DOCSLIB.ORG

Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927 1934 Supplement To Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927 (1927 to 1934) (Superseding Mason's 1931 Supplement) Containing the text of the acts of the 1929, 1931, 1933 and 1933-34 Special Sessions of the Legislature, both new and amendatory, and notes showing repeals, together with annotations from the various courts, state, federal, and the opinions of the Attorney General, construing the constitution,, statutes, charters, and court rules of Minnesota Edited by WILLIAM H. MASON, Editor-in-Chief W. H. MASON, JR. ~| R. O. MASON [ Assistant Editors J. S. O'BRIEN J CITER- DIGEST CO. SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA. 1934 §9145 CH. 75—COURTS OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE but he has authority to receive the fine at any time. sentence, may impose a straight jail sentence without Op. Atty. Gen., Sept. 5, 1931. the option of a fine, but where a defendant is sentenced Justice of the peace must see that fines are paid or to pay a fine and an alternative jail sentence is im­ defendant committed to jail, but fines may be collected posed in default of payment of the fine, the commitment by execution. Op. Atty. Gen., Aug. 15, 1933. should so state because the defendant is entitled to pay Successor of deceased justice is not compelled to issue his fine to the sheriff any time after he is committed, commitment on four-year-old judgment. Op. Atty. Gen.. and thereupon be released. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 28, 1931. Oct. 3, 1933. A justice of the peace has no authority to permit a de­ 9145. Pines—How collected and paid over. fendant to defer payment of any part of the fine, but A justice of the peace, where the prescribed punish­ he has authority to receive the fine at any time. Op. ment is in the alternative as between a fine or jail Atty. Gen., Sept. 5, 1931. CHAPTER 76 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 9148. Unlawful detention of lands or tenements 5. Who mny maintain. Lessee held real party in interest as against one in subject to fine. possession of property holding over after cancellation In forcible entry and detainer, exclusion of evidence of a contract for deed. Gruenberg v. S., 248NW724. See of defendants of nondelivery of Quitclaim deed to Dun. Dig. 3783. plaintiffs, held not error in absence of showing that it Sheriff may maintain action against tenant on land affected plaintiff's actual possession. Mutual Trust Life bid in by state for non-payment of taxes. Op. Atty. Gen. Ins. Co. v. B., 187M503, 246NW9. See Dun. Dig. 3244. 6. Parties defendant. Evidence that plaintiff had been in actual possession Husband of person holding under contract for deed of building for over a year and that defendant entered could be ejected in separate action against him alone. unlawfully, warranted directed verdict for restitution. 178M282, 226NW847. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. B., 187M503, 246NW9. See Dun. Dig. 3783. In forcible entry, evidence held to sustain finding that It is not necessary to prove that detention was forcible, defendant was mortgagee in possession. Schmit v. D., but it is sufficient to prove it to be unlawful. Mutual 249NW580. See Dun. Dig. 6238. Trust Life Ins. Co. v. B., 187M503, 24GNW9. See Dun. 7. Demand—notice to quit. Dig. 3783. Where a tenant is in default in the payment of rent, In forcible entry and detainer, court did not err in the landlord's right of action for forcible entry and un­ excluding from evidence decree to which defendants lawful detainer is complete notwithstanding the lease were not parties or privies. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. contains a right to terminate optional with the land­ v. B., 187M503, 246NW9. See Dun. Dig. 5156. lord and effective upon sixty days' notice. First Minne­ apolis Trust Co. v. D„ 185M121, 240NW459. See Dun. Dig. 9149. Recovery of possession. 5440(88). Minn." Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. C, 182M452, 234NW872. 4. When action will lie. 9155. Judgment—Fine—Execution. Force is not a necessary element to authorize action. Judgment in previous action for wrongful detainer, 178M282, 226NW847. held not estoppel in second action for same relief. Stein­ To render a constructive eviction a defense tenant berg v. S., 18GM640, 244NW105. See Dun. Dig. 5159, 5163. must abandon or surrender premises on account there­ 5167. of. Leifman v. P., 186M427, 243NW446. See Dun. Dig. 5425. 