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Internacionals CIDOB 176 the “TRUMP CARDS” of the RUSSIAN JUNE PROPAGANDA and DISINFORMATION 2017 OPERATIONS

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Internacionals CIDOB 176 the “TRUMP CARDS” of the RUSSIAN JUNE PROPAGANDA and DISINFORMATION 2017 OPERATIONS CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB 176 THE “TRUMP CARDS” OF THE RUSSIAN JUNE PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION 2017 OPERATIONS Sergey Sukhankin, Historian, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad. Associate Expert, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kiev; Visiting Research Fellow, IBEI (Barcelona), Contributing Author at the Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC). he outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in late 2013 has based on the spread of disinformation and distortion – el- not only demonstrated the depth of the abyss be- ements that have made the crisis as acute as it currently is. tween Russia and the West, there is another aspect to Tit: the quarter of a century that has passed since the dissolu- Indeed, some might be tempted to explain Russia’s incredu- tion of the USSR has not led toward the democratisation of lity toward the West through its arduous history. For a sig- Russia, nor has it witnessed nificant time the country was Moscow abdicating from haunted by a perpetual sense the neo-imperial ambitions At a time the vast bulk of negative sentiments and propagandist of fear and insecurity that in of its historical predecessor. escapades were levelled against the US and its European allies, the end resulted in seclusion Today Russia and the West whereas Germany, France and countries of Southern Europe were and mistrust toward the “for- find themselves almost ex- either subjected to a very mild form of criticism or portrayed as eign” and thus unknown, and actly where they were before “victims of American domination”. this played an essential role 1991 – in opposing trench- in the formation of Russian es, ready for a new lap of The mass protests in Moscow and other cities in 2011 were cons- national identity. Certainly trued by Moscow as the most despicable Western attempt to igni- confrontation. Regretfully, this greatly affected the Rus- te the process of regime change in Russia following the templet the current situation might sian stance on the culturally, of “colour revolutions”. be even more complicated economically and technologi- than in the times of the for- cally superior Europe. Name- The notorious pro-Kremlin journalist, zealous anti-Semite, open mer Soviet Union. The level xenophobe and homophobe Dmitry Kiselyov (deputy director of ly, it has framed the Russian of spite, hatred and aggres- Russian state TV holding company VGTRK) became the living perception of Europe within a sion coupled with the lack embodiment of anti- European propaganda. peculiar combination of tacit of hope for compromise and adoration of the Western life- the absence of any drive to- The pillars of Russian trolling are identified as follows: 1) de- style, culture and technolo- ward constructive dialogue fence of Stalinism; 2) praising of personalities of Vladimir Putin, gies, mixed with ostentatious painfully resemble the ideo- Sergey Shoygu as well as Russian Armed Forces; 3) aggressive rejection of openly admitting logical conformation in the militarism; 4) fascist-style anti-Semitism and xenophobia; 5) this. Probably that is why in heyday of the Cold War. sacred-sanctity of the Chechen war; 6) loyalty to KGB/FSB and spite of some optimistic tones But it has to be acknowl- hatred toward the “fifth column”, “deserters” and independent the majority of attempts to edged that the outbreak of journalists; 7) anti-Americanism and anti-Western sentiments; 8) break the “vicious circle” of ideological confrontation is Soviet nostalgia and rejection of perestroika; 9) blaming dissi- mistrust and bridge the gap to a large extent due to ag- dents and liberals for Russophobia. between the two sides have gressive Russian behaviour ended unsuccessfully. notes internacionals CIDOB 176 . JUNE 2017 notes internacionals CIDOB 176 . JUNE 2017 1 One such episode was the brief “honeymoon” between Rus- promise” given to Gorbachev in the late 1980s; sia and the West after the collapse of the USSR. The great ex- – Stern criticism of Russian policies in Chechnya by the pectations associated with perestroika, “new political think- Europeans. This “convinced” public opinion that the ul- ing” and the Common European Home – ideas that lured in timate goal of the West was to fragment, weaken and hu- many Soviet citizens and progressive intellectuals – did not miliate Russia to an even greater extent; materialise. – The “colour revolutions” (in Georgia and Ukraine in par- ticular) that were construed as an openly anti-Russian The economic hardships that hit Russia severely during the move. Many years later Russian Defence Minister