Cold War in Russian Popular Culture: From Suspi- cion to Acceptance via Seventeen Moments of Spring

Erik Jens

Introduction

In 1972, a classified CIA document (right) describing an episode of a novel that was serialized in Komsomolskaya Pravda during January and February 1969 was filed in CIA Headquarters. The episode involved a supposed Soviet intelligence operation early in 1945, in which a “Colonel Isayev” successfully “sabotaged” negotiations OSS officer Allen Dulles was then conducting with the Germans in Bern, Switzerland. Ac- cording to the report, Isayev also met two senior Germans, “Chancellor Bruening” and “Gestapo chief Mueller.” The report writer went on to conclude the account was “in all probability a fabrication”—although the Dulles negotiation was a fact— but in the interests of caution the report’s preparer recommended it be filed in Heinrich Muel- ler’s CIA file—where it remained at least until 2008, when it was declassified.1 As it turned out, the episode was neither a real operation nor a “fabrication,” but a synopsis of an episode in a Soviet spy thriller titled Seventeen Moments of Spring, which went on to become one of the USSR’s most pop- ular and enduring television miniseries.

That US intelligence analysts could mistake a work of Soviet-era spy fiction for reportable intelligence says much about the most famously, the 1973 television miniseries Seventeen opacity, to Western observers throughout the Cold War Moments of Spring.a, 2 The series, commissioned by then- and even afterward, of Soviet popular culture. The single KGB chief Yuri Andropov to burnish the reputation of most popular and venerable hero of Russian spy fiction, for nearly 50 years, has been Col. Maxim Maximovich Isaуev, known to every Russian of a certain age by his a. This essay will use the terms “Soviet” and “Russian” in- working cover name, Max Otto von Stierlitz, or simply terchangeably when discussing cultural attitudes, which had, as “Stierlitz,” the hero of several Soviet-era novels and, and retain, deep roots in the Russian motherland. The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Erik Jens, 2017

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In the Soviet Union of the late 1940s and 1950s, espio- nage, as a genre of fiction, held little appeal for the Soviet The Russian literary world had reading and movie-going public. therefore, by the start of the Great War and later, abdicated the field the intelligence profession, was Soviet Espionage Fiction of espionage fiction to (primarily) hugely successful upon its broadcast Before the Cold War the English, with Rudyard Kipling premiere, and its annual broadcast leading the charge. Along with him thereafter until the 1990s remained In the Soviet Union of the late came the respective anti-German jer- a major pop culture event for Soviet 1940s and 1950s, espionage, as a emiads dressed up as popular fiction viewers. genre of fiction, held little appeal for of novelists Erskine Childers and the Soviet reading and movie-going William le Queux, who established Seventeen Moments of Spring public. This was partly a result of the spy thriller as a permanent fixture may even have played a role in the Tsarist Russia’s cultural affiliations in the English literary landscape.6 rise of . In his first job with European high society. Russian But, neither Kim, that pivotal novel following his 1991 resignation from political, cultural, and literary life of Great Game espionage, nor the the KGB, Putin, then a St. Petersburg had closely followed that of France later writings of T.E. Lawrence (who, city official, had himself featured in since the 17th century; the connec- if not the first British “political” to a local documentary reenacting, as tion strengthened throughout the don native garb, was surely the first “Stierlitz,” an iconic scene from the 19th century and persisted until the to lend a largely fictional glamour to miniseries. The episode, which also establishment of the Soviet Union the intelligence business by posing marked Putin’s “coming out” as a cut off, officially at least, most such in full regalia for the home newspa- former spy, helped launch his politi- Western influences.5 The 19th-cen- pers as “Lawrence of Arabia”) had cal career, and the subsequent decade tury European literary disdain for counterparts in or made any lasting of adoring media comparisons to fictional “spies” had therefore persist- impression on Russia or the Soviet Stierlitz helped him all the way to the ed in Russian literature and popular Union of the period. 3 Russian presidency in 2000. Vladi- attitudes far longer than it did in the The Soviet Union’s own early mir Putin, thus, like Schwarzenegger, West.a And, at the turn of the 20th history created a second, more imme- rode the coattails of a fictional perso- century, the decade-long machina- diate and visceral, source of Russian na to political leadership. tions of the sorry Dreyfus affair, cultural antipathy toward espionage perpetrated by mendacious French Yet Stierlitz, “one of the central as a genre of entertainment. By the intelligence officers, gripped Russian characters in Soviet [and present-day start of the Cold War, “intelligence” readers and helped to solidify their Russian] grassroots mythology,” in the collective Russian memory image of “intelligence” as, by defini- remains almost entirely unknown meant spies, informers, and secret tion, wicked and, at best, a necessary outside the former Soviet Union.4 For murder, from the revolution through evil.b the intelligence historian, the back- years of purges culminating in the ground and production of Seventeen Great Terror of the mid-1930s. Moments of Spring provide worth- a. One of the few 19th-century novels while glimpses into Russian popular dealing directly with spies was American: The Soviet intelligence services attitudes, informed by their national James Fenimore Cooper’s 1821 tale of also emerged from the Great Patri- history and temperament, toward Revolutionary War espionage, The Spy. otic War with few, if any, sweeping, Cooper took pains to assure the reader that ready-for-fiction espionage or coun- intelligence work as a subject of even though the hero is spying, he is still a fiction. worthy person, as good as a soldier.—Brett F. Woods, “Revolution and Literature: Cooper’s The Spy Revisited,” varsityturos. eventual exoneration amid revelations of com (accessed 3 February 2017). the French military’s anti-Semitism and other perfidy, the “Dreyfus affair” was per- b. In 1894, French intelligence officers—as haps the first media-friendly global (or at was eventually proved—framed Jewish least Europe-wide) scandal and, incidental- army captain Alfred Dreyfus for treason. ly, helped to launch the espionage genre, at Throughout his trial, conviction, and least in Western Europe, as an established imprisonment on Devil’s Island until his category of popular fiction.

