Utrecht University Faculty of Science Master thesis in the degree program “History and Philosophy of Science” Supervisor: Professor Dr. Bob de Graaff Second reader: Dr. David Baneke Date: June 30, 2015

Semtex in the hand is worth two dirty bombs in the bush The historical relation between explosive technology and terrorism

Jonas Feltes Student number: 4102037 Degree program: Research Master “History and Philosophy of Science”

Zwischen Semtex und Utopie liegen sie sich in den Armen.

- Einstürzende Neubauten-

Abbreviations

ANALFO Ammonium nitrate aluminium fuel oil

ANALNM Ammonium nitrate aluminium nitromethane

ANFO Ammonium nitrate fuel oil

ANNM Ammonium nitrate nitromethane

CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

DDNP Diazodinitrophenol

EDD Explosive detection dog

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

HMTD Hexamethylene triperoxide diamine

IED Improvised explosive device

IS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

PETN Pentaerythrol tetrastearate

PLFP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

RAF Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)

RDX Hexogen

TATP Triacetone triperoxide

TNT Trinitrotoluene

Table of Contents

1. Innovation focus in terrorism research – An introduction ……….………………………6

2. Definitions and outline

2.1. Defining terrorism, technology, knowledge

2.1.1. Terrorism ...... 10

2.1.2. Explosive technology ...... 12

2.1.3. Knowledge ...... 13

2.2. Outline of this thesis

2.2.1. Structure of the introductory chapters ...... 15

2.2.2. Structure of the case studies ...... 16

3. Use and terrorist use of selected explosive technologies

3.1. Ammonium nitrate

3.1.1. The innovation ...... 19

3.1.2. The life cycle of ammonium nitrate ...... 20

3.2. TNT

3.2.1. The innovation ...... 24

3.2.2. The life cycle of TNT ...... 24

3.3. RDX

3.3.1. The innovation ...... 28

3.3.2. The life cycle of RDX ...... 28

3.4. PETN and Semtex

3.4.1. The innovation ...... 31

3.4.2. The life cycle of PETN and Semtex ...... 32

3.5. Special case: Peroxide explosives – Terrorist explosives?

3.5.1. The discovery of peroxide explosives ...... 35

3.5.2. The re-invention of peroxide explosives in the 1970´s ...... 36

4. The acquisition and use of explosive technologies by terrorist groups – Nine Cases

4.1. The acquisition and use of ammonium nitrate

4.1.1. Sterling Hall Bombing (1970) ...... 39

4.1.2. Oslo Bombing (2011) ...... 46

4.2. The acquisition and use of TNT

4.2.1. King David Hotel Bombing (1946) ...... 53

4.2.2. United States Embassy Bombing (1998) ...... 60

4.3. The acquisition and adaption of RDX and C-4

4.3.1. Bombay Bombing (1993) ...... 67

4.3.2. Tequendama Hotel Bombing (2000) ...... 74

4.4. The acquisition and use of PETN and Semtex

4.4.1. “Mai Offensive” of the Red Army Faction (1972) ...... 82

4.4.2. Pan Am Flight 103 (1988) ...... 89

4.5. The terrorist use of peroxide explosives – London Bombings (2005) ...... 95

5. “What to do with the results?” The possibilities of quantitative research in the history of

terrorism and technology ...... 102

6. Discussion, applications, concluding thoughts

6.1. Discussion ...... 106

6.2. Applications of the results ...... 111

6.3. Concluding thoughts ...... 113

References ...... 115

Appendices ...... 136

1. Innovation focus in terrorism research – An introduction

(…) [T]he history of the use of advanced chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in

guerilla warfare is limited, the fact of the matter is that in most cases where groups

have considered pursuing these capabilities have ultimately led to them being

abandoned in favor of more obtainable and efficient tactics. They simply fall well

short of the destruction wrought by simpler and more conventional explosive devices.

Pound for pound, euro for euro and hour for hour of effort, high explosives are far

more effective (…)1

Anders Behring Breivik

With groups like the self-proclaimed “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante” (IS) on the rise, terrorism is one of the leading topics in the media and global policy. Especially violent attacks of terrorist groups are extensively and publicly discussed and call for intensified efforts to counter these attacks by identifying and eliminating the sources of terrorist weaponry.

However, in both public discourse and academic analyses, most debates about the relation between terrorism and weapon technology are focused on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism.

Here, not only discussions concerning the future threat of CBRN terrorism, but even discussions concerning the historical relation between terrorism and CBRN weaponry are overwhelmingly extensive. Beginning as early as in the late 1970´s and early 1980´s with books like Richard Charles Cark´s Technological Terrorism, an innumerable amount of publications about the threat and the historical dimensions of CBRN terrorism have been published.2 However, despite this enormous popularity among researchers, CBRN terrorism

1 Breivik, 2083, p. 1022-1023. 2 Only to a few examples of publications with some emphasis on historical aspects of CBRN terrorism are: Apikyan et al., ‘Nuclear and Radiological Threats’; Arnon et al. ‘Botulinum Toxin; Carus, ‘Bioterrorism’; Cole,

Page 6 of 139 can be seen as rare phenomenon in the terrorist world. In fact, according to the Global

Terrorism Database (GTD), only 99 incidents of CBRN terrorism have occurred until 19703.

Moreover, even terrorists themselves, as for instance Anders Behring Breivik states in the quote above, have been expressing a certain disfavor of CBRN technologies in the terrorist world.

In contrast, other weapon technologies, namely conventional explosives, have been used considerably more frequently by terrorist groups: The GTD lists 49,770 cases of incidents in which explosive were used by terrorist groups and lone operators since 1970.4

However, despite this enormous popularity of explosives among terrorists, only few publications discuss the relation between explosive technologies and terrorism. Furthermore, although especially an historical investigation of the relation between explosive technology and terrorism is needed to understand today´s threat of explosive terrorism, only approximately very few publications deal, at least in parts, with this historical relation.5

Furthermore, although, in general, first steps have been made to shift the focus back to conventional weapon technologies in terrorism studies, for example in the proposal to include

Changing Face; Clark, ‘Technological Terrorism’; Handysides, ‘Bioterrorism’; Leitenberg, ‘Botulinum Toxin’; Morse, `Historical Perspectives; Pichtel, Terrorism; Pita&Gunaratna, ‘Anthrax’; Pita, ‘Toxin weapons’; Salem, ‘Chemical and Biological Terrorism’; Schmid&Kaufmann, ‘Anthrax in Europe’; The National Security Advisory Group, Reducing Nuclear Threats; Tucker, ‘Historical Trends’; Tucker (Ed.), Toxic Terror; Wilkinson (Ed.), Terrorism and Technology; Ghosh (Ed.); Science and Technology; Ivanova&Sandler, ‘CBRN Incidents’; Ivanova&Sandler, ‘CBRN Attack Perpetrators’; Cenciarelli et al.. ‘Bioweapons and bioterrorism’; Dembek, ‘The History and Threat’; Barras& Greub, ‘Biological warfare and bioterrorism’; Riedel, ‘Biological warfare’. In a more general and not representative search, a Google Scholar search of the combination of the exact terms “CBRN” and “History” as well as “Bioterrorism” and “History” brought 4,320 and 26,600 results respectively. The same combination brought 82 and 1,553 results respectively on worldcat.org. Furthermore a Google search of the exact phrases “History of CBRN” and “History of Bioterrorism” brought 20,900 and 52,700 results respectively. 3 Global terrorism database search parameters: Weapon types: “chemical”; “biological”; “radiological”; “nuclear”. Excluding: Ambiguous cases; unsuccessful attacks. The author chose to exclude all cases of minor poisoning and tear gas attacks manually, since they do not fit the definitions of chemical and biological warfare as formulated in: [UNODA], CWC; [UNODA], BWC. 4 Global terrorism database search parameters: Weapon types: “Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite”. Excluding: Ambiguous cases; unsuccessful attacks. 5 Examples of related discussions are: Davis, Buda´s wagon; Pichtel, Terrorism, chapter 6; Ghosh, Pakistan´s ISI, chapter 5, Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovation’; Wilkinson. Technology; Binnie&Wright, ‘Infernal Machines’. Page 7 of 139 explosives in concept of CBRN by renaming the term into CBRNe6, these efforts are still hopelessly outnumbered by the flood of CRBN literature.

By analyzing this disproportion in terrorism research from the perspective of the history of technology, it becomes apparent that most researchers with a focus on the historical dimension of CBRN terrorism maintain an approach that the historian of technology David

Edgerton calls an innovation-centric approach:7 By entirely focusing on novel technologies, such as nuclear technology and biotechnology, researcher presuppose that the innovation of these novel technologies has an immediate impact on society. However, as Edgerton points out, this focus is misleading, since the innovation of a particular technology should be seen as distinct from the use of this technology. By applying this distinction to the history of technology, Edgerton shows that many technologies were used frequently a considerable time after their innovation, and other very popular innovations, such as nuclear technology, have not been used frequently at all. Hence, Edgerton proposes to analyze the history of technology from the perspective of use rather than from the perspective of innovation to avoid a misconceptualization of history.

Thus, rather than warning against the (possible) terrorist usage of certain technologies from the perspective of an innovation-centric account, this paper aims to analyze the historical relation between science and technology on the basis of what Edgerton calls a “use-centered” approach: It focuses on the historical relation between weapon technology and terrorism from the point of view of the frequent usage of technologies by terrorist groups. In the present study, which is among the first studies to combine the history of technology with the history of terrorism8, I will connect the lifecycle of five explosive technologies with their usage by terrorist groups. By analyzing the development and distribution as well as the terrorist

6 Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 8. 7 Edgerton, Shock of the Old, p. xi. 8 One of the very few examples of such a combination is: Fridlund, ‘Buckets, Bollards, and Bombs’.

Page 8 of 139 acquisition and adaption of these five explosives in a set of nine case studies, I aim to answer the following research questions:

In accordance with Edgerton´s use-centric approach and to reassess short claims among researchers that terrorist groups tend to “adapt[] new weapons technologies belatedly”9, I will, first of all, discuss this claim from the perspective of history of technology by asking: (RQ1) At what stage in the life cycles of the selected explosive technologies did terrorist groups start to use these technologies frequently? Furthermore, by analyzing specific historical cases, I will discuss the questions: (RQ2) Through which means did terrorist groups acquire a certain explosive technology and (RQ3) how did they acquire the (RQ3a) explicit and (RQ3b) tacit knowledge to use these technologies? The outcomes of these questions will be used to, further, analyze (RQ4) why terrorist groups decided to use a particular explosive in their attack.

On basis of this four-staged analysis, I will describe a set of important factors that have been involved in the complex historical relation between selected explosive technologies and terrorism in the discussion section. Thereby, the outcomes of this paper might also give valuable insights for counterterrorism practice, including how to prevent the acquisition of explosive technologies and tacit knowledge by terrorists or how to explain the fact that certain conventional explosive technologies have been particularly popular among terrorist groups while novel technologies such as nuclear weapon technologies have (until today) failed to get adopted by terrorist groups.

9 Ghosh et. al, Science and Technology, p. 23. Page 9 of 139

2. Definitions and outline

2.1. Defining terrorism, technology, knowledge?

Before analyzing the historical relation between terrorism, explosive technology, and knowledge, it is necessary to discuss these terms. However, rather than choosing clear definitions of the terms, I will give a short overview of the problems in defining all three terms and, based on this discussion, defend a minimalistic and non-exhaustive approach to work with them.

2.1.1 Terrorism

All case studies in this thesis involve attacks committed by a group or individual that can be identified as terrorists. However, to define what a terrorist or a terrorist group is, one has to define terrorism first: Although terrorism certainly belongs to the most commonly used, yet most controversially discussed terms of our time, the international community did not manage to agree on a single definition of terrorism.10 Furthermore, public debates concerning terrorism are deeply influenced by the changing historical dimension of this term: As several researchers have pointed out, while terrorism tended to be positively perceived as noble act of resistance by its defenders in the beginning of the twentieth century, this connotation changed in the middle of the twentieth century: Terrorism was reduced to a tactic and obtained a negative connotation that has been used in a politicized sense by means of denouncing ones ideological enemies as terrorists.11

Because of this politicization of the term terrorism and because of the inability to formulate a public definition of terrorism, almost every academic discussion of terrorism faces the problem of defining terrorism. Thus, several researchers have provided different

10 Hoffmann, Terrorism, pp. 23-34. 11 Hoffmann, Terrorism, pp. 3-20; Rapoport, ‘Four Waves’, p. 50f.

Page 10 of 139 proposals to define terrorism12. However, rather than quoting these different proposals, I will, inspired by Peter de Kock´s approach, perceive terrorism as a method of communication.13

Furthermore, I will argue that the communication method of terrorism should be seen as a cluster consisting of a dynamic set of characteristics.

As shown by several researchers including Beatrice de Graaf, who claims that

“terrorism is communication”14 and Bob de Graaff, who states that “terrorisme is politieke agendering”15, terrorism can be characterized as a method to communicate political or other ideological goals and demands. Furthermore, several researchers state that the recipient of the message (i.e., terrorist act) is usually not the target of the attack.16 Rather, the target of the attack (for example civilians in a shopping mall) creates the message by being targeted and transfers this message to the receiver (for example a government) via an audience (the general public).

However, even if terrorism can be perceived as a method of communication, this still does not answer the question what terrorism actually is and how it is different from other forms of communication. Here, Schmid´s work can be helpful in identifying the main characteristics of terrorism. Schmid repeatedly surveyed the main elements of other researchers´ definitions using questionnaires.17 As a result of these surveys, Schmid proposed several “academic consensus definitions of terrorism”, of which the latest one reads:

Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a

special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other

hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action

without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants,

12 The most common definitions are those of Schmid, Laqueur, and Hoffmann. See: Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, p. 28; Hoffman, Terrorism, p. 40f.; Laqueur, Age of Terrorism, p. 143. 13 De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, pp. 52-56. 14 De Graaf, ‘Communication’, p. 1. 15 De Graaff, Armageddon, p. x. 16 Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, p. 28; Van der Heide, Individualterrorism, p. 14; De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, p. 53-56. 17 See Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, p. 1-10; Hoffmann, Terrorism, p 33f.