Sergey 1990s and the painful transition resulted in growing resent- Shoygu and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov ment, discontent with reforms and nostalgia for the Sovi- characterised the “colour revolutions” as a “new form et period when “everything” was planned for the people of Western warfare” whereas President Putin read it as a by the state without their direct participation. At the same “warning to Russia”; time, numerous social malaises (that existed and flourished – The “Big Bang enlargement” of the EU (2004) that brought in the late USSR and were skilfully concealed by Soviet pro- three Baltic states and Poland – countries that were (and paganda) that became particularly visible after 1991 turned still are) traditionally perceived as the main source of Eu- ropean Russophobia – in the “European The so-called “patriotic core” gathers illustrious public family” of nations. figures, sportsmen and intellectuals as well as war However, the main activities in the 2004– 2008 period tended towards the prepara- veterans and Cossacks. tion of the “turf” in the domestic theatre. Thus, Moscow made steps aimed at the public ire against the “liberals” and those forces that had consolidation of domestic anti-democratic forces. Among allegedly supported them – the Jews and the West. These the most noticeable should be mentioned: stereotypes/prejudices had for decades (and even centu- ries) dominated the mass consciousness of Russian society – The creation of various “anti-fascist” and “patriotic” or- during uneasy times. ganisations (such as “Nashi” (2005), “Young Russia”, “the Locals” and “the Young Guard of United Russia”) of The “liberal experiment” was practically finished by 1996 openly anti-Western orientation; when Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (along with a num- – The emergence of two new pro-governmental ultra-con- ber of like-minded politicians) was replaced by hardliner servative TV channels – Spas (pro-Orthodox) and Zvezda Yevgeny Primakov. Kozyrev was vilified and accused of (military-oriented) – as well as Russia Today (RT); “capitulating to the West”. What followed next was a direct – The establishment of the Institute for Democracy and Co- road toward increasing tensions and rebukes that were des- operation (2007) with branches in New York and Paris, tined to break out into open confrontation. headed by noticeable Russian conservative nationalists Andranik Migranyan and Nataliya Narotchnitskaya; – The launch of the “Russian World” Foundation (2007) Building a new ideological foundation headed by ultra-conservative Vyacheslav Nikonov (a grandson of Vyacheslav Molotov). The changing vector of internal development associated with the declining popularity of liberalism demanded the Nevertheless, for a time the vast bulk of negative senti- elaboration of a new ideological foundation. On March 15th ments and propagandist escapades were levelled against 1999 the TV programme “Odnako” was aired for the first the US and its European allies, whereas Germany, France time. Anchored by Mikhail Leontiev this project became an and the countries of southern Europe were either subjected outlet for xenophobia, spite and anti-Western/European to a very mild form of criticism or portrayed as “victims sentiments emanating from Russian TV screens. It needs to of American domination”. This misunderstanding inspired be underscored however that the outbreak of anti-Europe- Russian propagandist forces that attempted to create an an/Western frenzy in Russian society would have been im- artificial rift between members of the EU and undermine possible without the following developments: transatlantic solidarity. This was seen in 2003 (the outbreak of war in Iraq), 2005 (the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad/ – A Russian economic collapse (1998) that was widely asso- Konigsberg) and 2005/07 (the first concrete steps related to ciated not with the weakness of domestic economists, but the Nord Stream project), when pro-Kremlin propaganda was largely ascribed to the Western economic prescrip- made several efforts to pit countries of the so-called “old” tions;1 Europe against the “new” members. This however brought – NATO’s involvement in the war in Yugoslavia (1999) only limited success and caused vexation and disappoint- without consultation with Moscow, and its eastward ment among the Russian elites. Consequently, Moscow opt- enlargements (1999–2004) as a “traitorous violation of a ed to switch from mostly benign criticism of the EU to the rhetoric of ultimatums and blackmail. The central element that convinced Moscow of the “right- 1. Incidentally, the same line of argument is now being used in Ukraine by pro-Russian fulness” of this approach was a distorted vision of the EU as forces, where rising prices and the consequent growing poverty are correlated with the economic “prescriptions” of the international financial institutions. an
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