9157. Writ of restitution. Description of property in lease and in contract for deed held substantially same and sufficient to readily Defendant evicted from premises under a writ of res­ identify property. Gruenberg v. S., 248NW724. See Dun. titution has a right to appeal and have a trial de novo. Dig. 3785. 178M460, 227NW656. Mortgagee in possession is entitled to hold it as against mortgagor in action of forcible entry and de­ 9158. Appeal. tainer, mortgagor being in default. Schmit v. D., 249 178M460, 227NW656; note under §9157. NW580. See Dun. Dig. 6242. Roehrs v. T., 185M154, 240NW111: note under §9277. CHAPTER 77 Civil Actions 9164. One form of action—Parties, how styled. rely on implied contract of plaintiff to repay money or A private school held not negligent as to a spectator pay value of property taken. Kubat v. Z.. 186M122, 242 at a football game injured when players accidentally NW477. See Dun. Dig. 88. rolled out of bounds. Ingerson v. S., 185M16, 239NW667. 4. Criminal acts. See Dun. Dig. 6988, 8673. That defendant's conduct is criminal does not preclude In an action to recover damages for the failure of a civil remedy by injunction. State v. Nelson, 248NW751. bank to perform an agreement with a customer to pay, See Dun. Dig. 4190, 7271. out of funds placed in its hands, an existing mortgage 5. Abatement of actions. upon the customer's real property, general damages for Abatement of action for former action pending. 172 injury to the customer's credit standing and for mental M8, 214NW669. suffering are not recoverable. Swanson v. F., 185M89, Where laundry building was leased and personal prop­ 239NW900. See Dun. Dig. 2559-2569. erty therein concurrently sold under conditional sales 1. Election of remedy. contract, pendency of replevin action and retaking of Election of remedies. 171M65, 212NW738. personal property did not abate unlawful detainer under Action to recover on an express contract, held not lease. Steinberg v. S., 186M640, 244NW105. See Dun. an election of remedies so as to bar a subsequent action Dig. 5. in conversion. 178M93, 226NW417. 6. Common counts. A judgment entered on a verdict directed for the de­ An action for money had and received did not lie to fendant on the ground that the defendant was not au­ recover money paid to purchaser at foreclosure, but thorized by the law under which it was organized to owner could recover from such purchaser money re­ execute the promissory notes alleged as causes of action ceived by the latter from the sheriff on a subsequent re­ by the receiver of the payee bank is not a bar to action demption by a creditor who was entitled to the land for money had and received. Turner v. V., 182M115, 233 because the owner failed to file his certificate. 177M563, NW856. See Dun. Dig. 5169. 225NW815. Where the party defrauded has performed his contract Where a contract is completed, an action will lie on to a substantial extent before discovering the fraud, he the common counts for the balance due. 178M275, 226 may elect to continue performance and sue for the NW933. fraud, without attempting to rescind. Osborn v. W., 183 7. Equitable remedies. M205, 236NW197. See Dun. Dig. 10092(61), (62). In an action for equitable relief on account of the If the defrauded party relies solely on a guaranty or breach of a contract for maintenance and care of an warranty, there can be no recovery on the ground of aged person, given to him in consideration of a deed fraud, but that is ordinarily a question of fact. Osborn of his property, the court may grant such relief as the v. W„ 183M205, 236NW197. See Dun. Dig. 10100(55). facts will in equity and good conscience justify. John­ 2. Conflict of laws. son v. J.. 133M262, 238NW483. See Dun. Dig. 3142(60). See notes under §154. Where relief is sought for alleged excessive corpora­ 3. Contract or tort. tion salaries, and plaintiff is barred by covenant not Where defendant counterclaims for money or prop­ to sue for original corporate act fixing such salaries, erty wrongfully obtained, he waives tort and elects to equity will not afford relief against their continuance. 