The Financial Econometrics PROJECT
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Understanding the Risks of Smart Beta and the Need for Smart Alpha
UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS OF SMART BETA, AND THE NEED FOR SMART ALPHA February 2015 UNCORRELATED ANSWERS® Key Ideas Richard Yasenchak, CFA Senior Managing Director, Head of Client Portfolio Management There has been a proliferation of smart-beta strategies the past several years. According to Morningstar, asset flows into smart-beta offerings have been considerable and there are now literally thousands of such products, all offering Phillip Whitman, PhD a systematic but ‘different’ equity exposure from that offered by traditional capitalization-weighted indices. During the five years ending December 31, 2014 assets under management (AUM) of smart-beta ETFs grew by 320%; for the same period, index funds experienced AUM growth of 235% (Figure 1 on the following page). Smart beta has also become the media darling of the financial press, who often position these strategies as the answer to every investor’s investing prayers. So what is smart beta; what are its risks; and why should it matter to investors? Is there an alternative strategy that might help investors meet their investing objectives over time? These questions and more will be answered in this paper. This page is intentionally left blank. Defining smart beta and its smart-beta strategies is that they do not hold the cap-weighted market index; instead they re-weight the index based on different intended use factors such as those mentioned previously, and are therefore not The intended use of smart-beta strategies is to mitigate exposure buy-and-hold strategies like a cap-weighted index. to undesirable risk factors or to gain a potential benefit by increasing exposure to desirable risk factors resulting from a Exposure risk tactical or strategic view on the market. -
Low-Beta Strategies
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Korn, Olaf; Kuntz, Laura-Chloé Working Paper Low-beta strategies CFR Working Paper, No. 15-17 [rev.] Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for Financial Research (CFR), University of Cologne Suggested Citation: Korn, Olaf; Kuntz, Laura-Chloé (2017) : Low-beta strategies, CFR Working Paper, No. 15-17 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158007 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten -
11.50 Margin Constraints and the Security Market Line
Margin Constraints and the Security Market Line Petri Jylh¨a∗ June 9, 2016 Abstract Between the years 1934 and 1974, the Federal Reserve frequently changed the initial margin requirement for the U.S. stock market. I use this variation in margin requirements to test whether leverage constraints affect the security market line, i.e. the relation between betas and expected returns. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Frazzini and Ped- ersen (2014), but somewhat contrary to their empirical findings, I find that tighter leverage constraints result in a flatter security market line. My results provide strong empirical sup- port for the idea that funding constraints faced by investors may, at least partially, help explain the empirical failure of the capital asset pricing model. JEL Classification: G12, G14, N22. Keywords: Leverage constraints, Security market line, Margin regulations. ∗Imperial College Business School. Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus, SW7 2AZ, London, UK; [email protected]. I thank St´ephaneChr´etien,Darrell Duffie, Samuli Kn¨upfer,Ralph Koijen, Lubos Pastor, Lasse Pedersen, Joshua Pollet, Oleg Rytchkov, Mungo Wilson, and the participants at American Economic Association 2015, Financial Intermediation Research Society 2014, Aalto University, Copenhagen Business School, Imperial College London, Luxembourg School of Finance, and Manchester Business School for helpful comments. 1 Introduction Ever since the introduction of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), finance researchers have been studying why the return difference between high and low beta stocks is smaller than predicted by the CAPM (Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972). One of the first explanation for this empirical flatness of the security market line is given by Black (1972) who shows that investors' inability to borrow at the risk-free rate results in a lower cross-sectional price of risk than in the CAPM. -
Arbitrage Pricing Theory∗
ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY∗ Gur Huberman Zhenyu Wang† August 15, 2005 Abstract Focusing on asset returns governed by a factor structure, the APT is a one-period model, in which preclusion of arbitrage over static portfolios of these assets leads to a linear relation between the expected return and its covariance with the factors. The APT, however, does not preclude arbitrage over dynamic portfolios. Consequently, applying the model to evaluate managed portfolios contradicts the no-arbitrage spirit of the model. An empirical test of the APT entails a procedure to identify features of the underlying factor structure rather than merely a collection of mean-variance efficient factor portfolios that satisfies the linear relation. Keywords: arbitrage; asset pricing model; factor model. ∗S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, forthcoming, Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This article is taken from the authors’ original manuscript and has not been reviewed or edited. The definitive published version of this extract may be found in the complete The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics in print and online, forthcoming. †Huberman is at Columbia University. Wang is at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the McCombs School of Business in the University of Texas at Austin. The views stated here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Introduction The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was developed primarily by Ross (1976a, 1976b). It is a one-period model in which every investor believes that the stochastic properties of returns of capital assets are consistent with a factor structure. -
Understanding Alpha Versus Beta in High Yield Bond Investing
PERITUS ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC Market Commentary Independent Credit Research – Leveraged Finance – July 2012 Understanding Alpha versus Beta in High Yield Bond Investing Investors have come to recognize that there is a secular change occurring in financial markets. After the 2008 meltdown, we have watched equities stage an impressive rally off the bottom, only to peter out. There is no conviction and valuations are once again stretched given the lack of growth as the world economy remains on shaky ground. In another one of our writings (“High Yield Bonds versus Equities”), we discussed our belief that U.S. businesses would plod along, but valuations would continue their march toward the lower end of their historical range. So far, this looks like the correct call. Europe still hasn’t been fixed, the China miracle is slowing and, perhaps, the commodity supercycle is also in the later innings. The amount of debt assumed by the developed world is unsustainable so deleveraging began a few years ago. These are not short or pleasant cycles and both governments and individuals will be grumpy participants in this event. It simply means that economic growth will be subdued for years to come. I have never really been able to understand economic growth rates that are significantly ahead of the population growth anyway…oh yeah, the productivity miracle. I have written chapter and verse on the history of financial markets and where returns have come from: yield. Anyone with access to the internet can verify that dividends, dividend growth and dividend re-investment are what have driven stock returns over the decades. -
