DOCSLIB.ORG

IRN Population Movement Snapshot Dec 2020

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
IRN Population Movement Snapshot Dec 2020 AFGHAN POPULATION MOVEMENT SNAPSHOT December 2020 Since the 1979 Soviet invasion and the subsequent waves of violence that have rocked Afghanistan, millions of Afghans have fled the country, seeking safety elsewhere. The Islamic Republic of Iran boasts 5,894 km of borders. Most of it, including the 921 km that are shared with Afghanistan, are porous and located in remote areas. According to the Government of Iran, some 2000-2500 Afghans arrive in Iran every day. UNHCR Iran does not have access to border points and thus is unable to independently monitor arrivals or returns of Afghans. Afghans who currently reside in Afghanistan have dierent statuses: some are refugees (Amayesh card holders), other are Afghans who posses a national passport, while other are undocumented. These populations move across borders in various ways. 951,000 1,5-2 M 450,000 947 Amayesh Card Holders (Afghan refugees1) undocumented Afghans passport holders voluntarily repatriated in 2020 In 2001, the Government of Iran issues Amayesh Undocumented is an umbrella term used to The Comprehensive Regularisation Plan (CRP) In March 2020, UNHCR suspended its VolRep cards to regularize the stay of Afghan Refugees describe various groups of foreign nationals introduced in 2010 allowed undocumented activities as a preventive measure to reduce in the country as refugees. Each year, refugees residing in Iran including: those with an invalid Afghans to register with the government of Iran, exposure of refugees, host communities and sta have to renew their Amayesh cards. However, passport and invalid Iranian visa; those who lost and receive an Afghan passport and a visa to COVID-19. In May, UNHCR partially resumed more recently arrived Afghans do not receive an their Amayesh status for dierent reasons; those ("family passport"). The visas of those participat- VolRep activities from its Field Unit in Dogharoun, Amayesh card. The Government of Iran is in who hold a type of document, for example ing in the CRP have been extended at dierent in keeping with health and security measures, to charge of refugee status determination and Tazkara, but no legal residence for Iran; and intervals since 2012, often following high level assist refugees who have opted to return to UNHCR can advocate for a handful of refugees those who are not in possession of any type of visits by the government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan. to receive amayesh cards each year. document. REFUGEE POPULATION PER PROVINCE REPATRIATED BY LOCATION IN IRAN & INTENDED DESTINATION IN AFGHANISTAN AZERBAIJAN ARMENIA West Circle size is proportional to the Azerbaijan Ardabil number of refugees by province Ardabil East Golestan North East TURKEY Azerbaijan Khorasan Azerbaijan North West TURKMENISTAN Takhar Gilan Mazandaran Khorasan Jawzjan Azerbaijan 150,000 Gilan Golestan Balkh Kunduz Badakhshan Zanjan Razavi Zanjan Qazvin 50,000 Razavi Tehran and Khorasan Qazvin Mazandaran 10,000 Khorasan Samangan Kurdistan Alborz Semnan Semnan Panjsher Kurdistan Alborz Faryab Baghlan Khorasan Tehran Hamadan Qom KapisaNuristan provinces ISLAMIC Sar-e-Pul BamyanParwan Kermanshah Hamadan Hirat Badghis Kunar Markazi Laghman Lorestan Kermanshah REPUBLIC Kabul Qom Daykundi Nangarhar Isfahan Markazi Isfahan OF IRAN Ghor IRAQ South Khorasan WaLogarrdak Ilam AFGHANISTAN Yazd Lorestan AFGHANISTAN Paktya Chaharmahal South Khost Khuzestan Ilam Uruzgan and Bakhtiari Khorasan Ghazni Chaharmahal Farah Zabul Paktika Voluntary repatriated Kohgiluyeh and Bakhtiari Yazd by location in Iran and Boyer-Ahmad Kerman Kandahar Khuzestan 1 Fars Kohgiluyeh and Nimroz KUWAIT *The map reflects Afghan Boyer-Ahmad 10 Kerman PAKISTAN refugees as of 2015 and Iraqi Hilmand Bushehr 100 refugees as of 2013 Hormozgan Sistan and Baluchestan Disclaimer: the boundaries Bushehr Fars Intended return location SAUDI ARABIA and names shown and the Sistan and BAHRAIN in Afghanistan designations used on the map Hormozgan Baluchestan OMAN 1 do not imply ocial