626 CH. 77—CIVIL ACTIONS §9164 Butler v. B., 186M144, 242NW701. See Dun. Dig. 3142 injured a cow, was not sufficient evidence of negligence (58). to sustain a verdict for an employee, injured in a run­ An action between claimants to determine which one away, who had worked with the team two and a half is entitled to a fund deposited in court is governed by months and who based his action on failure to furnish equity principles and rules. Brajovich v. M., 248NW711. a safe team or to warn of their alleged propensity to See Dun. Dig. 4893. run away. Johnson v. A., 183M366, 236NW628. See Dun. Where judgment against member of school board for Dig. 5884-5915. amount of money expended without legal authority pro­ Death from falling down stairs by one injured in au­ vided that such member should be entitled to a con­ tomobile accident seven months before was not proxi­ veyance of property purchased on tender of amount of mately caused by the negligence of the automobile driv­ judgment and on tender it appeared that school dis­ er.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Table of Contents (V.3 No.1)
    Catholic University Law Review Volume 3 Issue 1 January 1953 Article 1 1953 Table of Contents (v.3 no.1) Catholic University Law Review Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Catholic University Law Review, Table of Contents (v.3 no.1), 3 Cath. U. L. Rev. (1953). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss1/1 This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA LAW REVIEW Volume III January, 1953 Number 1 CONTENTS ARTICLES Page Pretrial Procedure in the District of Columbia ...................... Honorable Alexander HoltzojJ I Some Reflections on Pound's Jurisprudence of Interests .......................... Rev. Dr. Francis 1. Powers 10 COMMENTS Inherent Power of the President to Seize Property ................... 27 Just Compensation and Riparian Interests ........................ 33 A Proposed Amendment to the Constitution ...................... 43 RECENT CASES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Captive Audience-Public Utilities- Right of Privacy not Violated by Transit Radio. Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 343 U. S. 451 (1952) .............................. 51 CORPORATIONS-Agency-Attorney and Client. Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., 87 A. 2d 123 (Del. 1952) .......................... 53 CRIMINAL LAW-Subnormal Mentality as Affecting Criminal Re- sponsibility. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 89 A. 2d 782 (Pa. 1952) ...... 55 FUTURE INTERESTS-Habendum Clause--Condition Subsequent-- Base or Determinable Fee. Ange v. Ange, 71 S. E. 2d 19 (N. C. 1952) 57 INSURANCE-Constitutional Law.
    [Show full text]
  • 099-0090.Pdf
    Public Act 099-0090 SB0057 Enrolled LRB099 05449 HEP 25484 b AN ACT concerning civil law. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: ARTICLE 1. HEART BALM ACTIONS Section 1-1. Findings. The majority of states have abolished heart balm actions. In Illinois, heart balm actions for alienation of affections, breach of promise to marry, and criminal conversation were permitted under the common law before the abolition of those causes of action by "An Act in relation to certain causes of action conducive to extortion and blackmail, and to declare illegal, contracts and Acts made and done in pursuance thereof", filed May 4, 1935, Laws 1935, p. 716. The Illinois Supreme Court held, in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296 (1946), that the 1935 Act was unconstitutional and that the abolition of heart balm actions would infringe upon the rights of parties to remedies under Section 19 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution. (Section 12 of Article I of the 1970 Constitution is similar to the relevant portion of Section 19 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution.) Since 1947, heart balm actions have been permitted with limited damages under the Alienation of Affections Act, the Breach of Promise Act, and the Criminal Conversation Act. Society has since recognized that the amicable settlement Public Act 099-0090 SB0057 Enrolled LRB099 05449 HEP 25484 b of domestic relations disputes is beneficial. In 1977, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act became the law of this State. As stated in Section 102 of that Act, among its underlying purposes are: promoting the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage; mitigating the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage; and eliminating the consideration of marital misconduct in the adjudication of rights and duties incident to the legal dissolution of marriage, legal separation and declaration of invalidity of marriage.
