DOOMED TO FAIL? and Conflict through a multicoloured lens

Word count: 22584

Cato Bequé Student number: 01503057

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Rozita Dimova Master thesis submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in East European Languages and Cultures

Academic year: 2018 - 2019

Preface

This dissertation has been written to complete the Master in Eastern European Languages and Cultures at Ghent University. I was engaged in researching and writing this dissertation in the second semester of the academical year 2018/2019. During the initial phase of my master's thesis, I actually had a slightly different subject, which dealt with the obstacles that Serbia must face before joining the EU. However, when I left for Serbia as part of an internship, I already noticed after a week that this would be too broad since there is still a lot that needs to be happened. Because of the same experience in Serbia, where I did an internship at the Embassy of Belgium in Belgrade, I was completely immersed in the final theme of this thesis. Although the conflict rarely reaches Western media and this year's high point is (already) celebrating its twentieth anniversary, the Kosovo issue is still alive and kicking in Serbia. I must admit that my knowledge of this subject was limited before the beginning of my research, but my interest in Eastern European politics and my curiosity in the Serbian culture have allowed me to deepen myself. First of all I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Rozita Dimova for the good guidance and useful tips and comments during this process. Thanks to my internship I had the pleasure of discovering the issue from the front row. That is why I also wish to thank Ambassador Koenraad Adam, who guided me during my research and internship. Katleen Cruypeninck and Jonathan Cholewa deserve a special thank for the practical and mental support. Their counsel and kind words have served me well, as did translator Jo Bequé in proofreading.

I

Table of content

Preface ...... I List of abbreviations ...... IV Introduction ...... 1 Body ...... 5 1. Kosovo’s significance for Serbia ...... 5 1.1 The historical role ...... 7 1.2 The religious role ...... 9 2. The conflict ...... 12 2.1 1920s-1990s ...... 12 2.2 1998-1999...... 19 2.2.1 Role of the west ...... 22 2.3 1999 – present ...... 26 3. Ethnic minorities...... 29 3.1 Serbian minority in Kosovo ...... 29 3.2 Albanian minority in Serbia ...... 30 4. Border change ...... 34 4.1 Potential land swaps ...... 34 4.2 Reasons...... 36 4.3 Opinion locals ...... 37 4.4 Historical comparison ...... 38 Conclusion ...... 41 Bibliography ...... 44 Appendices ...... 59 Maps ...... 59 Appendix 1: Map of the current borders of Kosovo and Serbia ...... 59 Appendix 2: Map of the Slavic tribes between the seventh and ninth centuries ...... 60 Appendix 3: Map of the Serbian territory from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries ..... 61 Appendix 4: Map of Kosovo in the and under the Albanian occupation in the Second World War ...... 62 Appendix 5: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of ...... 63 Appendix 6: Map of the number of dropped bombs by place ...... 64 Appendix 7: Map of Kosovo municipalities with a Serbian majority ...... 65 II

Appendix 8: Map of the cities where most ethnic live in Serbia and possible territory swap ...... 66 Texts ...... 67 Appendix 9: The Fall of the ...... 67 Appendix 10: Slobodan Milošević’s 1989 Speech ...... 71 Appendix 11: Resolution 1244 ...... 75

III

List of abbreviations

CIDR: Conflict-Induced Displacement and Resettlement. This is the forced displacement of persons due to conflicts in the area they come from. EU: European Union. ICJ: International Court of Justice in Den hague. IRLR: “Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction” framework, created by Michael Cernea. JNA: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija or the Yugoslavian National Army KFOR: : peacekeeping force, led by NATO. KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army. A paramilitary organisation in the . Sometimes also referred to as UÇK, following the Albanian name of the organisation Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës. In this thesis, the abbreviation UÇK will not be used. KOS: Kontraobaveštajna služba or the Counterintelligence Service. The counterintelligence service of Yugoslavian army (JNA). Kosmet & KiM: Kosovo and . The Serbian reference to Kosovo. Metohija emphasizes the numerous monasteries on Kosovo’s territory. Nor Kosmet or KiM will be used in this thesis. Kosovo will be referred to as Kosovo without Metohija. LDK: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës or the Democratic League of Kosovo. A Kosovo Albanian political party, led by Ibrahim . LPK: Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës or the People’s Movement of Kosovo. A Kosovo Albanian political party, which created the KLA. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NSA: Nacionalni savet Albanaca or National Council of Albanians. An organisation of self- government for Albanians in . OAF: Operation Allied Force. The name of the NATO intervention between 24 March and 10 June 1999. OZNA: Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda or Department for People's Protection. This was the security agency of Yugoslavia until 1952. RTS: Radio Televisija Srbije or Radio Televsion Serbia. This is the Serbian public broadcaster. RTS will be written cursive when it is used as a source, accessed at the new agency’s website. SANU: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti or the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts. The organisation set up a memorandum, which was published in 1986. In the memorandum the writers criticize the change in the 1974 constitution and the discrimination of in Kosovo.

IV

SL: Srpska Lista or the Serbian List. A Serb minority political party in Kosovo. SNS: Srpska napredna stranka or the Serbian Progressive Party. The current ruling political party in Serbia, led by Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić. UDBA: Uprava državne bezbednosti or the State Security Service. The secret police organisation of Yugoslavia. Also referred to as UDSA, but this abbreviation will not be used in this thesis. UN: . UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. A mission of the United Nations in Kosovo to create peace in the former province. UNSC: United Nations Security Council. Among other things, it has the authorisation to establish or refuse peace operations. US: of America.

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Introduction

Problem definition

In 2008, Kosovo declared independence after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. and were the first former member states that achieved independence. In the other former socialist republics, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosovo in particular, things got more complicated. After the Bosnian independence referendum, the majority of its population voted to leave the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As in , most ethnic Serbs in wanted to remain united with Serbia. Civil war broke out between ethnic Serbs, also supported by the Yugoslavian National Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija or JNA) on the one hand, and Bosnians and ethnic Croats on the other. The genocides, the crimes against humanity, and the war crimes committed by the JNA, as well as separatist groups, are notorious. Starting in 1991, Kosovo started to battle for independence. Serbia answered with ethnic cleansings. When the international community put pressure on Serbia to stop, and Serbia refused, NATO undertook bombardments in 1999. Serbian president Milošević signed the Agreement after 78 days, which formally ended the war. However, this did not end the conflict yet. Kosovo was controlled by the United Nations and NATO and was proclaimed an autonomous province of Serbia. Nevertheless the conflict continued and Serbs in Kosovo, as well as Albanians in the Preševo valley were discriminated. In 2008 Kosovo1 declared independence from Serbia, which the latter did not recognise and it still considers Kosovo as Serbian territory until the present day. Serbia has several reasons to not recognize Kosovo’s independence. Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo, the “cradle of Serbian society” is very different than Serbia’s relationship with e.g. Slovenia or Croatia. Kosovo has a bigger sentimental value for Serbia, based on four major points. First of all, Serbia’s history and are inextricably linked with Kosovo. Secondly, what happened in the recent history, especially in the war in the 1990s, is still very sensitive. The third aspect are the bad living conditions in which many Serbs live in Kosovo, as well as the Albanian population in Serbia. Last but not least are the recent talks, which suggest a “border correction”. Due to these four aspects, a normalisation of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia is currently impossible. Both countries aspire to EU membership, but the EU demands that they must normalize their relationship before joining. The normalization process is one with ups and downs and the talks have currently stalled over Kosovo’s introduction of tariffs on Serbian goods last November (cf. infra). A present drastic improvement is not in sight. Solutions, such as the reincorporation of Kosovo in Serbia as an

1 I will refer to Kosovo as an independent country. This in in line with Resolution 1244/1999 and the ICJ (International Court of Justice in Den Hague) position on Kosovo’s declaration of independence (cf. infra). Cities in Kosovo or by mainly Albanians inhabited Serbian cities that I will mention, are written according to the Serbian and not the Albanian spelling. I do not wish to take a political position by doing so, but since my thesis mainly focuses on Serbia’s and not Kosovo’s position, this is more appropriate. 1 autonomous province or territorial exchanges are not supported, nor by Serbian, nor by Kosovo citizens. How will this “frozen conflict” evolve? As I mentioned in the preface, I had initially another subject. But three months ago, I left for Belgrade to do an internship at the Embassy of Belgium. My view on the previous subject, namely the obstacles to Serbia’s membership to the European Union, radically changed. I got an insight in different subjects, a lot of information and soon enough, I noticed that the subject was too broad. Therefore, I decided only to concentrate myself on Kosovo. Although the other aspects are also very interesting and would be good material for another scientific work, Kosovo is more present in the everyday life of the people. Twenty years after the war, it is still one of the most discussed topics in the daily news and every Serb has his own opinion about it. According to the tabloids, Serbia fights passionately for Kosovo’s territory every day and every Western power (except for Trumps administration) is an enemy, so to speak. Kosovo still influences Serbia’s foreign policy and the popularity of politicians depends on their view on the Kosovo conflict. On the other side of the border, former partisans serve as the country’s leaders and the international community tries to create order in the chaos. Belgrade and Priština is an extremely interesting affair.

Objectives

The research reveals the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo and the problems which are involved in their cooperation. The focus lays on the importance of Kosovo for Serbia and shows the circumstances in which the current relationship has grown and evolved from the Medieval times until 2019. The central task in this thesis is to identify the character of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. This leads us to the subjects which are discussed in this thesis and the goals which are set. The objective is to give the four major features of their relationship and how a sustainable relationship can be built up. The four major features, which are addressed are: the historical and religious importance of Kosovo for Serbia, the conflict in the 1990s, the current human rights situation of the Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo, and the border change. The thesis is not totally descriptive, because every time the issues will be analysed. I did not undertake this investigation in the light of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s future membership of the EU. I will also discuss the ambiguous role of the West in the conflict. Though the four features are not easy to overcome, there is hope for a more stable relationship between the two countries. To support this, I will refer to Robert M. Haydens theory of “Antagonistic Tolerance”. This model allows two religious groups to share one sacred place, without excluding the other. This way of coexistence will be projected on Kosovo and Serbia. The focus will not lay on the religious aspect of Kosovo, but more on the sharing of the territory in an independent Kosovo. The model will be further explained in the conclusion (cf. infra). I reject the idea that a full normalisation of the relationship is possible, seeing the four features.

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As the reader may notice, I have skipped or provided minimal information about some historical and religious parts in this thesis, for example Serbia and Kosovo in the . Although I agree that some happenings and evolutions in Kosovo and Serbia are important in history, they are not necessarily connected with their neighbouring country, nor are they relevant for my thesis. Next to this, I have to respect the word count and have to limit myself to the given number of words. Therefore, I have decided not to incorporate every major event or detail. For additional information about certain topics, I refer to the sources in the bibliography (cf. infra).

Research question

My research question will be as follows: What are the main features of this conflict and how will the conflict evolve? I will formulate an answer by sticking to my objectives (cf. supra) and showing the importance of every feature in their relationship.

Methodology

For my qualitative research I have gained insight into the subject by analysing both Western and Serbian sources. These Western sources are mostly scientific studies to locate the happenings, while Serbian sources are mostly media sources. These Serbian media articles come from both independent press, among others Balkan Insight and Radio Slobodna Evropa, as state media, such as RTS, and sensational press, which is (unofficially) owned by the government, such as Kurir and Blic. I have also used independent Western newspapers, such as the Belgian De Standaard, the British The Guardian and the American The New York Times. However, I have always analysed this data critically. For my quantitative research I have tried to work as much as possible with results of NGOs or human rights organisations, active in Serbia or Kosovo. They provide independent and reliable data, which is for example very important when discussing the war casualties under the NATO bombardments or the living conditions of the ethnic minorities. I have worked with data of the United Nations, International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, World Health Organisation, etc. These are respected independent organisations, that perform qualitative work. I have also worked with data of the Republic of Serbia to look up official information about population figures, agreements and such. Special attention goes to authors, whose works I have regularly consulted. Florian Bieber’s works Understanding the War in Kosovo (2003), in cooperation with Židas Daskalovski and his article Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to the present in the magazine Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice (2011) have helped me a lot in shaping the first chapter. Elizabeth Colson (2003) has helped me with investigating the consequences of a potential border

3 change. Robert M. Hayden deserves a special place for his article Antagonistic Tolerance. Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the Balkans in the magazine Current Anthropology. His theory inspired me in writing my conclusion. The book Songs of the Serbian People Milne Holton and Vasa D. Mihailovich (1997) has been a major contribution to my first chapter. Jennifer Jackson (1998) has helped me in framing the fourth chapter and the definition of . Tim Judahs article The Serbs: The Sweet and Rotten Smell of History in the magazine Daedalus (1997) offered a good base for my explanation about the religious importance of Kosovo. Robert Muggah (2003 & 2000) has helped me comparing the recent talks about the border change with both his articles. Sabrina Ramet’s work (1995 & 1996) has been a major contribution to the afterwar period and current political and sociological situation in Kosovo and Serbia. Their works are retrieved in the bibliography and available at the digital academical library JSTOR, the UGent Academic Library or Google Scholar. I have used the ISO/R9 system to transliterate Cyrillic characters into Latin characters. I did not transcribe Cyrillic. This is also why I refer to the Kosovo capital as Priština and not Pristina. A map of Kosovo and Serbia is attached as appendix number 1. The links of the maps, that are used to support the thesis, are available in the bibliography.

Content of the chapters

The chapters will follow the structure of the four features, listed above. Each chapter will start with a short introduction of the content of the subject, followed by a thorough analysis. Throughout the chapters I explained the relevance of the subject for the central research question. The first chapter will discuss the historical and religious role of Kosovo. Special attention will be given to the , which is a major factor in the national consciousness of Serbia. The second chapter will discuss the conflict, which escalated in the 1990s. The conflict did not suddenly erupt, but was intensified by the happenings in the past century. Although I did not want to focus on Serbia’s future in the West, I did mention the NATO intervention in 1999 and the peacekeeping role of the UN and NATO after the war. The third chapter explains the minority rights of the Albanian community in Serbia and the Serbian community in Kosovo. The fourth chapter will cover the recent talks about potential “border corrections”, which would trade above ethnic minorities. These talks are very controversial and worth discussing. Haydens model of Antagonistic Tolerance will be explained in the conclusion and projected on the conflict.

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Body

1. Kosovo’s significance for Serbia

Prince Lazar, then bids his great host go forth.

The Serbian host is numerous and mighty, 80 some seventy and seven thousand men, and they scatter the Turks at Kosovo.

They leave the Turks no time to look behind; there is no chance for Turks to stand and fight.

Prince Lazar then, would overwhelm the Turks,

But may God’s curse be on Vuk Branković!

For he betrays his prince and his wife’s father, and Lazar’s host is overwhelmed by the Turks.

Now Lazar falls, the Serbian prince Lazar, and with him falls the whole of his brave host, 90 his seventy and seven thousand men.

