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Twelve Fallacies of the “Neo-Antitrust” Movement
TWELVE FALLACIES OF THE “NEO-ANTITRUST” MOVEMENT Seth B. Sacher John M. Yun Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper Series 19-12 This paper is available on the Social Science Research Network at ssrn.com/abstract=3369013 TWELVE FALLACIES OF THE “NEO-ANTITRUST” MOVEMENT Seth B. Sachera and John M. Yunb Antonin Scalia Law School George Mason University May 1, 2019 Abstract Antitrust enforcement is back in the spotlight with advocates from both the political left and the populist political right demanding fundamental competition policy changes. While there are differences among those calling for such changes, several common beliefs generally unite them. This includes a contention that the writings and interpretations of Robert Bork and the Chicago School of economics have led antitrust astray in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with the original intent of the Sherman Act. Further, they are united by a belief that recent empirical, economic studies indicate the economy is becoming overly concentrated, that market power has been increasing dramatically, that performance in many, if not most, markets has been deficient, and that too much profit is going to too few firms. In this article, we identify and detail twelve fallacies of what we call the “neo-antitrust movement” and their associated claims. At the heart of these fallacies is a fundamental misunderstanding of economics and the consumer welfare standard that has been at the heart of competition policy since at least the 1960s. Additionally, there is a heavy reliance on studies that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support the positions of those who cite them. -
1 Introduction
1 Introduction The Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA) establishes a process for the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC or ‘the Commission’) to assess and provide advice to the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) on competition in the retail electricity and natural gas markets of jurisdictions for the purpose of phasing out retail price regulation where effective retail competition is demonstrated (clause 14.11).1 1.1 Revisions to Statement of Approach In response to a request for advice by the MCE, this Statement of Approach sets out the proposed methodology and consultation approach the AEMC will adopt in conducting the retail competition reviews. The AEMC has previously prepared and published versions of the Statement of Approach which have been applied to the retail competition reviews undertaken in Victoria in 2007, South Australia in 2008 and the Australian Capital Territory in 2010. Over time, the MCE, in consultation with the AEMC, has periodically approved revisions and updates to the Statement of Approach to reflect developments and reforms in energy markets and revised timings of the AEMC’s remaining jurisdictional reviews. This latest MCE approved version of the Statement of Approach has been prepared for application to the New South Wales retail competition review in 2012-13. 1.2 Scope The scope of the competition reviews is set out in clauses 14.11(a) and (c) of the AEMA (see Appendix A). According to the AEMA, the aim of the competition reviews is to assess the effectiveness of competition in the electricity and gas retail markets for the purpose of the retention, removal or reintroduction of retail energy price controls. -
Comparative Market Structures in Developing Countries
380. 141 LI7" M671 No. 75 i"J- _ , Comparative Market Structures In Developing Countries by Marvin Miracle The University of Wisconsin LAND TENURE CENTER Madison, Wisconsin 53706 Comparative Market Structures in Developing Countries. 380.14i Wisconsir Uniro Lard Tenure Center. NTIS M671 Comparative Market Structures in Devel j)b oping'hp. Cou;triesoMarvh-7 P. Miracle. 19'0° I-,r /0L6 Bibliographic footnotes. C LTC Repriit -,o, 75. i. Markets. 2. Capital markets. 3. Marketing - Agricultural commodities, I. Miracle, Marvin P. IT. Title. Reprinted from Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 9, No. 4, Autumn 1970. Copyright by the University of Nebraska, 1970 COMPARATIVE MARKET STRUCTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* Marvin Miracle Associate Professor,Departmentof AgriculturalEconomics and Chairman,African Studies Program Universityof Wisconsin Market structures in developing countries arc of interest for a number of reasons. Apart from the possibility that market structure may have an important impact on the rate of economic growth-a possibility that will not be explored here-market structure is of interest because it clearly affects the distribution of income, a subject that is increasingly of interest among those working on the problems of developing countries. It is also of interest because economic theory has its widest applications when per fect competition can be assumed. In fact, in absence of evidence to the contrary, something close to perfect competition is nearly always assumed by planners in developing countries. The literature on market structures in developing countries-which are here defined to exclude Communist-bloc countries-is relatively thin, un usually widely scattered, and so far has resulted in few insights as to the impact of market structure on the pace and character of economic devel opment. -
