Journal of Namibian Studies, 22 (2017): 105 – 109 ISSN: 2197-5523 (online)

Review: Vilho Amukwaya Shigwedha, The reservations about . Aftermath of the Massacre: Shigwedha argues that “Vorster’s reser- Survivors, Deniers and Injustices , Basel, vations vindicate the argument that the Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2017. SADF went to Cassinga with full know- ledge and authority to kill civilians” (p. 15). This is a tendentious reading of the The 4 May 1978 attack by South African political calculations and military risks Defence Force (SADF) paratroopers on that Vorster would have had to consider the Peoples’ before approving of the operation. Organisation (SWAPO) camp at Shigwedha holds that the SADF pur- Cassinga 250 km inside was posefully planned the operation to kill hailed as an audacious and daring civilians, whereas McGill Alexander operation by the regime. argues that mass killing of civilians was Conversely, SWAPO claimed that it was a an unfortunate consequence of poor massacre of Namibian refugees and intelligence and the bombing and civilians. The controversy continues to strafing of the camp. 1 In addition, generate as much heat as light. The Shigwedha reckons that “[t]here are battle lines have been drawn and both several hints within their own discourse SADF apologists and SWAPO supporters to corroborate arguments that Cassinga seem more intent upon vindicating their was a noncombatant facility” (p. 91). positions than admitting flaws in their Indeed, Colonel Jan Breytenbach’s use argument or lapses of judgment. Both of the word ‘slaughter’ in connection sides are so intractable that neither is with the clearing of trenches where likely to re-evaluate, let alone change, occupants of Cassinga had sought its position. refuge from the SADF attackers might Under the circumstances, there seems well be construed as a tacit admission to be little likelihood that works on the that the majority of them were un- subject of Cassinga can remain neutral. armed. 2 The kill ratio suggests as much, Shigwedha’s book is no exception. He too. But while the SADF has undoubt- pointedly labels SADF participants in the edly attempted to play down the extent raid ‘deniers’ of the massacre. He of the killing, Shigwedha’s contention attempts to prove his point by reference that a massacre was systematically to the SADF’s own documentation. Thus, planned is not convincing and the killing for instance, he cites a memo by of civilians and children is vehemently General , Chief of the denied by participants in the attack. South African army, that enumerated 22 What cannot be refuted, however, is that reasons why the SADF regarded Operation Reindeer resulted a gross Cassinga as a military base. Viljoen used this ‘intelligence’ to persuade Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, that Cassinga 1 Edward George McGill Alexander, The Cassinga was a bona fide military target. Botha, in Raid , MA Thesis, UNISA, 2003: 186. turn, used the same argument to 2 Jan Breytenbach, Eagle Strike! The Story of the overcome Prime Minister B.J. Vorster’s Controversial Airborne Assault on Cassinga 1978 , Sandton, Manie Grovc, 2008: 154f.

Copyright © 2017 Otjivanda Presse.Essen ISSN 1863-5954 (print) ISSN 2197-5523 (online)

violation of human rights and, arguably, operation that is acclaimed in the annals a war crime. 3 of airborne operations rather than a Shigwedha questions the existence of difference of opinion over whether the singular SADF and SWAPO narratives of SADF had committed a reprehensible Cassinga – an argument that I have deed or outrage. Hough and du Plessis made in the pages of this journal. 4 While might be ‘dissenters’ but they are I would concede that there are varia- certainly not ‘moderates’ as Shigwedha tions on a theme, I stand by my claim would have us believe. They are not at that virtually all SADF paratroopers who odds with their compatriots about the participated in the attack tell much the matter of culpability for the killing of same story. The only exception to the innocent civilians. They, too, deny that rule is Johan Frederick Verster (with there was a massacre. They may not whom Shigwedha seems unacquainted) find themselves welcome at reunions of who testified to the Truth & Recon- self-styled ‘Cassinga veterans’ but they ciliation Commission (TRC) but whose have not disrupted the hegemonic SADF credibility as a witness is extremely version of events first constructed by questionable on account of his involve- the military journalist Willem Steen- ment in political assassinations and kamp, 5 and since perpetuated by two other criminal activities. Although participants, namely Breytenbach and Shigwedha adduces the testimony of Mike McWilliams. 6 Pierre Hough in support of his Shigwedha cites the testimony of one contention that SADF paratroopers do Cassinga survivor who claims that du not read off the same script, the latter Plessis went on a shooting spree and does not admit that he and his mercilessly shot dead the wounded at comrades were party to a massacre point blank range (pp. 51-53). It seems either. Rather, Hough seeks recognition that he identified du Plessis as the for what he regards as his starring role perpetrator after being shown a in the rearguard action in which the photograph that depicts him with a Cuban column’s advance on Cassinga (souvenir?) shoulder bag in the was countered. Likewise, the spat company of Breytenbach. Shigwedha’s between Breytenbach and Brigadier modus operandi appears to have been Mike du Plessis is over who exercised to induce Cassinga survivors to tell their leadership of the operation on the stories and elicit their responses to ground. In this case, it is a matter of photographs of the attack that he had claiming credit for commanding an reproduced for the express purpose of showing informants. This triggered