All his is done with good grace and honor, before the eyes of God the Almighty. (Holton and Mihailovich 1997: 147, 149-150)

This song, called The Fall of the Serbian Empire, depicts the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The battle is one of the most glorified historical events in the Serbian history. It shaped the national identity of the Serbian people and their love for Kosovo. The battle allegedly took place on the 15th of June2, Saint-’s Day or on Kosovo Polje or the “Field of the Blackbird”, a field north of Priština.3 A multicultural army, consisting of Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian and Wallachian troops, under Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović fought against the Ottomans, led by Sultan Murad Hüdavendigâr. Both leaders died and so did many of their soldiers. There is no historical consent to the global number of the casualties and losses in the battle, nor are there many sources. The scarce sources that exist often exaggerate the

2 This is according the Julian calendar. According to the Gregorian calendar it is on the 28 June. 3 Since there are no material artefacts, many historians and archaeologists question if the battle really took place or this is just a national construction similar to the Troyan war. 5 number of deaths and casualties. Although the Serbian army lost in the long term, this single battle did not mean the end for the Serbian Empire. Nevertheless, Serbia would never completely recover and would only be incorporated in the Ottoman Empire in 1455. The battle is historically almost insignificant, but is symbolically of great importance for the Serbian identity. The death of Prince Lazar and the defeat of the united Christian armies failed to keep the Ottomans out of and fell almost five hundred years under Ottoman rule. This symbolic keeps returning in epic heroic songs and poems. The original Serbian lyrics of the song is documented by distinguished Serbian linguist Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), who shaped the in the way it still exists today. He had collected several epic songs and poems and written them down, which is a great treasure, since these poems were mostly orally delivered. Vuk’s collection was translated and compiled by Milne Holton and Vasa D. Mihailovich in the book Songs of the Serbian People: From the Collections of Vuk Karadžić (1997). The song The Fall of the Serbian Empire was sung to Karadžić by a blind woman singer in the Srem District in , Serbia. The rhythm of the song is based on Old Slavonic chants. It displays several characteristics of epic poetry: the short and rhyming verses make it easier for the narrator to remember, the main character is a tragic hero, there is a link between God and the main character, etc. The song describes the number of soldiers on the Serbian camp. As mentioned above, there is no historical consent to the number of soldiers and it is likely that the number in the song is exaggerated. Vuk Branković was one of the commanders of Prince Lazar’s army and is depicted as a traitor in the epic poetry on the battle. He would have left the battlefield and collaborated with the Ottoman sultan by telling him the strategy of the Serbian troops. It is unlikely this really happened, but most historical sources point out that nevertheless, he and his army left the battlefield when he realized that the Serbs were going to lose. The whole song is attached as appendix number 9. Florian Bieber (2002: 95-99) reports that Vidovdan bears a special meaning in the Serbian society. In the spirit of the nationalism at the end of the 19th century, the 28th of June was proclaimed as an official religious holiday by the . On this very day the Serbian student also assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in 1914, which triggered many events, leading to the First World War and seven years later the by Serbs-dominated . In 1948 Stalin chose Vidovdan for the Third International to expel the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the eastern bloc, leading to an independent socialist Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milošević won the presidential elections in 1989 after he held a nationalistic speech 600 years after the Battle of Kosovo. In 2001 he surrendered to the International War Crimes Tribunal in Den Hague (Bieber 2002: 95). It symbolises the Serbian heroism and the battle against the . The present conflict is based on the assumption that history has repeated itself. The Islamic Albanians symbolise the Ottomans that seized the power in what used to be Serbian territory. Since Kosovo has been part of several Serbian states in the past, the historical and cultural relevance to the conflict cannot be left unmentioned. In this chapter I will first discuss the major features in the common history of Kosovo and Serbia, to switch afterwards to another

6 part. I will not go in detail about Serbia and Kosovo in the Ottoman Empire, since it would not contribute that much. I would rather focus on Kosovo in Serbian states. I will discuss the religious role of Kosovo in the second part, focussing on the role of Kosovo in the consolidation of the Serbian Orthodox Church and one of the most important religious sites: the Monastery of Peć. Finally, I will refer again to the Battle of Kosovo.

1.1 The historical role

Bieber and Daskalovski (2003: 12) state that the Serbian history in Kosovo already starts in the early Medieval times, when the Slavs were split up in three ethnic groups after the Great Migration to the European continent. One of these groups were the South Slavs, which were once again split in three groups – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Serbs settled on the land of present-day Kosovo between the seventh and the tenth century. This made Kosovo together with Raška the fundament of the Serbian state. A map is attached as appendix number 2. Following the migration, Anton Bebler (2008) documents that Kosovo was incorporated respectively by the Bulgarian and the Byzantine Empires. The Serbs, first under the Grand Principality of Serbia (also known as the State of Raška) and later the strong Serbian Kingdom both led by the Nemanjić dynasty, reconquered it in the late twelfth. In the meantime, they were converted to (Bieber & Daskalovksi 2003: 12) (cf. infra). Tim Judah (1997: 25) claims that after the demise of the Nemanjić dynasty the Serbs were divided again. The Muslim Ottoman Empire was expanding in southern Europe in the fourteenth century and became a notorious threat to the weakening Serbian Empire (also known as Moravian Serbia). This resulted in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 on Vidovdan. In 1455 Kosovo and Serbia were officially annexed by the Ottoman Empire and stayed under its rule until the end of the in 1913. The process of Islamisation in the first decennia of the Ottoman rule in the Balkan stimulated Orthodox Serbs to emigrate north in border regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while most Christian Albanians converted and stayed in Kosovo. By doing this, they benefitted of the economic and social privileges, e.g. Christians were disadvantaged by the tax policy. Mass conversions took place, whether or not voluntarily (Bieber & Daskalovksi 2003: 13). Nevertheless, the majority of the population in Kosovo remained mostly Serbian Orthodox until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even though there were sometimes conflicts in the Ottoman Empire, the different ethnic and religious groups lived together relatively harmoniously (which is often overlooked by nationalists nowadays). Many Christian Serbs fought in the Austro- Turkish war (1683–1699) at the Austrian side to overthrow the Ottoman rule. The relations between the Christians and Muslims deteriorated. The Ottomans won and the collaborators were punished, which resulted in Serbian mass migrations to the Habsburg Monarchy. Bieber and Daskalovski (2003: 13) estimate the number of migrated Serbs at 185.000. This contributed to the later Serbian absence in Kosovo. A map of the Serbian territory from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries is attached as appendix number 3.

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From the eighteenth century on, Islamic Albanians colonised the region. One must note that these were not the Albanians who had lived in Serbia and Kosovo for centuries, but Albanians who were sent by the government to expand the Ottoman’s decreasing control over the regions. The reaction on these harsh colonisation attempts was a growing commemoration of the myth. In the context of the growing nationalism, the idea of an independent Serbian state grew, but since there was long no secular leadership, it was not transformed into reality. Dejan Djokić (2009: 12) documents that the First Serbian Uprising from 1804 to 1813 was originally a local revolt, but induced a national independence movement. The restoration of the great Serbian Orthodox Kingdom in the Medieval times including Kosovo was seen as the purpose of the rebellion. Later, when the literate middle class began to expand and many intellectual Habsburg Serbs moved to Serbia, the nationalistic thoughts finally got shape. Not only the Battle of Kosovo Polje got attention, but also the concept of all Serbian lands or the Srpske zemlje (the by Serbs inhabited regions) too. In this spirit was the idea of a Great Serbia or Velika Srbija created, where all Serbs would be united in one state. A revolutionary war in Serbia followed in the late nineteenth century and paid off. The sovereign principality was recognised at the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Four years later Serbia proclaimed itself a kingdom. Although Serbia was granted the autonomy it wanted, the treaty did not satisfy the nationalistic claims. The territory was narrowed to present central Serbia and did not include the Serbian people and former Serbian territories in present-day Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo. Still, this was for nationalists a good base to reconquer the lost parts of .4 Many Kosovar Serbs, who still lived in the Ottoman Empire, migrated to Serbia following the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913. Once again the Serbs saw the parallels between the Battle of Kosovo and the present. It was not only very symbolic for these Kosovar Serbs, but also for the Serbian royal family. The Karađorđević dynasty used the myth to show their legitimacy, as they identified themselves with the Nemanjić dynasty. The formation of a new Serbian state, including Kosovo after the Balkan Wars, was seen as a restoration of what the forefathers had built up, but was demolished by the Ottoman Empire. Aleksandar Pavlović (2008: 231) states that by the time the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed after the First World War, one had to acknowledge that the Albanian community in Kosovo was no longer an intruder but instead, a native. This does not mean that the Albanian population was tolerated. There was a need to straighten up the historical injustice. Ramet argues (1995: 32) that the Albanian community was forced to emigrate to or Albania. The Kingdom made a pact with Turkey that it would accept 200.000 Albanians and another 40.000 Albanian families by 1938. Albanians in the Kingdom were the victim of discrimination and ethnic cleansing. Because of the great emigration in Kosovo and the following underpopulation, Serbs were encouraged to settle. The tide turned during the Second World War. Kosovo became a member of under the rule of the Kingdom of Italy. The Italian protectorate of Albania executed mass executions and caused

4 Judy Batt and Fred Tanner (2005: 13) note that the idea of a ‘Greater State’ did not come back in only the Serbian romanticism, but also in the folklore of Serbia’s neighbouring states like Croatia, Bulgaria and Albania and it symbolises the urge to search for the ‘golden age’ or the heyday of a nation. 8 refugee flows of 60.000 Serbs and and a repopulation of Kosovo by Albanians (ibid.). This will be discussed in detail in the second chapter (cf. infra). A map of the Kosovo in the Kingdom of Serbia and under the occupation of Albania is attached as appendix number 4. Kosovo was granted independence as an autonomous province of Serbia in 1968. From Tito’s death on more cases of violence and ethnic hatred against Kosovar Serbs were reported. This caused Montenegrins and Serbs to leave Kosovo and move to Serbia. According to Daskalovski (2003: 15) Serbs made up 23,6% of the population in 1961, while it dropped to 13,2% in 1981. The myth of the Battle of Kosovo became increasingly popular once again. Serbian intellectuals like writers Danko Popović and Vuk Drasković, playwright Naum Panovski and historian Dimitrije Bogdanović started to refer to the battle with elements of the myth, contributing to the . Bogdanović rated the Battle higher than necessary in his famous Book about Kosovo (Knjiga o Kosovu) in 1985. Seth Jones et al. (2005: 29-30) says that the eighties and nineties were followed by manifestations and more violence, which contributed to the conflict (cf. infra). Milosević’s answer on the growing conflict was an abolition of the status of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and a direct Serbian influence on the public affairs. Then the escalation of the conflict begun, which will be further explained in the second chapter (cf. infra).

1.2 The religious role

Serbs often refer to Kosovo as Kosovo i Metohija (Kosmet or KiM), seeing the number of monasteries, states Djokić (2009: 6-7). Kosovo was a place where Serbian medieval leaders built the most significant monasteries and churches. These buildings bear a special religious and cultural importance to the Serbian people. First I will explain the historical side, then a well-known site and I will end with the relevance of the Battle of Kosovo. The International Crisis Group (2001) reports that there are more than 1.400 locations listed as cultural heritage of importance to the Serbian people, five hundred cultural monuments and 162 sites classified as “cultural heritage of extreme importance.” The destruction of these sites in the past conflicts evoked extreme emotions among the Serbs. The Serbian Orthodox Church is a big part of Serbian nationalism, which is connected to the conflicts. To manifest the Serbian political power over Kosovo, people have always built churches. Andrew Herscher and András Riedlmayer (2000: 110-111) document that new churches were also (re)built in the 1990s. At the same time Albanians destroyed them. The Church also has a clear view over the Kosovo conflict: it is strongly opposed to the independence of Kosovo. Judah (1997: 25) provides a detailed analysis of the relevance of the medieval period for the Kosovo-Serbia connection. He argues that it all started when the head of the Nemanjić dynasty abdicated in 1196 in order to become a monk on . By doing so he embraced the Eastern Orthodox and not the Roman Catholic belief. Alice-Mary Talbot (1990: 122) discusses that Stefan Nemanja together with his son Rastko () founded in 1198 the Monastery on the Mount Athos and made it the most

9 important monastery of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the centre of the Serbian culture and religion. Rastko became in 1219 the first archbishop and thereby the head of the autocephalous or independent Serbian Church. Nemanja’s and his son’s roles in history secured the Serbian Orthodox Church, whereas the Serbian kings did not prefer one form of Christianity above the other in the past (Judah 1997: 25). Before the Serbian Orthodox Church was the main religion in the region, there was not a dominant one. The Balkans have always been on the border between big empires since the early Middle Ages. It formed the frontier between the Western and Eastern since 395, later the Balkans evolved to the borderlands of the Western Schism in 1054. The Middle Ages were dominated by the religious rivalry between the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox churches. In a while, the followed. Judah (1997: 25) argues that when the Serbian Kingdom was united by one religion, starting in 1196 (cf. infra), many neighbouring people converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church and subsequently ‘Serbianized’ to become more accepted in the society. Gerlachlus Duijzings (2000: 15-17) shows that as an extension of this theory, some historians claim that many contemporary Serbs have an Albanian background and that many Albanians have Serbian roots from the moment the Ottoman Empire conquered Serbia to be accepted in both empires. This is also misused by Serbian historians in the context of the political idea of a Greater Serbia, since they consider that the true Kosovar Albanian religion is the Serbian Orthodoxy and not the Islam. Moreover, Serbs set a high value on Kosovo already before the unification of the conversion of neighbouring people and their tragic death in the Battle of Kosovo. Due to the Serbian expansion in the east, at the expense of the weakened , and inherited Bulgarian regions the Serbian King Stefan Dušan Nemanjić wanted to place the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate more central in the Serbian Kingdom. Carole Rogel (2003: 169) documents that the Monastery of Peć served as the new base. It was erected in western Kosovo in the thirteenth century and given the title of Patriarchate in the fourteenth century.5 Peć symbolises the grandeur of the Serbian identity. It was built in the golden age of the Serbian state. Stefan Dušan conquered almost the whole Balkan peninsula (parts of present-day Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro and North Macedonia). Serbia has never been as powerful as it was then. The glorious Stefan Dušan Nemanjić was crowned in 1346 as king and the Grand Principality of Serbia was renamed as the Serbian Kingdom. The Serbian Orthodox religion survived the fall of the Serbian Kingdom (1371), the following Serbian Empire (1371-1401, existing out of loose principalities), and even the Ottoman rule (Judah 1997: 25). Once again one must look at the role of the Battle of Kosovo. Although this event is on the first sight a mainly historical albeit often viewed as mythical that never took place, it bears an immense religious importance. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, this is situated primarily in the epic poetry (cf. supra). Veljko Vujačić (2015: 66) documents that the first reason lies in the victimhood of the Serbian Orthodox fighters, who lost their lives in the battle and are seen as martyrs of the Christian faith. The second reason is a more detailed

5 Before the establishment of the Patriarchate in Peć, it was located in Žiča nearby Kraljevo, where the Serbian Orthodox Church was founded. 10 parallel between the Jesus and Lazar, states Judah (1997: 26-27). In the Serbian poetry two of Lazar’s knights are arguing during the dinner on the eve of the battle. One, Vuk Branković, accuses the other, Miloš Obilić, of betrayal. The next day Obilić6 manages to intrude the Ottoman camp and kills the sultan. Branković appears to have betrayed the Serbs (cf. supra). This implies that the Serbs had their own last supper and their own Judas. The myth making of the battle by Serbian monks resulted in the impression that Lazar would rather die than submit. According to Judah this leads to the idea that his empire will resurrect in heaven. He describes it in the following quote (1997: 27): “An earthly kingdom was rejected in favour of nobler ideals - victimhood and sacrifice – and this choice is to be compared with the temptations of Christ (Judah 1997: 27)”. First of all Kosovo is labelled as the Holy Land of the Serbian nation, secondly the Serbian people are portrayed as the chosen people because of Lazar’s sacrifice for the Christian faith. It can also be interpreted as a reason to revenge the lost battle. Nationalists call Kosovo sometimes the ‘Serbian Jerusalem’, pointing out the religious value of Israel and Palestine for the Jewish nation. One can say that the Jewish people were forced by Muslims to leave the heartland of their religious culture, as were the Serbian people. This is of course one’s personal view on the matter (Djokić 2009: 7-8).

