Book Review Essay

Science, Politics and International

EnvironmentalJudithBook Review A. Layzer Essay Policy • Judith A. Layzer

Edward A. Parson. 2002. Protecting the : Science, Strategy, and Negotia- tion in the Shaping of a Global Environmental Regime. Oxford: .

Reiner Grundmann. 2001. Transnational Environmental Policy: Reconstructing Ozone. London: Routledge.

In 1987, 30 nations signed the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, a historic international agreement to reduce chloroºuoro- carbons (CFCs), halons, and other ozone-depletingsubstances. The controversy that ultimately yielded this agreement dates back to the mid-1960s, when scien- tists began to suspect that pollutants from several kinds of human activities were depletingthe stratospheric ozone layer, which protects life on earth by screening out damaging, high-energy ultraviolet (UV) radiation. Though very little was known about the likely impacts of ozone loss, experts worried about effects on human health and ecosystems. In 1974, Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina identiªed CFCs as the most serious threat to stratospheric ozone, and shortly thereafter a small number of countries includingthe US decided unilaterally to restrict the use of those chemicals as propellants in aerosol spray cans. It was obvious, however, that the problem of was global and that an international solution was needed. Serious efforts to reach an international agreement to protect the strato- spheric ozone layer got underway in the late 1970s but for nearly a decade ended repeatedly in deadlock. This is hardly surprising: regulation of common pool resources at the international level is dauntingbecause any singledefector

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can undermine a cooperative agreement, and the mechanisms for ensuring compliance are virtually nonexistent. The uncertainty that pervades the scienti- ªc understandingof environmental problems and the impact of policies aimed at stemming them exacerbates the challenges to international cooperation. Yet remarkably, protracted negotiations in the mid-1980s yielded an agreement to cut CFCs by half. Then, in rapid succession, international negotia- tors agreed on a series of measures tightening controls on ozone-depleting sub- stances. The resultingregimeis the most protective and effective international environmental agreement ever enacted: by the end of the 20th century, at only modest cost, worldwide production of ozone-depletingchemicals had dropped by 95 percent from its peak in the late 1980s, and it continues to decline. The ozone case warrants scholarly attention for at least two reasons. First, it is the most progressive attempt to address a global environmental problem to date and hence may serve as a model for dealingwith biodiversity loss, climate change, and other seemingly intractable global environmental issues. Second, it offers insight into a question that has vexed scholars, activists, and policy- makers for decades: what role does science play in environmental policy-mak- ing? The answer to this question can inform efforts to design policy-relevant re- search and incorporate new scientiªc insights into our environmental policies, thereby making them more likely to ameliorate our environmental concerns. Two recent accounts, Edward A. Parson’s Protecting the Ozone Layer and Reiner Grundmann’s Transnational Environmental Policy, attempt to explain the evolution of national and international regulation of ozone depleting sub- stances and the role of science therein. Though they adopt very different ap- proaches, both authors reject the most popular explanation for the timingand stringency of the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent amendments. The ªrst such argument is that ozone controls were enacted because they advanced the economic self-interest of the primary players;1 the most common variant of this view is that DuPont pressed for CFC regulation only after it had secretly de- veloped a substitute. Parson and Grundmann persuasively rebut such expla- nations, however, pointingout that DuPont did not, in fact, have a readily available substitute for CFCs at the time it began endorsing controls on CFC production and emissions. They advance an alternative view that by 1986 DuPont, concerned about its reputation, felt the weight of the scientiªc evi- dence rendered its position untenable and, furthermore, that industry leaders feared the prospect of litigation or unilateral action by the US. Grundmann and Parson are also critical of what Grundmann calls the “cognitive” explanations, in which a decisive shift in scientiªc knowledge prompts policy change. Proponents of these explanations assume that there is sufªcient uncertainty about the world and the likely consequences of different choices that actors cannot easily calculate their interests, so expertise and knowledge confer power. According to Peter Haas, for example, an ecological epistemic community united by common values and cognitive beliefs played a