QATAR 10 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 100 1 (Afghan "prima facie" refugees. There has not been a prima facie decision or statement by the GIRI on prima facie recognition fro this group. Technically Amayesh is a "temporary residency permit" and it does not specifically aord refugee status. AFGHAN POPULATION MOVEMENT SNAPSHOT INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN ONWARD MOVEMENT OF AFGHANS In 2020, displacement due to ongoing conflict and natural disasters is continuing to drive humanitarian From January to November 2020, Afghans were the second most common citizenship to claim asylum in needs in Afghanistan. Almost 286,000 people have left their homes this year due to fighting. Many of Europe (28,145 first-time claims), after Syrians (43,135 first-time claims). In October 2020, 54% of Afghan these people remain displaced across the country, as conflict and poverty prevent them from returning to asylum claimants in Europe were granted international protection. Germany received the most claims. their areas of origin. 1% 9% 2,993,000 286,000 3,000,000 Rest of the world IDPs due to conflict as of end of 2019 Afghans displaced internally in 2020 Afghans outside of Afghanistan Europe South-West Asia (mostly Iran and Pakistan) The 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimates 59% of newly displaced Afghans are children This number includes only Afghan refugees and that close to a million people on the move will need under 18 asylum seekers 90% humanitarian assistance by the end of the year. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE BY PROVINCE OF ARRIVAL RETURN OF UNDOCUMENTED AFGHANS FROM IRAN 859,000 UZBEKISTAN Undocumented returnees in 2020 TAJIKISTAN # of returnees, thousands 859 Badakhshan 775 TURKMENISTAN The number of Afghans who have returned to 21 547 Balkh 3.8 19 446 464 480 Afghanistan spontaneously in 2020, without UNHCR Jwzjn. 30 8.7 Takhar Jammu support (approx. 534,000) increased 138% compared to 18 6.5 & 31 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 6.8 Kashmir 2019 (approx. 224,000), presumably due to the Faryab Smngn. Baghlan 0.5 Sar-e-Pul deteriorating financial situation in Iran and the 2.7 Nrstn. # of returnees Badghis Bamyan 1 33 Hirat Prw. 7.5 Spontaneous coronavirus pandemic. 4.4 4.2 Deportation 12 Mdn. Wrd. 31 150,000 1.2 3.5 Ghor Daykundi Ghazn. 100,000 3.4 5.2 1.6 Paktika 50,000 Farah Urz. Zabul 1 3.7 Jan Feb Mar Apr May JulJun Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May JulJun Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May JulJun Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Nimroz Kandahar PAKISTAN 2018 2019 2020 IRAN 15 7.4 2.1 RETURNEES BORDER MONITORING UNHCR AFGHANISTAN Hilmand 83% 89% 67% Number of displaced people INDIA of returnees are undocumented stayed less than a year (thousands) are male Deportee 6 - 10 years Born in Iran Male Spontaneous returnee 1 - 5 years More than 10 years Past six years Monthly trends Female Passport holder Less than 1 year Number of IDPs (thousands) Previous 3-year average VRF holder Past year Reasons of entry to Iran Top reasons of return to Afghanistan 100k In search of employment 90% Reunite with family members in Afghanistan 33% Conflict 9% Fear of COVID-19 13% No employment opportunities in CoPR 12% 675 636 Family visit 5% 50k Other 11% 512 Move to Turkey and/or Europe 2% 470 437 Abuse by police or state authorities 8% Drought 2% 286 High cost of living/ high rent in Iran 4% For medical treatment 2% 0 Denied access to health facilities 3% 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Business 1% Threat of forced quarantine 2% Other less than 0.5% Family gatherings 2% *2018 number also includes people displaced due to drought and other factors Floods less than 0.1% Discrimination by local community 2% Sources: Refugees in Iran - BAFIA (2015); Voluntary Repatriation - UNHCR Iran (Dec 2020); Afghans outside of Afghanistan - UNHCR Refugee Data Finder as of 5 Nov; Internally displaced Afghans due to conflict and violence in 2019 - IDMC; UNHCR Factsheet “Onward Movements of Afghan Refugees and Migrants toward Europe” (Nov 2020); undocumented returnees from Iran from 2018 to Dec 2020 - IOM Afghanistan Return of Undocumented Afghans reports (31 Dec 2020); UNHCR Afghanistan returnee border monitoring - UNHCR Afghanistan (covers the period from 4 June to 21 Sep 2020); internally displaced people in Afghanistan - OCHA Aghanistan “Snapshot of Population Movements (January to October 2020)” as of 19 Nov. The numbers are subject to change as more information becomes available. Updated: 13 January 2021. Contact: Farha Bhoyroo, Communications Officer, [email protected]. .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr
    Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Abbreviated Key Title: Saudi J Humanities Soc Sci ISSN 2415-6256 (Print) | ISSN 2415-6248 (Online) Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Journal homepage: http://scholarsmepub.com/sjhss/ Original Research Article Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr. Gülay Uğur Göksel2 1M.A Student of Political Science and International Relations Program 2Assistant Professor, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey *Corresponding author: Ziaulhaq Rashidi | Received: 04.04.2019 | Accepted: 13.04.2019 | Published: 30.04.2019 DOI:10.21276/sjhss.2019.4.4.9 Abstract In recent times, a number of countries faced major cracks and divisions (religious, ethnical and geographical) with less than a decade war/instability but with regards to over four decades of wars and instabilities, the united and indivisible Afghanistan face researchers and social scientists with valid questions that what is the reason behind this unity and where to seek the roots of Afghan national unity, despite some minor problems and ethnic cracks cannot be ignored?. Most of the available studies on nation building process or Afghan nationalism have covered the nation building efforts from early 20th century and very limited works are available (mostly local narratives) had touched upon the nation building efforts prior to the 20th. This study goes beyond and examine major struggles aimed nation building along with the modernization of state in Afghanistan starting from late 19th century. Reforms predominantly the language (Afghani/Pashtu) and role of shared medium of communication will be deliberated. In addition, we will talk how the formation of strong centralized government empowered the state to initiate social harmony though the demographic and geographic oriented (north-south) resettlement programs in 1880s and how does it contributed to the nation building process.
    [Show full text]
  • Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Department of Anthropology Papers Department of Anthropology 2012 Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies Brian Spooner University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_papers Part of the Anthropological Linguistics and Sociolinguistics Commons, and the Anthropology Commons Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE) Spooner, B. (2012). Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies. In H. Schiffman (Ed.), Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice (pp. 89-117). Leiden, Boston: Brill. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_papers/91 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies Abstract Persian is an important language today in a number of countries of west, south and central Asia. But its status in each is different. In Iran its unique status as the only official or national language continueso t be jealously guarded, even though half—probably more—of the population use a different language (mainly Azari/Azeri Turkish) at home, and on the streets, though not in formal public situations, and not in writing. Attempts to broach this exclusive status of Persian in Iran have increased in recent decades, but are still relatively minor. Persian (called tajiki) is also the official language ofajikistan, T but here it shares that status informally with Russian, while in the west of the country Uzbek is also widely used and in the more isolated eastern part of the country other local Iranian languages are now dominant.