6 Djokić (2009: 13) states that Gavrilo Princip was identified by his coevals with Miloš Obilić. He did not save Kosovo, but he was a true hero for the Serbian people after the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. 11

2. The conflict

This chapter reflects on the more recent developments between Kosovo and Serbia, by acknowledging that the Kosovo conflict is not something recent that suddenly erupted in the 1990s, Tensions have been emerging way back into the history of both Kosovo and Serbia. Building on the first chapter, where among other things I attempted to explain the historical value of Kosovo for Serbia (cf. supra), this chapter shows the execution of more recent events from the 20th and 21st centuries. The explanation of the conflict is divided in three parts. The first one shows the circumstances and cause of the conflict in the years before the war. The second will describe the Kosovo war in details and the importance of this war for the future attempts to normalise the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. The last part will focus on the current situation and changes in the living conditions of the people in both countries. Narratives of common people will be used in every part of the chapter, depicting how normal people have experienced the changes in their everyday life. The main emphasis will be on the dominant population while the issue of minorities will be additionally discussed in the fourth chapter (cf. infra).

2.1 1920s-1990s

While careful in delineating historical processes, for analytical purposes this chapter focuses on the several phases: the period between the Balkan Wars and the Second World is the first one; the post-war situation until the constitutional amendments in 1968 and the phase between 1968 and the Kosovo war in 1998. In the beginning of the twentieth century Serbia gained more power after the Balkan Wars, conquering territory where Serbs lived or used to live in the past centuries. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed under the rule of the Serbian royal family, the Karađorđević dynasty. Kosovo was included in the kingdom and the predominantly Albanian non-Slav population was regarded as an obstacle. From the Serbian point of view, the Albanian population did not have the right to live in Kosovo, considering Serbia’s history and religion (cf. supra). So they undertook action. According to László Gulyás and Gábor Csüllög (2015: 231) the government thus colonized the region after the First World War, at which Serbian and to a lesser extent Montenegrin war veterans, so called dovbrovoljci, were encouraged to move to Kosovo. When the government became cognizant of the failure of the colonisation program, it searched for another method to dispose the Albanian community. In 1938 the Yugoslavian government, led by the Minister of Exterior Vasa Cubrilovic, reached an agreement with Turkey, whereby Turkey would house 40.000 Albanian families from Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro. Due to the political and economic circumstances of the Second World War the plan was only partially implemented.

12

Moreover, Pavlović (2008: 231-232) considers the colonisation during the 1930s an attempt to homogenize the population.7 The colonisation program was not successful seeing that many colonists returned home and the majority of the inhabitants were still of Albanian descent. Daskalovski and Bieber (2003: 14) show that following this colonisation and the annexation by the Italian protectorate of Greater Albania during the Second World War, the Kosovo Albanian population took revenge. The war ended and Kosovo was integrated into the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. A map is attached as appendix number 5. The colonisation program of the 30s did not cause major demographic changes in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but the significance of the campaign cannot be overviewed. This form of ethnic cleansing is not an immediate trigger for the Kosovar independence movements and the Kosovo war in the 1990s, but it did contribute to the separatist nationalist identity of the Albanian inhabitants. Furthermore, the killings of Serbs (not only by Albanians, but also by Croats) that took place during the Second World War triggered the Serbian nationalist feelings which would be reignited by mobilising memories on these tragic historical events in the 1980s and 1990s. Aleksandar Petrović and Đorđe Stefanović (2010: 1081, 1088-1089) explain that the post-war situation in Kosovo. Although the colonisation project was put on hold after the war and the Albanian community formed the majority in Kosovo, the local party, administrative, police and state security functions were after the war occupied by Serbs. The racial harassment of Albanians happened often by the Yugoslavian security agencies, the Department for People's Protection (OZNA), the State Security Service (UDBA) and the Counterintelligence Service (KOS) which were all supervised by Aleksandar Ranković, the Minister of Interior in Socialist Yugoslavia in power from 1963 to 1966. He let be tracked down, arrest them on suspicion of being enemies of the state and liquidate them without a trial or evidence. It remains unknown how many Albanians were the victim of his purges. This was a new attempt to homogenize the population in Kosovo after the failed colonisation project. This reign of terror motivated many Kosovar Albanians to migrate to Turkey in the 1950s. Sabrina Ramet (1996: 355) explains that the situation improved after 1966 when Ranković was dismissed.8 From then on, Albanians could also join the police and state security units. They gained more cultural and educational rights. Damjan Pavlica (2011) recalls the start of Kosovo’s struggle for autonomy. In November 1968 the first major protests took place, set up by students of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Priština. The university separated from the University of Belgrade and made it possible for students to follow education in their mother tongue. The Albanian community got the status of a ‘nationality’, which was given to ethnic groups who were related to neighbouring states. Albanian became the language of administration and the

7 The precise number of colonists that stayed is unknown, since some came without the guidance of the government, as did many return home. Data about the indigenous Albanian community in Kosovo is unavailable. Academical sources offer divergent numbers claimed. As many of these numbers lack accuracy, I will therefore not use them. 8 In 1966 were Ranković and the top of the security agencies replaced after the Brioni Plenum (the fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at Brioni), when Tito found out he was eavesdropped in his house by the secret services. After the Plenum he withdrew from public life (Ramet 1996). 13 local media. The province of Kosovo also received to title of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Helmut Konrad (1992: 448) points out that as a matter of fact Kosovo became an autonomous province in the Socialist Republic of Serbia by the constitutional amendment in 1974. Hereby it received even more independence. Alex J. Bellamy (2000: 107) explains that the renewed constitution granted them economic autonomy by establishing a national bank and political autonomy: the Kosovar communist party was represented on national level and had the same voting rights as the ones of the six republics. These improvements had to satisfy the Kosovo Albanians. At the same time, Kosovo remained Serbia’s territory, which had to please the Serbs. Petrović and Stefanović (2010: 1077-1079) state that both ethnic communities were dissatisfied with the outcome. The Albanian people wanted to receive the same rights and status to be equally treated to the six major Slav nationalities in the country. Furthermore, they wished Kosovo to be recognized as a socialist republic. At the same time was the Socialist Republic of Serbia the only republic in Yugoslavia with two autonomous provinces, meaning that they had less power over their territory than the other five republics. Thus, Serbs supported the idea of an abolishment of the status of the two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo, so Serbia could be equal to the other republics. Wayne Nelles (2005: 70) explains the growing Albanian nationalist consciousness in the 1970s. Those years are characterized by an increase of the Albanian population in Kosovo. The first reason is the emigration of Albanians from Albania, because of the better economic circumstances and living conditions in Yugoslavia. The second reason lies in the fact that with the new status of a Socialist Autonomous Province, its ethnic majority should also be represented in state institutions according to the Yugoslav law, which meant that the authorities announced a policy on positive discrimination and Serbs were dismissed from the party and governmental functions. This came to the point that on one moment the Albanians were overrepresented in the public, governmental, police and administrative jobs. The new authorities abused their power and Serbs became soon the victims of discrimination. Nebojša Vladisavljević (2004: 4- 6) affirms this, saying that they underwent radical changes in their daily life. They could no longer use the Serbian language in their daily, scholarly and professional life and were targets of hate crimes. The police failed to protect them, but also did not show much interest in their stories about discrimination. Following the reformed ethnic balance in the government of the province and the radically changed climate, many Serbs decided to emigrate to other parts of Yugoslavia. Approximately 85.000 Serbs left Kosovo between 1961 and 1981. Only one third of them left because of economic reasons. Once again, Serbs felt excluded from their historical and religious motherland. The reasons mentioned above contributed to tensions and ethnic separation between the two peoples, but the conflict did not escalate yet. The primary preamble started after Tito’s death in 1980. Bieber and Daskalovski consider (2003: 18) the protests of Albanian and Serbian students in March 1981 as a first nationalist manifestation. Facing a significant higher number of students at the University of Priština after the measures of 1968, the university could not cope with them. The students demanded better living conditions at the university: initially they wished better food and accommodations in the dormitories. Besides these problems, Rogel (2003: 167) points to the economic situation: they barely found a job

14 after their graduation, as Kosovo was one of the least developed regions of Yugoslavia. At the moment, when the economy rock-bottomed, the unemployment was higher than ever. As time went on, the demands got a nationalist dimension and the protests triggered the whole Albanian community. As mentioned before, Kosovar Albanians demanded the status of republic which included the right to secession. Initiation Youth Initiative for Human Rights (Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava) (2017) records that official reactions followed soon to repress their call for independence. The police intervened rapidly, but this did not hold the protests back. The university was shut down and the authorities declared a state of emergency in April 1981. The national government reacted immediately by strengthening the hold on Kosovo. Two years after the beginning of the protests Mark Baskin (1983: 61-62, 64) reflects on the measures that were taken by the national authorities. The local League of Communists was purged and was severely repressed. The purge brought not foreseen problems and the extermination of Albanian nationalism was not so easy. Pamphlets promoting Albanian nationalism popped up in Kosovo and by Albanians inhabited regions in Montenegro and North Macedonia. The violence dominated the 1980s and by the end of the decade almost 585.000 people were arrested. In the next years followed Serbian counter-protests. One of most well-known Serbian processions was the funeral of Aleksandar Ranković. When he died in August 1983 many started to gather around his house in Drazevac, and thousands of people attended his funeral in Belgrade (Rogel 2003: 168). Vladisavljević (2004: 20) states that the economic crisis in the 1980s caused many people to participate in alternative actions, such as prolonged absence at work or strikes. It became more common, especially between 1985 and 1987. Although it seems that the demands of the protests were of an economic nature, it also had a political and social side. They did not have access to the jobs Serbs used to occupy before 1968. Now all the administrative, party, public functions were taken by Albanians, leaving Serbs without jobs (cf. supra) and causing a Serbian and Montenegrin migration. The let their voice be heard through demonstrations and petitions. Raymond Detrez (2011: 183-184) explains how this expressed itself in a memorandum. In September 1986, fragments of the so called Memorandum of the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts (SANU) were published in the Serbian newspaper Evening news (Većernje novosti). The memorandum, written by Serbian figures of the intelligentsia, criticized the constitutional amendments of 1974 and the economic and cultural developments. was considered an anti-Serbian doctrine, effectively weakening the Serbian nation in favour of the other republics. Next to discrimination of Serbs in other republics, it also addressed the living conditions of Kosovo Serbs. Adrian Knežević (2017: 16-17) states that a petition was started in January 1986, signed by two hundred members of the Serbian intelligentsia, among others the writer and future first President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dobrica Ćosić, and leading members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Hereby, they summed up all the aggression by Albanians towards Serbs and asked the Yugoslav and Serbian government to intervene by introducing changes in the constitution and guaranteeing equal rights for all (Detrez 2011: 183-184). It stated that already 200.000 Serbs and Montenegrins

15 were forced to flee for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, conducted by Albanians. The SANU Memorandum and the petition had a big influence on the development of nationalism among the Serbs and the call for independence in the other republics. In the Spring of 1987 Serbian activists in Kosovo planned to organize a march to Belgrade to express their dissatisfaction. Although Milošević was not so interested in this matter, he visited Kosovo Polje on 24 April to engage in a dialogue with local Serbs to resolve their problems. The Serbian newspaper Courier (Kurir) looked back on the historical event on the thirtieth birthday (2017). During a meeting with local representatives in Kosovo Polje, a group of 15.000 Serbian workers tried to enter the building to explain their difficulties. However, in an attempt to get closer, they clashed with the mostly Albanian police and were held back. Milošević witnessed the clash and tried to calm down the demonstrators, but failed. Seeing how one of the workers was beaten by the police, Milošević replied: “Niko ni sme da vas bije!”9. His statement was broadcasted on television over whole Yugoslavia and he gained the trust of the (Kosovo) Serbs. It was interpreted as not only a reaction on the direct aggression of the police officer, imposed on the Kosovo Serb worker, but also as a statement about Serb’s human rights in Kosovo. Andrew Wachtel (1998: 255) states that four days later, he gave a speech about the injustice and humiliation they were suffering on their ancestral lands. Vladimir Ribić (2008: 234-235) says that this event launched Milošević and the conflict accelerated. From now on he needed the Kosovo Serbs to retain power. They finally had the feeling they were being hears by the Belgrade officials while Milošević became the most powerful defender of the Serbian interests in Kosovo. Murat Somer (2001: 143-144) states that in this climate of rising nationalism and weakening of the central power, leaders such as Milošević became more and more popular indoctrinating large number of people into their ideology of nationalism and populism. These feelings were expressed by protests, explains Christina M. Morus (2007: 10): everywhere over Serbia gatherings were organized by Milošević. With these events he wanted to increase support for a new constitution, in which Vojvodina and Kosovo would lose their status as autonomous provinces. While the Albanian protests barely got media attention or were portrayed negatively in the press, the Serbian rallies were aired on every channel and illustrated joyous and proud Serbian people. The New York Times reported in November 1988 about the peaceful protests held in Belgrade by an estimated 800.000 Serbs. Discussing the reasons of the protests, journalist Roberto Suro (1988) wrote that ethnic tensions and dissatisfaction over the economy. Vujačić (2015: 18) states that the protests and manifestations escalated and the political clashes at the political top resulted in the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution (1987-1989), a series of large rallies of industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs, their allies and other groups, staged by Milošević, as well as counter-demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians (cf. supra). A series of high Yugoslav officials and regional leaders were accused of on one hand alienation of the civilians and on the other hand bureaucratic inefficiency. This created an unstable political climate, in which politicians succumbed quickly to the demands of the Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo and Vojvodina were placed under the Serbian central administration and government

