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SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Philosophy’s Polis: The Place of Europe in Husserl’s Critique of Reason A Dissertation Presented by Kenneth Knies to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University May 2010 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Kenneth Knies We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Donn Welton – Dissertation Advisor Professor, Philosophy Department Edward Casey – Chairperson of Defense Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Department Peter Manchester – Internal Reader Associate Professor, Philosophy Department James Dodd – External Reader Associate Professor of Philosophy, The New School John J. Drummond – External Reader Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Lawrence Martin Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Philosophy’s Polis: The Place of Europe in Husserl’s Critique of Reason By Kenneth Knies Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2010 This dissertation examines the “political” philosophy of Edmund Husserl through a critique of the concept upon which it depends: Europe or The West. Although this concept comes to play a decisive role in Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole, he never adequately clarifies its meaning or accounts for the significance it assumes in his final attempted treatise: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology . Because the concept “Europe” connects the cognitive aims of philosophy and science with the defining aspirations of a single historically specified humanity, it has received due attention in ideologically charged discussions of Eurocentrism. In this context, philosophical questions as to why an epistemologically oriented reflection should have recourse to such a concept, and what its content might be, are too often forgotten. I take these questions up, showing that the concept is not a product of Husserl’s historical circumstances, but rather functions in a fundamental reflection on the possibility of philosophical vocation as such. To understand what that function is, I situate Husserl’s Europe within the problematic of political philosophy as presented in Plato’s Republic , namely, whether and how philosophy might become a vocation of the polis. By rooting the possibility of Europe in the paradoxical conditions Socrates identifies for the existence of a philosophical polis, I provide a critical perspective on the issue that anchors it in the history of philosophy and puts challenging questions to Husserl’s final conception of phenomenology. iii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Part 1: Europe as the Final Presupposition of Phenomenological Method 10 Chapter 1: The Emergence of the Europe Problematic in Husserl’s Thought Section 1: Clarification of Consciousness as Philosophy’s Field of Work 11 Section 2: The Fundamental Character of the Europe Problematic 29 Section 3: Dissociation of Europe from the Problems of Relativism 40 Chapter 2: The Problematic of Political Philosophy in Plato’s Republic Section 1: Philosophy in its Vocational Horizon 48 Section 2: Philosophy as Techne in the Strict Sense 53 Section 3: The Problem of Philosophy’s Serviceability and Power 67 Section 4: The Discovery of Philosophy’s Serviceability and Power 74 Section 5: Philosophy’s Rule 82 Chapter 3: Europe as the Political Boundary of Husserl’s Critique of Reason Section 1: The Heart of Husserl’s Crisis Concept 97 Section 2: Determination of Crisis as an Essentially European Phenomenon 113 Section 3: Definition of the Crisis of Science as the Sickness of European Life 116 Section 4: Rededication and its Presuppositions 127 Section 5: The Subject of the Crisis 137 Part 2: The Conditions of European Existence 143 Introduction to the Categories of European Existence 144 Chapter 4: Europe’s Genesis: Denationalization Section 1: The Geo-Political Genesis of Philosophy 157 Section 2: Methodological Concerns 158 Section 3: The Nation as the House of Doxa 163 Section 4: Mythical Knowledge as Cosmic National World-View 171 Section 5: International Curiosity and the Breakthrough of Philosophy 176 Section 6: The Possibility of “Greece” 180 Chapter 5: Europe’s History: Renaissance Section 1: Europe’s Incorporation of its Ancient Origin 186 Section 2: Europe is not within History 192 Section 3: The Disappearance of Europe into History 198 Chapter 6: The Relation of Europe to its Others: Europeanization Section 1: Europe’s Global Position and its Tendency to Spread 210 Section 2: Europeanization and Violence 215 Section 3: The Europeanizing Attitude 222 Section 4: The Idea of Post-European Science 230 Conclusion 236 List of References 238 iv Introduction : Edmund Husserl’s final attempted treatise, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis ), raises several questions about the nature of the phenomenological project as a whole. In this text, a form of inquiry never before accorded methodological priority takes over the role of introducing phenomenology as philosophy. It is now from the perspective of a teleological-historical reflection on science and its crisis that we first arrive at transcendental subjectivity, the proper field of phenomenological research. On the basis of this reflection, phenomenology discovers that it is more than a self-grounding method of theoretical investigation, and takes on its full meaning as an “unavoidable” transformation of the modern philosophical project. Manuscripts composed by Husserl during the writing of the Crisis make it clear that he regarded its new approach to phenomenology as inherently more radical and comprehensive than that of previous texts. The concepts that function methodologically in the new approach of the Crisis thus take on a privileged importance. They concern ultimate phenomenological beginnings and horizons of self-understanding. The Crisis poses immense interpretive difficulties, however, because it is more a demonstration of this new approach to phenomenology than its clarification. For better or worse, the work Husserl intended as the definitive statement of phenomenological philosophy appears to us as a bold venture into uncharted territory. A rich tradition of interpretation has tried to come to terms with the questions to which the novel conceptions of the Crisis give rise. How can a philosophy rooted in the return to the cogito also require a historical introduction? Can Husserl discover a telos inborn in this history without engaging in ungrounded speculation? What exactly is meant by a “crisis of science,” and does Husserl really expect phenomenology to resolve it? Do the concepts of responsibility, faith and spiritual health appealed to in connection with the crisis-problematic imply an existential, ethical or even religious grounding of the scientific enterprise? The most thoroughgoing attempts to confront these questions have not shied away from acknowledging the difficulties they pose for the integrity of Husserl’s program as a whole. The Crisis is not only the vanguard of Husserlian phenomenology, but has also become a valuable resource for its self-critique. Perhaps the most important and mysterious concept of Husserl’s Crisis is “Europe.” The concept is especially important because it controls every methodological aspect of Husserl’s reflection. The knowledge-productions subject to critique are “European sciences,” the historical-teleological reflections concern “European history,” the critical situation of the present decides the fate of “European existence,” and we, who are called to take responsibility for the crisis, are addressed as “Europeans” reflecting on “our Europe.” Husserl even anticipates that the outcome of his final treatise will positively decide “whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning…” 1 The concept is especially mysterious 1 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy . Trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970)[Hereafter Crisis], p. 16. 1 because it controls the reflection, as it were, by force rather than by reason. Despite the encompassing role of Europe in his final treatise, Husserl never carries out a satisfying reflection on the legitimacy of this concept and the essential position that it comes to occupy. Was it somehow obvious to Husserl that Europe, by which he means the civilizational horizon that we would today call “the West,” should be the birthplace, crucible, and frontier of theoretical reason? With a few notable exceptions, scholarship has tended to treat Husserl’s Europe as a somewhat suspicious idea, most likely the product of an ideological Eurocentrism, the disavowal of which would not touch the core of Husserlian phenomenology itself. This is not our position. Husserl’s Europe is neither a simple mistake that might be rectified through a correct understanding of phenomenological concepts, nor is it a symptomatic expression of his time. The aversion to Eurocentrism that has motivated