    [Show full text]
  • LESSON 3 India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan G Stan India, Pakistan, and Afghanis
    LESSONLESSON 3 India,India, Pakistan,Pakistan, andand AfghanistanAfghanistan QuickQuick WriteWrite magine this: The year is 1921, and you’re a teenager in school in India. Your land has been Iunder British rule for as long as anyone can remember. You’re starting to hear about independence for India, though, and it sounds like an exciting idea. But what kind of independence? Self-rule within the British Empire? Or complete independence, like what What approach should the Americans got after 1776? British India have taken to independence? Why? India is a vast country—Hindus and Muslims are only two of its mixture of religious and ethnic groups. Could one country possibly be big enough to include everybody? Won’t some groups get lost? Should certain groups be guaranteed a share of seats in Parliament? Maybe two or more smaller countries would make more sense. British India could draw the map so that each territory LearnLearn AboutAbout was pretty clearly Hindu or Muslim and everybody spoke the same language. What do you think is best, • the precolonial history of the Mughals in the Indian and why? subcontinent • the encounter with Europe and the colonial period in the region • the history of the struggle for independence in South Asia • what caused the partition and war between India and Pakistan • how Muslim-Hindu strife affects the politics and economics of South Asia • which groups have struggled for control in Afghanistan and why 176 CHAPTER 2 Asia 75162_C2L3_p176-199_AFJROTC_FINAL.indd 176 11/9/09 1:55 PM The Precolonial History of the Mughals VocabularyVoca bulary in the Indian Subcontinent •Indian subcontinent You read briefl y in the Introduction about the Mughal Empire •aristocrat in the Indian subcontinent.
    [Show full text]
  • Project the Farsi/Persian Communities In
    IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY CAPACITY AND ENGAGEMENT (ICCE) PROJECT THE FARSI/PERSIAN COMMUNITIES IN LONDON A FORUM FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS PRESENTED BY: JOHN HOWARD SOCIETY OF LONDON AND DISTRICT FARSI / PERSIAN • Three countries speak Persian: • Western Persian (Persian, Iranian Persian, or Farsi) is spoken in Iran • Dari (Dari Persian, Afghan Persian, or Dari) is spoken in Afghanistan • Tajiki (Tajik Persian) is spoken in Tajikistan IRAN HISTORY OF IRAN . The official name of Iran is the “Islamic Republic of Iran” . ‘Persia’ was historically the common name for Iran (it was called Persia until 1935) . Iran is home to one of the world's oldest civilizations . Iran means “the land of the Aryans” Politics . The revolution of Iran was in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini . Before the revolution, Iran was a constitutional monarchy. The country was ruled by the Royal Government of Reza Shah Pahlavi . After the revolution, the Iranian government system became the Islamic Republic and its national day is the 12th Farvardin (1st of April) . The Iranians choose their own president. The election is carried out once every four years. Each president serves a four-year term and cannot serve more than two consecutive terms . The president uses the media to announce to the country the government’s plans and programs . The president has some say in the level of media freedom and political openness . Iran was at war with Iraq (1980-1988) for 8 years. The roots of the war lay in a number of territorial and political disputes between Iraq and Iran . The Iranian people
    [Show full text]
  • Second-Generation Afghans in Iran: Integration, Identity and Return
    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Case Study Series Second-generation Afghans in Iran: Integration, Identity and Return Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi Diana Glazebrook Gholamreza Jamshidiha Hossein Mahmoudian Rasoul Sadeghi April 2008 Funding for this research was provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Commission (EC) i AREU Case Study Series © 2008 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] or calling +93 799 608548. ii Second-generation Afghans in Iran: Integration, Identity and Return About the Research Team (in alphabetical order) The research team members for the Second-generation study conducted in 2006-7 also carried out the Transnational Networks study in Iran in 2005-6. Both of these studies were commissioned by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi is an Associate Professor in the Department of Demography of the University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran, and Adjunct Professor, Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute, Australian National University. Abbasi- Shavazi’s PhD study focused on immigrant fertility in Australia. He has conducted several studies on Iranian fertility transition as well as the Afghan refugees in Iran, and has published extensively on these subjects. He directed the project on Transnational Networks among Afghans in Iran in 2005, and prepared a country report on the situation of International Migrants and Refugees in the Iran in 2007.