9 “No one can beat you!” 16 officials were deposed and replaced by Milošević’s faithful and pro-Yugoslavian party officials. The revolution caused a revival of traditional Serbian cultural forms, such as folk music and epic poetry. The provinces lost their autonomy. The policy force, court, education system, economic policy was placed under Serbian rule. Albanian officials were replaced by Serbs and the Serbian language was reintroduced as the official language. As a result of the developments, large demonstrations by Kosovo Albanian took place in Kosovo, including a hunger strike of miners in Trepča. One often blamed Serbia to benefit of the proceeds of the Trepča mines (Detrez 2011: 181).10 These were roughly repressed by the army. The protests of Serbs in Kosovo reached a peak in 1988 and 1989, when the political top unintendingly created circumstances for the rise of nationalist leaders, like Milošević. In this turbulent political climate protests of Serbs, Kosovo Serbs, industrial workers and other supporting groups were getting bigger and bigger.11 Nationalist sentiment was widespread over Yugoslavia. This became increasingly apparent in Milošević’s in 1989. Cathy Nicholson (2018: 79) clarifies this. Milošević gave a historical speech on the ground of Kosovo Polje on 15 June 1989, commemorating the six hundredth birthday of the Battle of Kosovo. This renowned speech, called the Gazimestan speech (named after the memorial monument of the battle where the speech was given), compared the Battle of Kosovo with the latest changes in Yugoslavia. He claimed that the battle was not lost only because the Ottoman army outnumbered the one of the Serbian Empire, but also because of the Serbian disunity. He refers to the beginning of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, when the Serbian leadership was also divided and did not look after its own people. Now, since Kosovo’s autonomy is screwed back, Serbia is stronger and more united than ever (cf. infra). Agneza Bozic-Roberson (2004: 403) shorty describes the effect of the celebration. The speech and the TV broadcasting of it let people believe that Kosovo was Serbian and it needed to be retaken. When he soon abolished Kosovo’s autonomy, people considered Milošević as a true hero. An English translation of the Gazimestan speech is attached as appendix number 10. Shortly after Milošević’s speech and his purges in the highest political ranks of Kosovo, the nationalistic conflicts in Yugoslavia escalated. People lost their jobs and the local government was dismissed. Still, violence as in the other Yugoslav republics stayed out, states Besnik Pula (2004: 797). While the official political centre was located in Belgrade, a smaller one emerged in Kosovo. A parallel state was created by the political party Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) after a first independence declaration in July 1990. The Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly voted for the independence. Now that Belgrade noticed the resistance, it hardened its position in Kosovo. Altin Fuga (2007: 35) and the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 44) show that the majority of the Albanian citizens gave support to an independent Kosovo. In a referendum, held in

10 This must be nuanced: the other republics also benefitted of the low prices of the raw materials (gold, silver, lead, zinc, cadmium) of the mines. The republics gave in exchange financial support, since Kosovo was the poorest region of Yugoslavia. 11 It is important to note that not all protests at the end of the 1980s were dedicated to Kosovo. Tensions between different ethnicities elsewhere in Yugoslavia also escalated. Nationalistic protests against the political elite were organized over the whole country. 17

September 1991, 87,01% of the persons entitled to vote, took part and 99% was in favour for an independent state of Kosovo and the associated proposed new constitution. Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on October 22 the same year. Kosovo’s citizens approved the new state and constitution, but the international community (apart from Albania) did not recognize the independence. The attention was fixed on the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and North Macedonia. Originally, the Kosovo civil war was, in contract to the ones in other parts of Yugoslavia, fought underground. Led by the popular literature critic Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo state provided its own financial councils, educational and cultural institutions, health services and pluralistic government, all sponsored by Albanians abroad. Pula (2007: 804-806, 816) points out that this shadow society was not exclusively created by the LDK, but instead, it was a mass movement, as a result of the participation of the whole Kosovo Albanian community. The LDK did not have a real narrow vision of Kosovo’s future in the beginning, which also played a role in the popularity of the party. Since the political dimension was less important and distinct, the party was easy accessible. Approximately 700.000 people had joined the party by 1991 (Rogel 2003: 173). After the international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as independent states, the Albanian movement intensified its claims for Kosovo’s independence. In May 1992 they held again unofficial parliamentary and presidential elections, which were won by the LDK. The elections were observed by foreign media institutions and the electoral victory was considered in general more or less legitimate. Belgrade considered the elections illegal (Pula 2007: 816-817). Rugova became the first president and strove for independence in a peaceful manner. He believed that Kosovo could only peacefully achieve independence. According to him, the Yugoslav police and army were waiting for a pretext to attack the Albanian population. Moreover, it was dangerous and difficult to get weapons into Kosovo. Belgrade was aware of the parallel state, but did not have the means to solve the problem. Milošević only intervened when the shadow society wanted to establish a police force. Conflicts in the other former republics demanded more support of the army and police forces, which allowed the shadow society to grow. In the political circumstances, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established. Yet, the Yugoslav police often intervened, arrested and harassed supporters of the parallel state. Human rights were still violated (Pavlica 2011). Alex J. Bellamy states (2000: 115-116) that the tensions between the two ethnic groups caused many Kosovo Serbs to flee to Serbia. The Yugoslav government decided to reintroduce measures to ‘change the demographic balance’. This programme, called the Decree for Colonisation of Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had to motivate Serbs to colonise Kosovo. They received financial support to build up a life. Next to this, the government rewarded big Serbian families. The authorities used the Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina and settled them in Kosovo, some of against their will (Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava 2017: 10). Like the previous colonisation attempt in the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, this was not a successful project (cf. supra). Another way of creating a balance describes Bellamy (2000: 16) as making the stay intolerable for Albanians. They could not buy property, had to join the Yugoslav army (so the men would not return home) and punished Albanian families with more than one child.

18

Until 1995, Rugova’s strategy of non-violent resistance enjoyed broad support, but the tide began to turn after the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina because of three reasons. Firstly, seeing the measures the government in Belgrade had taken and the lack of international support, more and more Kosovo Albanians did not believe that a peaceful protest was effective enough (Pavlica 2011). Secondly, people had to pay taxes to both the Yugoslav state and the shadow society, whereby poverty flourished. People started to see Rugova as an autocratic and ineffective leader. Thirdly, the LDK demanded independence and nothing less, which seemed to many Kosovo Albanians impossible to reach (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000). The Albanian people lost their hope in the passive resistance of the LDK and searched for more effective alternatives. According to Judah (2000: 64-66), people sought protection in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Founded in 1993, the guerrilla movement strived for independence via violent means. The organisation was established by the political party People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK). In the first years it was considered a marginal organisation, because people relied on Rugova and his peaceful strategy. Keiichi Kubo (2010: 1142) explains that the KLA was only publicly active from 1996 on. In February, the KLA claimed for the first time a series of bombings on Serbian refugee camps in Kosovo. More attacks followed and tensions between Serbs and Albanians were increasing. Systematic killings between the police and the KLA enlarged. The KLA did not only focus on Yugoslav police, but also on Serbian, Romani and even Kosovo Albanians, who were suspected of collaboration. The KLA was initially a marginal organisation, but rose to prominence thanks to political mistakes of others: Judah (2000: 66- 67) claims that the KLA was built up from a network of so called ‘sleepers’. Men, who supported the organisation and wanted to fight. How did it grow suddenly in 1996 and 1997? On one hand, people did not believe anymore in Rugova and on the other hand the illicit trade in weapons from the imploded regime in Albania boomed after 1997. Weapons of the police or the army were stolen and were thereafter sold cheaply on the black market, mostly to companions in Kosovo.

2.2 1998-1999

The conflict escalated and led to the Kosovo war, which begun in 1998. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had had enough of the increasing terror of the Kosovo liberation army, which was backed up by the international community, and sent the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (the successor of the Yugoslav People’s Army) to Kosovo to support the police forces. Ethnic cleansing, widespread human rights violations and a large stream of refugees were the result. Victims mainly fell on the Albanian side, but Albanians also had blood on their hands: the KLA kidnapped and executed (innocent) Serbs. The international community approached Milošević in October 1998. Eric Herring (2000: 227) points out that American envoy already negotiated with the Yugoslav authorities. He proposed to grant Kosovo autonomy within Yugoslavia without the involvement of military troops, but with international presence. Nevertheless, the agreement was not signed.

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Adam Roberts (1999: 112-113) points out that the international community feared a humanitarian crisis and refugee flows to the equally unstable neighbouring countries. The United Nations called for a ceasefire in March 1998 and requested Milošević to withdraw his troops after an offensive which costed the lives of 1.500 Kosovo Albanians and motivated 300.000 to flee. On 13 October 1998, NATO threatened with air strikes if the Serbs would not withdraw within the next 96 hours. Two days later, on 15 October an agreement was signed. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 76) says that the Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement guaranteed the partial withdrawal of Serbian troops. It permitted also up to 2.000 unarmed men of the OSCE in Kosovo and by a NATO-led aerial verification. In springtime 1999, the Rambouillet Agreement was drafted by NATO. This agreement served as a peace proposal between Yugoslavia and Kosovo Albanians. Neither of the parties were satisfied with the proposal: the Kosovo Albanians did not want to be included in Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia was opposed against the independence of the province and the presence of NATO, as well as UN-troops. Mark Webber (2009: 449-450) mentions that the Kosovar delegation signed the document all the same. In the meantime Yugoslav forces continued the war, which brought forth 200.000 internally displaced persons. The agreement was rejected by Belgrade and at the same time, the Yugoslav government perpetrated a massacre on 15 January in Račak (in the area of the KLA headquarters). According to numbers of the OSCE (1999), 45 unarmed civilians died. Hereafter NATO decided that military actions and that humanitarian intervention were necessary. The result was the Operation Allied Force (OAF). Participating countries under the NATO flag were Belgium, , Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The campaign, led by the United States, started on 24 March 1999. The targets of the air strikes were both military and civilian: amongst other bridges, railways, chemical plants and the RTS television channel in Belgrade were targeted and destroyed by NATO bombings, at the expense of civilian casualties. However, the collateral damage was unintended and caused by military mistakes (cf. infra). A map of the targets is attached as appendix number 6. It is important to note that the Yugoslav army also caused many (civilian) casualties during the bombings. In 1999 Peter Beaumont et al. write that there were remarkably more refugees and victims of the Yugoslav army since the early start of the bombings. Balkan Insight (2012) affirms this and states that the Bulgarian government was aware of a military operation, which they called Operation Horseshoe, to expel all Albanians from Kosovo. The information about this ethnic cleansing campaign was passed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, who passed it then to NATO. The codename of the mission suggested that the Yugoslav army would try to launch an attack from three sides in the form of a horseshoe, first eliminating the KLA army and subsequently driving the Albanian population out Kosovo through the southwest into North Macedonia and Albania. The Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant (1999) reports that 40.000 soldiers, 300 armoured vehicles and 700 artillery guns were deployed, alongside 10.000 special police forces. Balkan Insight (2012) publishes an article about an interview with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria Nadezhda Neynski, in which she revealed that she was actually not entirely sure of the existence of the plan. Nevertheless, she believes that the immense refugee flow to the

20 southwest of Kosovo had not been caused by the bombings. The refugee flow, Neynski states, began in the early days of the bombings, when people did not have a reason to leave Kosovo. Franz-Josef Hutsch (2000) writes that the plan legitimised a Western intervention, which was sometimes questioned by the press and other sceptical war opponents. Nevertheless, the available information concerning the plan remained contradictory. Milošević always denied the existence of the operation and the War Crimes Tribunal in Den Hague did not attach much importance to it. Despite the questions around the authenticity of Operation Horseshoe, one cannot ignore the by Yugoslav forces committed war crimes. Isak Sherifi (2014: 359-360) states that after 78 days of bombing Serbian targets throughout Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, Milošević capitulated and signed the Kumanovo Agreement on 9 June 1999, which made the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the entry of international security forces a reality. The Yugoslav forces were prohibited to enter without consent of the International Security Force Command or Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Resolution 1244 was signed shortly thereafter (cf. infra). The precise number of deaths is unknown, both NATO and Yugoslavia did not reveal the real number of casualties in the media. The Belgian newspaper De Standaard (2000) reports that NATO exaggerated the numbers. The number of victims of Yugoslav repression before the NATO intervention was below 3.000, far less than the figure of 10.000 to 100.000 that NATO announced just before the start of the Operation Allied Force. Dutch journalist Abe de Vries (1999) writes that the same phenome occurred at the opposite camp. The Yugoslavian authorities stated that because of missed targets, NATO killed more than 2.000 people during the bombardments. In reality there are five to six hundred casualties. Credible sources of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed that at least 491 people were killed in Kosovo alone, of which mostly Albanian refugees. Human Rights Watch (2000) estimated the overall civilian casualties at five hundred in ninety separate incidents, caused by the bombings. The number of incidents was higher than the governments of NATO member states admit, but lower than the government of Yugoslavia claimed. Several mass graves of both Albanians and Serbs were discovered after the war in Kosovo and Serbia, which raises the estimated number. Next to this, the official list of missing persons is still high. Bieber and Daskalovski (2003: 149) state that by the end of May 1999 roughly 580.000 people were internally displaced in Kosovo and 1.5 million people in Kosovo were forced to leave their home. After the end of the NATO bombings, 225.000 Kosovars were still missing. The number of victims, who were killed before and during the bombings by both Yugoslav forces and NATO, is definitely higher than is stated.