Price Competition with Satisficing Consumers
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Aberdeen University Research Archive Price Competition with Satisficing Consumers∗ Mauro Papiy Abstract The ‘satisficing’ heuristic by Simon (1955) has recently attracted attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper I study a price-competition model in which the consumer is satisficing and firms can influence his aspiration price via marketing. Unlike existing models, whether a price comparison is made depends on both pricing and marketing strategies. I fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium by investigating the implications of satisficing on various aspects of market competition. The proposed model can help explain well-documented economic phenomena, such as the positive correla- tion between marketing and prices observed in some markets. JEL codes: C79, D03, D43. Keywords: Aspiration Price, Bounded Rationality, Price Competition, Satisficing, Search. ∗This version: August 2017. I would like to thank the Editor of this journal, two anonymous referees, Ed Hopkins, Hans Hvide, Kohei Kawamura, Ran Spiegler, the semi- nar audience at universities of Aberdeen, East Anglia, and Trento, and the participants to the 2015 OLIGO workshop (Madrid) and the 2015 Econometric Society World Congress (Montreal) for their comments. Financial support from the Aberdeen Principal's Excel- lence Fund and the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics is gratefully acknowledged. Any error is my own responsibility. yBusiness School, University of Aberdeen - Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street, AB24 3QY, Old Aberdeen, Scotland, UK. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 1 Introduction According to Herbert Simon (1955), in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are eval- uated before a choice is made. -
Industrial Organization 06 Market Structure and Market Power
Industrial Organization 06 Market structure and market power Marc Bourreau Telecom ParisTech Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 1 / 39 Outline 1 Introduction: definition of market power 2 Definition of relevant market An example: market definition in the telecommunications sector Approach based on cross price-elasticities Other approaches 3 The relationship between concentration and market power An example with the Cournot oligopoly model Issues in measuring concentration and market power Other concentration measures Other market power measures 4 The SCP paradigm 5 Some elements about the control of concentration Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 2 / 39 Introduction Introduction Remember, from the lecture on Monopoly: Definition of "market power" The ability of a firm to raise its price over marginal cost. Importance of measuring "market power": In competition policy, some practices (for instance, bundling) are illegal if a firm has market power. In order to estimate the market power of a firm, we need to define first the relevant market. Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 3 / 39 Market definition Definition of the relevant market Two questions: Product market Which products should we include in the "market"? Geographical market Which geographical zone do we have to consider? An economic definition of the market A market can be defined as a group of products presenting strong demand- substitutability and supply-substitutability. Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 4 / 39 Market definition Definition of the relevant market Definition of the European Commission (1997) The relevant market includes all the products and/or services considered as interchangeable or substitutable on the account of product characteristics, price, and regular use. -
Hearing on Oligopoly Markets, Note by the United States Submitted To
Unclassified DAF/COMP/WD(2015)45 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 12-Jun-2015 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________ English - Or. English DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE Unclassified DAF/COMP/WD(2015)45 HEARING ON OLIGOPOLY MARKETS -- Note by the United States -- 16-18 June 2015 This document reproduces a written contribution from the United States submitted for Item 5 of the 123rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 16-18 June 2015. More documents related to this discussion can be found at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oligopoly-markets.htm. English English JT03378438 Complete document available on OLIS in its original format - This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of English Or. international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. DAF/COMP/WD(2015)45 UNITED STATES 1. Following on our submissions to previous OECD roundtables on oligopolies, notably the 1999 submission of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission on Oligopoly (describing the theoretical and economic underpinnings of U.S. enforcement policy with regard to oligopolistic behavior),1 and the 2007 U.S. submission on facilitating practices in oligopolies,2 this submission focuses on certain approaches taken by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) (together, “the Agencies”) to prevent the accumulation of unwarranted market power and address oligopoly issues. 2. Pursuant to U.S. -
