Constructing Environmental Conflicts from Resource Scarcity

Constructing Environmental Conºicts from Resource Scarcity • Peter M. Haas*

PeterConstructing M. Haas Environmental Conºicts from Resource Scarcity Resource scarcity and environmental security are long standing themes in international relations and security studies. These are important ideas because they inform or justify US and other countries’ foreign policies. The commitment of resources, and possibly intervention, is warranted against these justiªcations. Claims that human societies are exhausting scarce resources, and that this process may contribute to armed conºict with and between states, has been part of the economics and politics literatures for at least 130 years. Yet an analytic focus on material scarcity as a provocation for conºict is but a meager part of much richer approaches to understanding conºict and cooperation more generally. The question is, can these doctrines of resource scarcity and environmental security bear the weight of justifying US interventions? My argument is that these doctrines are ºawed, and are selectively invoked by policy makers and in- attentive academics in order to justify preexisting state goals. My interest here is why they enjoy such resilience, despite the fact that each is widely contested within the relevant policy communities, and that there are many other ways of formulating interesting questions about resource scarcity. The attractiveness of these doctrines is not solely the nature of the argument they make, but rather their afªnity to the values and beliefs invoked by the person making the argument. We have a lot of names for such things, including myths, mental models, worldviews, frames, narratives, ideologies, paradigms, epistemes, referentielles, or worldviews, all of which can be encompassed in a broad view of “discourses.” Discourses impart meaning to an ambiguous policy domain. Discourses are important because they institutionalize cognitive frames. They identify issues as problems, set agendas, and deªne the salient aspects of issues as problems for decision-makers. Each discourse or perspective rests on different assumptions, goals and values, or ontologies and epistemologies as we now call them, and suggests different policy solutions. They have the effect of deªning provocations or crises. One could wonder why the US construes Iraqi potential

* This essay was originally presented as an invited talk to the Peace and World Studies Program at Hampshire College, Amherst MA on 12 June 2001. I am grateful to Steve Rayner and Jennifer Clapp for editorial comments.

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control over oil as a security threat but Saudi or Venezuelan control is not. The answer lies not in the nature of the resource, but with the presumptive motivations of the party with potential leverage over a resource that the US needs. Why do these exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity and their possible threats to environmental security persist? There are two reasons. The ªrst reason is the absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter- discourse (or inter-paradigm) disputes in either the arena of environmental issues or international politics. This absence of consensus distinguishes debates about environmental security, which are cast at the level of ritualized debates between highly polarized positions, from debates about multilateral environmental policy, around which consensual agreement has been reached about the utility of sustainable development approaches to environmental policy. The second reason is the elective afªnity between environmental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant discourses in social discussions such as neoclassical economics and realism in international relations and security studies on the other hand. Consequently self-interested political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions. In a sense, none of these discourses is “right.” A good approach to developing foreign policy, then, is procedural. It should be based on a public discursive dialogue between proponents of each. However, because each rests on its own assumptions, and is upheld by a different political constituency, it is difªcult to imagine a committed debate, much less achieving closure. Honest social scientists can do two things: identify myths that aren’t widely appreciated, thus illuminating the effect of tacit assumptions on people’s thinking, and help to dispel or debunk pernicious myths. I hope to do both.

Dominant Discourses about Environment and Security Cultural anthropologists who look at environmental politics have identiªed four overarching discourses or myths of nature.1 Myths organize our thinking by presenting a tacit set of cause and effect relations that we can apply when con- sidering an issue at hand, and also by providing a screen to select out factors that are not germane to the question at hand. Cultural anthropologists organize the four dominant voices in environmental discourses about risk and the implications of environmental change on human affairs, into the following categories: Cornucopian, Malthusian, Sustain- able Development, and Radical/Postmodern [I am relying only on their taxon- omy, and not on the grid-group scales that are sometimes associated with them]. In general authors fall into just one of the categories above, although some, such as Norman Myers, draw from Malthusian and Sustainable Develop- ment Discourses.2

