Princeton University POL 551 / Fall 2014 Department of Politics
SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Helen V. Milner Andrew Moravcsik Robertson 431 Robertson 443 OFFICE HOURS OFFICE HOURS
This seminar introduces the field of international relations. It is designed primarily for students pursuing the PhD in Political Science, Public Policy and related fields. The focus is on fundamental theoretical debates in IR and their relationship to empirical social science. The course complements other graduate offerings, which focus on discrete empirical and applications of these theories or methodological issues. Students should finish the course with an ability to situate arguments in the conceptual structure and intellectual history of IR theory, to grasp the assumptions, logical structure and implications of various theoretical positions, and to appreciate the diverse range of available concepts and explanations for state behavior.
Requirements for the course are:
(1) Attendance and active participation in discussion. All students are expected to participate actively in class discussions of all readings. This means students should be prepared to summarize, assess critically and evaluate the significance of every reading, without using notes.
(2) Formal advocacy and defense of specific readings. Students serve as formal advocates or critics of specific readings highlighted in yellow on the syllabus. The advocate speaks first. This does not mean summarizing the argument—unnecessary, because everyone has read it—but rather: (a) situating the contribution in the literature; (b) identifying the salient theoretical contribution and its broader implications; (c) identifying its major strengths as a contribution to IR theory. Critics challenge the contribution, its salience and implications, or point to theoretical or broad empirical weaknesses.
(3) Three 5 pp. papers. Each paper comments critically on 1-2 readings for a given week, selected from those marked in yellow. These papers must be distributed to the entire class by e-mail by 6 p.m. on the Monday preceding class; authors must also be prepared to discuss this paper in class. NB: A paper writer may not assume the role of a critic or defender (see 2 above) of the same reading. While these papers necessarily engage in minimal necessary summary and criticism of the respective readings, and occasionally “referee” debates among established authorities, neither is their primary purpose. Rather, the primary purpose of the papers is to use summary and criticism as a foundation from which to set forth original theoretical, empirical or methodological insights about how IR scholars can improve theories about the underlying phenomena and develop new empirical insights about important cases, thereby charting the best direction forward toward new and improved IR theory.
(4) Oral presentation of articles selected by students. During the final weeks of the course, 45-60 minutes of the seminar will be devoted to students leading a discussion of 1-2 articles they have selected. Articles may reflect: (a) current published research (i.e. from the last five years); and/or (b) classic research pertaining to a major strand of IR theory. All articles must be of major significance to theoretical and/or empirical debates in IR on an issue that has not received sufficient attention in the assigned readings. Articles must be approved in advance by the instructors.
(5) One take-home final exam. This exam questions are similar to those on the departmental “General Exams” in IR that students may take at the end of their second year. Each student will be asked to answer three broad questions about the IR literature on the syllabus.
Written work for the course should be submitted in electronic form by e-mail attachment only. All e-mails pertaining to the course should have a subject line beginning “POL551: …”
Grading will be on the basis of all items above.
Books are on reserve at the library, and permanent links to articles have been provided. Those who desire personal copies of books should search for copies from on-line providers; we recommend you purchase them used. Additional “recommended” readings, of use in studying for general exams, have been included a well. SEMINAR SCHEDULE
BACKGROUND READING: TO BE READ BEFORE CLASS BEGINS THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.
WEEK 1: 16 SEPTEMBER 2014 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
Lakatos, Imre (1974). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 1965 (2nd edition ed., Vol. 4, pp. 91- 196). London (UK): Cambridge University Press.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1, 3, and 6 (pp. 3-33, 75-114, 208-228).
Elster, Jon (1998). A Plea for Mechanisms. In Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (Eds.), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (pp. 45-73). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Lustick, Ian S. (2010). Tetlock and Counterfactuals: Saving Methodological Ambition from Empirical Findings. Critical Review. 22(4): 427-447. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2010.541698
Weber, Max (1946). Science as a Vocation. In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Translated and edited ed., pp. 129-156). New York: Oxford University Press.
Jervis, Robert (2001). International History and International Politics: Why Are They Studied Differently? In Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Eds.), Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (pp. 385-402). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fearon, James D. (1991). Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics. 43(2): 169-195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010470
Laitin, David D. (2003). The Perestroikan Challenge to Social Science. Politics & Society. 31(1): 163- 184. http://pas.sagepub.com/content/31/1/163.abstract
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2004). A Perestroikan Straw Man Answers Back: David Laitin and Phronetic Political Science. Politics & Society. 32(3): 389-416. http://pas.sagepub.com/content/32/3/389.abstract
List, Christian, and Kai Spiekermann (2013). Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation. American Political Science Review. 107(04): 629-643. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000373
Maliniak, Daniel, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney. (2012). TRIP Around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries. College of William & Mary. Williamsburg, VA. May 2012. Retrieved from http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/trip_around_the_world_2011.pdf
Kristof, Nicholas (2014). Professors, We Need You!, New York Times, p. SR11, February 16, 2014. Retrieved from http://nyti.ms/1fpmI9l
Stent, Angela (2014). Why America Doesn't Understand Putin. Washington Post, Washington, DC: The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-doesnt- understand-putin/2014/03/14/81bc1cd6-a9f4-11e3-b61e-8051b8b52d06_story.html
WEEK 2: 23 SEPTEMBER 2014 ANARCHY, RATIONALITY, POWER AND CLASSIC TYPOLOGIES OF IR THEORY Classical Realism Morgenthau, Hans Joachim (1948). Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf. 2nd or later edition. Chapter 1 (“A Realist Theory of International Politics”), Chapter 3 (“Political Power”), and Chapter 15 (“Morality, Mores, and Law as Restraints on Power”).
