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Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016)

SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES

Journal homepage: http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/

The Rise of Jewish Religious and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict

Javadikouchaksaraei, M.*, Bustami, M. R. and Farouk, A. F. A. Center for Policy Research and International Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the relationship between Jewish religious nationalism and Israeli approach to the conflict with Palestinians. This paper explores the relationship between religious nationalism and Israeli approach to the long standing conflict in the occupied territories. . It seeks to explain why religious nationalism has become closely associated with hawkishness since 1967. While the Jewish advocates no single approach to the conflict with the Palestinians, religious nationalism has been significantly more hawkish than the nonreligious approach in .

Keywords: Religious nationalism, Israel-Palestine-conflict, hawkish

INTRODUCTION to find a solution satisfactory to both parties, Many recent studies examining the impact but also because it is an active conflict of religious nationalism on conflicts between which threatens the Middle East and the states and ethnic groups tend to be centred world because of the involvement of super on the role of religious nationalism in the powers having vested interest in prolonging emergence and persistence of conflicts the conflict. Using the Israeli-Palestinian (Krishna, 1996; Calhoun, 2001; Secor, 2001; conflict as a case study, this paper examines Woltering, 2002; Agnew, 2008; Mullin, the crucial role of religious nationalism 2010). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one in sustaining the conflict. However, since of the most protracted and serious conflicts the 1967 war, religious nationalism and of the century not only because it is difficult hawkishness have become intertwined in perpetuating the conflict. ARTICLE INFO The Hebrew Bible attaches special Article history: Received: 9 January 2015 significance to the relationship between Accepted: 20 August 2015 and religion (Kaplan, 1994) E-mail addresses: [email protected] (Javadikouchaksaraei, M.), which underscores the “divinity” element in [email protected] (Bustami, M. R.), [email protected] (Farouk, A. F. A.) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. * Corresponding author

ISSN: 0128-7702 © Universiti Putra Malaysia Press Javadikouchaksaraei, M., Bustami, M. R. and Farouk, A. F. A.

In some situations, even where the Studies conducted thus far have focused on root cause of the conflict is religiously identifying factors that might lead to future motivated, the inclusion of religion into resolution of the conflict. most conflicts only makes matters worse. There are some limitations to the study. Thus, for a thorough comprehension of The first is theoretical and the second is this phenomenon, the authors of this paper historical. The theoretical one is related to set out to underscore in the most general of the kind of religious nationalism that is sense, the effect of religious nationalism on the focus since there are various religious the emergence and sustenance of conflicts in literature. (Hayes, 1966, with special focus on religious nationalism Smith, 1996). among the Israelis in the Israeli-Palestinian The historical limitation refers to the conflict. Though the focus of this paper is time constraint of the study. This study on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, its findings focused on the development of can be generalised to a large extent to many in the late 19th century with a view to conflicts around the world, thus, providing evaluating the historical, cultural and further insights and reference materials religious claims of the Jews in the late 20th for the study and debate on religious century. This paper will exclude recent nationalism. Despite the apparent religious Arab-Israeli conflicts as understanding the and political divide between the Israelis and recent political rapprochement from both the Palestinians, it must be noted that not sides is another topic altogether. all Jews support the Zionist agenda of the state of Israel and not all Palestinians are THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND supportive of the aggression of the militant DEFINITIONS groups. In an attempt to develop the theoretical This paper explores the relationship framework for the current study on between the approach adopted by Israel the relationship between religion and in dealing with the Palestinian issue and nationalism with special focus on the the religious nationalism aspect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is vital to have conflict. It also examines why religious a closer look at both sides of the political nationalism has become more hawkishness divide. Despite the religious and political especially since 1967. Thus, the main aim differences between these two groups, both of this paper is to understand the concept of are faced with similar problems. religious nationalism that is at the heart of In the study on nationalism, Roger the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As such, the Friedland (2002) and Juergensmeyer (1993) paper t contributes to the body of knowledge describe the concept of distinctive religious on this topic. Such a contribution will focus form of nationalism. In his discourse, on identifying and examining different Friedland argued that nationalism is ‘a points of view regarding the conflict. state-centred form of collective subject

