DOCSLIB.ORG

SPAIN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the Kingdom of Spain Is A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
SPAIN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the Kingdom of Spain Is A SPAIN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Kingdom of Spain is a parliamentary democracy headed by a constitutional monarch. The country has a bicameral parliament, the General Courts or National Assembly, consisting of the Congress of Deputies (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). The head of the largest political party or coalition usually was named to head the government as president of the Council of Ministers, the equivalent of prime minister. National elections held on November 20 were considered free and fair. Security forces reported to civilian authorities. The most significant human rights problems during the year included limited access to asylum for undocumented migrants and credible reports that security forces were given arrest quotas for immigrants and used ethnic and racial profiling to achieve this goal. Gender-based violence against women and girls was also a problem. Other problems included some reports that security forces abused suspects and used excessive force against demonstrators and prison overcrowding. Authorities at times delayed access by persons under arrest to legal assistance or to arraignment before a judge. Identification controls by security forces based on ethnic and racial classifications took place. Government corruption occurred, particularly at the provincial and municipal levels. Trafficking in persons and social discrimination against Muslims and other minorities were reported. Jewish groups reported isolated acts of vandalism and anti-Semitism. The government generally took steps to prosecute officials, both in the security services and elsewhere in the government, who committed abuses. There were no reports of impunity. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. As of September, authorities arrested 20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty ETA members as well as five persons allegedly involved in ETA’s street violence Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor SPAIN 2 campaign. In addition 26 members were arrested in France and one in another country. The Office of the General Prosecutor reported that during 2010 there were 54 trials of persons directly or indirectly related to ETA. b. Disappearance There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and laws prohibit such practices, and the government generally respected this prohibition. There were reports of police mistreatment, although some of them were dismissed by the courts. The Coordinator for the Prevention of Torture (a group of Spanish human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], universities, and bar associations) reported that in 2010 there were 251 reports of torture or mistreatment involving 552 complaints, down from 624 complaints in 2009. According to the group, 85 of the complaints involved cases against local police authorities, 79 against the national Civil Guard, 222 against the national police authorities, 52 against the Catalan regional police, 17 against the Basque police, and the remainder against prison staff. The regions with the highest number of complaints were Madrid (138), the Basque Country (132), Andalucia (68), Catalonia (67), and Valencia (43). The Catalan Department of Interior reported that only seven complaints of abuse or mistreatment were filed against Catalan regional police in 2010. On October 13, a group of 56 protestors from the May 15 movement presented a lawsuit against Catalonia’s minister of interior and other security officials for using force to break up a demonstration in Barcelona on May 27. Videos and photographs of the incident showed several police hitting male and female protestors with batons while they were sitting on the ground with their hands raised in the air. Lawyers for the protestors filed a complaint that the police “gravely” violated the protestors’ fundamental rights. The operation resulted in 121 injuries, including 37 of police. In a report to the Catalan parliament on July 10, the regional ombudsman cited the police for using excessive force in attempting to disband the protestors. The ombudsman received 391 complaints against the police for their actions during the demonstrations. The report also faulted regional and city police for their failure to protect lawmakers from demonstrators who blocked the entrances to the Catalan parliament on June 15. In light of those Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor SPAIN 3 events, the ombudsman proposed to create “mediation groups” to better equip the police to respond to protests without resorting to violence. The police maintained that their actions were a “proportionate and adequate” response, as some of the protestors had provoked the conflict. Amnesty International (AI) also reported excessive use of force by police against demonstrators on August 4-5 in front of the Ministry of the Interior in Madrid and on August 17-18 in the Puerta del Sol Square, also in Madrid. The AI annual report for 2011 criticized Spain for failing to investigate complaints of torture and mistreatment and for the preventive detention of foreigners. AI also criticized that authorities could hold suspects incommunicado for up 13 days if they are suspected of terrorist activities. The AI report stated that the number of police checks of immigrants based on racial consideration continued to grow. Prison and Detention Center Conditions As of August, a total of 71,955 inmates were in prison. Overall, the Spanish prison system contained 