Neorealism Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Chs. 1-2, 4- 6, and 8 (pp. 1-37, 60-128, 161-193).
… and its Critics Keohane, Robert O. (Ed.) (1986). Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters by Keohane (ch. 7), Ruggie (ch. 6) and Waltz (ch. 11) (pp.131-203, 322-346).
Wagner, R. Harrison (2007). War and the State: The Theory of International Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Ch. 1-2 (pp. 1-103). Available at: http://www.press.umich.edu/224960/war_and_the_state/?s=look_inside
Tang, Shiping (2009). The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies. 18(3): 587-623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050
Paradigmatic Alternatives and Typologies Jervis, Robert (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics. 30(2): 167-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958
Wendt, Alexander E. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 46(2): 391-425. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858
Lake, David A., and Robert Powell (1999). International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (pp. 3-38). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little (2010). World History and the Development of Non-Western International Relations Theory. In Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Eds.), Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia (pp. 197-220). New York: Routledge.
Realist War and the Democratic Peace: A Realist Perspective Gowa, Joanne S. (2011). The Democratic Peace after the Cold War. Economics & Politics. 23(2): 153- 171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00382.x
WEEK 3: 30 SEPTEMBER 2014 INTERDEPENDENCE AND STATE PREFERENCES 1 ‐ SOCIAL PRESSURES Interdependence and State Preferences Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization. 51(4): 513-553. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703498
Milner, Helen V. (1998). Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics. International Organization. 52(4): 759-786. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601357
Ideational Interdependence and Societal Preferences: Ethnicity, Ideology, Morality Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. International Organization. 36(2): 379-415. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527
Owen, John M. (2010). The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 1-30).
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Introduction (pp. 1-38), plus one of these two empirical chapters (pp. 79-120, or 121-164).
Busby, Joshua W. (2010). Moral Movements and Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (“States of Grace”) and Chapter 7 (“Conclusions”) (pp. 1-22, 255-272).
Bass, Gary Jonathan (2008). Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-38).
Economic Interdependence and Societal Preferences: Goods and Capital Rogowski, Ronald (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Required Chs. 1 and 6, also skim 2-5 (pp.3-20, 161-174, skim 21-162).
Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991). Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization. 45(4): 425-451. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706944
Interdependence and Conflict Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian M. Pollins (2003). Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction. In Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins (Eds.), Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (pp. 1-28). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Democratic Peace: Ideational Perspectives Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review. 80(4): 1151-1169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861
Mueller, John E. (2004). The Remnants of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chs 1 and 9 (pp. 8- 23, 161-182).
Democratic Peace: An Economic Perspective Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001). Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. International Organization. 55(2): 391-438. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078636
WEEK 4: 7 OCTOBER 2014 INTERDEPENDENCE AND STATE PREFERENCES 2‐ INSTITUTIONS Domestic Representation Milner, Helen V. (1997). Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 2-3 (pp. 33-98).
Rogowski, Ronald (1999). Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (pp. 115-136). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chs. 1-3, 6, and 9 (pp. 3-126, 215-272, 405-460).
Institutions and Economic Policy Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O'Halloran (1994). Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. International Organization. 48(4): 595-632. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706897
Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast (1997). The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. World Politics. 49(3): 309-338. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054005
Hiscox, Michael J. (1999). The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization. International Organization. 53(4): 669-698. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601306
Institutions and Security Policy Snyder, Jack L. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chs. 1-2, 8, and one empirical chapter (pp. 1-65, 305-322, and one other chapter).
Weeks, Jessica L. (2012). Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict. American Political Science Review. 106(02): 326-347. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000111
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder (2002). Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. International Organization. 56(02): 297-337. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078607
War and the Democratic Peace: Institutional Perspectives Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review. 93(4): 791-807. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586113
Debs, Alexandre, and H. E. Goemans (2010). Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. American Political Science Review. 104(03): 430-445. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000195
Goemans, H. E. (2000). War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Introduction and Conclusion (pp. 3-18, 310-324).
Domestic Institutional Change as the Object of Foreign Policy Boix, Carles (2011). Democracy, Development, and the International System. American Political Science Review. 105(04): 809-828. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000402
Gunitsky, Seva (2014). From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century. International Organization. 68(03): 561-597. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000113
WEEK 5: 14 OCTOBER 2014 STRATEGY FORMATION AND NON‐ OR BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL POLICY‐MAKING: IDEAS, PROCESS, PERCEPTION, COGNITION, PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGY, EMOTION, HABIT AND CULTURE AS SOURCES OF MEANS‐ENDS CALCULATION Ideas in General Goldstein, Judith L., and Robert O. Keohane (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. In Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (pp. 3-30). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Strategic and Economic Ideas Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. International Security. 19(4): 32-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119
Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (2010). Introduction: Constructing the International Economy. In Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons (Eds.), Constructing the International Economy (pp. 1-19). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (2010). Re-Constructing IPE: Some Conclusions Drawn from a Crisis. In Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons (Eds.), Constructing the International Economy (pp. 227-240). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Morrison, James Ashley (2012). Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization. International Organization. 66(03): 395-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000148
Procedural Constraints and Bureaucratic Politics Allison, Graham T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. American Political Science Review. 63(3): 689-718. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423
Krasner, Stephen D. (1972). Are Bureaucrats Important? (Or Allison Wonderland). Foreign Policy (Summer 1972): 159-179. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147761
Perceptual Lenses Jervis, Robert (1968). Hypotheses on Misperception. World Politics. 20(3): 454-479. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009777
Jervis, Robert (1989). War and Misperception. In Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.), The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (pp. 101-126). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Cognition and Expertise Khong, Yuen Foong (1992). Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 7 (pp. 3-18, 174- 208).
Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2009). Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy. International Security. 34(2): 119-161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.119
Psychology Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (pp. 3-22). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Stein, Janice Gross (2013). Psychological Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (2nd ed., pp. 195-220). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587.n8
Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2014). Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 11 (pp. 14-43, 241-254).
Mercer, Jonathan (2005). Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. International Organization. 59(1): 77-106. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877879
Lopez, Anthony C., Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Petersen (2011). States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics. International Security. 36(2): 48-83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00056
Emotions and Biology Rosen, Stephen Peter (2005). War and Human Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 1-26).
Kowert, Paul A., and Margaret G. Hermann (1997). Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41(5): 611-637. http://www.jstor.org/stable/174466
Habit Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot (2011). International Practices. International Theory. 3(01): 1-36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175297191000031X
Hopf, Ted (2010). The Logic of Habit in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations. 16(4): 539-561. http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/16/4/539.abstract
Gender Goldstein, Joshua S. (2001). War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-6, and Chapter 11 (pp. 403-414).
Johnson, Dominic D. P., Rose McDermott, Emily S. Barrett, Jonathan Cowden, Richard Wrangham, Matthew H. McIntyre, et al. (2006). Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender and Testosterone. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 273(1600): 2513-2520. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25223635
War and the Democratic Peace: Normative Perspectives Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946- 1986. American Political Science Review. 87(3): 624-638. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938740
Owen, John M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security. 19(2): 87- 125. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539197
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan (2001). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security. 26(1): 93-128. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092079
WEEK 6: 21 OCTOBER 2014 STRATEGIC INTERACTION ‐ COORDINATION, BARGAINING AND POWER Power and Strategic Choice in International Politics Lake, David A., and Robert Powell (Eds.) (1999). Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 3 (“The Strategic Setting of Choices; Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics”) and 7 (“The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation”) (pp. 77-114, 197-228).
Raiffa, Howard, John Richardson, and David Metcalfe (2002). Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Chapters 3 and 7 (pp. 33-52, 109-128).
Baldwin, David A. (2013). Power and International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (2nd ed., pp. 273-298). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587
Coordination Oye, Kenneth A. (1985). Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. World Politics. 38(1): 1-24. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010349
Axelrod, Robert M., and Robert O. Keohane (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics. 38(1): 226-254. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010357
Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser (1966). An Economic Theory of Alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics. 48(3): 266-279. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082
Interdependence and Power Hirschman, Albert O. (1980 (1945)). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Expanded ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Prefaces, Introduction, and Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. v- 52).
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-19).
Voeten, Erik (2001). Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review. 95(4): 845-858. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117717
Bargaining and Coercive Threats Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chs. 1-3, 8 (pp. 3-80, 187-204).
Powell, Robert (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. Annual Review of Political Science. 5(1): 1-30. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138
Powell, Robert (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization. 60(1): 169-203. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877871
Beyond Rationality Barnett, Michael N., and Raymond Duvall (2005). Power in International Politics. International Organization. 59(1): 39-75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877878
WEEK 7: 4 NOVEMBER 2014 SIGNALING, CREDIBILITY, AND DIPLOMACY The Theory of Two‐Level Games Fearon, James D. (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41(1): 68-90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/174487
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization. 42(3): 427-460. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785
Domestic Politics Trager, Robert F., and Lynn Vavreck (2011). The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party. American Journal of Political Science. 55(3): 526-545. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x
McGillivray, Fiona, and Allan C. Stam (2004). Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 48(2): 154-172. http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/48/2/154.abstract
Audience Costs and Signaling Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review. 88(3): 577-592. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796
Snyder, Jack, and Erica D. Borghard (2011). The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. American Political Science Review. 105(03): 437-456. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305541100027X
Weeks, Jessica L. (2008). Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization. 62(01): 35-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071874
Ramsay, Kristopher W. (2011). Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power1. International Studies Quarterly. 55(4): 1003-1023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468- 2478.2011.00687.x
Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro (2014). Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War. International Organization. 68(01): 1-31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000192
The Democratic Peace: A Signaling Perspective Schultz, Kenneth A. (1999). Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. International Organization. 53(2): 233-266. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601389
Deterrence Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett (1984). What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics. 36(4): 496-526. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010184
Signorino, Curtis S., and Ahmer Tarar (2006). A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence. American Journal of Political Science. 50(3): 586-605. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694236
Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. World Politics. 41(2): 143-169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010405
Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics. 41(2): 208-224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010408 and Downs, George W. (1989). The Rational Deterrence Debate. World Politics. 41(2): 225-237. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010409
Diplomacy Trager, Robert F. (2011). Multidimensional Diplomacy. International Organization. 65(03): 469-506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000178
Sartori, Anne (2002). The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes. International Organization. 56(1): 121-150. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078672
Jönsson, Christer (2002). Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (1st ed., pp. 212-235). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781848608290.n11
Trager, Robert F. (2010). Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters. American Political Science Review. 104(02): 347-368. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000158
Martin, Lisa L. (2005). The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 35(3): 440-465. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552700
WEEK 8: 11 NOVEMBER 2014 POLARITY, HEGEMONY, TRANSITIONS AND DETERRENCE Hegemony and Power Transitions Gilpin, Robert (1981). War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4, and 5 (pp. 9-49, 156-210).