1. See, for example, Oye and Maxwell 1995.

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primary role in bringing about the ozone regime by gathering information, forging a consensus on the causes and consequences of ozone depletion, dis- seminating those arguments to government and corporate decision makers, and helpingthem formulate CFC control policies. 2 A more nuanced version of this argument, proffered by Karen Litªn, focuses attention on the way scientiªc knowledge was used to support a precautionary discourse that limited the plau- sible range of policy choices. According to Liftin, ozone policy changed because precautionary discourse shifted decisively from a subordinate to a dominant position, largely as a result of the discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole in 1985.3 Though compelling, cognitive explanations rest on the existence of a scientiªc consensus, and Parson argues persuasively that the state of the scientiªc knowl- edge was “complex, multi-dimensional, contested, uncertain, and changing, with degrees of scientiªc consensus on speciªc points increasing and sometimes decreasing, and the identity of the more important or controversial points con- tinually shifting over time” (3). While they differ in detail, what Haas, Litªn, Parson, and Grundmann share is a recognition that knowledge itself has little independent impact on policy; rather, it is the interpretation of knowledge that plays a crucial role. Like Litªn, Grundmann draws on insights from and political science, to develop a framework that emphasizes the role of discourse and issue framingin bringing about policy change. At the center of the framework are policy net- works, which comprise actors from the public and private sectors that share worldviews, beliefs about cause-and-effect relations, and preferred solutions. Committed and reputable scientists, whom Grundmann calls “speakers,” mobi- lize members of a policy networks, who then rally around a set of ideas and thereby “prestructure” the conºict that unfolds. In situations of uncertainty, the network that is most trustworthy in its use of symbolic resources—such as scientiªc scenarios and warnings, interpretations of the situation, and proposed solutions—is likely to prevail. The network’s prospects are also contingent on its institutional opportunity structure: networks must be able to capitalize on op- portunities when they arise. At the international level, accordingto Grundmann, cooperation is un - likely to emerge in conºicts that revolve primarily around ideas because efforts at bargaining and interest mediation are likely to fail. Conºict under such cir- cumstances can only be resolved through “integrative bargaining,” which “makes the ‘almost unthinkable’ possible” (21): parties who want speciªc stan- dards or regulations offer side payments to opponents who stand to suffer eco- nomic losses. Integrative bargaining, in turn, is only likely to occur if a common good orientation becomes dominant as a result of policy network activity. Applyinghis framework to the ozone case, Grundmann ªnds that the as - cension of the pro-regulatory coalition in the US and Germany—though it oc-

2. Haas 1992, 187–224. 3. Litªn 1994.

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curred in different ways in each country—was critical to the shift to integrative bargaining at the international level. In the US, the precautionary approach gained status in the late 1970s largely thanks to the efforts of three highly credi- ble advocate scientists at the core of the pro-regulatory alliance. According to Grundmann, their initial deªnition of the problem and proposals for solvingit structured the entire controversy. After a brief initial setback under the Reagan administration, the US resumed the lead in the international arena, largely be- cause the pro-regulatory coalition’s ability to advance its precautionary argu- ments led to the dissolution of the anti-regulatory coalition. The primary obstacle to international CFC controls was the European Community (EC), whose leadingmembers were concerned about their eco - nomic self-interest. Initially, anti-regulation interests in Germany prevailed be- cause pro-regulatory interests lacked advocate scientists and a forum in which to publicize precautionary arguments. In 1986, however, Germany began to defect from the EC’s position and advance CFC controls as political leaders perceived the domestic political beneªts of a pro-regulatory international position. Ulti- mately, then, the decision to adopt the Montreal Protocol reºected the ascen- dancy of the pro-regulatory policy network, largely because of dramatic gains in its credibility. Amongthe most valuable lessons of Grundmann’s work are that advo- cates are necessary to draw attention to the diffuse interest in preservingcom- mon pool resources and that reputable scientists are particularly effective in the contest for public credibility. Detractingfrom Grundmann’s argumentis his oc- casionally impenetrable prose—though whether this is a characteristic of the original or a result of the translation is unclear. Furthermore, readers would beneªt from a coherent summary of Grundmann’s framework and its applica- tion to the ozone case. Finally, it is not clear how Grundmann’s discussion of the social construction of scientiªc knowledge enhances his analysis. His chap- ters on how scientists’ personalities and reputations affect their inºuence within both the scientiªc and policy-makingcommunities is instructive. It is not neces - sary to adopt a constructivist position in order to acknowledge the way scientiªc practices inºuence research or politics, however, and treatingenvironmental problems as claims makingobscures the important ways reality constrains scientiªc ªndings about environmental problems. In contrast to Grundmann, Parson is a scientiªc realist and refrains from engaging in the debate about scientiªc relativism. Parson presents the evolution of the scientiªc understandingof ozone formation and destruction and the hu - man impact on those processes with enormous clarity; he has sorted through the literature and produced a discussion that is lucid, balanced, and accessible to the layperson—a considerable achievement in itself. His analysis illuminates the way scientists rule out hypotheses as they conduct empirical tests, in the pro- cess generatingmorequestions than answers and often deepeningrather than reducinguncertainty. At the same time, Parson makes clear that scientiªc de - bates do close, especially in the light of very persuasive observations. Such clo-