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performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and

conflict parties.18

Thus, and in accordance with Schmid´s earlier claim, I propose to see Schmid´s consensus definition as a non-exhaustive collection of characteristics that are used to describe terrorism, but of which not all need to be present to define an act as an act of terrorism. Thereby,

Schmid´s consensus definition of terrorism constitutes a clustering approach that identifies acts that share most of their characteristics as acts of terrorism. Moreover, in addition to the characteristic of communication, the characteristics of violence19, political intent20, and creating fear21 shall be assigned with more value, and thus more importance, compared to the other characteristics and called “high value characteristics”. Such a clustering approach of defining terrorism certainly faces problems as well, since the exclusion or inclusion of ambiguous cases has to be justified individually.

To sum up, every approach to define terrorism faces problems. However, the approach to define terrorism as a method of communication and further to use a flexible set of independent characteristics to decide whether an act should be called an act of terrorism or not seems to be a useful way to provide a heterogeneous phenomenon like terrorism at least with a minimalistic and pragmatic definition.

2.1.2 Explosive technology

To define the term explosive technology one could assign a rather technical definition of explosives based on Rudolf Meyer´s definition, who characterizes explosives as

(…) solid or liquid substances, alone or mixed with one another, which are in a

metastable state and are capable, for this reason, of undergoing a sapid chemical

reaction without the participation of external reactants such as atmospheric oxygen.22

18 Schmid, ‘Academic Consensus Definition’, p. 158. 19 Schmid, ‘Academic Consensus Definition’, p. 158; Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, table 1.2. 20 Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, table 1.2. 21 Schmid&Jongmann, Political terrorism, table 1.2.; Schmid, ‘Academic Consensus Definition’, p. 158. 22 Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 131.

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However, adding to this technical definition, I will investigate the history of explosive technology by maintaining Edgerton´s minimalistic definition of technology: In his book The

Shock of the Old, Edgerton proposes to discuss the history of technology not only within a use-centric framework (see Introduction), but also by referring to technologies as things rather than independent historical actors.23 This approach offers the advantage that we are able to discuss the use and ownership of technology in a setting that we can understand, rather than discussing the use of technology by referring to technology as a mysterious and indefinable

“historical force”.24 This approach prevents to perceive technology as an historical actor within a linear and teleological view in terms of constant improvement that is, as David

Edgerton has shown, highly inaccurate, oversimplifying and, in fact, never used among historians of science and technology.25 Furthermore, in accordance with Edgerton´s use- centric approach to the history of technology, explosive technology should be seen as things that have been frequently used as an explosive by means of detonating for legitimate

(commercial/military) or illegitimate (terrorism) purposes.

However, and adding to Edgerton´s approach, I propose to not see things such as explosives as passive and unchangeable, but as dynamic objects that, through their use, have been changing our society. For example, an explosive can be changed by one group, what may affect the use of the explosive by a different group and vice versa.

2.1.3 Knowledge

To successfully use explosive technology, knowledge is necessary. Thus, the third term that needs to be defined in this chapter is the term of knowledge. Just in the cases of terrorism, the definition of knowledge has been subject to complex historical changes and has been interacting with social, political, and cultural values and ideas. Hence, the definition of

23 Edgerton, Shock of the Old, p. xvii-xviii. 24 Ibidem. 25 Edgerton argues that the “linear model” can be seen as “straw man” among historians, in: Edgerton, ‘Linear model’.

Page 13 of 139 knowledge has been discussed for millennia and is subject of one of the most basic disciplines of philosophy – the epistemology.26 Because even a short introduction into epistemology would go far beyond the scope of this thesis, I will maintain a minimalistic definition of knowledge by referring to it as everything that “has been cooked, processed or systematized by thought”27, as Burke states in his book A Social History Of Knowledge.

However, for this thesis it is more important to classify knowledge than to define it in general. In his book Gifts of Athena, Joel Mokyr distinguishes between two essential parts of knowledge: propositional knowledge or Ω knowledge, and prescriptive knowledge or λ knowledge. While propositional knowledge can be seen as a body of theoretical knowledge

(for example concerning natural laws), prescriptive knowledge describes the “know-how”, that means the instructive part of knowledge that consists of techniques (for example on how to successfully use technology).28

A further, related, distinction, that plays a central role in the present study, can be added to the domain of Mokyr´s λ knowledge that has been extensively used by researchers in organization and technology studies: The distinction between explicit knowledge and the so- called tacit knowledge – a term that was already introduced in 1956 by the philosopher

Michael Polanyi, who maintained that parts of human knowledge remains unarticulated and bound to a person´s experience.29 Thus, tacit knowledge cannot be formalized or be transferred by writing it down, and therefore can only can be acquired via human interaction and “learning-by-doing”.30 In contrast, explicit knowledge refers to the domain of knowledge that refers to theoretical instructions, such as manuals and, therefore, can be formalized and exists in written form.31 This distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge has

26 Introductory readings on this discipline: Audi, Epistemology. 27 Burke, Knowledge, p. 11. 28 Mokyr, Gifts of Athena, p. 4-15. 29 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 72-79. 30 Lam, Tacit Knowledge, p. 6f.; Jackson, Organizational Learning, p. 9. 31 Lam, Tacit Knowledge, p. 6f.

Page 14 of 139 not only been used extensively in organization studies, but was also utilized to analyze the knowledge transfer and acquisition of terrorist groups by researchers such as Brian Jackson,

Kim Cragin, and Michael Kennedy (here: “metis”).32 Hence, this distinction will also be part of the present study.

2.2. Outline of this thesis

2.2.1. Structure of the introductory chapters

In accordance with Edgerton´s approach of a use-centric history, the five explosives that will be used for the present analysis shall be among the most frequently used explosives in the terrorist world. To identify these explosives, I used a multilayered approach of qualitative and quantitative research. First of all, I consulted both a huge amount of journalistic sources about terrorist attacks and terrorism in general as well as relevant academic literature. Additionally,

I analyzed the frequency of a set of the most common explosives in terrorist incident databases such as the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents33, the Global

Terrorism Database34, and the ESC Pandora35 database as well as in the news database of the

LexisNexis database.36 This survey identified ammonium nitrate (with ANFO, ANNM,

ANALFO, ANALNM), trinitrotoluene, RDX (with Composition-4), and PETN (with Semtex) as among the most frequently used explosives by terrorist groups and lone operators.

However, this particular choice was not only influenced by pure numbers. Specifically, I also decided to exclude and include certain explosives for the sake of the design of this study. For example, although the quantitative analysis revealed that dynamite most certainly can be seen as among the most frequently used explosives, I decided to exclude this explosive from my

32 Jackson, Organizational Learning; Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition’; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth; Kennedy, ‘Organizational Learning’. 33 RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 34 Global Terrorism Database. 35 ECS Pandora Database. See for discussion De Kock, Criminal Behaviour. 36 See Appendix A; LexisNexis News Database. In case of the latter, I combined the name of the respective explosive with the search phrase „+terroris*“ to ensure relevant results for this survey. Details in Appendix A.

Page 15 of 139 analysis, since its relationship has already been researched in detail.37 Furthermore, I decided to include peroxide explosives (HMTD and TATP), specifically because their use-history is, interestingly, only restricted to terrorist use.38 By being two of the very few explosives with such a history, HMTD and TATP add a further dimension to the relation between explosive technology and terrorism.

To introduce these five explosives and to answer RQ1, the first main part of this thesis will consist of a short historical overview of each explosive. These introductory chapters are not meant to be exhaustive historical compendia, but brief overviews of selected aspects of the history of the above mentioned explosive technologies. In these overviews, the use- centered approach of Edgerton will be the starting point and I will show that the use history of the explosives is not only determined by the “technical superiority”39 of the respective explosive as some researchers maintain40, but is a complex interaction of various factors that led to the extensive use of these technologies. Although these overviews are focused on the use histories of explosive technologies, they cannot be presented without describing their innovation histories very briefly. The main part of the overviews will however be focused on the use history of each explosive by means of legitimate and illegal use as well as on the histories of countermeasures that have been used to prevent the illegal use of these explosives.

2.2.2. Structure of the case studies

In the second main part, I will assign two historical cases of terrorist use of each explosive to answer the questions RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4. The peroxide explosives will be provided with only one case study, since peroxide explosives present a special case in this analysis.

Of course, these nine case studies were primarily chosen on grounds of the publicly available information about these incidents. Only if enough journalistic sources, police or

37 See e.g. Merriman, Dynamite Club; Adamic, Dynamite; Short, Dynamite War. 38 See chapter 3.5.2 for discussion. 39 Brown, Big Bang, p. 152. 40 Brown, Big Bang, p. 152f.

Page 16 of 139 intelligence reports, indictments, court transcripts, or archival documents are available, the research question can be analyzed properly. However, besides the determining factor of available information, I tried to evenly distribute the below presented cases across time: The earliest incident of this thesis took place in 1946 and the last discussed incident in 2011.

Moreover, to analyze properly how the terrorist usage of the explosive interacted with the history of their legitimate use, usually one or more decades lay between two incidents that involve the same explosive.

In addition to the factor of time, the case studies also manage to represent all continents with the exception of Australia as well as various ideologies ranging from leftist to right wing ideologies or from Christian to Zionist and Islamic fanaticism. This selection of ideologies resembles to a certain degree the four-waves model of terrorism of David

Rapoport41, but is with cases such as the 2011 Oslo Bombing not restricted to it. Finally, to add another important component to my analysis of the terrorist use of explosives, I also included various different group forms including international groups with cells, criminal syndicates, local groups, and lone operators.

These nine case studies will be presented in the following form: After a short summary of the respective incident, I will, based on various sources, describe the explosive technology that was used during the incident and discuss the acquisition of these explosives (RQ2) and of the expertise (RQ3) to use the respective explosive technology. Here, this latter discussion will distinguish, if possible, between the acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge. In the last section of each case study, the results will be used to restore factors that might have been involved in the decision process of the group to acquire the particular explosive technology

(RQ4). However, since this analysis is usually an interpretation of the results of RQ2 and

41 See for detailed discussion: Rapoport, ‘Four Waves’.

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RQ3, it is necessary to formulate some criteria of the factors that might be involved in this decision process beforehand:

The decision to acquire a particular explosive technology for a bombing is determined by factors that can be divided into (1) operational factors and (2) symbolic factors:

(1) Based on academic literature on terrorist decision making42 and discussions concerning the knowledge acquisition and sharing among terrorist groups, 43 the following operational factors can be identified:

a) the group capabilities by means of:

 expertise44 (not only the general degree of expertise, but

also the specialization of expertise on certain technologies),

 financial resources45,

 the group´s network.46

However, from the perspective of an historian of science and technology also the technology itself should be seen as determining the decision process to acquire it to a certain degree.

Thus, another important operational factor is:

b) the nature of the explosive by means of:

 quality (detectability, size, resistance to water, shock etc.)

 availability

 handling

However, these two factors, the group´s capabilities and the nature of the explosive, are interacting with each other. For example, the availability of a certain explosive is

42 Drake, Target Selection; Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition’; Dolnik, Terrorist Innovation. 43 Forest, Teaching Terror; Cragin&Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat; Forest, ‘Knowledge Transfer’; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth. 44 Forest, Teaching Terror, pp. 1-13; Cragin&Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, pp. 48-50 ; Forest, ‘Knowledge Transfer’, p. 269; , Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition’, p. 201f.; Dolnik, Terrorist Innovation, p. 19. 45 Dolnik, Terrorist Innovation, p. 19; Cragin&Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, pp. 54-57; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, table 2.1. 46 Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition’, pp. 198-200 ; Forest, ‘Knowledge Transfer’, pp. 272-282.

Page 18 of 139 dependent on the network and financial resources of a group and its handling can be seen as relative to the group´s expertise. However, the group´s capabilities and the nature of the particular explosive are only to some degree relative to each, since every explosive obviously possesses inherent qualities by being, for example, easy to handle for everyone or openly available to everyone.

(2) Besides these operational factors, symbolic factors are also implicitly involved in the decision making process of a terrorist group to use a particular explosive.47 For example, the use of C-4 could signal high sophistication of an Islamist terrorist group in Iraq and could, thereby, intimidate US soldiers, who have to witness that their own military explosive is being turned against them. In the same narrative, the usage of AN, TATP, or HMTD could imply the omnipresent threat of explosive terrorism, since these explosives are openly available substances. However, whether symbolic factors were involved in a particular attack is rarely visible in any sources and is, thus, in most cases subject of interpretation or an educated guess. Of course, this list of the two factors is only a selection of interacting factors that might be important for terrorist decision making and should therefore not be understood as exhaustive.

3. Use and terrorist use of selected explosive technologies

3.1. Ammonium nitrate

3.1.1. The innovation

Ammonium nitrate (AN) was already discovered in Early Modern times by the alchemist and natural philosopher Johann Rudolph Glauber who initially described AN in his book

47 The symbolic value of using sophisticated technology (in case of Aum Shinrikyo) is discussed in: Dolnik, Terrorist Innovation, p. 70f.

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Miraculum Mundi in 1648.48 Glauber produced the novel substance that he called “nitrum flammans”49 by mixing ammonium carbonate with nitric acid. Although since Glauber several researchers found alternative manufacturing processes, such as the Oswalt process in which ammonium is oxidized to AN with the help of catalytic platinum50, Glauber´s simple experiment has remained the most common manufacturing style of AN.51 However, despite its early discovery, it was not before 1883 that the explosive characteristics of AN were described by the French chemist Marcellin Berthelot in detail.52 Finally, with the possibility to convert nitrogen into ammonia with the help of hydrogen, introduced by chemist Fritz Haber as Haber process in 1909, and with its industrial scale application by Carl Bosch in 1910, AN could be manufactured and used as fertilizer and explosive in large quantities.53

3.1.2. The life cycle of ammonium nitrate

While AN was already to some degree used as fertilizer in the late 19th century, the frequent usage of AN as explosive began in the first decades of the 20th century – roughly 250 years after its discovery. However, already in 1863, ten years before Berthelot described the explosive characteristics of AN, the Swedish researchers Ohlsen and Norrbin patented a mixture of AN and charcoal as mining explosive.54 After Berthelot´s description, several other followed, so that, between 1885 and 1906, several patents were granted that described mixture of AN with aluminum powder, called Ammonal.55 Two of the most influential patents of this kind were submitted by Hans Ritter von Dahmen and the chemist Richard Escales.56

48 Glauber, Miraculum Mundi and more generally: Osler, Scientific Revolution, p. 119-122. 49 Ibidem. 50 Mellor, Treatise II, p. 831. 51 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 450; Urbansik, Chemistry III, p. 498-503. 52 Berthelot, Sur la force; Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 455. 53 See Erisman et al., ‘ammonia synthesis’. 54 Urbanski, Chemistry III, p. 395. 55 Urbanski, Chemistry III, p. 268. 56 Patent DE172327; Patent US812195.