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A tipping point in overcoming Soviet popular disdain for terintelligence exploits. In contrast, fictional espionage was the 1961 elevation of Vladimir the wartime American and British Semichastny to the head of the KGB. intelligence and counterintelligence services had made critical, dramatic, Japanese fleet’s location and defeat it later Russian war films have ever had and well-publicized contributions at Midway. much use for happy endings. in breaking German and Japanese ciphers and otherwise helping to Yet another primary obstacle to What few spy-protagonists ap- militarily defeat the Axis powers on the emergence of fictional hero-spies peared on page or screen in postwar the ground and at sea. Soviet intelli- was the Russian obsession with de- settings had to be free from the taint gence could boast of no comparably fense. This long predated the USSR, of Stalin-era repression. One solu- dramatic contributions to their coun- but the Soviet Union could not be tion was to make the fictional spy a try’s grinding war of attrition against portrayed, even in fiction, as an NATO officer who sees the light and German invaders. Whether for lack aggressor; its mighty military and se- defects to the party, as in the popular of imagination or opportunity, the curity forces were wholly for the peo- 1968 spy film, Oshibka Rezidenta Soviet spymasters never executed ple’s protection. But espionage, by (The Resident’s Mistake). In the grad- operations with the inherent drama definition, is something that a state ually burgeoning field of Russian spy of such British operations as Double does primarily to other states, usually fiction of the mid- and late 1960s, the Cross or Mincemeat.a on their territory. Indeed, the very hero, if not a sympathetic Westerner, name of the Stalin-era counterintelli- was likely to be placed in the Great A noteworthy exception was the gence organization, Smert’ Shpionam Patriotic War—“the only time in So- Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) the (English acronym, SMERSH), meant viet history when the interests of the acclaimed, if ultimately smashed, So- “death to spies.” people coincided with the interests of viet HUMINT network in Europe in the state”—or else during the Bolshe- the early 1940s. The Red Orchestra, Given all the obstacles—histori- vik Revolution.10 however, was concerned mainly with cal disdain for spying, memories of incrementally damaging German the Terror, and a lack of inspiring A tipping point in overcoming military and industrial production.7 dramatics in actual Soviet espio- Soviet popular disdain for fictional No Soviet intelligence operation that nage history—Soviet “spy” fiction espionage was the 1961 elevation of we know of saved so many Allied in the early Cold War centered less Vladimir Semichastny to the head of lives or was so valuable to eventual on traditional clandestine espio- the KGB, a post he held until 1967. Allied victory as, for example, the nage and more on military scout or Only 37 upon his ascension to KGB Americans’ use in 1942 of decrypted reconnaissance units, which at least leadership, Semichastny had little Japanese naval traffic to divine the were incontrovertibly a part of the direct memory of the Terror and had Soviet military machine that had been just old enough to be drafted saved the motherland in the Great late in the Great Patriotic War. Jeal- Patriotic War.8 Most Soviet films ous for the reputation of his agency, and books involving intelligence a. As most intelligence historians will rec- Semichastny anonymously wrote an ognize, Mincemeat was a British deception were thus packaged as “historical” or article for Izvestia to assure readers operation involving a dead tramp dressed as “adventure” films, their spy-like plot that “many young Communist Party a British officer with false documents, left elements dressed up as Red Army and Communist Youth League work- at sea for the Spanish to find and hence con- scout patrols, or perhaps domestic ers have joined the KGB and none vince the Germans to prepare for invasion counterintelligence—all ideally set of the people who, during the time of at the wrong place. And British intelligence, during the Great Patriotic War. For in Operation Double Cross, used decrypt- the personality cult of Joseph Stalin, ed German Enigma traffic to capture and example, SMERSH’s operational took part in the repressions against then double the entire German HUMINT high point was working against the innocent Soviet people is now in the network in England back against the Ger- German military on Soviet soil.9 The Service [italics added].” Throughout mans throughout the war. For more on this, heroes in such stories also tended his tenure, Semichastny not only see Robert Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent to die tragically. Neither Soviet nor supported positive fictional portray- Operations in World War II,” Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, no. 2 (June 2014) als of the KGB, but also worked

