Donald Trump and the Usurping of the Broadcast Media: how the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election was a victory for ordinariness in retaliation against the political elite
By: Kyle Fitzgerald (w1608580)
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the MA degree in Communication University of Westminster Copyright (2017) University of Westminster and Kyle Fitzgerald
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election signified a referendum against the broadcast media. Throughout the campaign,
Donald Trump chastised the broadcast media as Hillary Clinton sycophants. No presidential candidate was discussed more on broadcast media than Trump, which led the author to investigate how he was covered during the election cycle.
Democratic theorists argue that the electorate possesses the power to overthrow a government if that government infringes upon the peoples’ rights (Mill, 2009); furthermore, the dominant elite is considered to be the greatest threat to democracy
(Bennett, 1996). As key social influencers within the United States, the broadcast media are capable of using their platform to either heighten or disparage political candidates.
The author understands the power of discourse and the power relations with which it is associated; especially amongst social influencers and politicians. This research project will explore and analyse both Trump’s language and broadcast media’s language (namely CNN and MSNBC) during the campaign season. By undergoing content and critical discourse analysis of both Trump’s campaign speeches and broadcast programmes, the researcher hopes to uncover if the broadcast media threatened key values of Trump’s electorate.
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Table of Contents Abstract ...... 3
1.0 Introduction ...... 6 1.1 Background of Research ...... 6 1.2 Significance and Purpose of Study ...... 7 1.3 Current Gaps in Research ...... 8 1.4 Questions, Aims, and Hypotheses ...... 9 1.5 Methods Employed ...... 10 1.6 Structure of Research Project ...... 10
2.0 Theoretical Framework ...... 11 2.1 Introduction ...... 11 2.2 First subtheme: The dominant elite as gatekeepers of news ...... 11 2.3 Second subtheme: Distribution of broadcast media hegemony ...... 12 2.4 Third subtheme: Audience activity and voter participation in a democracy ...... 13 2.5 Fourth subtheme: Populism, the American Dream, and a marginalized public ...... 15 2.6 Theoretical Framework, Conclusion ...... 19
3.0 Methodology ...... 20 3.1 Introduction ...... 20 3.2 Samples and Methods Employed ...... 20 3.2.1 Samples Employed ...... 20 3.2.2 Methods Employed ...... 21 3.2.2.1 Analysis of Trump’s Speeches ...... 22 3.2.2.2 Media Analysis ...... 22 3.2.3 Critical Discourse Analysis Framework ...... 23 3.2.4 Coding Structure ...... 23 3.3 Theoretical Framework of Chosen Methodologies...... 24 3.4 Rationale of Chosen Methodologies ...... 26 3.5 Limitations of Chosen Methodologies ...... 28 3.6 Methodology, Conclusion ...... 29
4.0 Presentation and Analysis of Findings ...... 30 4.1 Introduction ...... 30 4.2 Donald Trump’s Speech in North Carolina, 9 August 2016...... 30 4.2.1 Social Actors Associated with Anti-Elite ...... 31 4.2.2 Trump’s Invocation of Fear ...... 33 4.2.3 The American Dream and Hillary Clinton’s Malpractice ...... 34 4.2.4 Donald Trump’s Speech: 9 August 2016, Conclusion ...... 36
4.3 Media Findings ...... 37 4.3.1 Introduction ...... 37 4.3.2 CNN Tonight with Don Lemon, 9 August 2016 – CNN ...... 37 4.3.3 Morning Joe, 10 August 2016 – MSNBC ...... 40 4.3.4 Chris Cuomo interview with Rudy Giuliani, 11 August 2016 – CNN Live ...... 42 4.3.5 Summation of Analysed Media Programmes ...... 45
4.4 Donald Trump’s speech in Pennsylvania, 12 August 2016 ...... 47 4.4.1 Incongruities Noticed between Trump’s First and Second Speeches ...... 47 4.4.2 Social Actors Associated with Anti-Elite ...... 48 4.4.3 The Link between Hillary Clinton and the Broadcast Media ...... 51 4.4.4 Trump and the Paradigm Shift ...... 53 4.4.5 Donald Trump’s 12 August 2016 Speech, Conclusion ...... 54
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Table of Contents, continued
5.0 Conclusion ...... 55 5.1 Re-evaluating the Theoretical Framework ...... 55 5.2 The Jeff Zucker Problem ...... 56 5.3 The Crumbling Trust in Insititutionalised Media and its Repercussions ...... 57 5.4 Limitations, and Suggestions for Further Research ...... 59
Works Cited ...... 60
Books ...... 60 Scholarly Journals ...... 61 Newspapers and Magazines ...... 62 Web Articles ...... 67
Bibliography ...... 67
Appendices
Appendix A: Timeline of Events, Week of 9 August 2016 ...... 68 Appendix B: Description of Media Programmes ...... 69 Appendix C: Description of Populism and American Dream Subcategories ...... 70
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1.0 Introduction 1.1 Background of Research The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election was subjugated to sentimentalism. Hillary
Clinton, who focused on policies in the beginning stages of the election, eventually submitted to sentimentalism as well. Her final address before Election Day (9
November 2016) ended with the slogan, “Love trumps hate” (Lee and Merica, 2016).
Whilst Clinton’s subliminal association between Donald Trump and hatefulness in the aforementioned catchphrase, tangible policies and issues were marginalized. Soon-to- be President-elect Trump’s own language waived policy in favour of emotion. Thus begot the post-truth era, in which emotional appeals are more likely to shape opinion than objective facts (Flood, 2016). The question remains, though: how did Trump’s post-truth politics triumph over Clinton’s – albeit delayed – sentimentalism?
Trump’s successful presidential campaign in 2016 conjured messages of corruption and fear – and the only way to defeat the corrupt ruling class was to elect the ideal every-day man: Trump himself. The populist candidate welcomed chants of
“Lock Her Up,” (Mortimer, 2016) which referred to his fan base’s negative perception of Hillary Clinton and the political elites. The Clinton Machine was a threat to the way of life for Trump’s electorate. Yet it was not Clinton’s character that was most polarizing during the 2016 election: it was Trump’s. Despite clips of him boasting about affairs with women (Jacobs and Siddiqui, 2016), among other gaffes, Trump’s candidacy rested on the platform of him being the antithesis of politicians, and his victory was deemed by journalists as a repudiation against the establishment
(Flegenheimer and Barbaro, 2016). In the current social context of a world eschewing establishment politics – beginning with Brexit (Ash 2016) – the American electorate Fitzgerald, Page 7 of 70
opted to overturn the establishment. They wanted to return autonomy to the public.
The result on 9 November 2016 signified not just a repudiation of Clinton and the current Washingtonians, but also of those associated with it: namely, the televised press.
1.2 Significance and Purpose of Study
The media’s role within democracy is essential to its survival. By monitoring public officials – as well as influencers within the private sector – the mass media influences the ethics within the public domain (Francke, 1995). One ought to be concerned, then, with its current state in 2017. A poll released by the Economist (‘Fox
Populi’, 2017: 34) displayed the lack of trust that Americans had in media. The two television stations listed were CNN and Fox News (which the author of this project considers to be an extension of the Trump administration 1 ). Nearly 80% of
Republicans polled trust Trump more than CNN.
Trump, whose stardom was established during The Apprentice series on NBC, is an astute mind when liaising with the televised media. The Atlantic (Leetaru 2016) monitored the frequency at which politicians were mentioned during the election coverage 2 . Trump was mentioned 1.9 million times by the broadcasters, whereas
Clinton was mentioned approximately 685,000 times. The ownership of these broadcasters might provide an insight as to why Trump was mentioned so often throughout the election. Jeff Zucker has been president of CNN since 2013. He brought decades of experience with him, most notably when he was the president and CEO of
NBCUniversal. Zucker’s decades-long television career had been strictly based in
1 Jeff Zucker, president of CNN, himself claims Fox News to be state-run media, “which is extolling the line out of the White House” (Mullin, 2017). 2 The Atlantic monitored the following broadcasters: Aljazeera America, Bloomberg, CNBC, CNN, Comedy Central, FOX Business and News, LinkTV, and MSNBC. Fitzgerald, Page 8 of 70
entertainment television until he joined CNN. Carlos Maza of Vox, who dubs CNN to be the “ESPN of politics,” notes that CNN forgoes news in favour of “drama and spectacle” (2017). Zucker himself believes that, saying “the idea that politics is sport is undeniable, and we understood that and approached it that way” (Mahler, 2017). The
New York Times noted that Zucker was notorious for being obsessed with ratings
(Mahler, 2017) when he joined CNN. The ratings reflect his obsession: CNN’s prime- time ratings increased by 70 percent in 2016 (Mahler, 2017).
Trump received $5 billion in free advertising because of the media coverage he received; he spent one-third of the amount of money that Clinton did on advertising
(Le Miere, 2016). Suffice to say, Trump dominated daytime and primetime coverage.
Having understood this, and aware of the negative coverage he received due to some of his outrageous remarks, Trump deflected the criticism into a disparaging of the broadcast media. CNN and MSNBC were two networks that he often attacked. These two networks, according to him, were part of the same political elites to which Hillary
Clinton belongs.
1.3 Current Gaps in Research
Studying Trump is nothing new. Since the election, scholars and practitioners have both studied his populist narrative (Lind, 2016; Gusterson, 2017). Articles have also been written lambasting the media for propelling Trump to victory (as evidenced by him receiving $5 billion in free advertising via television). Other scholars have historically been critical of the media for its financially motivated owners. However,
No academic studies have yet analysed how the televised media threatened the existence of Trump’s electorate. Though some media outlets did identify that Trump’s supporters felt left behind (Cohen et al, 2016; Green, 2017), they failed to acknowledge that perhaps the media might be culpable, to some degree, in this phenomenon. Fitzgerald, Page 9 of 70
1.4 Questions, Aims, and Hypotheses
The research questions are as follows:
Main question: How did Donald Trump’s discourse propel him to win the 2016 United
States Presidential Election?
Sub question 1: What were the prominent characteristics of Trump’s language?
Sub question 2: Are the media politically associated with Hillary Clinton?
Sub question 3: To what extent did television’s coverage of the United States
election fail to garner trust amongst voters?
Research aims:
1. To understand if those with a negative perception of televised media bias are
correct and justified in their claims.
2. To identify patterns in broadcast media’s practices that could be resolved in
future elections.
Research hypotheses:
1. Donald Trump’s character as a political outsider, coupled with his anti-media
rhetoric, empowered angry voters to associate the broadcast media with Hillary
Clinton.
2. The electorate rejected the televised media because they believed the media
threatened inalienable rights that the electorate perceived to be universal to all
Americans.