1. Schwartz and Thompson 1990; Thompson and Rayner 1998; and Timmerman 1986. 2. Myers 1989.

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Cornucopian writers see nature as boundless, and thus unlikely to exercise signiªcant constraints over human action.3 Nature is seen to be essentially ro- bust and benign. Summarizing this view, Jordan and O’Riordan write that “the management style associated with this view is relaxed, non interventionist and laissez-faire. It is associated with a market perspective on institutional function- ing, and a belief in the prominence of the individual in coping with challenges.”4 Economic growth encourages technological innovation and technical solutions to resource scarcity. Malthusians see nature as “precarious and unforgiving, vulnerable and constraining on human agency.”5 Resources are seen as ªnite and limited and thus exercise constraints on human action. Population grows more rapidly than the resource base, and creates inexorable scarcities. “Human agency can “tip it over” to the point where human well-being itself is threatened.”6 Malthusian policy responses tend to be hierarchically designed, with a strong state based managerial bent aimed at reducing population growth and resource usage. Sustainable Development sees nature as resilient within a context of some range of parameters that are themselves dynamic.7 “Nature is manageable so long as its limits are taken into account, either by conscious “holding back” or by the application of ecological principles to human affairs.”8 This perspective calls for deliberative procedural responses to environmental risks, stressing the need for involving multiple voices in formulating and assessing policy responses. Economic development and social growth is not seen as inconsistent with environmental preservation. Radical views and Postmodern views see Nature as capricious, and unre- lated to discourses about it or to social efforts to regulate it. Such authors dis- pute the underlying utility of discussing resource availability in the abstract. They argue that the true questions have to do with inequitable resource access and distribution.9 They focus on redistributive policies to address questions of resource scarcity, and thus look at the social context in which resource decisions are taken, rather than taking resource availability as an exogenous factor. To date, the principal debates have been between Malthusians and Cornucopians.

Intellectual History of Resource Scarcity The intellectual history of concern about resource scarcity probably goes back to the Greeks. Early environmental determinism, and vulgar environmental analy-

3. In the US see Simon 1981; and Simon and Kahn 1984. In the UK see Beckerman 1992. For a recent Danish articulation see Lomborg 2001. 4. Jordan and O’Riordan 1997, 28. 5. Jordan and O’Riordan 1997. Major Malthusian writers include Myers 1989; Homer-Dixon 1991; and Klare 2000. 6. Jordan and O’Riordan 1997. 7. Holling 1978; Clark and Munn 1986; and Holdren 1991. 8. Jordan and O’Riordan 1997. 9. Galtung 1973; Dalby 1999; and Redclift 1987.

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sis, were based on univariate causality in which climate or natural resources de- termine a country’s development potential and political position in the international system. In its most vulgar form, environmental determinism claims that climate dictates national potential and individual psychological character. In its more sophisticated form it means that physical geography and access to and control over material resources inºuence national power capabilities in the international realm. The precise nature of these resources varied at historical mo- ments: control over the European heartland and its agricultural production and transportation routes, control over naval routes, and control over enough physical territory to control food and all natural resources for lebensraum in interwar Germany. Most of these statements were just doctrinal justiªcations for expan- sion: We now know that these state objectives of access to resources can be more easily and efªciently achieved through trade, with less possibility of military provocation.10 Thomas Malthus in 1798 argued, based on fairly primitive British demo- graphic data, that population grows geometrically but food production only grows arithmetically. This simple observation was extrapolated into an iron law of universal resource scarcity. But he neglected family planning and birth control, as well as technological innovation. The 19th century industrial revolution in England prompted concerns about scarcity of non-renewable resources. In 1865 William Jevons predicted coal shortages and an energy crisis.11 Materials consumption in England acceler- ated dramatically between 1880 and 1913. The 1954 Paley Commission in the United States expressed concern about scarcity and foreign control over natural resources necessary for the US economy. In the 1970s similar concerns were expressed again, in a series of reports to the Club of Rome. The most famous one was the 1972 Limits to Growth, fol- lowed by a 1992 sequel.12 The Limits to Growth report predicted widespread collapse by the early 21st century of modern economic systems, from pollution and resource scarcity. The assumptions driving these extrapolations were profoundly Malthusian.13 OPECgenerated a burst of writings about whether resources and com - modities could be controlled through cartels for political ends. Likewise, concerns were expressed about the manipulation or control of imported “strategic minerals” that were considered essential to the US economy and to the US military establishment because they were found in just a few countries and because no substitutes existed for them. All these predictions, so far, have been wrong. There was no energy crisis in 19th century England; in fact the very foundations for the Industrial Revolu- tion were based on a series of contingent historical events based on resource scarcity. The widespread deforestation of England in the middle ages as a conse-