Chadefaux, Thomas (2011). Bargaining over Power: When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War? International Theory. 3(2): 228-253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175297191100008X
Time Inconsistency and Informational (aka “Rationalist”) Theories of War Fearon, James D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization. 49(3): 379-414. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903
Powell, Robert (2012). Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power. American Journal of Political Science. 56(3): 620-637. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23316010
Kirshner, Jonathan (2000). Rationalist Explanations for War? Security Studies. 10(1): 143-150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429423
Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev (2007). The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War. American Journal of Political Science. 51(4): 755-771. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4620098
Treisman, Daniel (2004). Rational Appeasement. International Organization. 58(2): 345-373. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877861
Lake, David A. (2010). Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. International Security. 35(3): 7-52. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00029#.U_NPU2NuVZU
Gartzke, Erik (1999). War Is in the Error Term. International Organization. 53(3): 567-587. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601290
Unipolarity Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (2009). Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences. World Politics. 61(1): 1-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S004388710900001X
Wohlforth, William C. (2009). Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics. 61(1): 28-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060220
Monteiro, Nuno P. (2011). Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful. International Security. 36(3): 9-40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064
WEEK 9 – 18 NOVEMBER 2014 BALANCING, INTENTIONS AND NEO‐CLASSICAL REALISM Neo‐Classical Realism Walt, Stephen M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 8 (pp. 1-49, 262-286).
Schweller, Randall L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security. 19(1): 72-107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539149
Glaser, Charles L (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics. 50(1): 171-201. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031
… and its Critics Legro, Jeffrey W., and Andrew Moravcsik (1999). Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security. 24(2): 5-55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539248
Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin- Bor Hui, et al. (2007). Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History. European Journal of International Relations. 13(2): 155-185. http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/13/2/155.abstract
Wallander, Celeste A., and Robert O. Keohane (1999). Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions. In Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane (Eds.), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (pp. 21-47). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Ty-cyk- ZOGAC&lpg=PA88&ots=DqSGvbCfH7&dq=Imperfect%20Unions%3A%20Security%20Institu tions%20over%20Time%20and%20Space&lr&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q=Imperfect%20Unions: %20Security%20Institutions%20over%20Time%20and%20Space&f=false
Learning from History Reiter, Dan (1994). Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past. World Politics. 46(4): 490-526. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950716
The Domestic Politics of Alliances David, Steven (1991). Explaining Third World Alignment. World Politics. 43(2): 233-256. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010472
Narizny, Kevin (2003). Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament. American Political Science Review. 97(2): 203-220. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118204
Alliances and Conflict Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder (1990). Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. International Organization. 44(2): 137-168. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792
Leeds, Brett Ashley (2003). Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. American Journal of Political Science. 47(3): 427- 439. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186107
WEEK 10 – 25 NOVEMBER 2014 INFORMATION AND COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Hegemony and Global Order Lake, David A. (2009). Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 17-62).
Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics. 28(3): 317-347. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009974
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3, and 8 (pp. 5-17, 31-48, 135-181).
Institutions and Regime Theory Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization. 36(2): 185-205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520
Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. International Organization. 36(2): 497-510. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706531
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 4-7, 9-10 (pp 49-134, 182-242).
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast (1990). The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. Economics & Politics. 2: 1-23. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468- 0343.1990.tb00020.x/abstract
Stone, Randall W. (2011). Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 10 (pp. 1-48, 207-224).
Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (2006). Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory. In Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (pp. 3-38). New York: Cambridge University Press.
…and their Critics Krasner, Stephen D. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-42).
Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization. 42(3): 485-507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787
Powell, Robert (1994). Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Organization. 48(2): 313-344. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706934
The English School Bull, Hedley (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters 2 and 3 (pp. 22-73).
Student Presentations to be Added
WEEK 11 – 2 DECEMBER 2014 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, COMPLIANCE AND AUTONOMY Variation in the Form and Function of International Institutions Martin, Lisa L. (1992). Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. International Organization. 46(4): 765-792. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706874
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization. 55 (4): 761-799. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078615
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner (2001). The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization. 55(4): 829-857. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078617
Fearon, James D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization. 52(2): 269-305. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601276
Carnegie, Allison (2014). States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. American Political Science Review. 108(01): 54-70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000646
Legalization Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal (2000). The Concept of Legalization. International Organization. 54(3): 401-419. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601339
Keohane, Robert O., Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2000). Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational. International Organization. 54(3): 457-488. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601341
The Domestic and Transgovernmental Politics of Compliance Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993). On Compliance. International Organization. 47(2): 175-205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706888
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization. 50(3): 379-406. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704030
Haas, Peter M. (1989). Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organization. 43(3): 377-403. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706652
Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli (1993). Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. International Organization. 47(1): 41-76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706882
And the response…
Garrett, Geoffrey (1995). The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union. International Organization. 49(1): 171-181. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706870
And the rebuttal…
Mattli, Walter, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (1995). Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett. International Organization. 49(1): 183-190. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706871
Simmons, Beth A. (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 57-158).
Davis, Christina L. (2004). International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. American Political Science Review. 98(1): 153-169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145303
Dai, Xinyuan (2002). Information Systems in Treaty Regimes. World Politics. 54(4): 405-436. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054198
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery (2009). Network Analysis for International Relations. International Organization. 63(3): 559-592. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40345947
Conditionality Pevehouse, Jon C. (2002). Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization. 56(3): 515-549. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078587
International Organizations as Actors Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization. 53(4): 699-732. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601307
Vreeland, James Raymond, and Axel Dreher (2014). The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-93).