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1.5 Methods Employed
The researcher will employ content analysis and critical discourse analysis to answer the above questions and to test the hypotheses. These two methods will be used to assess the week of 9 August 2016. The week begins with a speech made by Donald
Trump, followed by three television programmes analyzing it, and then closed by a second speech made by Trump. Content analysis will be used to identify the amount of times Trump mentioned Hillary Clinton and the media, amongst other subjects. It will also be used to count the amount of times the media associated Trump with violence. The content analysis will used to understand how these subjects were linked to wider themes, such as populism.
1.6 Structure of Research Project
Chapter 2 explores the theoretical framework by which the research has been conducted. Critical, gatekeeping, and democratic theories will all be analysed with their context in the broadcast media. Additional framework will be explored within the parameters of populism and the American Dream, two expansive ideologies that transcended the 2016 election. Chapter 3 will outline the design of the research, particularly exploring the dual usage of content and critical discourse analysis. The researcher selected the week ranging from 9 August to 12 August 2016 to study two of
Trump’s speeches, and three programs broadcast on CNN and MSNBC. Chapter 4 will then present and analyse the findings that the researcher uncovered. Chapter 5 will present the conclusion, in which the researcher will re-evaluate the theoretical framework in reference to the findings discussed in the preceding chapter.
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2.0 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
The overarching theme of this literature review is understanding the autonomy of the cultural elite and broadcast media. Nicholas Garnham (1978: 15) asks if broadcasters can freely operate without being subjected to the temptations of cultural elitism. Under this overarching theme four subthemes have been identified:
1. Dominant elite as gatekeepers
2. Distribution of broadcast media hegemony
3. Audience activity and voter participation in a democracy
4. Populism, the American Dream, and a marginalized public
This literature review will link three separate theories: gatekeeping, critical and democratic. Understanding content through these lenses will be a focal point in the beginning of the dissertation, in which American broadcast media are held skeptic by the general public.
2.2 First Subtheme: the dominant elite as gatekeepers of news
The media can be understood as a social institution (Lister et al, 2009: 10); consequently, social relations are involved in the decision-making process of what is produced. The gatekeeper decides which information passes through and which information does not (University of Twente, n.d.; Lewin, 1947). Gatekeeper theorists suggest there is a multiplicity of factors that account for this process (Berkowitz, 1990), whereas critical theorists are skeptical and discern that the owners decide which information is important (Golding and Murdock, 1991; McChesney, 2000; Herman and Chomsky, 1998). Herman and Chomsky (1998) identify media ownership as a Fitzgerald, Page 12 of 70
censorship filter3 in their propaganda model. The media serve the needs of the owner, being an investment from which he or she can recoup money. Jeff Zucker, for example, who is obsessed with ratings, structured CNN as a dramatized broadcast network to reflect his vision for a ratings-driven behemoth.
The media serve the needs of the dominant elite in a society where power is grasped by the state and a monopolistic handling of censorship, yet is more difficult to see in a system that contains private media entities (Herman and Chomsky, 1998); however, it does not suggest that it does not exist. In relation to the election, Trump frequently engaged in anti-Clinton rhetoric (Fisher, 2016; Dreazen, 2016; Strassel,
2016). This idea was placed into the minds of an undecided public and served Trump’s campaign, and is a possible reason why disgruntled citizens perceived both Clinton and the [broadcast] media as corrupt and biased. In Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, they assert that the powerful may fund politicians who will, in exchange, directly serve the interests of the media (1998: 26).
2.3 Second Subtheme: distribution of broadcast media hegemony
As the previous section introduced critical and gatekeeping theory into broadcast media production, this section will analyse democratic and critical theory to discuss how broadcast media may have attempted to maintain its dominant status.
News becomes a means of handling social change in an effort to maintain the status of the existing elite (Mosco, 2009). It accomplishes this by channeling pre- existing attitudes and values that the viewers hold (Simonson and Weimann, 2003;
Lister et al, 2009). The media present superimposed meanings that are continually forced upon the consumer (Adorno and Bernstein, 1991). As these images become
3 The other three filters are: anti-Communism, flak from government, and sources from which information was gathered. Fitzgerald, Page 13 of 70
superimposed, a deficit of alternative sources emerges. Robert Dahl (2000), one of the leading political theorists, claims that alternative sources are vital to democracy, and questions how citizens can acquire political resources if “a single group enjoys a monopoly in providing information (2000: 97);” furthermore, the American capitalist system creates inequalities, which limits democratic potential because it reduces the distribution of political information that voters need (2000: 177). Dahl’s critique on media and capitalism coincides with Herman and Chomsky (1998: 15), who claim that an advertising-based system drives out radical media.
With consideration to the election, advertisers would be more inclined to sponsor broadcast media that supported the elite and supporters of the Obama administration and the Clinton campaign. These legitimized views are superimposed and delivered to attract undecided voters (Bennett, 1996); yet they have to be superimposed in a way that is not considered “high-brow” (Adorno and Bernstein,
1998, p160) and in relation to the dominant culture’s established media forms (Lister et al, 2009).
2.4 Third Subtheme: audience activity and voter participation in a democracy
As the first two themes focused on the cultural elite’s role in producing and distributing news, this theme will primarily rely on democratic and critical theory to analyse voter participation. A liberal democracy is maintained by engaging in political discourse (Williams, 1983: 96). In the U.S. General Election, candidates from the two major parties actively engage in a select number of debates prior to Election Day, and the electorate engage in a similar discourse to sway their colleagues’ opinions. The dominant elite is the greatest obstacle in developing and nurturing this democracy
(Bennett, 1996) because it is concerned with nurturing its own power. The cultural elites who own the broadcast media have the autonomy to superimpose their Fitzgerald, Page 14 of 70
ideologies on the general public, thus exercising alternative opinions and nullifying discourse. Political theorist John Stuart Mill (2009: 61), who is most notable for his discussion on utilitarianism, states that people in a society are bound to not infringe upon others’ interests considered as rights, and the offenders of the rules will be punished by opinion. If adults want to be protected by those who govern (Dahl, 2000), and live in a society which suppresses marginal interests, then a referendum on these elites is necessary. Since America’s capitalist structure creates inequalities in the distribution of political sources, the voters are stripped of the resources they need to make an informed decision (McChesney, 2000); this is further exacerbated by the news cycle that makes decisions for the masses on the “spur of the moment” (Mill,
2009, p61) because of the 24-hour news cycle. If a political candidate issued a seemingly obscene remark, for example, then a broadcaster would dedicate extensive coverage to argue why it was obscene. By airing programmes that continually devote coverage to this one particular news angle, and without an alternative voice, then voters would not be aware that there is another explanation for the seemingly remark that the political candidate made.
David Gauntlett (2002) is concerned that the homogenization of news leads to a circle of manipulation and a passive audience. Yet Adorno and Bernstein (1991) state that spectators – once aware of the patterns in media – consume media with certain expectations. This activism in voters, then, does exist, and as these citizens become disillusioned by the cultural elite that produce and foster their hegemony and social status, active participation and eccentricity are the means to break through this tyranny (Mill, 2009; Dahl, 2000). Even if the public make the wrong choice (Mill,
2009), it is still considered “right” because they are protecting their own interests and rights that they believe are being infringed upon. Fitzgerald, Page 15 of 70
2.5 Fourth Subtheme: populism, the American Dream, and
a marginalized electorate
It is difficult to identify a more consequential movement in contemporary
Western politics than populism. In order to analyse Trump’s message to American voters and why it resonated with them (as evidenced by his election), a firm understanding of populism must be established. Despite the negative connotations associated with the rise of populism (Future, 2016), this section will attempt to uncover its essential elements.
Scholars cite the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as the first populist party (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Shuster, n.d.) to initiate the anti- establishment domino effect when U.K. voted to leave the E.U. This resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron. The message was fueled by Nigel
Farage, leader of UKIP during the EU referendum. His anti-EU and anti-immigrant messages coaxed 52% of British voters to vote to leave the European Union (Shuster, n.d.). Brexiteers, the Economist explains (M.S., 2016), referred to themselves as “the people” who “smashed the elite;” it was a surge in ordinariness revolting against those in positions of power. The U.S. faced a similar leader in Trump who, days after winning the election, posed for a photograph with Farage at Trump Tower (Knight, 2016).
These two anti-establishment figures became the manifestation of the populism trend that threatened to spread to other parts of the Western world, such as the Netherlands and France (Lehne, 2017).
Populism can only thrive when a group of people believe that their collectively shared values have been rejected by the self-gratifying elites. These values, however, should not be linked between political movements because the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy does not reflect objective reality (IESE Business School, 2017). Pippa Fitzgerald, Page 16 of 70
Norris and Sean Inglehart support the previous claim, explaining that populist leaders employ a similar approach to politics, but the policies they support are dependent upon a nation’s particular “cultural cleavage” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Populism in Europe, for example, is centralized more on “forcing out stigmatized groups” whereas Latin American populism wants to welcome those groups that have been shunned by the elite (M.S., 2017). The one defining trait of it, as alluded to, is the concept of “the people” and the “corrupt elite” and the use of emotion and language to depict that distinction (IESE Business School, 2017). One of the most powerful emotions is fear, which a campaigner may use to identify economic inequality and security, among other issues (Chevigny, 2016).
Populism is often linked to nationalism. Though the two are their own distinct ideologies, social actors tend to invoke one ideology to bolster the other. Populism’s ambiguity aids in this connection (Brown, 2017). The Economist agrees with this sentiment, adding that its ambiguity also makes it easy for candidates – such as Trump
– to manipulate it (2016). The Economist also details how Trump’s nationalism- populism led to a more isolationist policy. One of his key slogans, “America First”, is a call for the U.S. to shy away from globalization, and to shift attention inwards.
Akin to the debate of populism’s current status in the world, scholars clash over its central components. A characteristic which is traditionally agreed upon by scholars, and arguably its most distinct, is that “populism says something about the relationship between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’” (Mudde, 2004: 543). The elite cheat and rig the system, and it is the people’s responsibility to repudiate that social class (IESE
Business School, 2017). Inglehart and Norris (2016: 6) argue that the populist philosophy exonerates the “wisdom and virtue of ordinary people (silent majority) over the ‘corrupt’ establishment.’ This argument runs parallel to John Stuart Mill’s Fitzgerald, Page 17 of 70
thesis (2009) that the public will punish those who infringe upon another’s rights. An establishment is considered corrupt when the public considers the establishment to be acting contrary to the public’s interests. Populists also characterize themselves to be the sole messengers in speaking on behalf of real, ordinary people. This often leads to a conflict between the ‘real people’ and the establishment (Brown, 2017).