10. Rosecrance 1986; and Keohane and Nye 2001. 11. Jevons 1865. 12. Meadows et al. 1972 and 1992. 13. Hughes 1985; and Freeman and Jahoda 1978.

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quence of burning wood for fuel and cutting down large trees for the Royal Navy raised the cost of fuel wood and encouraged the development of coal mining in Wales. By the late 1780s the most accessible coal had been extracted, and pumps had to be devised to extract the water from mines to facilitate deeper mining. In turn, these pumps provided the technological innovations for steam power that motivated the Industrial Revolution.14 Predictions of oil and food scarcity have also failed to materialize. Esti- mates of oil reserves, since 1952, have actually increased, and the years remain- ing before current reserves are exhausted have actually increased.15 Food production has exceeded population growth for the last 20 years. FAO estimates indicated that food production per person worldwide has increased, outside of Africa, although maintaining these achievements rest on continued provision of chemical inputs and irrigation.16 Strategic Minerals shortfalls have also failed to materialize, due to stock- piling.17 The Center for Defense Information concludes that “military intervention or posturing is more likely to threaten than protect important foreign raw materials, military force cannot guarantee the uninterrupted ºow of raw materials, and the US leans too heavily upon its military might to protect access to foreign raw materials to the exclusion of more effective and less costly economic measures.”18 Why have Malthusian estimates been consistently wrong? The discourse is generated by its assumptions, and the assumptions presume that scarcity will occur. In particular, Malthusian analysis typically neglects two vital social phe- nomena. One is that analysis is based on projections of consumption and production, but does not take account of prices or markets.19 Consequently, there is no price signal feed back mechanism provided in Malthusian analysis, and thus no potential for social accommodation to resource pressures. Secondly, Malthusians do not take account of the potential for technological innovation or substitution for resources, as they become scarce. For instance, copper, which was widely feared in the 1970s as a future scarce resource, is now in ample sup- ply as the principal use of copper, telephone cable, has been replaced by ªber optics. These discursive blinders in Malthusian thought are in large part the consequence of the disciplinary orientation of most Malthusians, who are natural scientists rather than economists, and thus rest their analysis on measurements of resource assessments in the physical environment rather than the price for those resources. The irony is that it presently appears that the social, political and economic consequences of scarcity are now more appropriate for renewable resources (such as timber) rather than non-renewable resources. But this is be-

14. Ashby and Anderson 1981, 1. 15. Data provided by Michael Lynch, WEFA, Inc. 16. Smil 2000; http://www.fao.org/wfe/fe/e/agricult/agpro-e.htm. 17. Russett 1984. 18. The Defense Monitor 1985, 8. 19. Kaysen 1972.

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cause many governments, particularly in developing countries, pursue policies that encourage unsustainable use of renewable resources (such as trees) to generate foreign exchange or to beneªt specialized interests within the country.

