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Erman Hyperinflation 1 923 - a La\V and Economics Approach C;erman Hyperinflation 1 923 - A La\v and Economics Approach Index Bandwagon effect, 62, 63 Bank Charter Act of 1844,115 A Baranger, Michel, 51, 54, 55 Adams, John, 102 Barnard, Daniel, 104 African States, 34 Barriadas of Lima, 95 Ageo/Enlightenment, 44, 122 bartering, 122 Alx-en-Provence, 132 basic rights 0/ citizens, 25 Alionlo Popular Revolvtionaria Americana {APRA}, Bastiat, Frederic, 112 96 beha vioural disorders, 43, 121 Allied Powers, 21, 29, 30 behavioural psychology, 63 Amazon Lowlands, 95 Befle-epoque, 40 Americoll Economic Association, 106 Benjamin, Walter, 132 American Institutionalis t School, 49 Benvenisti, e, 33 American Revolution, 48 Berger, Sebastien, 100 Andes, 94,95 Berlin, 3, 72, 73, 78 Andes H;ghlonds, 95 Berlin Bourse, 83 Anglo-Russian Elltente (1907), 18 Bemholz, Peter, 104 Aquinas, Thomas, 45 Bieber, Horst, 95, 96 Archbishop a/Canterbury, 35 Bismarck, Otto von, 20, 72, 79 Archduke FroM Ferdinand, 15 black market, 96, 122 Architecture and DeSign a/Europe, 20 Blanchard, Olivier, 119 Arendt, Hanno~ 132 Bolshevik government, 29 Aristotle, 101 Bookrags, 30 armistice, 74 Bottigliero, I, 30 Article 109, German Constitution 0/ l1'h August 1919 Boyle, James, 109 [Reichsver/assungJ, 89 Braun, Grete, 131 Article 109, Section 1, German Constitution 0/11'" Bremer/lOven, 127 August 1919 [Reichsver/assungJ, 89 British Empire, 29 Article 153, German Constitution O/l1'h August 1919 Brownlie, 35 (Reichsver/assungJ, 88 Brownlie, I, 34 Article 2310/ the Treaty 0/ Versoil'/es 1919,30,33 Brussels, 131 arti/lcial intelligence, 52 Bryan, Michael F, 45, 48, 110 Associated Powers, 29 Bucharest, 92 Association far Social Policy, 48 business cycle, 111, 115, 117 Atohua/pa, 94 Atkeson, Andf'eli\l, 112 c Attwood, Thomas, 101 Aujwertungsgesetz vom 16, JuJi 1925, Annang, 84 Cantil/on, Richard, 111 Aujwertungsgesetz, Relchsgesetzblatt, Teil J, 1925, Capital Gains Tax, 6 88 Carroll, Charles Holt, 105 Au/wertungsgesetz, zweites Gesetz u.ber den Carthage, 30 va/ksentscheid, 90 Catherine the Great, 44, 122 Australian Labor Party, 2' Catholic Church, 45 Austrio-Hungory, 29 Caveat Emptor, 52 Austrian Sc/)aol 0/ economics, 103, 110, .123 Cavour, 20 Austrian theory o/the business cycle, 116 Central Bank, 8, 12 Autobohnen,.119 Central Powers, 115, 21, 29 Chong, I, 36 Chaos and Complexity, 54 B Chaos Theory, 55 Baden-Baden, 40, 127, 128, 129 chaotic system, 2, 51, 60, 66 Bainbridge, Lister, 53 Chinese Empire, 91 Baldeoux, Dieter, 92 Church of England, 35 195 German l--lyperinHation 1922/1923 - A b,',.\, and Economics Approach Cipolla, Carlo, 116 Duffy, M, 15 City Council LiJdenscheid, 127 Classless Society, 46 th E Coin Law (Miinzgesetz) of the 30 of August 1924 (RGBI, /I p. 254), 68, 84 Early Weimar Republic, 125 Colander, David C, 45, 46 Ebert, Friedrich, 2, 8, 24, 74, 75, 77, 78, 120 Collins, Joseph, 93 Economic and Social Enquete, 8,0 Colonialism and Imperialism, 19 Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), 49 Communist Party of Peru, 95 economic we/I-being of Germons, 25 Compiegne/France, 5 Edward VII, 15 complex system, 2, 51, 52, 54 Eighty Years War, 17 complexity, 51 Einstein, Albert, 124 Complexity Economics, 