Student Presentations to be Added
WEEK 12 – 9 DECEMBER 2014 FEEDBACK AND LONG‐TERM EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM Feedback and Evolution Gourevitch, Peter A. (1978). The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. International Organization. 32(4): 881-911. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706180
Kahler, Miles (1999). Evolution, Choice, and International Change. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (pp. 165–196). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Diffusion, State Formation and Evolution of the International System over Time Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 8 (pp. 154-180).
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (2006). Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. International Organization. 60(4): 781-810. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877847
Branch, Jordan (2011). Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change. International Organization. 65(01): 1-36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000299
Ruggie, John Gerard (1993). Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. International Organization. 47(1): 139-174. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706885
Historical Institutionalism Pierson, Paul (1996). The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies. 29(2): 123-163. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/29/2/123.abstract
Socialization Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan (1990). Socialization and Hegemonic Power. International Organization. 44(3): 283-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706778
Wendt, Alexander E. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4 (pp. 1-46, 139-192), 5 (pp. 233-245 only), and 7 (pp. 313-369).
Fearon, James D., and Alexander E. Wendt (2002). Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (pp. 52-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781848608290.n3
Johnston, Alastair Iain (2008). Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 5 (pp. 1-44, 197-212).
Mercer, Jonathan (1995). Anarchy and Identity. International Organization. 49(2): 229-252. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706971
Institutional Socialization and Communicative Action Legro, Jeffrey W. (1997). Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism. International Organization. 51(1): 31-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703951
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization. 52(4): 887-917. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361
Finnemore, Martha (1996). National Interest in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 24-33 only), 3 (pp. 69-88).
Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly. 45(4): 487-515. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096058
Risse-Kappen, Thomas (2000). 'Let's Argue:' Communicative Action in World Politics. International Organization. 54(1): 1-39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601316
Student Presentations to be Added
WEEK 13 – OPTIONAL (IF NEEDED)
Student Presentations to be Added
SOME RECOMMENDED READINGS Week 1 Adcock, Robert (2001). Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research. American Political Science Review. 95(03): 529-546. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118231
Sartori, Giovanni (1970). Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. American Political Science Review. 64(4): 1033-1053. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1958356
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown (1985). Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making. In Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (Eds.), Advances in Information Processing in Organizations (Vol. 2, pp. 21- 58). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Lijphart, Arend (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review. 65(3): 682-693. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955513
Almond, Gabriel A., and Stephen J. Genco (1977). Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics. World Politics. 29(4): 489-522. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010037
Review Symposium: The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Laitin, David D. (1995). Disciplining Political Science. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 454-456. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082445
Caporaso, James A. (1995). Research Design, Falsification, and the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 457-460. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082441
Collier, David (1995). Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 461-466. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082442
Rogowski, Ronald (1995). The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 467-470. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082443
Tarrow, Sidney (1995). Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 471-474. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082444
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1995). The Importance of Research Design in Political Science. American Political Science Review. 89(2): 475-481. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082445
Elster, Jon (1989). Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-10).
Eckstein, Harry (1975). Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science (Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry, pp. 79-137). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Exchange on the Third Debate: Lapid, Yosef (1989). The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era. International Studies Quarterly. 33(3): 235-254. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600457
Holsti, K. J. (1989). Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All? International Studies Quarterly. 33(3): 255-261. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600458
Biersteker, Thomas J. (1989). Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations. International Studies Quarterly. 33(3): 263-267. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600459
George, Jim (1989). International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate. International Studies Quarterly. 33(3): 269-279. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600460
Lakatos, Imre (1974). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 1965 (2nd edition ed., Vol. 4, pp. 91-196). London (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Gaddis, John Lewis (1996). History, Science, and the Study of International Relations. In Ngaire Woods (Ed.), Explaining International Relations since 1945 (pp. 32-48). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levy, Jack S. (2001). Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of International Relations. In Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Eds.), Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (pp. 39-83). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein (2010). Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tao, Terence (2012). E pluribus unum: From Complexity, Universality. Daedalus. 141(3): 23-34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00158
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2011). Case Study. In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonne S. Lincoln (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 301-316). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gerring, John (2001). Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 10 (“Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation”) (pp, 205-232).
Week 2 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.
Carr, Edward H. (1946). The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
Clausewitz, Carl von (1976). On War (rev. ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kubalkova, Vendulka (1998). The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E.H. Carr and IR. In Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (pp. 25-57). New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed.). New York: Knopf. Chapters 3, 8-14.
Thucydides (1888). The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V. Boston, MA: Ginn & Company. The Melian Dialogue.
Posen, Barry R. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1, 2 and 7 (pp. 13-80, 220-244).
Johnson Bagby, Laurie M. (1994). The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations. International Organization. 48(1): 131-153. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706917
Symposium on War and the State in International Theory: Wagner, R. Harrison (2010). War and the State: a Synopsis. International Theory. 2(02): 283-287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000084
Schweller, Randall L. (2010). The Logic and Illogic of the Security Dilemma and Contemporary Realism: a Response to Wagner's Critique. International Theory. 2(02): 288-305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000096
Fearon, James D. (2010). Comments on R. Harrison Wagner's War and the State: The Theory of International Politics. International Theory. 2(02): 333-342. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000126
Boesche, Roger (2003). Kautilya's "Arthaśāstra" on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India. The Journal of Military History. 67(1): 9-37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093167
Fairbank, J. K. (1942). Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West. The Far Eastern Quarterly. 1(2): 129-149. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2049617
Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (1993). The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth Neal, and James D. Fearon (2012). A Conversation with Kenneth Waltz. Annual Review of Political Science. 15(1): 1-12. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-020511-174136
Milner, Helen V. (1991). The Assumption of Anarchy in International Politics: A Critique. Review of International Studies. 17(1): 67-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097244
Johnston, Alastair Iain (2012). What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory? Annual Review of Political Science. 15(1): 53-78. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.040908.120058
Biersteker, Thomas J. (2009). The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for 'American' International Relations. In Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever (Eds.), International Relations Scholarship Around the World (pp. 308-327). New York: Routledge.
