Renewing Leadership

EGYPTIAN LEADERS KEY PoINTS n Many jihadists may resent Ayman al- Zawahiri’s ascent to the top role in Al-Qaeda, because they are critical of traditional Egyptian dominance of the group’s senior leadership. n As an organization with an Egyptian face, Al- Qaeda central is likely to lose recruits from the Gulf countries to its branch in Yemen. n Al-Qaeda will need to integrate Gulf Arabs or at least a Yemeni into its leading circle if it wants to retain its position in the global jihadist movement As-Sahab / IHS Jane’s Renewing leadership The role of Egyptians and Libyans in Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership Rivalries between the Egyptian leaders in Al-Qaeda and their detractors have been simmering for years, but Osama bin Laden’s death has cast fresh light on the contradiction of such nationalism within an ideology that espouses Muslim fraternity. Guido Steinberg reports on the potential schism and how events could develop in the future ith his ascent to the post of Al-Qaeda Although the differences between Yemeni into its leading circle if it wants leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri has final- national groups within Al-Qaeda have lost to retain its position in the global jihad- Wly taken over an organization which some importance (largely as a result of ist movement, while encouraging the Gulf he, together with his Egyptian entourage, the enormous pressure drone strikes have Arabs to keep fighting in Pakistan and has dominated since it was established in the placed on its leadership since late 2007), Afghanistan rather than joining Al-Qae- mid-1990s. Nevertheless, his position is con- they may still hinder Zawahiri from effec- da in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in siderably weaker than that of his charismatic tively rebuilding Al-Qaeda and propagat- Yemen. predecessor Osama bin Laden, who was ing its vision and agenda. killed in a US special forces raid in Abbot- This could also be the case if Al-Qaeda’s Opposition to Egyptian dominance tabad, Pakistan, on 2 May 2011. This is due Iranian-based leaders become more active. Zawahiri is a much less engaging personal- to Zawahiri’s personal shortcomings (the lack Unconfirmed media reports in mid-May ity than was Bin Laden, as indicated by the of personal charisma being only one) but also 2011 citing Pakistani intelligence and jihadist rather muted response from Al-Qaeda affil- because he represents Al-Qaeda’s Egyptian sources even suggested that its leading figure, iate groups to the 16 June 2011 announce- wing, which has been criticized by other parts Sayf al-Adl (an Egyptian) had succeeded Bin ment that he had succeeded Bin Laden of the organization because of their perceived Laden as Al-Qaeda’s interim leader. as leader of Al-Qaeda. Although he com- group solidarity and over-representation in Every indication is that Al-Qaeda will mands respect in jihadist circles, because the organization’s higher ranks. need to integrate Gulf Arabs or at least a of his role as a strategic thinker and Bin IHS Security and Military Intelligence Consulting / January 2012 EGYPTIAN LEADERS (Far left) The upward mobility in the Al-Qaeda movement for non-Egyptians seems to have been driven by the loss of important Egyptian operatives and Al-Qaeda’s inability to replace them. The most prominent loss was of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Al- Qaeda’s commander in North Waziristan and its unofficial third in command, who was killed in a US drone strike in Miramshah, North Waziristan, on 22 May 2010. (Left) Competing groups emerged after AQSL was weakened by the loss of its base in Afghanistan. The most successful of them was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Unity and Jihad Group), which from 2003 fought against U.S. forces in Iraq. Zarqawi’s aim was to create an alternative to the Egyptian-dominated Al-Qaeda by defining goals attractive for the Levantine Arabs. The detrimental effect of Zarqawi’s policies for Al-Qaeda were somewhat mitigated by the subsequent integration of his group into the organization. In October 2004, a statement appeared on a jihadist website (seen here) in which Zarqawi swore allegiance to Bin Laden and changed the name of his organization to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Laden’s long-time deputy, he is frequently Atef’s deputy, Sayf al-Adl, held most of the tion of jihadists across North Africa, Syria criticized for his lack of charisma and rhe- important posts in Al-Qaeda’s functional and Jordan argued that the narrow agenda torical skills and has the reputation to be committees. Without the ideological, stra- pursued by Al-Qaeda’s Egyptian and Saudi jealous, quarrelsome and something of a tegic and military expertise of the Egyptian personnel was at odds with the ideal of know-it-all – a characterization uncom- contingent, most of Al-Qaeda’s operational supranational solidarity within the Muslim fortably close to a stereotype of the Egyp- successes since the mid-1990s