DOCSLIB.ORG

John Kenneth Galbraith

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
John Kenneth Galbraith JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH The Economic Legacy Edited by Stephen P. Dunn Volume I The Large Firm, Keynesianism, Price Control and Economic Development fl Routledge jj^^ Taylor & Francis Croup LONDON AND NEW YORK CONTENTS VOLUME I THE LARGE FIRM, KEYNESIANISM, PRICE CONTROL'AND' ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Acknowledgements xix Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters xxiii General introduction 1 Books by John Kenneth Galbraith 19 Introduction 21 PARTI The emergence of the large firm 29 > 1 The quantitative position of marketing in the United States 31 J. K. GALBRAITH AND J. D. BLACK 2 Monopoly power and price rigidities 47 J. K. GALBRAITH 3 Rational and irrational consumer preference 61 J. K. GALBRAITH 4 Monopoly and the concentration of economic power 68 J. K. GALBRAITH 5 The defense of business: a strategic appraisal 95 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH CONTENTS PART 2 Early Keynesianism 107 6 The maintenance of agricultural production during the depression: the explanations reviewed 109 JOHN K. GALBRAITH AND JOHN D. BLACK 7 Fiscal policy and the employment-investment controversy 124 J. K. GALBRAITH 8 Public works policy and unemployment _ 136 J. K. GALBRAITH PART 3 Price control 147 9 Defense financing and inflation potentialities 149 ALVIN H. HANSEN 10 The selection and timing of inflation controls 159 J. K. GALBRAITH 11 Some additional comments on the inflation symposium 165 ALVIN H. HANSEN 12 Price control: some lessons from the first phase 169 J. K. GALBRAITH PART 4 A Theory of Price Control: defence and debate 177 13 Reflections on price control 179 J. K. GALBRAITH 14 The disequilibrium system 191 J. K. GALBRAITH 15 The strategy of direct control in economic mobilization 207 J. K. GALBRAITH 16 Review of 'A Theory of Price Control' 216 G. C. ALLEN VI CONTENTS 17 Market structure and stabilization policy 218 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 18 Galbraith on market structure and stabilization policy 234 ROBERT SOLOMON 19 Galbraith on market structure and stabilization policy: comment 242 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 20 A comment on market structure and stabilization policy 244 ALLAN H. MELTZER 21 A comment on market structure and stabilization policy: reply 249 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 5 A Theory of Price Control: critical commentaries 251 22 Galbraith and the theory of price control 253 DAVID COLANDER 23 The theory of price controls: John Kenneth Galbraith's contribution 264 STEPHANIE LAGUERODIE AND FRANCISCO VERGARA PART 6 • The economics of war 293 24 Germany was badly run 295 J. K. GALBRAITH \ 25 Recovery in Europe 308 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 26 Professor Despres on "Effects of strategic bombing on the German war economy" 332 PAUL A. BARAN AND J. K. GALBRAITH Vll CONTENTS PART 7 Economic development 337 27 Puerto Rican lessons in economic development 339 J. K. GALBRAITH AND CAROLYN SHAW SOLO 28 The underdeveloped country: lectures I-V 345 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 29 A positive approach to economic aid 378 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH - 30 Galbraith on economic development 390 JOHN ADAMS * 8j 31 Galbraith and the problem of uneven development 400 JIM PEACH VOLUME II AMERICAN CAPITALISM, AVARICE AND AFFLUENCE Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 PART 8 American Capitalism: defense and debate 7 32 Review of American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 9 JOAN ROBINSON 33 American Capitalism 12 ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. 34 Competition, monopoly and countervailing power 19 WALTER ADAMS 35 Errors in the concept of countervailing power 41 SIMON N. WHITNEY 36 Countervailing power 61 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH Vlll CONTENTS 37 The economist plays with blocs 67 GEORGE J. STIGLER 38 Competition and countervailing power: their roles in the American economy 76 JOHN PERRY MILLER 39 Discussion 86 DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT 40 A critique of countervailing power 96 ARTHUR SCHWEITZER 41 Notes on countervailing power 119 A. HUNTER * $ 42 Mr. Hunter on countervailing power: a comment 135 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 9 Countervailing power: critical commentaries 139 43 Countervailing power revisited 141 ARTHUR SCHWEITZER 44 Countervailing power and consumer prices 159 PAUL W. DOBSON AND MICHAEL WATERSON 45 Dominant retailers and the countervailing-power hypothesis 174 ZHIQI CHEN PART 10 Money and speculation 195 46 The days of boom and bust 197 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 47 The balance of payments: a political and administrative view 207 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 48 1929 and 1969: financial genius is a short memory and a rising market 218 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH IX CONTENTS 49 The stock market boom and crash of 1929 revisited 234 EUGENE N. WHITE 50 John Kenneth Galbraith's contributions to the theory and analysis of speculative financial markets 253 CHARLES G. LEATHERS AND J. PATRICK RAINES 51 J. K. Galbraith and the nature of modern money 273 PAUL DAVIDSON AND STEPHEN P. DUNN PART 11 The Affluent Society and social imbalance 303 52 How much should a country consume? 