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While Ammonal and other mixtures were mainly used for mining in the early 20th century57, explosives containing AN quickly became popular shell fillings during both world wars. Here, war parties such as Germany, Russia, and Great Britain58 used AN, mixed with other explosives, as shell fillings, simply because it offered an inexpensive alternative to the significantly more powerful, but also more expensive, picric acid, TNT, or RDX.59

After the Second World War, commercial applications of AN as fertilizer and explosive prevailed again. However, with the production of AN in prills in 194860 another important explosive mixture with AN was discovered: In 1955, H. B. Lee and R. L. Akre described that prilled AN soaked with fuel oil can be used as powerful and inexpensive explosive.61 This mixture, called ANFO, quickly became a popular and inexpensive mining explosive that superseded the significantly more powerful Nobel´s dynamite as commercial explosive.62 Hence, in the late 1950´s, two different types of AN prills were developed: One

“ANFO version” with porous prills that could soak up oil and another version with dense prills that could be used as fertilizer.63 However, even the “fertilizer version” of AN can be used to manufacture ANFO by simply milling or grinding the prills.64 Today, ANFO remains the most important commercial explosives and is industrially manufactured and sold by mining suppliers, such as Orica mining services.65

(RQ1) The history of AN is not only a history of mining and agriculture, but also a history of disasters. Although AN can be seen as insensitive to shock and only detonates while ignited by a smaller detonation, several severe accidents have occurred in which large amounts of AN detonated and harmed persons. Additionally, AN took hundreds of lives as an

57 Urbanski, Chemistry III, p. 268. 58 See for detailed discussion Urbanski, Chemistry III, pp. 266-274. 59 See chapter 3.2.2; Urbanski, Chemistry III, pp. 268-270. 60 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 100. 61 David, Welding Research, p. 661; Urbanski, Chemistry III, p. 253f; and further Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 252. 62 Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 252; Urbanski, Chemistry III, p. 508-510; Oxley, ‘Non-traditional explosives’, p. 36. 63 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 101. 64 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 102. 65 Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 252; Oxley, ‘Non-traditional explosives’, p. 36; Krehl, Shock Waves, p. 209f.; Orica Website.

Page 21 of 139 explosive that was used by terrorist groups. Beginning in the 1970´s with the usage of AN by leftist terrorist groups such as the New Years Gang66 and the Red Army Faction (RAF)67, AN was further used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1980´s and 1990´s.68 Moreover, the right wing terrorists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols used large amounts of ANFO in one of the worst terrorist attacks in the history of the United States – the Oklahoma City

Bombing.69 Finally, one of the most recent deployment of AN as terrorist weapon was the

Oslo Bombing in 2011.70

To prevent this malicious use of AN and to minimize accidents, the Governments of several countries introduced regulations concerning the purchase, storage, and transportation of AN. One of the forerunners in this regard was Great Britain: In 1984, the British government issued the Control of Major Accidents (COMAH) regulation on the maximum amounts of AN for trade, storage, and transportation, which was redefined in 1999 and again in 2005.71 In the United States, the transportation of AN has been regulated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (TSA) of 200172 and AN was added to the Chemical Facility

Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), which regulates the storage of chemicals.73 Furthermore, the US Department of Homeland Security proposed an Ammonium Nitrate Security Program in 2011 that would regulate the purchase of AN by demanding registration of any purchase and by limiting the amount of purchasable AN.74

The European Union already started to regulate the trade and transportation of AN in the 1970´s: Whereas the regulation 76/116 EEC from 197675 controlled the composition of

66 See chapter 4.1.1. 67 Ibidem. 68 See [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 104-105. 69 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 37. 70 See chapter 4.1.2. 71 [United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive], COMAH. 72 [United States Congress, 107th], TSA. 73 [United States Department of Homeland Security], Chemical Facility, Appendix A. 74 [United States Department of Homeland Security], Ammonium Nitrate. 75 76/116 EEC.

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AN fertilizers in general, the regulation 80/876 EEC from 198076 already described clear safety regulations by stating that the oil retention of AN prills should not exceed 4% or that the maximum amount of combustible material in AN fertilizers should not exceed 0.2%.

Furthermore, this regulation stated that every AN fertilizer that enters the free market has to undergo a detonation testing. This regulation was further improved by regulations 96/82/EC77,

2003/105 EC78, and 2003/2003 EC79 that focused on the storage and labeling of AN fertilizers. Finally, with its REACH legislation from 201080, the European Union prohibited all AN fertilizers with more than 16% nitrogen to be sold to private persons except farmers and authorized explosive workers. Simultaneously to the efforts to prevent the malicious use of AN through regulations, several efforts have been made since 1968 to render the structure of AN to prevent it from detonating entirely.81 However, until today these efforts remain proposals.

Besides regulating the distribution of AN explosives, a further way to prevent its illegal use is to detect the explosive. However, because of the low effectiveness of AN based explosives, its use as an explosive requires large amount of the compound.82 Thus, vehicles rather than suitcases or bags have been the most common delivery system for AN based explosives. Hence, its detection through methods like x-ray technologies is not as relevant as the detection of large amounts of AN in vehicles. Here, explosive detection dogs (EDD´s) can provide valuable services.83 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that traces of AN on individuals can be detected by ion mass spectrometry scanners. Ion mass spectrometry was introduced in the 1980´s and has been used successfully at airports to detect traces of

76 80/876 EEC. 77 96/82 EC. 78 2003/105 EC. 79 2003/2003 EC. 80 1907/2006 EC, M5, No. 48. 81 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 97- 114. Latest proposal was issued by Sandia National Laboratory. See Sandia National Laboratory Website. 82 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 15. 83 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 38. Page 23 of 139 explosives on the hands of passengers. In the negative ion mode, these scanners manage to detect AN.84

3.2. TNT

3.2.1. The innovation

Trinitrotoluene (TNT) was discovered by the German chemist Julius Wilbrandt in 1863 by mixing the chemical compound toluene with nitric acid and sulfuric acid while boiling this mixture.85 After several days, Wilbrandt added water to the mixture and crystallized the resulting sediment with alcohol and water. The crystalline compound that was formed through this procedure was called “Trinitrotoluol”86 by Wilbrandt.

The newly discovered TNT was further investigated by the chemists Beilstein and

Kuhlberg, who identified its isomers in 1870,87 by Hepp, who managed to prepare pure trinitrotoluene in 187088, and by Claus and Becker, who improved the manufacturing process of TNT in 1883.89 Another important step was made by the chemist Carl Friedrich

Häußermann, who initially described the explosive characteristics of TNT in 1889 and advised the German military to replace the until then commonly used explosive picric acid with TNT as shell filling.90 Amongst others, because of Häußermann´s findings, the industrial manufacturing of TNT became increasingly sophisticated in the beginning of the 20th century.

3.2.2. The life cycle of TNT

During the first 40 years after its discovery by Wilbrandt in 1863, TNT was not used as an explosive, but as a dye to dye textiles yellow.91 Only after Häußermann´s discovery, the

German military recognized the explosive character of TNT. Although TNT is less powerful

84 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 156, 161. 85 Wilbrandt, ‘Trinitrotoluol’, p. 178. 86 Ibidem. 87 Akhavan, Chemistry, p. 34-35; Urbanski, Chemistry I, p. 285; 291. 88 Akhavan, Chemistry, p. 34, table 2.11. 89 Akhavan, Chemistry, table 2.11; Urbanski, Chemistry I, p. 254, 291. 90 Swart, Karl-Heinz, ‘Haeußermann, Carl Friedrich’. 91 Brown, Big Bang, p. 153f.

Page 24 of 139 than picric acid92, it held several advantages that influenced the German military´s decision to replace picric acid with TNT as shell filling: TNT was very insensitive to shock or heat, the costs of production were lower than those of picric acid production, and it did not react with metals and melted at around 100C°, what made it significantly easier to fill it into shells.93

While Germany began in 1902 to produce and use TNT as military explosive, other nations such as Great Britain, followed not before the beginning of the First World War.

According to Georg Ingham Brown, the British military was especially motivated to completely replace picric acid with TNT as shell filling after German warships succeeded over British navy during the battle of Jutland in 1916.94 According to Brown, the Germans used TNT during the battle and, thereby, indirectly exported the usage of TNT to Britain.95

This export of TNT after the Battle of Jutland could be interpreted as a merely psychological decision: Since the Germans managed to beat the British navy and used TNT, the British military increased the efforts to produce huge quantities of this novel innovation that apparently wins more battles than the commonly old, but more powerful, picric acid. 96

However, during the war, the mass production of TNT was still an expensive and time-consuming procedure. Thus, to lower the costs, a mixture of TNT and AN, called

AMATOL, was used as shell fillings by several war parties.97 However, the adaption of

AMATOL in Britain encountered some drawbacks, since it was initially rejected by military officers, since it was perceived as “second class” shell fillings.98

In the aftermath of the first World War, the military production of TNT decreased, but

TNT was increasingly used for civilian purposes including mining and quarrying and evolved

92 See Appendix B. 93 Brown, Big Bang, p. 153. 94 Brown, Big Bang, p. 151-153. 95 Brown, Big Bang, p. 157. 96 See RE factors of both explosives in Appendix B. 97 Brown, Big Bang, pp. 158-159. 98 Brown, Big Bang, p. 159.

Page 25 of 139 into a popular industrial explosives in the middle of the twentieth century.99 However, the

Second World War reactivated the military use of TNT on a dramatic scale: According to

Brown, Britain alone used 284,000 tons of TNT during this war, which was, thanks to repeatedly improved production techniques, now available for mass production. Today, TNT is still one of the most commonly used explosives for both military and commercial purposes.100 Due to this popularity, its detonation power serves as scale for the relative effectiveness (RE factor) of explosives in general.101

(RQ1) This popularity of TNT enabled several terrorist groups to acquire and use the explosive. The first certain occurrence of TNT in the weaponry of terrorist groups can be located in mandatory Palestine between the 1920´s and the late 1940´s.102 Here, both militant

Israeli and Arab groups used TNT to execute attacks against each other or against the occupying British forces. One of the most popular incidents during this conflict was the King

David Hotel Bombing in 1946103. Later, TNT was used by several terrorist groups such as the

IRA in the 1980´s and 1990´s104 and Al Qaida in the 1990´s. For example, the latter used TNT to attack two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998105. Although several terrorist manuals including William Powell´s The Anarchist Cookbook describe the manufacturing process of trinitrotoluene briefly106, the manufacturing as well as the isolation of chemicals like toluene require extensive chemical knowledge and equipment.

Amongst others due to the danger of misuse of TNT, several national and international regulations concerning the trade and usage of this explosive have been formulated: Although trinitrotoluene was initially not considered an explosive and was, thus, excluded from the

British 1875 Explosives Act that regulated the handling of explosive compounds, it was added

99 Brown, Big Bang, p. 164; Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 338. 100 Akhavan, Chemistry, p. 35; Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 338. 101 See Appendix B. 102 See for the early use of TNT by Zionist groups: Begin, Revolt. 103 See chapter 4.2.1. 104 Keane et al., ‘Forensic Investigation’. 105 See chapter 4.2.2. 106 Powell, Anarchist Cookbook, p. 118.

Page 26 of 139 to this act in the beginning of the 20th century.107 Furthermore, TNT has been considered a high explosive by regulations regarding explosives in several other states including the United

States108 and Germany.109 In 1993, the international trade of TNT was regulated by the

Wassenaar Agreement. However, the agreement considers TNT a so-called dual use technology that can be used for both military and commercial purposes and, thus, should be handled as industrial good with certain restrictions.110 Moreover, the United Nations

Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods added TNT to the list of explosives and assigned its transportation with several security restrictions.111

Furthermore, the detection of this explosive became another key element of security considerations concerning this explosive. While until the 1970´s only odor based detection measures, such as EDD´s, could detect TNT, 112 several other detection technologies were developed in the 1980´s and 1990´s to prevent the misuse of TNT. For example, in 1972, colorimetric detection methods became able to detect TNT.113 During the 1980´s x-ray scans were introduced to detect TNT based explosives visually, and furthermore CXRS scans have been able to detect TNT through its crystalline nature since the 1990´s.114 Most recently, CT x-ray scans have been introduced, who are able to detect TNT on basis of its density and other characteristics.115 Parallel to x-rays, also other methods including ion mobility spectrometry have been capable of detecting TNT containing explosives since the 1980´s.116

107 Brown, Big Bang, p. 153. 108 [ATF], Explosives Law. 109 [Deutsches Bundesministerium für Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz], SprengG. 110 [WA Plenary], Wassenaar Arrangement, Dual Use List Cat. 1, 1. A 8,; Annex 111 [United Nations Economic and Social Council´s Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods], Dangerous Goods, Number 0209. 112 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 30. 113 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 53. 114 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 121; 123-127. 115 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 131-144. 116 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 64; Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 171-202; esp. 177.

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3.3. RDX and C-4

3.3.1. The innovation

On July 15, 1898 the German chemist Georg Friedrich Henning was granted a patent for the process of manufacturing a novel nitroamine out of the nitration of hexamethylene tetramine by using concentrated nitric acid and by pouring this mixture into ice water.117 The product that precipitates out of this procedure was called cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine, or hexogen.