The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election is considered to be a populist movement
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Taub, 2016; Taylor, 2016). If the U.S. election was indeed a populist movement, then Trump’s supporters must have held a “the people vs. the elite” mentality; therefore, there must be some cultural values that they shared.
According to the Pew Research Center (Smith, 2016), 81% of those who favoured
Trump stated that “life for people like you today is worse than it was 50 years ago,” indicating that there has been a shift (yet undefined) in American life that resulted in
Trump’s supporters, who received his most votes between the ages of 40 years onwards (Gould and Harrington, 2016). Emma Green (2017) reported that cultural anxiety – “feeling like a stranger in America” – led to Trump’s election. The base of
Trump’s supporters, commonly 40 years or older and white (Huang et al, 2016), felt marginalized. Inglehart and Norris (2016) identify that older units support politicians that are more likely to defend traditional values.
In a review of Arlie Hochschild’s book Strangers In Their Own Land, Cohen et al (2017) summarise a key component of Louisiana voters:
“Their deep story focused on the American Dream: the idea that, if you work hard and play by the rules, you can have a better life. But what happens when that dream doesn't come true? When people see ‘line cutters’ getting ahead while their own lives don't seem to be going anywhere?”
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The above quote is revealing on several accounts. It identifies the values of fair play.
The American Dream is supposed to reward honesty and hard work. It then identifies a second value of better: that one’s standard of life ought to improve because one honours honest work. Finally, it juxtaposed their dismay over those acting in discordance with the American Dream, yet those individuals are profiting rather than those who are fairly playing the game.
The ideology of the American Dream, Lawrence Samuel (2012) argues, is the most potent belief in the United States. This belief is imbedded, Samuel argues, within the fabric of American society. The ideals of entrepreneurship and property rights can be identified in the Declaration of Independence (Bronner, 2016). If the American
Dream has been the crux of social movements during the twentieth century (Samuel,
2012), then it must also be at the crux of the populist surge in 2016 when rhetoric was targeted at the elite class. One perspective about the American Dream is its notion of meritocracy (Samuel, 2012), where the Founding Fathers framed the Constitution to reward citizens based on merit. Critics of the American Dream deride its materialism and its out-of-reach nature (Clark, 2007). Entrepreneurs are seen as American Dream idealists because of the effort they make into establishing their businesses, which requires a harder work ethic than those who have determined roles within corporations (Goldberg, 193). One can only succeed in entrepreneurial endeavours if one is willing to work eight days a week, Goldberg argues.
Samuel (2012) explains that home ownership was the cornerstone of the
American Dream since its inception, culminating in an innate consumerist dogma.
Though aspects of the American Dream have shifted throughout decades and in response to political and economic events, Jilson argues that a “legitimate claim to exceptionalism” is present in each incarnation (cited in Samuel, 2012: 6) coincided Fitzgerald, Page 19 of 70
with values of hard work and success. This argument of a legitimate claim, as well as
Hochschild’s admission that the American Dream is a promise that all Americans have an equal chance at their own success, leads one to infer that this is not an ideology, but rather a right bestowed upon every American. If the public believes their rights are being infringed upon by a tyrant, then the public may usurp that tyrant (Mill, 2009).
2.6 Theoretical Framework, Conclusion
The task of this literature review was to establish the theoretical foundations for how the researcher will analyze the findings. The first section explored how a dominant cultural elite may develop, and how it produces and secures its ideologies.
The second section was then concerned with the distribution process of political resources in an attempt to understand how a lack of alternative news sources led to voters portraying broadcast media as elitist and biased in favour of a particular administration. It then outlined participation as a result of the dominant cultural elite, and began the conversation as to why the white majority felt ostracized by a shifting media and political spectrum, and used Donald Trump as a protest vote against the elite. It finally outlined characteristics of populism and the American Dream, and how they relate to a marginalized public who may believe that the current political elites are detrimental to their survival.
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3.0 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This section will outline the researcher’s intended use of content and critical discourse analysis in the research project. This section will first describe how the researcher will be operating within Jupp’s framework (2006) within the methodology.
A thorough review of the tradition of critical discourse analysis will then be discussed because of its link between theory and methodology (Chouliaraki and Fairclough,
2010). Following that, the researcher will provide a rationalization for conducting critical discourse analysis (CDA). The limitations of the chosen method will then be identified with reference to the questions and aims of the study.
3.2 Samples and Methods Employed
3.2.1 Samples Employed
Aware of the longevity of the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle and its coverage, the researcher employed two different databases for identifying key dates to analyse. The Trump Twitter Archive has been used by news outlets such as the
Washington Post and the Boston Globe, among others. The Trump Twitter Archives has categorized Trump’s tweets, ranging from “Fake News!” to “On President Obama.”
The researcher used the “Media Disdain” category in its search to find key dates:
- CNN was tweeted at 26 times by candidate Trump.
- NBC and its affiliates (CNBC and MSNBC) were tweeted at five times by
candidate Trump.
- Television hosts/personalities employed by the above broadcasters were
tweeted at more than 30 times by candidate Trump. Fitzgerald, Page 21 of 70
The second database used by the researcher was the American Presidency
Project, which archived every Trump speech during the U.S. election beginning on 16
June 2015 (when Mr. Trump announced his candidacy for president) and ending on 9
November 2016 (Trump’s victory speech). The two aforementioned databases were used as a compass by the researcher to identify what the researcher understands to be the most suitable date range for conducting critical discourse analysis. These dates were 9-12 August 2016, with coverage focused on Trump’s comments concerning the
2nd Amendment. Five texts from this week will be studied:
1. Donald Trump’s speech in North Carolina, 9 August 2016.
2. CNN Tonight with Don Lemon, 9 August 2016.
3. Morning Joe, 10 August 2016.
4. CNN Live: Chris Cuomo’s interview with Rudy Giuliani, 11 August 2016.
5. Donald Trump’s speech in Pennsylvania, 12 August 2016.
The three television programmes all dedicated air time reacting to Donald Trump’s speech in North Carolina, whilst Trump’s Pennsylvania speech is reactionary of the media coverage that he received from those programmes.
3.2.2. Methods Employed
The researcher will be utilizing both critical discourse analysis and content analysis. Content analysis will be used to identify the amount of times Trump and the media programs mentioned a particular subject. The content analysis will be used to assist in critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis, according to van Dijk
(1995: 24), “studies discourse and its functions in society and the ways society, and especially forms of inequality, are expressed, represented, legitimated or reproduced in talk and text.” Fitzgerald, Page 22 of 70
The Atlantic (Leetaru, 2015) created a graphic displaying the number of mentions each presidential candidate received on eight television stations. The graphic displays that Trump was mentioned 75,976 times within 30 days of the election, whilst
Clinton was mentioned 9,113 times. Within 15 days leading up to the general election,
Trump was mentioned 39,383 times and Clinton was mentioned 5,736 times. These figures suggest that there was an increase in televised political correspondence within the final month of the presidential race. The researcher then briefed over Trump’s twitter timeline – political analysts credit the social platform in helping him win the presidency (Barber, Sevastopulo, and Tett, 2017) – to identify dates which he lambasted the media.
3.2.2.1 Analysis of Trump’s Speeches
With regards to Trump’s speeches, the researcher will use the two transcripts
provided by the American Presidency Project. The researcher only edited the
transcripts to correct punctuation errors.
3.2.2.2 Media Analysis
Transcripts for CNN Tonight with Don Lemon and CNN Live with Chris Cuomo
were obtained from the CNN Archives and from Media Matters, respectively.
MSNBC did not provide a transcript for Morning Joe, thus the editor
transcribed it verbatim via the MSNBC YouTube channel. The researcher will
solely rely on footage of the broadcasters’ programs to code CNN and MSNBC’s
news coverage.
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3.2.3 Critical Discourse Framework
The researcher will employ Jupp’s framework (2006) when operating critical discourse analysis. Jupp outlines a 12 step process when critically analysing (2006: 278 - 279):
1. What discourses are important when discussing what is “right” and “wrong”? 2. In what kinds of documents do these discourses appear? 3. Who presents these discourses, and whom do they represent? 4. What is the intended audience of the discourse? 5. What does a critical evaluation of these discourses uncover, concerning: a. What is defined as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and therefore seen as problematic b. What explanation is offered for what is seen as problematic c. What is seen as the solution to the problem, then? 6. What does a critical reading of the discourses tell the researcher about: a. What is not considered to be problematic b. Which explanations are rejected/omitted c. Which solutions are not preferred 7. What alternative discourses exist? 8. How do these alternative discourse relate to ‘internal differentiation’ within semi-autonomous realms of control? 9. What does a critical reading of the alternative discourses tell the researcher? 10. Is there evidence of negation with/resistance to dominant discourses? 11. What is the relationship between the discourses and social conflict, social struggle, hierarchies of credibility, order and control, and the exercise of power? 12. Are discourses, knowledge and power pervasive or reducible to class, class conflict, and struggled diverted through one source (i.e.: the state)?
3.2.4 Coding Structure
When applying Jupp’s framework, then, the researcher will look to identify these features using a set of codes. The researcher will refer to the theoretical framework to assist in formulating the coding categories that are, at first, more theoretical
(Schneider, 2013). The researcher will then analyze the discourse whilst recognizing Fitzgerald, Page 24 of 70
that other categories can develop. This, Schneider (2013) cites Marying, is referred to as evolutionary coding. To properly code and analyse the documents, the research will deconstruct and reconstruct the documents being analyzed. Deconstruction, Jupp discusses, involves identifying the essential elements of the dominant discourse, and then reconstruct – or rebuild – the discourse into “terms of oppressive social structural arrangements which underpin or sustain it” (2006: 279).
Once the critical discourse analysis is complete, the researcher will then determine the data’s validity (McIntosh and Morse, 2015) of the CDA texts that will be analysed.
The researcher will then finally refer to the questions, aims, and hypotheses of the research project and determine if those questions are answered, and if the hypotheses are or are not supported.
3.3 Theoretical Framework of Chosen Methodologies
Qualitative methods are focused on asking questions beginning with “How” and
“Why” (Sargeant, 2012) because it provides a clearer understanding of the phenomena being questioned. Sargeant’s argument correlates with van Dijk (1995) who explains that critical discourse analysis helps the researcher to understand how certain inequalities are circulated by discourse, and how some groups might be marginalized.
Van Dijk continues, pleading with researchers that an efficient critical discourse analysis requires “good theories of the role of discourse in the enactment and reproduction of social domination and resistance” (1995: 19). Chouliaraki and
Fairclough (2010) further this argument, stating that “CDA is a mode of critical inquiry where theory and methodology are inherently linked to one another.” One must be aware of the tradition of critical discourse analysis to appreciate its practice and understand how it is employed by scholars. Breeze (2011) identifies several schools within this tradition that are linked to the methodology. The scholars cited within this Fitzgerald, Page 25 of 70
section’s theoretical framework often disagree with one another because they operate the practice through their own approaches. The importance of understanding the inextricable link between theory and methodology is unique to critical discourse analysis because its perceptions and definitions have developed throughout centuries.