305 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 53 The social balance 314 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 54 Economics and the quality of life 321 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 12 The Affluent Society: reviews and reactions 337 55 The Affluent Society: a review article 339 RUTLEDGE VINING 56 Economics of affluence 348 CYRIL A. ZEBOT 57 The consumer and Madison Avenue 361 HARRY G. JOHNSON 58 The non sequitur of the "dependence effect" 370 F. A. VON HAYEK 59 Social imbalance: where do we stand? 374 CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL 60 The Affluent Society after twenty-five years 394 J. R. STANFIELD 61 Rereading The Affluent Society 411 ROBERT HEILBRONER CONTENTS VOLUME III THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, THE BIMODAL VIEW AND REACTION TO 'MOVEMENT CONSERVATISM' Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 PART 13 The New Industrial State: Reith Lectures 11 62 The new industrial state, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 1 13 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 63 The modern corporation, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 2 22 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 64 Control of prices and people, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 3 31 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 65 The role of the state, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 4 40 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 66 The bearing on socialist development, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 5 48 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 67 The cultural impact, the Reith Lectures: Lecture 6 58 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 14 The New Industrial State: defence and debate 67 68 The new industrial state or son of affluence 69 ROBERT M. SOLOW 69 A review of a review 78 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 70 A rejoinder 88 ROBERT M. SOLOW 71 Galbraith, Solow, and the truth about corporations 90 ROBIN MARRIS XI CONTENTS 72 The truth further refined: a comment on Marris 99 ROBERT M. SOLOW , 73 The close of the Galbraithian system 104 SCOTT GORDON 74 Professor Gordon on 'The close of the Galbraithian system' 114 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 75 "The Galbraithian system": rejoinder 124 SCOTT GORDON i. 76 Economics as a system of belief 128 JOHN KENNETH*GALBRAITH 77 Discussion 145 E. GOLDSTON AND H. DEMSETZ 78 Power and the useful economist 156 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 79 Time and The New Industrial State 169 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 80 Discussion 175 B. BLUESTONE, R. M. SOLOW AND F. M. SCHERER 81 A look back: affirmation and error 183 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH » PART 15 The New Industrial State: reviews and reactions 187 82 Professor Galbraith's "New Industrial State" 189 IRVING KRISTOL 83 Galbraith and consumer sovereignty 196 MAURICE ZINKIN 84 Is "The New Industrial State" inevitable? 204 J. E. MEADE 85 Review of The New Industrial State 225 ROBIN MARRIS Xll CONTENTS 86 A Galbraith reappraisal: the ideologue as gadfly 233 BOB FITCH 87 Professor Galbraith and American Capitalism 243 RALPH MILIBAND 88 Planning within the firm 256 JOSEPH L. BOWER 89 Advertising in the affluent society 271 HAROLD DEMSETZ 90 Where is the new industrial state? 280 HAROLD DEMSETZ * Ij, 91 Thorstein Veblen and the new industrial state 292 CHARLES G. LEATHERS AND JOHN S. EVANS PART 16 Economics and the Public Purpose: the bimodal view 307 92 Contemporary capitalism and the problem of unequal growth 309 J. K. GALBRAITH 93 The bimodal image of the modern economy: remarks upon receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award 319 J. K. GALBRAITH 94 The defense of the multinational company 330 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 17 Economics and the Public Purpose: reviews and reactions 345 95 Galbraith redux 347 JAMES TOBIN 96 Review of Economics and the Public Purpose 358 BARBARA R. BERGMANN 97 Minus the spark 362 KENNETH E. BOULDING XU1 CONTENTS 98 Four reviews of John Kenneth Galbraith: Economics and the Public Purpose 364 MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, CHARLES H. HESSION, BARBARA DECKARD, HOWARD SHERMAN AND CAREY C. THOMPSON PART 18 Mature Keynesianism and the rise of 'movement conservatism' 375 99 Recent economic policy: the deeper perspective 377 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 100 Solving unemployment without inflation 387 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 101 The conventional wisdom of J. K. Galbraith 390 MILTON FRIEDMAN 102 The market and Mr. Reagan 414 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 103 The way up from Reagan economics 419 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 104 The social consensus and the conservative onslaught 