Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban a pioneering conference FULL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Geneva 24th and 25th March 2000 International Conference Centre of Geneva CICG Geneva Hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with the members of the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, the UK Working Group on Landmines and the Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines Permanent secretariat Swiss CBL Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey Pl. Mairie 4 CH 1256 Troinex - Geneva CH Phone + 41 22. 328.01.73 Fax + 41 22. 328.01.73 e-mail [email protected] Secretariat during the conference M. Cyril von Maydell Av. Trembley 14 1209 Geneva - CH Phone + 41 22. 734. 54. 84 Fax + 41 22. 734. 61. 48 e-mail [email protected] Published by the Conference Organizers 2001 Quezon City, Philippines design sadidaya disenyo layout itemplo/east axis creative cover artwork Christopher C. Ku cover layout karissa villa/east axis creative contents List of Acronyms vii Introduction 1 1 Opening Words 11 Conference Rationale and Objectives 11 The Role of Geneva 13 2 Framing the Problem 17 A Global Look at Non-state Armed Actors 17 One Man’s Terrorist is Another Man’s Liberator 20 Minefields and Non-state Actors 27 Discussion: Supply and Demand; Peacebuilding 30 3 Legal and Normative Frameworks 33 Overview of Legal and Normative Frameworks 33 International Humanitarian Law and the Public Conscience 40 The ‘Dynamic Approach’ to Public International Law 43 Discussion: Defining NSAs and Other Issues 49 4 Views from the Ground 55 Working with NSAs in Burma 55 Mines in the Caucasus 59 Mines in the context of the Zapatista struggle in Chiapas/Mexico 61 Situation of Guatemala in a Central American Context 63 On Mines in Colombia 67 Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland 69 Mine Action in Southern Sudan 72 Difficulties in Addressing Landmines in Palestine 77 Challenges in Engaging the LTTE (Sri Lanka) 79 iii 5 NSA Perspectives 81 Former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) (Kosovo/former Yugoslavia) 81 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Northern Kurdistan/Turkey) 82 Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Philippines) 83 Polisario Front (Western Sahara/Morocco) 85 Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas and the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPM-P/RPA-ABB) (Philippines) 86 Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) (Sudan) 89 6State Perspectives 93 New Approaches to NSAs93 Statements by Governments 96 Discussion: Confidence-building, which landmines to ban, and targeting sanctions 99 7Engaging NSAs in Integrated Mine Action 105 Integrated Mine Action 105 Victim Assistance 106 Clearing the Way to Peace 107 Community Rehabilitation 111 8 Developing Approaches 117 Principles of Engagement 117 Tools for Engagement 125 Overview of Tools of Engagement 127 The Law: A Tool to Engage Non-state Actors 130 NSAs and the Ottawa Treaty 135 Geneva Call 137 iv contents Monitoring and supporting implementation 143 Draft Guidelines 152 9 Recommendations from Conference Organisers 157 10 Closing Words 161 Annexes 1 Selected statements by NSAs 163 Taliban Declaration 163 Moro Islamic Liberation Front Regulations 165 Kurdistan Workers’ Party Statement 165 2 Bibliography 169 3 March Conference 171 Programme 171 Workshop Process 174 List of Participants 177 Feedback 182 Contact Information 184 Acknowledgments 185 contents v list of acronyms ANC African National Congress APM Anti-personnel mines ATM Anti-tank mines CCW 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CPP Communist Party of the Philippines DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ELN National Liberation Army – Colombia EPL Ejercito Popular Liberacion EU European Union EZLN Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FMLN Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade HR Human rights ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) IHL International Humanitarian Law IRA Irish Republican Army ISCE Inter-sessional Standing Committees of Experts KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iraq (also PDK) KLA Kosovo Liberation Army (also UCK) KNLA Karen National Liberation Army (Burma) KPC Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), successor to KLA in Kosovo LT TE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines) ML Umkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the ANC MOU Memorandum of Understanding vii NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-governmental organisation NPA Norwegian People’s Aid NSA Non-state actor OAS Organization of American States OAU Organisation of African Unity OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan ONUSAL Mision de la Organicacion Naciones Unidas para El Salvador OSIL-Sudan Operation Save Innocent Lives – Sudan PDF Popular Defence Forces, paramilitaries in Sudan PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Turkey) PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation PNA Palestinian National Authority POW Prisoner of War PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Iraq) RPM-P/RPA-ABB Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas and the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (Philippines) SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement SPM Somali Patriotic Movement SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation (Namibia) TMK Kosovo Protection Corps (Albanian acronym), successor to KLA in Kosovo UCK Kosovo Liberation Army (Albanian acronym) UN United Nations UNDHA United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala UXO Unexploded Ordnance WFP World Food Programme WTO World Trade Organisation viii acronyms introduction Mary Foster Conference Proceedings Editor In March 2000, about 120 people from over 30 countries gathered in Geneva to discuss ways of engaging armed opposition groups, called “non- state actors”, in the effort to eradicate landmines. Remarkably, the partici- pants included not only academics, activists and representatives of NGOs, but also representatives of both governments and non-state actors themselves. What pulled this disparate group together was concern for the people living on mined land under non-state control or injured by landmines pro- duced, used, stockpiled and traded by non-state actors. why engage non-state actors? The conference consolidated opinion — from point of view of states, NSAs, and NGOs — that the NSA element of the landmine crisis needs to be addressed in a concerted fashion. It is clear that the effort to ban landmines must, sooner or later, address non-state as well as state use of mines. Indeed, as one of the speakers pointed out, it has necessarily been doing so in a quiet way from the very beginning of the international initiative. While binding governments to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty 1 will certainly advance the goal of eradicating anti-personnel landmines, this is a limited strategy. It will never be sufficient while non-state actors continue to be part of the landmine equation. What makes this difficult to see is the still overwhelming focus on the state in dominant discourses and institutions of global relations. It is neces- sary to remind ourselves that, around the world, close to 200 armed entities, many with land and populations under their sway, stand outside the inter- state system. Dozens of these are directly involved in the landmine problem; 1 along with states, they are manufacturing, trading, selling and using landmines and controlling areas of land where people are living with landmines. The practical implication for anyone wishing to alleviate the suffering caused by landmines is that strategies to engage non-state actors, comple- menting strategies aimed at states, must be developed. defining mines “Landmine” has proven difficult to define. The difficulties have as much to do with politics as technicalities, reflecting differences in attitudes towards militarism and even the nature of political change. The definition in the Ot- tawa Treaty has been criticised for not capturing claymore-type mines2 and certain anti-tank mines which can function as person-activated weapons3 . In contrast, broader, function-oriented definitions, as formulated in the “Bad Honnef Framework4 ,” for example, attempt to capture all weapons which can, in practise, be activated by individuals, not just those designed to do so. The Bad Honnef definition has in turn been questioned for its failure to encom- pass all anti-tank mines, which also create problems for civilians, relief ef- forts and post-war recovery. Most Ottawa Treaty countries have accepted a ban on anti-personnel mines while supporting mine clearance programmes which address the whole range of explosive remnants of war. A few, like Italy, have gone further, ban- ning a much broader category of landmine. Non-state actor positions on landmines also reflect these debates: some are more concerned with anti-personnel mines as defined in the Ottawa Treaty; others, such as the Taliban, have gone further in statements they have made or, like the SPLA, in their mine clearance support. The problems posed by a wide range of mine-like weapons, including cluster bombs and anti-tank mines, were discussed at the conference. “Vic- tim-activated weapons” and the ICRC’s catch-all “explosive remnants of war” provided