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sure is never permanent, in the sense that every scientiªc concept or theory is open to challenge, but it can provide a reasonably stable and reliable basis for regulatory decision making. Like Grundmann, Parson ªnds that the extent to which scientiªc knowl- edge inºuences policy-making depends not on its existence but on its form. In contrast to Grundmann, however, Parson attributes the rapid emergence of the ozone regime between 1986 and 1988 primarily to the 1986 NASA/WMO as- sessment (Atmospheric Ozone 1985). He contends that this assessment, which was the result of 30 workshops comprisingabout 150 scientists from 11 coun - tries, was sufªciently authoritative that it “caused several actors who had been the strongest opponents of international controls to revise their positions and established a broad new policy consensus supportingmodest international con - trols” (6). A second assessment released two years later, the Ozone Trends Panel, consolidated the regime and prompted a movement toward total elimi- nation of CFCs. Accordingto Parson, scientiªc assessments both resolve key scientiªc is - sues, makingconsensus possible, and limit the rangeof plausible solutions by rulingout the scientiªc justiªcation for some proposals. To be authoritative, a scientiªc assessment must do three things: (1) make certain scientiªc proposi- tions and their policy implications sufªciently salient that key actors cannot ig- nore them; (2) be credible enough that those actors cannot arbitrarily deny its ªndings; and (3) be legitimate, so that those actors cannot dismiss it as partisan or biased. To attain these attributes, an assessment must engage a critical mass of the most respected experts, thereby ensuringthat no one can mount a com- peting assessment. Parson also ªnds that technological knowledge—again, not its existence but its form and availability—played a key role in ozone policy formation. Prior to 1986, Parson argues, the major obstacle to the formation of an ozone regime was that knowledge of CFC alternatives was tightly controlled by a small num- ber of ªrms. This made it easy for those ªrms to argue that no substitutes were available and difªcult for environmentalists to make a persuasive case that they were. In the absence of credible evidence of grave, imminent environmental risk (which presumably was provided by the 1986 assessment), arguments about the cost of regulation held sway. Once the ozone regime was formed, however, the technology assessment processes incorporated into the regime encouraged both innovation by ªrms and tightening of regulatory controls by negotiators. Parson’s work is novel in its explication of how authoritative scientiªc consensus documents can prompt major policy change and international re- gimes designed to facilitate adaptation in response to new information can yield enormous environmental gains. On the other hand, unlike Grundmann, Parson does not ground his analysis in the substantial literature on the role of ideas in politics. As a result, he neglects the role of discourse, media coverage, and other elements of domestic politics in shapingnational positions on inter - national regulation. This explains, for example, why Parson’s downplays the im- pact of the Antarctic ozone hole. While reports of the ozone hole may not have

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had an immediate impact on thinkingwithin the scientiªc community or on negotiators’ beliefs, it does seem to have bolstered the credibility of precaution- ary discourse and galvanized its proponents. The discovery suggested the situa- tion was worse, and potentially much worse, than scientists had predicted; this, in turn, made scientists look conservative rather than hysterical. Conªrmingthis suggestion, nearly everyone Grundmann interviews ascribed crucial importance to the Antarctic ozone hole in undermining the anti-regulatory position. In many respects these thoroughly researched accounts are complemen- tary: while Grundmann illuminates the political context for negotiations, Par- son sheds light on the behavior of negotiators themselves. Taken together, they suggest that the formation of precautionary regimes to address global environ- mental problems rests on the ability of advocates to convert scientiªc knowl- edge into a politically compelling form. They do this in several ways: by translat- ingscientiªc explanations into political stories that are consistent with precautionary policies; by capitalizingon focusingevents, such as major scientiªc discoveries, to project the urgency of addressing the problem; and by forging a highly visible and authoritative scientiªc consensus. Combined, these elements comprise a potent counterweight to the inherent advantages enjoyed by development interests. Subsequent improvements in the regulatory frame- work seem to depend on incorporatingmechanisms within the regimefor learningand adaptation. Such insightshave enormous practical importance for the burgeoning number of efforts to manage natural systems, both domestically and internationally.

References Haas, Peter M. 1992. BanningChloroºuorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Ozone. International Organization 46 (1): 187–224. Litªn, Karen T. 1994. Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooper- ation. New York: Columbia University Press. Oye, Kenneth A., and James H. Maxwell. 1995. Self-Interest and Environmental Manage- ment. Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (4): 192–221.

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