44,669 cells, of which 1,120 housed three or more inmates. There were 67 prisons in the country. Approximately 8.7 percent of the prison population was female, the majority of whom were serving sentences for drug trafficking. There were 5,526 juveniles imprisoned during 2010, and an additional 10,527 were on probation. Prisoners had access to potable water, food, entertainment, sports facilities, and libraries. Prisoners and detainees had reasonable access to visitors and were permitted religious observance. According to the 2010 report by the Coordinator for the Prevention of Torture, there were 552 complaints against security forces and jail functionaries for abuse of authority, 72 less than in 2009. The report indicated that in 2010 a total of five persons died while in police custody, 46 died in jail, and one minor died while in a detention center for youth. On March 25, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) released a report on its 2007 visit to Spain. At the time of the visit, 57,042 persons were incarcerated in Spain (excluding Catalonia) in prisons with an official total capacity of 39,893, creating an overall occupancy level of 143 percent. In Catalonia, where the regional government has jurisdiction of the penal system, the prison population was 9,363 in facilities with an official capacity of 6,600. The report noted that conditions of detention in National Police stations visited by the CPT varied considerably. While conditions were generally acceptable in many Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor SPAIN 4 stations, cells in some stations lacked access to natural light and had poor artificial lighting and ventilation. At the Ville de Vallecas police station in Madrid, detainees were not provided mattresses at night. The CPT found conditions at the Puente de Vallecas police station in the Madrid area “totally unacceptable” due to an array of problems including “woefully inadequate” ventilation. Material conditions at Civil Guard establishments were generally satisfactory, although a number lacked access to natural light, had poor ventilation, and had small cells. Lack of access to natural light and ventilation were also observed at Mossos d’Esquadra detention facilities. Authorities permitted prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and request investigation of credible allegations of inhumane conditions. Authorities investigated credible allegations of inhumane conditions and documented the results of such investigations in a publicly accessible manner. The government generally investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions. Prisoners can file complaints regarding mistreatment with the national ombudsman, who investigates complaints but does not have authority to take corrective measures directly. In July the Spanish Ombudsman, in its role of National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, issued a report recommending the closing of the detention centers for illegal foreign migrants at Algeciras and Malaga because they did not meet minimum conditions. Another recommendation was to fully investigate any reports of torture or mistreatment. The ombudsman requested that authorities discontinue the practice of holding juveniles incommunicado and allow detainees to have private meetings with the lawyers they have been assigned. The report also requested video surveillance and video recording devices in all detention centers “to prevent improper behavior.” The ombudsman made more than 300 unannounced visits to police and Civil Guard detention centers, jails, centers for minors,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Inter-Organizational Coordination: How Police Forces
    INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION: HOW POLICE FORCES RELATE TO POLITICAL PRINCIPALS, JUDICIAL BODIES, AND OTHER POLICE FORCES Mila Gascó-Hernández Ángel Saz-Carranza Institute of Public Governance and Management ESADE Barcelona, Spain [email protected] / [email protected] Abstract This exploratory paper aims at understanding how several police forces across Europe manage their relationships with three of the main actors they must coordinate with: politicians, judges and prosecutors, and other police forces. The paper particularly refers to the specific case of two Spanish police forces: the Catalan police force and the Madrid local police force. Our main research question is exploratory in nature: how do police forces relate to other security forces and to political and judicial principals? Methodologically, the paper is part of a wider FP7 research, COMPOSITE (Comparative Police Studies in the European Union). Keywords Inter-organizational coordination, police forces, stakeholders, Weberian politics- administration separation, principal-agent theory INTRODUCTION Today’s complex world increases “wicked” problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and the need for organizational mechanisms combining dispersed power with unification (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Security issues are no exception. Terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, to name a few, are ever more complex phenomena covering many different kinds of actors and territories. These social problems require modern police forces capable of coordinating and collaborating with other police bodies but, also, with such as the political principal, other governmental departments, and judicial bodies. Several theoretical streams are useful to approach coordination activities in such heterogeneous and fragmented context: network management (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bouckaert, Peters & Verhoest, 2010), and agency theory (Verhoest et al., 2010).