    [Show full text]
  • Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws Albert A
    Cornell Law Review Volume 45 Article 5 Issue 3 Spring 1960 Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws Albert A. Ehrenzweig Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws , 45 Cornell L. Rev. 514 (1960) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol45/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS* Towards the Lex Forifor Admonitory Torts Albert A. Ehrenzweigt "If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."' This is the "rule" of the Restatement which, for the sake of "certainty," courts throughout the country during the last few decades have invoked in nearly every torts conflicts case-only to reach widely differing results by the haphazard and therefore unpredictable use of various other devices.2 Arbitrary localization of the "place of wrong," arbitrary "characterizations" (e.g., procedure, contract), arbitrary resort to public policy, and even occasional arbitrary flight into renvoi, that "puerile" concept "of violently prejudiced literature,"3 are some of the devices which have been employed.
    [Show full text]
  • Alienation of Affection Suits in Connecticut a Guide to Resources in the Law Library
    Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries Copyright © 2006-2020, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved. 2020 Edition Alienation of Affection Suits in Connecticut A Guide to Resources in the Law Library This guide is no longer being updated on a regular basis. But we make it available for the historical significance in the development of the law. Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................... 3 Section 1: Spousal Alienation of Affection ............................................................ 4 Table 1: Spousal Alienation of Affections in Other States ....................................... 8 Table 2: Brown v. Strum ................................................................................... 9 Section 2: Criminal Conversation ..................................................................... 11 Table 3: Criminal Conversation in Other States .................................................. 14 Section 3: Alienation of Affection of Parent or Child ............................................ 15 Table 4: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 18 Table 5: Campos v. Coleman ........................................................................... 20 Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations, Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit [email protected] Alienation-1 These guides are provided with the understanding that they represent
    [Show full text]
  • Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss
    San Diego Law Review Volume 23 Issue 1 Torts Symposium Article 5 1-1-1986 Should Tort Law Protect Property against Accidental Loss Richard Abel Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation Richard Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property against Accidental Loss, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986). Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol23/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss? RICHARD L. ABEL* Tort damages for accidental harm to property violate the funda- mental values of autonomy, equality, and community. Tort law itself recognizes that property is less important than personal in- tegrity. State action, includingjudicial decisionmaking, that seeks to protect property against inadvertent damage either is unprinci- pled and hence arbitraryor reflects and reinforces the existing dis- tribution of wealth and power, or both. Tort liabilityfor acciden- tal injury to property cannot be defended as a means of reducing secondary accident costs, it entails very high transactioncosts, and it has little or no proven value as a deterrent of careless behavior. Consequently, courts should cease to recognize a cause of action in tort for accidental damage to property. t An earlier version of this Article was presented to the Symposium of the Colston Research Society at the University of Bristol, April 3-6, 1984.
    [Show full text]
  • INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol
    Indiana La^i^ Revleir Volume 24 1991 Number 2 ESSAY Who's Been Sleeping in My Bed? You and Me, and the State Makes Three Phyllis Coleman* I. Introduction Recently a married woman narrowly escaped a trial,* the possibility of two years in prison, and a $10,000 fine for a crime that an estimated sixty percent of the adult American population has committed. ^ Donna E. Carroll, a Wisconsin woman, was charged with having an adulterous affair. * Professor of Law, Nova University. B.S.. 1970; M. Ed., 1975; J.D., 1978, University of Florida. The author wishes to thank Professors John Sanchez and Bob Jarvis for their helpful comments and criticisms. 1. The 26-year-old Wisconsin woman was spared a trial when she agreed to perform 40 hours of community service and undergo two months of parental counseling. Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1990, at 2, col. 3. Her attorney made it clear that the woman agreed to these sanctions not as an admission of guilt, but only to avoid trial. The Times (London), May 9, 1990, Overseas News. This widely reported case "prompted disbelief and hilarity in the liberal northern cities but won approval from many conservative and religious groups." Id. 2. "Despite all the hush-hush, the morality, and the vendettas against those involved in them, affairs are extremely common. Almost everyone engages in one in his or her Hfe at some time." L. Linguist, Secret Lo\'ers xi (1989). Dr. Linguist estimates 70% of married men and 50% of married women have affairs. She also calculates that approximately 60% of all single people have had a sexual relationship with a married person.
