Washington University Jurisprudence Review Volume 6 | Issue 1 2013 An Interest in the Impossible Todd Kesselman Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence Part of the Epistemology Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Metaphysics Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Todd Kesselman, An Interest in the Impossible, 6 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 059 (2013). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. AN INTEREST IN THE IMPOSSIBLE TODD KESSELMAN I Ever since Kant first introduced the notion of disinterested pleasure in his Kritik der Urteilskraft from 1790, critics have been baffled by the contradictory resonance of the term. Nietzsche, for example, was notoriously unsympathetic to Kant‘s aesthetic endeavor, since he took Kant to be arguing for a notion of detached and indifferent contemplation and concluded from this that Kant‘s theory allowed no room for a robust affective engagement with works of art. The idea of pleasure deprived of all interest, for Nietzsche, was all but unintelligible. A number of notable commentators however (e.g., Guyer, Allison, and