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At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov produced from his novel a script for a television miniseries, which was pro- hands, its English translation has duced—again, with KGB approval and support. Zakhov throwing 07 off a cliff to his death—which may say more about to publicize the feats of formerly who might excite and inspire socialist the political or money-making agen- obscured, if not officially denied, readers.12 das of Cold War–era translators than Soviet intelligence officers.11 During about Gulyashki himself. and after Semichastny’s time in the Seeking a literary riposte to the KGB, the Kremlin came to lionize increasing global popularity of the such Soviet intelligence officers and Bond franchise, Soviet officials Beginning the Transformation assets as Rudolf Abel, Kim Philby, turned to Bulgarian author Andrei and Richard Sorge.a Gulyashki, whose 1963 novel The Zakhov Mission had brought him to In 1966, the Soviet author Julian the attention of Soviet authorities Semyonov, a longtime news reporter as the likeliest candidate to cre- and tracker of Nazi war criminals, Soviet Reactions to the ate a Soviet literary rival to James published a novel about a young So- Rise of James Bond Bond.13 Gulyashki, probably with viet intelligence officer, one Colonel KGB approval and support, visited Isayev, working against anti-Bol- On the other side of the Iron London in 1966 to ask the late Ian sheviks in 1921. His book attracted Curtain, Ian Fleming’s James Bond Fleming’s publisher for permission the favorable attention of KGB chief novels were gaining increasing pop- to use James Bond as a character Semichastny and his successor, Yuri ularity throughout the late 1950s and in his new book. His presence in Andropov. Also intent on rehabilitat- 1960s. The Bond film franchise, be- England created a minor splash in ing the KGB’s popular image, An- ginning in the early 1960s, launched Time magazine, which wondered dropov commissioned Semyonov to Agent 007 into the global cultural in print, “Who would that baggy write a follow-up novel about a Sovi- stratosphere alongside Coca-Cola Bulgarian be, prowling up Bond et agent in Germany during the Great and Mickey Mouse. The Kremlin Street, slipping into pubs all over Patriotic War. Semyonov accordingly made sure to have Bond blasted in town and quietly haunting the men’s wrote his next novel, Seventeen Mo- the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda clubs?”14 Gulyashki failed. Fleming’s ments of Spring (1969) with substan- (not unjustly) as “liv[ing] in a night- publisher not only promptly denied tial KGB support, including access to 16 marish world where laws are written him permission to use Bond or his its secret archives. at the point of a gun, where coercion 007 prefix, it took immediate steps ot While the perennial Soviet “book and rape are considered valour and protect its copyright by commission- drought” prevented most Soviet murder is a funny trick.” Privately, ing Kingsley Amis to write, under citizens from reading Seventeen however, Soviet leaders were well a pseudonym, the first of over 30 Moments before the miniseries aware of Bond’s propaganda value post-Fleming Bond novels.15 premiered in 1973, many had read at to the West and of the absence of any least some of the story in the install- equally charismatic Russian hero Gulyashki, undeterred, renamed his forthcoming book Zakhov vs. 07 ments noted above in the CIA report and saw it into print in 1968. While on the Komsomolskaya Pravda series as literature the novel has little to early in 1969. As printed, Seventeen a. Abel was arrested in the United States recommend it, it does illustrate a pe- Moments relied heavily on offi- and eventually traded for captured U-2 pilot rennial distinction between Western cial-looking “dossiers” to introduce Gary Francis Powers; Philby, one of the and Soviet-era fictional spies:Agent characters and move the plot along— “Cambridge Five,” did immense damage doubtless one reason the CIA analyst to the British and American services in his Zakhov is more of a detective than work for the KGB; and Sorge, one of the a superspy, a man of simple tastes took it seriously enough to have it most famous and venerated wartime Soviet who nonetheless is able to best the filed as possibly genuine intelligence. intelligence officers, was captured and brutal and misogynist “07.” Curious- At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov eventually executed by the Japanese when ly, while the original novel leaves Stalin refused to acknowledge him as nashi produced from his novel a script for 07 alive and chastened at Zakhov’s (one of ours).