This research, similarly to Breeze (2011), will attempt to identify distinguishing theories of these practitioners whilst uncovering themes within the tradition that practitioners reach consensus. Breeze (2011) has found that the critical discourse analysis tradition contains two indispensable elements: the use of power within society in a political context, and how language succors how power is used.
Within the tradition of CDA, theorists have created various meanings for the term “discourse”. Jupp (2006) characterizes it to be any idea or statement that is dominant at a specific time. This is not to suggest that discourse is stagnant, however.
Jupp argues that discourse transcends any idea or statement that are dominant amongst a particular set of people in relation to another set. The purpose of critical discourse analysis, then, is to analyse the power that an individual (or individuals) evokes in one’s discourse when providing a message to the recipient.
When applying critical discourse analysis in practice, one identifies the documents and texts; the former being associated with the medium by which the actor’s message is to spread, and the latter containing the message which constitutes meaning (Jupp, 2006; 274). When studying discourse, one must not make mistake it to simply be a one-dimensional object. Billig (2008) explains that discourse contains both verbal and written articles. The United States election provides a particular unique discourse because of its saturated news coverage and the copious stump speeches given by candidates. Jupp continues his thoughts on discourse, stating that the viewer may perceive it in hierarchical terms, particularly how individuals exercise Fitzgerald, Page 26 of 70
their power and status upon the viewer – and, in this research’s intended subjects, the
American electorate. Jupp’s 12 step agenda for discourse analysis follows three features (Jupp, 2006: 279):
1. Discourse is social, and therefore its meaning is dependent upon in what
context it is used, by whom it is used, and for whom it is targeted. There is
not a universal discourse because the meaning of discourse varies.
2. Discourses may be in conflict with each other.
3. Discourses could be arranged in a hierarchy, which is closely linked to
power.
Sapsford (2006) argues that ideology is characterized as a defining set of rules by which one ought to live which may define the interests of a particular sect of people, but serves the interests of more powerful players in the social structure. Discursive analysis emphasizes debate, conflict and resistance (Sapsford, 2006: 262). Billig
(2008: 784) has a similar perspective on the study, pleading for analysts to emphasize how language is used to reproduce ideology, inequality, and power. The above characteristics of critical discourse evoke language of power as they attempt to sway behavioural patterns of audiences.
3.4 Rationale of Chosen Methodologies
Qualitative data is preferred over quantitative data in this research project because the project is attempting to understand a particular phenomenon rather than determine the outcome of something (Sargeant, 2012); consequently, because it is attempting to understand a phenomena, it is more suitable to analyse it in a narrative style rather than supplying statistics (though statistics do aid the narrative structure).
Content analysis has the potentiality to uncover descriptive data that can aid in understanding phenomena (Abbott and McKinney, 2013). The coding process applied Fitzgerald, Page 27 of 70
by the researcher will identify themes within the actors being studied to uncover how they used language to coax the American electorate to vote for their preferred presidential candidate.
The researcher understands the power structures that are analyzed by those who communicate messages to different audiences. Since the research is studying cultural elitism in broadcast media, it is imperative that the researcher analyses language used by broadcasters – particularly CNN and NBC (and NBC’s affiliates) – when discussing electoral issues with voters. Donald Trump’s language must be studied because it, too, evokes power and resistance (Sapsford, 2006: 262) to other groups – namely, broadcasters. Whilst other methods, such as surveys and interviews, would be helpful to discern – and possibly quantify – the perceptions and values of
Trump supporters, they would not be as reliable in uncovering the power relations amongst broadcasters, the presidential candidates, and their supporters. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (2010) state that the four pivotal interests of critical discourse analysis are the “emergence, hegemony, recontextualization and operationalization of discourse.” By undergoing this process, the researcher is empowered to undercover themes and subthemes within language that would not be possible with other methods. A researcher cannot provide verifiable data regarding broadcast media’s power structure and discourse if the researcher does not attempt to analyse the very subject that is at the crux of research question. The CDA tradition also emboldens the researcher to study the use of language by power agents as an outsider (Breeze, 2011), which culminates in a more inquisitive and investigative method.
Content analysis is a similar method to critical discourse analysis; those who employ the method also analyse texts and interpret them into a narrative structure
(Krippendorf, 2004). Content analysis can also help to understand rhetoric (Abbott Fitzgerald, Page 28 of 70
and McKinney, 2013) and how it is interpreted by different parties. The broadcasters being analysed, for instance, will understand some of Donald Trump’s remarks in a particular perspective that his supporters and surrogates may not. Additionally, identifying the amount of times a reference has been issued will be useful in analyzing how it corresponds to discourse within the social context. By applying content analysis to the frequency by which Trump mentioned Clinton, the Second Amendment, and the economy from his first speech to his second speech will help the researcher understand if his tone shifted to a stance following the media coverage that week.
3.5 Limitations of Chosen Methodology
The tradition of critical discourse analysis is contested amongst its participants.
Breeze (2011) acknowledges that there is no established “objective standpoint” at which to commence CDA. Since some theorists employ CDA in a more critical and negative way than others, they are often criticized (Breeze, 2011). The absence of a unified definition and structure of critical discourse analysis leaves it vulnerable for criticism both within and outside of its theoretical tradition.
The author believes that it is difficult for one to be objective when listening to
Trump’s remark (see Page 37) unless one is unaware of who Trump is. If one happens to believe that Trump did incite violence towards his candidate, then one would argue that the broadcast programs were apt in their criticism, thus ameliorating any negative perception towards them. The researcher mitigated this circumstance by creating a rigorous coding system that nullified any bias the researcher may have of Trump’s comment.
The research being undertaken is further limited in its scope. The ubiquity of
Trump’s mentions by networks is apparent; as mentioned earlier, the former Fitzgerald, Page 29 of 70
presidential candidate was mentioned more than 75,000 times within 30 days of 9
November 2016. The researcher is aware that, because of the limited scope, there might have been a particular time period that would have been more suitable for critical discourse analysis than the week chosen. Though the researcher took extra steps to find the most appropriate date possible, the researcher also recognizes that other programs or speeches might be more elaborate and, therefore, more apt for analysing. To accomplish this is quite unfeasible because of the seemingly infinite sources of programming available to study the election coverage.
3.6 Methodology, Conclusion
The purpose of the research project is to identify and uncover the power structures of broadcast media during the 2016 U.S. election and the Trump electorate’s resistance and rebellion against it. This ideological power struggle is inherent in critical discourse theory, which studies how actors utilize discourse to provide a particular message or achieve a particular goal. Though the researcher is aware of conflicting perspectives within the critical discourse tradition, the researcher believes that studying the broadcasters and Mr. Trump’s language will provide the most valid data with respect to the research project’s questions, aims, and hypotheses.
Fitzgerald, Page 30 of 70
4.0 Findings
4.1 Introduction
The findings will be presented chronologically, with respect to the timeline that the critical discourse analysis has been conducted (See Appendix A). The most appropriate way to present the results is to do so chronologically because one must understand how the involved social actors responded to the previous social actor[s]’ rhetoric. One cannot fully infer the percentile increase between references made by
Trump’s speeches on 9 and 12 August if one does not first assess the discourse of the media between those two dates since – as the author alludes to – Trump’s remarks on
12 August are reactionary of the media coverage following the 9 August speech that commenced the research.
4.2 Donald Trump’s Speech in North Carolina, 9 August 2016
Figure 1: References made by Donald Trump, 9 Aug. 2016
45 42 40 35 30 25 20 18 16 15 9 10 10 6 6 5 3 0 American Populism Hillary Barack Media Economy 2nd Taken Dream Clinton Obama Amendment
The above chart lists the amount of times that Donald Trump mentioned a particular subject during his approximately 24 minute speech to his supporters. Fitzgerald, Page 31 of 70
Populism was the subject that was mentioned most frequently by Trump; the then- candidate prompted its use 42 times. As discussed in the theoretical framework populism is a broad subject and was thus divided into five categories: Anti-Elite, Fear,
Movement, Nationalism, and Outsider Status.
Figure 2: Populism Categories4 Elicited by Donald Trump: 9 August 2016 Category Number of Mentions
Anti-Elite 28
Fear 15
Movement 4
Nationalism 10
Outsider Status 6
4.2.1 Social Actors Associated with Anti-Elite
There are three social actors that were linked to anti-elite:
Of the 16 times Trump (2016a) mentioned Hillary Clinton, 15 of those instances
were linked to Anti-Elite. One such linkage between Clinton and Anti-Elite is
this example: So, I just look at this, and I said that if she gets elected, she will
cause the destruction of this country from within. Remember that. Remember
that. Clinton is characterized as a corrupt official who “has disregarded the lives
of Americans” (Trump, 2016a) in favour of special interests and other members
of the elite class. By doing this, Trump argues, the United States will be overrun
by those whom are not concerned with American welfare, but their own welfare.
4 See Appendix C for definitions of Populism categories. Fitzgerald, Page 32 of 70
Barack Obama was linked to Anti-Elite rhetoric eight times during Trump’s
speech. Unlike Clinton; however, he was primarily associated as incompetent.
Obama’s incompetency, according to Trump, has culminated in a lower
standard of life for Trump’s fan base. Obama was also linked to Hillary Clinton
seven times. One can infer from this link that Trump considers Clinton to be an
extension of the Obama administration, and is linking the two individuals
together in his speech to convey a similar message to his supporters.
The media, though being referenced to just three times, were linked with Anti-
Elite on each occasion. Referred to as “the world’s most dishonest people,”
Trump (2016a) associates the media as an assemblage interested in his failure.
All three mentions Trump (2016a) made regarding the media portray them as
aiming to discredit his candidacy:
1. If we had a protester that's the only time they move because they're showing something that in their mind is a bad thing, so then they move. 2. Unstable Hillary lacks the judgment, now; Bernie Sanders said she lacks judgment, right…When I say it [the media] say that's terrible the way you talk. 3. They [the media] would be calling for my execution, -- electric chair. They'd bring back the electric chair. It would be a whole different ball game if I said it, believe me.
Trump is questioning the objectivity of news coverage during the election. As
chief disseminators of news, the media possess the influence to sway how
individuals think about candidates and issues. Additionally, by criticizing how
the media perceives a Trump comment as opposed to an outsider, Trump is
linking the media to act as surrogates for the Clinton campaign.
