The Marshall Plan
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HISTORYHISTORY — PAST AND PERSPECTIVE By 1951 Europe had not only achieved its prewar level of produc- The Marshall Plan tion but its level of industrial produc- tion rose to virtually guarantee pros- The post-WWII Marshall Plan, long touted as the aid plan perity for the future. that reinvigorated Europe, didn’t have as its first priority There it is: The United States, out of the actually helping the citizens of Europe. goodness of its heart, gave five percent of its gross national product with no strings attached to European nations to help them get back on their feet. And it worked! Look! By 1951, Europe had fully recovered! On the surface, Remini appears to be correct, but that does not preclude asking some questions and pointing out some er- rors of commission and omission in his es- tablishment view. For instance, who wrote Marshall’s speech? What were that ghost writer’s intentions? Did he have connec- tions to others behind the scenes who had differing purposes? And did Europe begin to recover because of Marshall Plan aid, or had that recovery begun long before any aid arri ved? And what about the miracle of Germany — known as Wirtschaftswunder , or “economic miracle” — that began on Sunday, June 20, 1948? (This was the day that Germany’s economic director, Ludwig Erhard, eliminated all price controls, which AP Images unleashed Germany’s economy, entirely in- Bread and building: Wage and price controls installed by the Nazis remained in force after the dependent of any Marshall Plan aid.) And war, resulting in continuing shortages of essentials such as bread. The German economic miracle what about the Marshall Plan’s alleged suc- began only when those controls were lifted, long before the arrival of any Marshall Plan “aid.” cess as creating the justification for decades of additional foreign aid because it had by Bob Adelmann on the American Republic’s early figures, been so successful in reviving Europe? such as Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, Let’s get some perspective. VE (Vic- hen establishment historians John Quincy Adams, and Daniel Webster. tory in Europe) Day was May 7, 1945. VJ consider the Marshall Plan, its In 2005, Remini was appointed the histo- (Victory over Japan) Day was August 14, W intents and purposes and alleged rian of the U.S. House of Representatives. 1945. President Franklin Roosevelt had successes, they typically make at least two Remini thus serves as the perfect example died on April 12, 1945 and the new presi- errors — one in logic and the other in his- of someone who knows his history but dent, Harry Truman, was sworn into of- tory. First, they assume that since Europe fails to tell all he knows, especially when fice that same day. The national elections began to revive at about the time the Mar- it comes to the Marshall Plan. in November 1946 shifted control of the shall Plan was implemented, then that re- In his “A Short History of the United House of Representatives to the Republi- vival must have been because of the plan, States,” this is what Remini had to say cans, gaining 55 seats compared to the pre- not in spite of it. about the Marshall Plan: vious Congress. The nation was weary of Second, they fail to make any mention war; 418,000 Americans had died in that of the forces in the background that had a Secretary of State, George C. Mar- conflict, and the war had cost the nation much different purpose in mind: specifi- shall, … devised a plan, which he out- $288 billion. In today’s money, that’s near- cally, how to use the Marshall Plan to fur- lined in a speech at Harvard University ly $5 trillion! The very last thing Ameri- ther their internationalist agenda. on June 5, 1947, by which the United cans wanted was any further involvement One example of a “court historian” pro- States would assist European nations in world affairs. They just wanted to get viding his readers with the accepted view to rebuild their shattered economies.... back to whatever “normal” used to be. of the Marshall Plan is Robert V. Remini, Between April 1948 and December It was not to be. The Soviet Union professor emeritus at the University of 1951, the United States contributed a began to flex its muscles when, ignor- Chicago, and author of numerous books little over $12 billion to Europe.... ing the terms of the Potsdam agreement, 34 THE NEW AMERICAN • July 23, 2012 it refused to withdraw its troops states around them as a protective from Iran. Truman had sent his shield. Secretary of State, James By- Not surprisingly, Kennan’s long rnes, to the Moscow Conference telegram was published in the July in December of 1945, asking him 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs mag- to confront Soviet Premier Josef azine, the print mouthpiece for the