Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and the Hazon Ish,Book Announcement
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Response to Criticism Part 4; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and the Hazon Ish Response to Criticism Part 4; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and the Hazon Ish Marc B. Shapiro Continued from here. 1. In Limits,p. 14 n. 55, I write I should call attention to a significant philosophical and halakhic point which appears to have gone unnoticed. The Vilna Gaon (R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman (1720-97) apparently believed that the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. According to him, one who believes in God’s existence and unity, despite his other sins, is regarded as a Jew in good standing and he is thus able to be included in a minyan (quorum for public prayer). None of the numerous discussions regarding whether a Sabbath violator maybe in included in a minyan seems to have taken note of the Gaon’s comment, which appears in his commentary on Tikunei Zohar, 42a. Grossman writes: Apparently, concludes Shapiro, since the Gaon cites only idolatry as invalidating prayer and does not cite the rest of the Thirteen Principles, he is disputing Rambam’s classification of the others as binding fundamentals. However, this source has no bearing on the Principles. The Gaon’s comment refers to counting one for a minyan and to having one’s prayer accepted by God. He is clearly not referring to the Principles, since [in his commentary to Tikunei Zohar] he includes in the metaphor of the scorpion the sin of consorting with gentile women, which is unrelated to any Principle. (p. 48) The first thing to note is that I never said that the Vilna Gaon disputed “the Rambam’s classification of the others [other Principles] as binding fundamentals.” Of course the Gaon held that people must believe that there is prophecy, that God gave the Torah, that there will be a Messiah, etc. But that is not what I am referring to when I say that for the Gaon the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. As I explain, for the Rambam the Thirteen Principles are special in that if you deny any of them you are to be regarded as having removed yourself from the Jewish people. When the Gaon makes the fascinating comment that belief in the First and Second Principles are enough to be regarded as part of the Jewish people, thus enabling one to be counted in a minyan, this means that as far as he is concerned (in this passage at least), only these beliefs qualify as Principles in the absolute sense that denial of them removes you halakhically from the Jewish people. If I were writing the book today, I would say that the Gaon focuses on three Principles, since he includes belief in the unity of God and an affirmation of God’s corporeality (Principle no. 3) certainly violates God’s unity. I have to say, however, that while the Gaon’s comment is of great importance when it comes to the issue of Sabbath violation, I am no longer sure about the correctness of my larger point. It could just as well be that when the Gaon derives from the passage in Tikunei Zohar that if you believe in God and His unity, despite your other sins, you are still a Jew in good standing, it does not necessarily mean that these are the only true Principles. It could be that he is merely explicating the meaning of the passage in Tikunei Zohar, which relates to God, but that if it was a different passage he could have spoken about different principles, for example, as long as you believe in the Messiah and the resurrection even if you sin you are still a Jew in good standing. Here is some of what the Gaon writes: כ”ז שמאמין באחדותו ית’ אפי’ עובר כמה עבירות אינו מומר לכל התורה ואעפ”י שחטא ישראל הוא ומצטרף למנין כמ”ש עבריין כו’ ונכלל תפלתו בכלל ישראל . אבל עקרב הוא המודה בעבודת כוכבים ומשתחוה לאל אחר וכן בבת אל נכר אז הקוץ ח”ו מסתלק מצדו וזהו פירוד הגמור וז”ש ואיהו פוסק וברח כו’ ר”ל יוסף במדרגתו ומסתלק הקב”ה ממנו כלל וכלל ואין תפלתו עולה כלל In the Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam says that if you believe that God has a physical form you are a heretic, and Rabad famously defends those who did not know any better. According to Rabad, although these people are wrong they are certainly not heretics because of their mistake. Regarding this dispute there is R. Hayyim Soloveitchik’s famous statement in defense of the Rambam’s position that “one who is nebech an epikores is still an epikores.”