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The television premiere of Seventeen Moments, eagerly a television miniseries, which was anticipated by Russian viewers, was an immediate smash produced—again with KGB approval success. and support—during 1971–72. Upon completion of filming, a first edit of agents, and engages in a battle of Russian viewers largely accepted as the miniseries sparked a spat between wits with various high-level Nazis, fact, is that the supposed secret peace the KGB officials who had midwifed especially Gestapo chief Heinrich talks were designed to carve up the it and their military counterparts; the Mueller. As the Javert-like Mueller postwar world behind Stalin’s back, latter castigated Seventeen Moments comes closer and closer to identify- not for its more limited aims, about for ignoring the Red Army’s role in ing Stierlitz as the mole within his which Moscow was duly informed.18 actually winning the Great Patriotic organization, the latter must rely American journalist Hedrick Smith, War. To placate the generals, director almost entirely on his wits to avoid traveling in Russia during 1973–74, Tatyana Lioznova was forced to add detection. found that “ordinary Russians,” al- a number of “meanwhile, on the bat- most universally admirers of Seven- tlefield” interludes, mostly random To a Western viewer, the minise- teen Moments, routinely accepted as stock footage of Soviet ground forces ries is deliberately paced—even for a historic truth its depiction of Amer- in combat.17 Soviet film production— sometimes ican connivance with Nazis at the to the point of catatonia. Stierlitz Soviet Union’s expense.19 The television premiere of Seven- seems to spend as much time tak- teen Moments, eagerly anticipated by ing languid walks and engaging in Russian viewers, was an immediate conversations with people uncon- smash success. Viewed by an esti- nected to intelligence—or the plot of Seventeen Moments of Spring’s mated 30–50 million viewers nightly, the miniseries—as he does actually Uniqueness in Soviet Television the 12-part series was immediately thwarting the Nazi high command. heralded—and remains to this day—a And in contrast to the typically The series was very well-made by cultural touchstone of Russian lethal, kinetic climax of a Western Soviet standards, on par with theat- popular culture and the single most spy thriller, as the entire Gestapo rical films of the era. Among many transformative event in rehabilitating, appears to be rummaging Berlin to other cultural accolades, Mikael in the eyes of the Soviet citizenry, the find Stierlitz, we see him sleeping in Tariverdiev’s music, especially the image of the heroic Russian spy. It a car just outside of town. Yet this is theme song “Moments,” has entered continued to be annually rebroadcast part of the point of the story: Stierlitz the Russian pantheon of popular, fre- nationwide well into the 1990s. spends time and does things with quently performed film music.20 But people who have nothing to do with its production quality was only one The plot of Seventeen Moments his mission, simply because, while of several factors that ensured Seven- plays out in and around Berlin, an active intelligence officer, he teen Moments cultural immortality. during the war’s final months in remains a human being. He balances Firstly, and in sharp contrast to most 1945. Max Otto von Stierlitz (played the necessary hardness of clandestine genre films and books to that point by the popular actor Vyacheslav intelligence work with his need to in Soviet culture, the script almost Tikhonov) is a longtime mole high in remain a functioning social being never refers to “the Soviet Union” or the Nazi hierarchy. His primary mis- with meaningful relationships—even “the party.” Stierlitz works and fights sion is to disrupt secret peace talks if they are mostly with citizens of an for “Russia.” And, significantly, we between Germany and the United enemy state. learn that Stierlitz has spent “over a States, a scenario based very loosely decade” in deep cover in Germany on talks OSS officer Allen Dull- The show’s “documentary” style, and thus cannot have been involved es and SS commander Karl Wolff complete with portentous voiceovers in the Great Terror of the mid-1930s. had as part of Operation Sunrise, a and onscreen “dossiers” providing In Semyonov’s earlier books, Stierlitz negotiation to secure the surrender background on various characters, had been on duty at least since 1921, of German troops in Italy. Along the lends even its creative fabrications but that backstory was dropped from way Stierlitz disrupts a German nu- an authoritative air. Most notably, the Seventeen Moments. clear weapon project, recruits several central plot point of the series, which

