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Home , Irish Rebellion of 1641, Irish Rebellion of 1798

Commission on the Defence Forces Public Consultation Response Template

1. Introduction. “At the end of the Civil War in 1922 the army had a strength of 55,000 men…(After steady reductions, in 1925) the government set a limit of 10,000 men… all the government was prepared to fund was a small, docile infantry army, just sufficient in size to cowe the republican movement.”1 I suggest that the only change since then is that the Defence Forces are also required to maintain an overseas presence so as to support our diplomatic posture, e.g. our current membership of the UN Security Council. The reductions in the 1920s and 1930s took place through “the growing supremacy of the civilian side of defence over the military…The civilian hegemony (of the Department of Defence) was achieved primarily through financial controls, assisted by continuity: in the first thirty-five years of the state’s existence there were a dozen Chiefs of Staff, but just two secretaries of defence.”2 This dominance has bedevilled the Defence Forces ever since. In 1990 the Gleeson Commission reported that “the centralised bureaucracy and the slow processing of decisions through extended chains of command create a sense of powerlessness and disillusion among military personnel, resulting in lower morale and widespread feelings of frustration.”3

1.1. To attempt a review of the Defence Forces without considering the governance provided by the Department of Defence, therefore, appears to me to be a fruitless exercise and is like participating in a performance of Hamlet without the prince. Nevertheless, despite the restricted Terms of Reference of this Commission, the choice of deciding whether to make a submission is to either not do so, or to attempt to make the best of a bad situation; and given that that is the spirit in which so many tasks are undertaken in the Defence Forces, I have put forward the following suggestions.

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2. Capabilities – I would like to address the issues of future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in terms of professional military education and training, that will prepare and support the Defence Forces for future operations.

2.1 On 28th February 2021, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, wrote in his blog4:

“Moving forward on European defence…(there is a) need for Europeans to develop a common strategic culture: if we don’t share the same perspective on what the threats and challenges are, we will not agree on what to do about them…

“The Strategic Compass: a collective answer to a new strategic environment… it is critical that we come together and decide what our objectives and ambitions are for the next 5 to 10 years;… the threat analysis presented last November… paints a bleak picture of the security and defence challenges we face namely growing geopolitical competition and pressure on the multilateral system; destabilisation of our regional environment; as well as increasingly sophisticated hybrid and transnational threats targeting the EU directly.

1 O’Halpin, Prof. Eunan, “Defending ”, Oxford University Press (1999) p. 86 2 Ibid., p. 87 3 Report of the Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence Forces (the Gleeson Report) (, 1990) p. 21. 4 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/93928/moving-forward-european- defence_en

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“The four dimensions of the Strategic Compass are:

“First, we need to make our ongoing engagement as effective as possible… We need to improve force generation… we lack the means to do our job… Second, we should enhance our resilience to prevent and respond to changing security threats and challenges… in particular cyber, the high seas and space… Third, we need the necessary civilian and military capabilities (emphasis mine). Further deepening European defence cooperation remains the only way to make our defence sector more efficient …We have made good progress over the last years, in particular through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Fourth, we should step up cooperation with partners bilaterally and with international organisations…

He summarised the issue as follows: “Keeping the momentum on EU security and defence… The European Union External Service and the EU military staff will continue to take work forward (emphasis mine).

2.2 It is obvious from this that the fundamental work of taking EU security and defence forward is being undertaken by civilian and military colleagues working together. This seems to be a sine qua non concept for planning at the EU level. Ireland, however, insists on maintaining a separation of effort that is both ineffective and counterproductive. I hope that this Commission on Defence can address this problem.

2.3 I would like to propose the following suggestions which if implemented would help towards solving our problems in the areas of both “integrated capability development” and “professional military education and training”. Both joint participation on courses and joint involvement on exercises focus on the Defence Forces and its integration with external agencies to enhance its development.