    [Show full text]
  • Perspectives on Attitudes and Behaviors of Pashtun Women in Afghanistan and Pakistan
    Perspectives on Attitudes and Behaviors of Pashtun Women in Afghanistan and Pakistan By Anne Pessala May 17, 2012 8000 Towers Crescent Dr. Suite 1350 . Vienna, Virginia 22182 USA . Ph.703.255.0884 . Fx.703.255.6465 . www.D3systems.com 1 Perspectives on Attitudes and Behaviors of Pashtun Women in Afghanistan and Pakistan • Who are the Pashtun people? • Methodology • Access to healthcare and education • Attitudes towards women’s rights • Finances • Voting behavior • Media behavior • Future research 2 Who are the Pashtun People? • Largest populations are in Pakistan (approx. 21 million) and Afghanistan (approx. 10 million) • Distinguished by language (Pashto) and adherence to Pashtunwali • Many principles of Pashtunwali direct the treatment and behavior of women • Rural population 3 Geographic Distribution of Pashtun Population Afghanistan Pakistan 4 What traits do Pashtuns share? • Per capita GDP in Afghanistan is $501 and $1,019 in Pakistan • Slightly higher incomes relative to general population • Role in government • Security 5 About the studies • 2007 – Afghanistan: 2,346 randomly selected Afghans in 34 provinces from March 7th-14th, 2007 (502 Pashtun women) – Pakistan: 2,065 randomly selected Pakistanis in four provinces from March 17th-March 30th (102 Pashtun women) • 2012 – Afghanistan: 2,018 randomly selected Afghans in 34 provinces from January 24th-February 3rd, 2012 (383 Pashtun women) – Pakistan: 2,065 randomly selected Pakistanis in four provinces from March 19th-March 30th (133 Pashtun women) 6 Access to Healthcare and Education
    [Show full text]
  • Secret Languages of Afghanistan and Their Speakers
    Secret Languages of Afghanistan and Their Speakers Secret Languages of Afghanistan and Their Speakers By Jadwiga Pstrusińska Translated into English by Agata Lenard Edited by Agata Lenard and Ben Young Secret Languages of Afghanistan and Their Speakers By Jadwiga Pstrusińska This book first published 2013 First shorter version published in Polish as O tajnych językach Afganistanu i ich użytkownikach by the Księgarnia Akademicka academic publishing house, Krakow 2004. Published with the financial support of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Jadwiga Pstrusińska Cover design by Wiktor Dyndo. Front cover image: a key to an Afghan lock (author’s private collection). All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4970-7, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4970-8 To the memory of Bozay Some questions may remain in limbo for many years before the necessary evidence can be gathered. Some questions may never be answered because the necessary evidence cannot be obtained. But even the discovery that the evidence is not available is a contribution, if only because it allows scientists to move on to new questions. Steve Olson (2003: 167) TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ................................................................................... ix Introduction ...............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan Threats and Opportunities
    Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan Threats and Opportunities CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 author Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Shiza Shahid E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org codirectors Rick Barton Karin von Hippel November 2009 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan: Threats and Opportunities 0 Background This report is the result of an experts meeting hosted by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project on October 15, 2009. The discussion focused on the role of regional players in Afghanistan and Pakistan – primarily China, India, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – in promoting stability in the region. It was attended by a number of government officials and non-governmental experts, who underscored how each country is currently involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what the regional interests are, and how each country can be engaged to work towards an effective regional strategy. This report summarizes the key conclusions from the meeting and highlights avenues for further research. Key Questions 1. What are the national interests of each regional player in Afghanistan? 2. What are regional players currently doing to promote stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan? 3. What national interests may contradict regional cooperation on Afghanistan? 4. What can each regional player bring to the table to promote regional integration and reconstruction
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Criminology Through Radical Diversity in Asian Reconciliation
    Asian Criminology (2015) 10:183–191 DOI 10.1007/s11417-014-9200-z Rethinking Criminology Through Radical Diversity in Asian Reconciliation John Braithwaite Received: 30 October 2014 /Accepted: 10 December 2014 /Published online: 7 January 2015 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015 Abstract Five cases of radical diversity in Asian reconciliation are used to suggest hypotheses for the kind of Asian relational theory building suggested in the contribution of Liu (2014)to this special issue: 1. Polynesian shame 2. Confucius and East Asian restorative justice 3. Indonesian and Timorese cultures of compliance with reconciliation agreements 4. Restorative justice hybridity in Pakistan and Afghanistan 5. Victim-initiated justice in Nepal Keywords Reconciliation . Restorative justice . Asian criminology The Cases, The Hypotheses Five cases and insights of radical diversity in reconciliation from all corners of Asia are considered. The first is about shame in Polynesia, the second about Confucian philosophy in East Asia and restorative justice. The third considers Southeast Asian cultures of compliance with reconciliation agreements. The fourth is restorative justice hybridity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the fifth is victim-initiated justice and recon- ciliation in Nepal. These provide lenses through which we can see a need to revise explanatory theories of crime from those dished up by western criminal law and criminology. They also suggest changes to normative theories of rights in criminal justice that deserve consideration. Asia and the Pacific embrace the regions of greatest cultural and linguistic diversity in the world. Asia’s most important contribution to global criminology is therefore in opening its eyes to completely new ways of seeing, as opposed to adjusting, testing, or revising western theories in light of eastern experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Balancing Act in Afghanistan
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Browse Reports & Bookstore TERRORISM AND Make a charitable contribution HOMELAND SECURITY For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation occasional paper series. RAND occa- sional papers may include an informed perspective on a timely policy issue, a discussion of new research methodologies, essays, a paper presented at a conference, a conference summary, or a summary of work in progress. All RAND occasional papers undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.
