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Return to Stalinism in the U.S.S.R.? Wolfgang Leonhard

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Return to Stalinism in the U.S.S.R.? Wolfgang Leonhard RETURN TO STALINISM IN THE U.S.S.R.? WOLFGANG LEONHARD PROPOSE to try to analyse internal Soviet political development Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/33/3/280/2700473 by guest on 27 September 2021 around the turn of the year 1956-7. That development seems to be I somewhat contradictory, both in itself, and in comparison with what had previously taken place. The main questions seem to me to be the following: Has there recently been a change of policy inside the Soviet Union and, if so, when did it occur? Would it be correct to call it a return to Stalinism? What were the reasons for this change? What forces stood behind these changes? In using the word 'de-Stalinization' I would like to make clear at the beginning that by de-Stalinization I do not mean merely the attitude towards Stalin himself or towards his policies, but the complex of measures taken by the post-Stalinist Government in the fields of internal policies, economy, nationality policies, party policies, and ideology, which differ from the policies followed during the Stalin era, and even contradict them. Not merely the attitude towards Stalin himself but also the changed pattern of Soviet policies form, in my view, the most important features of de-Stalinization. In the period between Stalin's death and the present there are in my opinion four phases which differ from each other both in respect of the tempo of de-Stalinization, and in respect of the issues which were given primacy. In the first period, from Stalin's death until the downfall of Beria in July 1953, we see de-Stalinization primarily in internal policy: in the campaign for 'socialist legality', the release of the 'Kremlin doctors', the announcement of an amnesty, the diminishing power of the security services, the change of policy towards the Soviet nationalities (in particular, the decline of insistence on 'russification') ; and, of course, in the introduc­ tion, at the centre of all this, of collective leadership. The second phase was from July 1953 until February 1955, when Malenkov resigned from the Premiership. The main issues of this period were economic and to a certain extent they laid the foundation for political de-Stalinization. This period was marked by the shift of emphasis from heavy industry to consumer industry, a policy which was more or less withdrawn at the end of 1954 but only officially renounced shortly before Malenkov's resignation in February 1955. From that date until the open­ ing of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 we have a third period of de-Stalinization, which is probably more important than is usually assumed. Its most important measure was the beginning of a 280 JULY 1957] RETURN TO STALINISM IN THE U.S.S.R.? 281 decentralization of economic power (including the grant of many new rights to Soviet factory directors) which led more and more to certain political consequences that were given official expression at the Twentieth Party Congress. With the Twentieth Party Congress the fourth and maybe the most important period of de-Stalinization began. This fourth period, which I would assume lasted from February to July 1956, seems to me to be the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/33/3/280/2700473 by guest on 27 September 2021 highest point of de-Stalinization reached inside the Soviet Union up till now, and the main point about it is that indirect de-Stalinization then became direct. Up to the Twentieth Party Congress there had been very important changes of internal, party, and nationality policy, changes to collective leadership, important changes in ideology, but none of these changes had been openly declared. Thus the change from the third to the fourth period was marked at the Twentieth Party Congress by an open attack on Stalin and on certain features of his system. The retreat from this highest degree of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, which we are now witnessing, does not, in my view, date from the Soviet intervention in Hungary but from the middle of July 1956. Between March and July 1956 the following were the main measures of de-Stalinization: the official denunciation of Stalin at the Congress itself, and then in Khrushchev's secret speech; the introduction of a new thesis of the independent way to Socialism in other countries according to their own traditions, including the achievement of Socialism by parlia­ mentary methods; the official denunciation of Stalin's theory about the sharpening of the class struggle after a victorious revolution; the re­ habilitation of some so-called 'enemies of the people'; the honouring in the Kremlin of the old Bolsheviks who had been ignored (or purged) during the Stalin era; a revision of the party history, dealing mainly with the period after 1917, but going so far as to reconsider the relations between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks before 1917. In this period it was even indirectly indicated that the struggle against bourgeois ideology should be changed to a certain kind of competition between Soviet and bourgeois ideology, hinting at coexistence with bourgeois ideas. Between February and July 1956 very important measures were taken in the interests of the whole population: the abolition of certain labour laws, e.g. the 'Twenty Minutes Law' (according to which any worker could be punished by six months' corrective labour if he arrived at work more than twenty minutes late); the abolition of Uni­ versity fees; a decrease in the hours of the working day; and an increase in old age pensions. At the end of this fourth period there were signs that these measures were beginning to alter certain features of the system itself. In June and July 1956 some Soviet factories began to introduce a kind of workers' 282 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [VOL. 33, NO·3 council, not so advanced as those which exist in Yugoslavia, or now in Poland, but as advisory bodies. At the end of July an article appeared by Skyrenko, the managing director of the 'Trekhgornaya Manufaktura', which not only described in G.etail how this new system worked but also indicated that it would be necessary and desirable to use this model for all factories in the Soviet Union. Thus between February and July 1956 there came the first indications that the changes were going further than mere Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/33/3/280/2700473 by guest on 27 September 2021 changes inside the Stalinist system. They were the first indications of changes which might affect the structure of Stalinism itself. The other important point was that in this period tendencies towards a qualitative change began to be seen. Up to February 1956 de-Staliniza­ tion was organized, led, and put through entirely by the Soviet leadership, which had complete control of how far and how fast de,..Stalinization went, which way it went, and in which sectors of social life it took effect. De-Stalinization was a transformation process completely in the hands of the Soviet leadership, which could use this process in the way the leader­ ship itself wanted. After February 1956 we had the first signs inside the Soviet Union that other social forces were now using the new ideas presented at the Twentieth Party Congress; they were putting forward demands themselves, and then going further than the Soviet leadership found desirable. In this we find an explanation for the change of Soviet policy after July 1956, when the Soviet leaders began to tighten their control on political and intellectual life; and their policy became increasingly firmer after the Soviet inter­ vention in Hungary in November 1956. I would now like to discuss the forces inside the ruling strata of the Soviet Union, the forces which were in favour of de-Stalinization and those that were against it, and the balance between them during the period 1953-6. It is usual when considering the forces inside the Soviet Union to speak of the difference between the hard core and the liberals, or between 'right' and 'left'; sometimes it is even assumed that the only struggle is between the Party and the Army. I think Soviet developments after Stalin's death are more comprehensible if we see at least three groups or forces inside the Soviet higher strata, each with different aims, social origins, and methods of accomplishing their aims. On the one hand there is the conservative or pro-Stalinist group; I do not call it the Stalinist group, because I do not think that any real great force in the Soviet Union actually wants a complete return to Stalinism. I would rather call it the pro-Stalinist group because its aim is to make as few changes as possible, and no changes which could endanger the leading role of the Soviet leadership, i.e., no change which would be so rapid that the leadership would lose complete control. These conservative pro-Stalinist forces are mostly to be found inside the bureaucracy of the JULY 19571 RETURN TO STALINISM IN THE U.S.S.R.? 283 Party and State apparatus, particularly inside the Soviet security services, which, though weakened after Stalin's death, still exist in considerable strength. In the top leadership Molotov, Kaganovich, and, to a lesser extent, Voroshilov and the rather out-spoken Suslov might perhaps be considered as representatives of this conservative force. On the other hand the forces in favour of de-Stalinization seem to be divided into two groups with different aims. The first of these is a group Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/33/3/280/2700473 by guest on 27 September 2021 which I would call the 'economic reformists', or, as they are called in some circles in Moscow, the 'Malenkovites'.
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