2.4 Many, if not most, international military organisations involve civil servants from Departments such as Defence and Foreign Affairs in their education and training. (I am sure that the international members of the Commission will agree). In the UK, for example, officers will serve on secondment in civil service roles and civil servants routinely undertake leadership courses run by the military.5 The former (joint involvement on exercises) has been done in the past in Ireland and I specifically remember our participation in the Viking series of Peace Support exercises run by the Nordic countries. From a military point of view, these exercises were beneficial (I was involved in one in particular, in which the same officers and senior NCOs from Sweden and Ireland who trained together would subsequently deploy on a UN Mission to Liberia; they all stated afterwards how worthwhile the exercise had been to them). These exercises, while focused on military capabilities, also had a large civilian input; I recall a civil servant from the Department of Foreign Affairs who participated in a Civil/Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Cell saying afterwards how beneficial he found the exercise. However, on the way to a planning meeting for the same exercise, I asked the civil servant from the Department of Defence who accompanied me as to what DoD’s interest would be in our participation; she answered “cost”.

2.5 There is scope therefore, for increased participation by civilian servants in military training. I am sure that the international members of the Commission will corroborate this. One area that would facilitate this, at virtually no cost, with wide-ranging benefits, would be civilian participation in military professional courses.

5 “The ‘cold war’ between the Irish military and the civilians in charge of them”, Irish Times, 20 Feb 2021

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2.6 The Military College runs several career courses for officers. Two of these, the Junior and Senior Command and Staff courses, would be particularly suitable for participation by civil servants from Departments such as Defence and Foreign Affairs. The latter course offers a Master’s degree which is cost free to students. Benefits which would accrue from civilian participation would include a deeper appreciation from both military and civilian perspectives of each other’s modes of operation: this would benefit both “sides” in understanding each other’s points of view and subsequently working more productively together both in Ireland and overseas. Indeed, the Department of Defence were invited to participate some years ago but responded saying that they were too busy and that they had no one to spare given their low numbers of personnel. As their numbers have increased, they and other Departments should be invited again to send one or two students to participate (and the persons selected could be awarded a Master’s degree at no cost to them).

2.7 If Civil servants and military personnel trained together, both on exercises and on courses, it would promote understanding and trust between both groups; this would be invaluable in their joint work in the future on issues such as the Strategic Compass.

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3. Structures – In this Section, I wish to address the Army’s brigade structure), and the issue of the Reserve.

3.1 Irish history shows that conflict occurs every two generations or so (every 40 – 60 years). So, there have been wars, , rebellions, uprisings, insurrections and “troubles” since Cromwell (and many before that, back to the Vikings):

1641–42 Part of the Eleven Years' War

1642–49 Confederate War Part of the Eleven Years' War

1649–53 Cromwellian conquest of Ireland Part of the Eleven Years' War

1689–91 Williamite–Jacobite War Part of the War of the Grand Alliance

1760 French troops landed in , and captured the town and its castle. The French held out for five days before returning returning to France.

1798

1831-36

1848 Young Irelander Rebellion

1867

1870-93

1916 Part of the Irish period

1919-22 Irish War of Independence Part of the Irish revolutionary period

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1922-23 Part of the Irish revolutionary period

1942-44 Northern Campaign Irish republican campaign against

1956-62 Border Campaign Irish republican campaign against Northern Ireland

1968-98 The “Troubles”

3.2 It is undeniable that there is a pattern to our history; and to ignore this pattern would be unwise. “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”6 The obvious lesson is that it is more likely than not that conflict could occur again in Ireland, at some time in the not-too- distant future. To fail to prepare to deal with conflict is irresponsible. How might such conflict happen?

• During the Brexit negotiations and the discussions about maintenance of a “soft” border on the island of Ireland an awareness emerged of the possibility or even likelihood of violence occurring if a hard border was reimposed between Norther Ireland and the Republic;

• “DUP declares ‘’ on Northern Ireland protocol” was a headline in “The Irish Times” on the 28th February 2021. “DUP Brexit spokesman Sammy Wilson said …’We will fight guerrilla warfare against this, until the big battle opportunity comes’ “7

• Coincidentally, there have been increasing calls for a Border Poll which is provided for under the (Section 1, Schedule 1). The clamour for such a Poll has been increasing and it is likely that such a Poll may take place in the next ten to fifteen years. Whatever the result of a Border Poll will be, one side or the other will be seriously disappointed and it is entirely likely that the extremists on the losing side could resort to violence.