312 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict formation…a program for the co-constitution traditional role of the family as the primary of the state and the territorial bounded source of continuing human existence population in whose name it speaks… [and] through reproduction, and thus, protecting a set of discursive practices by which the it against the undesirable economic and territorial identity of a state and the cultural cultural forces which tend to weaken its identity of the people whose collective prominence. From the point of view of representation it claims are constituted as a gender, religion seeks to preserve traditional singular fact’ (Friedland, 2002). gender roles both within the family and Friedland defines religious nationalism in the wider society, and also to a great as a special form of nationalism with variable extent, restricts sexuality within the family. content describing the ‘joining of state, The relationship between nationalism territory, and culture’ (Friedland, 2002). and religion has also been acknowledged The form, however, does not explicitly by sociologists, thanks to the increasing explain how these entities are to be joined detachment of the latter from traditional together, what content it entails in the state- religious institutions under whose purview centred collective subject formation, or they once flourished and ‘may be invested the constituents of the discursive practices with highly diverse meanings and used for necessary to amalgamate the geography a wide variety of purposes . . . both within of a people with their cultural identity. A and outside the framework of religious possible mode of specifying the content of organizations, and where there exist state the form is provided in religion. In short, ’ (Beckford, 1989). While religion religion provides a means ‘of joining tends to take the back seat in most secular state, territory, and culture’. This power states of the world, religious practices of religion, according to Friedland, is due deemed advantageous, especially in the areas to its unique ‘models of authority’ feature of national security, are easily incorporated on the one hand, and its ‘imaginations of into the national development agenda an ordering power’ (2002) on the other. (Martin, 1978; Bruce, 1996). As indicated Religion, according to the author, can be by David Martin (1978), the relationship regarded as the ‘totalizing order capable between religion and nationalism is of vital of regulating every aspect of life’ (2002). significance upon which religious values Friedland however, acknowledged the fact flourish among the countries of Europe. This that this injunction is less applicable to phenomenon, the author argued, holds even Christianity – for Christianity originated for Christianity despite its apparent conflict as a stateless religion. In an attempt to with nationalism. The author says: amalgamate state, territory, and culture, “Christianity may be a religion that religious nationalism places importance rejects the worship of Caesar or the exaltation on the family, gender and sexuality. In this of the , but in order to retain even way, religion assists in safeguarding the the possibility of suggesting more worthy

Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) 313 Javadikouchaksaraei, M., Bustami, M. R. and Farouk, A. F. A. objects of praise, it must be positively national consciousness emerging in the related to the national consciousness, absence of a state. particularly as this is highlighted in a myth The most familiar typology of of national origin” (Martin, 1978). nationalism has two main categories. In the Most historical studies highlight the voluntarist conception, individuals must continuing and significant role played by belong to a nation, but they can choose religion and religious belief systems both which nation they wish to belong to. in 19th and 20th centuries, further indicating Members are related by citizenship and the that despite the potential risk of decline population within a certain territory belongs in people’s appeal for religious belief due to the same nation regardless of cultural to rising nationalism and racism, various affiliation. In the organic conception, philosophies of nationalism act as boosters individuals are born into a nation and for religious practices (Hugh McLeod, wherever they migrate, they remain an 2000). A similar argument is put forward by intrinsic part of birth. (Khalidi, 1997). (Turner, 1988) who believes the emergence The basic tenets, fundamental ideals, and of the modern day nation states as strength core concepts of nationalism have remained rather than a weakness for Christianity in its fairly constant through time and across drive towards Christianisation of the masses cultures. The basic tenets or propositions (Turner, 1988). to which most nationalists adhere to form the framework of the nationalist vision of NATIONALISM the world . Nationalists envision a world The terms nation and nationalism have divided into a nation. The nation is the sole proved difficult for historians to define. source of political power and require Adam Smith defines nationalism “an full self-expression and . Loyalty ideological movement for attaining and to the nation overrides all other loyalties, maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity and to be free, every individual must belong for a population which some of its members to a nation. This core doctrine provides the deem to constitute an actual or potential rationale and impetus for various kinds of nation” (Smith, 2001). Benedict Anderson’s nationalist activity. The fundamental ideals view of the nation relates to the Smith’s of nationalist are well-defined potential nation. Anderson views the nation relating to collective self-rule, territorial as an imagined political community whose unification, and cultural identity. The members dream of being free and the symbol dream or plane future is as important in the of this is the (Benedict, foundation of the nationalist movements 1991). Ernest Gelllner ties nations . Zionism as the past (Smith, 2001). National destiny created Isreal. Palestine is a potential nation. more than simply ideas of the future. Palestinian nationalism is an instance of Destinies are predetermined by histories and

314 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict chart a unique course and fate. Lastly, the between the West and Islam. (Bonney, 2004: homeland constitutes an historic territory p.269). or the ancestral land. All of these tenets, It is not surprising that much has been ideals and concepts are not involved in every written about it by historians and political nationalist’ or movement, but scientists. The Palestinian-Israeli dispute these overlapping concepts of nationalism has played a critical role in shaping the can be used to better understand nationalist political landscape of the Middle East and ideologies (Stendel, 1996). has been the focus of considerable social Historians recognise that nationalism is science research. not just an ideology of reaction. Nevertheless, There have been many theoretical particular nationalisms arise in opposition to perspectives which offer an understanding some ‘other’, and nationalisms are defined of popular attitudes toward issues related by what they oppose. The development and to war and peace.. The political cultural maintenance of every culture requires the approach, for instance, is prevalent among existence of a different and competing alter scholars who argue that shared norms and ago. The construction of identity involves values are the basis of political attitudes the construction of opposites and ‘others’ (Tessler & Nachtwey, 1998). whose actuality is always subject to the Literature contends that religion has continuous interpretation of their differences played a major role in fuelling most ethnic from us (Stendel, 1996). Nationalisms conflicts in recent decades. (Rummel, demand the rediscovery and restoration of 1997; Fox, 1997, 1999, 2000a, b, c, 2004); the nation’s unique cultural identity, and they Laitin, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal, 2002; are dependent on leadership that is capable Roeder, 2003; Sammy & Javadi, 2015). of formulating an ideological content When a state relies on religious convincing enough for a large population. doctrines to obtain political , it An important element of a nation’s unique leaves ample room for religious leaders and cultural identity is ethnic, usually associated established religious institutions to bring with a particular territory and incorporates an overtly theological interpretation to any myths of ancestry and historical memories political question. Religious nationalisms, with elements of common culture (Smith, even those that appear to be ethnic, have 2001). an ideological component. This is because religion, the repository of traditions of LITERATURE REVIEW OF symbols and beliefs, always stands ready RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM: THE to be tapped by those who wish to develop HIGH STAKES INVOLVED a new framework of ideas about social Palestine-Israel dispute is still one of the order. In the case of Bosnia, for example, major disputes persisting in the world the anger of Bosnian Serbs is also fuelled at present symbolising the relationship by an imaginative religious myth. The Serb

Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) 315 Javadikouchaksaraei, M., Bustami, M. R. and Farouk, A. F. A. leaders are Orthodox Christians who see militants associated with Egypt’s radical themselves as surrogate Christ-figures in al-Iama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), for a contemporary political understanding of example, have attacked not only Egyptian the “passion” narrative. Dramas and epic politicians - killing president Anwar Sadat poems have been invented to retell the New and attempting to kill his successor, Hosni Testament’s account of Christ’s death in a Mubarak - but also foreigners such as the way that portrays historical Serbian leaders Greek tourists killed near the pyramids on as Christ figures, and the Bosnian Muslims 17 April 1996 (the tourists who were on a as Judas. This mythologised dehumanisation bus were allegedly gunned down by Muslim of the Muslims allows them to be regarded terrorists). The movement literally moved as a sub-human species, one that in the its war abroad against secular powers when Serbian imagination deserves the genocidal its leader, Sheikh Omar ‘Abd ai-Rahman, “” that killed so many in the moved to New Jersey and was involved in darkest hours of the Bosnian civil war (Sells, a bomb attack on the World Trade Center 1996). As the Bosnian case shows, there is on 26 February 1993 that killed six and a fine line between ethnic and ideological injured thousands. The trial that convicted forms of religious nationalism. It may be him in January 1996 of masterminding the just as violent as ideological nationalism. attack also implicated him in an elaborate The London terrorist bombings by the Irish plot to blow up many sites in the New York Republican Army when the ceasefire broke City area, including the United Nations down in February 1996, and the LTTE buildings and the Lincoln Tunnel. Algerian (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Muslim activists have apparently brought Lanka suicide attacks that demolished their war against secular Algerian leaders downtown Colombo in January 1996 are to Paris, where they have been implicated recent examples. Yet, to some extent, these in a series of subway bombings in 1995. acts of violence are understandable because Hassan Turabi in Sudan has been accused of they are aimed at a society that the terrorists orchestrating Islamic rebellions in a variety regard as exerting direct military or political of countries, linking Islamic activists in control over them (Juergensmeyer, 1996). common cause against what is seen as the Some religious nationalists see their great satanic power of the secular West. own secular leaders as part of a wider, virtual In some cases, this conspiratorial vision global conspiracy, one controlled by vast has taken bizarre twists, shared by both political and economic networks sponsored the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo and certain by European and American powers. For that American Christian militia movements that reason they may hate not only their own Jews and Freemasons are collaborating to politicians, but also these leaders’ political control the world (Safan, 2001). and economic allies in lands far beyond Israel has a long history of including their own national boundaries. Islamic religious nationalism in its and

316 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict therefore, it has an effect on the conflict with people from a different religion. The Torah Palestinians. commands the nation of Israel to fight in Reiter (2010) provides answers to what the cruelest way possible any nation from exactly the role of religion has been in the taking full control of the Promised Land Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He puts forth (Reiter, 2010). five characteristics of a conflict fuelled by The second element of religious faith religion; representing conflicting values relates i. The enlisting of religious ‘warriors’ to the status of the territory in question, unfurls beyond the region in conflict and whether or not control should be exclusive. A theological outlook among ii. Individuals/groups motivated by Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews holds religious ideology carry out sensationalist that Palestine is a ‘holy land’ – the Waqf terror acts and assassinations in a bid to (pious endowment) for the former, and frustrate political negotiations. the Promised Land for the latter (Khaid, iii. Religious formations that demonstrate 2011). Religious faith, therefore, “forbids adherence to the prepositions or conceding any control over the land” (Funk fundamental truths of religion, and & Said, 2009). The Jews believe that it is show commitment towards infusing their religious duty to occupy the entire land the same among members of the public and not share it with members of any other command massive/decisive political religion (Reiter, 2010). power The third element relates to the status iv. Religious symbols and values are part of Al-Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and of asocial fabric that the general public whether or not members of other religions is not predisposed to compromise or have a right over it. The Temple Mount/Al- negotiate Haram site, the old City of Jerusalem and holy sites as Al-Masjid Al-Ibrahimi/the Cave v. Religion values and controls holy places of the Machpela, Joseph’s tomb in Nablem, that can neither be compromised nor and Rachel’s tomb “are anchors for the negotiated national-religious and historical identity of Israel and Judaism have 3 parallel a vast population which includes people who and central “elements of religious faith are not necessarily religious” (Barsiman, that represent conflicting values, and 2010). The immensely charged nature are therefore used in specific contexts of the said sites as religious and historic to reinforce the religious aspect of the” nationalism symbols is demonstrated Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Reiter, 2010). perfectly by the decision of the Netanyahu The first relates to the laws of peace and war Administration to include the Machpela and the question of whether or not a nation Cave and Rachel’s tomb among heritage can settle a conflict by compromising with symbols intended for development (Reiter,

