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No. 54, Alley 8, Lane 36, Min-Sheng E Published by: International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan Taiwan : 1st Floor, No. 54, Alley 8, Lane 36, Min-sheng E. Road Sec. 5, TAIPEI Europe : P.O. Box 91542, 2509 EC THE HAGUE, The Netherlands Canada : P.O. Box 67035, 2300 Yonge Street, TORONTO, Ont. M4P 1E0 U.S.A. : P.O. Box 45205, SEATTLE, WA 98105-0205 : P.O. Box 15275, WASHINGTON, DC 20003-5275 International edition, April 1992 Published 6 times a year 54 Electing the President ? In the first half of March 1992, a heated debate erupted in Taiwan about the issue of presidential elections. Ironically, the debate was not between the DPP and the KMT as is usually the case but between the conservative and progressive wings of the Kuomintang itself. The debate centered around the way in which the future President should be elected: by direct elections, or continuation of the present system of indirect elec- tions through the National Assembly. Until the beginning of March 1992, the gen- eral Kuomintang-line had been based on the present system, with only a minor modification, and thus euphemistically called direct election by delegation. It re- quired National Assembly members to declare which presidential candidates they support before being elected to the electoral college. Banner at opposition rally in Taichung on 23 February 1992 Taiwan Communiqué -2- April 1992 The discussions were taking place in preparation for the National Assembly ses- sion, which started on 20 March, and which is considering possible changes to the Constitution. In the following report, we give an overview of the events. Direct or Indirect Elections ? The debate within the Kuomintang spilled out into the open, when, in the first week of March 1992, a major KMT faction within the Legislative Yuan the New KMT Alliance suddenly broke ranks with the established party line, and came out in favor of direct elections. A number of more progressive party leaders, such as Judicial Yuan President Lin Yang-kang, KMT Secretary-General James Soong, Taiwan Provincial Governor Lien Chan, Interior Minister Wuh Poh-hsiung also spoke out in favor of a direct vote instead of the indirect system. On 7 and 9 March, the Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang held two marathon talks, each lasting from six to seven hours, in an attempt to resolve the is- sue. However, the Committee could not reach a consensus, as 14 members of the Mainstream faction led by President Lee Teng-hui spoke out in favor of di- rect elections, while ten conservative members among whom Prime Minister Hau Pei-tsun remained in favor of the indirect system. Five members were re- portedly undecided or non-committal. The matter was then referred to the Plenary Session of the 180-member Central Committee, which took place on 14 and 15 March 1992. However, even after sev- eral rounds of lengthy negotiations, the gathering could not arrive at a consensus either. The third plenum was attended by some 900 Kuomintang figures, 180 of whom could vote on the issue as members of the Central Committee of the KMT. The gathering was marked by heated debates over the issue. In the plenary meeting, some of the elderly, conservative, Kuomintang members mounted a vicious attack on President Lee, accusing him of harboring ambitions to become a dictator (although President Lee has stated repeatedly he wil not continue for a second term as President). The conservatives even threatened to withdraw from the party if the leadership forced a vote on the method of electing the president. As a compromise, a resolution was drafted stating that ..the next president will be elected by voters in the free area of the Republic of China, and the method of election the president will be decided by the new National Assembly. Taiwan Communiqué -3- April 1992 National Assembly becomes focus of attention The battlefield thus moved to the National Assembly, where the debate could result in an interesting alliance between the democratic opposition of the DPP and the progres- sive wing of the Kuomintang. If this coalition could muster a 75% majority on the is- sue, then the next president will be popularly-elected. However, if opponents of direct presidential elections can gain support from a quarter of the 423 members of the As- sembly, they can block the passage of the direct elections clause. In a cover article of 15 March 1992, the Taipei-based maga- zine The Journalist reported that President Lee Teng-hui himself is in favor of direct presidential election, because he believes only a strong president who is directly elected by the people has the mandate to carry out reforms in the military, in the party and in the government. At the President Lee's dilemma: direct elections (by moment, the military is still automobile) or indirect elections (by rickshaw) ?? dominated by a clique around Premier Hau, the former chief of staff of the armed forces, the