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Among Russian citizens, the cultural legacy of Seventeen Moments was the lasting positive impression of espio- In any case, even under the nage it created. KGB’s scrutiny, Seventeen Moments of Spring director Tatyana Lioznova Casting was another factor lifting toward Stierlitz—the hero’s pre- made the most of her talents and Seventeen Moments far above the dicament as a deep-cover operative her opportunities to introduce many usual run of Soviet television produc- in Nazi Germany echoed for more layers of subtlety in realizing the ap- tions. In contrast to the usual Soviet discerning Soviet viewers their own proved shooting script on film—even depictions of wartime Germans as daily lives: an intelligent person sur- beyond the unusually long leash the unequivocally evil, most of the Ge- rounded by mostly sympathetic char- KGB provided. stapo high officials with whom Stier- acters, to whom they can never utter litz spars throughout the series were a word of their secret thoughts. In played by beloved Russian character informer-saturated Soviet Russia, this Lasting Cultural Impact: Who actors, whose mostly advanced ages was a compelling metaphor. Indeed, Is the “American Stierlitz”? in this KGB-assisted production also many critics identified the Nazi Party served as “a courteous bow to the of the television series as an allegory Among Russian citizens, the cul- vitality of Soviet gerontocracy.”21 for the Soviet Communist Party.22 tural legacy of Seventeen Moments In particular, Leonid Bronevoi, the In this reading of the miniseries, was the lasting positive impression of Jewish actor and survivor of the Stierlitz represents and speaks for the espionage it created. This emerging Great Terror, playing Gestapo chief Soviet intelligentsia, forced to live popular appreciation of the spy trade Mueller, pulls off the same trick that within a society hostile to much of became, as will be discussed below, Tommy Lee Jones famously achieved what they hold dear, prevented from first an inspiration and later a pow- in the 1993 American film The Fugi- ever speaking aloud what they truly erful political asset for an ascendant tive: making the antagonist at least as believe. Seventeen Moments thus Vladimir Putin. To fully appreciate sympathetic as the hero. works both as a typical espionage the miniseries’ impact on Russian thriller and as an unusually nuanced culture, we must first examine candi- The sympathetic portrayal of metaphor for Soviet daily life. many Germans throughout the dates, in the English-speaking world, series—including most lower-rank- Critics differ on whether the KGB for a similar position in our own ing and civilian Germans—not allowed or even encouraged such popular culture. only deepened the story’s depth and “dog whistles” to the Soviet educat- While Stierlitz is often called subtlety in contrast to decades of po- ed class. Given the extent to which “the Russian James Bond,” he is not litically orthodox hackwork in Soviet the KGB had involved itself in the nearly so cartoonish or formulaic a film and television but also served production of both the source novel figure as is Agent 007 or indeed the to assure the German audience of and the TV series, it seems likely majority of Western, and especially the 1970s that they were not held to that it licensed a calculated degree American, fictional spies. While blame for the evils of Nazi Germa- of subversive language and imagery of course Bond’s love of creature ny. This approach, in turn, reflected that would help the series’ bona fides comforts and use of high technolo- the long-running Soviet propaganda with cynical Soviet viewers.23 For gy reflect Western ideas (one might strategy that separated Western lead- example, Stierlitz, while certainly even say, the Western id), he also ers and their policies from Western never approaching “Bondian” levels springs from a society that, much as countries’ citizens, an approach that of ostentatious consumption, is not it suffered in World War II, for the was perhaps wiser than the West’s above enjoying black-market treats most part cannot begin to compre- less subtle approach to Cold War from America and France: cigarettes, hend the shadow the Great Patriotic propagandizing by railing against the cognac, and other items that Soviet War cast throughout the Cold War “commies.” orthodoxy disapproved of but many over the roughly 80 percent of Soviet ordinary Soviets of the 1970s craved citizens who survived the German Finally—and perhaps most and acquired whenever possible. critically for the continuing respect and affection Russians felt, and feel,