Resale Price Maintenance in China – an Increasingly Economic Question
Resale Price Maintenance in China – an increasingly economic question Three recent decisions in China suggest that Resale Specifically, the Court was clear that since RPM was Price Maintenance cases will not be decided solely on a defined in the law as a “monopoly agreement”, it must be legal consideration but will also turn on the economic expected to have the impact of eliminating or restricting context of the agreements in question. competition in order to be found illegal. To determine whether the agreement had the impact of eliminating or Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is a contractual restricting competition, the Court proposed four constituent commitment imposed by a supplier on its distributors not to economic questions: sell its product for less (or more) than a given price. It is very 1. Is competition in the relevant market “sufficient”? common in distribution contracts throughout the world, 2. Does the defendant have a “very strong” market especially in China because of the control that RPM position? provides over resale quality and the distribution chain. 3. What was the motive behind the RPM agreements? RPM is a particularly contentious area of competition law 4. What was the competitive effect of the RPM? since RPM clauses can be both beneficial and harmful to competition depending on the context in which they are implemented. For example, RPM may facilitate unlawful Specifically, the Court suggested that if competition in the collusion between suppliers by allowing them to control and market was sufficient then it would not have found the RPM monitor the final retail price. RPM may also be forced on agreement illegal. -
Effective Competition and Corporate Disclosure A
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE A CRITICAL STUDY by RAZAHUSSEIN M, DEVJI B. Sc. (Econ)», University of London, 1961 Barrister-at-Law, Honourable Society of Middle Temple, London, 1962 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In the Faculty of Graduate Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required staricTardT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1968 In presenting this thesis in partial ful• filment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study* I further agree that permission for ex• tensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, B. C. Canada. ABSTRACT Economic activity in the United States and Canada is predominantly performed by corporations. They are by far the largest private employers of workers, the biggest investors and the predominant instrument of production. They are rapidly growing in size, are generating sufficient funds internally to carry out most of their expansion programs, and are diversifying into unrelated activities. Their affairs are increasingly managed by professional executives who have little, if any, stake In the risk capital. The shareholders, who are legally pre• sumed to exercise control over the powers and actions of corporate executives, are normally too numerous and scattered so as not to be in a position to have a significant influence on the policies of the corporations. -
CHOICE – a NEW STANDARD for COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? a Choice — a New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?
GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? a Choice — A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis? Editors Paul Nihoul Nicolas Charbit Elisa Ramundo Associate Editor Duy D. Pham © Concurrences Review, 2016 GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS All rights reserved. No photocopying: copyright licenses do not apply. The information provided in this publication is general and may not apply in a specifc situation. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. The publisher accepts no responsibility for any acts or omissions contained herein. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to the Institute of Competition Law, at the address below. Copyright © 2016 by Institute of Competition Law 60 Broad Street, Suite 3502, NY 10004 www.concurrences.com [email protected] Printed in the United States of America First Printing, 2016 Publisher’s Cataloging-in-Publication (Provided by Quality Books, Inc.) Choice—a new standard for competition law analysis? Editors, Paul Nihoul, Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo. pages cm LCCN 2016939447 ISBN 978-1-939007-51-3 ISBN 978-1-939007-54-4 ISBN 978-1-939007-55-1 1. Antitrust law. 2. Antitrust law—Europe. 3. Antitrust law—United States. 4. European Union. 5. Consumer behavior. 6. Consumers—Attitudes. 7. Consumption (Economics) I. Nihoul, Paul, editor. II. Charbit, Nicolas, editor. III. Ramundo, Elisa, editor. K3850.C485 2016 343.07’21 QBI16-600070 Cover and book design: Yves Buliard, www.yvesbuliard.fr Layout implementation: Darlene Swanson, www.van-garde.com GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS ii CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? Editors’ Note PAUL NIHOUL NICOLAS CHARBIT ELISA RAMUNDO In this book, ten prominent authors offer eleven contributions that provide their varying perspectives on the subject of consumer choice: Paul Nihoul discusses how freedom of choice has emerged as a crucial concept in the application of EU competition law; Neil W. -
The United States Has a Market Concentration Problem Reviewing Concentration Estimates in Antitrust Markets, 2000-Present