Environmental Security A shift in discourse occurred in the 1970s and 1980s from discussing resource scarcity to talking of environmental security. With the end of the cold war this discourse was picked up by traditional security policy networks in Washington as a way to think about new security threats, but their prior dominant realist worldview shaped their acceptance of the arguments to only their Malthusian kernel. The environmental security discourse was closely tied to the Malthusian geopolitical approach to resource scarcity. Marvin Soroos distinguishes between two alternative views of environmental security.20 A broad deªnition sees environmental security in terms of challenges to governability: literally governments become incapable of satisfy- ing the needs of their population because of environmental threats, or ªgura- tively because of a legitimacy crisis facing governability at all, in a Habermasian sense.21 This broad approach was popular in Scandinavia under the rubric of “comprehensive security,” and as a positive image of peace by peace researchers, rather than as a provocation to war as it is viewed in the Malthusian discourse. A narrower view sees environmental scarcity as a catalyst to violence. This argument is most forcefully advanced by Homer-Dixon, who presented the nuanced argument that resource scarcity is a contingent trigger to domestic and international violence. Homer-Dixon provides a progressive step to the Malthu- sian discourse through his attention to domestic/international interactions, and his probabilistic argument about the direct and indirect causal pathways to conºict potentially triggered by resource scarcity or degradation, including a focus on population dislocation and migration stimulated by environmental dis- ruptions.22 A full list of environmental issues cited in the environmental security literature includes climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of agricultural land, overuse and pollution of fresh water supplies, ªshery decline, biodiversity loss, atmospheric pollution, and access to strategic minerals.23

General Assessment of Environmental Security Empirically none of these claims is upheld. One of the most frequently cited environmental triggers to conºict is that of access to fresh water.24 Egyptian

20. Soroos 1995, see also Choucri, Brown, and Haas 1990; and Elliott 1996. 21. Habermas 1973. 22. Homer-Dixon 1991. 23. Wieder and Brecke 1998, 16. 24. Gleick 1993; and Cooley 1984.

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posturing about the importance of the Nile is widely cited as an example of the strategic importance of water. In 1980 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat de- clared “If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force.” In 1985 then Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali reiterated “The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile not over politics....”25 Earlier Egypt had threatened to send troops to the southern border if Sudan had proceeded with its plans for a water diversion project. Yet, with water there are still no cases of interstate water wars, and most domestic water conºicts are prevented through state interventions or efforts to create markets for water and thus encourage con- servation.26 The empirical record of wars fought over resources is quite meager. There are few direct or indirect cases of violence, in Homer-Dixon’s work or others’. In fact, virtually no one has been killed in direct international conºicts over water or any other resource. The standard argument in international relations is that war is rationally chosen as the extension of policy by other means. There- fore we would expect resource scarcity to galvanize armed conºict only under highly polarized circumstances in which states are looking for a provocation to ªght. Nor does the literature on state failure support the proposition that resource degradation and scarcity undermines state authority domestically. Gurr’s extensive literature review suggests that resource inequality may be a determi- nant of economic growth, and its inºuence on violence is a matter of speed with which the scarcity is imposed.27 The important manipulable variable is economic equality and access to resources. The 1998 CIA State Failure Task Force Report, which relied in part on Gurr’s database, found that “environmental change does not appear to be directly linked to state failure.”28

Theoretical Shortcomings with Environmental Security Arguments The environmental security argument suffers from a number of theoretical problems. Methodologically, authors are seizing on the independent variable, thus any examples of violence are attributed to the resource variable, rather than other possible events. They neglect the vast number of cases in which resource scarcity did not generate conºict. More generally the argument suffers from the same set of theoretical blinders as the Malthusian approach to resource scarcity: a neglect of markets and policy interventions that could inºuence distribution, poverty reduction, and poor people’s ability to pay for access to resources, or invest in producing more resources.

25. Quoted in Myers 1989, 32. 26. Wolf 1997; and Postel and Wolf 2001. For online databases on water access and availability see http://terra.geo.orst.edu/users/tfdd/ and http://www.worldwater.org/conºict.htm. 27. Gurr 1985. 28. Esty et al. 1998, 24.