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As a piece of technical filmmaking,Seventeen Moments onslaught.a No fictional Russian has had little discernible influence on other filmmakers spy, either approved by the Kremlin within or outside the former Soviet Union. or accepted by the Soviet citizenry, could take such a cartoonish view throughout Seventeen Moments but more than any other television series of life and death as do James Bond with never a whisper of seductive to recast science fiction as a genre and his countless Western imitations. intent. Handsome enough to garner garnering the attention of an intelli- Stierlitz’s strength lies rather in his the lasting adoration of millions of gent audience. Indeed, the Kremlin intellect, his ability to keep a secret, Russians, Stierlitz nonetheless re- evidently had its share of Trekkies. and, especially, his endless patience, mains the consummate father figure, Pravda allegedly complained after which, on film, occasionally tests no more romantically available than the first few episodes about the lack the patience of, at least, the Western Mr. Spock or Atticus Finch to those of any Russians in the otherwise viewer. More George Smiley than around him. overtly “liberal” and progressive James Bond, Stierlitz remains a step series, resulting in the last-minute ahead of the Gestapo “by cunning Indeed, Atticus Finch, as written assignment of Ensign Chekov to the and rhetoric, not an ejector seat.”24 by Harper Lee in To Kill a Mocking- Enterprise.c bird and played on-screen in 1962 by Comparisons of Stierlitz to Gregory Peck, may be the Western Imagine a Soviet-era intelligence Bond, or even to more cerebral and literary and screen character whose or propaganda service trying to well-written Western creations like impact most closely mirrors that understand American culture without George Smiley, fall short in another of Stierlitz in Russia. This lawyer ever having heard of either To Kill sense. Bond is a pop-culture icon, on of the Deep South is, like Stierlitz, a Mockingbird or Star Trek, and the the same plane as Superman, Tintin, a morally complex and admirable lesson for American intelligence and or Mickey Mouse. And however character, highlighting by sheer messaging professionals about the intricately and realistically John le force of character a national cultural value of keeping up, to some degree, Carré rendered him or how compel- attitude (in his case, awareness of with Russian popular culture be- lingly Gary Oldman and the late Alec the evil of racism). And Atticus, like comes clear. Guinness played him on-screen, Smi- Stierlitz, works to redeem an oft-dis- ley remains a creature of the shadowy dained profession.b Finally, again like As a piece of technical filmmak- intelligence world, known mainly to Stierlitz and emphatically unlike the ing, Seventeen Moments has had little fans of the genre and having little to ever-fungible James Bond, Atticus discernible influence on other film- say to the wider culture. was, and for most Americans could makers within or outside the former only be, played onscreen by a single Soviet Union. Though much admired Finally, Stierlitz’s quiet fidelity beloved actor, whose face and perso- in Russian culture, the veteran direc- to his wife throughout a decade of na have become inextricably linked tor Tatyana Lioznova’ s masterpiece cover assignment contrasts strongly with the character he played. has never been emulated by her peers with James Bond’s famous readiness in the same way that, for example, to seduce seemingly any woman who Frivolous as it might initially Stanley Kubrick or the great Russian stops moving long enough. Stier- seem, Mr. Spock is nearly as apt litz spends time, and even dances a Western analog of Stierlitz as is and drinks, with attractive women Atticus Finch. The original run of Star Trek (1966–69) probably did c. This claim, which producer Gene Roddenberry first made in a 1968 book, a. The author’s wife recalls classroom di- The Making of Star Trek, has never been atribes, all through her Moscow childhood verified or disproved, though a 1996 book in the 1980s, about America’s pernicious b. The 2015 publication of the Mockingbird by the series’ original producers reproduces delay in opening a second front against the “sequel” Go Set a Watchman, featuring, a letter that Roddenberry wrote to Pravda, Germans during the Great Patriotic War. alas, a racist Atticus, does not change this apparently in response to its complaint, in- Like many former Soviet citizens, she cultural history, though the character’s im- forming the editors of Chekov’s addition to remains impatient with Western film depic- age has surely been tainted for those readers the cast—Herb Solow and Robert Justman, tions of the war as a gallant adventure, won (not including this author) who accept the Inside Star Trek: The Real Story (Pocket by the Western Allies as a matter of course. 2015 book as “canon.” Books, 1996).