In the patent, Henning elaborated about possible applications of this novel chemical in detail, but stated that this nitroamine “soll technische Verwerthung finden und als Ausgangsmaterial für medizinische Präparate dienen”118. However, in a patent from 1919 the German company

Centralstelle für Wissenschaftlich-technische Untersuchungen GmbH initially proposed to use hexogen as an explosive that, unlike to the already discovered nitroglycerine, would be shock insensitive.119

This new characteristic of hexogen managed to turn Henning´s findings, in light of the

First World War, into a popular discovery that was internationally recognized and modified by researchers like the Austrian chemist Edmund von Hertz120 or by George Hale, who described the detailed explosive properties of hexogen in 1925.121Furthermore, the hexogen production was constantly improved and industrialized by means of several different production processes, such as Wolfram´s “W process” from 1934, Schnurr´s “SH process” of

1937, and Knöffler´s “KA process” from 1943.122

3.3.2. The life cycle of RDX and C-4

Due to these improvements in producing hexogen, it was possible to produce the explosive in large quantities in several countries including Great Britain, where it was called RDX

117 Patent DE104280; Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 234. 118 Patent DE104280. 119 Patent DE298539. 120 Patent US1402693. 121 Hale, ‘Nitration’. 122 Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 176; Urbanski, Chemistry, pp. 87-105.

Page 28 of 139

(Research Department Explosive), because it was manufactured and improved by the British research department in Woolwich. However, countries like Germany and the United States also quickly managed to produce and use RDX on a large scale. Furthermore, shortly after the end of the war, the US military used RDX as basic ingredient for the manufacturing of the first plastic explosives Composition A, B, and C in the 1950´s.123 The most prominent plastic explosive that quickly became the standard explosive for the US military was C-4 that consists of 91% RDX mixed with plasticizers.124

After the war, RDX as well as its modification C-4 remained to be military explosives that were used in conflicts like the Vietnam war and the war on terror. Although there are possibilities to use RDX commercially including as “fireworks, in demolition blocks, as a heating fuel for food rations, and as an occasional rodenticide“125, it has never been commercially produced in the United States. Rather, the sole source of RDX production in the

United States has been several ammunition plants owned by the US army.126 Besides its shock insensitive nature, the popularity of RDX among several militaries stems from its enormous detonation force as well as from its insensitivity.127 Additionally, the modification of RDX into C-4 allows to form and adjust the explosive optionally.

(RQ1) However, although RDX and its modification is almost exclusively used by the military, terrorist groups managed to acquire and use this explosive several times since its discovery. Within the life cycle of RDX, the 1980´s and 1990´s could be seen as the two decades during which terrorist groups started to frequently use RDX and RDX containing explosives to execute attacks. Here, for example the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in

123 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 78. 124 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 45; Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 256. 125 Singh, Microbiological Degradation, p. 236. 126 Cyclonite, in: Toxicology Data Network. 127 For RE factor see Appendix B. Page 29 of 139

1987128 as well as the Bombay Bombings in 1993129 could be seen as the most popular early incidents involving RDX and C-4. Today, RDX and especially C-4 seem to be highly popular among terrorist groups, since they have been used in recent attacks, including the Khobar tower bombing (1996)130, the USS Cole bombing (2000)131 as well as the Commuter Train blasts in Mumbai (2006)132. However, C-4 in particular was already loosely connected to terrorist groups in the 1970´s, since investigators revealed that former CIA agent Edwin P.

Wilson managed to transfer approximately twenty tons of C-4 to Libya, where they were transferred to terrorist groups such as the PLFP.133 Moreover, the literature warns that there are several manual on how to manufacture “homemade” RDX and C-4 available.134 However, while some of these manuals refer to a mixture of AN with nitro methane (ANNM) as

“homemade C-4”135, others give only a very brief and general description of the manufacturing process that requires a huge amount of chemical expertise as well as complex chemicals.136

Amongst others, due to this misuse of RDX, the explosive has been assigned with strict regulations: In the United States, its acquisition, usage, and marketing has been strictly restricted to Governmental entities by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives137 and was included into the ammunition list of the US Army that, thereby, considers RDX a military explosive according to federal law.138 In the Wassenaar agreement of 1996, RDX and all of its modification are defined as defense-related products that underlie

128 Oxley, ‘Non-traditional Explosives’, p. 6. 129 See chapter 5.3.1. 130 Cohen, Report. 131 Sniffen, ‘FBI: Plastic explosive’; Lorentz, Maritime Threat. 132 Tankel, Indian Jihadist Movement, p. 20. 133 Little, ‘Shores of Tripoli’, p. 82. 134 Oxley, ‘Non-traditional Explosives’, p. 30; 34. 135 Benson, Homemade C-4. 136 The in this regard most cited book describes the manufacturing process of RDX with 200 words by repeating the manufacturing method of Henning´s patent. See: Lecker, Homemade Semtex. 137 [ATF], Explosive Laws. 138 [United States Directorate of Defense Trade Control], Munitions List.

Page 30 of 139 strict regulations concerning trade and usage.139 Furthermore, the United Nations consider

RDX a hazardous substance and regulate the transport of RDX containing products according to the UN Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods140.

Furthermore, several measures were introduced to detect this explosive during the

1980´s and 1990´s. While the detection of RDX through vapor based detection tools could cause problems because of its low vapor pressure141, colorimetric detection as well as x-ray scans and CXRS scans are able to detect RDX.142 Furthermore, ion mobility spectrometry as well as the novel CT x-ray scan technology is able to detect RDX containing explosives.143

Finally, to enhance the detection of RDX containing explosives, especially C-4 has been, since the 1980´s, marked with small amounts of 2,3-dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane (DMNB).144

3.4. PETN and Semtex

3.4.1. The innovation

The explosive characteristics as well as the manufacturing process of the basic component of

PETN, Pentaerythritol, was initially described by the German chemists Bernhard Tollens and

P Wigand. In an article that was published in the journal Justus Liebigs Annalen der Chemie, the researchers described that Pentaerythritol could be manufactured through an alkaline condensation of acetaldehyde and formaldehyde in water.145 Three years later, the German explosive manufacturer Rheinisch Westfälische Sprengstoff AG managed to manufacture

Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) by nitrating it from Pentaerythritol with the help of

139 [WA Plenary], Wassenaar Arrangement, Munitions List. 140 [United Nations Economic and Social Council´s Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods], Dangerous Goods, Numbers 0072, 0391, 0483. 141 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 4. 142 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 53; 121; 94. 143 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 131-144 and p. 171-202; [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 64. 144 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 46. 145 Tollens&Wigand, ‘Ueber den Penta-Erythrit’; Zukas et al., Explosive Effect, p. 41; Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 175; Krehl, Shock Waves, p. 405.

Page 31 of 139 concentrated nitric acid.146 Since then, researchers described two common methods to manufacture Pentaerythritol; namely through nitrating it with or without diluting it into water.147 However, the newly created explosive turned out to be too shock sensitive to be used as a main charge in its pure form. However, despite this disadvantage, possible applications of PETN as explosive agent were quickly discovered: The first patent for PETN in connection to explosive technology was granted Dr. C. Claessen on October 1, 1913, in which Claessen described that PETN could be successfully used in blasting caps and that the detonation force of these blasting caps exceeds not only the detonation force of picric acid, but also that of trinitrotoluene.148 However, despite that early discovery of its explosive characteristics as well as of the great detonation force of PETN, the industrial production and usage of PETN should not begin until the outbreak of the Second World War, when the industrial production of acetaldehyde and formaldehyde became available.149

3.4.2. The life cycles of PETN and Semtex

During the Second World War, PETN was almost exclusively used for military purposes including bridge destruction and detonations under water. During the wartime, Germany produced approximately 1440 tons of PETN every month in the factory Krümmel that was owned by the Alfred Nobel Dynamit AG.150 In this factory, the Dynamit AG was the first company to develop a method (that is called the “German method”151), to produce PETN as a secondary explosive charge on a large scale. Other countries, including the Soviet Union and

Japan, followed during the war by introducing own methods of the industrial production of

PETN.152 After the Second World War, PETN was increasingly used for commercial purposes. In form of blasting caps and detonation cords, the explosive has been especially

146 Zukas et al., Explosive Effect, p. 41. 147 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 175. 148 Patent DE265025A_1. 149 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 176. 150 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 176, 187; Zukas et al., Explosive Effect, p. 41. 151 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 187. 152 Urbanski, Chemistry II, p. 190-191.

Page 32 of 139 frequent used by the mining industry.153 For example, PETN has been the main ingredients of various products of the largest supplier of mining products, Orica Mining Services, and is widely used as basic component for various plastic explosives in industry and military.154

However, one of these plastic explosives, that was invented by the Czech company Explosia

(then: Synthesia) in 1966, was not only used for military and commercial purposes, but also gained particular notoriety in connection with international terrorism:

Commissioned by the Government of North Vietnam to design an equivalent explosive to the American C-4 explosives, Synthesia employee Stanislav Brebera combined the explosives RDX and PETN with plasticizers and created the plastic explosive Semtex.155

At first, Semtex was sold under the trademark B1, but was renamed and manufactured into the two products Semtex 1A and Semtex H in 1967:156 Semtex 1A consists of 41 to 50% percent of PETN and 41 to 50.2% of RDX and was used mainly for blasting in

Czechoslovakia. Semtex H, which consists of 76 to 94% of PETN and 4.6 to 5.7% of RDX, was exported in several countries and used for hardening, mine clearance, and other military and commercial purposes.157 However, Synthesia did not only export Semtex H to the befriended socialist countries North Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic, but also to countries like Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and Libya during the late 1970´s and early 1980´s.158

(RQ1) To locate the usage of PETN within the life cycle of this explosive is rather difficult, since this explosive has mostly been used by means of being the basic ingredients in detonation cords and blasting caps. However, early incidents of the usage of PETN containing explosives by terrorists can be located in the early 1970´s. Here, the German Red Army

Faction as well as US American leftist groups stole and used PETN containing explosives

153 Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 237, 257; Orica Website; Krehl, Shock Waves, p. 406. 154 Orica Website; Krehl, Shock Waves, p. 406. 155 [Explosia Website], History; Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’; Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 260. 156 [Explosia Website], History. 157 Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 261; UN UNTERM, ‘Semtex’. 158 Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’; Hart-Davis&Brown, Big Bang, p. 165.

Page 33 of 139 from stone pits and mines to use them for attacks159 Furthermore, PETN was frequently used throughout the 1980´s, 1990´s, and 2000´s by several terrorist groups and individuals. Here, the bombing of the Maison de France building (1983)160, the failed attack of Richard Reid

(2001)161 as well as the Christmas bomb plot (2009)162 and the cargo plane bomb plot

(2010)163 of Al Qaida could be seen as only few examples. Semtex was already shortly after its invention used by several terrorist groups, including the IRA and the PFLP-GC in the late

1970´s.164 Besides several bombings with Semtex executed by the IRA in England and

Northern Ireland165, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 is a prominent example of the terrorist use of Semtex166.

Just like RDX, the trade of PETN based explosives is also regulated by the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in the United States and by the UN Committee of

Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.167 However, other than RDX, PETN is not considered an explosive that is foremost assigned to military purposes. Hence, it does not appear on the munitions list of the US army and it has not been considered a defense-related product in the UN Wassenaar agreement from 1996. Rather, it is here considered a so-called

“dual use product” that underlies certain restrictions concerning transportation and trade.168

However, while the same status was assigned to Semtex until 1981, the regulation has, due to the above described incidents, radically changed: In 1981, the export of Semtex was restricted to Warsaw treaty countries and its production temporarily prohibited in 1989.169 After this ban

159 See chapters 5.1.1 and 5.4.1. 160 Sample, ‘Cargo plane bomb plot’; [Der Spiegel], ‘Maison de France’. 161 Ong Junio, ‘Report’; Bolz et al., Counterterrorism, p. 246. 162 Ibidem. 163 Sample, ‘Cargo plane bomb plot’; Shane, ‘Suspicious Packages’. 164 Brown, Big Bang, p. 165. 165 Ibidem. 166 See chapter 5.4.2. 167 [United States Directorate of Defense Trade Control], United States Munition List; United Nations - Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Numbers 0072, 0391, 0483. 168 [WA Plenary], Wassenaar Arrangement, Dual Use List, Cat. 1, 1. A 8,; Annex. 169 Explosia Website, History; Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’. Page 34 of 139 was withdrawn, the Czech Ministry of Industry and Export began to monitor the manufacturing and export of Semtex in the Explosia factory in 2002.170

Furthermore, because of the frequent use of PETN and Semtex by terrorist groups, the detection of these explosives became a relevant trait of research in countering terrorism. Since

PETN has, just as RDX, a low vapor pressure, most vapor based detection tools have difficulties to detect it.171 However, PETN is detectable by colorimetric detection tools as well as visually by x-rays s and by CXRS scans.172 Furthermore, PETN is detectable by ion mass spectrometry and the density of PETN has been included into the library of CT x-ray scans.173

However, while Semtex is also detectable by ion mass spectrometry as well as by CT x-ray scans, it was merely undetectable by conventional x-ray scans as well as by all vapor based detection tools.174 Hence, after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Semtex was initially marked with ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN) in 1991 and later with DMNB to make it detectable. Additionally, efforts have been made to reduce the lifespan of the explosive from

20 years to three years. 175

3.5. Peroxide explosives – Terrorist explosives?

3.5.1. The discovery of peroxide explosives

Triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was discovered by the German chemist Richard Wolffenstein in 1895, who discovered the novel chemical compound by mixing acetone with hydrogen peroxide and an acid.176 After storing this mixture several days, Wolffenstein described trimeric crystalline structures that had emerged in the mixture, which he called “Tri-

170 UN UNTERM, ‘Semtex’; Explosia Website, History; Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’. 171 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 4. 172 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 121; 94. 173 Marshall&Oxley, Explosive Detection, p. 131-144. 174 Brown, Big Bang, p. 165; UN UNTERM, ‘Semtex’; Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’. 175 [Commitee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Material], Containing the Threat, p. 51; UN UNTERM, ‘Semtex’; Koyen&Zaitchik, ‘Semtex’. 176 Wolffenstein, ‘Wasserstoffsuperoxyd’.

