Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law
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Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2003 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law Alan Schwartz Robert E. Scott Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Contracts Commons Recommended Citation Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541 (2003). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/339 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scottt* CONTENTS I. IN TROD U CTION ................................................................................. 543 II. JUSTIFYING AN EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CONTRACT ........................ 550 A . W hat Firms M axim ize .................................................................. 550 B. Why the State Should Help Firms ................................................ 555 III. THE ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION ........................................................ 556 A. Enforcement Often Is Unnecessary.............................................. 557 B. EncouragingRelation-Specific Investment .................................. 559 C. ContractingTo Avoid Disruption: The Case of Volatile Markets ........................................................................... 562 D. Enforcement and Duress.............................................................. 565 IV. THE INTERPRETATION FUNCTION ..................................................... 568 t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management. tt David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Justin W. D'Atri Visiting Professor of Law, Business and Society, Columbia Law School. This Article benefited from comments received at workshops at the Law Faculty, Cambridge, England, at the 2003 American Law and Economics Association meetings, and at the Harvard, Pennsylvania, Texas, Toronto, Virginia, and Yale Law Schools. We also are grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Scott Baker, Richard Brooks, Jules Coleman, Victor Goldberg, Sam Issacharoff, John Jeffries, Jason Johnston, Paul Mahoney, Tom Nachbar, Eric Posner, Andrew Postlewaite, Henry Smith, Paul Stephan, William Stuntz, and George Triantis for helpful comments. 541 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 113: 541 A. The Relevant Interpretive Question ............................................. 568 B. Two InterpretiveIssues: Problems of Meaning and of Language .......................................................................... 570 C. The Parties'PreferencesRegarding InterpretiveStyles .............. 573 1. The Continuous-PayoffCase ................................................. 574 2. The Discontinuous-PayoffCase ............................................ 578 3. Sum m ary ................................................................................ 583 D. PrivateLanguages, Linguistic Defaults, and the Parol Evidence R ule ............................................................................. 584 1. The PreferredLinguistic Default .......................................... 584 2. The ParolEvidence Rule ....................................................... 590 3. Course-of-PerformanceEvidence ......................................... 592 V. THE LEGAL DEFAULT PROJECT ........................................................ 594 A. The Casefor Defaults .................................................................. 595 B. The Cost Concern and Default Rules ........................................... 598 C. The MoralHazard Concern and Default Standards.................... 601 D. The Asymmetric Information Concern......................................... 605 E . Sum m ary ...................................................................................... 608 VI. MANDATORY RULES ......................................................................... 609 A. Parties CannotBan Modifications............................................... 611 B. PartiesMust Accept SubstantialPerformance ............................ 614 C. Parties CannotAgree to Penalties............................................... 616 V II. C ON CLU SION ..................................................................................... 618 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2003] Limits of Contract Law 543 I. INTRODUCTION Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be. These gaps are unsurprising given the traditional definition of contract as embracing all promises that the law will enforce. Even a theory of contract law that focuses only on the enforcement of bargains must still consider the entire continuum from standard form contracts between firms and consumers to commercial contracts among businesses. No descriptive theory has yet explained a law of contract that comprehends such a broad domain. Normative theories that are grounded in a single norm-such as autonomy or efficiency-also have foundered over the heterogeneity of contractual contexts to which the theory is to apply.' Pluralist theories attempt to respond to the difficulty that unitary normative theories pose by urging courts to pursue efficiency, fairness, good faith, and the protection of individual autonomy. Such theories need, but so far lack, a meta-principle 2 that tells which of these goals should be decisive when they conflict. 1. For a broad discussion of this problem, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 241-68 (1993). Autonomy theories require elastic notions of consent in order to regulate the full scope of contracting behavior with one norm. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077 (1989); Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24, 33-43 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis ofJustification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995). Efficiency theories tend to have a more limited scope. Positive articles analyze broad doctrinal patterns in an attempt to find fundamental consistency between these patterns and the efficiency norm, but the authors do not purport to provide a fully descriptive theory of contract law. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). Normative economic theories, on the other hand, typically evaluate discrete doctrines by the efficiency norm. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, LiquidatedDamages]; Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI.L. REv. 1155 (1990). 2. The problems that pluralist theories without meta-norms pose are nicely illustrated in Melvin Eisenberg's effort, which purports to solve the broad-scope-of-contract problem by proposing overlapping sets of norms. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1982); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Theory of Contracts]. For example, Eisenberg's schema restricts the domain of freedom of contract by norms of reciprocity, trust, and fairness. He recognizes that this multivalue approach can generate conflicting social propositions. When conflicts actually occur, "the lawmaker must make a legal rule that gives a proper weight and role to each of the conflicting values or goals in the context at hand." Eisenberg, Theory of Contracts, supra, at 244. Further, "when social propositions conflict the Legislator must exercise good judgment concerning the weight and role Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 113:541 We attempt to make progress here with a more modest approach-to set out and defend a normative theory to guide decisionmakers in the regulation of 3 business contracts. The theory's affirmative claim, in brief, is that contract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the "contractual surplus") from transactions. The theory's negative claim is that contract law should do nothing else. Both claims follow from the premise that the state should choose the rules