[1] In Limits I referred to the Hazon Ish’s opinion that the Rambam actually agrees with Rabad when dealing with a heretic who does not know any better. I further note, in agreement with R. Hayyim, that the Hazon Ish’s suggestion cannot be correct, and the Rambam, Guide 1:36, specifically rejects the Hazon Ish’s point. In fact, R. Kafih thinks that the Rambam saw Rabad’s criticism of what he wrote in the Mishneh Torah, and the end of Guide 1:36 was written in response to Rabad and is the Rambam’s defense of his position that faulty education or simply ignorance is no defense when it comes to belief in God’s corporeality.[2] In truth, even if we did not have this chapter of the Guide, the Hazon Ish’s position cannot be sustained, as it is in opposition to the Rambam’s entire conception of immortality which is a natural process. Thus, there is no room to raise questions about “fairness” or why does God not judge an ignorant person mercifully and grant him a share the World to Come if through no fault of his own he believes that God has a physical form. Grossman, on the other hand (p. 49), claims that a close reading of the Guide supports the Hazon Ish’s position that someone who does not know any better, and who has no one to teach him, is not to be regarded as a heretic. Suffice it to say all scholars of the philosophy of the Rambam agree with R. Hayyim in this matter. Furthermore, the issue is not whether we regard someone as a heretic or not. There could be societal reasons that determine whether or not one is to be regarded as such. The dispute between the Rambam and Rabad is regarding someone who doesn’t know any better and denies a principle of faith, does such a person have a share in the World to Come? It is clear, as Rabad recognized, that according to the Rambam the answer is no. That is why I wrote that when the Hazon Ish explained the Rambam to really be agreeing with Rabad—that an unwitting heretic has a share in the World to Come—that this approach should be seen as in opposition to the Rambam’s position, even though the Hazon Ish was offering his approach as aninterpretation of the Rambam.[3] Grossman then writes (p. 49 n. 65): “In another example of the same hubris towards a giant of Torah scholarship, Shapiro, on p. 37, asserts that the Chazon Ish’s acceptance of Torah She- be’al Peh as having Divine authority (Iggeros 1:16 [should be 15]) is disputing Rambam. Chazon Ish there is merely emphasizing Rambam’s Eighth Principle, but Shapiro claims that Chazon Ish actually ‘added a new dogma.’” The reader who turns to my book, p. 37, will find that contrary to what Grossman states, I do not mention anything about Torah she-be’al peh. The issue I was concerned with is the authority of Aggadah. In one of his most often quoted letters (Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, 1:15), the Hazon Ish writes that all aggadot have their origin in the sages’ prophetic power, and one who denies this is a heretic. משרשי האמונה שכל הנאמר בגמ’ בין במשנה ובין בגמ’ בין בהלכה ובין באגדה, הם הם הדברים שנתגלו לנו ע”י כח נבואי שהוא כח נשיקה של השכל הנאצל, עם השכל המורכב בגוף . נרתעים אנחנו לשמוע הטלת ספק בדברי חז”ל בין בהלכה בין באגדה, כשמועה של גידוף ר”ל, והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר בדברי חז”ל, ושחיטתו נבילה, ופסול לעדות, ועוד, ולכן נגעו דבריך בלבי Incidentally, in the published version of the letter it has והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר כדברי חז”ל Here is the section of the actual letter of the Hazon Ish .ככופר בדברי חז”ל where you can see that it should read Searching on Otzar haChochma, I see that almost everyone who cites this passage corrects the printing error. It is with regard to this statement about aggadah, and this statement alone, that I spoke of a new dogma—which can perhaps already be seen in the Maharal if not earlier—that is not held by the Rambam who, together with the entire geonic and medieval Sephardic rabbinic tradition, did not have such a view about the binding nature of all aggadot. The reader of Grossman’s article who does not examine my book would think that I claimed that the Rambam did not believe that Torah she- be’al Peh has divine authority. Yet the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish is over a different matter, namely, what is included in Torah she-be’al Peh. In fact, this is not really a dispute between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish, but a dispute between two traditions regarding how to understand Aggadah.