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2.2.1 Role of the west

The role of the Western community cannot be overlooked. Firstly, they turned a blind eye to the war crimes of the KLA, secondly, there has been much discussion about the legitimacy of the NATO bombings. Thirdly, the used projectiles were made of depleted uranium, which is said to have negative long-term effects on the environment and health to those who were exposed to it. Fourthly, NATO is accused of attacking civilian objects, among others, the RTS- headquarters in Belgrade (cf. infra). In the last years, more research has been done to the KLA. Aidan Hehir (2016) refers to a report of lawyer Clint Williamson, who has evidence for different war crimes, committed by the KLA. Williamson points out that this happened when NATO was active in Kosovo:

A 2014 report by a Special Investigative Task Force, led by U.S. lawyer Clint Williamson, found evidence that KLA operatives engaged in a campaign of “unlawful killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, illegal detentions…, sexual violence, … forced displacements of persons …, and desecration and destruction of churches and other religious sites,” which they concluded caused “ethnic cleansing” during the period when the international community was exercising complete control over Kosovo after NATO’s intervention. (Hehir 2016)

In fact, Bekaj (2010) calls attention to a state visit of the former president of the United States Bill Clinton in Priština in 1998, where the president called the KLA a terrorist group. However, the United States did support the KLA later. The current , Hashim Thaçi, was involved in these practices. NATO was familiar with these illegal practices, but did not undertake action. Judah (2000: 65) states that the KLA-army was militarily and economically dependent on their sources abroad. The officers received by retired Albanian military officers training on guerrilla and other kinds of warfare and bought later on also military artillery from their Albanian partners, too (cf. supra). The KLA received funds from Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and other Western countries with a large Albanian community. The KLA was often portrayed in the media as liberators from the Serbian regime. They indeed played a big role in Kosovo’s independence developments, but this does not compensate the war crimes they committed. The second controversial point is the legitimacy of the Operation Allied Force. Several sources below state that the real reason behind the NATO intervention was not of a humanitarian kind. Christine Chinkin (1999: 844) writes that first of all, the United Nations Security Council did not grant permission to execute the mission. Russia and China did not stand behind the idea and as permanent members of the UNSC, they had the right to veto the proposal. Therefore, notes Tania Voon (2001: 1088-1089), it was against the sovereignty of the Yugoslav Republic and cannot be seen as a humanitarian intervention. However, one can point out that NATO’s intervention was necessary or legitimate in some sense. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 4) considers Operation Allied Force legitimate since diplomacy failed to stop the oppression of Kosovo Albanians by

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Yugoslav authorities and establish peace in Kosovo. Nevertheless, Daya Kishan Thussu (2000: 346-347) states that the operation was an attempt to show that NATO was still relevant after its fiftieth anniversary and the end of the Cold War, in which the organisation was originally set up. Initially, the military organisation’s main goal was the protection of its members from military attacks by the . Now the Soviet Union broke up and the Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved, the situation changed. Geopolitically Yugoslavia was insignificant for NATO member states and was also no direct threat to the West. This time, NATO intervened to build peace and stop violence between the Yugoslav authorities and Albanian majority in Kosovo. Ten years after the beginning of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, Ian Bancroft (2009) wrote an article about the bombardment in which he questions the justification of NATO’s bombardments. According to Bancroft the involvement of NATO was one big mistake, beginning from the Rambouillet Accords to the end of the military campaign. To cite Bancroft: “Though justified by apparently humanitarian considerations, Nato's bombing of Serbia succeeded only in escalating the Kosovo crisis into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe” (Bancroft 2009). As it turned out, the bombings did not make the peace process much easier. During the bombardments there were many civilian casualties. Twenty years onwards, the local environment and health of citizens is still affected by the depleted uranium. Kosovo turned into a state, where, after twenty years, the international community still controls everything (cf. infra). There was also much discussion about the targets of Operation Allied Force. One of the bombed places was the Serbian public broadcaster Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS). Andreas Laursen (2001: 779) reports that on 23 May the headquarters of the public broadcaster were attacked and sixteen people died. Since media are considered to be a civilian object, several NGOs, among others Amnesty International, have condemned the attack. NATO stated that the RTS was a target, because it spread propaganda and so contributed to the war. The goal of the attack was to undermine the morale of the population and the armed forces. There is no proof that it served as military facility. Amnesty International (2009) concluded that if the attack on the RTS was premeditated and that there has not been a warning before the bombing, it was a war crime. Lyombe Eko (2002: 29-30) states that another 52 communication or broadcast infrastructures were bombed and that each time NATO used three reasons to justify the attacks. Firstly, the military used the broadcast infrastructure to communicate with each other. Secondly, the broadcaster propagated Milošević’s policy. Thirdly, it was a combination of above two reasons. Regardless these other 51 communication targets, the bombing of the RTS-building was by far the most controversial one. Several times NATO bombed civilians by mistake. Human Rights Watch (2000) describes in the report The Crisis in Kosovo some of the incidents, which caused civilian deaths. One of the biggest incidents was the bombing of a passenger train over the Grdelica Klisura bridge near Leskovac on 12 April, killing twenty or more Serbian civilians. The railway line was an important transportation line for Yugoslav troops heading to Kosovo. NATO admitted that it wanted to destroy the bridge and that the pilot failed to see the passenger train approaching. After hitting the train for the first time, a second attack took place. Amnesty International (2000) blamed NATO for dropping a second bomb, while the pilot realized that

23 he hit the train, regardless the smoke that was caused by the first bomb. Two days later, another civilian target followed: the bombing of a convoy near Đakovica, existing of Albanian refugees on 14 April. Human Rights Watch (2000) states that NATO airplanes accidentally bombed an Albanian refugee convoy in daylight, which costed the lives of 73 civilians and left 36 wounded. Denying the mistake for the first five days, NATO admitted bombing a civilian vehicle. The pilots had mistaken tractors for military convoys and flew too high to distinguish. Thereafter it acknowledged that several airplanes dropped bombs on a military convoy, which was traveling with civilians. Later, research and interviews with witnesses showed that the convoy consisted exclusively of Albanian refugees. NATO claimed to be more cautious after the incident. Human Rights Watch (2000) notes a new attack with civilian casualties near Lužane in Kosovo on 1 May. A "Nis Express" passenger bus was hit while driving on a bridge. 39 civilians died and 13 were left injured. NATO admitted and said that the bus just drove the bridge when the attack was planned. The bridge was on a route of military importance for Yugoslav forces. A later report of Human Rights Watch (2016) shows that a similar incident occurred in the Korisa Woods on 14 May, where 87 people (mostly refugees) died and sixty were wounded as the result of a nocturnal air strike. NATO claimed that there was a Yugoslav military camp nearby and the attack was therefore legitimate. There were several other incidents, where unintentionally civilians were targeted. Another remarkable case is the bombing, executed by the US, of the Embassy of the People’s Republic China in Belgrade on 7 May. Kevin Ponaja and Lazara Marinković write (2019) about the bombing. Three journalists died and in total 21 people were injured. The event caused an international stir. According to the United States, the bomb was unintentional and was supposed to hit the Yugoslav Federal Office for replenishment and supply (a state agency dealing with the import and export of military weapons and equipment) on the other side of the road. NATO explained that the maps and coordinates, which were used on that moment, were not accurate and that bad internal communication caused the mistake to be made. However, the Chinese government and Western newspapers did not believe this theory and called it a violation on the international law. John Sweeney et al. (1999) reports in October the same year that three NATO officers confirmed that the attack was deliberate, since the Chinese embassy acted as a rebroadcast station for the Yugoslav army after previous strikes hit the Yugoslav radio transmitters of Milošević. This theory was reinforced when an unknown source of the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency declared that the story about the wrong maps was made up. It is still unknown why the Chinese embassy was targeted during the war, but several theories try to explain the attack. NATO forces used depleted uranium in the bombardments. De Volkskrant (2000) writes that at first NATO denied the use of it, but after more than six months insistence by the United Nations, the organisation released a map of Kosovo, indicating where ammunition with depleted uranium was used. However, not all locations were initially released. NATO still denies the impact of the depleted uranium on the local environment and health of the people (cf. footnote number 12). The use of depleted uranium stays the subject of debate. Cristina Giannardi and Daniele Dominici (2003: 229) researched the military use of the

24 chemical element. Uranium has a high density, which makes it possible to penetrate an armoured piercing projectile. It is more effective than less dense materials, such as lead. Next to this, it is easy inflammable, which has a bigger impact when the projectile or ammunition hits the target. This is why depleted uranium is often used in military projectiles. The metal was used in the tops of NATO projectiles of the bombing in 1999. However, depleted uranium also has a downside. Due to the metals toxicity and radiation it is a controversial weapon. The Documentation and research centre on nuclear energy Laka (2006) specifies that the dust cloud, that is created when the bomb hits the target, is dangerous. In the cloud are small uranium oxides, that are poorly soluble. When those are inhaled, they stay in the lungs and spread to other parts of the body. The World Health Organisation (2009) already proved that when depleted uranium is inhaled or absorbed by the body, the radiation has long-term effects on the internal organs. Next to this, the victims have an increased risk of lung cancer and leukaemia and malfunctioning of kidneys, liver, brain and heart, depending on the exposure of the person to the uranium. The Serbian newspaper Telegraph (Telegraf) (2019) reported on 5 April 2019 that 7.500 Italian soldiers have been diagnosed with sicknesses that are caused by the use of depleted uranium, referred to as the Balkan Syndrome. Telegraf (2019) also reports that already 373 Italian veterans have already died and others are seriously ill from their exposure to the dust. Some children of the soldiers, which are born after their father’s mission in Kosovo, suffered severe disabilities. Depleted uranium also contaminates the environment, as shows the study of Bleise (2003: 97-98). He and his colleagues state that one of the major concerns is the potential contamination of ground water in the long-term. Giannardi and Dominici (2003: 230) add that the absorption and concentration of depleted uranium in the soil is important. This can contribute to the contamination of plants and animal products, fish and affect the health of the consumers. However, several research programs12, executed in the early 2000s reject or minimalize the environmental and health problems caused by the use. However, there is no consensus on the Balkan Syndrome. According to the report New Figures on Civilian Deaths in Kosovo War by Human Rights Watch (2000), the United Kingdom and the United States, as NATO members, used cluster bombs13, while they first denied this. In a report (2016) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international treaty that prohibits cluster bombs since 2008, is stated that more than 240.000 submunitions were dropped, causing the death of minimum 75 deaths and injuries and 150 post-conflict casualties (up till 2016).14

12 Bleise, et al. (2003: 93); European Atomic Energy Community (2001); NATO (2001); United Nations (2003). Participating countries Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United States have stated that there is no risk on major health issues, caused by the depleted uranium (2005). Overview of the countries’ statements is available at https://www.nato.int/du/relsites.htm. Accessed 8 April 2019. 13 Cluster bombs contain approximately two hundred smaller bombs. When the cluster bomb explodes, these smaller bombs are released. Because of the spread of the smaller bombs (submunitions), the target area is large. This means that the target is hit more easily. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (2016) says that 98% of the casualties of cluster bombs worldwide are civilians. 14 These post-conflict casualties are most of the time victims of unexploded and undiscovered at the end of the conflict, according to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2016). There are no reliable sources that show how many post-conflict casualties fell after 2016. 25

2.3 1999 – present

On 3 June 1999 Milošević signed an armistice with the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari and the Special Representative of Russia Viktor Černomyrdin. The New York Times (1999) explains that the agreement was signed by Milošević under pressure to stop the NATO air campaign. Both NATO and Russian and Ukrainian forces would participate in the peacekeeping mission. In an article of 9 June 2017, the seventeenth birthday of the Kumanovo Agreement, called after the North-Macedonian city where it was signed, Kurir (2017) describes the content and consequences of the agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO. It marked the end of the war and stopped the bombings and the Yugoslav military presence in Kosovo. Within the next eleven days the Yugoslav army and police had to be withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo. The Kosovo Force (KFOR), led by NATO troops, had to disarm the KLA forces. Written by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (1999), Resolution 1244 made the United Nations responsible for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, interim administration and construction of a new government apparatus under international supervision in Kosovo. The KFOR was set up to guarantee the safety of the Kosovo population. The resolution had to provide a legal framework in which refugees would safely return home, the Yugoslav military and police army would withdraw and the Kosovo Liberation Army and other separatist Kosovo military forces would be demilitarized. The international community would supervise the establishment of local self-governing administration in the Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo regained its status of autonomous province from before 1989. In order to achieve these goals, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established. The text of Resolution 1244 is attached as appendix number 11. According to Aleksandros Yannis (2004: 69-70), Kosovo stayed an autonomous province in Yugoslavia, although the central authorities in Belgrade did not have much power over the territory. Almost all administrative tasks were performed by the UNMIK. For some Western countries and observers Belgrade lost the moral right to govern over Kosovo after the ethnic cleansing in the past. The obligation to relinquish their sovereignty, caused opposition at the authorities in Belgrade and ensured that they were soon against all UNMIK decisions, e.g. the introduction of the Deutsche Mark as additional official currency in the province. Next to this, the United Nations never had such a big peace keeping action before, did not have a clear future view of Kosovo and lacked personnel and financial support, so it had difficulties establishing a new authority in the first six months. Jens Narten (2006: 146-152) writes that the KLA overtook power and was not loyal to Resolution 1244, while Rugova’s party LDK (cf. supra) was put aside. Kosovo Serbs had their own social and administrative structure as well. The parallel structures ceased to exist after December 1999 when an agreement between NATO and Kosovo Albanian leaders Hashim Thaçi, Ibrahim Rugova and Rexhep Qosja (an Albanian writer and politician, supporter of the KLA) was signed. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces did not bring an end to the ethnic division. The violence between ethnic groups spread. Human Rights Watch (2001) states that many Kosovo Serbs already left with the withdrawal of the troops on 12 June. Serbs and people of

26 other ethnic minorities were targeted in raids by Kosovo Albanians (sometimes organized by the KLA) for collaborating. The NGO reports that by July 2001, some thousand Kosovo Serbs and Roma were missing. Members of minority groups, such as Croats, Turks, Muslims who spoke Slavic languages, were also victims of violence. This violence included arson and looting of their houses and religious buildings, killings, abductions, harassment and intimidation. Most witnesses of such crimes did not report the happenings to the police, either from fear or because of a belief that Serbs earned it. According to Edward Tawil (2009: 14) 155 Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries, statues and other religious monuments were destroyed between 1999 and 2004. The situation escalated into a major demographic change, reports the publication of Human Rights Watch (2001). More than 150.000 members of ethnic minorities fled to Serbia. Next to this, it also resulted in an internal displacement inside Kosovo, with the majority of Serbs and other minorities concentrated into enclaves like Northern Mitrovica or Kosovo Polje. The highlight of the ethnic violence against Kosovo Serbs (and to lesser extent Roma) were the outbursts of violence in March 2004, involving more than 50.000 Kosovo Albanians. There were several grounds for the outbreak of the 2004 riots. David Buerstedde (2004: 135- 137) states that on 15 March a Serbian teenager Jovica Ivić got shot in Čaglavica, causing the Serbs in Čaglavica to block the road. This caused tensions encouraging the Serbs from the neighbouring village Gračanica to manifest their sympathy by doing the same. On 16 March an association of groups of veterans of the KLA organized anti-UN protests in Priština, and Peć against the prosecution of former KLA-soldiers for war crimes, causing 18.000 people to participate. Whilst both demonstrators used roadblocks, the media and Albanians disapproved the Serbian protests, but did not mention the roadblocks used by the KLA-veterans. The following day three Albanian children drowned nearby the house of a Serbian family. The children who witnessed the incident blamed the family, claiming that they had chased the children with a dog, causing them to flee in the water. While there was (and there still is) no evidence of the family’s guilt in this incident, massive riots erupted over the whole country the next day continuing until 19 March when, the violence stopped (Daltveit 2007: 107-110). The UNMIK and KFOR evidently failed to protect the Serbian communities. Moreover, they became targets themselves and thus were unable to stop the grave consequences of this conflict. According to data of the International Crisis Group (2004), nineteen people died, nine hundred were injured, more than seven hundred Serbian, Ashkali and Roma public institutions, houses and 32 religious buildings were destroyed. An estimated 4.500 Serbs fled. The International Crisis Group points out that approximately 50.000 Albanian people participated in this event -all over Kosovo. TransConflict (2011) explains that Kosovo’s independence declaration from 2008 is based on a plan, designed by UN special envoy for the status of Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari, and was supposed to avoid above situations. Ahtisaari’s plan included basic rights for ethnic minorities in Kosovo and allowed Kosovar Serbs to create their own institutions for healthcare, education, social policy and local police. These would be financed by both Kosovar and Serbian authorities. It also put Kosovo under international authority, thus securing the presence of international military and preventing a formation of a Kosovar army and building political alliances across the borders. Six out of the ten municipalities that are

27 mainly inhabited by Serbs are still governed in this way. The four remaining in the south have less autonomy following the Brussels Agreement in 2013, which started the normalisation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia (cf. infra). The Serbian community holds ten seats in Kosovo’s parliament, receives three ministries and the function of the Deputy Prime Minister (Helsinki Committee for 2019). The Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013 and ensured the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo a status of a global Association/Community. This gave them among other things self- governance in several areas such as education, economic development, health care, urban and rural planning and most importantly, an umbrella organisation when representing the Serbian community to the central authorities (Vlada Republike Srbije 2019). Both Serbia and Kosovo benefitted from this agreement, since Serbia officially received the status of EU candidate country and Kosovo was allowed to join a range of international organisations. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (2019) reported that although the Ahtisaari Plan of 2008 and the Brussels Agreement of 2013 have aimed to improve the lives of the Kosovar Serbs, there is still a long way to go until reaching its goal. In the legislation and these past agreements minority rights are described, the only problem is that the laws are not implemented. Agon Demjaha (2017: 190) states that the next incident in their relationship was in March 2011. At that moment, the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia started, facilitated by the EU. These talks focus on regional cooperation, such as freedom of movement and the rule of law. Among other things, these negotiations had to facilitate the recognition of each other diplomas and the possibility to cross normally the Kosovo Serbian border. Both things, however, have not been successful (cf. infra). In the meantime, the talks have proved not to be as productive as they were supposed to be. In the same year there were a number of clashes at the border between ethnic Serbs in and the Kosovo authorities. Judah (2011) points out that tried to take two border posts over from Serbian authorities, which evoked violent protests among the local Serbs. These protests lasted for several months and caused multiple victims. One of the last conflicts was a train incident on 14 January 2017. After almost twenty years, Serbia wanted to resume its rail connection from Belgrade to Kosovo. The Süddeutsche Zeitung (2017) reports that the first train was painted in colours of the Serbian flag and on it was written “Kosovo je Srbija”15 in different languages. The interior of the train was decorated with pictures of Orthodox icons from monasteries, located in Kosovo. Priština considered this as a provocation. Eventually, the train stopped at the border in the town of Raška, after mutual accusations. The last major event, which influenced the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo was the arrestation of Kosovo Serb politician Marko Đurić on 23 March 2018. Die Morina (2018) states that the Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija was arrested during a visit to North Mitrovica for illegal entry, after the Kosovo police had already banned him. Although Đurić knew he was not allowed to come (according the Brussels Agreement) (cf. infra), he did and provoked the Kosovo authorities by doing so. He was released four days later.