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Vladimir Putin was 21 when he first sawSeventeen Mo- ments of Spring and has often credited the show as a Political Impact: Russian Re- primary influence in his joining the KGB. sentments and the Rise of Vladimir “Stierlitz” Putin director Andrei Tarkovsky continue within his fictional universe, but a to influence the language of film. hapless stooge outside of it. An entire Seventeen Moments of Spring academic subfield addresses the phe- cemented in Soviet popular culture That said, at least one Hollywood nomenon of Soviet-era anekdoty, and the lasting belief that America and spy thriller, Brad Bird’s Mission Im- Stierlitz and Gestapo chief Mueller, Germany had secretly bargained possible: Ghost Protocol (2011), paid his chief foil in the miniseries, loom for peace behind Stalin’s back—a homage to perhaps the most famous large in this literature. central, and fictional, plot point in the scene of the entire miniseries. Stier- miniseries. The Kremlin was nervous litz is allowed to see, from across Finally, there is a small irony in enough about the series’ depiction of a café, his wife, secretly smuggled the fact that starting in 1973, the this pernicious American scheme— into Berlin from Russia for the sole same year when Soviet intelligence, complete with a cartoonishly Machi- purpose of this one meeting after after decades of popular disdain, avellian Allen Dulles—to delay the a decade of being apart: they gaze acquired via Seventeen Moments series’ 1973 broadcast premiere until at one another for over six minutes of Spring new respect and esteem after Brezhnev’s visit to the United of screen time, allowed neither to at home, the American Intelligence States, that summer.26 They need not approach or even speak to the other. Community began suffering a series have worried. Other than a New York In the final scene ofGhost Protocol, of public blows—Watergate, Sey- Times article by Hedrick Smith in Ethan Hunt, still in deep cover like mour Hersch’s revelations of spying January 1974, almost no US media Stierlitz, is granted the chance to on domestic groups, and reports from outlets reported on the series, nor was share a long, silent, poignant gaze the Church and Pike Committees— any official notice taken on this side with his wife from a distance, before from which it would take decades of the Atlantic about the depiction resuming his mission. to recover in the public eye. Indeed, of a villainous Dulles scheming to most pre-1990s American scholarship betray his country’s wartime ally. Russian popular affection for Max on “intelligence ethics” proceeded Otto von Stierlitz has not prevented on the assumption that intelligence Vladimir Putin was 21 when the emergence of an entire genre of work is amoral and those who do he first saw Seventeen Moments of jokes (anekdoty) lampooning the it, by definition, morally compro- Spring and has often credited the often portentous and self-evident mised. To what extent was this badly show as a primary influence in his voiceovers throughout the series: mistaken stance influenced by the joining the KGB: “What amazed me contemporary depictions of spies in most of all,” he was quoted as saying, Stierlitz had a thought. He liked American culture as violent and/or “was how one man’s effort could it, so he had another one. evil? Not only James Bond’s objec- achieve what whole armies could A flower pot fell off the window tively poor behavior, but any number not.”27 Putin has also credited another sill of the secret apartment and of 1970s thrillers using the CIA as miniseries of the Andropov KGB era, smashed Stierlitz on the head. the plot’s default Big Bad, and even The Sword and the Shield (1968), This was the signal that his wife M*A*S*H’s paranoid counterintelli- which, however, seems to have left had just given birth to a son. gence officer, Colonel Flagg, come to very little impression on Soviet and Stierlitz shed a single manly mind—and all suffer in contrast with subsequent Russian culture—likely tear. He hadn’t been home for the virtuous, and virtuoso in espio- because of its strict party orthodoxy 25 seven years. nage, Stierlitz. and inferior overall quality. In these jokes, Stierlitz is affec- From the very beginning of his tionately conceived as a combination political career, Putin cultivated his of the American TV characters Joe media image as a “real-life Stier- Friday and Maxwell Smart: a compe- litz.” Indeed, Putin’s first television tent if self-important “straight man” appearance, when he was working

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in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office the Fatherland, Third Class) to the four-decades-old miniseries is its the year after his resignation from 75-year-old , artful blend of facts and propaganda, the KGB, was in a 1992 documenta- who had remained a pop-culture icon presented with little effort to dis- ry about the city government. Putin since the 1970s based on his portray- tinguish historic truth from creative himself urged the director to stage al of Max Otto von Stierlitz.31 fiction. As a result, even today many a famous scene from the miniseries Russians derive their understanding finale—Stierlitz’s long drive back An important lesson that Vlad- of the wartime US-Soviet relation- to Berlin after his final mission, as imir Putin—and indeed, any polit- ship largely from old memories of the iconic theme music plays—with ical leader who studies the role of watching Seventeen Moments of Putin himself as Stierlitz. This “hom- misinformation in consolidating Spring, cheering Stierlitz’s noble ef- age” to Russia’s most beloved fic- power—might have drawn from this tional spy both announced Vladimir Putin to the nation as a former KGB officer and helped launch his national political career.28

Throughout the 1990s, Putin would continue to benefit politically from the stream of media compari- sons to Stierlitz. The KGB veteran’s public image of quiet, reassuring professionalism played into popular angst about Russian political and social instability and the “public longing for a real-life Stierlitz who could deal with any crisis calmly and efficiently.”29 Indeed, the “Stierlitz phenomenon” had already become a cliché in Russian media commentary by early in Putin’s first presidency. The newspaper Vlast noted the polit- ical value to Putin of such compari- sons:

The only thing that puts any blood at all in the veins of the generally rather pallid image of Putin is his past as a spy. Work in Germany, devotion to the homeland, shedding a tear on Soviet holidays. Maxim Maxi- movich Isayev [Stierlitz’s true Russian name], the very one.30

In 2003, presumably in recogni- tion of his debt to the actor whose popularity and talent had helped launch his own career, Putin present- “President 2000: Portrait of the Future Head of State,” Vlast (Power) magazine, 14 March ed a medal (the Order for Service to 2000, The cover image of Stierlitz invoked the fictional spy’s popularity in coverage of Putin during the election that took him to Russia’s presidency a week later.