THE UNITED STATES HAS A MARKET CONCENTRATION PROBLEM REVIEWING CONCENTRATION ESTIMATES IN ANTITRUST MARKETS, 2000-PRESENT ISSUE BRIEF BY ADIL ABDELA AND MARSHALL STEINBAUM1 | SEPTEMBER 2018 Since the 1970s, America’s antitrust policy regime has been weakening and market power has been on the rise. High market concentration—in which few firms compete in a given market—is one indicator of market power. From 1985 to 2017, the number of mergers completed annually rose from 2,308 to 15,361 (IMAA 2017). Recently, policymakers, academics, and journalists have questioned whether the ongoing merger wave, and lax antitrust enforcement more generally, is indeed contributing to rising concentration, and in turn, whether concentration really portends a market power crisis in the economy. In this issue brief, we review the estimates of market concentration that have been conducted in a number of industries since 2000 as part of merger retrospectives and other empirical investigations. The result of that survey is clear: market concentration in the U.S. economy is high, according to the thresholds adopted by the antitrust agencies themselves in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. By way of background, recent studies of industry concentration conclude that it is both high and rising over time. For example, Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely conclude that concentration increased in 75% of industries from 1997 to 2012. In response to these and similar studies, the antitrust enforcement agencies recently declared that their findings are not relevant to the question of whether market concentration has increased because they study industrial sectors, not antitrust markets. Specifically, they wrote, “The U.S. -
Harvard Law Review 132, No. 2, December 2018, Pp
SURESH NAIDU November 12, 2019 BUSINESS ADDRESS: 1405 IAB MC 3328 [email protected] 420 W. 118th St. www.santafe.edu/~snaidu New York, NY. 10027 APPOINTMENTS: Professor, Department of Economics/SIPA, Columbia University. September-December 2016 Visiting Researcher Princeton University Industrial Relations Section. July 2010-July 2016 - Assistant Professor, Department of Economics/SIPA, Columbia University. August 2013-May 2014 – Visiting Assistant Professor, MIT Department of Economics. 2008-2010 - Harvard Academy Junior Scholar Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University. OTHER AFFILIATIONS: Santa Fe Institute External Faculty Roosevelt Institute Fellow NBER Faculty Research Fellow (DEV, POL, and, DAE) BREAD faculty affiliate Microsoft Research New York: Visiting Researcher (2016-2017), Consulting Researcher (2017-2018). Faculty Affiliate with Columbia University Population Research Center and Data Sciences Institute. Social Science Research Council Working Group on Big Data in the Historical Social Sciences. EDUCATION: DEGREE DATE FIELD University of California, Berkeley Ph.D. December 2008 Economics University of Massachusetts, Amherst M.A. August 2004 Economics University of Waterloo B.Math.(With Distinction) May 2001 Pure Mathematics (minor in Peace and Conflict Studies) PUBLISHED PAPERS: “Text-based Ideal Points” (with David Blei and Keyon Vafa) -Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 2020. “Do Americans Want to Tax Capital? Evidence from Online Surveys” (with Ray Fisman, Ilyana Kuziemko, and Keith Gladstone). -Forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.. “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets” (with Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, and Siddarth Suri) -American Economic Review- Insights, 2(1) March 2020. 33-46. “American Slavery and Labor Market Power” -Economic History of Developing Regions, 35(1), January 2020 3-22. -
Official Journal of the European Communities on the Definition Of
9 . 12 . 97 [ EN ] Official Journal of the European Communities C 372/ 5 COMMISSION NOTICE on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (97/C 372/03 ) ( Text with EEA relevance ) I. INTRODUCTION 3 . It follows from point 2 that the concept of 'relevant market' is different from other definitions of market often used in other contexts . For instance , companies often use the term 'market' to refer to the area 1 . The purpose of this notice is to provide guidance as where it sells its products or to refer broadly to the to how the Commission applies the concept of industry or sector where it belongs . relevant product and geographic market in its ongoing enforcement of Community competition 4 . The definition of the relevant market in both its law, in particular the application of Council Regu product and its geographic dimensions often has a lation No 17 and (EEC ) No 4064/ 89 , their decisive influence on the assessment of a competition equivalents in other sectoral applications such as case . By rendering public the procedures which the transport, coal and steel , and agriculture , and the Commission follows when considering market defi relevant provisions of the EEA Agreement ('). nition and by indicating the criteria and evidence on Throughout this notice , references to Articles 85 and which it relies to reach a decision , the Commission 86 of the Treaty and to merger control are to be expects to increase the transparency of its policy and understood as referring to the equivalent provisions decision-making in the area of competition policy .