427 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 105 The good society considered: the economic dimension 442 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH VOLUME IV THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE: METHODOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTS AND REAPPRAISALS Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 PART 19 Methodology 9 106 The language of economics 11 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH XIV CONTENTS 107 On Post Keynesian economics 21 J. K. GALBRAITH 108 Ideology and economic reality 25 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 109 Economics in the century ahead 34 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH PART 20 Methodology: critical commentaries 41 110 Galbraith on economics as a system of professional belief 43 WARREN J. SAMUELS ' 111 The realist approach of John Kenneth Galbraith 57 STEPHEN DUNN AND ANDREW MEARMAN 112 John Kenneth Galbraith and original institutional economics 77 JAMES RONALD STANFIELD AND MARY WRENN PART 21 The theory of the firm: developments 97 113 Uncertainty, market structure and performance: Galbraith as conventional wisdom 99 RICHARD E.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Death of the Firm
    Article The Death of the Firm June Carbone† & Nancy Levit†† INTRODUCTION A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are ex- tended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.1 In the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lob- by—and more generally in corporate and employment law—the firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis. We use the term “firm” in this Article in the sense that Ronald Coase did to describe a form of business organization that or- ders the production of goods and services through use of a sys- tem internal to the enterprise rather than through the use of independent contractors.2 The idea of an “entity” in this sense † Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minneso- ta Law School. †† Curators’ and Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law, University of Mis- souri – Kansas City School of Law. We thank William K. Black, Margaret F. Brinig, Naomi Cahn, Paul Callister, Mary Ann Case, Lynne Dallas, Robert Downs, Max Eichner, Martha Fineman, Barb Glesner Fines, Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Amy Monahan, Charles O’Kelley, Hari Osofsky, Irma Russell, Dan Schwarcz, Lynn Stout, and Erik P.M. Vermeulen for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article and Tracy Shoberg and Shiveta Vaid for their research support.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction Robert Gibbons and John Roberts
    Introduction Robert Gibbons and John Roberts Organizational economics involves the use of economic logic and methods to understand the existence, nature, design, and performance of organizations, especially managed ones. As this handbook documents, economists working on organizational issues have now generated a large volume of exciting research, both theoretical and empirical. However, organizational economics is not yet a fully recognized field in economics—for example, it has no JournalofEconomic Literature classification number, and few doctoral programs offer courses in it. The intent of this handbook is to make the existing research in organizational economics more accessible to economists and thereby to promote further research and teaching in the field. The Origins of Organizational Economics As Kenneth Arrow (1974: 33) put it, “organizations are a means of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations where the price system fails,” thus including not only business firms but also consortia, unions, legislatures, agencies, schools, churches, social movements, and beyond. All organizations, Arrow (1974: 26) argued, share “the need for collective action and the allocation of resources through nonmarket methods,” suggesting a range of possible structures and processes for decisionmaking in organizations, including dictatorship, coalitions, committees, and much more. Within Arrow’s broad view of the possible purposes and designs of organizations, many distinguished economists can be seen as having addressed organizational issues
    [Show full text]
  • The Property Right Paradigm Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz The
    The Property Right Paradigm Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 33, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History. (Mar., 1973), pp. 16-27. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28197303%2933%3A1%3C16%3ATPRP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A The Journal of Economic History is currently published by Economic History Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/eha.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Thu Jun 7 08:00:21 2007 The Property Right Paradigm INTRODUCTION CONOMICS textbooks invariably describe the important eco- E nomic choices that all societies must make by the following three questions: What goods are to be produced? How are these goods to be produced? Who is to get what is produced? This way of stating social choice problems is misleading.