15 “Kosovo is Serbia” 28

3. Ethnic minorities

The antagonism between Albanians and Serbs steadily increased during the conflict in the 90s, forcing many people to migrate. Yet there are still Albanian communities in Serbia and Serbian communities in Kosovo. In this chapter I focus on the minorities within the borders of Serbia and Kosovo, on their living conditions under the current circumstances, and what is the role of the minority on the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.

3.1 Serbian minority in Kosovo

According to data of the European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo (2013), Serbs made up to 9,9% of the population of Kosovo in 1991 with a number of 194.190 inhabitants. After the NATO intervention at the end of the 1990s, the number had decreased to 7% in 2000. In 2013 the number slightly rose to 7,8% with a number of 146.128 Serbs. The tendency to flee is turning around and Serbs are slowly voluntarily returning to Kosovo, regardless the negative portrayal of Kosovo in the media. Most people who return however, settle in the north. The Serbian population is divided into two communities: one is in the north and one is in the south of Kosovo. The community in the north had in 2013 70.430 Serb inhabitants and is more prosperous than the community in the more rural region south of the river , which has 75.698 Serb inhabitants. Serbs form in ten municipalities the majority of the population. In the north they form the majority in Gračanica, Klokot, Novo Brdo, Parteš, Ranilug and Štrpce in the north and in Kosovska Mitrovica Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Zvečan. A map of cities with a Serbian majority is attached as appendix number 7. More recent demographic figures are not available. The political party Serbian List (SL) was elected in June 2017 (RTS 2017), which has good ties with the in Serbia ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Although the government in Belgrade has promised an unconditional support for the party and the Serbian minority, it never kept its promises. Moreover, the society remains divided among political elites making it impossible to find a job in healthcare, administration or education without having good ties with the SL. The party members are said to be only interested in the power and money they receive from Belgrade. Arguably, the idea of cherishing the “Serbian cradle” by maintaining conflict and division is more important than the needs of the Serbs living there. Belgrade claims to be involved in improving the living conditions in Kosovo, but the locals barely notice something from the assistance. Furthermore, investors rather spend their capital in Serbia because Kosovo is currently not attractive for a Serb to invest in. Radio Free Europe (Radio Slobodna Evropa) (2018) explains that Serbian entrepreneurs have to pay double taxes and Kosovo that raised tariffs of 10% to 100% for Serbian and Bosnian goods. This measure is said to last until Serbia grants recognition to Kosovo.

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The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia describes the consequences of the bad economic situation as follows (2019):

Families also manage to keep ends meet with the assistance from those who have moved out. The gap between the employed and unemployed is deep. The unemployed receive 11,000 RSD social welfare (about 100 Euro) from Belgrade, but from Kosovo too. For instance, one-fourth of population in Ranilug live on welfare either from Belgrade or Pristina. There are also many people who do have jobs but are being paid just minimal wages. (The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia 2019)

There are also major differences between the two Serbian majorities in the north and the south of Kosovo. Jelena Lončar (2016: 282) notes that the two communities are divided and have minimal contact. Kosovar Serbians in the north consider themselves as “proper” Serbs and participate in Serbian elections, while the Serbs in the south participate more in the Kosovar state and recognize its legislation. This is actually quite remarkable, as most Serbian historical and religious important sites are located in the south. They are geographically, infrastructurally and institutionally different. Kosovar Serbian politicians, who have to represent the Serbian communities in the Kosovar authorities, always come from the north and are not aware of the poor living conditions in the south. In interviews with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (2019) locals addressed high rates of unemployment, crime, corruption, drug addiction and garbage disposal as the biggest problems. Next to this, security, the quality of water supply and infrastructure leave much to be desired. The World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (2018) criticizes just as much the Serbs’ lack of freedom on multiple subjects. They are not able to use Serbian in public administration outside their compounds, they have the feeling that they are not protected enough by the Kosovo police, they cannot practise the Serbian Orthodox faith everywhere because several religious sites have been demolished during the riots in March 2004 (cf. supra). The north stands stronger; the territory borders on Serbian territory and it is economically healthier. If one thinks of the Serbian nationalist thought, one would assume that Serbia would fund the south more; historically and religiously more important and the remaining Serbs are surrounded by Albanian municipalities, which makes them more vulnerable.

3.2 Albanian minority in Serbia

The biggest Albanian communities on the territory of Serbia can be found in the south of Serbia in the cities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, also called the Preševo Valley. A map of the cities where most ethnic Albanians live in Serbia is attached as appendix number 8. Ilir Zylfiu, Dukagjin Leka and Valbona Ahmeti Zylfiu published data about the Albanian minority. In 2002 was 0,8% of the Serbian population from Albanian background in 2002. In

30 whole Serbia lived in 2002 approximately 61.647 Albanians. In two cities Preševo and Bujanovac, Albanians form the majority of the population.16

Albanian population Total population Preševo 31.098 34.904 Bujanovac 23.681 43.302 Medveđa 2.816 10.760

Albanian people in Serbia have been targeted since the outbreak of the bombardments in 1999, with peaks between 2003 and 2005, after the anti-Serb riots in Kosovo (cf. supra), and the declaration of independence in 2008. In February and March 2008 hundreds of crimes against Albanian persons -or institutions have been registered, and yet, the police and the government did not undertake any action. Only after the independence declaration of Kosovo in 2008, and the large-scaled hate crimes against Albanians in Vojvodina and central Serbia, local authorities became alarmed, whereby minimal measures were taken. The government supported the ultra-nationalist protests and official reactions and condemnations of the violence stayed out. The violence was barely covered by the media. The Human Rights Watch describes in their report Hostages of Tension. Intimidation and Harassment of Ethnic Albanians in Serbia After Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence (2008) the cooperation with the police after the hate crimes against Albanians as following:

According to information obtained by Human Rights Watch from the police, of the 221 officially registered Kosovo-related incidents (including those, such as the criminal damage caused during protests in Belgrade, that lacked an ethnic dimension), 10 people were convicted and fined for misdemeanours. We did not obtain comprehensive statistics on prosecutions in the criminal courts, despite contacting the Chief Prosecutor of Serbia, and prosecutors across Vojvodina region. Through these officials, however, we learned of only one active case against a named perpetrator (a minor). A handful of other cases had been discontinued for lack of evidence, or were opened against “unknown perpetrators.” (Human Rights Watch 2008)

Even though physical harassment faced by the Serbian minority in Kosovo in 2008 did not occur anymore on a large scale, the Albanian community continues to be discriminated and treated as a subordinated group. Serbian military and police forces are still present in the valley to prevent similar incidents as the ones in 2008, but instead their presence intimidates and deters the local people.

16 In the municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac there was undercoverage of the census units owing to the boycott by most of the members of the Albanian ethnic community. The number is probably higher. In recent studies most Albanians also boycotted it. Officially lived in 2011 only 5.809 Albanians in Serbia. 31

The Preševo Valley is one of the poorest and underdeveloped regions of Serbia, with a high rate of unemployment, criminality and poverty. The President of the National Council of Albanians (NSA) Ragmi Mustafa claims in an interview with the newspaper Beta News that the human rights of Albanians in Serbia are still violated, this was said in an article in the newspaper Today (Danas) (2019). The government does not look after the needs of the municipalities, hence the inhabitants of the region have the feeling that they are underrepresented in the national administration. One of the major current topics is the education. Schools in the Valley of Preševo are in a poor condition. Many infrastructural problems, such as the lack of heating and hygiene, are recurring problems. Despite the Serbian law of mandatory primary education in a mother tongue, Veton Zejnullahi (2015: 93) states that Albanian children do not have access to schools and universities where they are educated in their mother tongue. Albanian textbooks are rare and the content of the books, used by the Albanian community does not conform with the Serbian standards. The only language they speak is Albanian, so many youngsters follow high school and/or go to a university in Kosovo, where there is more choice. Due to political problems between the two states, Kosovar degrees are not recognized in Serbia which creates additional social problems for the graduates who are then unable to seek employment with their university qualifications. Naser Pajaziti (2014) states that in the last years, more Albanian young people from the Valley of Preševo study in North Macedonia as an alternative given that Serbia does recognize North Macedonian degrees. The locals’ inability to speak Serbian disadvantages them in their public life (cf. infra) and in the labour market, causing high unemployment numbers. In addition, lack of security, prosperity and economic development are the main reasons for migration causing large numbers of people to leave this region. The Serbian newspaper Evening News (Večernje Novosti) in 2012 argued that RTS does not offer programs in the , which impedes the integration of the Albanian minority in the Serbian society. As stated above (cf. supra), the Albanian language is not used in judicial, state and public institutions and documents, although according to the Serbian law this should be the case (Zylfiu et al. 2017: 72). An evident progress has been made in securing the Albanian minority in the north of Serbia, especially in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina where the uproar in 2008 was the highest (Human Rights Watch 2008), although the Albanian population is here significantly lower than in the south of the country. I conclude that the living conditions of the minorities in both countries contribute towards keeping the tensions alive, and need to be improved. A better treatment of these communities would be an important step towards the normalisation of the relation between Serbia and Kosovo. The role and integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo is limited, as is the role of the Albanian community in Serbia. The recent studies on the discrimination of these groups show that the public (violent) hate crimes are decreasing, but that their integration into both states is not running smoothly. They are considered as second-rate citizens, who experience discrimination in public affairs, education, employment, health care, etc. Measures are taken by both countries to improve the minorities’ living conditions,

32 but the changes are not implemented in the reality. In my opinion, there is a legal basis to stop mutual discrimination. The countries themselves will not take the initiative to improve the living conditions of the ethnic minorities on their territory, so the international community will have to exert more pressure. Corruption and bad economic circumstances complicate the mutual relationship. Both countries do not show much attention for their ethnic minorities in the other country. Serbs in Kosovo do not feel like they are being heard by Belgrade, so does the Albanians in Serbia think of Kosovo.

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4. Border change

This chapter will cover the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia. Both countries have ethnic minorities in certain parts of their territory. In the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia is the population merely from an Albanian background, meanwhile in the north of Kosovo in the region of Mitrovica the population is predominantly Serbian. There has been speculation about a possible territory swap or border change, as well as the displacement of the minorities to the other country. Why is it so controversial? In this chapter I will discuss the potential land swaps, as well as the reasons behind it. Next to this, the opinion of the local population will be given. By sweeping out an ethnic minority through displacement or deportation of the members of an ethnic minority, border or territory change to make a geographical area more ethnically homogeneous or create a nation-state, Serbia and Kosovo would execute an ethnic cleansing. Although this issue is contentious, it is not seen as an independent crime under international law, states the United Nations (2019). The potential border change will also be compared to previous border change or forms of ethnic cleansing. Jennifer Jackson (1998: 820) states that the term ethnic cleansing is only invented in the 1990s and is literally translated from the Serbo-Croatian words “etničko čišćenje”. Although this term is quite recently invented, this does not mean that in the the first attempt to ethnically cleanse a region was tried. The Treaty of Lausanne will be taken as an example of a population swap in this thesis (cf. infra).

