one of the fundamental elements of the strategy it adopted after the loss of land and cities. Fifth, it is quite difficult to hold large arid desert lands as they need large forces and great logistical support to meet the geographical conditions of such a region. This desert has long poses a direct threat to the security of the adjacent cities such as al-Qaim, Rawa, Haditha, Mosul, Tel Afar, Baaj, Hatra, Shirqat and Baiji, besides its proximity to the Syrian border, where ISIS is still geographically located in its western part and trying to expand into the Iraqi depth towards the desert. Confronting this requires the preparation of the operations stage (camps, roads, population centers, logistic support bases) and strong border control, as the preparation of this stage will facilitate security and military forces’ tasks to secure the western front of Iraq against any threats coming from Syria, which directly affect the Iraqi situation.

13 CURRENT ISIS STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Current ISIS Strategy Objectives: First: to create psychological superiority of its elements after the collapses it faced due to the loss of their state (Caliphate) and the cities it occupied, besides their aim to weaken security forces’ morale through attacks on peripheral cities and roads and security forces, a tactic was used before 2014. Second: the use of bombings and attacks tactics to confuse the security services, deplete their capabilities in a guerilla style war and drain the state economically. Third: Spreading chaos as what happened in Baghdad’s Karrada bombings in 2017. Fourth: In an attempt to push the security forces to change their plans by moving the conflict to areas far from operations’ field such as the western Badia and the mountainous areas surrounding the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul and Tikrit and force it to extract part of its strength from within the cities outside to allow the sleeper cells in the cities to work and carry out terrorist operations. However, the Iraqi forces that hold cities centers, villages and rural areas need new concepts in order to create a harmonious environment that helps them to establish security and stability and get access to information since security cannot be achieved only by forces holding the ground through checkpoints, bases and mobile forces without cooperation with the environment surrounding the security forces. They require the concept of "Flow Security", which simply means that security starts from the bottom up, that the population is the source of information when it become repulsive to terrorist organizations and elements. This can only be achieved through a close relationship and building confidence between security forces and the population. The tense relationship between the security forces and the population was among the reasons for the fall of Mosul in 2014. The current war style adopted by ISIS requires security forces to develop intelligence work by using sophisticated equipment and changing traditional methods because the current battle is primarily a battle of intelligence. Effective intelligence provides the security forces with time and effort and can carry out pre-emptive operations against the terrorist group in order to retain the initiative. The operations carried out by the security forces come as a reaction to terrorist operations that were supposed to be thwarted in the planning period and before they occur if accurate intelligence was available.

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Conclusions: Through the discussion of ISIS strategy and the stages of its development according to field data, the following conclusions were revealed: First, the group has a great flexibility, which makes it move from one situation to another and be able to adapt and stay in accordance with positions’ developments. Second: the definite defeat of the group is elusive in the near and medium-term future because it still retains a number of its high ranks leaders in addition to having a strategic vision that maintains its existence despite the defeat of its political project related to the spatial control of urban areas. However, the group is still active and spread in uninhabited areas and inhabited ones east of the Euphrates in Syria. Third: to develop the lessons of the previous phase and avoid repeating the political and sectarian disputes, which create chaos and security vacuum that the group can exploit to expand through its ability to seize opportunities. Fourth: Resolve the Syrian crisis politically as the continuation of the war in Syria without a political settlement of this crisis would make the elimination of ISIS almost impossible. Fifth: To develop security and military approaches and to emphasize the offensive war to weaken the group and not letting it to flourish in uninhabited areas. Sixth: Developing the intelligence effort and coordination with the regional environment to follow up this group’s member, especially its senior leadership, which form a central cornerstone of the group. Seventh: In light of the disintegration of the hard military body of this group and its losses, it is difficult for it to return to the areas it occupied or to be able to occupy territories or cities. However, it is capable of carrying out qualitative operations. Eighth: The government’s delay and inability to rebuild the cities destroyed by the military operations might lead the terrorist group to try to reorganize the inhabitants of these cities again and use the popular wrath to return. Ninth: The group may establish a state of instability in the cities and areas that have been restored from it to exhaust the security forces and distract the military and security effort, taking advantage of some gaps in Iraqi forces’ strategy using its knowledge of the environment where it locates. Tenth: It is possible that ISIS would increase its terrorist operations in soft and peripheral areas or to conduct suicide operations within city centers reckoning on sleeper cells.

15 REFERENCES

References: 1- Thomas Phil, Director of International Coalition’s media Office, December 2017 2- Amaq News Agency on May 23, 2016 3- Information from ISIS detainees during the investigation done by Iraq’s security services. 4- Statement of the Spokesman for Joint Operations on 272018/6/ and the report of Tigris Operations Command on June 27, 2018. 5- Statement of Karim Nouri, the spokesman for the Popular Mobilization Forces, on February 18, 2018. 6- Statements of military operations leaders and media reports for the period from July 2017 to June 2018. 7- The Carnegie Middle East Center’s Report on 29/ 6/ 2015. 8- Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee in the Netherlands, March 2018. 9- Raymond Thomas, Commander of Special Operations in the Department of Defense on February 15, 2017. 10- Reports of human rights organizations, media agencies and press releases in the period from August 2017 to May 2018. 11- Position Assessment Study - retired Major General Majid al-Qaisi August 2015. 12- Statement of the Iraqi Border Forces Command in July 2018. 13- Joint Operations Command’s statements in April 2018 and June 23, 2018. 14- Statements of Joint Operations Command in May 2018 and Iraqi Intelligence in May 2018.