Kahler, Miles (1997). Inventing International Relations. In Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (1998). International Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization. 52(4): 645. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601354
Weber, Cynthia (1999). IR: The Resurrection Or New Frontiers of Incorporation. European Journal of International Relations. 5(4): 435-450. http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/5/4/435.abstract
Jervis, Robert (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-54).
And reviews thereof: Snyder, Glenn H. (2002). Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay. International Security. 27(1): 149-173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228802320231253
Rosecrance, Richard N. (2002). War and Peace. World Politics. 55(1): 137-166. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212
Nye, Joseph S. (1988). Neorealism and Neoliberalism. World Politics. 40(2): 235-251. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010363
Ruggie, John Gerard (1998). What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization. 52(4): 855-885. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601360
Klotz, Audie (2001). Can we Speak a Common Constructivist Language. In Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Joergensen (Eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (pp. 223-235). Armonk, NY and London (UK): M.E. Sharpe.
Lapid, Yosef (1989). Quo Vadis International Relations? Further Reflections on the 'Next Stage' of International Theory. Millennium - Journal of International Studies. 18(1): 77-88. http://mil.sagepub.com/content/18/1/77.short
Wæver, Ole (1998). The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. International Organization. 52(4): 687-727. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601355
Wæver, Ole (1996). The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate. In Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds. (Eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (pp. 149-185). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wiener, Antje. (2006). Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory. Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State. Queen's University Belfast. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939758
Kaplan, Robert D. (2009). The Revenge of Geography. Foreign Policy(172): 96-105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20684874
Glaser, Charles L. (2010). Rational Theory of International Politics: the Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Week 3 Kant, Immanuel (1983). To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Ted Humphrey, Trans.) Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals (pp. 107-144). Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.
Kupchan, Charles A. (2010). How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Especially chapters 2 and 5 (pp. 16-72, 183-283).
Haas, Ernst B. (1964). Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Deutsch, Karl W. (1968). The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Zacher, Mark W., and Richard Matthew (1995). Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands. In Charles Kegler Jr. (Ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and Neoliberal Challenges. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Angell, Norman (1933). The Great Illusion. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Hiscox, Michael J. (2001). Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. International Organization. 55(1): 1-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078596
Kurth, James R. (1979). The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes. International Organization. 33(1): 1-34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706592
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996). Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security. In Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 1-32). New York: Columbia University Press. Available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=bPjkBhKWBOsC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false
Krasner, Stephen D. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 2 (pp. 35-54).
Weldes, Jutta (1999). Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kirshner, Jonathan (2007). Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Laitin, David D., and Jacob Shapiro (2008). The Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of Terrorism. In Philip Keefer and Norman Laoyza (Eds.), Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness (pp. 209-232). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Deutsch, Karl W. (1969). Nationalism and its Alternatives. New York,: Knopf, distributed by Random House. Chapters 1-3.
Anderson, Benedict (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Revised and extended edition ed.). London; New York: Verso. Chapter 3 (pp. 37-46).
Posen, Barry R. (1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival. 35(1): 27-47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672
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Cardoso, F. Henrique, and Enzo Faletto (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Pages vii-xxv, 176-216.
Frieden, Jeffry A., and Ronald Rogowski (1996). The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview. In Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (Eds.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics (pp. 25-47). New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Week 4 Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse (2008). Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration. World Economy. 31(1): 67-96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01082.x
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse (2006). Democratization and International Organizations. International Organization. 60(1): 137-167. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877870
Kelley, Judith Green (2007). Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements. American Political Science Review. 101(3): 573-589. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644467
Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota (2005). Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. International Organization. 59(1): 107-143. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877880
Kono, Daniel Y. (2006). Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review. 100(3): 369-384. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644361
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam (2003). Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter. International Security. 28(1): 168-179. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137580
Christensen, Thomas J. (1996). Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947- 1958. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Eds.) (1996). Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters by Russett (“The Fact of the Democratic Peace”), and Mansfield and Snyder (“Democratization and the Danger of War”) (pp. 58-81, 310-336).
Rosato, Sebastian (2003). The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. American Political Science Review. 97(4): 585-602. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025
Russett, Bruce M. (1990). Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Evangelista, Matthew (1997). Domestic Structure and International Change. In Michael W. Doyle and G John Ikenberry (Eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (pp. 202-228). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) (1978). Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hall, Peter A., and David W. Soskice (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Peter A. (1986). Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ikenberry, G. John, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno (Eds.) (1988). The State and American Foreign Economic Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Ann Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (1992). Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
MacIntyre, Andrew (2001). Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia. International Organization. 55(1): 81-122. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078598
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Oren, Ido (1995). The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Germany. In Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace (pp. 263-300). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder (1995). Democratization and the Danger of War. International Security. 20(1): 5-38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539213
Week 5 Autesserre, Séverine (2009). Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention. International Organization. 63(02): 249-280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090080
Tickner, J. Ann (1992). Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 5 (pp. 1-66, 127-144).