    [Show full text]
  • Immigration Policy Paradoxes in Catalonia, Spain, 1985-2011: a Political Economy Approach
    Immigration policy paradoxes in Catalonia, Spain, 1985-2011: a political economy approach by Luke Stobart submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of PhD in Business and Management Studies March 2016 Abstract Before the crisis Catalonia and the rest of Spain received high volumes of immigration – of which much was “illegal”. This was despite formally strict controls – EU policy – and different governments in Madrid claiming to operate a legal model of migration – leading to identification of a “policy paradox”. In the same period immigration became problematized, which in Catalonia allowed xenophobic politics to gain popular support – despite being a territory proactive at integrating newcomers. This research aimed to identify the undercurrents of these contradictions and respond to questions on the relative impact of business, state, national and electoral factors. It surveys literature on migration paradoxes and theories, develops an original conceptual framework by critically assessing a range of radical writing, performs quantitative and secondary study of the Catalan, Spanish and European economic and policy contexts (in general and regarding immigration), and analyses findings from interviews with privileged “insiders” and observers (employers, union leaders, migrant activists and policy advisors). Policy contradictions and the problematization of immigration were identified as rooted firstly in the inherent contradictions of the capitalist state. States must ensure availability of new reserves of labour to guarantee accumulation and make savings by not having to “socially reproduce” “imported” labour power. Yet their abstract national and bounded character propels constant nationcraft – a process best performed invisibly and negatively by symbolically and practically excluding migrants from territory, rights and citizenship.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing in Federal States
    NEPAL STEPSTONES PROJECTS Policing in Federal States Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler (Eds.) Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) www.dcaf.ch The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assis- tance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security ser- vices and the military. 2011 Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva, 2011 Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler, eds., Policing in Federal States, Nepal Stepstones Projects Series # 2 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011). Nepal Stepstones Projects Series no. 2 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., <www.procon.bg> Cover design: Angel Nedelchev ISBN 978-92-9222-149-2 PREFACE In this book we will be looking at specimens of federative police or- ganisations. As can be expected, the federative organisation of such states as Germany, Switzerland, the USA, India and Russia will be reflected in their police organisation, though the extremely decentralised approach of Switzerland with hardly any central man- agement structures can hardly serve as a paradigm of ‘the’ federal police organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • An Unholy Alliance
    An Unholy Alliance The European Far Right and Putin’s Russia Antonis Klapsis Antonis Klapsis Antonis Credits Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies Rue du Commerce 20 Brussels, BE 1000 The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the political foundation and think tank of the European People’s Party (EPP), dedicated to the promotion of Christian Democrat, conservative and like-minded political values. For more information please visit: www.martenscentre.eu Editor: Ingrid Habets, Research Officer, Martens Centre External editing: Communicative English bvba Layout and cover design: RARO S.L. Typesetting: Victoria Agency Printed in Belgium by Drukkerij Jo Vandenbulcke This publication receives funding from the European Parliament. © Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies 2015 The European Parliament and the Wilfied Martens Centre for European Studies assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. Sole responsibility lies with the author of this publication. ISBN (to come) Table of Contents About us 04 About the author 06 Acknowledgements 08 Executive summary 10 Introduction 12 The ideological connection 16 Russia as a geopolitical alternative 24 Maintaining close contacts 32 Ukraine and Crimea 38 Exercising pressure from within 48 Conclusions 54 Policy recommendations 58 Bibliography 60 Keywords Far right – Political extremism – Russia – European Union – NATO – Anti-Americanism – Euroscepticism – Ukraine – Crimea – Populism About us Martens Centre profile The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, established in 2007, is the political foundation and think tank of the European People’s Party (EPP). The Martens Centre embodies a pan-European mindset, promoting Christian Democrat, conservative and like-minded political values.