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Cycloacetonsuperoxyd”177. According to Wolffenstein, the Cycloacetonsuperoxyd was able to detonate with “ungeheure[r] Explosibilität”178 caused by medium shock and evaporated within days.179 Further research on Cycloacetonsuperoxyd showed that the weak oxygen- oxygen bond structure of the crystalline compound causes both its great shock sensitivity as well as its instability.180 In 1900, the German chemists Adolf Baeyer and Victor Villiger renamed the compound into triacetonetriperoxide.181

Hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD) was discovered by the chemist L. Legler while slowly combusting ether in 1885.182 According to Legler, the byproduct from the combustion reacted with ammonia and formed the crystalline compound HMTD. The manufacturing process of HMTD was initially described by Baeyer and Villiger in 1900 and involved the mixture of hydrogen peroxide with ammonia and formalydehyde.183Furthermore,

Baeyer and Villiger also found that HMTD “beim Erhitzen, beim Reiben und beim Schlag so heftig explodirt wie salpetersaures Diazobenzol und daher sehr vorsichtig gehandhabt werden muss”184. However, HMTD tends to sublime slower than TATP, but reacts with most common metals, such as iron or copper.185

3.5.2. The re-discovery of peroxide explosives in 1979

Unlike all other explosives in this paper, neither TATP nor HMTD have ever been used as military or commercial explosive. However, shortly after the discovery of both compounds, militaries and industrialists were interested in deploying the explosives. For example, Richard

Wolffenstein patented TATP shortly after his discovery in 1895 and described that TATP

177 Wolffenstein, ‘Wasserstoffsuperoxyd’, p. 2266-2267. 178 Wolffenstein, ‘Wasserstoffsuperoxyd’, p. 2268. 179 According to Wolffenstein, 0.182 grams of the substance lost 0.0059 g after within 48 hours. Wolffenstein, ‘Wasserstoffsuperoxyd’, p. 2266. 180 Oxley et al., Explosives Detection, p. 21. 181 Baeyer&Villiger, ‘Caro´sches Reagenz’; Baeyer&Villiger, ‘Nomenclatur’, p. 2480. 182 Legler, ‘Producte’. 183 Baeyer&Villiger, ‘Nomenclatur’, p. 2486. 184 Baeyer&Villiger, ‚Nomenclatur‘, p. 2487. 185 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 49.

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“explodirt (…) heftig, so daß es als Pulver oder Sprengmittel Verwendung finden kann”186.

Thirty years later, a German company patented TATP as explosive by proposing to use it with

TNT in blasting caps.187 However, due to its great shock sensitivity and its instability, TATP was never used as a commercial or military explosive.188

Just as TATP, also HMTD has never been used as a military or commercial explosive.189 However, HMTD was tested by the US military in the 1920´s and was judged to be a more powerful ingredient for blasting caps than the, by then commonly used, mercury fulminate explosives.190 However, its shock sensitivity and its reactivity with metals caused the US military to conclude that HMTD should not be employed as an explosive.191

(RQ1) However, despite their absent “legal” use-history, both TATP and HMTD were re-discovered by terrorist groups in the late 1970´s and early 1980´s: In the aftermath of an arrest in 1979, Israeli police forces found a detonator that contained HMTD and only one year later, identified TATP in an undetonated improvised explosive device (IED).192 In the same year, the PLO detonated an IED that contained TATP and killed six Israeli students as well as injured 17 in Hebron. According to former Israeli bomb disposal officer Michael Cardash, the

PLO acquired the expertise to manufacture both substances from an individual called Adnan

Ja’ber, who had received training in IED manufacturing in the Soviet Union in 1974.193

After these first incidents, TATP and HMTD quickly became frequently used explosives among terrorist groups in the 1990´s and 2000´s.194 For example, the so-called millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, used, among other substances, HMTD in an

186 Patent DE84953. 187 Patent DE423176. 188 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 49; Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 343. 189 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 61. 190 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 48. 191 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 60f. 192 Oxley et al., Explosives Detection, p. 50. 193 Cardash&Johnston, ‘Mother of Satan’, p. 50. 194 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 57.

Page 37 of 139 unsuccessful plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport in 2000.195 Moreover, on

December 22, 2001, Al Qaeda affiliate Richard Reid tried unsuccessfully to detonate an IED containing PETN and TATP in American Airlines Flight 63 to Miami.196 Furthermore, the perpetrators of the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005 used both HMTD and TATP and at least

TATP was confirmed to have been used in the unsuccessful transatlantic bomb plot in 2006.

One important reason why both HMTD and TATP could be seen as popular and frequently used by terrorists is the fact that both substances can be manufactured with ingredients that can be purchased via the free market.197 However, as already shown by

Wolffenstein, Bayer, and Villiger, the manufacturing of TATP and HMTD is bound to extreme dangers, since both compounds can already be detonated by small shocks or friction.

Because of these dangers, TATP gained notoriety as “Mother of Satan” in the terrorist community, since several attempts to prepare it ended deadly.198

Because of the availability of both TATP and HMTD, it has been very difficult to prevent the illegal usage of these explosives. However, after the 7/7 attacks and the transatlantic bomb plot, European law enforcement agencies called for restrictions concerning the ingredients of TATP and HMTD. Hence, the European Parliament issued a regulation in

2013 that states that chemicals like hydrogen peroxide shall still be publicly available, but its purchase should be registered and reported.199 Additionally, the European Commission limited the concentration of hydrogen peroxide containing substances to 12% or up to 30% with special licenses, as the EPP license, which was introduced in Great Britain in 2014.200

However, other ingredients of TATP and HMTD, such as acetone and hexamethylenetetramine, are still openly available, since the European Commission judged

195 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 63; Oxley et al., Explosives Detection, p. 21. 196 Oxley et al., Explosives Detection, p. 13; Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 63. 197 Yaeger, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 50. 198 Cardash&Johnston, ‘Mother of Satan’. 199 98/2013 EC, Annex I. 200 98/2013 EC, Article 4, 3a; [United Kingdom Home Office], Licensing. Page 38 of 139 that a regulation of these substances would generate enormous costs for consumers and businesses.201

Earlier than the efforts to regulate the distribution of certain chemicals, methods of detecting the explosive compounds TATP and HMTD were invented and introduced by law enforcement and governments. Since both substances simply consist of white powder and cannot be visually identified,202 the researchers Keinan and Itzhaky developed a colorimetric testing device, the Peroxide Explosive Tester (PET), to identify TATP and HMTD in 1999.203

In addition to that, both substances can be detected with ion mass spectrometry.204

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the transatlantic bombing plot several Governments banned, in cooperation with major airlines, any liquids of more than 100 ml from the hand luggage of aircraft passengers.205 This ban should prevent terrorists to bring TATP or HMTD, dissolved in liquids, into airplanes.206

4. The acquisition and use of explosive technologies by terrorist groups – Nine Cases

4.1. The acquisition and use of ammonium nitrate

4.1.1. Sterling Hall Bombing (1970)

In the night from August 23 to August 24, 1970 an explosive device detonated behind the

Sterling Hall Research Center at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The explosion destroyed parts of the building with a strength of 3,400 sticks of dynamite, injured three and killed one person, the physicist Robert Fassnacht.207 Apart from the loss of a life and the destruction of decades of research in mathematics and physics, the financial damage to the

201 98/2013 EC, p 3 (21). 202 Marshall&Oxley, Explosives Detection, p. 50. 203 Ibidem. 204 Note: TATP is only detectable in positive ion mode. See: Oxley et al., Explosives Detection, p. 193. 205 See for the European Union: EU Regulation No 1546/2006. 206 Bennett&Waller, ‘Airline Plot’. 207 [Madison Capital Times], ‘Text of FBI Affidavit’; Cronon&Jenkins, University, p. 517; Pfarrer, ‘Bomb’.

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University of Wisconsin was approximately 2.5 million dollar. The perpetrator of this attack was later identified as the leftist group “New Year´s Gang” of which the members Dwight

Armstrong, his brother Karleton Armstrong, David Sylvan Fine, and Leo Burt planned and executed the attack.208

The agenda of the in 1969 established New Year´s Gang could be described as organizing demonstration and attacks on US military property to oppose the US lead war against the communist forces of North Vietnam as well as to support the Tupamaro guerilla in

Uruguay and fighting against discrimination and militarization in academia.209 While earlier attempts of the New Year´s Gang to attack military facilities in Wisconsin did not succeed or achieved only little damage and attention, the Sterling Hall bombing is, for many US

Americans, after the Oklahoma City bombing still one of the worst cases of domestic terrorism in the United States.210

However, according to the group´s account no civilian should get hurt in the attack during which the only target was the Army Mathematics Research Center (AMRC). The

AMRC was located in the left wing of the Sterling Hall building and, as part of the US army,

“bears full responsibility for amerikan [sic] military genocide throughout the world”211 as the group explained in the leftwing student newsletter Kaleidoscope. However, although the group executed a warning call, the detonation occurred prematurely and, thereby, killed

Robert Fassnacht.212 While the Armstrong brothers and Fine were arrested in 1972, 1977, and

1976, Leo Burt has been avoiding arrest since the attack. 213

The arrest and interrogation of Dwight Armstrong and David Fine as well as the investigation at the site of the explosion revealed that the IED that detonated in front of the

208 Cronon&Jenkins, University, p. 517; [Madison Capital Times], ‘Text of FBI Affidavit’. 209 [New Year´s gang], statement. 210 Hewitt, Political Violence, p. 52; Lewin, Cold war, pp. 175-176; Bie, Wisconsin, p. 122. 211 Ibidem. 212 Fellner ‘Untold Story Part 2’; Bates, Rads, 307. 213 Bates, Rads, p. 446.

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Sterling Hall consisted of roughly 793 kg of AN mixed with approximately 75 liters of fuel oil (ANFO) that were detonated by a small portion of dynamite.214 The Armstrong brothers,

Fine, and Burt filled the ANFO in three 208 liter-barrels and added a fourth barrel that was only filled with the leftovers of fuel oil.215 The barrels were loaded in a stolen Ford Deluxe

Club van and the barrel in the center of the car was equipped with one stick of dynamite and a blasting cap as detonator that was connected to approximately 3 meters of 400-second Clover

Brand safety fuse.216 The lengths of the fuse should time the detonation on 6.40 minutes. The van was parked at the backside of the Sterling Hall building and the fuse was lid. However, for until today unexplained reasons the detonation occurred already 4 minutes after the fuse was ignited. According to Karleton Armstrong´s own account, small amounts spilled fuel oil may have “caus[ed] the fuse to short-circuit”217. However, how did the group acquire the ingredients for this explosive device?

(RQ2) To answer the first question, it is necessary to consult a variety of different source material, since no detailed academic analysis of these aspects of the Sterling Hall bombing has been written yet. Hence, only journalistic accounts as well as popular literature and court documents provide information on how the New Year´s gang acquired the ingredients to build its IED.

According to the book of journalist Tom Bates, which is based on interviews with the perpetrators, Karl Armstrong purchased one stick of dynamite as well as the blasting cap and the fuse via the free market in Minneapolis.218 This claim seems to be supported by journalistic sources like a report about the incident in the Milwaukee Journal, in which it is

214 [Madison Capital Times], ‘Text of FBI Affidavit‘; Cronon&Jenkins, University, p. 516; Bates, Rads, pp. 278- 289. 215 Bates, Rads, p. 298. 216 Bates, Rads, pp. 298; Fellner ‘Untold Story Part 1’, p. 16. 217 Fellner ‘Untold Story Part 2’, p. 5. 218 Bates, Rads, pp. 279.

Page 41 of 139 written that “Karl had driven to Minnesota to buy the dynamite, caps and fuse needed to set off the bomb”219.

However, while not many details are available about Karl Armstrong´s dynamite purchase in Minneapolis, several sources give a more detailed description on how the New

Year´s gang acquired the main charge of its IED – AN and fuel oil. According to David

Cronon and John Jenkins, the New Year´s gang purchased both substances via the free market as well, after receiving approximately 200 dollar from the sale of Marijuana.220 A more detailed account offers the text of the FBI affidavit of the bombing that was printed in the

Madison Capital Times newspaper on September 3, 1970. Here, the investigators state that the

Armstrong brothers rented a U-Haul trailer and bought huge amounts of fuel oil at a local station.221 After storing the fuel oil at a staging area in the remote area of Devil´s lake state park, the New Year´s gang bought, according to the affidavit, 1,700 pounds (771 kg) of AN at the Farmer´s Union Co-operative store in Baraboo, Wisconsin. The store manager, Robert

Stieve, told the investigators that Karl Armstrong identified himself as George Reed and explained that he purchased the AN for “agricultural purposes”222.

Bates dedicates approximately two pages of his book to the acquisition of ANFO by the New Year´s gang and gives additional information about the purchase: In these two pages,

Bates states that Leo Burt “was concerned that buying AN and fuel oil in the quantities Karl

[Armstrong] was talking about would arouse suspicion”223. Hence, according to Bates, Burt started efforts to get a blasting license. However, after gaining knowledge about the (time and effort consuming) procedure to get such a license, Burt “decided to forgo the cover story”224.

Yet, according to Bates, Karl Armstrong did not only provide Stieve with a false identity and

219 Fellner ‘Untold Story Part 1’, p. 16. 220 Cronon&Jenkins, University, p. 516. 221 [Madison Capital Times], ‘FBI Affidavit’. 222 Ibidem. 223 Bates, Rads, p. 285. 224 Ibidem.

Page 42 of 139 purpose of his purchase at the store, but also dressed in a certain way to maintain the cover of a farmer. Bates writes: “In a clean T-shirt and bell-bottoms, with his side-burns trimmed and his beard gone, Karl looked like any young farm-hand”225. Furthermore, Bates states that

Armstrong purchased 1,750 pounds of AN by pretending to buy it on behalf of his employer who, according to Armstrong, owned a sod farm.226

However, the mixing of these, by the group purchased substances, and the assembling of the bomb required a certain amount of explicit and tacit knowledge:

(RQ3a) In the FBI-affidavit that was printed in the Madison Capital Times, the store manager of the farmer´s cooperative store, Robert Stieves, informed the investigators that he told Karl Armstrong, while he was purchasing the AN, that “nitrogen soaked in fuel oil can be used at an explosive”227. The FBI investigators stated further that Robert Stieves also “advised that he has in the past used this mixture in connection with dynamite and that it has produced an explosion of tremendous force”228. Thus, Robert Stieves worried that he had provided the

New Year´s gang with the necessary, explicit knowledge to build the IED.