Frictional Finance “Fricofinance”
Frictional Finance “Fricofinance” Lasse H. Pedersen NYU, CEPR, and NBER Copyright 2010 © Lasse H. Pedersen Frictional Finance: Motivation In physics, frictions are not important to certain phenomena: ……but frictions are central to other phenomena: Economists used to think financial markets are like However, as in aerodynamics, the frictions are central dropping balls to the dynamics of the financial markets: Walrasian auctioneer Frictional Finance - Lasse H. Pedersen 2 Frictional Finance: Implications ¾ Financial frictions affect – Asset prices – Macroeconomy (business cycles and allocation across sectors) – Monetary policy ¾ Parsimonious model provides unified explanation of a wide variety of phenomena ¾ Empirical evidence is very strong – Stronger than almost any other influence on the markets, including systematic risk Frictional Finance - Lasse H. Pedersen 3 Frictional Finance: Definitions ¾ Market liquidity risk: – Market liquidity = ability to trade at low cost (conversely, market illiquidity = trading cost) • Measured as bid-ask spread or as market impact – Market liquidity risk = risk that trading costs will rise • We will see there are 3 relevant liquidity betas ¾ Funding liquidity risk: – Funding liquidity for a security = ability to borrow against that security • Measured as the security’s margin requirement or haircut – Funding liquidity for an investor = investor’s availability of capital relative to his need • “Measured” as Lagrange multiplier of margin constraint – Funding liquidity risk = risk of hitting margin constraint -
Leverage and the Beta Anomaly
Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109019000322 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS COPYRIGHT 2019, MICHAEL G. FOSTER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WA 98195 doi:10.1017/S0022109019000322 https://www.cambridge.org/core Leverage and the Beta Anomaly Malcolm Baker, Mathias F. Hoeyer, and Jeffrey Wurgler * . IP address: 199.94.10.45 Abstract , on 13 Dec 2019 at 20:01:41 The well-known weak empirical relationship between beta risk and the cost of equity (the beta anomaly) generates a simple tradeoff theory: As firms lever up, the overall cost of cap- ital falls as leverage increases equity beta, but as debt becomes riskier the marginal benefit of increasing equity beta declines. As a simple theoretical framework predicts, we find that leverage is inversely related to asset beta, including upside asset beta, which is hard to ex- plain by the traditional leverage tradeoff with financial distress that emphasizes downside risk. The results are robust to a variety of specification choices and control variables. , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at I. Introduction Millions of students have been taught corporate finance under the assump- tion of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and integrated equity and debt markets. Yet, it is well known that the link between textbook measures of risk and realized returns in the stock market is weak, or even backward. For example, a dollar invested in a low beta portfolio of U.S. stocks in 1968 grows to $70.50 by 2011, while a dollar in a high beta portfolio grows to just $7.61 (see Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2014)). -
Effects of Estimating Systematic Risk in Equity Stocks in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) (An Empirical Review of Systematic Risks Estimation)
International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences Vol. 4, No.4, October 2014, pp. 228–248 E-ISSN: 2225-8329, P-ISSN: 2308-0337 © 2014 HRMARS www.hrmars.com Effects of Estimating Systematic Risk in Equity Stocks in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) (An Empirical Review of Systematic Risks Estimation) Paul Munene MUIRURI Department of Commerce and Economic Studies Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology Nairobi, Kenya, E-mail: [email protected] Abstract Capital Markets have become an integral part of the Kenyan economy. The manner in which securities are priced in the capital market has attracted the attention of many researchers for long. This study sought to investigate the effects of estimating of Systematic risk in equity stocks of the various sectors of the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE. The study will be of benefit to both policy makers and investors to identify the specific factors affecting stock prices. To the investors it will provide useful and adequate information an understanding on the relationship between risk and return as a key piece in building ones investment philosophy. To the market regulators to establish the NSE performance against investors’ perception of risks and returns and hence develop ways of building investors’ confidence, the policy makers to review and strengthening of the legal and regulatory framework. The paper examines the merged 12 sector equity securities of the companies listed at the market into 4sector namely Agricultural; Commercial and Services; Finance and Investment and Manufacturing and Allied sectors. This study Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) to vis-à-vis the market returns. -
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (Capm)
THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM) Investment and Valuation of Firms Juan Jose Garcia Machado WS 2012/2013 November 12, 2012 Fanck Leonard Basiliki Loli Blaž Kralj Vasileios Vlachos Contents 1. CAPM............................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Risk and return trade off ............................................................................................................... 4 Risk ................................................................................................................................................... 4 Correlation....................................................................................................................................... 5 Assumptions Underlying the CAPM ............................................................................................. 5 3. Market portfolio .............................................................................................................................. 5 Portfolio Choice in the CAPM World ........................................................................................... 7 4. CAPITAL MARKET LINE ........................................................................................................... 7 Sharpe ratio & Alpha ................................................................................................................... 10 5. SECURITY MARKET LINE ................................................................................................... -
How Did Too Big to Fail Become Such a Problem for Broker-Dealers?
