Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North here develops an analytical framework for ex­ plaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE uncertainties involved in human interaction; th!=y are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic perfor­ mance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while other economies develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and pro­ duction costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institu­ • tional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organizations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institu­ tional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the struc­ ture of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorpo­ rated into neoclassical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. ~ ! THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS INSTITUTIONS, editors INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE James Alt, Harvard University Douglass North, Washington University in St. Louis AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Other books in the series Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights DOUGLASS C. NORTH Robert H. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya Gary D. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy Charles Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, I865-I92I TIll' riglll o/the UlliIWS;I}' of Cambridge TO prillt and sdl all mamu'r of books was gran It,d bJ' H,'/Iry V/JI ill 1534. TII(· Urrilwsil), Iw.r printt'tl alld published l'ol11illllr)flJly since 15B4. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney Contents Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge Series editor's preface page vi The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge eB2 IRP Preface vii 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY IOOII, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Part I Institutions © Cambridge University Press 1990 I An introduction to institutions and institutional change 3 First published I990 2 Cooperation: the theoretical problem II 3 The behavioral assumptions in a theory of institutions 17 Printed in the United States of America 4 A transaction cost theory of exchange 27 '.5 Informal constraints 36 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 6 Formal constraints 46 North, Douglass Cecil. 7 Enforcement 54 Institutions, institutional change and economic performance / ,8 Institutions and transaction and transformation costs 61 Douglass C. North. p. cm. (The Political economy of institutions and decisions) Part II Institutional change Includes bibliographical references. 9 Organizations, learning, and institutional change ISBN 0-521-39416-3. - ISBN 0-521-39734-0 (pbk.) 73 I. Institutional economics. 2. Organizational change. 10 Stability and institutional change 83 3. Economic development. I. Title. II. Series. I I The path of institutional change 92 HB99.5.N67 1990 302.3'5 - dC20 9°-1673 Part III Economic performance British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 12 Institutions, economic theory, and economic performance 107 North, Douglass C. (Douglass Cecil) 13 stability and change in economic history II8 Institutions, institutional change and economic 14 Incorporating institutional analysis into economic history: performance. - (Political economy of institutions and prospects and puzzles 1 decisions). 13 1. Economics. Theories I. Title II. Series References 33°·155 Index ISBN 0-52I-39416-3 hardback rSBN 0-52r-39734-0 paperback v Series editor~s preface Preface History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the The Cambridge Series in the Political Economy of Institutions and Deci­ continuity of a society's institutions. Today's and tomorrow's choices are sions is built around attempts to answer two central questions: How do ~ha~ed ,by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and mstltutlOnal evolution. Integrating institutions into economic theory and choices, and how do institutions affect the performance of political and economic history is an essential step in improving that theory and history. economic systems? The scope of the series is comparative and historical This study provides the outline of a theory of institutions and institu­ rather than international or specifically American, and the focus is pos­ tional change. Although it builds on the earlier studies of institutions that itive rather than normative. have been the focus of my attention for the past twenty years, it delves In this challenging theoretical work, Douglass North examines how to much more deeply than the earlier studies into the nature of political and explain the vastly different performances of economies over long periods economic institutions and how they change. The specification of exactly of time. Asking "What combination of institutions best permits capturing ~hat institutions are, how they differ from organizations, and how they the gains from trade?", he offers a broad perspective on how institutions mfluence transaction and production costs is the key to much of the persist and change, superseding his own earlier work on incentives to­ analysis. ward efficient institutions. Now his focus is on the interaction of institu­ The central focus is on the problem of human cooperation - specifical­ tions, defined as any constraint humans devise to shape their interactions, ly the cooperation that permits economies to capture the gains from trade and organizations, created to take advantage of the opportunities present­ that were the key to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The evolution of ed by institutions in shaping the development of economies. The impor­ institutions that create an hospitable environment for cooperative solu­ tance of institutions arises from the costliness of measuring what is valu­ tions to complex exchange provides for economic growth. Not all human able, protecting rights, and policing and enforcing agreements. Once cooperation is socially productive, of course; indeed, this study is con­ created, institutions determine the costs of acting in various ways in polit­ cerned as much with explaining the evolution of institutional frameworks ical and economic contexts. North applies his theories of the interplay that induce economic stagnation and decline as with accounting for the between institutional evolution and political and economic organization successes. to a range of historical examples, including the development of manage­ My primary objective is to construct a way of approaching the issues - ment structures, law merchants, insurance, and financial markets. The a necessary first step in evolving a theory of institutional change. There­ synthesis he achieves will be equally valuable to students of economics, fore, much of the book is devoted to developing the analytical framework. history, and politics. The history I include is illustrative, designed to show the promise of the approach, but far from providing for the kind of hypothesis testing that must ultimately be done. Although my primary message is to economists vii VI Preface and economic historians, I believe the argument will be equally interest­ ing to other social scientists. With this in mind, I have attempted to keep the economic terminology to a minimum and make the analysis clear to Part I the noneconomist. So many people have played a role in the development of the ideas presented here that it is difficult to know where to begin in acknowledging them. The first draft of this manuscript was written while I was a fellow at Institutions the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences supported by Grant # BNS 8700864 of the National Science Foundation. Gardner Lindzey, Bob Scott, and the staff established a wonderfully hospitable environment for this enterprise. lowe a particular debt to Carol Baxter, who patiently indoctrinated me into enough of the mysteries of the com­ puter to alter fundamentally (for the better) my way of writing. Robert Keohane, Steven Krasner, Mark Machina, and Ken Sokoloff, fellows at the Center that year, all contributed to the development of this study. lowe special debts to Barry Weingast and John Nye, with whom I have discussed many of the ideas developed herein and who read and com­ mented extensively