54, 55, 62, 66, 120, 122,124 Eisenach, 48 camplexity SCience, 54 Ekklesio News Brief, 35 concentration camp, 12$, 131 Elbing, 127 Constitution of the German Empire from 28th of Ellis, J, 29 March 1849, 71, 72 Enabling Law of October 13,1923 (RGBlI943), 67 consumer affairs, 52 Engels, Friedrich, 46, 47, 48 Consumer behaviour, 53 English Historicists, 49 consumer sovereignty, 52 Entente, 30 conventional economics, 66 Entente Cordiole (1904), 18 conversion raM, 1, 83~ 122, 123 £ntscheidung des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen RGZ Copleston, Edward, 111 104,394,87 cost of the war, 5 EifurteT Program of the German Social Democratic cauncil movement, 79 Party (Sozialdemakratische Partei Deu.tschlands - Council af the Pea pie 's Represen tatives (Rot der SPD),3 Volksbeouftragten), 74, 75 Erzberger Tax Reform, 120 Council on Economic Affairs of the German Republic Erzberger, MatthiaS, 7, 8, 9, 10, 120 (Reichswirtscha/tsratj, 3 Erzberger's financial reform, 10 crowd behavior theory, 64 Euclidean line, 54 cuius religio eius reliqio, 17 Eum, 39 Cuno, Wilhelm (Chancel/or), 61 Eurape, 39 currency depreCiation, 81 European Community Countries, 39 Currency School, 1,04, 1.15 European Parliament, 98 Everett, Edward, 101 D Explanations of the computation method for the revaluation numbers in appendix 1 to the law, 83 Darwin, Charles, 19 Dos Kapital- Kritik der poMischen Okonomie (The F Capital) 1867, 47, 50 Dovies, Paul, 2, 51, 52 Fadiga, L, 4,0 Dawes Plan, 13, 30, 31, 33, 67 Ferguson, Niall, 21, 56, 60, 62, 66 Dawes, Charles, 31 Feuchtwanger, Lion, 132 de MillO's, 130 fiat money, 50, 111 de Soto, Jesus Huerta, 116 Fiji's Promotion of Reconciliotion Tolerance and deflation, 110 Unity Bill 20,05,121 Demburg,.9 Final Act of Vienno, 17 depreSSions, 112 Findley, C V, 29 demllqe economic calculation, 123 Fink, Werner, 128 Deutsche Mark (DM), 68 First ond Second Punic Wars, 3,0 Deutsches KOiserreich, 126 First World Papulation conference in 1974, 92 Deutsches Reich, 69; 71, 74 Fiscal Auth ority Act, 10 Dialectic of Spontaneity and Organisation, 76 Fischer, Robert, 3, 125 DoebJin, Alfred, 132 Fisher, Irving, 48, 109 doHor index, 83 Fogassi, L, 4,0 Dostoyevsky, 4 Foster, William, 102, 113, 119 Draft of a low about the revaluation of mortgages Fourteen Point Peace Plan, 24 and other cloims (Reic/lstag /II. Wah/periode fractol,54 1924/25, Nr. 8,04), 82, 83 France, 29, 91 Dreadllaught, 20 Fronco-Prussion War (1870-1871), 21, 30, 12,0 1% German IIypcrinflation 1922/1923 - A Law and Ikonomics Approach Franco-Russian Alliance (1894), 18 GofJIa, H P,. 94, 95 Frankenberg, G,37 gold core currency, 69 Fraser, David, 119 gold exchange standard, 109 Frederick The Great, 44, 122 gold reserve, 68 Free' Corps (Freikorps), 24, 75, 76 gold spede standard, 104 free market economy, 3, 47 gold standard currency, 68 Free Socialist Republic of Germany, 74 Goldmark, 83, 84 Freiheitsgesetz ('Liberty Law'), 32 Gono, Gideon (Dr), 98 French reparations in 1871, 6 Goods Turnover Tax, 6 French Vichy government, 132 Gorbachev, Michael, 42 Frenkel, Jacob, 98 Government of Zimbabwe, 100 Freud, Sigmund, 64 Great Depression, 3, 109, 110 Friedrich-Wililelm IV, 72 Greenspan, Alan, 54 full employment, 110 Gribel, Carl, 83 Fuller, Lon, 33 group dynamics phenomenon, 121 future consumption, 116 Grundpflichten,. 