Fitzgerald, Page 33 of 70
4.2.2 Invocation of Fear
The second key category to understanding Trump’s populist message is his insistence on using “fear” as a campaigning device. This is often linked to “taken” – which is considered to be language used by a social actor insinuating a particular right has been either taken away by a third party or has been lost because of the actions of a particular third party. Three examples to understand this better are listed below:
1. […] If you don't do the right thing, either you're not going to have a Second Amendment or you're not going to have much of it left. And you're not going to be able to protect yourself, which you need. You know, when the bad guys burst into your house, they're not looking about into Second Amendments5, and, do I have the right to do this? OK, the bad guys aren't going to be giving up their weapons (Trump, 2016a). 2. We want clear air, we want clean water. We want clear water. But -- but... To do that […] you don't have to destroy our country and destroy our businesses (Trump, 2016a). 3. But the thing I'm doing, I'm cutting taxes big league. Especially for the middle class and especially for businesses. Because businesses are dying and that means small businesses, businesses period (Trump, 2016a). All three of the statements spoken by Trump refer to “taken” and “fear”. In the first statement, Trump refers to the Second Amendment being “taken”, and invokes “fear” by arguing people will not be able to defend themselves against criminals and/or terrorists. The second and third statements by Trump both relate to businesses being taken, and uses words such as “destroy” and “dying” to elicit fear: the death of the
Middle Class and the annexation of the American Dream. The Second Amendment is a divisive issue in American political culture. David Cohen, a Constitutional law professor, (2016) penned an argument for a repeal of the Second Amendment because of the mass shootings that have recently occurred in the United States, decrying it as a
5 The Second Amendment is about firearms in the U.S. Advocates interpret it as “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” (Cornell Law School, n.d.a) which can be identified as a constitutional right. Others interpret its language about militia as a “collective rights theory,” which restricts individuals’ rights to possess firearms.
Fitzgerald, Page 34 of 70
“a threat to liberty.” He is contravened by Charles Cooke (2015), who asserted in the
Washington Post that the inalienable rights defined in the Constitution “necessitates the auxiliary [sic] right to the private ownership of “arms” … that could be wielded by an individual.” Cooke’s invocation of the term “inalienable right” resonates most strongly with the language that Trump used in his statement on the 2nd Amendment being taken.
4.2.3 The American Dream and Clinton’s Malpractice
Similarly to the inalienable perception of the Second Amendment, the
American Dream is also considered to be an inalienable right that is guaranteed to all
Americans. Though its definition and perspective are fluid with economic, political, and cultural cycles, the characteristics that were identified to be most consistent were:
Better (life ought to be better as one gets older, and from one generation to the next),
Entrepreneurship, Fair Play, and Home6. Peoples’ lives ought to improve throughout each generation if they work hard and be honest in their endeavours, and the home is a subsequent symbol of their success. Trump’s language in the speech, however, insists that the standard of life in 2016 has declined. His first reference on the American
Dream includes several of its characteristics:
This is year in and year out, it's actually amazing that our country keeps going. But what has happened is, we have people in the audience, in 18 years, they're making less money now than they made 18 years ago, in real wages, 18. And in many cases, they're working two and three jobs, OK? But they're making less money now than they made 18 years ago. And those stats come right out, real wages. They're working harder, they're getting older. So in theory it's supposed to be the other way, you know you work and you're young, you don't care. Get a little older, it's like, oh by the way, how about me (Trump, 2016a)?
6 For further descriptions of American Dream characteristics, see Appendix C. Fitzgerald, Page 35 of 70
One can infer that those who work “two and three jobs” are honouring the value of fair play, as they are working “harder;” however, as Trump insists, those who have attended his speech are earning less money than they were making 18 years ago. This statement, along with his acknowledgement that the standard of life is supposed to improve as one gets older, implies that the American Dream has been seized from either all Americans, or those who supported him. In essence, this inalienable right has been “taken” from them. Two questions arise from this: what is being “taken”, and by whom?
This section has already concluded that Trump has linked Hillary Clinton and
Barack Obama to each other as elite social figures; furthermore, his Anti-Elite rhetoric towards them suggests that they are corrupt and/or incompetent. As someone who
“disregarded the lives of Americans,” Clinton is portrayed as a suspect who is a threat to collective rights bestowed to Americans. Two references by Donald Trump (2016a) suggest that she is a legitimate threat to these rights:
1. Her plan will tax many small business -- businesses who are already in deep trouble out of business. 2. So now look at it. So Hillary essentially wants to abolish the Second Amendment. Entrepreneurship is an identified characteristic of the American Dream, and Clinton’s tax plan, according to Trump, is an act of malpractice that will take this away from his supporters, despite their practice of fair play. One may infer that, from this supposed tax plan, that Trump’s supporters’ lives would be negatively impacted by it and thus be not “better”. The second reference by Trump, via the employment of the word
“abolish,” argues that Clinton is a threat to an additional inalienable right.
Fitzgerald, Page 36 of 70
4.2.4 Donald Trump’s Speech: 9 August 2016, Conclusion
The most important component to recognize from this speech is to understand the context from which it is being analysed. The purpose of analysing this initial speech was to identify links between social actors, negative associations connected to those actors, and inalienable rights that are threatened by these actors. The two chief social actors whom Trump references are Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, who will now be considered as one social entity. This elite social figure is a threat to the American
Dream, and Trump’s populist message is a solicitation towards his supporters to repudiate the ruling class. This research is not concerned with Trump’s message concerning Clinton or President Obama; its aim is to identify whether or not broadcast media (CNN and NBC) marginalized Trump supporters. Though there is a suspicion that the media might be hegemons in how they reported on the election, three references made by Trump is not a large enough sample to justify such a claim.
Fitzgerald, Page 37 of 70
4.3 Media Findings
4.3.1 Introduction
The following three analyses conducted on media coverage focuses on media’s coverage7 concerning Trump’s comments concerning the 2nd Amendment and Hillary
Clinton (2016a):
“Hillary wants to abolish -- essentially abolish the Second Amendment. By the way, and if she gets to pick...If she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks.
Although the Second Amendment people, maybe there is. I don't know.”
4.3.2 CNN Tonight with Don Lemon: 9 August 2016 – CNN
The first program that was analysed was a CNN program that was broadcast after Trump’s speech in North Carolina. There were five social actors discussing the above remark conducted by Trump: Don Lemon (host), Sara Murray (CNN political reporter), David Gergen (CNN senior political analyst), Jeffrey Toobin (CNN senior legal analyst), and Dan Bongino (former Secret Service agent and then-local political candidate). Of the five social actors listed above, Bongino was the sole Trump surrogate. This was the most combative program of the three television broadcasts studied, as Bongino and Lemon both belittled each other. The combative nature of the programme was perceived by the researcher to be more of a spectacle than an investigative news panel. This kind of spectacle is indicative of Zucker’s influence within the network. The CNN boss, via his copious experience in the entertainment industry, is aware that this kind of combative nature is more likely to generate interest and reaction from viewers than a cut-and-dry news segment.
7 Refer to Appendix B for a description of the television programs being analysed. Fitzgerald, Page 38 of 70
Figure 3: Trump references made by speakers on CNN Tonight with Don Lemon, 9 August 2016
Neutral Positive 15% 15%
Negative 70%
Positive Negative Neutral
Trump was mentioned 40 times during the CNN Tonight segment, which is a reflection of how the segment was solely dedicated to him and his remark. Of the 40 mentions, 28 negatively mentioned him, accounting for 70%. Positive and Neutral statements weighed at 15% each, both having been associated with him six times. All six positive statements that were associated with Trump’s name were spoken by
Bongino, a Trump surrogate. The researcher found that those whom negatively associated Trump’s comment frequently used the word “violence” or a term implying some sort of violence (e.g.: “assassinate,” “harm,” “threat,” etc.). Of the 28 negative remarks about Donald Trump, 15 associated him with violence.
Each speaker attempted to legitimize his own perspective on Trump’s remark in an attempt to establish credibility with audience members. There were 23 instances when these social actors either defended their own credibility, or rebuffed the credibility of another. Lemon and Bongino were particularly keen on diminishing each other’s credibility, as demonstrated by this exchange: Fitzgerald, Page 39 of 70
BONGINO: Don, it doesn't make -- Don, frankly, I'm ashamed that you're talking to me as if I'm a child when 12 years of my life... (CROSSTALK) LEMON: No. You're treating me as a child because you're telling me what I'm supposed to hear, and you're sitting here on television... (CROSSTALK) BONGINO: While you were learning how to be a TV personality sitting here lecturing me. LEMON: ... lying to the American people. BONGINO: You don't know crap about this, Don. You're a TV guy. I was a secret service agent. Now cut off my mic. Do what you want. LEMON: I'm not going to cut off your mic. I'm going to tell you that you sit here and you're lying to the American people. In this exchange between the two social actors, Bongino is recalling his experience as a Secret Service agent to legitimize his claim that Trump’s remark was not an attempt at inciting violence towards Hillary Clinton. He juxtaposed his experience with Lemon, whom he attempted to discredit as a “TV personality.” Lemon, meanwhile, accuses
Bongino of lying to CNN’s audience about the context of Trump’s remark; this is supported by Lemon’s earlier question of the “legitimacy of spin coming from the surrogates or from people like you [Bongino].”
One can deduce that the panel members on CNN Tonight strove for legitimacy following Trump’s accusations of their dishonesty. As they ought to be objective in their reporting, the media’s credibility must be insuperable if any message is to be trusted by the audience. Their discrediting of Trump’s remarks; however, and the linkage between him and violence, does connect to his Anti-Elite rhetoric aimed at the media in his speech earlier that evening, where he decried that they only report on him in a negative perspective.
Fitzgerald, Page 40 of 70
4.3.3 Morning Joe: 10 August 2016 –MSNBC
Hosted by Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski, Morning Joe also involved several social actors to discuss the remarks made by Donald Trump on the preceding evening. Unlike CNN Tonight, though, this program did not include a surrogate of
Donald Trump with whom to talk; consequently, there was a far greater dichotomy between positive and negative references.
Figure 4: Trump references made by speakers on Morning Joe, 10 August 2016
Neutral 11% Positive 3%
Negative 86% Positive Negative Neutral
Trump was mentioned 36 times during the 14 minute segment. 31 comments were negative; four comments were neutral. The lone positive comment8 about Trump was from a statement released by the Trump campaign, which was read by Brzezinski.