4.1 Potential land swaps

The territory changes would take place along the ethnic lines, in the areas where each country’s minorities live. In Kosovo, this would be the region North Kosovo north of the Ibar river, which includes a major part of the Serbian community in Kosovo. The four cities North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Zvečan would be included. There are also Serb enclaves south of the Ibar, but they do not live together in one big community as in the north. In Serbia would be the Preševo Valley swapped, a valley where merely Albanians live. More information about their living conditions is provided in chapter three (cf. supra). A map of the cities where most minorities live and the potential land swap is attached as appendix number 8. One can argue that the idea of land swaps has not arisen after the war, it actually existed already in the 1990s, when the tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo escalated. It had been proposed multiple times during the , inspired by the Dayton Agreement, which split up territories between the ethnicities in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1995. There was not much interest in it, though. The idea appeared again before Kosovo’s independence declaration as a solution for the Serbian community in northern Mitrovica. BBC News (2007) reports that EU envoy Wolfgang Ischinger showed his support if both parties were willing to agree on the matter. Priština did not agree, so there was no land swap. The Albanian leaders did not want to lose the prosperous north with the economically

34 strong Trepča mines and the remaining Kosovo Serbs, living south of the Ibar, also did not want to give up the north. It stays a controversial case in the normalisation dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, though the United States and the European Union have repeatedly stated not to support such a deal.17 One year ago Vučić and Thaçi presented the idea once again, though the Brussels Agreement has to secure the rights of Kosovo Serbs in northern Mitrovica (cf. supra) and does not allow a border redrawing. Instead of presenting the results of their talks, both presidents just use a lot of empty rhetoric. Nikola Burazer (2019) stated in January that regardless of the vague messages of the leaders to the press, the plan is still under consideration. In March 2019 Thaçi and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj declared that a potential division of Kosovo would never happen, reports RTS (2019). Vučić now also expressed his doubts since the introduction of taxes on Serbian and Bosnian goods by the Kosovar government (cf. infra). Now the European Union and United States have changed their position and would tolerate a border correction in the framework of the normalisation conversations between Serbia and Kosovo. They see it as an easy decision and a final solution for the normalisation of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia would recognize the independence of Kosovo and the integrity of its territory. Both countries would be happy with the deal, as it brings them one step closer to a EU membership. However, mentions Amra Zejneli Loxha (2018), European member states, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, individually do not support the idea. But rumours are enough to spark a debate whether or not it is legitimate and righteous. Neighbouring countries, such as Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia, also oppose a land swap. Aljazeera Balkans (2018) reports that Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia Marija Pejčinović Burić expressed her worries. She said that the border change would solve one problem, but would cause other problems in neighbouring states such as Bosnia and Hercegovina and North Macedonia. Here Pejčinović Burić refers to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, who consider Croatia and Serbia as their motherlands and whose parties are also funded by their native lands. Next to this, she also mentions the territory claims in North Macedonia by supporters of a Greater Serbia. However, the former President of , one of the two political entities of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Milorad Dodik backs the idea, Daria Sito-Sucic and Maja Zuvela (2018) report. He claimed that if there was a referendum in Republika Srpska today, most Serbs would vote to join Serbia. He also expressed his support for a potential land swap between Serbia and Kosovo. RTS (2018) published an interview in which the President of Montenegro Milo Đukanović declared that he decries the idea. He states that the border change along the ethnic lines would not only affect the two countries, but could have a domino effect, affecting the whole Balkan. Đukanović said that this border change would spark the thoughts of a Greater Serbia and some would start to challenge the Montenegrin independence, claiming that Serbia has a

17 The European Union sets the normalisation of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia as a condition for EU membership. If both countries agree to not swap territories and subsequently become a member of the EU, they do not have to care much more about the borders since there will be free movement of goods and people. Therefore an exchange of territories is not needed. Naturally, the countries need to normalize their relationship for themselves and not for an accession to the European Union. 35 natural right to Montenegro (cf. supra). Radio Kim (2011) reports that the former President of North Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov also stated that a potential border change would destabilise the whole region. Though not a neighbouring country, Albania does not support the border change either. The Serbian newspaper Flash (Blic) (2019) published a statement of the President of Albania Ilir Meta. He stated that a correction of borders is dangerous for the region, moreover it would undermine the credibility of the Balkan countries as stabile countries. These statements show that the regional leaders are worried about the misuse of the potential border change: it would give nationalists a reason to further change borders along the ethnic lines. Especially in the Balkans, where people of different ethnicities live in one state, border changes or the creation of an ethnically homogenous state, could cause another conflict. It seems that there is no long term consensus on nor the international nor the regional stage. Fear of (violent) separatist rebellions by minority communities of both Serbs and Albanians in the framework of a greater state (cf. supra) motivates regional leaders to block the negotiations.

4.2 Reasons

The reasons of a potential mobilisation of the minorities or the border changes are simple. History shows that when the power balance in Kosovo is not equally divided, one of the two ethnic groups is suppressed (cf. supra). By deporting the minority, there would not be suppression anymore. In this case Kosovo Serbs would not be longer victims of hate crimes and large scale discrimination based on their ethnicity. The constitution would be changed and the Kosovar parliament would no longer have Kosovo Serbian representatives, which would give them more freedom to implement changes in the law (on minority rights). Next to this, a land swap may be the solution for the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia. The news site Kosovo North Portal (Kosovo Sever Portal) (2018) states that if the agreement would be implemented, Serbia would give up 30.000 people and receive 42.000, next to this, it would also receive 1.000 squares metres than would yield. Receiving North Kosovo would give Serbia full control over the local economic activities, such as the successful Trepča mines. By exchanging North Kosovo for the Preševo Valley, Serbia would still keep a part of its historical “heartland” and it would not have to cede seats in the parliament to the Albanian minority. Just as the Kosovo Serbs in the north of Kosovo, Serbian Albanians would not be discriminated anymore. Serbia is willing to recognise Kosovo’s independence when it will have received the north. With this improvement of their relationship, both are more likely to join the European Union.

36

4.3 Opinion locals

These decisions are taken by politicians and not by the members of the ethnic minorities themselves. They also have formed their own opinion about the potential land swaps. The local newspaper of Bujanovac, one of the Serbian municipalities with a mainly Albanian population, Bujanovačke (2019) published the latest data about the opinion of the locals of Preševo and Bujanovac. The survey, conducted in January and February by the Council for Human Rights in Preševo (Odbor za ljudska prava iz Preševa) showed that 77% of the Albanian population is positive about a potential land swap as the solution of the normalisation of the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, while 74% of the Serbian population is against the idea. Only 11% of the ethnic Serbian respondents supported the idea. 57% of the Albanian respondents think it is impossible to integrate fully and continue to live in Serbia, while 53% of the Serbs believe that Albanian integration is possible. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (2019) states that all mayors in South Serbia have also been involved in the dialogue and have been presented the plans for border changes. There are no surveys with the opinion of Kosovo Serbs in North Kosovo about the border change. However, RTS (2012) notes, the Serbs in North Kosovo have voted against the Kosovar authorities in a referendum in 2012. 99,74% of the voters said not to recognise the authority of the Kosovo institutions. The referendum did not have any effect. Still, this does not indicate directly that they are eager to be reabsorbed by the Serbian government. Serbs from the southern municipalities in Kosovo have expressed their dissatisfaction, though. In Gračanica in South Kosovo, the location of one of the most important Serbian Orthodox monasteries, people are unhappy with the negotiations. The city is surrounded by Kosovo Albanian neighbourhoods and the people feel abandoned by Serbia. The Japan Times (2019) interviewed some of the Serbian locals in Gračanica. They feel forgotten by Belgrade and fear that the remaining Serbs would be abandoned, although they already have a less strong bond with Serbia. They would lose their minority rights when a deal would be made, just when the integration of the Serbs in Kosovo is slowly improving. For them is the south what really matters, too, since several Serbian religious sites are based there and the Serbian “heartland” is concentrated there. It is precisely this historically and religiously important part that would remain in Kosovo. It would make the them insecure and would cause an emigration to Serbia. The political climate and hard rhetoric concern the inhabitants, because they do not know how their future will look like. Eleanor Rose (2018) visited Čabra, a village in the district of Kosovska Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo with only Albanian inhabitants. There, the Albanian people fear a potential delineation, since it could bring back ethnically motivated violence of the 1990s. They do not believe that a territory swap could bring peace in the region and, if it is deployed, they would leave. Ethnic disputes would come back. The mayors in the by Serb dominated municipalities in Kosovo (from both north and south of the Ibar) have not been involved in the dialogue, which leads to frustration among the citizens. It is unknown whether the governments are planning to motivate the remaining minorities (Serbs in south Kosovo and the Preševo valley and Albanians in north Kosovo) to migrate after the delineation. 37

4.4 Historical comparison

As mentioned above, this is not the first attempt of ethnic cleansing. Hans Vermeulen et al. (2015: 51) state that the first large-scale population exchange was introduced by the Treaty of Neuilly and the associated Convention between Bulgaria and Greece Respecting Reciprocal Emigration of Minorities in 1919. It had to cede four areas in the west to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as stated in the treaty. Next to this, the convention forced 35.000 Greeks in Bulgaria to move to Greece and between 42.000 and 66.000 Bulgarians, mainly from Greek Eastern Macedonia, to Bulgaria. Jackson (1998: 824-825) recalls the Treaty of Lausanne, which regulated population transfers between Turkey and Greece. Supervised by the League of Nations, the transfers had to be conducted peacefully and the migrants had to receive compensation for the properties they had left behind. 1.5 million Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Ottomans had to leave Ottoman territory and 400.000 Greek-speaking Muslims had to leave Greece to Turkey. The words involuntary resettlement have not been heard yet in the talks between Belgrade and Priština, but could appear after the borders have changed. Kosovo Albanians in North Kosovo, who would suddenly find themselves in Serbia, might be resettled later against their will. The same applies to Serbs in South Serbia, who would suddenly live in Kosovo if the border correction takes place. Also Serbs from South Kosovo could be victimised. These three populations could be forced by the state to resettle (in another country) or could do this by their own will. These projects had immense consequences, which will now be mirrored on a potential scenario of a Kosovo-Serbian land swap. First of all, social, economic and political structures were lost in Greece and Turkey and the society had to be rebuilt in the regions which were hit the hardest. These Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Ottomans, states Renée Hirschon (2003: 14-19), belonged to the Ottoman elite, mercantile class and the bourgeoisie. By exchanging these, Turkey lost ‘valuable’ citizens, who contributed a lot to the country’s economy and politics. Greece on the other hand gained commercial expertise, increasing market and labour forces. If we compare this to Kosovo and Serbia, neither country would lose a strong political and economic class, since unemployment is high in both North Kosovo and South Serbia. Serbia would gain expertise about mines, since the Trepča-mines in North Kosovo would be included in the deal. Secondly, Greece was not able to resettle all 1.5 million people and had to set up camps, while Turkey faced abandoned villages. If we reflect this on Kosovo and Serbia, Serbia would gain 10.000 people and Kosovo would lose the same amount. In the case of a land swap, people would normally not be forced out their houses. They would remain where they lived before the border change. Thirdly, politics in Greece and Turkey were also affected by the refugee influx. Greek politics in the interbellum was characterized by political instability and a growing communist movement. Chances are rather minimal that there would be a new communist regime in the Balkans. However, the deal could influence the politics; Serbian and Albanian nationalism would be fuelled. Opinions about a border change are divided in Serbia and could make or break the government. In neighbouring countries ethnic minorities in other countries could also request a border change. Political instability would be spread over the region. The fourth 38 comparison is the fate of the remaining ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities that were allowed to stay in Greece and Turkey, became hostages to the vicissitudes in Greco-Turkish state relations in the following decades. Their fate depended on geopolitical issues, on international relations and national politics. This could be the same in Kosovo and Serbia. Their relationship is very complicated and the remaining ethnic Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo could be the victims of a tug of war. Fifthly, the culture of the incoming population was oversimplified. Although they shared the same religion, they were not a completely homogenous group; there were often regional, cultural or linguistical differences. As a result of the ethnic cleansing, both countries underwent unforeseen problems with the minorities. Although the population or land swap comprised a much bigger number of ethnic minorities, I am convinced that these problems could also occur when Kosovo and Serbia conclude a similar agreement. In the long term, the effects of the forced displacement are still present. Elizabeth Colson (2003: 6-9) notes that the psychological impact on the victims cannot be underestimated. They end up in camps, have little control over what happens, lose hope and start to despair. Many of these refugees or displaced persons have experienced torture or other violence that make them doubt themselves as well as others. Their integration and new community infrastructure in the new state develops slowly and they stick to their old identity. This is also proven, based on research into Greek refugees from Asia Minor, which were deported to Greece in the interbellum (cf. supra). Seventy years after their exile, their identity was still formed by the place they came from. If Kosovo Serbs would be traded for Serbian Albanians or if both ethnicities would be expelled and settle down in another region or state, they could experience the same feelings. Their integration in Serbia and Kosovo or Albania, respectively, would be more difficult than it seems at first sight. Just as Greek refugees from Asia Minor, most Kosovo Serbs would not identify themselves immediately with Serbs in Serbia or Albanians in Kosovo or Albania. One cannot assume that members of ethnic minorities immediately feel at home after their emigration in the host country (cf. supra). Another possible outcome of the conflict is a Conflict-Induced Displacement and Resettlement (CIDR). We can link this with an article of Robert Muggah (2003: 7). Displacement occurs when the people are more exposed to risks at their homes than to opportunities. Internal displacement can be caused by several factors of which ethnic or religious persecution is one. Displacement can be linked with a violation of human rights. An example of a displaced person is a refugee or an internally displaced person (IDP, a refugee who does not cross internationally recognized borders). Muggah (2003: 12) states that involuntary resettlement is often linked with impoverishment (IRLR)(cf. infra). People have to leave their houses, job and belongings behind in order to rebuild life elsewhere. They have a higher chance on landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration. Their access to education, political expression and violence is also doubtful. If we reflect this on a possible land swap, a forced displacement of the remaining ethnic minorities (Kosovo Serbs in the South, Serbian Albanians not from South Serbia and Serbs from South Serbia) could take place. Although the ethnic minorities would probably end up in host countries where their ethnicity matches that of the majority population, they would

39 still leave behind their life and property in their former country. In a previous work he already referred to the “Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction” framework (IRLR), created by Michael Cernea. The model serves to ensure that refugees or internally displaced people can have the same standard of living as before their resettlement. Muggah (2000) used this theory and applied the IRLR model to a resettlement project in Colombia during the Colombian Civil War. Enforced displacement of Colombian civilians was part of a strategy to eliminate threats and dismantling production systems (Muggah 2000: 204). If we apply this to Kosovo and Serbia, it could be that both governments decide to displace the ethnic minorities in order to avoid armed conflicts or dangerous separatist movements, e.g. the KLA. However, Colombia’s conflict exists of multiple armed camps, such as the government, far-left guerrilla movements and far-right paramilitaries. As we can see 80 to 90% of the victims of involuntary displacement have resettled in (peri-)urban area and have the lowest income. Muggah (2000: 206) also states that ethnic minorities in Colombia are also targeted, although they are encouraged to remain neutral in the conflict. Only 35% of the IDP’s receives aid from the state or NGO’s. The IDP’s, of which the majority consists of women and children, do not have access to the means, needed to build up a life after the conflict. Next to this, educational and health services are limited. In other words, the IRLR theory shows the severe consequences for conflict displaced persons (CID). If we mirror this model on a potential similar conflict in Kosovo and Serbia and new ethnic minorities (Kosovo Serbs in the South, Serbian Albanians not from South Serbia and Serbs from South Serbia) that suddenly would live in a country where their ethnic group does not form the majority of the population, they could be victimised and become IDP’s. They would undergo the same problems, living conditions in camps and troubles in their later life as the Colombian victims of the civil war. IRLR wants to elevate the living conditions of the IDP’s to the ones they had before their displacement. This aim is very expensive and often unaffordable by the state, moreover the international community does not finance enough. If we look at the findings of a survey in involuntary resettlements in Colombia, it shows that the majority of the respondents are most concerned with losses in common property, educational access and problems associated with housing (Muggah 2000: 210). Colson, Jackson and Muggah show that these ethnic cleaning projects have a major impact on the victims’ lives. Not only they experience discrimination, the process of resettlement in camps is difficult and on the long-term they have problems integrating in their relocated communities. Due to the lack of basic provisions in these camps, they have a higher risk of joblessness and homelessness and they lack educational services. This is a process that influences multiple generations. If we would reflect this on Kosovo and Serbia in the form of a population swap, they could experience the same difficulties as the Greek minority from Asia Minor in Greece. Holding on to their regional and cultural characteristics, they want to distinguish themselves from autochthonous Greeks. To a lesser extent this would affect the Albanian community in South Serbia, since they have expressed their support for a land swap. A forced resettlement, in which local minorities are forced to leave their hometowns but stay within the state, would cause the same effects as Colson and Muggah state.