    [Show full text]
  • DOUGLASS C. NORTH and NON-MARXIST INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINISM Joseph R
    Journal of Libertarian Studies Volume 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 101–137 2002 Ludwig von Mises Institute www.mises.org DOUGLASS C. NORTH AND NON-MARXIST INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINISM Joseph R. Stromberg* Men imprison themselves within structures of their own creation because they are self-mystified. — Edward Palmer Thompson1 Douglass North has written many essays and books over forty or more years in which he has sought to reintegrate economic theory and economic history. His project became more and more ambitious over time, producing interesting insights, questions, and narratives. His early interests and work centered on the economics of location, transpor- tation costs, and interregional economic relations in American history. In mid-career, he seized on transaction costs—modified from time to time by other “variables”—as the main motor of history, economic history, and institutional development. It was North’s approach to combining history and theory that help- ed him bring into being the New Economic History and, later, what North and his school call the New Institutional History. For his efforts, North shared the 1993 Nobel Prize in Economics with Robert W. Fogel, a University of Chicago economist who is a major practitioner of Cliometrics, or quantitative economic history. The Nobel Comm- ittee cited North and Fogel “for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.”2 *Historian-in-Residence, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama. 1E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Merlin Press, 1978), p. 165. 2“Press Release,” The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/press.html.
    [Show full text]
  • Nine Lives of Neoliberalism
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) Book — Published Version Nine Lives of Neoliberalism Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) (2020) : Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, ISBN 978-1-78873-255-0, Verso, London, New York, NY, https://www.versobooks.com/books/3075-nine-lives-of-neoliberalism This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215796 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative
    [Show full text]
  • United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955 Herbert Hovenkamp
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 2009 United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955 Herbert Hovenkamp Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Hovenkamp, Herbert, "United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955" (2009). Minnesota Law Review. 483. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/483 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955 Herbert Hovenkampt INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL EXPLANATION AND THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION The history of legal policy toward the economy in the United States has emphasized interest group clashes that led to regula- tory legislation.' This is also true of the history of competition policy. 2 Many historians see regulatory history as little more than a political process in which well-organized, dominant interest groups obtain political advantage and protect their particular in- dustry from competition, typically at the expense of consumers.3 t Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Christina Bohannan for commenting on a draft. Copyright 0 2009 by Herbert Hovenkamp. 1. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULA- TION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83-84 (1996); THE REGULATED ECONO- MY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 12-22 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D.