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Daniel Deudney summarizes the major theoretical challenges to Homer- Dixon’s framing of environmental scarcity as a security issue.29 First, he reiter- ates the problem of causal inference mentioned above: resource scarcity is not a cause but an intervening variable that inºuences violence. Here it is not the nature of resource scarcity that makes war likely; it is the nature of the political climate in which scarcity occurs. Similar demand for a resource in other regions is unlikely to provoke war. Scarcity may amplify pressures when they are already acute. Second, Deudney says that the environmental security concept reºects a materialistic notion of security associated with realism, and has the effect of ap- propriating the political agenda at the expense of other, more comprehensive notions of ecological security. It provides too narrow a formulation of security. Third, Deudney cites a rhetorical error in using the term security. The term “national security” has a rhetorical play to it, as Wolfers noted long ago, and that which is national security is whatever a state can successfully convince its citizens to embrace. To the majority of the foreign policy community, security invokes national security and the protection of borders and citizens from foreign threat, generally cast at the level of the state. (While the comprehensive deªnition of environmental security is cast at the individual level, this as- pect of the argument is usually absent from discussions about environmental security.) Yet few environmental issues share these properties of security as deªned by the mainstream foreign policy community. While human survival may be at risk from environmental degradation, the risk doesn’t stem from armed conºict. It is from starvation, cancer, and the long run degradation of the global ecosys- tems on which human survival depends. And it is from cumulative individual actions, at an unknown point in the future. Deudney argues, correctly I believe, that the environmental security discourse is counterproductive. Efforts to improve environmental protection are tarnished by shoddy conceptualizations of environmental security. The environmental security discourse uses language that privileges the military, when the point is that military responses are inappropriate and the wrong perspective in which to view things. There are two consequences of this error. The ªrst is that it discredits efforts at environmental protection by associating it with a ºawed causal argument that environmental scarcity contributes to violence. Environmental protection should be pursued because environmental protection is a valued goal, not because it can be instrumentally (and erroneously) linked to a related popular discourse. Once the ºaws are made manifest any support for the goal of environmental protection is potentially jeopardized. The second consequence is that the ownership of security then resides with the wrong policy community. One of the initial tactical motivations in the 1970s behind the environmental security literature was to get the environment onto the US foreign policy agenda

29. Deudney 1997; and Deudney 1990.

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and to get positions in the administration associated with those issues. But this was counterproductive, as the issue was seized by the Pentagon and the majority of money in the US spent on environmental security went to cleaning up military bases, rather than any other items on the environmental agenda that may have posed a greater threat to human survival.

Conclusion Resource scarcity debates have been around in various forms for a long time, and remain contested. Environmental threats are important and inºuence the quality of human life. On the other hand, they are seldom issues over which na- tions will go to war, either directly for resources, or even indirectly because of the stresses generated from resource scarcity. Violent conºict over resources at the national level is possible, but it seems unlikely to spill across borders. We shouldn’t call such threats a matter of international security, because that no- menclature interferes with understanding and improving policy. These discourses persist not because they are accurate, but because they are politically embedded discourses. Constructivists explain their persistence because they acquire a taken-for-granted quality as bureaucrats are socialized into accepting the worldview within the administration through standard operating procedures, and because the arguments are often expedient for achieving other goals. In addition lazy thinkers acquire the ideas in graduate school. But discourses are also subject to challenge through deliberative debate in public about their foundations, and about alternatives. As self-conscious schol- ars of IR we can contribute to this process. Three options are available. One is to debunk the arguments, and identify ºawed use of theory to justify standard foreign policy goals. A second is to discuss and promote alternative formulations to the environmental security and resource scarcity discourses. While not explicated at length in this essay, I prefer the Sustainable Development voice, because I feel that the core elements of Sustainable Development have greater technical consensus, political support and provide a better mechanism for achieving substan- tive and tactical linkages on international policy agendas.30 If we remember that each of these four formulations is a discourse about the world, and consider the possible consequences of error (that is that the world behaves in a different way than presumed by the discourse), then the most tolerant policy to pursue is that of sustainable development. Even if wrong it promises some beneªts through economic development and improved energy efªciency, as well as being attractive on political grounds insofar as it contributes to democratic processes of governance. The social costs of error for the other three are all severe. Assuming a Malthusian future reduces liberties. As- suming a radical future precludes efforts to redress environmental threats. As- suming a Cornucopian future risks environmental collapse.

30. Haas 1996; and Bernstein 2000.

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Finally, there is a need for further research on institutional design that can improve environmental quality, and prevent violent responses to environmental scarcity or degradation. Amartya Sen noted that famines do not occur in de- mocracies, where food allocation decisions are taken publicly, and that hunger is largely a consequence of ability to buy food rather than the absolute availability of food. What is often obscured in most studies is that environmental threats have actually been prevented through international governance. Further research can improve our understanding of effective responses.

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