However, since it is highly unlikely that the group purchased the AN and fuel oil before having knowledge of the explosive force of ANFO, Stieves´s advise could not have contributed to the explicit knowledge of the New year´s Gang. Yet, how and from where and whom did Karl Armstong and the others know that? A court manuscript concerning the trial against David Fine provides a possible answer to this question. Here, the investigators state:

The affidavit in support of the warrant states that Edward H. Bull, supervisor of mine

safety, state department of industry, labor and human relations, identified

photographs of Leo Burt and David Fine as persons who had contacted him on July

13, 1970, regarding the use of fertilizer and fuel oil as an explosive device. Mr. Bull

225 Bates, Rads, p. 287. 226 Bates, Rads, 287f. 227 [Madison Capital Times], ‘FBI Affidavit’. 228 Ibidem.

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stated that he provided them with information, including an "Explosive Notebook" of

the state of Wisconsin, and that the two men appeared to be compiling information.229

In this quote, it is clearly visible that the New Year´s gang consulted the academic personnel of the University of Wisconsin to gain explicit knowledge about the production and usage of

ANFO. Another example of this usage of the University´s facilities is published in Bates´s book, in which he states that the investigator Joe Sullivan found out that Leo Burt borrowed a manual on how to produce and use ANFO, called Pothole Blasting for Wildlife from the

University library weeks before the attack.230

Thus, the New Year´s gang did apparently not have any problems in obtaining the explicit knowledge on how to produce and use ANFO correctly. They simply relied on open- source material as well as on the information openly provided by Edward H. Bull. A reason for the open availability of this delicate information can be seen in the practice of the farmers in Wisconsin in the 1960’s: Here, Bates writes “Farmers used ANFO to blow stumps; quarrymen and miners employed it as a substitute for dynamite. You could buy the nitrate cheaply at any farm-supply house without a permit (…)”231. In the 1960’s, ANFO was a openly accessible and common tool for farmers, which made it easy for the New Year´s gang to gain access to ANFO itself and the explicit knowledge to use it.

(RQ3b) In addition to that, the common presence of ANFO in the rural area of

Wisconsin also partially provided the New Year´s gang with the necessary tacit knowledge to assemble and use the explosive. Since ANFO explosions could not be seen as a rare phenomenon in the rural areas of Wisconsin, the group had the possibilities to experiment with small amounts of ANFO in the remote hideout near Devil´s lake. In the safe space of this hide out in the forest, the gang could easily perform test detonations and, thereby, acquire the necessary tacit knowledge via a simple method of learning-by-doing – or trial and error.

229 [United States District Court, W. D. Wisconsin], United States of America v. Fine, 413 F. Supp. 740 (1976). 230 Bates, Rads, p. 31. 231 Bates, Rads, p. 25.

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In addition to that, Bates describes an earlier episode of Karl Armstrong´s terrorist activities that could have influenced his tacit knowledge to mix and use ANFO. On December

31, 1969, the Armstrong brothers tried to attack the Badger Army Ammunition Platform in

Baraboo by dropping jars filled with ANFO from a small airplane.232 Here, Karl Armstrong´s knowledge on how to produce ANFO could, according to Bates, have originated in a visit to the farm of an uncle of Armstrong´s friend Scott Nelson: Bates describes that Karl Armstrong witnessed the usage of ANFO to open up duck ponds at the farm.233 However, according to

Cronon, Jenkins and Bates, Karl Armstrong was not aware of the fact that one has to ignite the ANFO and assumed that it would detonate on impact.234 Hence, the bombing of the

Ammunition Platform was unsuccessful, but added another valuable piece of experience to the New Year´s gang´s knowledge on how to use ANFO.

To sum up, it has been shown that the New Year´s gang managed to acquire the ingredients as well as the expertise to build the IED for the attack against the Sterling Hall building, because AN and the mixture ANFO was openly accessible, well-known, and commonly used in Wisconsin.

(RQ4) These outcomes also provide answers to the questions why AN was chosen for this attack: First of all, while the bombing of Sterling Hall building can be interpreted as a symbolic aggression against the infrastructure of imperialism, the group´s decision to use

ANFO does not seem to be of symbolic nature. Rather, the financial means and expertise of the group and the accessibility and ease of use of ANFO determined the decision to use this explosive: Cronon and Jenkins come to a similar conclusion by writing that “Armstrong decided they would (…) use a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, the only explosive he could afford on the $200 profit he had gained (…)”235. Furthermore, Bates states that,

232 Bates, Rads, pp. 158-166. 233 Bates, Rads, p. 158. 234 Bates, Rads, p. 166; Cronon&Jenkins, University, p.516. 235 Cronon&Jenkins, University, p. 516.

Page 45 of 139 although Karl Armstrong earlier managed to steal Primacord detonation cord, he “never figured out to use it”236, which provides the information that the New Year´s gang was not familiar with the usage of sophisticated explosives and, thus, chose the user-friendly and easily obtainable ANFO.

4.1.2. Oslo Bombing (2011)

In the afternoon of July 22, 2011 a car bomb detonated in front of the Office of Norway’s

Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and the Ministry of Justice and the Police that killed 8 people and left at least 209 persons injured.237 However, approximately 90 minutes after the bombing in Oslo´s Governmental district, a man dressed as a Norwegian police officer gained access to a Youth camp of the Norwegian party Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AU) on the Norwegian holiday island Utøya. Here, the intruder started to fire with automatic weapons on staff and camp visitors and, thereby, executed 69 people, most of them adolescents, in an one hour lasting shooting rampage. In the early evening of July 22, the by then still unidentified man surrendered to Norwegian police Special Forces and was detained.238

In the aftermath of this, until today, worst terrorist attack in Norway, the arrested man was identified as the Norwegian farmer Anders Behring Breivik and, hours after the attack on

Utøya, linked to the bombing in Oslo.239 As the investigators of the Norway attacks described through the media, Breivik could be characterized as a lone operator influenced by Far Right,

Christian conservative, and islamophobic ideologies.240 This characterization of Anders

Behring Breivik´s political mindset was validated by Breivik himself, who had sent a 1518 pages long ego-document to 1,003 addresses via email shortly before the attacks.241 In this document with the title 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence, Breivik described

236 Bates, Rads, p. 279. 237 Harris, ‘Norway´s 9/11’; Appleton, ‘Lone Wolf’, pp. 127-128; Berntzen&Sandberg, ‘Collective Nature’, pp. 759-760; Mala&Goodman, ‘At least 80 dead’. 238 Appleton, ‘Lone Wolf’, pp. 127-128; Berntzen&Sandberg, ‘Collective Nature’, pp. 759-760; Harris, ‘Norway´s 9/11’. 239 [Daily Mail], ‘Blonde Norwegian’; Erlanger&Shane, ‘Oslo Suspect’. 240 [Daily Mail], ‘Blonde Norwegian’; Erlanger&Shane, ‘Oslo Suspect’; Taylor, ‘Breivik’. 241 Taylor, ‘Breivik’.

Page 46 of 139 in detail that he perceives himself as “Commander (…) and one of the several leaders”242 of a fictional, patriotic movement that he calls the Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique

Salomonici (PCCTS) Justiciar Templers.243 Furthermore, Breivik claimed that his attacks as well as future attacks executed by this organization should be seen as political acts of

Christian resistance against what he calls the Islamization of Europe through “Cultural

Marxism”244.

Besides laying down his ideological background, Breivik also used his ego-document to describe in detail how he planned and prepared his attack. Thus, Breivik´s ego-document can be seen as extraordinary valuable for analyzing the explosives that were used in the attack: While the media stated that an AN-fuel oil mixture (ANFO) was used in the attack245,

Breivik´s IED consisted, according to his own accunt, out 25 g Diazodinitrophenol (DDNP) as detonator246 and approximately 500 ml of purified picric acid crystals (from 1,5 liters unpurified picric acid)247 as booster charge. The main charge consisted of a 900 kg mixture of

AN, aluminium powder, and fuel oil (ANALFO)248 as well as of 38 kg AN mixed with 6 liters of nitromethane and 6 kg aluminium powder (ANALNM) as inner charge. Additionally,

Breivik added approximately 42 kg of micro balloons to intensify the explosive effect of the

IED.249 However, this sophisticated construction raises the question where and how Breivik acquired the materials to manufacture this explosive device.

(RQ2) Detailed answers to this question are also given in Breivik´s document. Here, he meticulously describes every chemical that would be necessary to build the above mentioned device and adds not only detailed manuals on how to mix these chemicals, but also reveals the sources from which he bought the components of his IED. Furthermore, he

242 Breivik, 2083, p. 9. 243 Breivik, 2083, p. 9 244 Breivik, 2083, pp. 12-16. 245 Klis, ‘Terreurhandleiding’. 246 Breivik, 2083, p. 1463. 247 Breivik, 2083, p. 1447. 248 Breivik, 2083, p. 1468. 249 Breivik, 2083, p. 1466.

Page 47 of 139 informs the reader about the carefully constructed cover stories that he used to purchase the materials: To manufacture DDNP as detonator for his explosive device, Brevik ordered sulphur powder from Ebay in December 2010 by pretending to be an aquarium enthusiast.250

Furthermore, he ordered sulphuric acid via a car supply company by pretending to need car battery acid, because he ordered empty battery shells via the Norwegian online store mcdeler.no.251 In addition to that, Breivik ordered sodium nitrite at the Polish chemical store

Keten by using no cover story at all.252 However, to manufacture DDNP successfully, Breivik also needed certain amounts of picric acid that he manufactured on his own and also used as a booster for his IED. To manufacture picric acid, Breivik bought, in addition to the above mentioned chemicals, sodium nitrate at a drugstore close to his farm. Here, he told the store manager that he would need the sodium nitrate for his hunting club, since this chemical is often used to process meat.253 Furthermore, Breivik bought 190 packages of Aspirin

(Acetylsalicylic acid) in a city close to his farm by consulting 20 different drug stores and pharmacies. Even here, Breivik prepared a cover story and told the store managers that he would prepare his company for the “alcohol side effects” after the company´s Christmas party.254

However, the most advanced cover invented Breivik to buy the components for the main charge of his IED: Since the acquisition of AN fertilizers is restricted to farming companies, Breivik bought a farm in a rural area close to Oslo and acquired a so-called

“producing number” from the Norwegian Government by founding a farming company that was specialized on sugar beet farming.255 In his manifest, he describes this cover in detail by

250 Breivik, 2083, p. 1425. 251 Breivik, 2083, p. 1427. 252 Breivik, 2083, p. 1428. 253 Breivik, 2083, p. 1426. 254 Breivik, 2083, p. 1427. 255 Breivik, 2083, p. 1448.

Page 48 of 139 giving a 16-pages introduction to the essentials of sugar beet farming.256 Provided with a producing number, a legitimate sugar beet farming company, and a farm with several hectares of land, Breivik managed to buy, amongst seeds and other fertilizers, five 600 kg bags of the

AN fertilizer CAN 27-0-0 from the farm supply company Felleskjøpet Rena.257 Furthermore,

Breivik ordered 150 kg of aluminum powder via Keten by pretending to be the owner of a company that produced “coating solutions for the maritime sector“258. Finally, Breivik bought huge amounts of RC fuel, since it contains unpurified nitro methane. Here, it seems reasonable that Breivik ordered the fuel via a hobby store by pretending to be an enthusiasts of remote-controlled model helicopters, since he advised his readers to use this cover story to buy nitro methane (“that you say you own a T-Rex 600 f example“259).

(RQ3a) Breivik seemed to have profound knowledge of the chemicals that are needed to manufacture a sophisticated explosive device and his ego-document contains several detailed manuals on how to process and mix various chemicals to manufacture a powerful explosive device.260 However, where did Breivik acquire that explicit knowledge?

At several points in his ego-document, Breivik explicitly states that he acquired the explicit knowledge to build the IED via the internet. He writes that he “(…) reviewed more than 100 instructions/guides on how to create various explosive devices and/or compounds”261 that he found on the internet “after googl[ing] for 200 hours over the course of

2 weeks”262. On basis of this research, Breivik managed to download approximately 639 files including several pdf´s and 24 books on explosive manufacturing via fileshare platforms like piratebay.263 Breivik included several of these manuals into his ego-document 2083; for example four manuals on the manufacturing of picric acid or four manuals for DDNP

256 Breivik, 2083, pp. 1491-1506. 257 Anders Behring Breivik Court Transcript 2012-04-16. 258 Breivik, 2083, p. 1428. 259 Breivik, 2083, p. 1002. 260 See e.g. Breivik, 2083, pp. 978-1007; pp. 1438-1472. 261 Breivik, 2083, p. 978. 262 Breivik, 2083, p. 982. 263 Ibidem.

Page 49 of 139 manufacturing.264 To disguise his internet activities, Breivik accessed the internet, according to his own account, either via the TOR network or via free wireless internet at fast food restaurants.265

However, despite the great opportunities the internet presented to Breivik, he admits that “many of the bomb-making guides available through the internet are now quite useless”266, since the ingredients, like AN, have been subject to restrictions and changes.267

However, Breivik even managed to solve this problem, in parts, via the internet. For example, he managed to find answers to the questions how to the dense prills of the CAN 27-0-0 fertilizer to detonate it.268 Here, Breivik states “Ironically, it wasn’t until I reviewed a state funded anti-terror site I was finally able to find the answers I was looking for.“269. However, his research only provided Breivik with assumptions that he had to test in practice:

(RQ3b) In order to manufacture a working IED, Breivik had to acquire tacit knowledge as well. Here, the remote location of his farm helped him to acquire the necessary tacit knowledge to successfully build and use the above described IED. Not a single source suggests that Breivik acquired the tacit knowledge to build his IED by consulting experienced bomb builders. Rather, it seems like he tested his explicit knowledge and, thereby, acquired tacit knowledge on basis of trial and error. For example, in the section on picric acid manufacturing, he writes. “The only problem I had while making it was that when you dump the finished nitrated liquid into ice water to precipitate the picric acid, a lot of the picric dissolves in the water.“270

Later in the document, Breivik seemed to have found a solution to this problem by writing: “Ensure you have enough ice and add just a little at a time. Keep it cool or it will fail

264 Breivik 2083, pp. 986-987. 265 Breivik, 2083, p. 948. 266 Breivik, 2083, p. 950. 267 See chapter 4.1.2. 268 Breivik, 2083, p. 992. 269 Ibidem. 270 Breivik, 2083, p. 989.