The absence of any Trump surrogate, or any political analyst who perceived
Trump positively, created a vacuum of air time to be filled. Since this panel consisted
8 The comment from the Trump team is not considered to be the media’s interpretation of the remark, but of an extension of Donald Trump. Fitzgerald, Page 41 of 70
only of social actors who negatively perceive Trump and his comment, an echo chamber was created where the speakers repeated words made by others. For example,
Jon Meacham characterized Trump’s candidacy as “disqualifying” as a result of his 2nd
Amendment remark. Brzezinski immediately repeated the word “disqualifying,” echoing what Meacham had just said. The speakers on Morning Joe also associated
Trump with violence, eliciting that theme a total of 13 times. Scarborough was particularly fervent about the association between Trump and violence, decrying
Trump as a “fascist” because of the call to violence: That he’s suggesting to his supporters that they assassinate – that they assassinate- no that they assassinate his opponent [CLINTON]. This, similarly to Don Lemon Tonight, is a further example of
Trump’s assertion that the televised media are subjective in their reporting of events.
Credibility was referred to or defended seven times. Brzezinski read aloud statements made by Conservatives who decried Trump’s comments. The researcher presumes that, by including statements made by Conservatives, Morning Joe strove to portray this situation as a non-partisan issue in an effort to receive support from a wider populous, as opposed to marginalizing a selection who do not identify as
Democrats.
Fitzgerald, Page 42 of 70
4.3.4 Chris Cuomo interview with Rudy Giuliani: 11 August 2016 – CNN Live
Of the three television programs analysed, and the social actors whom participated, Chris Cuomo appeared to be the most moderate/neutral speaker of his media counterparts. The only two actors involved were him and Rudy Giuliani, a
Trump surrogate. The banter between the two resulted in a more balanced display of positive and negative reception:
Figure 5: Trump references made by speakers on CNN Live, 11 August 2016
Neutral 28%
Positive 39%
Negative 33% Positive Negative Neutral
14 references made towards Donald Trump were positive, 12 references held a negative perception, and 10 references were neutral. Of the 14 references; however, 13 positive remarks were spoken by Giuliani. The former New York City mayor frequently appeared on television in defence of Trump; because of this, the researcher considers
Giuliani to be a Trump surrogate and thus an extension of the Trumpian message. The lone comment spoken by Cuomo that the researcher perceived to be a positive perception is his claim that “I don't think that he [Trump] was inciting violence” when Fitzgerald, Page 43 of 70
he made the remark about Hillary Clinton and the Second Amendment. Cuomo, unlike his colleagues at Don Lemon Tonight and Morning Joe, acknowledged the vagueness of Trump’s rhetoric. This acknowledgement culminated in a greater amount of neutral perspectives. One such example can be found in a snippet of tête-à-tête with Giuliani:
GIULIANI: I'm going to tell you, because you don't give him [Trump] a fair shot. You take his words and parse them and you take them apart. I was on the plane with him when they called him and they said to him, "They are accusing you of saying kill Hillary Clinton." He said, "What? I didn't say that." What I said was -- CUOMO: He didn't say that. You're right. I never said he did. GIULIANI: He said, "I said 'don't vote for her.'" CUOMO: He said something clumsy that was open to misinterpretation.
Giuliani’s remarks about “you don’t give him a fair shot” locate the displeasure that
Giuliani, a Trump surrogate, and thus Trump himself, has experienced with media coverage. Cuomo neutrally acknowledged that Trump’s remarks were vague enough that they could be interpreted either positively or negatively; the previous two television programs negatively perceived the respective remarks.
Cuomo’s centrist approach to the storyline ought not to deceive one into concluding that the interview was strictly question-and-answer; contrarily, he and
Giuliani wrestled to appear more credible to legitimize their claims. Credibility was invoked 17 times during the dialogue. Giuliani attempted to discredit the reporting by criticizing the media by attaching it to Clinton, whilst Cuomo defended the reporting conducted by his colleagues:
Fitzgerald, Page 44 of 70
CUOMO: No politician likes the media. No politician says the media is fair to them. GIULIANI: Nobody, nobody, nobody brought up Hillary's comments about Bobby Kennedy9. CUOMO: What are you talking about? It's all over the place. It's all over the place. GIULIANI: No, it isn't all over the place. Not three days, front page of the newspaper. The front page of the Times yesterday didn't have the pay for play scandal. The front page of The New York Times had three articles on Donald Trump, all negative, and nothing about pay for play. CUOMO: Every outlet is different. I don't work at The New York Times, we have been covering it consistently.
Giuliani compared the media’s current coverage to his perception media coverage from a similar comment Hillary Clinton said in the 2008 election. He is also bidding to accord different media outlets together by mentioning the New York Times. By associating print and televised media, it is convenient for one to consider “the media” as a singular entity, rather than a set of different organizations. Cuomo attempted to defend CNN’s credibility whilst disassociating it from the New York Times. The skirmish for
“credibility” is more unique in a dialogue between two parties, because the audience member is digesting two unique perceptions of coverage. Morning Joe did not provide this opportunity to the viewer, whilst CNN Tonight presented a panel of four social actors with a negative perception of Trump versus one positive perception, a heavy imbalance between points of view.
9 In the 2008 Democratic Primary, Hillary Clinton issued a remark about not ceding the primary to Barack Obama because Bill Clinton, her husband, did not win the nomination until late in the primary season. She added that Senator Bobby Kennedy was assassinated late in the primary season in 1968 (Seelye, 2008). Fitzgerald, Page 45 of 70
4.3.5 Summation of Analysed Media Programmes:
FIGURE 6: TOTAL TRUMP REMARKS MADE BY TELEVISED MEDIA PROGRAMS ANALYSED (DISCLUDING TRUMP SURROGATES) Positive Negative Neutral
80 71 70
60 50 40 30 20 20
10 1 0 Number of Trump Mentions
Figure 7: Total times Trump was connected to violence 35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 Number of mentions CNN Tonight Morning Joe Chris Cuomo Donald Trump was mentioned a total of 91 times by the social actors on the three analysed media programs. 78% of the total references portrayed Trump negatively, with just one positive remark from Chris Cuomo. Violence was associated with Donald Trump 32 times; more than one-third of all remarks made by the speakers, then, connected Trump to violence. Fitzgerald, Page 46 of 70
The media is a “dishonest” body that reports on Trump – according to Trump if and only if it is to negatively portray him; furthermore, his message that he is a
“messenger” within a movement depicts himself as a Christ-like figure whose aim is to purge the ruling elite10 under whose discretion the inalienable right of the American
Dream – as well as the Second Amendment – has been expunged. The sum of total negative remarks about Donald Trump far outweigh the lone positive remark, suggesting that the media have cherry-picked a particular Trumpism whilst rejecting his cumulative message. By frequently portraying the populist candidate through this negative lens, it is not a stretch for a Trump-leaning supporter to comprehend that the media is supporting his failure. If the media is supporting Trump’s failure, then the media is supporting the failure of a candidate whose aim is to bring back the American
Dream from people whom have lost it under current elites.
The final discourse analysed, Trump’s speech on 12 August 2016, will reveal the consequences of the respective media’s coverage and presentation of their arguments.
10 The ruling elite, as defined by Trump’s speech, is so far considered to be the Clinton-Obama administration. The two politicians are not considered to be separate individuals, but one particular body. The researcher has not yet concluded that the media are a part of this body. Fitzgerald, Page 47 of 70
4.4 Donald Trump Remarks in Pennsylvania: 12 August, 2016 4.4.1 Incongruities Noticed between Trump’s First and Second Speeches
Figure 7: References made by Donald Trump 60
50
40
30
20
10
0 American Populism Hillary Barack Media Economy 2nd Taken Dream Clinton Obama Amendment 09-Aug 12-Aug
The above chart displays references issued by Donald Trump on 9 August and 12
August. References made regarding Economic Policy and the Second Amendment were prompted 18 and six times, respectively. There was no increase in utterances between Speech 1 to Speech 2. All non-policy references, contrarily, saw a positive percentage increase.
Percent-Change Formula: [(Speech 2 References – Speech 1 References)/Speech 1 References] x 100% American Dream: [(8-6)/6] x 100% = +33.3311% Populism: [(54/42)/42] x 100% = +23.81% Hillary Clinton: [(31-16)/16] x 100% = +93.75% Barack Obama: [(10-9)/9] x 100% = +11.11% Media: [(13-3)/3] x 100% = +333.33% Taken: [(19-10)/10] x 100% = +90.00%
11 Rounded to nearest one-hundredth percentile. Fitzgerald, Page 48 of 70
The percent-changes from Trump’s 9 and 12 August speeches signify some kind of reaction towards the events that preceded this event. Trump took the opportunity on 12 August, then, to not address the economy or tax reform, but instead to continue his admonishing of Hillary Clinton, and to further escalate the abhorrence with television broadcasters.
Figure 8: Populism Categories mentioned by Donald Trump Category 9 August 12 August Percent Change Anti-Elite 28 31 +10.71% Fear 15 21 +40.00% Movement 4 2 -50.00% Nationalism 10 3 -70.00% Outsider 6 9 +50.00%
There was a further percentile in key categories (See Figure 8) contained within
Populism. Anti-Elite, Fear, and Outsider all saw a positive change, whilst Movement and Nationalism recorded a negative decrease. The figures could be attributed to
Trump’s escalating references directed at Hillary Clinton and the media. Those two references recorded the highest percentage increases from Speech 1 to Speech 2, at
+93.75% and 333.33%, respectively.
4.4.2 Social Actors Associated with Anti-Elite
There were three key social actors that were linked to Anti-Elite:
1. The typical politician was referenced eight times during Trump’s speech
(2016b). Though these politicians have not been named, one can reasonably
infer that these politicians are of the same ruling elite to which Hillary Clinton
and Barack Obama belong:
Fitzgerald, Page 49 of 70
“When a company wants to leave our country to go to another country and think they're going to make their product, and because our politicians are weak, stupid, taken care of by lobbyists, special interests—they're taken care of by lobbyists, they're taken care of by donors and special interests.”
The typical politician being rebuked by Trump is earmarked as both
incompetent and corrupt; as an official who cannot effectively govern and an
official whose interests lie within politician-self is not concerned by the
circadian struggle of Americans (i.e.: Trump Supporters) who believe that
their values are being revoked.
Hillary Clinton has been portrayed as a corrupt and incompetent member of
the ruling elite that is disinterested in governing Americans. The researcher
noted in Section 4.2.1 that Clinton does not care for the average American.
Though one cannot directly indict Clinton of being the colloquial politician
discussed by Trump, one can imagine that Trump created a broad perspective
that the politicians within the ruling elite (to which Clinton and Obama
belong) exhibit this type of character.
2. Hillary Clinton was again most-often connected with anti-elite discourse. Not
inclusive of the occasions the colloquial politician was linked to anti-elite,
Clinton was associated to the category 16 times. Similar to the previous
passage discussed, Trump (2016b) often depicted her political career as
poppycock.
