Study on EU Support to Justice and Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean

Study on EU Support to Justice and Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean Final Report / November 2013 This study was prepared by Robert Muggah, Victoria Walker, Ilona Szabo and Antoine Hanin. This study was financed by the European Union. The views expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission, ISSAT1 or any of ISSAT’s other Governing Board members. 1 The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) is an integral part of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). It was created in 2008 to provide a standing capacity for its members to reinforce them in the support they provide to countries undergoing justice and security sector reform processes. More details can be found at http://issat.dcaf.ch Study on EU Support to Justice and Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean Final Report – November 2013 Executive Summary Many Latin America and Caribbean countries face a dilemma in the twenty first century. On the one side are promising signs of democratic consolidation and steady economic growth. On the other side are some of the highest rates of criminal violence and socio-economic inequality in the world. The failure to prevent and reduce organised and street crime, injustice and impunity is in some societies deterring and disabling development, particularly among countries in the Caribbean, the northern triangle of Central America and some parts of South America. Governments across the region have adopted strategies ranging from heavy-fisted policing and incarceration to investments in primary and secondary prevention. International cooperation from the European Union (EU) and other multilateral and bilateral donors has also involved investments in the policing, justice and penal sectors over the past decades, but also growing support in harm reduction policies, programmes for at-risk youth, and observatories to monitor trends in violence and victimization. But the results of these efforts have been mixed. The EU is preparing its support to justice and security sector reform (JSSR) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for the next financial framework (2014-2020). The EU’s adoption of a “differentiated strategy” entails an overall reduction and refocusing of bilateral aid, including JSSR assistance, on the poorest and most violence-prone regions and states in the Caribbean, Central America and selected countries in the Andean region and South America.2 It also means targeting assistance in a smarter way that disrupts transnational, regional and sub-regional criminal networks. In this way, the emphasis will increasingly be directed toward supporting regional priorities and institutional mechanisms rather than the outright provision of aid. It is important to note that this strategy is occurring at a time when the EU is adjusting its physical footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean and re-organising the scope and scale of its activities. 2 Countries receiving bilateral assistance in 2013 include Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. Meanwhile, those countries no longer receiving bilateral assistance include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay. Even so, countries that do not receive bilateral assistance will still be eligible to participate in regional activities. 1 Commissioned by the European Commission, this assessment considers past experiences, strategic priorities, and practical options for EU engagement, predominantly from a regional perspective. Conducted between December 2012 and June 2013, the study entailed a comprehensive review of primary and secondary documentation. It also consisted of missions to twelve countries involving hundreds of interviews with national and regional counterparts in foreign affairs, police, justice, penal sectors, oversight bodies, ombudsmen and human rights defenders, EU Delegations (EUDs) and Member States (MS), international agencies, non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and wider civil society and private sector representatives.3 A focus was on defining regional and national threats, needs and capabilities in the security and justice sectors. The parameters of JSSR are drawn from established international principles, capturing EU policy frameworks and wider best practice in the sector. Due to a parallel study on border cooperation undertaken during the period of this assessment, the present report does not address Integrated Border Management in any detail. While a relatively new area of practice for the EU, the assessment detects evidence of bilateral and multilateral support for justice and security sector reform stretching back to the 1980s and 1990s. The United States (US) is by far the largest foreign contributor, and, together with the EU, has devoted some 20 billion USD to strengthening institutions and building capacity. 4 Between 2007 and 2013, the European Commission committed some 366 million euros5 through bilateral, sub-regional, regional and trans-regional programmes. EU MS such as Spain, Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK) and others feature dense networks of cooperation, including exchanges of personnel, equipment and know-how. International organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and United Nations (UN) agencies such as the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UN Development Programme (UNDP) have also committed significant resources to security and justice priorities under the rubric of both JSSR and, more commonly, “citizen security”. The key “regional threats” identified by regional and national counterparts are related to drug production, trafficking, and consumption, transnational cartels and gangs, human and arms smuggling, money laundering and cyber-crime. Additional issues such as timber and mineral extraction were also noted, particularly in Brazil, Colombia and Peru, but not thoroughly addressed in the present report owing to space constraints. Additional domestic threats, not least homicidal violence and victimisation, kidnapping and extortion, police and military misconduct and human rights abuses and corruption were also routinely singled out. These were 3 The assessment team undertook field visits to 12 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in the US. These included visits to EU regional delegations for Central America (Nicaragua), the Caribbean (Guyana), the Andean region (Lima) and a series of distance interviews with the South American office (Uruguay). It also included specific 3-5 day visits to Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and Washington D.C. 4 See UNDP (forthcoming) UNDP Human Development Report for Latin America. New York: UNDP. 5 See EC Database (CRIS) and ISSAT analysis. 2 compounded by the frequent general lack of confidence among citizens in the capacities of state institutions to provide credible security and justice. Respondents regularly noted the poor state of police professional skills, weak criminal justice systems, limited witness protection facilities and forensic capacities, and extensive overcrowding in prisons and jails. Additional challenges include varying levels of political will to engage in security and justice sector reform processes across the region and the high levels of heterogeneity in capability across countries. Importantly, many respondents also noted the emergence of important public security innovations, many of them described as citizen security, some of which have generated promising improvements in safety. What is more, the shift in tone on regional drug policy is also generating a debate on the merits of prevention and together with policies and programmes that better balance supply-side reduction priorities with demand and harm reduction. Recommendations The assessment was designed to assess primarily Latin America and the Caribbean´s regional priorities and capacities in relation to JSSR, although it is impossible to do this without also taking into account national aspects. Indeed, regional programs and institutions were often singled out as suffering from acute weaknesses as compared to national initiatives that were widely regarded as having registered greater impact. Although the present study focuses predominantly on issuing regional recommendations, it nonetheless anchors these in relation to national priorities and capacities. This is of course aligned with accepted norms associated with ensuring alignment and ownership in development cooperation more generally. The recommendations also acknowledge the EU’s added value as a supranational body, the s continuity of support it can bring through longer-term engagement, and the diverse array of different aid modalities and instruments available. In addition, the twelve field mission reports provided to Brussels and the EU Delegations (EUDs) offer more in-depth information that may be useful for sub-regional or national-level programming, though are not included in this final report. The recommendations are divided into four areas: general principles, regional entry- points, national priorities and future horizons. General principles Consider re-framing regional and national investments in JSSR as “citizen security”: the citizen security concept is widely accepted and understood across Latin America and the Caribbean. While different organisations and countries operationalise citizen security

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