Evangelista, Matthew (2003). Rough-and-Tumble World: Men Writing about Gender and War. Perspectives on Politics. 1(2): 327-334. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688904
Levy, Jack S. (1992). Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems. Political Psychology. 13(2): 283-310. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791682
Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond (1992). Rethinking Allison's Models. American Political Science Review. 86(2): 301-322. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964222
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Levy, Jack S. (1986). Organizational Routines and the Causes of War. International Studies Quarterly. 30(2): 193-222. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600676
Rathbun, Brian C. (2011). Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations. International Organization. 65(02): 243-273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000014
Johnson, Dominic D. P. (2004). Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 1-34).
Holmes, Marcus (2013). The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions. International Organization. 67(4): 829-861. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000234
Frank, Robert H. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: Norton.
McDermott, Rose (2004). Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
McDermott, Rose (2004). The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science. Perspectives on Politics. 2(4): 691-706. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688538
McDermott, Rose, Dustin Tingley, Jonathan Cowden, Giovanni Frazzetto, Dominic D. P. Johnson, and Raghavendra Gadagkar (2009). Monoamine Oxidase a Gene (MAOA) Predicts Behavioral Aggression Following Provocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 106(7): 2118-2123. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40272635
Zajonc, Robert B. (1980). Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences. American Psychologist. 35(2): 151-175. http://psyc604.stasson.org/zajonc.pdf
Bechara, Antoine, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel, and Antonio R. Damasio (1997). Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy. Science. 275(5304): 1293-1295. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2892390
Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby (2000). Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions. In Michael Lewis and Jeannette Haviland- Jones (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions (2nd ed., pp. 91-115). New York: Guilford Press.
Slovic, Paul, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor (2007). The Affect Heuristic. European Journal of Operational Research. 177(3): 1333-1352. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221705003577
Lupia, Arthur, and Jesse O. Menning (2009). When Can Politicians Scare Citizens into Supporting Bad Policies? American Journal of Political Science. 53(1): 90-106. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193869
Hatemi, Peter K, Enda Byrne, and Rose McDermott (2012). Introduction: What is a ‘Gene’ and Why Does It Matter for Political Science? Journal of Theoretical Politics. 24(3): 305-327. http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/24/3/305.abstract
Elster, Jon (1986). Rational Choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chapters 2, 4-6, and 9.
Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro (1994). Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Owen, John M. (1997). Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Jabko, Nicolas (2006). Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Preface and Chapters 1-4 (pp. ix-56).
Kupchan, Charles A. (1994). The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-104).
Kier, Elizabeth (1995). Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars. International Security. 19(4): 65-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539120
Rosen, Stephen Peter (1995). Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters. International Security. 19(4): 5-31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539118
Masters, Roger D. (1990). Evolutionary Biology and Political Theory. American Political Science Review. 84(1): 195-210. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963637
Mercer, Jonathan (2005). Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. International Organization. 59(1): 77-106. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877879
Nisbett, Richard E. (2003). The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently - and Why. London; Yarmouth, ME: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. Introduction and Chapter 3 (xiii-xxiii, 47-78).
Enloe, Cynthia (1998). All the Men Are in the Militias, All the Women Are Victims: The Politics of Masculinity and Femininity in Nationalist Wars. In Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (Eds.), The Women and War Reader (pp. 50-62). New York: New York University Press.
McNamara, Kathleen R. (1998). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Klotz, Audie (2001). Can we Speak a Common Constructivist Language. In Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Joergensen (Eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (pp. 223-235). Armonk, NY and London (UK): M.E. Sharpe.
Lapid, Yosef (1989). Quo Vadis International Relations? Further Reflections on the 'Next Stage' of International Theory. Millennium - Journal of International Studies. 18(1): 77-88. http://mil.sagepub.com/content/18/1/77.short
Wæver, Ole (1998). The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. International Organization. 52(4): 687-727. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601355
Wæver, Ole (1996). The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate. In Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds. (Eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (pp. 149-185). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Week 6 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1987). Power and Interdependence Revisited. International Organization. 41(4): 725- 753. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706764
Lukes, Steven (1974). Power: A Radical View. London: MacMillan.
Pape, Robert A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review. 97(03): 343-361. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117613
Baldwin, David A. (1980). Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis. International Organization. 34(4): 471-506. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706510
Gruber, Lloyd (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1991). Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics. 43(3): 336-366. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010398
Jervis, Robert (1988). Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation. World Politics. 40(3): 317-349. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010216
Dixit, Avinash K., and Barry J. Nalebuff (1991). Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: W. W. Norton. Chapters 5 and 6 (pp. 119-167).
Axelrod, Robert M. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Harper Collins: Basic Books.
Week 7 Ikenberry, G. John (2011). Liberal Leviathan: the Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 7 (pp. 279-332)
Walt, Stephen M. (2009). Alliances in a Unipolar World. World Politics. 61(1): 86-120. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060222
Jervis, Robert (2009). Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective. World Politics. 61(1): 188-213. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060225
Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Steven E. Miller (Eds.) (1994). The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Expanded ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Art, Robert J. (1980). To What Ends Military Power? International Security. 4(4): 3-35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626666
Olson, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Nye, Joseph S. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.
Strange, Susan (1987). The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony. International Organization. 41(4): 551-574. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706758
Lake, David A. (1983). International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934. World Politics. 36(4): 517-543. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010388
Snidal, Duncan (1985). The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International Organization. 39(4): 579-614. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706716
Jervis, Robert (2002). Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace. American Political Science Review. 96(1): 1-14. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117806
Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth (2008). World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Week 8 Rose, Gideon (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics. 51(1): 144-172. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068
Gulick, Edward Vose (1955). Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Kaplan, Morton A. (1957). System and Process in International Politics. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Chapters 1-3.