    [Show full text]
  • 2, 2012, 97:109
    Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 2, 2012, 97:109 Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan Muhammad Saleem Mazhar♣ Samee Ozair Khan Naheed S. Goraya Abstract Ethnicity as an issue has been faced by all multi-ethnic societies. But it is a matter of great apprehensions and graver outcomes in those societies which are going through post- conflict reconstruction, like Afghanistan is today. The paper will discuss in detail the ethnic groups, which exist in Afghan society along with the country’s ethnic history. This paper attempts to analyze the fact how social and political objectives of ethnic groups are liable to be accommodated in the new structure of Afghan State. It will also argue about the composition of ethnic groups, impact of war on ethnic communities, and why the ethnic fault lines may continue and under what circumstances, they may fade away? Keywords: Ethnicity, communist regime, Mujahideen, multi-ethnic state, racial homogeneity, post-colonial states, Treaty of Rawalpindi Introduction Afghanistan is the meeting place and centre of four ecological, cultural and strategic areas; the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian Sub-Continent and the Far East, for the Pamir Mountains intrude into Chinese Sinkiang (Marwat, 1997: xiii). Devastated by wars over the last three decades, Afghanistan has strived for peace and solidity regardless of grave internal and external challenges, together with its history, demography, geography, geography and global power politics. Like most of the post-colonial states, through out the history, Afghanistan has remained a “multi-ethnic state”, having more than “one ethnic group, speaks too many languages, and has multiple and multi-layered identities” (Shahrani, 2002: 715-722).
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan and Pakistan: More Realism Needed to Prevent US Failure
    Amit Pandya Afghanistan and Pakistan: More Realism Needed to Prevent US Failure THE CHALLENGE Afghanistan and Pakistan present distinct challenges to US policy. Yet they are closely linked by the political, historical and cultural unities that span their border. Instability and violence in each have had destructive effects on its neighbor. Security, political stability, and economic development in Afghanistan have been spiraling downward for a while with few prospects for improvement. The international community has already failed there. Pakistan now faces both the consequences of long-standing weaknesses of democratic governance and economic policy, and a present crisis of political authority, economic instability and violent threats to internal security. Despite mutual dependence between the US and Pakistan, the relationship is steadily deteriorating. The challenge for the US is to recalibrate Afghanistan policy in a time of acute crisis, while developing more long-term strategies for engaging Pakistan. THE CONTEXT Recent trends in Afghanistan include a 40% increase in civilian casualties; a higher mortality rate for US soldiers there than in Iraq; a steady trajectory of eroding control by the Kabul government; and military and political advances by its enemies. Foreign troops and civilian casualties are irritants to Afghan nationalism, prompting many to join the Taliban, often as an act of national resistance rather than of ideological sympathy. The Afghan Army suffers from a lack of legitimacy because it is seen as the instrument of a weak government that enjoys little popular legitimacy. The Afghan state fails to provide personal security; law and order routinely means predatory behavior by licensed law enforcement; courts are slow, capricious and unreliable; and corruption is pervasive.
    [Show full text]