    [Show full text]
  • Spain 2012 International Religious Freedom Report
    SPAIN 2012 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally respected religious freedom. However, some local governments imposed restrictions that affected members of religious minority groups. For example, some Muslim and non-Catholic Christian groups stated that restrictions and policies at the local level inhibited them from assembling to practice their beliefs. The law provides taxpayers the option of allocating a percentage of their income tax to the Catholic Church but not to other religious groups. The trend in the government’s respect for religious freedom did not change significantly during the year. There were reports of societal discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. Prominent societal leaders, however, took positive steps to promote religious freedom. Muslims continued to experience some societal prejudice and challenges related to integration. Some expressions of anti-Semitism persisted, including graffiti and the dissemination of neo-Nazi messages. U.S. officials engaged with government and religious leaders to foster dialogue and promote religious tolerance and freedom. The embassy and consulate general in Barcelona organized events with leaders of minority religious groups, and hosted speakers to share U.S. perspectives on religious freedom. Section I. Religious Demography The National Statistics Institute estimates the population to be 47 million. The government does not collect data on religious affiliation. According to a survey conducted in October by the Spanish Center for Sociological Investigation, approximately 71 percent of respondents identified themselves as Catholic and nearly 3 percent as followers of another religion. In addition, 16 percent described themselves as “non-believers,” and 9 percent as atheists.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 Spain. Populism from the Far Right to the Emergence of Podemos
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by St Mary's University Open Research Archive 19 Spain. Populism From the Far Right to the Emergence of Podemos Karen B. Sanders, Rosa Berganza, and Roberto de Miguel Introduction There is a lack of systematic research on populism and populist political communication in Spain, consisting as it does of mainly descriptive and case study work. This state of research contrasts to the greater body of work carried out in the Latin American context. The absence of a developed corpus of theoretical and empirical research leads us to argue that caution should be exercised in assessing and classifying populism and populist communication in the Spanish context at this stage. However, the evidence that we have been able to collect from published research, survey data, media accounts, and interviews with political actors allows us to present what we hope is a useful review of the state of political populism scholarship regarding Spain. Research on Populism in Spain In the May 2014 European Parliament elections, Podemos (We Can), a party registered in March 2014, won five seats and 1.2 million votes. Podemos emerged from Spain’s 2011 Outraged Movement. Although its activists and leaders claim that it is “neither of the left or of the right” (Carlin, 2015), most Spanish commentators consider it to be Spain’s most significant left-wing populist party (see, e.g., Carlin, 2015), despite the as yet limited number of publications analyzing its rise and characteristics. Until the appearance of Podemos, most research that centered on Spanish political populism relied on single case studies and treated the phenomenon as typical of the far right of Spanish politics in common with developments in other European countries (see Hernández-Carr, 2011, 2013).
    [Show full text]
  • Darya Bazarkina Moscow State University for Humanities Sholokhov, Russia
    Originalan naučni rad UDK 329.055.1:323.28 329.18:316.774(4-672 EU) Primljeno: 14.10.2015. Odobreno: 02.11.2015. Darya Bazarkina Moscow State University for Humanities Sholokhov, Russia RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN THE TERRITORY OF THE EU: FROM “STREET FIGHTERS” TO “NATIONAL-SOCIALIST UNDERGROUND” Abstract In this paper are elaborated contemporary forms of extreme right-wing in the terri- tory of the EU, with special emphasis on right-wing terrorist activities. The author paid special attention to communicational aspect of contemporary extreme right- wing actions through comparative analysis of media from the EU territories. The goal of this paper is examination of causes and consequences of the contemporary European extreme right-wing and the consequences of their actions. The ideology of neo-Nazism is explained, within which the author pointed out similarities and differences between the old and the new reforms of the right-wing extremism. The author concludes that the two main communication channels that were on-going previous years – internet and WPM scene – are still continuously used with a goal of spreading the neo-Nazi idea throughout Europe. Key words: extreme right-wing, Nazism, neo-Nazism, fascism, communication, violence, terrorism, EU. Ultra-right-wing spirits have become a big problem of the European society during the actual economic crisis. That is, for example, according to survey data which was collected by Institute for market researches in Linz, ordered by the Austri- an magazine Standard, “more than a half of the population (54%) believes that Nazis are very possible to win the elections, if it is assumed that banning of the Nauka i drustvo 2-2015.indd 85 16.12.2015 17:08:14 86 Darya Bazarkina national-socialist ideology will be overthrown”1.