3.3 During the “Troubles”, the British deployed more than 40,000 security forces (13,000 police and 27,500 military)8 to try and keep the peace to a level which British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling referred to “an acceptable level of violence”.9 How would Irish security forces manage (current strength c. 15,000 gardaí,10 and some 8,500 Military personnel11) to secure the whole island?

3.4 I am not proposing a large augmentation of the regular Defence Forces: the meagre pay rates presently applying would mitigate against that. However, it seems to me that there are two actions that should take place without delay:

6 George Santayana (1905) Reason in Common Sense, p. 284, volume 1 of The Life of Reason 7 Irish Times article by Brian Hutton, 28 February 2021. 8 13,000 RUC, 21,000 British Soldiers, 6,500 UDR Total: Circa 40,500 (Wikipedia: ”Operation Banner” 9 McMahon, Sean; O'Donoghue, Jo (2006). "Acceptable level (of violence)". In McMahon, Sean; O'Donoghue, Jo (eds.). Brewer's Dictionary of Irish Phrase & Fable. Chambers Harrap Publishers. 10 Dept of Justice Figures 11 www..ie › 17 Nov 2020 — The military authorities have advised that on 30 September 2020, the strength of the Permanent Defence Force was 8,529 personnel, comprising 6,878 Army personnel, 752 Air Corps personnel and 899 Naval Service personnel.

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• First. A return to the three-brigade structure. The present two- brigade experiment has not worked and results in such anomalies as troops in Galway having their brigade HQ 120 miles away in rather than 50 miles from Athlone; and the Battalion in Donegal reporting to a HQ more than 120 miles away in Dublin. This structure is unwieldy, inefficient and costly. I recommend a structure similar to that which was abandoned in 2012. The new structure might be:

• 1 (Southern) Brigade (Cork) composed basically of: o 4 Inf. Bn. (Cork) o 12 Inf. Bn. (Limerick) o 30 Inf. Bn. ()

• 2 (Eastern) Brigade (Dublin) composed basically of: o 7 Inf. Bn. (Dublin) o 27 Inf. Bn. () o 3 Inf. Bn. ()

• 4 (Western) Brigade (Athlone) composed basically of: o 1 Inf. Bn. (Galway) o 6 Inf. Bn. (Athlone) o 28 Inf. Bn. (Donegal)

• Second. The expansion of a realistic Reserve Force which can be used to augment the Regulars if required. Reservists should be trained to a high enough standard to allow them to serve overseas, as is normal in other countries. The structure outlined above allows for Reserve companies to be attached to Regular Battalions which would permit rapid augmentation if required.

3.5 If these courses of action were adopted, the Army would be in a much better position to be quickly augmented if required; and the reinvigorating of the Reserve force would give increased benefits such as extra skills to the DF as a whole.

3.6 Si vis pacem, para bellum.

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4. Conclusion. Professor O’Halpin writes that the Defence White Paper of 2000 “was prepared almost entirely without consultation with the general staff. Clothed in the language of modern public service management, it was in practice a straightforward essay in military emasculation…it sought to transfer ultimate responsibility for advice on defence policy from the chief of staff to the civilian head of the department, a proposal made doubly bizarre by that department’s historic aversion to the very idea that policy formed any part of its brief.”12 This was copperfastened in 2015: “The Department of Defence continues to provide leadership on defence policy”13 The White Paper Update 2019 and National Risk Assessment 2019 continued in this vein. I cannot change this status quo but I strongly urge within the context of this Commission on Defence that my suggestions, in particular that of joint training and education between the Defence Forces and the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs, are taken into consideration. Such joint effort can only be of great benefit to Ireland’s defence capabilities for the future.

12 O’Halpin, Prof. Eunan. Ibid., Addendum to Paperback Edition, p. 353. 13 White Paper on Defence, 2015.

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