    [Show full text]
  • Breach of Promise to Marry and Return of Engagement Ring and Courtship Gifts a Guide to Resources in the Law Library
    Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries Copyright © 2001-2021, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved. 2021 Edition Breach of Promise to Marry and Return of Engagement Ring and Courtship Gifts A Guide to Resources in the Law Library Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................... 3 Section 1: Breach of Promise to Marry and Return of Engagement Ring and Courtship Gifts ............................................................................................................... 4 Table 1: No Fault Approach........................................................................... 20 Figure 1: Substituted Complaint .................................................................... 22 Figure 2: Amendment to first count of plaintiff’s complaint ............................... 25 See Also: Alienation of Affection Suits in Connecticut Replevin in Connecticut Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations, Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit [email protected] Breach of Promise to Marry – 1 These guides are provided with the understanding that they represent only a beginning to research. It is the responsibility of the person doing legal research to come to his or her own conclusions about the authoritativeness, reliability, validity, and currency of any resource cited in this research guide. View our other research guides at https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/selfguides.htm This guide links to advance
    [Show full text]
  • Does Equity Protect Property Rights in Domestic Relations? Thomas D
    Kentucky Law Journal Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 5 1930 Does Equity Protect Property Rights in Domestic Relations? Thomas D. Theobald Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Theobald, Thomas D. Jr. (1930) "Does Equity Protect Property Rights in Domestic Relations?," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 19 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol19/iss1/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES DOES EQUITY PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS? INTRODUCTION In many cases, we find the broad general statement that "Equity protects onl7 property rights." This rule that the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by an express statute, are limited to the protec- tion of property rights,1 is a rule of very general application. In People vs. Pro tty 2 the court said: "Injury to property whether actual or prospective is the foundation upon which the jurisdiction of courts of equity rests." And in In Re Sawyer,3 we find the following statement: "The office and jurisdiction of equity, unless enlarged by stat- ute, are limited to property rights." In some decisions, expressions are found to the effect that a court of equity would seem to be as responsive to a call for protection of personal rights, as to one for the protection of rights relating to property.- However, where the sole damage suffered consists of injury to personality, there is very little authority for giving injunctive relief.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT __________ No. 04-6055EM __________ In re: Cynthia Marie Stage, * * Debtor. * * Gail Osborne, * * Appeal from the United States Plaintiff - Appellee, * Bankruptcy Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri v. * * Cynthia Marie Stage, * * Defendant - Appellant. * __________ Submitted: February 8, 2005 Filed: March 10, 2005 __________ Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, DREHER and MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judges. __________ KRESSEL, Chief Judge. This case has its origins in alienation of affections litigation in Missouri state court in which a jury awarded Appellee Gail Osborne a $50,000.00 judgment against Appellant Cynthia Marie Stage. Stage appeals from the order of the bankruptcy court granting summary judgment to Osborne based on collateral estoppel. The principal Appellate Case: 04-6055 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2005 Entry ID: 1876995 issue in this appeal is whether the state court judgment for alienation of affections established that Stage willfully and maliciously injured Osborne for purposes of 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6). We conclude that it did not, and reverse. BACKGROUND Osborne filed suit against Stage in state court based on the tort of alienation of affections. On July 28, 1999, after a two day trial, the case was submitted to a jury with the following instruction: Your verdict must be for Plaintiff, Gail Ann Osborne, if you believe: First, Plaintiff was married to Daniel Osborne, and Second, Defendant, Cynthia Stage caused Plaintiff to lose the society, comfort, affection
    [Show full text]
  • Alienation of Affections in Illinois
