The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Names Are Predicates
Names Are Predicates Delia Graff Fara Princeton University Names are predicates. This claim can mean different things to different people. Willard V. Quine thought that names were predicates in the sense that they were to be represented as general terms in translations of En- glish sentences into the language of first-order logic.1 Clarence Sloat (1969) thought that “proper nouns,” as he called them, were predicates in the sense that, like common count nouns, they must occur either as a bare plural or with a determiner (such as ‘the’, ‘some’, and ‘a’), although ‘the’ would in some cases go unpronounced. Tyler Burge thought that “proper names,” as he called them, were predicates in the sense that they I am grateful for discussion to David Beaver, Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Bu¨ring, Paul Elbourne, Michael Fara, Elizabeth Harman, Gilbert Harman, Robin Jeshion, Nick Kroll, David Manley, Ora Matushansky, and Dolf Rami. I am also grateful to audiences at Parma, Stockholm, Buffalo, Rochester, Princeton graduate seminars in 2012 and 2014, a meeting of the Jowett Society at Oxford, and MITing of the Minds 2013 at M.I.T., especially to my commentator on that occasion, Bernhard Salow. I appreciate detailed comments on early drafts from Tyler Burge and Stephen Schiffer and detailed comments on late-stage drafts from Kent Bach, Samuel Cumming, Paul Elbourne, Gilbert Harman, Yu Izumi, Ora Matushansky, and Daniel Rothschild. Above all, I am grateful to Harold Hodes and to an anonymous referee for the Philosophical Review for a generous volume of detailed comments on the final drafts, which led to significant improvement of the overall structure and argument of the essay. -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE Timothy Williamson Position: Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College Oxford Born: Uppsala, Sweden, 6 August 1955 Nationality: British Address: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, U.K. E-mail: timothyDOTwilliamsonATphilosophyDOToxDOTacDOTuk Positions held 1980-88 Lecturer in Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin. 1988-94 Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy, University College, Oxford; C.U.F. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford. 1995-2000 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh. 2000- Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College Oxford 1990, 1995 Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U. 1994 Visiting Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T. 1995 Visiting Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury. 1998-99 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University. 2004 Visiting scholar, Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. 2013- Nelson Visitor, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (annual). 2 Distinctions Fellow of the British Academy (elected 1997) Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 1997) Foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (elected 2004) Foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2007) Member of the Academia Europaea (elected 2013) Fellow of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (elected 2011) Named lectures: Henriette Hertz Lecture, British Academy, 1996 Weatherhead Lecture in Philosophy of Language, Tulane University, 1998 Jacobsen Lecture, University of London, 2001 Skolem Lecture, University of Oslo, 2004 Blackwell Brown Lectures, Brown University, 2005 Jack Smart Lecture, Australian National University, 2005 Anders Wedberg Lectures, University of Stockholm, 2006 Gaos Lectures, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Mexico City, 2006 Carl G. -
Draft. Please Do Not Quote) 2 Preface
1 Not Exactly in Praise of Vagueness by Kees van Deemter University of Aberdeen (Draft. Please do not quote) 2 Preface Vagueness is the topic of quite a few scholarly books for professional academics. This book targets a much broader audience. For this reason, the exposition has been kept as informal as possible, focussing on the essence of an idea rather than its technical incarnation in formulas or computer programs. Most chapters of the book (with the exception of chapters 8 and 9, which rely on the material explained in earlier chapters) are self-explanatory. In a few areas of substantial controversy, I have used fictional dialogues – a tried and tested method since Plato’s days of course – to give readers a sense of the issues. Although some things have been too complex to yield willingly to this treatment, it has been a delight to discover how much complex material can be reduced to simple ideas. On a good day, it even seems to me that there are themes that are best explored in this informal way, free from the constraints of an academic straightjacket. The fact that the book is informal may not always make it an easy read. For one thing, it requires a somewhat philosophical spirit, in which one asks why certain well-known facts hold. Moreover, we will not be content when we, sort of, dimly understand why something happens: we will ask how this understanding can be given a place in a known theory. Essentially this means that we will insist on trying to understand vagueness in a way that is compatible with everything else we know about the world. -
Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics
Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics Hasen Khudairi June 20, 2017 c Hasen Khudairi 2017, 2021 All rights reserved. 1 Abstract This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as con- cerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the compu- tational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of undecidable propositions and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational propositional intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is in- terpreted as a modal mental state. Each essay is informed by epistemic logic, intensional semantics, hyperintensional semantics, modal and cylindric alge- bra or coalgebra, modal fixpoint logic, correspondence theory, or automata theory. The book’s original contributions include theories of: (i) epistemic modal algebras and coalgebras; (ii) cognitivism about epistemic modality; (iii) two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and interpretations thereof; (iv) the ground-theoretic ontology of consciousness; (v) fixed-points in vague- ness and a novel approach to conditions of self-knowledge in the setting of the modal µ-calculus; (vi) the modal foundations of mathematical platon- ism; (vii) a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on metaphysical definitions availing of notions of ground and essence; (viii) the application of epistemic two-dimensional semantics to the epistemology of mathematics; (ix) a modal logic for rational intuition; and (x) a novel epistemicist solution to Curry’s paradox. 2 Acknowledgements From 2014 to 2017, I was a Ph.D. -
Delia Graff Fara CURRICULUM VITAE Last Modified: Tuesday, 26 May 2015
Delia Graff Fara CURRICULUM VITAE Last modified: Tuesday, 26 May 2015 Department of Philosophy 245 E. 11th St #3G 212 1879 Hall New York, NY 10003 Princeton University 212-463-7981 Princeton, NJ 08544 [email protected] 609-258-4311 www.princeton.edu/ dfara ∼ EDUCATION Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1993–1997 Doctoral Program in Philosophy. Ph.D. (September 1997) with a minor in · linguistics. Dissertation: The Phenomena of Vagueness. Advisers: George Boolos and · Robert Stalnaker. Harvard University 1991–1993 Doctoral Program in Philosophy. Transferred to M.I.T. · Harvard University 1987–1991 Bachelor of Arts (1991), with a joint concentration in Philosophy and Government. · ACADEMIC POSITIONS Princeton University Professor, Philosophy Department July 2012–present · Associate Professor, Philosophy Department July 2005–June 2012 · Cornell University Associate Professor, Sage School of Philosophy July 2004–June 2005 · Assistant Professor, Sage School of Philosophy July 2001–June 2004 · Academic Positions, continued Princeton University July 1997–June 2001 Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department · Central European Summer School in Generative Grammar August 2000 Instructor (Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria) · Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1994–1997 Teaching Assistant, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy · Harvard University Spring 1996 Teaching Assistant, Philosophy Department · ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS Princeton University Equal-Opportunity Officer, Philosophy Department July 2014–present · Executive Committee on the Program in Linguistics July 1999–June 2001; · July 2008–present AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Philosophy of Language, Philosophical Linguistics, Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic. PUBLICATIONS (2015c) “A Problem for Predicativism Solved by Predicativism,” Analysis 75(3), pages TBD. (2015b) “Names Are Predicates,” Philosophical Review 124(1), 59–117. (2015a) “ ‘Literal’ Uses of Proper Names,” in On Reference, Andrea Bianchi, ed., Oxford University Press, 251–279. -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE Timothy Williamson Positions: Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College Oxford A. Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor, Yale University Born: Uppsala, Sweden, 6 August 1955 Nationality: British Address: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, U.K. E-mail: timothyDOTwilliamsonATphilosophyDOToxDOTacDOTuk Positions held 1980-88 Lecturer in Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin. 1988-94 Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy, University College, Oxford; C.U.F. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford. 1995-2000 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh. 2000- Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College Oxford 1990, 1995 Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U. 1994 Visiting Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T. 1995 Visiting Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury. 1998-99 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University. 2004 Visiting scholar, Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. 2013-15 Nelson Visitor, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 2016-17 Visiting professor, Yale University. 2018- A. Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor, Yale University 2 2 Distinctions Fellow of the British Academy (elected 1997) Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 1997) Foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (elected 2004) Foreign honorary