25 Grundrech te, 25 G Grzybowski, 81 Grzybowski, Kozimierz, 81 Galbraith, john Kenneth, 49, 53, 102 Guernsey, 33 GolJese, V, 40 Gurs camp, 132, 133 GarCia, Alan (President), 1, 96 Garibaldi, 20 H Garrison, Roger, 116 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Hoose, H, 75 49, 69 Hanke, H.,. 91, 96, 98 George V, 15 Hasen, Walter, 132 German Army (Reichswehr), 76 Hazlitt, Henry, 11 0, 115 German Cen trol Rentenbank, 13 Hegel, Georg W F, 4 German Centry Party (Zentrum), 90 Heilmann, Ernst, 128, .129 German Communist Party (KPD), 62, 74 Hel!ferich, 5 German Constitution, 71, 75, 77, 78, 80, 88, 122 Hemes, l1 German Council (Reichsratj, 80 herd behaVior, 64 German Economjc Council, 79, 80 herding instinct,. 63 German Empire (Deutsc!les Kaiserreich), 29, 48, 72, Hermanns, Johannes, 94, 95 78, 79,127 Hers/lI!:y Jr, Robert D, 103 German Government (Reichsregierung), 3, 66, 68, 78, Hettloge, 9 80,90,122 Hilferding, Rudolf, 12 German High Command, 74 Hirschberg, Eliyah u, 81 German Historicol School, 49 History of Economic Thought, 45, 102 German hvperinflation, 2, 51, 60, 64, 65, 66, 119, Hitler Government, 71 122, 124 Hitler Youth,. 129 German Imperial Government, 61, 120 Hitler, Adolf, 26, 32,66,80,119:,130 German National Assembly, 3, 78, 80 Holocaust, 34, 121 German National Assembly in the Frankfurt Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, 62, 65, 69 Paulskirche 1848, 71, 72 Holy Roman Empire, 17 German Parliament (Deutscher Reichstag), 66, 72, homo economiCU5, 52 74,77,80,88,122 Honig, F, 34 German Railways, 41 Hugenberg, Alfred, 32 German Republic (Deutsches Reicll), 1, 3, 72, 78, 120, Hume, Dovid, 48 126 Humpllrey, Thomas, 49,. 110 German Reserve Bank {Reichsbankj, 68 hyperinflation, 2, 11, 27, 39, 52, 55, 56, 69, 77,96, German Revolution, 75, 76 98, 114, 119, 124 German Social Democratic Party, 2, 80 hyperinflation, definitiOn, 51 German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), 80, 88 German Supreme Court, Judgement of 4'" November I 1925,88,89 German Workers Council, 79 ideo I Money, 105 Gestapo, 129 Ideological causes, 19 Goebbels, Joseph, 130 Imperial Chancellor, 74 197 German Hyperinflatioll 1922/1923 - A Law and Economics Approach Inca Empire, 94 Landreth, Harry,. 45, 46 Incas, 94, 95 Lar,emont,. R R, 36 Independent Treasury Ac" 105 Latin America, 93 industrial retrogression, 1 Law about the referendum 27th of June 1924, 90 inflation, 49, 56, 81, 102, 103, 109, 110, 123 Law about the Revaluation of Mortgages and other inflation tax, 2 Claims, 80, 84, 88, 89 inflationary process, 56, 60, 62, 122 iowofdemand,52 inherent randomness, 55 Lawson, Robert, 53 Institutional anomalies, 27 League 01 Nations, 15,28,121 Institutionalised inflation, 103, 114, 115 Leaphart, J V, 34 International Commission of Jurists, 33 Leher, .Emst, 128, 129 Intemationol Monetary Fund (IMF), 96, 123 Leibniz,Gottfried Wilhelm, 4 Inti,96 Le.ljonl:wjvud, Axel, 109 intrinsically evolutionary systems, 55 Lenin, 20, 49 Iran, 33 Les Milles camp, 132 Iraq, 33 Uberty Law, 32 Island of Rugen, 69 Ue.bknecht, Karl, 74, 75, 76 Israel,34 Lima, 94,95 Italy, 29 living standard price index, 82 Lloyd George, David, 21 London Ultimatum, 7,
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