3 The TRC classified Cassinga in terms of the former and not the latter because the paradigm 5 Willem Steenkamp, Borderstrike! it employed was informed by the precepts of into Angola , Durban/Pretoria, Butterworth, 1983. transitional justice rather than international law. 6 Mike McWilliams , Battle for Cassinga: South 4 Gary Baines, “Conflicting memories, competing Africa’s Controversial Cross-Border Raid, Angola narratives and complicating histories: Revisiting 1978 , Pinetown, South Publishers, 2011. the Cassinga controversy”, Journal of Namibian Shigwedha omits this text from the bibliography Studies , 6, 2009: 7-26. although he references it in his study.

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memories, some of which were ob- 58). This amounts to a straw-man viously traumatic for the survivors. proposition and leads to a facile Shigwedha sought to understand why argument. For even if photographs of the view was repeatedly expressed that the perpetration – as opposed to the the photographs did not capture the aftermath – of violence existed, how can survivors’ particular experiences. He they be expected to do justice to the observed that the subject matter of the experiences of the Cassinga survivors? ‘iconic’ photograph of the mass grave Still photographs, by their very nature, taken by the Italian cameraman Gaetano are little more than selective and Pagano did not reflect the experience of subjective traces of the past. Their survivors who lived with mental and literal value as evidence is limited. They physical scars as a result of the endur- might acquire enormous metonymic and ing violence perpetrated by the SADF symbolic value but they remain paratroopers. Likewise, the photo- imperfect and partial representations of graphs shot by the official SADF historical events. Shigwedha is well photographer, Mike McWilliams, did not aware of this (see p. 52) but still reveal the harm done to their bodies expends much effort trying to explain and minds. These include the so-called the disjuncture between the fleeting ‘immaculate photograph’ which he images captured by photographers and regards as a sanitized shot of the ‘two the tangible experience of the survivors. commanders’ of the operation that He would have done better to have screens the viewer’s gaze from the explored the disconnect between the massacre. Shigwedha is correct in personal memories of survivors and the suggesting that the select SADF narratives constructed by SWAPO and photographs that have been archived the SADF, respectively. and published are not ‘innocent’. But he Shigwedha’s stated aim is to “untie cannot be sure that “the SADF as well [sic] the problematic relationship bet- as individual paratroopers do not have ween the representation of the Cassinga the courage to distribute and dissemi- massacre through images and political nate horrific photographs of civilian rhetoric and the reality of Cassinga casualties in Cassinga” (p. 61). Even if experienced by survivors” (p. 2). such exist, he offers no hard evidence However, his engagement with the of a conspiracy to prevent self-in- theory of photographic representation is criminating photographs from reaching convoluted and contradictory. He the public domain. challenges the metaphoric [positivist? Shigwedha holds that “[t]he near realist?] assumption that images convey absence of factual evidence” which the the actual life of events and people (p. photographs of Cassinga exhibit, “ob- 25). This is fair enough but he does not scures the traumatic experience and articulate a coherent argument in his suffering of those who survived the attempt to do so. Instead, Shigwedha massacre as they narrate it” (p. 22). implies that photographs are able to But images can hardly be expected to speak; that they are neither inert not retrieve a “true picture of Cassinga” (p. mute. So he reckons that “photographs