And companies were leaving, tremendous unemployment, tremendous problems, making nothing and she said I will turn it around, I will create 200,000 jobs, we're going to do a great job. Guess what? She got elected, she did nothing. And the only ones that benefited were the consultants and the people that helped her out. It is a disaster. Upstate New York is right now worse than anything you have in the state of Pennsylvania, she did nothing.
Fitzgerald, Page 50 of 70
Again, Trump typifies Clinton’s Congressional tenure as an out-of-touch
politician under whose governance witnessed civilians becoming unemployed,
entrepreneurial decline, and “tremendous problems.” These accusations are far
removed from the ideals integrated within the American Dream. Of the 19 times
that “taken” was referenced by Trump (See Figure 7), 14 of them were directly
linked to jobs and businesses.
3. “Media” received the highest percentage increase (333.33%) from Speech 1 to
Speech 2, being mentioned 13 times during the latter. Of the 13 times Trump
mentioned the media, Trump invoked “anti-elite” sentiments towards them 11
times. The media were frequently castigated in Trump’s perceived incongruent
coverage during the election. Several mentions were related to broadcasters’
coverage of his remarks towards Hillary Clinton and the Second Amendment.
Two examples made by Trump (2016b) are:
1. […] If I make one mistake [inaudible] say, he [TRUMP] mentions something wrong. He got a wrong date. It’s like headlines all over. 2. And these dishonest media people—they’re the most dishonest people. They said oh, did he mean that? Didn’t he mean that?
Dubbed by Trump (2016b) as the “lowest form of humanity,” the media are
portrayed as Trump as a dishonest homogenous body, whose values are
dichotomous with “fair play” (one of the traits identified within the
American Dream). A schism exists between the elite class and the average
American/Trump supporters. One must continue to probe into the
connections between the subjects being referenced by Trump, and what
they signify.
Fitzgerald, Page 51 of 70
4.4.3 The Link between Hillary Clinton and the Media
The researcher identified a new relation made by Trump during his 12 August speech: Hillary Clinton and Media. Trump issued four direct remarks on the pair:
1. It turned out to be a total fantasy and I have to tell you, I respect the Washington Post for writing one bad story. Because you know what they’re doing? And Reince was alluding to it a little bit, the only way she gets elected is if they don’t report on her. They don’t show her. They have me on so much television. There’s CNN, you talk about dishonesty, it’s called the Clinton— wait—it’s called the Clinton News Network, CNN. (Trump, 2016b).
This is a clear indictment of the media’s objectivity in reporting during the 2016 Election. By connecting the acronym CNN to Clinton’s name, Trump is accusing the televised media and Clinton of being one singular entity – similarly to how Clinton and Obama are the same entity, and how Clinton/Obama are of the same substance as the colloquial politician.
2. She’s (Hillary Clinton) hardly ever on [TV] (Trump, 2016b).
3. So now they (Clintons) have a big scandal in New York. It’s in the New York papers, but very little. Pay right? Pay for play. And it’s horrifying, it’s horrifying. Our government is for sale. Our government is for sale by a crooked person. And what they’re doing is they’re trying to not talk about her. Take a look. You go to CNN as an example. Story after story about Trump. Story—Trump. Trump. Trump. Trump (Trump, 2016b).
4. But somebody was explaining to me their theory. If they (Media) don’t report on her (Clinton), people aren’t going to know how bad she is (Trump, 2016b).
One must ask oneself if it is fair for two ruling elites to conspire with each other to ensure, in essence, political survival. The game that these two entities are playing, Trump states, is a contradiction to the values that his supporters uphold when identifying the American Dream. The elite are cheating, and the average American is suffering the consequences.
The researcher could not conclude, from Trump’s first speech, that the media were hegemons in their approach to reporting during the 2016 election. The following will attempt to make that connection. Fitzgerald, Page 52 of 70
The researcher will continue to follow mathematical traditions by applying the transitive property, which states the following: If A = B, and if B = C, then A = C12. The researcher will substitute the references in places of the variables. The researcher will substitute Media for A, Hillary Clinton (abbrev. HRC) for B, and Elite as C.
If Media = HRC, and if HRC = Elite13, then Media = Elite.
This is significant because the media are complicit in taking away the American
Dream and other inalienable rights – i.e.: Second Amendment – from Trump supporters and other Americans. Clinton’s political tenure has been demurred by
Trump as egoistic and shameful; Clinton, the figurehead of American politics, is subservient to the interests of other elites, who are disinterested in the ordinariness of the average American’s strife. The media, Trump claims, serve the cyclical needs of the ruling elite to ensure its survival; by disparaging Trump, and by omitting Clinton’s fallacies, the media are fighting for the survival of a fellow elite. If the media are a part of Hillary Clinton, and if Hillary Clinton is Anti-Elite
(i.e.: Corrupt, etc. Taken), then the media too contribute to this apocalyptic
America.
The discourse utilised by Trump envisions a dystopic fantasy of American politics. He employs fearful messages aimed at his supporters, who believe that their inalienable rights are being retracted by the ruling elite. He universalizes the political elite not as factions of different and organizations, but as a homogenous entity aiming to coalesce its power (as earlier alluded to by describing the colloquial politician). Trump’s key message is essentially saying, “It’s not fair.” The
12 Source: Encyclopaedia Brittanica (n.d.) 13 HRC=Elite does not signify that Clinton is resistant to the ruling elite; rather, it signifies that she is part of the elite that Trump’s anti-elite rhetoric discusses. Fitzgerald, Page 53 of 70
puzzle, now to be solved by the electorate, is this: who can end this tyranny? If the ruling elite are conspiring with each other, and are harming the electorate by doing so, then how can the electorate defend itself; or, who can defend the electorate?
4.4.4 Trump and the Paradigm Shift
The answer to the question above, according to Donald Trump, is Donald
Trump. Trump (2016a, 2016b) coined his political following as a “movement.” The movement to which he refers can be better understood as a political paradigm shift; he believes that his character as a political outsider has spurred the electorate to reassert itself as the bedrock of American politics. Rather than being oppressed by the current elites, the electorate is taking ownership of its own survival. Trump’s simple language evokes attitudes that he is not bound to the same elite class such as the televised media or Hillary Clinton. Having referred to his “outsider status” nine times on 12 August, Trump (2016b) portrayed himself as a poor-man’s billionaire:
And I grew up, you know they say, ‘you know you’re really rich, how come you sort of relate to these people?’ Well, my father built houses and I used to work in these houses and I got to know the electricians, I got to know all these people, I got to know the plumbers, the steamfitters—I got to know them all. And I liked them better than the rich people that I know. I know a lot of rich people. It’s true. They’re better. I like them better. There are two sorts of political figures in the 2016 election: the current elite (to which Clinton belongs), that is subservient to other elites and apathetic towards the electorate; the other is Donald Trump, who (according to himself) shunned the elite class in favour of the electorate. By championing himself as a commoner,
Trump is the champion – or “messenger” – of the revolution that he spurred:
We’ve lost thousands and thousands of companies, we’ve lost millions of jobs – too late. I should have been there 10 years ago. Nobody would have left. Nobody would have left because you need the right messenger, you know, I’m your messenger in terms of this movement (Trump, 2016b). Fitzgerald, Page 54 of 70
Trump is juxtaposing two powerful emotions: fear and hope. The electorate,
Trump claims, has already been decimated; however, his arrival marks the beginning of a paradigm shift in American politics, where ordinary people have a champion who will be subservient to their values. By lambasting the political elite media and their argumentative discourse as a conglomerate interested in his dismissal, Trump is elevating his own status as messenger.
4.4.5 Donald Trump’s Speech: 12 August 2016, Conclusion
Trump’s fearmongering discourse creates a dystopic fantasy in which the average person within the American electorate is oppressed by the ruling elite, fostered and developed by the televised media. The televised media do not represent the American people, according to Trump. Though the intended audience is the same electorate to which Trump is speaking, the broadcast media’s interests are not pure because they are championing a corrupt politician. The media, Trump issues, are cheating the game and, by doing so, risk the survival of his electorate. By treating candidate Trump as a spectacle, the media are admonishing an oppositional voice. Trump, in whose political character resides hope, will restore the values contained within the
American Dream to those whom have witnessed it being taken away from them. That oppositional voice, the electorate believes, will reset the game being overrun by the political elites, culminating in a resuscitation of their livelihoods.
Fitzgerald, Page 55 of 70
5.0 Conclusion
5.1 Re-evaluating the Theoretical Framework
The broadcast media’s presence during political cycles are especially poignant because the electorate is much more aware of the political consequences that their actions possess; additionally, news coverage is crucial for aspiring candidates. As chief social influencers, the media’s perception of certain candidates typically shapes public opinion (Cohen, Tsafati, and Sheafer, 2008). It is the candidate’s duty to seize coverage and continue to foster the coverage he or she receives.
Trump expertly handled this. The three television programs that were analysed all negatively reacted to his remarks about Hillary Clinton, and derided his candidacy as disqualifying and toxic. Trump pivoted his anti-elite discourse towards the institutionalised media, associating them with Hillary Clinton and the current elite class. Mosco (2009) reasoned that news is a method to preserve the status of the existing social elite. By skewering his character, the televised media are reproaching an opposing voice. That opposing voice, though, is a self-characterized reference to those Americans who believe that their core American values and rights are under threat of extinction by the corrupt ruling class. In a democracy, it is the electorate’s role to defend its inalienable rights. Bennett (1996) identified the dominant elite as the chief threat to a democracy. The 2016 American electorate deduced, then, that the current dominant elite – which contains the broadcast media – was the greatest threat to American democracy. The dominant elite infringed upon those rights that the electorate cherished, and were thus subjugated to being deposed. The broadcast media were not as concerned with nurturing the electorate’s inalienable rights; they were more concerned about their own survival vis-à-vis profiteering from ratings. A look into CNN’s ownership will explain why this is worrisome. Fitzgerald, Page 56 of 70
5.2 The Jeff Zucker Problem
A brief investigation into CNN’s ownership will lead one to discover that the network is subservient to Jeff Zucker. One who is familiar with Zucker will recognize his presence within CNN is problematic. Ownership and advertising are two of the five filters of censorship identified by Herman and Chomsky (2008). The owner is interested in profiteering from his or her media outlet investment, and advertisers will engage in bidding wars to secure advertisement slots for programs with more viewers.
This is a threat to news coverage on television, especially during the election cycle.
Trump’s celebrity status inflamed the threat even further. As American news organizations developed into commercial enterprises via the development of capitalism, their presence exists to serve the owners (Herman and McChseney, 1997).