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2010). The move did not, however, go Library and the internet have been down well with the Palestinian leaders, extensively used for this research. Secondary and a religious war erupted, with each side sources such as books and articles dealing claiming ownership and “sovereignty that with Israel and religious nationalism idea cannot be relinquished to the other side are used to answer the research question. exclusively” (Barsiman, 2010). To answer the research question and This study contributes to the literature the claims of the paper, the study adopts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by a historical analysis. In order to draw an bringing forward different points of view. accurate profile of events, persons or objects All the studies on this conflict are based (Adams, 1985). on the possibility of reaching a settlement Historical analysis involves in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict one day. investigation and analysis of controversial This thesis tries to focus on the conflict ideas and facts, and aims at assessing the from another perspective and strives to meanings and reading the messages of reflect that both sides have an interest in the the happenings while asking the questions continuation of conflict as their national and of “what happened” and “why or how religious aspirations over the same territory it happened” (Leedy, 2012). This study require. demonstrates how different sides of the conflict interpret the history of the conflict. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In this regard, hypothesising the influence of Any research, regardless of the type is the past is executed in this study to display conducted with the overriding aim of deeply the effect of different evolvement of gathering intelligence about the marketplace the positions of the Palestinian and the Jews and illuminate trends and behaviours. in the conflict. Given the fact that modern Qualitative data, though not easily historical analysis usually draws upon measurable, reveals valuable perspectives most of the other social sciences, in order and attitudes that are almost undetectable to ensure these narratives are thorough, the using quantitative means. Its exploratory study has availed of the use of international nature allows for the collection of data on relations. It will also use the interpretation specific areas of interest, often by means of the other’s working on the conflict. As a of expert reviews and dialogue between result of library investigation composed of researcher and respondent (McLeod, 2008). scanning the secondary sources, this study Therefore, the paper uses the qualitative also gets the opportunity of observing and method because it focuses on a smaller comparing tendentious sources written about number of cases to provide an in-depth the Palestinian -Israeli conflict. Sanning the evaluation of valuable perspectives and secondary sources is important in order to hidden attitudes. see the perspectives of the conflict.

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DISCUSSION of state governance along the western liberal Israel and the Zionist Agenda type which has a religious element; he dedicating a full section of the book to this In spite of the dispersion of most Jews after theme. In a somewhat vivid rhetoric, Herzl the Roman reconquest of the asked “will we end by having a ?” in 135 C.E., Jews continued to consider and he answered his own question by saying themselves a nation even though they had “No, indeed. Faith unites us, knowledge no country or state before 1948. They did gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent not lose their religious, cultural and national any theocratic tendencies from coming to connection to the Land of Israel and to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We Jerusalem, the central location of Judaism shall keep our priests within the confines where their temple once stood. Communities of their temples in the same way as we of Jews lived continuously in their homeland shall keep our professional army within the and those living elsewhere expressed their confines of their barracks” (Herzl, 1946). hope to return through prayer, folklore, Despite acknowledging the significant artwork, and song. Modern Zionism began in role played by religion in the mobilisation Europe in the late nineteenth century, when of masses in different parts of the Christian both nationalism and antisemitism were on world, the Zionist movement was particularly the rise. The founder of political Zionism cautious in preventing the different factions was Theodor Herzl, whose ideas were in their midst from dominating the entire influenced by the anti-Semitic elements in movement or in becoming a rigid opposing the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish faction; a mechanism that enabled the officer in the French army, who was falsely integration of the key religious players, and convicted of treason (he was exonerated thus putting Zionism on a stronger footing in 1906). Herzel witnessed French mobs in the international arena. In presenting shouting “Death to the Jews” during the its demands to the world, the leadership trial. The Dreyfus trial, compounded by of the World Zionist Organization was ongoing anti-Jewish violence in Eastern never isolated in its ideology of avoiding Europe, led Herzl to conclude that the only theocracy. In fact, the religious components solution to the persecution of Jews is to of the Zionists also agreed to follow the re-establish a . He developed same line of action in pursuit of a common modern political Zionism, or Jewish goal: establishing a Jewish state. If religion nationalism, which is the belief in the bestows on humankind the feeling their fates right to self- determination for the Jewish are interconnected, this primordial feeling people in their ancient homeland, the Land is continually reshaped and energised by of Israel. In his renowned book entitled common experiences and interactions, Der Judenstaat, which was published in then by extension, a common religious 1896, Herzl highlighted the need for the faith should foster the development of prospective Jewish state to adopt a system brotherhood (Gutmann, 1979).