Page 50 of 139 to precipitate properly“271. Clearly, Breivik acquired this applied knowledge of manufacturing picric acid via trial and error.

Furthermore, Breivik also executed test explosions at his farm to ensure that his manufacturing techniques worked. In his diary, he writes “Later that evening I put a large plastic container box with 8L of 30% nitro methane/18% oil/52% methanol outside to test the evaporation method. Theoretically; the methanol should evaporate before the nitromethane starts to evaporate“272. Here, Breivik simply tested the theoretical knowledge that he gained through the manuals by performing experiments. After the attack, Breivik also spoke in court about several problems that he had while assembling the bomb including “great difficulty finding a method where I could crush ammonium nitrate pills”273. Exactly through solutions to these problems did Breivik manage to gain the tacit knowledge to complete the IED.

Finally, Breivik also profited from the tacit knowledge of experienced bomb makers and terrorists to a certain degree, since he writes by referring to AN grinding:

I heard that Baader, the Marxist scumbag from Red Army Fraction bought tens of

grinders as they regularly broke down. He even bought a really expensive one but

that one broke down as well. They ended up using wood rollers resulting in limited

amounts of end product.274

However, Breivik only had the chance to perform evaporation experiments, or to evaluate the best AN grinding technique, since he was preparing his attack at a very remote location – the farm. While Breivik´s experiments would have uncovered his attack preparations in an urban area, the safe environment of the farm offered the opportunity to make mistakes and to acquire tacit knowledge through trial and error. This did not only enable him to successfully build the IED, but also to write an enormously detailed manual on bomb making and, thereby, share his expertise with other terrorists.

271 Breivik, 2083, p. 989. 272 Breivik, 2083, p. 1466. 273 Anders Behring Breivik Court Transcript 2012-04-19. 274 Breivik, 2083, p. 998. Page 51 of 139

To sum up, Anders Behring Breivik acquired all the ingredients to build the IED for the attack on Oslo through the free market by using different cover stories. While Breivik´s explicit knowledge to build the explosive device seems to have its roots on the internet,

Breivik acquired the tacit knowledge to manufacture the device through testing and experimenting in the save environment of his hideout.

(RQ4) On basis of these results and in combination with Breivik´s own account in his document 2083, one can assume several reasons for Breivik´s decision to use ANALFO and

ANALNM in his IED: While there is no passage in Breivik´s egodocument that would refer to this specific IED as having ideological or symbolic value, the usage of an explosive device in general to perform sabotage attacks is encouraged as “the most efficient ways to cripple the current Western European multiculturalist regimes“275 in 2083.

Rather, the results of this analysis as well as short passages in 2083 seem to suggest that Breivik´s decision to use the above mentioned ingredients stems from operational considerations: As repeatedly mentioned in his ego-document, Breivik chose the above described explosive on basis of a various factors, including the strength and the handling of the explosives that would fit his expertise. 276 Furthermore, the fact that Breivik bought all ingredients of his IED via the free market can be seen as a result of a consideration concerning the accessibility of the ingredients. Thus, on basis of these operational considerations, Breivik writes: “I´ve concluded that the following explosives are most suitable for my purpose […] based on a variety of factors: DDNP as detonator; Picric acid as booster;

ANFO/ANNM as main charge”277.

275 Breivik, 2083, p. 965. 276 See for this discussion concerning DDNP: Breivik, 2083, p. 985. 277 Breivik, 2083, p. 981.

Page 52 of 139

4.2. The acquisition and use of TNT

4.2.1. King David Hotel Bombing (1946)

At 12.37 pm on July 22, 1946, a powerful explosion occurred in the basement of the King

David Hotel in Jerusalem and caused the south wing of the hotel, that was used as administrative and military headquarter of the Government of the British Mandate of

Palestine, to collapse almost entirely.278 The explosion took the guests, employees, and

Governmental service workers by surprise and claimed 91 lives, although minutes before the explosion two minor explosions occurred on the street in front of the hotel and although the radical Zionist group Irgun, who took responsibility for the explosion in the King David

Hotel, claimed to have performed three warning calls to the hotel and a newspaper 20 minutes before the explosion.279

Irgun, who described their ideological aims as supporting the “foundation of a Jewish

State in Eretz-Israel, in its historical boundaries”280 and as fighting against “the Mandatory

Power, ‘Great Britain’”281, claimed responsibility for the attack, but emphasized that the bombing was planned as an act of sabotage against the British Mandate. With the destruction of the southern wing of the building, Irgun tried to weaken the British influence in Palestine in general, but also tried to destroy certain documents that linked Irgun to the semi legal paramilitary organization Haganah as well as to the Jewish Agency for Immigration.282

However, according to the memoirs of former prime minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, who was commander of Irgun at that time, the group tried to avoid casualties during the attack at all costs by detonating two minor IED´s in front of the hotel minutes before the attack as well as by performing the above mentioned warning calls.283 Although Begin´s claim

278 Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 262; Bell, Terror, p. 171 and see for a detailed account: Clarke, Blood. 279 Hoffman, ‘Small Wars’, p. 263; Quillen, ‘Mass Casualty’, p. 293; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, pp. 258-262. .Irgun], Irgun Tzevai Leumi Belsrael, p. II] כ2/1/1-5 280 .Irgun], Irgun Tzevai Leumi Belsrael, p. II] כ2/1/1-5 281 282 Clarke, Blood, p. 100. .Collection King David Hotel (Part 1), p. 43 כBegin, Revolt, pp. 295-296 and p. 292; 1/11/5-4 283

Page 53 of 139 concerning the warning calls could never be proven, it seems likely to assume that, indeed, a warning call took place, as researcher Nicholas Bethell pointed out.284

The most reliable source to answer the question which explosive technology was used during the attack against the King David Hotel is the official police report of the incident.

Here, it is written that the investigators found an undetonated IED in front of the King David

Hotel that contained “TNT and inflammable material”285. Thus, it can be assumed that Irgun used trinitrotoluene as explosive material to attack the hotel. This assumption is corroborated by the memoirs of Begin, in which he states that a 500 lb mixture of TNT and gelignite was used during the attack.286 This mixture was poured in seven milk churns that were transported to the hotel with a hijacked truck and were placed in the basement of the hotel´s southern wing.287 This account can be corroborated by historian Thurston Clarke, who describes, based on interviews with the perpetrators and investigators, that the bomb consisted out of seven milk churns that were filled with 350 kg of TNT-gelignite mixture instead of 500lbs (approx.

227 kg) as Begin claimed.288 These seven IED´s were secured with booby traps and initiated by timing devices that consisted of Nr. 8 commercial aluminum detonators as well as a voile with acid and a wooden top that worked as an acid fuse to initiate the detonator.289 According to both Begin and Clarke this acid fuse was activated at 12.13 and detonated at 12.37, six minutes earlier than the Irgun members had estimated.290

While it is frequently cited in the literature that Irgun used TNT to attack the King

David Hotel291, it has not been discussed yet, how the Irgun members acquired the TNT for the attack.

284 Bethell, Palestine Triangle, pp. 263-266. 285 Police report cited through Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 262. 286 Begin, Revolt, p. 294; Terror out of Zion, p. 170. 287 Begin, Revolt, p. 294. 288 Clarke, Blood, p. 45; pp. 152-153. 289 Clarke, Blood, p. 177. 290 Begin, Revolt, p. 294; Clarke, Blood, p. 177. 291 See e.g. Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 262; Bell, Terror, p. 170.

Page 54 of 139

(RQ2) No source could be found that manages to reveal the exact origin of the TNT that was used by Irgun during the attack. However, Begin´s memoirs as well as Clarkes´s investigative account provide several options.

(i) The first possible supplier of Irgun for explosive technology could have been the sympathizing Jewish paramilitary organization Haganah from which Irgun split up in 1937.292

Haganah possessed huge quantities of different explosives including TNT as a seizure in June

29, 1946 (known as Operation Agatha) showed.293 Furthermore, Haganah cooperated with

Irgun on several occasions and played a minor role in the planning of the attack on the King

David Hotel.294 Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that Haganah provided Irgun with the

TNT for the attack. However, from which sources did Haganah acquire these high explosives? According to Clarke, the weapons of Haganah were either purchased through smugglers, captured from Arab fighters, or simply collected from dead German soldiers in

Europe and North Africa in the aftermath of the Second World War.295 Furthermore, the

British Royal Army supplied Haganah with weapons in 1942 to defeat German troops at the

Egypt border.296

(ii) The second possible origin of the TNT could be Arab suppliers. In his memoirs,

Begin claims that in its early years Begin was occasionally supported by different Arabic military organizations, who occasionally saw them as allies in their struggle to fight against the British mandate in Palestine. Begin reports that approximately eighty percent of the TNT that was used by Irgun in the early 1940´s was purchased from Arab suppliers.297

292 Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 41. 293 Clarke, Blood, p. 67. 294 Begin, Revolt, p. 160. 295 Clarke, Blood, p. 67; supported by Bell, Terror, p. 306, who describes weapon transfers to Irgun in 1948. 296 Clarke, Blood, p. 67 and p. 97. 297 Begin, Revolt, p. 90.

Page 55 of 139

(iii) A third possible origin of the TNT is presented in Begin´s memoirs. Here, Begin states that Irgun repeatedly “borrowed”298 TNT from the British by means of stealing large amounts of weapons and explosives from British military camps in Palestine. This claim is supported by Clarkes account299 and by later passages in Begin´s memoirs in which he describes specific incidents in which Irgun members stole weapons and explosives from several British military compounds (e.g., the Sarafand Garrison Camp at Sarafand al-‘Amar in the spring of 1946).300

This hypothesis is supported by Clarke, who states that, in order to organize the bombing of the King David Hotel, Amichai Paglin, accepted to become member of the Irgun high command under the condition “that he be allowed to break into British police camps and armories in order to steal his favorite weapon: dynamite”301. In Clarke´s book the term

“dynamite” is used in its wide definition to describe explosives in general as for example the passage “Paglin decided to return to his original plan and dynamite Government house. To do this he needed hundreds of pounds of TNT (…)”302 shows. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Paglin and other members, in fact, stole TNT from British military and police camps and used this TNT to attack the King David Hotel. Another piece of evidence that supports this hypothesis is the fact that Paglin and other Irgun members used British army delay switches to construct the timing devices for the bomb that detonated on July 22.303

(iv) The last possibility how Irgun acquired the TNT is presented by J. Bowyer Bell´s, who mentions briefly that Irgun purchased 9,800 pounds of nitrate from the British Imperial

Chemical Industries in 1945 via the municipality of Hebron.304 Bells describes further that

298 Begin, Revolt, p. 90. 299 Clarke, Blood, p. 104. 300 Begin, Revolt, pp. 316-333. 301 Clarke, Blood, p. 45. 302 Clarke, Blood, p. 42. 303 Clarkes, Blood, p. 177. 304 Bell, Terror, p. 149. Page 56 of 139

“[n]early five tons of nitrate disappeared into the Irgun explosives factories”305. Thus, it is also possible that Irgun used homemade TNT for the attack. However, in a footnote, Bell explains that groups like Irgun and LEHI did not manufacture TNT in their explosive factories, since TNT “required complicated production lines”306, but less powerful, improvised explosives307. However, as above shown, several sources state explicitly that TNT was used during the attack. Thus, the probability that Irgun used homemade-manufactured

TNT to attack the King David Hotel cannot be corroborated by any sources.

In conclusion, it seems most reasonable to assume that Irgun acquired the TNT by either purchasing it from Arabic militant groups, by receiving it from the Haganah, or by stealing it from British military camps. However, how did the Irgun acquire the explicit and tacit knowledge to prepare and to use the TNT? As shown in the following passage, in this case there is one answer to both questions:

(RQ3a&b) Although Irgun was a rather small group with members from different backgrounds, the High Command of Irgun was highly skilled in tactics as well as trained to use and manufacture weapons and explosives.308 This expertise was transferred to the low ranked members of Irgun by means of frequent weapon and combat trainings. Irgun even organized a one-year lasting explosive course for the members to ensure that even low ranked members of the groups could handle high explosives such as TNT safely.309 However, to, further, analyze from which sources the High Command of Irgun acquired this experience, it is necessary to investigate the lives of two high ranked Irgun members:

Amichai Paglin was one of the leading commanders of Irgun that planned and executed the attack on the King David Hotel. During the years 1945 and 1946, Paglin was the explosive and weapon expert of Irgun and constructed several different weapons, including

305 Bell, Terror, p. 149f. 306 Bell, Terror, p. 175 (footnote 7). 307 Ibidem. 308 See discussion below. 309 Bell, Terror, p. 108. Page 57 of 139 mortars, rifles, booby traps, and explosives. 310 According to both Begin and Clarke, Paglin constructed the above described IED´s in the milk churns as well as the detonators and booby traps that were used in the attack against the King David Hotel.311 Begin even claimed that

“Giddi had had far more experience in this kind of fighting than had the Haganah Operations

Officer”312, who was involved in the explosive attack. This is especially interesting, since

Paglin, as many other Irgun fighters, seemed to have acquired first experiences in handling

TNT at the Haganah:

After Irgun split up from the Haganah in 1937, several former Haganah fighters joined

Irgun from Haganah and the paramilitary organization Betar and brought their experience in combat and explosive manufacturing that they had acquired during their training in Haganah or Betar camps.313 One of these experienced fighter was Paglin, who came as an experienced

Haganah soldier to Irgun, since he did not support the cooperation between the paramilitary organization with the British military.314 Furthermore, even British soldiers joined Irgun occasionally, as the example of Yanai shows, who had been a corporal in the British army, but deserted and joint Irgun to become its “only army-trained explosive expert”315.