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forts to thwart America and Germany Conclusion of Seventeen Moments of Spring from plotting against the motherland. in the Agency’s historical Nazi While both Western and Soviet/ files, given the book’s (and minise- In our era of rapidly increasing, Russian espionage fiction have his- ries’) highly permeable membrane politically driven, and often highly torically developed at least partially between historical accuracy and successful “fake news,” increasing- in response to their respective gov- creative fiction. Whether the endur- ly abetted by high-tech fakery, it is ernments’ agendas, as well as what ing Russian love for Max Otto von worth remembering that carefully their readership wanted, Seventeen Stierlitz is in spite of, or due to, the crafted, low-tech misinformation Moments of Spring represents the KGB’s involvement with its produc- can be at least as effective, even apotheosis of a high-quality, enduring tion, Seventeen Moments of Spring after several decades. The KGB has work of popular art—which nonethe- remains well worth watching, both as seldom enjoyed such lasting success less had its origins in, and was both entertainment and as a window into with any propaganda or disinforma- supported and vetted throughout by, Russian popular culture and its effect tion campaign as with its support the very government whose agents’ on recruiting for, and glamourizing of Julian Semyonov’s story about secret heroics it portrayed. The CIA that nation’s intelligence communi- a spy—nashi (one of ours)—in the analyst who wrote the report quoted ty—no less in recent years than four Great Patriotic War. at the beginning of this essay may decades ago. easily be forgiven for filing the plot

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Endnotes

1. CIA website, Special Collection, document titled MUELLER, HEINRICH VOL. 2 0027. pdf, document num- ber 519b7f99993294098d5131d5, (accessed 30 January 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/ 519b7f99993294098d5131d5. 2. “Seventeen Moments of Spring,” Sovlit.net website, 12 November 2014 (accessed 23 January 2017), http://www.sovlit.net/17moments. 3. Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (Viking, 2016), chapter 8. Clips from the 1992 documentary in question can be viewed in an online article on pbs.org, Tim Malloy, “Watch Part of a Film Commissioned by Vladimir Putin—About Himself,” published 12 January 2015 (accessed 2 March 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-part-of- a-film-commissioned-by-vladimir-putin-about-himself. 4. Ivan Zasoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (Routledge, 2004), 144. 5. Encyclopedia.com, “French Influence on Russia” (accessed 6 February 2017), http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-al- manacs-transcripts-and-maps/french-influence-russia. 6. Christopher R. Moran and Robert Johnson, “In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller 1901–1914,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 1–20. 7. Paul Brown, “Report on the IRR File on the Red Orchestra,” National Archives website (accessed 3 February 2017), https://www. archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/red-orchestra-irr-file.html. 8. Elena Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies: Soviet TV Mini-Series of the 1970s (doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2003), 33. 9. Ibid., 63. 10. Igor Pomoranzev, “The Case of the Missing Russian Crime Novel,” Radio Free Europe website, published 31 July 2009 (accessed 1 February 2017), http://ww”w.rferl.org/a/The_Case_Of_The_Missing_Russian_Crime_ Novel/1789846.html. 11. World Heritage Encyclopedia, reprinted on Project Gutenberg website (accessed 31 January 2017), http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/ vladimir_yefimovich_semichastny. 12. Yuri Zhukov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 30 September 1965, reprinted in Jeremy Black’s The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming’s Novels to the Silver Screen (Praeger, 2000), 6. 13. Andrew Nette, “A Proletarian James Bond?”, Overlord 214 (Autumn 2014) (accessed 20 January 2017) https://overland.org.au/previ- ous-issues/issue-214/feature-andrew-nette/. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Cecile Vaissie, “False Nazis and True Chekists,” in The Cold War and Entertainment Television, ed. Lori Maguire (Cambridge Scholars, 2016), 107–20. 17. Ibid., 111. 18. “Office of Strategic Services: Secret Intelligence Branch,” CIA public website, published 19 November 2009 (accessed 6 February 2017), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/oss-secret-intelligence-branch.html. 19. Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Spy Thriller ‘Exposes’ U.S. Plot,” New York Times, 7 January 1974. 20. David MacFadyen, Red Stars: Personality and the Popular Soviet Song (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 115. 21. Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, 103. 22. Ibid. 23. Vaissie, “False Nazis,” 112. 24. Greg Afinogeniov, “A Portrait of Bureaucracy in Twelve Parts: Seventeen Moments,” in Idiom, March 2010 (accessed 31 January 2017), http://idiommag.com/2010/03/a-portrait-of-bureaucracy-in-twelve-parts-seventeen-moments/. 25. “Vashatedil’s Blog” (accessed 30 January 2017), https://vahshatedil.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/Stierlitz-jokes-the-funniest-i-have-ever- read/ . 26. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (Ballantine, 1976), 432–34. 27. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice (Routledge, 2003), 6. 28. Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, chapter 8. 29. Ibid. 30. Zasoursky, Media and Power, 136. 31. “Putin Decorates Beloved Screen Spy,” Moscow Times, 10 February 2003 (accessed 19 January 2017), http://old.themoscowtimes.com/ sitemap/free/2003/2/article/putin-decorates-beloved-screen-spy/240496.html.

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