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The rationale for this compromise and Plan of November 29, 1947), the movement acceptance by can be was compelled to surrender segments of understood from the Zionist belief that the territories considered by Zionists as part of establishment of the Zionist movement historic Jewish settlements. and the eventual setting up of the state of Israel are pivotal components towards the Religion and Hawkishness: Understanding realisation of redemption of their people. the Fundamental Correlation This ensured the plans for a theocratic The impact of the Six Day War dimension was deferred. The traditional One of the most cited reasons for the Jewish Party, Agudat Israel, whose ideology relationship between religion and includes rejection of the notion that secular hawkishness is the influence of the Six Jews may attain redemption, and argued Day War (Rosenak, 1988) which saw the that such elements should be prevented capture of the holiest Jewish site (the Temple from Yishuv’s (Jewish Mandatory Palestine) Mount) by the Israeli army. Furthermore, the national institutions, and eventually, the swift nature of the conquest in that the Jews government. Being cognisant of the fact that triumphed from the fear of the re-emergence no man but God predestined the theocratic of the Holocaust to a rapid military victory vision, the Agudah in fact became even more all within six days, in fact led many religious politically dormant on foreign affairs than Jews to believe in the divine intervention. the (NRP). Similar beliefs are shared by ultra-Orthodox David Ben-Gurion’s political philosophy Jews as well. For the ultra-Orthodox Jews, introduced the Mamlachtiyut, the idea of the Six Day War made it easier for one to statism, which argued that the state should readily associate them with their political be the focal point of Zionism (Liebman & right agenda, Gush Emunim, in contrast to Don-Yehiya, p. 983 ). Against the backdrop their predecessors prior to 1967. Thus, the and believing his Jewish predecessors lacked religious Jews generally tend to support the political realism, Ben-Gurion developed idea of Israel’s continuing control of the statism in 1936. “We want to build a state, territories captured during the Six Day War and we shall not build one without political (Rebinstein, 1981). thought, political talent and political The most tormented by the success of prudence,” he noted (Yanai, 1987). In two the Israel military in the 1967 War was the distinct instances, the Zionist movement, ultra-orthodox Jews. Just before the war, after very intensive debates, agreed to the Israel was somewhat intimidated by the demands by the international community to strong rhetoric from Arab leaders claiming relinquish territories considered sacred. In that Israel would be completely destroyed both instances (the acceptance of the 1937 and the war will be another Holocaust. For partition proposal of the Royal Commission this reason, Israel’s unprecedented defeat of headed by Lord Peel and the UN Partition the Arabs, which led to their control of the

320 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict substantial portions of the ancient holy land occupied after the war, including and Jerusalem, led many Jews to believe the and the Gaza Strip. With this engulfment of invisible hands of divine intervention. One portions of Palestine into Israel, the Arab movement with revivalist tendencies caught population living in Israel surged and the the attention of prominent figures among population distribution of Israel between the Orthodox yeshivot (Yehiya, 1996). the Arabs and Jews became a hot political For the followers of this movement, the debate. The total population of Israel based phenomenal victory of Israel signalled the on the latest census stands at 7,282,000, imminent redemption of the whole world. comprising 75.5% Jews, 4.4% non-Jews To such advocates, victory is indicative of which are mainly immigrants from the God’s decision for the Jews to rescue their former Soviet Union and the rest (20.1%) entire original homeland and that for the Arabs (ICBS 2008); it is a balance which Messianic redemption to be accelerated, is likely to change significantly when the the promised land must be controlled and Palestinians in the Territories are counted as Jewish settlements erected. In short, the a single geographic unit, in which case the 1967 military action was necessary. Among two ethnic groups maybe similar in terms the first flag bearers of the movement that of number. advocated for the settlement of Israelis In 1977, the political hegemony enjoyed in the administered territories were the by the Labour regime was lost due to the Modern Orthodox (Lustick, 1988; Sprinzak, disastrous Yom Kippur War in October 1991). Initially, the settlement spree was 1973. Also, as a consequence of that war, triggered by security concerns. The Labour the role of religion in Israeli politics changed Government’s focus was on securing the drastically. strategic coastal line. However, majority of In addition to 1978 declassification the settlers perceived this security concern of Israeli documents and archives, the only as secondary with the primary reason backdrop for this shift in popular and being the return to the promised land. For academic commentary can be found in this reason, the religious Zionist movement events such as the Yom Kippur War which continued in their drive for expanding altered the political landscape and created a settlements to the various holy sites, more hawkish, ethnically diverse, political regardless of the government’s approval or and religious right conservatives. The 1977 disapproval of such moves. With the coming electoral triumph of the Likud coalition into power in 1977 of the Likud Party, the over the Ashkenazi-led labour group, the government supported and further celebrated ongoing, high-profile clashes between the settlement agenda, providing funding in the Israeli government and Fatah or the order to intensify the process. military wing of the Palestinian Liberation By 1967, Israel again imposed a military Organization, and the 1982 Israeli invasion regime on the Arabs living in the territories of southern Lebanon and controversy over