How did Too Big to Fail become such a problem for broker-dealers? Speculation by Andy Atkeson March 2014 Proximate Cause • By 2008, Broker Dealers had big balance sheets • Historical experience with rapid contraction of broker dealer balance sheets and bank runs raised unpleasant memories for central bankers • No satisfactory legal or administrative procedure for “resolving” failed broker dealers • So the Fed wrestled with the question of whether broker dealers were too big to fail Why do Central Bankers care? • Historically, deposit taking “Banks” held three main assets • Non-financial commercial paper • Government securities • Demandable collateralized loans to broker-dealers • Much like money market mutual funds (MMMF’s) today • Many historical (pre-Fed) banking crises (runs) associated with sharp changes in the volume and interest rates on loans to broker dealers • Similar to what happened with MMMF’s after Lehman? • Much discussion of directions for central bank policy and regulation • New York Clearing House 1873 • National Monetary Commission 1910 • Pecora Hearings 1933 • Friedman and Schwartz 1963 Questions I want to consider • How would you fit Broker Dealers into the growth model? • What economic function do they perform in facilitating trade of securities and financing margin and short positions in securities? • What would such a theory say about the size of broker dealer value added and balance sheets? • What would be lost (socially) if we dramatically reduced broker dealer balance sheets by regulation? • Are broker-dealer liabilities -
The Memory of Beta Factors∗
The Memory of Beta Factors∗ Janis Beckery, Fabian Hollsteiny, Marcel Prokopczuky,z, and Philipp Sibbertseny September 24, 2019 Abstract Researchers and practitioners employ a variety of time-series pro- cesses to forecast betas, using either short-memory models or implic- itly imposing infinite memory. We find that both approaches are inadequate: beta factors show consistent long-memory properties. For the vast majority of stocks, we reject both the short-memory and difference-stationary (random walk) alternatives. A pure long- memory model reliably provides superior beta forecasts compared to all alternatives. Finally, we document the relation of firm characteris- tics with the forecast error differentials that result from inadequately imposing short-memory or random walk instead of long-memory pro- cesses. JEL classification: C58, G15, G12, G11 Keywords: Long memory, beta, persistence, forecasting, predictability ∗Contact: [email protected] (J. Becker), [email protected] (F. Holl- stein), [email protected] (M. Prokopczuk), and [email protected] (P. Sibbertsen). ySchool of Economics and Management, Leibniz University Hannover, Koenigsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany. zICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading, Reading, RG6 6BA, UK. 1 Introduction In factor pricing models like the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) or the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Ross, 1976) the drivers of expected returns are the stock's sensitivities to risk factors, i.e., beta factors. For many applications such as asset pricing, portfolio choice, capital budgeting, or risk management, the market beta is still the single most important factor. Indeed, Graham & Harvey(2001) document that chief financial officers of large U.S. -
Return, Risk and the Security Market Line Systematic and Unsystematic
Expected and Unexpected Returns • The return on any stock traded in a Return, Risk and the Security financial market is composed of two parts. c The normal, or expected, part of the return is Market Line the return that investors predict or expect. d The uncertain, or risky, part of the return Chapter 18 comes from unexpected information revealed during the year. • Total return – Expected return = Unexpected return R – E(R) = U Systematic and Unsystematic Diversification and Risk Risk Systematic risk • In a large portfolio, some stocks will go up in value because of positive company-specific Risk that influences a large number of events, while others will go down in value assets. Also called market risk. because of negative company-specific events. Unsystematic risk • Unsystematic risk is essentially eliminated by Risk that influences a single company or diversification, so a portfolio with many assets a small group of companies. Also called has almost no unsystematic risk. unique or asset-specific risk. • Unsystematic risk is also called diversifiable risk, while systematic risk is also called nondiversifiable risk. Total risk = Systematic risk + Unsystematic risk The Systematic Risk Principle Measuring Systematic Risk • The systematic risk principle states that Beta coefficient (β) the reward for bearing risk depends only Measure of the relative systematic risk of an on the systematic risk of an investment. asset. Assets with betas larger than 1.0 • So, no matter how much total risk an asset have more systematic risk than average, has, only the systematic portion is relevant and vice versa. in determining the expected return (and • Because assets with larger betas have the risk premium) on that asset.