    [Show full text]
  • Eli Heckscher,Sweden,Liberalism
    Discuss this article at Journaltalk: http://journaltalk.net/articles/5902 ECON JOURNAL WATCH 13(1) January 2016: 75–99 Eli Heckscher’s Ideological Migration Toward Market Liberalism Benny Carlson1 LINK TO ABSTRACT Sweden is a country that is often misunderstood by outsiders, and even by Swedes themselves. From the latter part of the nineteenth century, Sweden’s eco- nomic policies were quite liberal, and for 100 years, say from 1870 to 1970, the economy grew rapidly (see Schön 2011; Bergh 2014). During this period Sweden enjoyed relatively high-quality public debate—a tradition in which Sweden still remains quite exceptional. Leading economists took active part and influenced opinion; they were genuine leaders in public discourse. Five titans stand out: Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin, and Gunnar Myrdal.2 The first three were highly liberal. Ohlin began as liberal, like his mentor Heckscher, but moved to a position of social liberalism, or moderate welfare-statism, and became a leading politician (Berggren 2013). Myrdal represents Sweden’s turn toward social democracy (Carlson 2013). Here I tell of Eli Heckscher (1879–1952), and in particular of his ideological development. For most of his life Heckscher was the most firmly principled eco- nomic liberal Sweden had. He fought against state-socialist tendencies, Keynesian crisis policy, and economic planning, and had only one real rival, Gustav Cassel, 1. Lund University School of Economics and Management, 221 00 Lund, Sweden. I thank MIT Press for their permission to incorporate in this article some material that was previously published in a chapter of Eli Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History, edited by Ronald Findlay, Rolf G.
    [Show full text]
  • The Environmental Optimism of Elinor Ostrom Edited By: Megan E
    The Environmental Optimism of Elinor Ostrom Edited by: Megan E. Jenkins, Randy T Simmons, and Camille H. Wardle The Environmental Optimism of Elinor Ostrom Edited by: Megan E. Jenkins, Randy T Simmons, and Camille H. Wardle Copyright © 2020 the Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University All rights reserved Paperback ISBN 978-1-7348561-0-1 eISBN 978-1-7348561-1-8 Cover design and typesetting by Brooke Jacques The Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University 3525 Old Main Hill Logan, UT 84322 www. thecgo.org “As an institutionalist studying empirical phenomena, I presume that individuals try to solve problems as effectively as they can. It is my responsibility as a scientist to ascertain what problem individuals are trying to solve and what factors help or hinder them in these efforts.” –Elinor Ostrom, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences Contents Introduction ................................................................................... vii Megan E. Jenkins and Randy T Simmons Chapter 1 Resource Governance in the American West: Institutions, Information, and Incentives ............................................ 1 Peter J. Hill and Shawn Regan Chapter 2 Self-Governance, Polycentricity, and Environmental Policy................... 31 Jordan K. Lofthouse Chapter 3 Pacific Salmon Fisheries Management: An (Unusual) Example of Polycentric Governance Involving Indigenous Participation at Multiple Scales .......................... 61 Shane Day Chapter 4 Population Growth and the Governance of Complex Institutions: People Are More Than Mouths to Feed ............... 91 Pierre Desrochers and Joanna Szurmak Chapter 5 Contracting and the Commons: Linking the Insights of Gary Libecap and Elinor Ostrom ....................... 149 Eric C. Edwards and Bryan Leonard Chapter 6 The Environmental Benefits of Long-Distance Trade: Insights from the History of By-Product Development .........................
    [Show full text]
  • The End of Antitrust History Revisited
    BOOK REVIEW THE END OF ANTITRUST HISTORY REVISITED THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE. By Tim Wu. New York, N.Y.: Columbia Global Reports. 2018. Pp. 154. $14.99. Reviewed by Lina M. Khan∗ INTRODUCTION In April 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission reported to Congress that “the state of the U.S. antitrust laws” was “sound.”1 Created by lawmakers to examine whether antitrust laws should be re- vised, the bipartisan Commission concluded that existing statutes were sufficiently flexible to address emerging issues, and that courts, antitrust agencies, and practitioners were now in proper agreement that “con- sumer welfare” was the “unifying goal of antitrust law.”2 A decade later, the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section delivered a similar as- sessment, remarking that “the Nation’s system of competition enforce- ment has been in good hands.”3 These reports represented a high-water mark of agreement within the antitrust community that, despite ongoing debates about specific doctrinal tests or particular standards of proof, antitrust law was, altogether, on the right course. The fact that antitrust had shed its public appeal in favor of an expert-driven enterprise — becoming “less democratic and more technocratic”4 — was generally seen as further evidence of its success.5 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗ Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law. This Review reflects my per- sonal views and not those of the Committee or any of its members. For insightful comments and conversations, I am grateful to Eleanor Fox, David Grewal, Lev Menand, John Newman, and Mar- shall Steinbaum.