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Israel’s indirect role in the massacre of Labour-masterminded settler scheme. What Muslim Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila is evident though is the fact that since 1967, refugee camps all helped in changing the the national dynamism transcended from attitude of the Jews regarding the Palestinian the Labour movement (characterised by issue. In this chaotic political context, Israeli their incipient ) to the national scholars began to question the status quo on religious advocates including the Likud the ground, drawing parallels to events and Party, the national religious party, and the policies as early as the 1920s and 1930s, Shas Party as well as other nationalistic for example, David Ben-Gurion’s policy of parties. “transfer”— that is, the Zionist euphemism In the 1970s, a robust changed occurred for what Palestinians call “dispossession” at in the relationship between religion and best, “rape and pillage” at worst ( Masalha, nationalism. This change is attributed 1992).The illegal invasion and occupation of mainly to the policy changes afforded by the a land far away to create a Jewish homeland, religious–national party during this period. the eviction of a majority rightful occupants Until the 1970s, the central focus of the and the suppression of the remaining few party was to protect the image of the Jews termed as a bunch of useless “minority” and safeguard their interests and this party with no rights, made it justifiable for Jews was typically regarded as one of the most in Israel to emphasise the Jewish race and dovish players in the political arena at the use it as a rallying call (Kimmerling, 1999; time. However, the party changed face from Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005) to unite its people. being a religious–national party to national The post-1967 war made this sense of religious party, and has since shifted focus “bondage” based on Jewishness stronger; on the construction of Jewish settlements with Jewishness not only being referred to across the West Bank enlisting the Yeshiva as a distinct race but also a national religion. (Jewish high school students) into the Israeli There has been substantial debate Army. This new national religious face was among the commentators of the Israel- represented by the Gush Eminum movement Palestinian crisis concerning whether the (Block of Faithful) which was established in Six Day War constituted a breakdown 1974 (Lustick, 1988) and adopted suitable or extension . For those in favour of a ideologies from both the Jewish religionism breakdown , the occupation of parts of the and Zionist nationalism. From the former, Palestinian territory after Israel’s victory, the Gush Eminum movement adopted the by itself, constituted a new dimension idea of a community based on the traditional of national religiosity which was never Jewish faith foreseeing a Messianic revival; apparent prior to the war. On the other from the latter, the Gush Eminum also hand, the commentators of continuation adopted the idea of the territory being are of the view that this new movement the central focus as well as upholding the is more or less an extension of the old concept of Messianic revival. Thus, a new

322 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict concept of Messianic Zionism was borne synonymous to “Left” while Jewish religion based on two strategic areas: community and became synonymous with the Right. the territory. Hence, while in the relationship The integration of culture and religion between nationalism and religion in the had a significant impact on the Israeli post-1970 era was primarily implicit, if political landscape; a view which is not completely negative, the relationship also confirmed by data from the current became positive thereafter. This positive study. As can be shown, the current study relationship became even stronger in 1977 indicates that the Mizrachim which are when Labour lost power to the Likud Party descendants of Arab or Muslim countries under the leadership of Menachem Begin. exhibit more religiousness compared with The key supporters of Likud-led government those of European descent (the Ashkenazi). were middle-class Ashkenazi religious Specifically, the result depicts that 50% nationalists who were mainly represented of the Mizrachim are “traditionalists”, by the National Religious Party and the low- compared with Ashkenazim whereby only class traditional and nationalist Mizrachi 19% saw themselves “Traditionalist”. Only members. In the 1980s, a number of the 9% of Mizrachim are “non-religious”, low-class Mizrachi elements influenced “non-observant”, or “anti-religious”, the traditionalists and the ethnic Mizrachi compared with the Ashkenazim which members to shift their support to the Shas account for 34%. Yet, about 78%–86% of party (Peled, 1998). Another significant Mizrachim believe in God compared with turning point in Israeli political history was only 49%–52% believers in God among the the reconciliation between the state and Ashkenazims. the Orthodox Jews. When Likud came to About 62%–69% of the Mizrachim power, the parties protecting the interests believe that the Jews are a “chosen of the Orthodox found it suitable to be part people” compared with 35%–36% of the of the Likud coalition, a thing they dodged Ashkenazim. The one religious category throughout the Labour regime. In the 1990s, where the Ashkenazi weight is significantly the Likud party came under a new leadership higher than the Mizrachi is the Orthodox headed by Benyamin Netanyahu. During (Levi & Katz, 2000). the election season, Netanyahu’s campaign While the secular governing parties slogan was “Netanyahu is Good for Jews”. of the different regimes may have been The new Likud coalition represented almost poised to believe that they have successfully all minority groups except the Arabs. These used the settlers to their own political included the Mizrachi Jews, new Russian advantage, Labour’s strategy in intimidating migrants, religious nationalists as well as the Arab states to sign peace accords, and the Orthodox (Haredi) Jews (Shafir & Peled, Likud’s threats of further occupation of 2002). In this way, secularism became the territories without the possibility of

Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) 323 Javadikouchaksaraei, M., Bustami, M. R. and Farouk, A. F. A. returning them even when there are peace despite Likud’s philosophy of safeguarding agreements showed that both parties lost , they are succumbing sight of the “religious” injunctions that to moves resulting in the expulsion of Jews gave birth to the settlement movement in from their historic homeland. To some of the the first place. Over time, these differences religious settlers, the Likud Party’s behavior between the politicians and settlers became not only tantamounts to a betrayal of their the source of significant divide between religion but was also a violation of the divine the two. For example, the Labour Party’s order (Sprinzak, 1991). acknowledged readiness to surrender the Religious Zionism eventually led to occupied territories in exchange for peace much violence. For example, in the West rendered the party at loggerheads with the Bank, a Jewish secret terrorist group was Religious Zionists. In fact, even the Likud initiated, carrying out assassinations of Party, which also preaches and strongly Arab politicians and opinion leaders, and believes in the settlement programme masterminding bombings in public places eventually clashed with the Religious and transportation. Similarly, a celebrated Zionists over differences in approach and Jewish physician in the occupied territories, extent. Security being the primary concern Baruch Goldstein, in a revenge for the of the Likud, the party identified that parts of killing of his friend by a Palestinian, gunned the occupied West Bank (previously under down over 30 Muslims while observing their the control of Jordan) and the Golan Heights prayers. Similar violence was meted out by (captured from Syria) are key territories for Religious Zionists on the Palestinians and buffering national security, while the Gaza moderate Jews who tended to advocate for Strip and Egypt’s Sinai Desert (conquered Palestinian sovereignty. While such actions during the 1967 war) were of secondary were usually condemned by the National importance – for they provided limited or Religious Party as well as the religious no strategic security benefits. Thus, when elites, the acts also were also justified on Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made religious grounds. In some cases, support prouncements that he was ready for a for such acts was implicitly indicated. This peace deal with Israel in the 1970s under include, for example, the Chief Rabbi of the David Agreement, the Likud party Israel’s praise singing at Meir Kahane’s accepted the peace offer in a bid to free funeral, who was the mastermind of the Israel from the potential danger of one of its Kach movement, and who repeatedly likened key enemies. This however, requires Israel Palestinians to animals and advocated their to withdraw from Sinai and evacuate all complete eviction from the state of Israel. In the Jewish settlements established during some cases, the religious justification of the the occupation. When the Likud party violent acts is explicit. For example, when agreed to this compromise with Egypt, the the Israeli government planned to come into religious settlers felt utterly dismayed that terms with the Palestinians concerning the

324 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict settlement issue, including Israeli readiness liberalism, and the drive towards a more to relinquish parts of the Jewish settlements dovish stance. In fact, after the 1987– in the occupied Palestine, a number of rabbis 92 intifada, Israel experienced a drastic publicly cautioned Jews in the military to decline in ethno-nationalism, with more desist from being a part of an action which concerted efforts towards upholding the is not in conformity with the will of God. Israeli territorial integrity (Arian, 2002). For Israel, where the political neutrality Politicians such as the then Prime Ministers of the military almost became a religious Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak argued that requirement, such a strong rhetoric is given the declining fighting spirit among indicative of the huge destabilising potential the populace, it was wise to resort to the of the land issue. dovish stance (Rynhold, 2003). The Moshe Dayan and other secular Zionists diminishing republican ideologies is also also expressed delight at the return of Jews a directly related to increase in the number to what they referred to as their historic of ultra-Orthodox young men exempted homeland. In this way, public opinion was from serving in the Israeli army due to generally hawkish in the immediate period religious reasons (Accordance with the just after the Six Day War. However, with Israeli Security Service Law). While this the emergence of major events such as the number was only a few hundred in the Lebanon War in 1982 and the Palestinian 1950s, it jumped to over 30,000 in the 1990s Intifada of 1987–92, Israeli public (Ilan, 2000). opinion gradually became more dovish. For the ultra-Orthodox community, the Nevertheless, the religious community emergency of hawkishness can be attributed remained consistent in being more hawkish to the increased participation in the politics than the non-religious one. The question of ultra-Orthodox ideologists (Sheleg, & now is: why has the trend persisted?. This HeChadashim, 2000). Even though this question could be answered by considering shift in focus cannot be regarded as explicit the changes in both nonreligious, and the republicanism, it is symbolic of their rising religious segment of the Israeli society self-consciousness. Since 1977 after the (Yishai, 1987). Starting from the mid-1980s, Israeli advocacy of the Right to power, the Israeli political spectrum has witnessed ultra- Orthodox practitioners felt their reformation towards greater secularism, closeness to power for their perception is liberalism and individualism especially the ethnocentricity of right and that right among the younger generation. Before is more sympathetic to organized religion ; this period, however, the Jewish political thus, their participation in national politics spectrum was somewhat divided between surged (Shragai, 2001, & A Dayan, 2002). republicanism and ethno-nationalism, both The “divinisation” of religiously of which have experienced significant motivated violence reached its apex decline over the years, thanks to rising on November 4, 1995; the day a siting