would have community, limiting the overall appeal of tian upper classes that is widespread in the been impossible to achieve. Al-Qaeda’s ideology and message. Arab world. Zawahiri’s 90-minute rebuttal Concurrently, however, Egyptian domi- Egyptian influence became an especially in April 2008 to a series of questions post- nance of AQSL proved to be of mixed utility important source of friction after the Al- ed on jihadist websites in December 2007 to the organization, as it fostered a degree Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Nairobi, and January 2008 did little to quell such a of hubris. Many Egyptian jihadists viewed Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in depiction. themselves as natural leaders in the orga- August 1998, when an increasing number Perhaps more importantly, many jihadists nization, provoking resistance by several of young men from across the Arab world may resent Zawahiri’s ascent, because they groups and individuals. Among them were travelled to Afghanistan in order to join are critical of traditional Egyptian dominance many of Bin Laden’s followers from the Gulf Bin Laden’s organization. At this point, of Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership (AQSL). and Yemen, who criticized the excessive many non-Egyptians realized the discrep- Rivalries between the Egyptians and solidarity of the Egyptians within AQSL. ancy between the ideal of a supranational their detractors have a long history within Even more importantly, a younger genera- community, and the reality of Egyptian Al-Qaeda. When the organization emerged domination of Al-Qaeda. Internally and in the mid-1990s as an alliance of the Egyp- externally, Zawahiri and his followers had tian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), led by Zawahiri, The ascent of the Libyans to cope with significant resistance. and the Saudi-Yemeni-dominated group will make it easier for Zawahiri to led by Bin Laden, the Egyptians quickly Abu Musab al-Suri filled the upper echelons of Al-Qaeda’s mask the cultural differences and The Syrian ideologist and strategist Abu hierarchy. Zawahiri became the Al-Qaeda conflicts between the Egyptians in Musab al-Suri was perhaps the most deputy leader, Muhammad Atef (Abu Hafs AQSL and their detractors, which vocal critic of the Egyptians within AQSL. al-Masri, killed in a US airstrike on an Al- have shaped the history of Al- Although not a member of the organiza- Qaeda safe house in Kabul in November tion, he was an influential strategic thinker 2001) was named military head of the orga- Qaeda for so long among many jihadist groups. His opposi- nization, and other Egyptians, including tion to the Egyptians was to some extent January 2012 / IHS Security and Military Intelligence Consulting EGYPTIAN LEADERS Rewards for Justice A substantial part of AQSL has been based in Iran for most of the past decade and led by Egyptian national Sayf al-Adl. The image on the left is an official photo released by the FBI. The second image is taken from an Al-Qaeda video filmed in Afghanistan in January 2000 and subsequently recovered by the US military and leaked to the media in October 2006. dictated by his origin, as most Syrian jihad- began to argue that in addition to targeting organization’s abilities to recruit volunteers ists felt that the Saudis and Egyptians did local Arab regimes, jihadists would also from the Levant. Therefore, competing not take their objectives – which concen- have to focus on the US, Israel and Russia groups emerged after AQSL was weakened trated on the Levant in general and Israel in – was only a vehicle in order to return to a by the loss of its base in Afghanistan. The particular – sufficiently seriously. local Egyptian strategy once the conditions most successful of them was Abu Musab Suri was more critical of Bin Laden and were again ripe. al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad his Peninsula Arabs than of Zawahiri and (Unity and Jihad Group), which from 2003 the Egyptians, but his conflict with the lat- Palestinians and Jordanians fought against US forces in Iraq. Zarqawi’s ter was especially important as Zawahiri Suri’s criticism of the Al-Qaeda leadership aim was to create an alternative to the Egyp- had established himself as the strategic head mirrored similar grievances of fellow mili- tian-dominated Al-Qaeda by defining goals of Al-Qaeda and thus competed in Suri’s tants from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the attractive for the Levantine Arabs. field of expertise. According to Suri, the Palestinian territories. Until several years Thus, he claimed that after the success- Saudis and Egyptians not only dominated after 2001, the impression was widespread ful campaign in Iraq, the jihadists would the organization, but adjusted Al-Qaeda’s that Al-Qaeda remained insufficiently com- establish an Islamic state and carry the strategies to their national interests, under- mitted to the struggle against Israel.

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