Infantry Weapons 2012 Conference Summary
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
INFANTRY WEAPONS 2012 CONFERENCE SUMMARY “With a wide diversity of attendees and presenters, discussions at the event ranged freely across the field of infantry weapons, strategy and procurement.” Close Support One overriding impression from the conference, is that the infantry soldier of today is invariably, One of the early speakers at the Conference, carrying too much weight of equipment. As a Captain Claus Schmidt, described the use of the result, mobility and freedom of manoeuvre is crew operated Carl Gustav recoilless rifle in impaired or compromised. Strength and physical Afghanistan. Armour support can be invaluable, fitness can help mitigate the effect of the weight particularly when there is the very real possibility burden; however, adverse terrain or climate can of ambush from buildings and from behind field easily tip the scales to the point where physical walls. Armour support, however, often requires exhaustion degrades performance. Weight significant forward planning and can become, reduction is, therefore, a key factor on the mind ‘unavailable,’ at a particularly crucial time. of everyone who studies the equipment and effectiveness of the modern infantryman. Consequently, it is essential for the infantry to have their own means of addressing mouse hole The Golf Bag Concept (loop hole) firing points in sturdy walls. From a somewhat different perspective, the impact of KLM indicate in their literature that; ‘a golf bag the Carl Gustav, on an engagement, was such that counts as a single piece of luggage and may weigh it often enabled the infantry to disengage from up to 23 kg (50.5 lbs).’ In infantry small arms contact at a time of their choosing. Because of terms the golf bag concept describes the idea and the weight (10Kg + ammunition), this was a crew ideal of having equipment options close to hand, operated weapon that fitted into the Platoon to address different missions. As the Conference structure. progressed, a number of references were made to this concept, ranging across the field of See the presentation by Captain Claus Schmidt infantry weapons, tasks and training. and Saab, pg 2. The golf bag concept is not new and almost certainly represents a key component of the Special Forces modus operandi. Register for Infantry Weapons 2013 Page 1 www.InfantryWeaponsConf.com The Carl Gustav recoilless rifle within Platoon structure Published with permission Register for Infantry Weapons 2013 Page 2 www.InfantryWeaponsConf.com New Intermediate Calibre Ref: *The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat, Dr Jim Storr, RUSI Defence Systems, June 2009. A thought provoking presentation by Nicholas www.rusi.org/publications/defencesystems/ref:A Drummond entitled, “The case For an 4A37A52DC2A35/ Intermediate Calibre Military Cartridge,” addressed the question of a new intermediate With regard to suppressive fire, Anthony G calibre to potentially replace 5.56x45 and Williams has written: 7.62x51. This question has been brought to the forefront by the need to reduce the infantry load “The second problem with 5.56mm ammunition is and by the apparent lack of effectiveness of the its lack of suppressive effect. On most occasions 5.56x45 calibre (M855) NATO ammunition. For when British foot patrols come under fire, they further discussion on this issue, see: never see their attackers; the Taliban are skilled at selecting concealed positions for ambush. So the Time to Bite the Bullet, Anthony G. Williams & soldiers return fire in the hope of pinning down Nicholas Drummond, October 2012 the enemy long enough for heavier weapons to be http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/The%20Next%2 brought to bear. Field testing has revealed that 0Generation.htm) 5.56 bullets have only half the suppressive radius of 7.62 fire, exacerbated by the fact that the little US Military Small Arms Ammunition, Failures and bullets are more affected by wind drift and solutions, Gary K. Roberts, LCDR, USNR therefore less likely to get close to the target. This www.dtic.mil/ndia/2008Intl/Roberts.pdf is supported by battlefield reports that the Taliban basically ignore 5.56 suppressive fire.”** Monograph: Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan, Taking Back The Infantry Half Ref: ** Anthony G Williams, The Next NATO Rifle Kilometre, Thomas P. Ehrhart, United States Army and Machine Gun Cartridge? Small Arms Defense www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512331 Journal. http://sadefensejournal.com/wp/?p=775 As a result of the deficiencies associated with 5.56x45, at longer range, more 7.62x51 calibre In conclusion, Nicholas Drummond mentioned the rifles in the role of Sharpshooter, or Designated following current state of affairs: Marksman Rifle (DMR) have been purchased and introduced to plug the capability gap. “First signs that intermediate calibres are being An important aspect mentioned by Nicholas seriously evaluated. Drummond, in his presentation, is the psychological effect on an enemy of experiencing The armies of four NATO countries plus Russia a; ‘near miss.’ Suppressing the enemy often and China are now involved in intermediate enables the infantry to manoeuvre and gain calibre development projects. advantage. With regard to suppressive fire, Dr Jim Storr has written: In addition to Remington and Alexander Arms, five other ammunition manufacturers are “In simple terms, it makes them keep their heads presently developing intermediate calibre down.”* cartridges. Register for Infantry Weapons 2013 Page 3 www.InfantryWeaponsConf.com Six major military small arms manufacturers have developed or are developing intermediate calibre weapons. Considering that the USA, UK, Germany and France cannot presently share each other’s 5.56 mm ammunition, standardisation may not be the barrier to adoption it’s perceived to be. The ease and speed with which .338 Lapua has become a new sniper standard and 4.6 mm a PDW standard shows that effective technical solutions soon gain currency.” Almost certainly, the biggest impediment to the introduction of an intermediate cartridge would be cost. As an example, for the UK alone, it would be of the order of £1billion. Replacing belted 7.62x51 MG ammunition, including tracer, might be a truly daunting economic mountain to Looking Forward climb. A requirement to replace both 5.56x45 and 7.62x51 might, unfortunately, count against It may be reasonable to surmise that making any change at all. developments and innovation in electronics and sensors will drive improvements in addressing the It is perhaps worth considering that, only a few first four components of the Lethality chain; years ago, discussing the shortcomings of the Detect, Recognise, Identify and Acquire. 5.56x45 calibre might have generated a negative impact on a promising career. Those who initially Magnifying optics, combined with digital opened the debate on the effectiveness of the electronics, already influence the battlefield 5.56x45 calibre, showed courage, in opposing the significantly through implementation in other status quo and the accepted wisdom of the time. arms. Improvements in traditional view-through- optics, combined with digital electronics (perhaps The Lethality Chain including multi-spectral imaging), could dramatically change the infantries view. Colonel A presentation from Lieutenant Colonel James York mentioned that the SA80 (L85) is already on York, outlined the; “Lethality Challenges,” faced its 3rd generation of sight. in Afghanistan. The systems view of lethality, as described, entails a chain of seven discreet but If the infantry could Detect, Recognise, Identify interacting stages: Detect, Recognise, Identify, and Acquire at longer range, it would be logical to Acquire, Engage, Hit and Defeat. have a rifle calibre with a commensurate range. When taking the last three components of the This is reiterated in the slide provided by Systems Lethality chain into consideration, Engage, Hit and Engineering & Assessment Ltd. (SEA), pg 5. Defeat, it might be reasonably argued that the 5.56x45 calibre, at longer range, is the weakest link. Register for Infantry Weapons 2013 Page 4 www.InfantryWeaponsConf.com Published with permission: Robert Marshall & Philip Macey, SEA Register for Infantry Weapons 2013 Page 5 www.InfantryWeaponsConf.com Bullet Design Constraints AMICC, Report on The review Conference of The With regard to improving the last two aspects of Rome statute of The International Criminal Court. the Lethality chain, Hit and Defeat, there are Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, By bullet design constraints that need to be Douglas Dunbar and Julia Martínez Vivancos. considered. www.amicc.org/docs/RC.pdf “These constraints are imposed by adherence to Clearly, any thought of crossing the ‘1899 Hague The Hague Convention, Declaration (IV,3) Convention’ line must entail huge consideration. concerning Expanding Bullets, The Hague, 29 July The 5.56x45 calibre might, therefore, be trapped 1899.) The 1899 Hague Declaration (the between its poor terminal ballistics at longer Declaration) is a treaty prohibition based on range and the Hague Convention of 1899. particular technical specifications about a weapon system, namely, the construction of bullets. The Procurement Declaration has been widely adhered to and has assumed the status of customary law.” *** Some of the NATO countries, represented at the Conference are moving forward with small arms ***The 1899 Hague Declaration concerning procurement to address long standing questions Expanding Bullets, A treaty effective for more of modernisation and rationalisation. than 100 years faces complex