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act indifferently to the rules of the whether oral or written. This uncritical apartheid’ state” (p. 57) – whatever approach is problematical, especially as that means. But photographs have no Shigwedha subjects non-verbal versions agency in and of themselves. If they can of the Cassinga events to scrutiny (as be said to speak, as in the cliché that ‘a he should). This methodological short- picture is worth a thousand words’, then coming is a fundamental weakness of it is invariably cultural brokers and the book. political elites who mediate a particular Shigwedha shows that most Cassinga meaning of images. It is those with survivors whom he interviewed felt that vested interests and a common purpose their story had been appropriated for in constructing a particular narrative political purposes by SWAPO and that that have managed to essentialize and their personal suffering and ongoing mythicize the meaning of Cassinga. But trauma had not been properly acknowl- the stories of Cassinga’s primary edged. Moreover, they felt that they victims, the survivors, have undoubtedly deserved unconditional apologies from been marginalized in the process. the perpetrators and some form of Shigwedha makes extensive but redress by way of compensation for arbitrary use of the testimonies of having to endure physical injuries and Cassinga survivors. For instance, he socio-economic deprivation. They had frames the entire treatment of the suffered injustices at the hands of both subject by reproducing a lengthy extract the apartheid regime and of Namibia’s from the testimony of a witness of the ruling party which had promoted attack on the camp. He does so without reconciliation over justice; they were identifying the witness until after the doubly victimized. Yet, Shigwedha is passage of five dense pages of also willing to acknowledge that the narrative, and then only by way of a SADF paratroopers, too, were victims of reference. The reader is not informed sorts. Most were civilian-soldiers who why this passage was chosen, nor why were called up to perform Operation the account commences with this Reindeer and they, too, would have particular testimony (rather than been affected by the violence and others). It would appear that Shigwedha killing. He reckons that the participants seeks to establish a core narrative at are likely to be haunted by the the outset but such testimony cannot “innocent lives they destroyed in serve as the foundation of the Cassinga Cassinga” (p. 62). Perpetrator trauma story. Witness testimony is notoriously might be a very real experience of unreliable; it should be cross-checked ‘Cassinga veterans’ but it is noteworthy and verified. Testimony should also be that they have not tried to relativise closely investigated. Shigwedha seems their responsibility nor assuage their to take it at face value as if everything guilt by making recourse to the defence recounted is, ipso facto, accurate and that they were following orders. Apart truthful. It is merely one version of from Verster, no paratroopers have events that should be weighed up expressed remorse and most appear to against other witness testimony – have actually taken pride in their

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accomplishments. Indeed, Breytenbach’s by words in parenthesis that note that: visit to the site of the mass grave “it appears this sentence has no purportedly to pay his respects to all meaning” (p. 25). The latter, pre- those killed in action (described by sumably, is an editorial comment that Shigwedha in Chapter 7) was not an act was not removed from the final version of contrition but one of self-affirmation. of the text. Actually, this sentence is not Shigwedha’s book includes some new nearly as unintelligible as many others material but it is essentially a revised that litter the text. But the incomprehen- version of his PhD thesis awarded by sibility of so much of the text detracts the University of the Western Cape. It is from the coherence of the reasoning published as part of the Namibia Studies and renders any attempt to follow its Series produced by the independent logic frustrating and, ultimately, unre- publishing house P. Schlettwein on warding. Although the book is mercifully behalf of the Basler Afrika Biblio- short, it still required an act of perse- graphien (BAB). It is admirable that the verance to stay the course. I cannot Schlettwein Foundation and the BAB are honestly say that the meal left me committed to archiving Namibian records satiated. Actually, I suffered a spot of and promoting scholarship dedicated to indigestion. Namibian history. However, in this instance the author was poorly served Gary Baines by whatever editorial intervention was Rhodes University provided by the publisher. Given that Shigwedha is self-evidently not a native English speaker, the text would have benefitted from more extensive and thorough editing. Unfortunately, it is riddled with grammatical, syntactical and a host of other infelicities of language and expression. One glaring lapse occurs on p. 54 where the author refers to “humanitarian atrocities”. Such errors are far too extensive to enumerate. Indeed, the poor presentation and style of Shigwedha’s book makes the argument difficult to follow. In these and other respects, it replicates the shortcomings of the original thesis. At one point, the author states: “The position presented in this chapter [2] that violence is in the knowing of the individual victims of the Cassinga massacre, not in a photograph or other forms of testimony” and this is followed

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