party elders resist re- forms, and the government bureaucracy has a lot of deadwood. The local news media, such as the more liberal Independence Evening Post, Freedom Times and the pro-government China Times all favor of direct presi- dential election and a presidential system of government that will provide leader- ship in the present stage of political development in Taiwan. The opposition DPP has long called for direct presidential elections. It is also in favor of streamlining the complex five-chamber system of government which came over from mainland China in the 1940s, and has called for abolition of the Na- tional Assembly, the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan, arguing that these dont fulfill any useful function in the present-day political system. The DPP fa- vors the establishment of a presidential system where power is divided among the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of government. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Taiwan Communiqué -4- April 1992 A Showdown Averted KMT threatens to disband DPP On 13 October 1991, at its Fifth Annual Convention, the DPP adopted a clause in its party Charter calling for ... the establishment of an independent and sover- eign Republic of Taiwan and the enactment of a new Constitution, to be decided by the people of Taiwan in a plebiscite. After the adoption, the Kuomintang authorities launched a strong fear-and-slander campaign against the opposition (see Taiwan Communiqué no. 52, pp. 8-9). The KMT also threatened to disband the DPP. The political tension reduced slightly af- ter a November 4th meeting between Premier Hau Pei-tsun and leading DPP legis- lators. The authorities didnt follow up on the disbandment threat at the time, ap- parently fearing a backlash in the run-up towards the 21 December 1991 National Assembly elections. The matter came to a boil again in the beginning of Feb- ruary 1992, after the Cabi- ns et Political Party Screening Committee de- cided that the DPP clause was illegal and stated that the party should be dis- banded. The Committee, which falls under the aus- pices of Premier Hau Pei- tsuns Cabinet, has led a DPP to KMT: "Go ahead .... if you are not shady existence, and ac- afraid to be stung by those bees !!" cording to press reports in Taiwan ...has rarely done anything substantial during the past decades. DPP legislators have questioned the legality of the Committee, which has never been formally approved by the Legislative Yuan. During the first half of February, KMT government officials, like Vice Premier Shih Chi-yang, who is the chairman of the Political Party Screening Committee, sounded ominous warnings of disbandment and told the DPP to drop the pro-inde- pendence clause before the deadline of 24 February 1992, or else.... Taiwan Communiqué -5- April 1992 However, the DPP ignored the warnings, and refused to drop the clause. DPP-lead- ers said there would be a major political uproar if the KMT authorities would fol- low through on the disbandment threat, and stated they would simply form another party under a different name, perhaps even Taiwan Independence Party. They also indicated that they would forcefully raise the issue during the opening of the Legislative Yuan on 21 February, and that the DPP would boycott the upcoming National Assembly session, leaving the Kuomintang with an empty shell. The DPP also stated it would propose that the Council on Grand Justices should study whether the Law on Organizations of Civic Groups the law under which it is prohibited for groups to advocate Taiwan independence is unconstitutional, since the Constitution provides for freedom of expression and assembly. On 19 February 1992 just five days before the deadline of 24 February the whole matter was abruptly put on hold again, when the Kuomintang authorities de- cided to delay the decision on the disbandment of the DPP ... for an indefinite pe- riod. The opening of the Legislative Yuan on 21 February thus occurred peace- fully, and on 22 February 1992, a meeting was held between delegations of the DPP and KMT in order to arrive at an understanding. While the two delegations couldnt come to an agreement on any major political issue, they did decide to meet regularly to communicate differences and attempt to resolve the major is- sues dividing the two parties. Demonstrating for Independence in Taichung On 23 February 1992, a large demonstration took place in the Central Taiwan city of Taichung urging the KMT government to end its isolationist policies and work towards rejoining the United Nations, and to protests the KMT attempts to disband the DPP for its position in favor of Taiwan independence. A crowd estimated at between 20,000 and 40,000 people gathered at the Taichung stadium, and after speeches by major opposition leaders, filed out of the stadium in a five-kilometer long procession, winding its way through the center of the city.
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