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Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in politics by ultra-Orthodox ideologists was assassinated by an ultra-nationalist (Sheleg, & HeChadashim, 2000). In the 1996 Yigal Amir. Unlike many other assassins election, \ the ultra-Orthodox leadership who were often societal outcasts, Amir decided to throw their weight behind Shimon was a product of the Religious Zionist Peres for prime minister candidature, due to movement, a part timer at an ultra Orthodox his good funding of ultra-Orthodox affiliated yeshivah as well as a student of law at the institutions. However, pressure from the Orthodox university in Israel (Bar-Ilan). junior ultra-Orthodox members resulted in Amir confessed to the killing of the prime them doing the reverse (Shragai, 2001). In minister and accused him of turning into addition, during the reconstruction of the a traitor and endangering the lives of the settlements, some ultra-Orthodox advocates Jews by sacrificing the sacred territories for bought houses in the territories and through a peace deal; and as enshrined in the Jewish which they have some interactions with the law, Amir argued, Rabin’s tyranny legalised people. his assassination (Golinkin, 1996). In summary, the strong correlation There is continuing debate among between religion and hawkishness since Israelis whether Amir was a misguided 1967 can be explained in terms of the ultra-nationalist or a true product of ultra role of religious and nonreligious actors Orthodoxy. What is clear though is the which helped in shaping the political fact that the pronouncements of Amir culture of the Jewish state. While political were not in any way uniquely associated liberalism increased, ethno-nationalism with ultra-orthodoxy. In fact, they are and republicanism diminished significantly commonplace among other non-religious in the secular community. In the religious Zionist movements as well. Thus, while community, however, the reverse is true. the majority of the commentators tended to blame Amir for his action, they still found CONCLUSION the Likud Party wanton for inciting violent Religion always has an advantage over reactions to the peace process initiated political ideology, because it need not offer a by the Labour Party. However, media political strategy, and its legitimisation is not reports have also pointed out the extreme dependent on a clear-cut criterion of failure entanglement of the land issue and religion or success. Victory or defeat can quite easily in Orthodox discourses and argued that, to be explained as the will of the Almighty. some extent, Amir being exposed to the Religion appears as a universal vision extremist views of the Religious Zionists that offers “salvation” to all mankind. It is may have influenced in his judgement utopian, undefined in time and unspecific (Horvitz, 1995). about ends and political means. But Judaism The emergency of hawkishness can contains some acutely ethnocentric ideas be attributed to the increased participation which separate the Jewish people from the

326 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 24 (1): 311 - 330 (2016) The Rise of Jewish Religious Nationalism and Israeli Approach to the Palestinian Conflict rest of the world. religious justification for specific actions After the creation of the state of Israel, have become fused. The volatility of the there remained a profound split between situation in the Middle East has often made those focused on the religious nature of the it very difficult to find common ground. first Jewish state, and citizens who viewed Sadly, when the discourse shifts from the state primarily as a haven for Jews. But arguable definitions of national security all citizens became more mobilised thanks and state’s rights to religious arguments, the to the continual threat posed by hostile potential for dialogue between secular and Arab states, and protecting the new nation religious forces within Israel is thwarted, not became infused with religious as well as just between Israelis of different political practical zeal. Although some religious Jews orientations but also between Israelis and living in Israel do not play an active role the Palestinians with whom they must in the defence of Israel, for many religious negotiate. History has made many dovish Jews, playing an active role in supporting a Israelis remain suspicious of Arab intentions militarised state is seen as essential. despite their greater willingness to make It was not until after the 1967 War, concessions. Liberals and moderates often however, that support for an expansionist find themselves thwarted by a right-wing vision of Israel and religious ideology religious ideology that sees negotiation as a became more galvanised. The unexpected form of religious heresy as well as militarily nature of Israel’s victory and its seemingly dangerous. effortless acquisition of lands once part of the Biblical state of Israel fuelled religious REFERENCE nationalism among many religious groups. Agha, A. (2015). Religious Discourse in Tablighi It created a strong association between Jama’at: A Challenge to Female Sexuality?. hawkishness, support for a relatively hard- International Journal of Multicultural and line attitude against the Palestinians in the Multireligious Understanding, 2(3), 1-16. occupied territories, and a belief that Israel Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical is entitled to its original . assumptions of international relations theory. Although religion remains a constant Review of International Political Economy, 1(1), 53–80. in politics, its role will thus inevitably change with recent circumstances and Almog, Samuel. (1974). Nationalism & Antisemitism will be affected by external pressures. in Modern Europe, 1815 – 1945. Oxford: Pergamon Press. The many changes witnessed by Israel over the course of its short history have Arian, A. (1995). Security Threatened. Cambridge: changed notions not only of what it means Cambridge University Press, 62-67, pp. 115-119. to be Jewish in a political sense, but also Arian, A. (2002). Israeli Public Opinion on National in a religious sense: for some citizens, an Security. Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic ideology of nationalism, militarism, and Studies.

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