    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS IN ILLINOIS: CONFLICT BETWEEN JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE The plaintiffs, five minor children, sought damages against a woman defend- ant for alienating the affection of their father and depriving them of his support and society. The complaint alleged that the defendant had induced the father to desert his family and to refuse to return and that the father had made no con- tribution to their support except as ordered in another action. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on the grounds that no such cause of action was recognized at common'law, that no such right had been created by the Illinois legislature, that the action was barred by the "Heart Balm Act,"' and that there was no allegation that the father failed to comply with the support order, and hence that the plaintiffs sustained no damages of which a court may take cognizance. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the judg- ment was reversed and the cause reinstated. Johnson v. Luhman.2 The court recognized that the cause of action was unknown at common law, but said that the law was flexible enough to take account of the transition which has taken place in our conception of family life. It pointed out that the family is no longer under the complete control of the father, as at common law, but has become an institution in which the members have relative rights and re- sponsibilities. As a result, judicial notice will be taken of the interest that chil- dren have in the security of their family life and in their relations with their parents, and the court will recognize their resulting right to seek damages from one who has destroyed the family unit.
    [Show full text]
  • Protecting Marriage Dedicated to the Preservation of the Family 10 Good Reasons to Preserve Meaningful Tort Laws by John Rustin and Jere Z
    Protecting Marriage Dedicated to the Preservation of the Family 10 Good Reasons to Preserve Meaningful Tort Laws By John Rustin and Jere Z. Royall, J.D. he family has long been was to protect marriages from intentional the Act was passed, men retained the right recognized as the interference by third parties and to provide to sue for alienation of affections and building block of consequences when interference did occur. criminal conversation, but now the wife had society, but with divorce Although they are usually used together, a right to sue using the same actions. As the rates at record levels in alienation of affections and criminal American court system began to develop its the United States and conversation are two very distinct causes of own cause of action, previous actions for North Carolina, and the action with different elements and different “abduction” and “enticement” gave way to very definition of historical origins.3 a more modern name—alienation of 7 marriage and family under attack, the Alienation of Affections affections. The tort of alienation of underpinning of the family, namely affections was first recognized in New York The origin of alienation of affections as marriage, continues to crumble.1 in the 1866 case Heermance v. James.8 a cause of action can be traced to the While most citizens would agree that the Removal of the spouse was no longer English cause of action for abduction. In government should provide public policies required, and consortium came to include a these cases, a husband could recover to preserve and protect marriages and more emotional definition that embraced “love, damages for the loss of the “society and families, a move is afoot in the North society, companionship and comfort.”9 services” of his wife.
    [Show full text]
  • Torts -- 1955 Tennessee Survey
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 8 Issue 5 Issue 5 - August 1955 Article 16 8-1955 Torts -- 1955 Tennessee Survey John W. Wade Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation John W. Wade, Torts -- 1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 Vanderbilt Law Review 1131 (1955) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol8/iss5/16 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TORTS-1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY JOHN W. WADE* I. NEGLIGENiCE 1. Breach of Duty to Use Care The decision of whether a defendant is negligent is normally for the jury to decide. This year, as in other years, the Tennessee courts have taken frequent opportunity to emphasize this,' though a directed verdict is proper when the jury could reasonably reach only a single re- 2 sult. The negligence issue is submitted to the jury in terms of the usual standard-whether the defendant acted as a reasonable prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. 3 At times some of the circumstances may be more specifically adverted to in the instructions. Thus, under the "emergency", or "sudden peril doctrine," specific reference is made to the emergency and the jury may be told that "he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation."4 The only cases raising this matter during the Survey period did so for the purpose of emphasizing the limitation on the "doctrine" to the effect that it is inapplicable when the defendant creates the emergency by his own negligence.5 * Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
    [Show full text]