    [Show full text]
  • Seminario De Historia
    SEMINARIO DE HISTORIA Dpto. de Hª Social y del Pensamiento Político, UNED Dpto. de Hª del Pensamiento y de los Movimientos Sociales y Políticos, UCM Fundación José Ortega y Gasset-Gregorio Marañón Curso 2015-2016 Documento de trabajo 2015/9 BRIDLED NATIVISM? ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE IN SPANISH NORTH AFRICA AND IN CATALONIA Aitana Guía (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute) SESIÓN: JUEVES, 17 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2015, 19 H. Lugar: Aula 11 Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset c/ Fortuny 53, 28010 Madrid Contacto: [email protected] DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION Bridled nativism? Anti-Muslim prejudice in Spanish North Africa and in Catalonia - AITANA GUIA - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy - [email protected] Introduction The worrisome rise of xenophobia in Europe in the post-Cold War period is not in doubt any longer. If for the past couple of decades analysts considered that support for the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, and people’s parties in Switzerland, Denmark, or the Netherlands was a temporary phenomenon that had reached its upper limits at around 20 percent of the electoral vote, by 2014 it is clear that populism and xenophobia are growing in all European countries and have surpassed the 20 percent electoral mark in Austria, Switzerland, United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, and Hungary.1 Scholars trying to make sense of the resurgence of populism and xenophobia in Europe catalog these parties and movements as extreme-right or radical right populists.2 While I think this approach yields useful results in understanding the discourse, policies, and electoral success of xenophobic parties in Europe, it does not fully explain the widespread and growing appeal of these parties to so many Europeans.
    [Show full text]
  • 3G INTERNET and CONFIDENCE in GOVERNMENT∗ Sergei Guriev R Nikita Melnikov R Ekaterina Zhuravskaya Forthcoming, Quarterly
    3G INTERNET AND CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT∗ Sergei Guriev ○r Nikita Melnikov ○r Ekaterina Zhuravskaya Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics Abstract How does mobile broadband internet affect approval of government? Using Gallup World Poll surveys of 840,537 individuals from 2,232 subnational regions in 116 countries from 2008 to 2017 and the global expansion of 3G mobile networks, we show that, on average, an increase in mobile broadband internet access reduces government approval. This effect is present only when the internet is not censored, and it is stronger when the traditional media are censored. 3G helps expose actual corruption in government: revelations of the Panama Papers and other corruption incidents translate into higher perceptions of corruption in regions covered by 3G networks. Voter disillusionment had electoral implications: In Europe, 3G expansion led to lower vote shares for incumbent parties and higher vote shares for the antiestablishment populist opposition. Vote shares for nonpopulist opposition parties were unaffected by 3G expansion. JEL codes: D72, D73, L86, P16. ∗We thank three anonymous referees and Philippe Aghion, Nicolas Ajzenman, Oriana Bandiera, Timothy Besley, Kirill Borusyak, Filipe Campante, Mathieu Couttenier, Ruben Durante, Jeffry Frieden, Thomas Fuji- wara, Davide Furceri, Irena Grosfeld, Andy Guess, Brian Knight, Ilyana Kuziemko, John Londregan, Marco Manacorda, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Chris Papageorgiou, Maria Petrova, Pia Raffler, James Robinson, Sey- hun Orcan Sakalli, Andrei Shleifer, Andrey Simonov,
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Xenophobia and Populism in Catalonia (Spain) Montserrat Clua I Fainé Universitat Autònoma De Barcelona
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Cultural Heritage in European Societies and Spaces EASA Workshop 2012: Working Papers (CHESS) 2012 Multiculturalism, Identities and National Uncertainties in Southwest Europe: The Rise of Xenophobia and Populism in Catalonia (Spain) Montserrat Clua i Fainé Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/chess_easa Part of the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons Clua i Fainé, Montserrat, "Multiculturalism, Identities and National Uncertainties in Southwest Europe: The Rise of Xenophobia and Populism in Catalonia (Spain)" (2012). EASA Workshop 2012: Working Papers. 3. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/chess_easa/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cultural Heritage in European Societies and Spaces (CHESS) at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in EASA Workshop 2012: Working Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Multiculturalism, Identities and National Uncertainties in Southwest Europe: The Rise of Xenophobia and Populism in Catalonia (Spain) Montserrat Clua i Fainé, PhD (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) This paper proposes a critical reflexive approach to the multiculturalist debate. The starting point is to realize that, despite the years we have spent debating about multiculturalists and interculturalists policies, even the amount of writings we have about the issue (Rodríguez, 2010), it seems that all this work has not been effective for the disappearance of racism and its consequences. As was stated in the proposal of the workshop, today many European countries (with or without a history of multicultural policies) have seen a reaction against the policies of multiculturalism and an increasing of the presence of racist and xenophobic attitudes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Extreme Far-Right in Greece: the Case of Golden Dawn
    Capítulo 23 The extreme far-right in Greece: the case of Golden Dawn Anna Zaptsi * 1. INTRODUCTION. ne of the most notorious outcomes of the wrenching Greek economic and humanitarian crisis was the emergence of a formerly marginal O political formation, namely the ultranationalist, far- right political party Golden Dawn (GD). The party rose to popularity in 2010 with its unprecedented election of a municipal counsellor during the Athens Mayoral Election. Its successful electoral results in 2012 general elections, that converted it into the most successful right-wing parties of European extremism and consequently, placed the cradle of democracy firmly on the map of countries with a quite powerful hostile far-right constituency. This organization has attracted both the public and academic attention and concern, given its extremist populist discourse and violent activities. Nevertheless, in the latest 2019 Greek general elections, Golden Dawn failed to enter the parliament putting an end to its further successful electoral penetration at the Greek politics. The purpose of this article is to examine the factors that led to GD's meteoric rise and to unveil the reasons of its poorer overall performance in the 2019 Greek elections. Additionally, this paper will argue to classify GD as a criminal and pro-Nazi political organization provoking severe impacts on Greek and European sociopolitical issues. Taking into consideration that it is the most radical right-wing party in Europe, and it had also received an incredible influx of votes, the Greek party Golden Dawn was selected, therefore, making this study designed as a single-case one. * Psicóloga, psicoterapeuta sistémica y doctora en Comunicación Audiovisual por la Univer- sidad de Sevilla, España.
    [Show full text]
  • Pedlars of Hate: the Violent Impact of the European Far Right
    Pedlars of hate: the violent impact of the European far Right Liz Fekete Published by the Institute of Race Relations 2-6 Leeke Street London WC1X 9HS Tel: +44 (0) 20 7837 0041 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7278 0623 Web: www.irr.org.uk Email: [email protected] ©Institute of Race Relations 2012 ISBN 978-0-85001-071-9 Acknowledgements We would like to acknowledge the support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Open Society Foundations in the researching, production and dissemination of this report. Many of the articles cited in this document have been translated into English by over twenty volunteers who assist the IRR’s European Research Programme. We would especially like to thank Sibille Merz and Dagmar Schatz (who translate from German into English), Joanna Tegnerowicz (who translates from Polish into English) and Kate Harre, Frances Webber and Norberto Laguía Casaus (who translate from Spanish into English). A particular debt is due to Frank Kopperschläger and Andrei Stavila for their generosity in allowing us to use their photographs. In compiling this report the websites of the Internet Centre Against Racism in Europe (www.icare.to) and Romea (www.romea.cz) proved invaluable. Liz Fekete is Executive Director of the Institute of Race Relations and head of its European research programme. Cover photo by Frank Kopperschläger is of the ‘Silence Against Silence’ memorial rally in Berlin on 26 November 2011 to commemorate the victims of the National Socialist Underground. (In Germany, white roses symbolise the resistance movement to the Nazi
    [Show full text]