Organski, A. F. K. (1968). World Politics (2nd revised edition ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 12.
Haas, Ernst B. (1953). The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda? World Politics. 5(4): 442-477. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009179
Schroeder, Paul W. (1994). Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory. International Security. 19(1): 108-148. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539150
Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press. Preface and Chapters 1-4 (pp. xiii-118).
Rational Deterrence Debate in World Politics: Jervis, Robert (1989). Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence. World Politics. 41(2): 183-207. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407 Downs, George W. (1989). The Rational Deterrence Debate. World Politics. 41(2): 225-237. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010409
Morrow, James D. (1994). Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-50).
Kreps, David (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford\New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 4 and 5 (pp. 37-132).
Kreps, Sarah E. (2011). Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-3 (pp. 3-48).
Suh, Jae-Jung (2007). Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances. New York: Palgrave MacMillan Chapter 1 (pp. 1-28).
Wallander, Celeste A. (2000). Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War. International Organization. 54(4): 705-735. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379
Week 9 Fettweis, Christopher J. (2006). A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right? International Studies Review. 8(4): 677-697. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4621772
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2003). The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics. 1(3): 475-494. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688707
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review. 97(1): 75-90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222
Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way (2004). The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 48(6): 859-885. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149798
Van Evera, Stephen (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1-3 and 9 (pp. 1-72, 255-258).
Betts, Richard K. (1999). Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay. International Security. 24(2): 166-198. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539256
Mack, Andrew (1975). Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. World Politics. 27(2): 175-200. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880
Davis, James W., Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles L. Glaser, and Chaim Kaufmann (1998). Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory. International Security. 23(3): 179-206. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539342
Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann (1998). What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it? International Security. 22(4): 44-82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539240
Cederman, Lars-Erik, T. Camber Warren, and Didier Sornette (2011). Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War. International Organization. 65(04): 605-638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Powell, Robert (1999). In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-39).
Week 10 Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security. 19(3): 5-49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078
Baldwin, David A. (Ed.) (1993). Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press.
Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy (Eds.) (1993). Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies. 44(5): 936-957. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x/full
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1989). Studying Institutions: Some Lessons From the Rational Choice Approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1(2): 131-147. http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/1/2/131.short
Powell, Walter W., and Paul DiMaggio (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Introduction (pp. 1-40).
Haas, Peter M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization. 46(1): 1-35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951
Caporaso, James A. (1992). International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations. International Organization. 46(3): 599-632. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706990
Carlson, Allen (2005). Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Introduction and Chapters 1-2 (pp. 1-48).
Oksenberg, Michel (2001). The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context. In Stephen D. Krasner (Ed.), Problematic Sovereignty (pp. 83-104). New York: Columbia University Press.
Osiander, Andreas (2001). Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. International Organization. 55(2): 251-287. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078632
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons (1998). Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization. 52(4): 729-757. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601356
Crawford, Neta C. (1994). A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations. International Organization. 48(3): 345-385. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706963
Hui, Victoria Tin-bor (2004). Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe. International Organization. 58(1): 175-205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877892
Kang, David C. (2003). Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations. International Security. 28(3): 165-180. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481
Week 11 Ikenberry, G. John (1998). Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order. International Security. 23(3): 43-78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539338
Adler, Emanuel, and Michael N. Barnett (Eds.) (1998). Security Communities. Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-66).
Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli (1993). Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. International Organization. 47(1): 41-76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706882
Moravcsik, Andrew (2012). Liberal Theories of International Law. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (Eds.), International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (pp. 83-118). Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press.
Raustiala, Kal (1997). States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions. International Studies Quarterly. 41(4): 719- 740. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600859
Drezner, Daniel W. (2004). The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In. Political Science Quarterly. 119(3): 477-498. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202392
Simmons, Beth A. (2000). International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review. 94(4): 819-835. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586210
Special issue on Legalization in International Organization: Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal (2000). The Concept of Legalization. International Organization. 54(3): 401-419. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601339
Alter, Karen J. (2000). The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash? International Organization. 54(3): 489-518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601342
Kahler, Miles (2000). Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case. International Organization. 54(3): 549-571. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601344
Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope (2001). Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics. International Organization. 55(3): 743-758. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078663
Reus-Smit, Christian (2011). Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System. International Organization. 65(02): 207-242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000038
Week 12 Hurd, Ian (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organization. 53(2): 379-408. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601393
Lebow, Richard Ned (2008). A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 9, and 10 (pp. 1-121, 439-570).
Also see reactions to it: Welch, David A. (2010). A Cultural Theory Meets Cultures of Theory. International Theory. 2(03): 446-453. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000175
Rengger, Nicholas (2010). Remember the Aeneid? Why International Theory Should Beware Greek Gifts. International Theory. 2(03): 454-460. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000187
Hymans, Jacques E.C. (2010). The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism. International Theory. 2(03): 461-467. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000199
Wohlforth, William C. (2010). A Matter of Honor. International Theory. 2(03): 468-474. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000205
Morrow, James D. (2010). Eight Questions for A Cultural Theory of International Relations. International Theory. 2(03): 475- 480. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000217
Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 4 (pp. 1-78, 114-152).
Pouliot, Vincent (2010). The Materials of Practice: Nuclear Warheads, Rhetorical Commonplaces and Committee Meetings in Russian–Atlantic Relations. Cooperation and Conflict. 45(3): 294-311. http://cac.sagepub.com/content/45/3/294.abstract
Pouliot, Vincent (2010). International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press.
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