    [Show full text]
  • The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights Author(S): Harold Demsetz Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol
    The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights Author(s): Harold Demsetz Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 7, (Oct., 1964), pp. 11-26 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/724917 Accessed: 05/05/2008 21:44 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org THE EXCHANGE AND ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS* HAROLD DEMSETZ Universityof Chicago OUReconomic system, with its specializationof economicactivities into separateownership and decisionunits, requiresboth controlover goods and exchangeof goods if it is to cope with the diversityof wants of specialist producers.This paperis concernedwith the fact that the exchangeof goods and the maintenanceof controlover the use of goodsimpose costs on traders and owners.It is also concernedwith the cost of governmentalternatives to the marketplace.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 February 20, 2015 HAROLD DEMSETZ Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Emeritus Professor Emeritus Business Economics Address: Departmen
    February 20, 2015 HAROLD DEMSETZ Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Emeritus Professor Emeritus Business Economics Address: Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095. Telephones: Office: (2l3) 825-365l; Home: (818) 343-8743 Fax: 310-825-9528 (Departmental fax). Education Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois: Ph.D. and M.A. (Economics, l959); MBA (1954) University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois: B.S. (Economics, l953) Professional Employment Academic Emeritus Professor, UCLA 1994 University of California, Los Angeles, California. Professor, l97l to 1994. Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Chair in Business Economics, 1986 to 1995. Director, Economic/Business Program, l983 to 1995. Chairman, Economics Department, l978-l980. Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, 1960-1963. Senior Research Fellow, the Hoover Institution, l97l-l979; Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri Visiting Distinguished Professor, l982-l983. University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois Associate to full Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business and the Law School, l963-l97l; visiting Professor, 1990. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan Instructor to Assistant Professor, Economics Department, l958-l960. Non-academic Consultant to the RAND Corporation, l96l-l962. 1 Scientific Analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses, while on leave from U.C.L.A., l963. Consultant to General Motors, l974. Consultant to ARCO, l976-l985. Honorary Societies and Awards Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters, received from Northwestern University 1994 Honorary Doctorate of Social Studies, received from Francisco Marraquinn University 1996 Listed in Great Economists Since Keynes, by Mark Blaugh, l983. Listed in Who=s Who in Economics, Who=s Who in America, Who's Who in the Social Sciences, Who's Who in the West and in other similar directories.
    [Show full text]
  • The Essential RONALD COASE
    The Essential RONALD COASE by L. Lynne Kiesling Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.org The Essential Ronald Coase by L. Lynne Kiesling Fraser Institute www.fraserinstitute.org 2021 www.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute d iii Copyright © 2021 by the Fraser Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. The author of this publication has worked independently and opinions expressed by her are, therefore, her own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Fraser Institute or its supporters, directors, or staff. This publication in no way implies that the Fraser Institute, its directors, or staff are in favour of, or oppose the passage of, any bill; or that they support or oppose any particular political party or candidate. Printed and bound in Canada Cover design and artwork Bill C. Ray ISBN 978-0-88975-644-1 Contents Introduction / 1 1 Institutions, Property Rights, and Transaction Costs / 5 2 Why Do Firms Exist? / 9 3 Resolving Disputes: The Problem of Social Cost / 19 4 Applied Transaction Cost Economics: Spectrum Allocation / 27 5 Applied Transaction Cost Economics: Emission Permit Trading / 33 6 Coase and the Lighthouse in Economics / 41 7 Problems of Monopoly / 45 8 Conclusion / 53 Works Cited and Suggestions for Further Reading / 55 Publishing information / 61 Author’s acknowledgments / 62 About the author / 62 Publisher’s acknowledgments / 62 Supporting the Fraser Institute / 63 Purpose, funding, and independence / 63 About the Fraser Institute / 64 Editorial Advisory Board / 65 Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.org Introduction: Who Was Ronald Coase? Ronald Coase was one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, and one of the most unusual.
    [Show full text]