To the detriment of American civics, Zucker is rebranding CNN primarily as an entertainment network (he oversaw The Apprentice whilst at NBC). Another glance at
CNN Tonight with Don Lemon illustrates this the duplicity of favouring spectacle over legitimate news coverage. Introducing four social actors to disparage the remarks of one comment, and introducing one surrogate to inorganically create tension, does not add any value to political rhetoric. Instilling talking heads for the sake of drama and spectacle is antithetical to substance. Zucker – and therefore CNN – does not seem to care. The network hired Trump’s former campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, after he was forced to resign following accounts of sexual harassment. Margaret
Sullivan of the Washington Post (2016) penned that CNN’s hiring of Lewandowski plunged the ratings driven network into a “sea of muck.” CNN hired Lewandowski aware that he could not speak ill of Trump because of his non-disclosure agreement.
This move by Zucker was not intended to add another credible and objective voice; he merely added another player to the game. Fitzgerald, Page 57 of 70
Should politics be directed by entertainment producers? Though one may agree that creating engaging news segments generates more interest in politics, one has to also consider if hyper-partisanship is worth the cost. Similar to local sports clubs, where rival fans negatively view each other, the Pew Research Centre (Doherty and
Kiley, 2016) found that many registered Republicans and Democrats associate undesirable qualities to those of the opposing party. This transcends party ideologies, and it is dangerous. By manipulating audiences into believing they are consuming news coverage – where in actuality they are consuming yet another nearly-scripted drama – Zucker is creating an increasingly unstable political atmosphere that discourages the electorate in trusting institutions vital to American democracy.
5.3 The crumbling trust in institutionalised media and its repercussions
The answer to the question of how political programming can change is not easy to answer, nor does an answer yet exist. With broadcasting increasingly becoming more concentrated14, some have shifted focus towards the infinite optimism of social media, yet its accessibility has only helped fuel extreme identity politics (Kesvani, 2017) and fragmentise audiences (Bennett, 2013) that no longer interact with one another.
The most logical – and unlikely – option would be for new legislation detailing criteria for broadcasters during election cycles to present news in an equilateral manner that minimizes editorials whilst maximizing legitimate news coverage. This will not ever happen because of two reasons. First, as Herman and Chomsky (1998) identified in their propaganda model, the purpose of broadcasting is to profiteer from its ratings.
The more outlandish news coverage becomes, the more viewers tune into the program, and the programme makes more money. The second impasse is the nation’s strict
14 GE, Viacom, Disney, Time Warner, CBS, and Viacom own 79.5% of the total cable channel market (Noam, 2009). Fitzgerald, Page 58 of 70
understanding of the First Amendment15. Congressmen are already in positions of power and need media coverage to help portray them positively (accomplished via advertisements paid for by Super-PACS16), so the idea that political elites would be willing to thrust their political career into uncertainty will not ever happen.
This presents a real threat to American democracy. Those who voted for him ought not to be blamed. If a group of people believe their way of life is in danger, do they not have the authority to protect it? Trump’s discourse throughout the campaign eschewed fear – the American Dream is in danger, and the life of his supporters are in tatters. The Clinton legacy brought about the loss of jobs and the destruction of towns and infrastructure, and is back again. More alarmingly, the broadcast media
(according to Trump) seem to be accomplices in the corruption of the political elites.
The United States is witnessing itself slide down the slippery slope into authoritarianism. Trump’s discourse towards the media has only escalated since his election, rebranding the term “fake news” (Rosen, 2016) in the process to categorize the institution as dishonest and corrupt. To combat this epidemic that he sees, Trump has installed a “Real News” channel on his Facebook page to deliver his own message to the people (Vitali, 2017), which is nothing short of state-run propaganda.
The repercussions of this election will be long-lasting, not just because of policy, but because how it heightened hyper-partisanship in the United States. The televised media must accept its responsibility in destabilising the foundations of American politics, and the consequential democratic crisis that currently grips the nation.
15 The First Amendment in the Constitution of the United States says that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” (Cornell Law School, n.d.b). 16 A political action committee may accept unlimited funds for campaigns so long as it is not coordinated with candidate himself or herself. Super-PACS typically raise hundreds of millions of dollars (hence the prefix, “Super”) that are used for advertising on television, in print, etc. (Frum, 2016). Fitzgerald, Page 59 of 70
5.4 Limitations, and Suggestions for Further Research:
The researcher acknowledges the lack of information discussed concerning nationalism. There are two reasons for this. First, as identified in the theoretical framework, nationalism is its own ideology. Second, nationalism was frequently linked to immigration in Trump’s discourse, which is an issue that would have steered the researcher away from the main issue. Immigration and nationalistic sentiments ought to be studied further, and would be most effectively studied if studied separately from populism.
The researcher also did not include any religious portrayals that Trump evoked or pandered to, which did play a role in the election. According to the Washington Post,
80% of white Evangelical voters voted for Trump; he also received 59% of the Catholic vote (Bailey, 2016). Considering he depicted himself as a messenger who has been frequently attacked by the ruling class, and who promises hope for a beleaguered people, it would be noteworthy to identify how Trump identified with Christian values, and how he became a Christ-like figure. It would be wise to also study the American
Dream, specifically how it relates to the Trump’s fan base. This type of research has not yet been conducted, yet could be crucial to understanding if their values were lagging behind an evolving ideology.
Further research should also be conducted on the current Trump presidency, which is in the midst of an investigation into possible collusion during the election
(Beauchamp and Prokop, 2017). The media’s portrayal of Trump throughout the investigation will be crucial as to how audiences will react to his acquittal or indictment.
In retaliation against the reports, Trump has used Twitter as a means to disparage media outlets (Sargent, 2017). One must be critical in how the televised media outlets report the investigation because of the fervency inherent within Trump’s fan base. Fitzgerald, Page 60 of 70
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Appendix A: Timeline of events (Week of 9 August 2016) Date Time Subject Social Actors Involved (Affiliation)
09-Aug-16 15:00 EST Trump: Remarks at a Rally at the University of North CarolinaDonald in Trump Wilmington (Presidential Candidate) Don Lemon (Host) Sara Murray (CNN Political Reporter) 09-Aug-16 22:00 EST CNN Tonight with Don Lemon Dan Bongino (Trump Surrogate) David Gergen (Sen. Political Analyst, CNN) Jeffrey Toobin (Sen. Legal Analyst, CNN) Joe Scarborough (Co-Host) Mika Brzezisnki (Co-Host) Willie Geist (Co-Host) 10-Aug-16 6:00-9:00 EST Morning Joe airs on MSNBC Mark Halperin (Sen. Political Analyst, MSNBC) Mike Barncile (Broadcast Journalist) Jon Meacham (Exec. VP, Random House) Trump tweets: .@dbongino You were fantastic in defending both the Second Amendment and me last 10-Aug-16 8:08 EST Donald Trump (Presidential Candidate) night on @CNN. Don Lemon is a lightweight - dumb as a rock Trump tweets: Morning Joe's weakness is its low 10-Aug-16 8:36 EST ratings. I don't watch anymore but I heard he went wild Donald Trump (Presidential Candidate) against Rudy Giuliani and #2A - sad & irrelevant! Trump tweets: This is no surprise. Constant phony 10-Aug-16 7:15 EST reporting from failing @CNN turns everyone off. The Donald Trump (Presidential Candidate) American people get it! […] Chris Cuomo (CNN Anchor) 11-Aug-16 8:00 EST Chris Cuomo interviews Rudy Giuliani on CNN Live Rudy Giuliani (Trump Surrogate) Trump: Remarks at Erie Insurance Arena in 12-Aug-16 Time not available Donald Trump (Presidential Candidate) Erie, Pennsylvania
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Appendix B: Description of Television Programmes
CNN Tonight with Don Lemon: A two-hour long program dedicated to the day’s majour stories, according to its profile on CNN. Don Lemon was listed by the Columbia Journalism Review as one of the worst journalists of 2014 (Uberti, 2014) for his remarks concerning the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, the Bill Cosby rape case, and the riots in Ferguson, Missouri. It is a multi-camera setup within a panel format, where he often invites fellow CNN talent to contribute to the broadcast. Morning Joe A three-hour long program (from 6:00-9:00 am EST) co-hosted by Mika Brzezinski, Joe Scarborough, and Willie Geist. Scarborough and Brzezinski are the two stars of the program. Scarborough, a former Representative from Florida, is a conservative. Brzezinski’s views often contradict with Scarborough, as she is a liberal. The show mainly covers feature stories from the previous day. Shot within a panel format, they often host other contributors to join the discussion on the day’s news. CNN Live with Chris Cuomo Chris Cuomo was brought up within a political background, whose father served as the Governor of New York from 1979-1982, and whose brother currently holds the same position. Cuomo has been an anchor for CNN since 2013. He was the former Chief Law and Justice Correspondent for ABC. Cuomo typically interviews subjects of interest one-to-one.
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Appendix C: Description of Populism and American Dream Subcategories
Populism Anti-Elite: This category refers to any occasion where Trump issues a derogatory remark towards those considered “elite” (i.e.: politicians, Hillary Clinton, the media). The researcher found that Trump used words such as “corrupt” and “incompetent” in his anti-elite rhetoric. Fear: Referring to any message directed by Trump to invoke a sense of fear. This could be identified when Trump responded to immigration as the “Trojan Horse,” or crying that the election of Hillary Clinton will lead to the destruction of the United States. Movement: Populism is an ideology of “us and them”; thus, the former are revolting against the current status quo. Populist leaders also consider themselves to be the messengers, as identified in the theoretical framework, who convey a particular message to those whom support him/her. Nationalism: Nationalism, as identified in the literature review, is often used interchangeably with populism because both ideologies wish to limit immigration in favour of domestic workers. It also represents domestic policies rather than globalisation. Trump’s motto, “America First,” is an example of nationalism. Outsider Status: This category is held separately from anti-elite because it does not disparage the current elite, but proves that Donald Trump is an average individual running for office. Unlike a typical politician, he would raise money himself instead of issuing a Super-PAC; consequently, he argues this is proof he is of service to Americans and not lobbyists. He did use his outsider status to juxtapose his characteristics with Hillary Clinton. American Dream: Fair-Play: This category suggests that one of the ideals of the American Dream is for individuals to work honestly. Those who employ fair play are those who work within the political confines surrounding them. Better: A consequence of fair play, which argues that if one works honestly, then one’s life ought to improve economically and socially. It also includes generational gaps, where parents’ children ought to be better off than parents were. Entrepreneurship: Since economic success is guaranteed to those who idealize the American Dream, people wish to create their own businesses. Home: Home ownership is considered to be the prize for those who follow the values of the American Dream. If one works hard, then their concurrent economic success enables him or her to own a home.