Stalin on the matter, and when now well-known internationalist Byrnes returned he told Truman Council on Foreign Relations. of his “success.” It turned out Kennan’s influence in cementing that there had been no discussion America’s acceptance of inter- about Iran after all, and Truman ventionism was noted by historian blew up. In a letter to Byrnes, John Lewis Gaddis, who said that Truman wrote: Kennan supported the notion that “only the prospect of an undiffer- Without these supplies fur- entiated global threat could shake nished by the United States, Americans out of their isolation- Russia would have been igno- ist tendencies that remained latent miniously defeated. Yet now among them .” (Emphasis added.) Russia stirs up rebellion and Kennan was certainly up to keeps troops on the soil of her the task of removing those latent friend and ally — Iran.... isolationist tendencies. Near the Unless Russia is faced with end of his life (he died in March an iron fist and strong lan- 2005 at age 101), the establish- guage another war is in the ment journal Foreign Policy (part making. Only one language do of the liberal Washington Post they understand: “how many The Bohlen Plan? George C. Marshall was the front man for empire) called Kennan “the most divisions do you have?” players behind the scenes who wanted to redesign Europe. influential diplomat of the 20th I do not think we should play Marshall’s speech that announ ced his plan was actually written century,” while internationalist compromise any longer.... I am by Charles “Chip” Bohlen. Henry Kissinger said that Kennan tired of babying the Soviets. “came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as Postwar Policymakers involve questions so intricate, so any diplomat in our history.” Kennan was James Byrnes is the first in a long list of delicate, so strange to our form of one of six insiders exposed in the 1986 characters who were heavily involved in thought, and so important to analysis book The Wise Men: Six Friends and the setting post-war foreign policy under the of our international environment that World They Made , which included Tru- new president. Byrnes had deep ties to I cannot compress answers into [a] man’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Progressive movement dating back to single brief message without yielding FDR’s “special envoy” W. Averill Har- the Wilson administration. In fact, Byrnes to what I feel would be a dangerous riman, Truman’s Secretary of Defense had become so close to Wilson that the degree of oversimplification. Robert Lovett, U.S. High Commissioner president would often entrust important I hope, therefore, [that you] will to Germany John J. McCloy, and Soviet political tasks to him rather than to older, bear with me if I submit an answer Ambassador Charles “Chip” Bohlen. Au- more experienced individuals. Years later [in] five parts. thors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas Byrnes supported President Roosevelt in described them as the hidden architects his efforts to pack the Supreme Court in Among those “five parts” were Kennan’s behind the Truman Doctrine, the Mar- 1937, and Roosevelt returned the favor by perceptions that the USSR “perceived it- shall Plan, and the entire concept of appointing Byrnes to that court in 1941. self [to be] at perpetual war with capital- Soviet power “containment” that ruled The next on that list of individuals in- ism,” that the USSR would use friendly America’s foreign policy for 40 years. volved in influencing American foreign Marxists residing in the West as allies The authors’ favorable treatment of these policy was George Kennan, deputy chief in that war, that Soviet aggression was “hidden architects” earned high praise of the mission of the United States to the rooted in “historic Russian nationalism from the Council on Foreign Relations, USSR. It was his mission to confirm Tru- and neurosis,” and that its governmental which called it man’s suspicions that the Soviets weren’t structure “prohibited objective or accurate to be trusted, and that only a policy of pictures of internal and external reality.” a sober and straight-forward account “containment” would serve American in- In other words, it was going to be impos- of what actually happened and why.... terests best. In a long telegram to the U.S. sible to deal rationally with the Soviets, so In this context the book does a Treasury Department in February 1946, he the United States would have to “contain” great service. It restores balance to noted that relations with the Soviets their aggressions by building up nation- our recent history, and some sheen to www.TheNewAmerican.com 35 HISTORYHISTORY — PAST AND PERSPECTIVE munist threat, and the Greek named him as ambassador to the Soviet The nation was weary of war; 418,000 Civil War ended in 1949.