40

Conclusion

My research question is as follows: What are its main features and how will this conflict evolve? The goals was to identify the characters of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. Based on the sources I have used and the knowledge I have acquired I come to the following conclusion. The first of the four key elements is of a historical and religious nature. Historically the Battle of Kosovo in 1398 plays a significant symbolic role in the incorporation of Serbia in the Ottoman Empire. It was the subject of many romantic and nationalist poems and songs. The victory of the Ottomans on Kosovo Polje is considered as the present domination by the Kosovo Albanians. As stated in the first chapter, many Serbs believe that their presence is illegitimate. Kosovo also bears a religious value, as one of the first Serbian Orthodox patriarchies is located there. Moreover, many other religious sites have been destroyed or damaged in the Kosovo war and the following conflicts (e.g. the outbursts of violence in 2004). Losing Kosovo would mean that the Serbs lose part of their identity. The second key element was the conflict itself, which was accelerated after Kosovo became a Serbian province after the Balkan Wars in the beginning of the twentieth century. This century has shown that when either of both ethnic groups in Kosovo took the upper hand, the other was suppressed. This is proven in the interwar colonisation attempts by Serbs and the forced resettlement of the Kosovo Albanians into Turkey. In the Second World War, Kosovo Albanians took revenge by committing war crimes against Kosovo Serbs, which caused thousands of them to migrate. Under Tito’s rule the colonisation attempts were stopped, but Kosovo Albanians fell victim to Ranković’s illegitimate purges. The tide changed when Kosovo was recognised as an autonomous province and more civil rights were granted to its Albanian population. Then the Serbs were victimised through large-scale discrimination. In the early 1990s, Milošević reduced their rights and Kosovo lost its status of autonomous province. A military conflict ensued and NATO decided to intervene. For 78 days, NATO air strikes hit Kosovo and Serbia. Milošević surrendered and signed the Kumanovo Agreement. However, the end of the war did not mean the start of a harmonious relationship between the province and Serbia. Outbursts of violence in 2004, the independence declaration of Kosovo in 2008 and several other events reinforced tensions and did not contribute positively to the normalisation of the relationship between both parties. The current situation does not seem to lead to a step forward within the next months. The third key element, the violation of human rights of the ethnic minorities goes on. Their rights are violated and there is still much space for improvement. Both countries have the legal framework to improve the living conditions of the ethnic minorities, but do not show much interest in it and do not implement changes. Possible solutions for the Kosovo-Serbia conflict have proven to be ineffective. This is the fourth key element in this thesis. One of those is a potential exchange of borders or ethnic minorities, whereby South Serbia or its Albanian population would be exchanged for North Kosovo or its Serbs. Moreover, the ideas they propose about potential border corrections only make the ethnic minorities involved anxious. Is this the solution and will the conflict evolve this way? History shows that ethnic cleansing campaigns are outdated and do not

41 have any positive effects. A potential border swap is not popular among the local ethnicities (except for South Serbian Albanians), nor is it a sustainable solution. Both countries are incredibly vague about a potential deal, which means that the two countries are not on the same line. Elizabeth Colson (2003) states that the relocated ethnic group does not automatically identifies itself with the new country (although people of the same ethnic minority might be the majority of the population there). On the contrary, over time they feel more connected to the region they come from and try to distinguish themselves from the others from the same ethnic community in their new country. Jennifer Jackson (1998) has discussed the evolution of ethnic cleansing campaigns and how ethnic cleansing was executed in the past century and how the international community has changed its position on the matter. She points out (1998: 841) that the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in the 1990s was condemned internationally and that the multinational Bosnian state was legitimate. However, the European Union and the United States have now expressed their support for a potential ethnic cleansing project in the minority regions of Kosovo and Serbia (cf. supra). Robert Muggah (2000 & 2003) reveals the risks for the relocated people with Cernea’s impoverishment risks and livelihood reconstruction, that proves that the lives of the displaced people are extremely affected by these processes. Based on eight variables, common to resettlement, he shows that the relocated people have a higher chance on impoverishment Muggah (2000: 1999). The neighbouring countries, too, do not advocate this, as it may open Pandora’s box, motivating other separatist movements among ethnic minorities in the Balkans to demand independence. After reflecting these Political Science and International Relations' approaches on Kosovo’s situation, it is obvious that any of these scenarios would not have positive effects in Kosovo and Serbia. The chances that both countries will normalise their relationship are minimal, so they have to be realistic and let the case rest. The best option is a form of peaceful coexistence. While above theories are almost irreconcilable, there is a way to achieve this. The answer lies in the model “antagonistic tolerance” or competitive sharing. This theory, developed by anthropologist Robert M. Hayden, states that a sacred site can be shared among different competitive religious groups, without one of them manifests its dominance over the other. Hayden states that “the competitive sharing is compatible with the passive meaning of “tolerance” as non-interference but incompatible with the active meaning of tolerance as embrace of the Other (2002: 205). Positive tolerance is described as the active embrace of the Other. Three conclusions ensue: firstly, this model can only work during periods of social tensions between religious groups. Secondly, democracy based on the consent of the governed can often be incompatible with programs that demand positive tolerance. Thirdly, antagonistic tolerance is fostered by inequality and is endangered by equality between the different religious groups. Hayden designed this theory, looking at the religious conflict in South Asia between Muslims and Hindus and the ethnic cleansing campaign in the Balkans in the 1990s. Hayden only applies it to religious sites, but could it also be applied to the Kosovo conflict? In this case Kosovo should not be depicted as a sacred site (although it is in some way for Serbs), but as a political entity. The three conclusions Hayden mentions, are present. Firstly, there are social tensions in Kosovo between two ethnic groups, Albanians and Serbs, characterised by different . Secondly, the Kosovar democracy is based on the

42 consent of the governed, so positive tolerance is not possible. Thirdly, inequality and human rights violations are frequent. The two ethnic groups in Kosovo are not equal. Under the international rule (UNMIK and KFOR), Kosovo Serbs should be protected, but this has failed in the past (cf. supra). This could be a solution. The state of tension is not necessarily negative and destructive, this is also proven by Edward Evans-Pritchard, with his segmentary lineage system. The term segmentary lineage was first applied to the tribal society of the Nuer of Southern Sudan. Peter Kloos (1995: 70- 71) explains the theory as follows: large descendant groups, connected by a mutual forefather, consist of segments, which in turn consist of smaller segments. The smallest segment is close family. The larger segments consist of more distant family (cousins) and their families. If brothers fight between themselves, the cousins will not take sides. When the conflict is between cousins, brothers will align against brothers on the other side. The segments are between themselves opposed to each other, but can also work together when attacked by an outsider. There is no central authority, but this does not mean that there is chaos. They live in constant tension with their neighbouring tribe, the Dinka. This tribal society model also comes back in Albania and to a lesser extent Kosovo. Tahir Latifi (2018: 148, 150) states that in Kosovo, where the establishment and the authorities fail to govern and protect the country, kinship (a group of persons linked through descendants of the male line) and personal relations are important to find a job or gain support for a professional career. Political conflicts in tribal societies are resolved by blood feuds. This provides a compensation for homicide and maintains the equilibrium of the conflict. Enrique Muñoz- Salido (2018) states that fear of incurring blood feud is a guarantee for the individual to keep safe. Most intertribal conflicts are solved by an impartial authority, who guarantees justice among the sections of the tribe. This institution does not have the same authority when it comes to major conflicts. This person can offer an alternative punishment for a blood feud. Nevertheless, the blood feud never ends and is a vicious circle; it contributes to the beginning of political conflicts. Blood feud is also present in Albania. This society has its own way of solving (intertribal) wars and lives constantly in tension. However, this constant state of tension is not necessarily destructive. The fear of an escalation of a conflict, which is resolved by blood feud, holds the tribes back to form a new one. Only external factors and international presence can influence this system. The segmentary lineage system shows that two or more rival tribes or ethnic groups can live next to each other in tension, but that this tension is not negative. Kosovo and Serbia are able to have a tense and conflicting relationship and do not have to normalise it. The international community has the impression that it has to intervene, because it is financially more powerful, in order to integrate Serbia and Kosovo into the European Union. But why can the countries not join the European Union without signing an agreement and just keep the relationship as it is now? By not changing their relationship, their neighbouring countries will not have negative consequences, as it would have if Kosovo and Serbia undertake a border or population swap or other forms of ethnic cleansing.

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Appendices

Maps

Appendix 1: Map of the current borders of Kosovo and Serbia

The map is available at BBC News (2010).

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Appendix 2: Map of the Slavic tribes between the seventh and ninth centuries

The map is available at Reddit (2019).

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Appendix 3: Map of the Serbian territory from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries

The map is available at University of Texas Libraries (2019).

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Appendix 4: Map of Kosovo in the Kingdom of Serbia and under the Albanian occupation in the Second World War

The map is available at University of Texas Libraries (2019).

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Appendix 5: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The map is available at Mondialisation (2016).

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Appendix 6: Map of the number of dropped bombs by place

The map is available at the Twitter-account of Milos Popović (2019).

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Appendix 7: Map of Kosovo municipalities with a Serbian majority

The map is available at Wikipedia (2019). The blue parts are municipalities with a Kosovo Serbian majority.

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Appendix 8: Map of the cities where most ethnic Albanians live in Serbia and possible territory swap

The three municipalities Medveđa, Preševo and Bujanovac in Serbia have a mostly Albanian population, while North Mitrovica in Kosovo has a mostly Serbian population. The map is available at Insight Turkey (2019).

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Texts

Appendix 9: The Fall of the Serbian Empire

This is the text of the song, translated by Milne Holton and Vasa D. Mihailovich in the book Songs of the Serbian People: From the Collections of Vuk Karadžić (147-150).

From that high town, holy Jerusalem, there comes flying a gray bird, a falcon, and in his beak a small bird, a swallow.

Yet this gray bird is not just a falcon; it is our saint, the holy Saint Elijah.

And the swallow is not just a swallow, but a message from the Holy Virgin.

The falcon flies to Kosovo’s flat field.

The message falls in the lap of the tsar; for Tsar Lazar is the message destined: 10

“O Tsar Lazar, prince of righteous lineage, which of the two kingdoms will you embrace?

Would you rather choose a heavenly kingdom, or have instead an earthly kingdom here?

If, here and now, you choose the earthly kingdom, saddle horses, tighten the saddles’ girths, let all the knights put on their mighty swords, and launch you then assault against the Turks.

Then their army, all the Turks, shall perish.

“But if, instead, you choose the heavenly kingdom, 20

Then you must build a church at Kosovo.

Do not build it upon a marble base, but on pure silk and costly scarlet cloth, and give your host orders to Holy Mass.

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For every man, all soldiers, will perish, and you, their prince, will perish with your host.”

When Tsar Lazar has heard the whole message,

Lazar is vexed; he ponders, he thinks much:

“O my dear lord, what shall I ever do?

And of the two, which kingdom should I choose? 30

Shall I now choose the promised heavenly kingdom, or shall I choose an earthly kingdom here?

If I do choose I embrace the latter, if I do choose the earthly kingdom here, then what I choose is but a transient kingdom; the eternal one is that promised in heaven.”

Lazar chooses the heavenly kingdom; he refuses the earthly kingdom here.

So he has built the church of Kosovo.

He does not build upon a marble base, 40 but on pure silk and costly scarlet cloth.

He calls to him, the Serbian ; beside him stand twelve great Serbian bishops.

The whole army comes to take communion.

No sooner have the orders been given than the Turks come and assault Kosovo.

Old Jug Bogdan bids his great host go forth with his nine sons, all nine Jugovićes, his nine proud sons, proud like nine gray falcons.

Each commands there a host of nine thousand; 50

Old Jug Bogdan, he has twelve thousand men.

All meet the Turks and fight them with their swords;

68 they strike and slay seven Turkish pashas.

When with the eight they begin to battle, the old leader, the brave Jug Bogdan, falls; with him his sons, all nine Jugovićes, his nine proud sons, proud like nine gray falcons, and with them fall the whole of their brave hosts.

Now others come, Mrnjavčevićes three:

Ban Uglješa and Voivode Gojko, 60 a third man, too, the brave king Vukašin.

Each one leads forth a host of thirty thousand.

They meet the Turks and fight them with their swords; they strike and slay eight Turkish pashas there.

When with the ninth they begin to battle, two gray falcons, Mrnjavčevićes, fall;

Ban Uglješa, Voivode Gojko die.

King Vukašin is most sorely wounded; the Turks trample upon him with their horses.

With these three fall the whole of their brave host. 70

Archduke Stefan then bids his host go forth, and his army, numerous and mighty, a great army, sixty thousand in all.

They meet the Turks and fight them with their swords; they strike and slay nine Turkish pashas there.

When with the tenth they begin to battle, but Stefan falls, Archduke Stefan himself, and with him falls the whole of his brave host.

Prince Lazar, then bids his great host go forth.

The Serbian host is numerous and mighty, 80

69 some seventy and seven thousand men, and they scatter the Turks at Kosovo.

They leave the Turks no time to look behind; there is no chance for Turks to stand and fight.

Prince Lazar then, would overwhelm the Turks,

But may God’s curse be on Vuk Branković!

For he betrays his prince and his wife’s father, and Lazar’s host is overwhelmed by the Turks.

Now Lazar falls, the Serbian prince Lazar, and with him falls the whole of his brave host, 90 his seventy and seven thousand men.

All his is done with good grace and honor, before the eyes of God the Almighty.

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Appendix 10: Slobodan Milošević’s 1989 Gazimestan Speech

The translated text is available at www.Slobodan-Milosevic.org (2019).

By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos [Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.

Serbian Character -- Liberational

Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions will be constantly sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.

Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others.

Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.

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Unity Will Make Prosperity Possible

Disunity among Serb officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia. Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo and no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.

Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in doing so. This is why the optimism that is now present in Serbia to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, also because it is based on freedom, which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities aimed at furthering social and personal life.

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.

Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic.

Dramatic National Divisions

After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.

The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.

For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts.

At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.

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Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at is tail.

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, 6 centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion, they could allow themselves to be disunited and to have hatred and treason because they lived in smaller, weakly interlinked worlds. Now, as people on this planet, they cannot conquer even their own planet if they are not united, let alone other planets, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.

Therefore, words devoted to unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason.

In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and in bringing about the fate which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries.

Even if it were not so, from a historical point of view, it remains certain that the people regarded disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future.

Unity brings Back Dignity

This year, the Serbian people became aware of the necessity of their mutual harmony as the indispensable condition for their present life and further development.

I am convinced that this awareness of harmony and unity will make it possible for Serbia not only to function as a state but to function as a successful state. Therefore I think that it makes sense to say this here in Kosovo, where that disunity once upon a time tragically pushed back Serbia for centuries and endangered it, and where renewed unity may advance it and may return dignity to it. Such an awareness about mutual relations constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, for its fate is in the joined hands of all its peoples. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing.

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle,

73 we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavour to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country, this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!

Long live Serbia!

Long live Yugoslavia!

Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!

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Appendix 11: Resolution 1244

The text of the resolution is available at United Nations Security Council (1999).

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self- administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

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3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

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10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors’ conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

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15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary- General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; - Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; - Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; - Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; - The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; - A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; - Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

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Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; - Marking/clearing minefields; - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the note below. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other

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Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel; - Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; - Timetable for their return; - Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; - Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; - Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); - Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; - The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

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