While Paglin represents one option of how Irgun fighter gained experience in handling explosives before joining the groups, the life of Menachem Begin, who commanded Irgun between 1943 and 1948316, shows another source of expertise. Before joining Irgun, Begin fought as a soldier in the so-called Free Polish Anders Army against the Germans between

1941 and 1942.317 In this paramilitary organization it seems highly likely that Begin and many

310 Begin, Revolt, p. 115. 311 Begin, Revolt, p. 291; Clarke, Blood, p. 180. 312Begin, Revolt, p. 289. 313 Several examples can be found in Bell, Terror, pp. 10-59. 314 Paglin´s brother was killed during a joint mission of the Haganah and British army. See Begin, Revolt, p. 116; Bell, Terror, p. 175 (footnote 9). 315 Clarke, Blood, p. 24. 316 Bell, Terror, p. 111; 342. 317 Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 153.

Page 58 of 139 other future Irgun members318 acquired experience in handling military explosives such as

TNT, which was commonly used by during the Second World War.319

To sum up, it has been shown that Irgun received huge amounts of explicit and tacit knowledge in explosive usage via recruiting former Haganah fighters, former European soldiers, and even British soldiers. With these diverse sources of expertise, the group managed to train explosive experts and to build a network of expertise in the group that was shared throughout the generations of Irgun fighters.

(RQ4) These outcomes of the above performed analysis can help to analyze the decision of Irgun to use TNT to attack the King David Hotel. Clearly, the decision to bomb the south wing of the hotel that housed the British administrative and military headquarter in

Palestine could be seen as strongly influenced by the symbolic factors to “shake Britain and to destroy its prestige”320. Additionally, one could argue that, if the TNT was in fact stolen from

British military camps, the decision to use this British military explosives against the British military headquarter could be seen as influenced by the symbolic factor to humiliate the

British military by attacking them with their own weapons. However, no single source manages to support this claim. Rather, the accounts of Begin and Clarke show that the quality of the explosive was an important factor within the decision process: According to Paglin´s estimations, only certain amounts of a military explosive, such as TNT, were able to cause the collapse of the south wing of the building.321 Thus, TNT was the best choice to ensure the success of the attack. Furthermore, as shown above through the presence of the British military, TNT was used and, thereby, widely available in Palestine. Thus, the operational factors of the availability of TNT as well as of its strength clearly dominated the group´s decision to use TNT.

318 Begin, Revolt, p. 123; Bell, Terror, p. 36, 40, 44, 46; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, p. 154. 319 See chapter 4.2.2. 320 Clarke, Blood, p. 45. 321 Clarke, Blood, p. 45 and more general Begin, Revolt, p. 294.

Page 59 of 139

4.2.2. United States Embassy Bombings (1998)

In the morning of August 7, 1998, a by then almost unknown terrorist group parked a truck bomb in the parking lot of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya and in front of the

United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. At 10.30 and 10.35, respectively, both truck bombs in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam detonated and caused the death of 213 civilians in

Nairobi and 11 civilians in Dar es Salaam.322 In addition to the loss of 224 lives, more than

5,000 people were injured and the Embassy building were severely damaged during the attack.

In the aftermath of the attacks, the investigators identified the terrorist group Al’Qaida with its, by then little-known, leader Usama bin Ladin as perpetrator of the attack. After Bin

Ladin declared war against the United States in August 1996, up to 27 individuals including the Al’Qaida affiliates Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali,

Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, and

Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, were entrusted with the planning and execution of the attacks against the embassies in 1998.323 The motivations for the attack could be seen as part of Bin

Laden´s fatwa (i.e., order) that ordered every Muslim to kill American citizens all over the world in February 1998, which was a result of Bin Laden´s opposition against the military involvement of the United States in the Gulf war and in Somalia in the early 1990´s.324

However, while Usama bin Ladin, as leader of Al’Qaida could be seen as ultimately responsible for the attack on the embassies325, the other 27 above mentioned

Al’Qaida affiliates were responsible for the preparation and execution of the attack in Kenya.

In the aftermath of the attacks, African and American investigators managed to arrest several

322 [Federal Bureau of Investigation], ‘Executive summary’; Claiborne, ‘Bombs explode’; [CNN], ‘Rescuers’; Hamm, Terrorism as Crime, p. 51; Forest, Countering Terrorism, p. 104. 323 [Federal Bureau of Investigation], ‚Executive Summary‘;Forest, Countering Terrorism, p. 104-105. 324 Forest, Countering Terrorism, p. 104-105; [Federal Bureau of Investigation], ‘Executive summary’. 325 Forest, Countering Terrorism, p. 104.

Page 60 of 139 of these 27 operators and had the chance to interview them about the attack.326 These, recently declassified, interviews do not only show the involvement of the Al’Qaida high command in the attacks, but also provide valuable information about the nature of the explosive devices that were used during both attacks:

According to the interrogation transcripts of Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, Khalfan

Khamis Mohamed, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who were substantially involved in the planning of and preparations for the attack, the truck bombs consisted of altogether 400 to 500 cylinders of trinitrotoluene, of which each cylinder weighed „possibly more than 250 grams“327. The TNT for the bombing in Dar es Salaam was put into wooden boxes, loaded into a refrigeration truck (Nissan Atlas328), and combined with several cylinder tanks that contained oxygen and acetylene329 and with unspecified fertilizer. This IED was detonated with more than 100 electrical detonators that were initiated by two car batteries.330

However, while the arrested individuals do not provide a detailed description of the

IED that was used during the bombing in Nairobi, researcher Mark S. Hamm provides such a description: According to Hamm, the TNT for the bombing in Nairobi was, also in wooden boxes, loaded into the cargo area of a different truck (Toyota Dyna331) and combined with aluminum nitrate and aluminum powder.332 This IED was detonated with the help of detonation cord. Other than in Dar es Salaam, where the bomb was detonated remotely by a detonator switch attached to wire, the truck bomb in Nairobi was initiated inside the vehicle by an individual called Awan, who committed suicide in order to execute the attack.333

326 See [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al. for full list of suspects in custody and further: Odeh interrogation transcript, Ghailani interrogation transcript; Khamis interrogation transcript. 327 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 15. 328 [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al., p. 35. 329 Ibidem. 330 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 17f. 331 [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al., p. 34. 332 Hamm, Terrorism as crime, p. 66. 333 Hamm, Terrorism as crime, pp. 76f. Page 61 of 139

(RQ2) While Mark S. Hamm provides his readers with a full and detailed account of the composition of both truck bombs that were used to attack the US embassies, he does not give detailed information about the origin of these explosives. Hamm only states by referring to researcher Yossef Bodansky334, that

[Mohmmed Saddiq] Odeh had acquired these explosives from an unidentified source

in Luanda. The explosives were shipped from Luanda to Pakistan; from Pakistan to

Dar es Salaam and Mombasa (possibly concealed in boxes of lobsters); and from

there driven to the bomb factories.335

However, other sources to corroborate Hamm´s claim could not be found and neither the indictment of the perpetrators, nor the 8763 pages of court transcripts mention Luanda or

Pakistan as origin of the TNT. The only source that could be seen as indirectly supporting

Hamm´s claim is a sentence in Odeh´s interrogation, in which “Odeh stated that hypothetically speaking, a good way [to smuggle explosives] would be to put explosives in boxes of lobsters.”336. On basis of this claim and given the fact that Odeh was owner of a small fishing company in Kenya, one could, in accordance with Hamm´s view, assume that

Al’Qaida indeed smuggled explosives to Kenya by hiding them on fishing vessels.

However, the declassification of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani´s interrogation transcript337 in 2010 and the trial against him in the same year sheds new light on the question through which means the group in Kenya acquired the explosives for the attacks. During his interrogation, Ghailani described that, while he was located in Dar es Salaam, Msalam and

Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil assigned him to pick up “horse soap”338 in the city of Arusha

(Tanzania) so that Msalam could sell it with profit in Nairobi. In Arusha, Ghailani met a by

334 Bodansky, Bin Laden, p. 258. 335 Hamm, Terrorism as Crime, p. 66. 336 Odeh interrogation transcript, p. 16f. 337 Ghailani´s interrogation has been controversially discussed, since his interrogators were accused of having used advanced interrogation techniques during Ghaliani´s interrogation. See: [Guardian], ‘1998 embassy bombings’. 338 Ghaliani interrogation transcript, p. 4. Page 62 of 139 the time of the interrogation unidentified man called Hussein, who sold him several containers of what Ghailani believed to be horse soap. However, during the purchase, Hussein told him that the purchased substances were in fact TNT. After Ghailani confronted Msalam about the nature of the purchase, Msalam told him that the purchased TNT was part of the explosives that were meant for Al’Qaida training camps in Somalia.339 All in all, Ghailani “made four to six (4-6) trips to Arusha for the explosives, and transported them from Arusha to Dar es

Salaam by public bus”340. In Dar es Salaam, the explosives were stored at a safehouse on

Amani Street, owned by Rashid Saleh Hemed, and further transported to a safehouse in the city district of Ilala that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed had rented earlier.341 In addition to the

TNT, Ghailani also purchased approximately 1,000 detonators from Hussein in Arusha.342

However, it remains to clarify how the seller of the TNT and the detonators, Hussein, managed to acquire such high quantities of the high explosive. In this regard, Ghailani mentioned during his interrogation that, although he did not know his full name, he remembers that Hussein “had a gold and/or tanzanite mining business”343. This claim could be corroborated after Tanzanian and CIA investigators managed to identify and approach

Hussein Abebe, who told the CIA that a man called Rashid (most likely Rashid Saleh Hemed) contacted him in 1997 to order explosives that would be picked up by Rashid´s friend Ahmed

(Ghailani). According to Abebe, Ghailani told him “that the explosives were for a pearl mining operation off the coast of Somalia”344. Since Abebe was interviewed by several law enforcement agencies and announced as witness in Ghailani´s process, detailed information on his life were published. According to the New York Times and researcher Tod Hoffman,

Hussein Abebe´s family owns a mining business in Tanzania, which enabled him to gain

339 Ghailani interrogation transcript, p. 4. 340 Ghailani interrogation transcript, p. 5. 341 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 15. 342 Ghailani interrogation transcript, p. 5. 343 Ghailani interrogation transcript, p. 4. 344 [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261.

Page 63 of 139 access to large amounts of TNT and detonators.345 However, Abebe´s own profession remains uncertain in most sources: While Hoffman claimed that Abebe worked in his family´s mining business346, other sources state that he was a taxi driver.347

Thus, it seems that the groups purchased the TNT for the attacks via Hussein Abebe, who had access to industrial TNT for mining purposes and was willing to sell huge quantities of the explosive to strangers. Although this action would be bound to several restrictions in

Europe or the United States, the purchase of TNT for mining purposes seemed to be very easy in Tanzania, since even Msalam stated that “too much TNT [was] available in Tanzania”348 and Odeh claimed that “there was lots of explosives there and readily available”349.

(RQ3a&b) However, while the purchase of TNT in Tanzania did not seem to require huge efforts or skills, the manufacturing of the above mentioned IED´s presupposed a basic understanding of handling high explosives like TNT as well as of detonators. Here two persons seem to be the main sources of the group´s explicit and tacit knowledge: Mohammed

Saddiq Odeh and Abdul Rahman Al-Muhasar.

According to Hamm, Odeh supervised the manufacturing of both the IED for the attack in Nairobi and the IED for the attack in Dar es Salaam350. Further, the investigators managed to show that Odeh possessed extensive experience in bomb manufacturing, which he acquired in Afghanistan in 1990: During his interrogation, Odeh described that he travelled to an Al’Qaida training facility called Farouq in the Afghan-Pakistani border region Khost in

October 1990.351 During a two month training course, Odeh took training lessons on “the use

345 Weiser, ‘Witness’; Hoffman, Al Qaeda, chapter 17. Author´s note. For this analysis, only the ebook version of Hoffman´s book was available. Thus, instead of page numbers, indications of the chapters will be used in the references. 346 Hirschkorn, ‘Ghailani Commission’; Hoffmann, Al Qaeda, chapter 17. 347 [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261; Finn, ‘98 East Africa embassy bombings’. 348 Odeh interrogation transcript, p. 19. 349 Court Transcript Day 12, p. 1658. 350 Hamm, Terrorism as crime, p. 66. 351 Court Transcript Day 11, p. 1626.

Page 64 of 139 of high explosives such as C3, C4 and TNT”352 in Farouq and, further, attended a training in advanced military tactics in the Al’Qaida Jihad Wael training facility in Khost in the beginning of 1992. Furthermore, he attended an advanced explosive training at a training facility called Seddiq camp in June 1992.353 Here, he studied “mathematic formulas to determine the type and amount of explosives to do a job”354 and got to know Abdul Rahman

Al-Muhasar, who worked as an explosive advisor in the camp. According to Hamm, Al-

Muhasar helped Odeh in 1998 to assemble the IED´s for the attacks against the embassies.355

This account was partly corroborated by Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who stated that

Al-Muhasar „came to stay at the Ilala house to organize all matters with regard to the bomb about a week prior to August 7, 1998”356. Furthermore, Mohamed claimed that “Abdul

Rahman was the engingeer [sic] of the bomb and that he worked with ‘all confidence’”357.

According to Khamis, Al-Muhasar “did not use papers or books to guide him”358 while wiring the bomb. During the bomb manufacturing process, Khamis assisted Al-Muhasar by means of grinding the TNT and assembling the parts of the bombs together with Fahid Mohammed

Ally Msala.359

However, to effectively assist Al-Muhasar with the manufacturing of the bomb,

Khamis and Msala must have possessed a basic expertise in handling and manufacturing explosives. According to the interrogation transcript, the two men acquired this expertise during their stay in an Al’Qaida training facility in Afghanistan in 1994.360 Here, both Khamis and Msala received an advanced explosive training, in which they, amongst other tasks,

352 Odeh interrogation transcript, p. 28. 353 Odeh interrogation transcript, p. 5; [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al., p. 14; Court Transcript Day 11, p. 1627. 354 Odeh interrotation transcript, p. 6. 355 Hamm, Terrorism as crime, p. 66. 356 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 14. 357 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 19. 358 Ibidem. 359 Mohamed interrogation transcript, pp. 16, 18. 360 Mohamed interrogation transcript, pp. 6-9.

Page 65 of 139 learned “how to join detonators and wires”361. This statement was partially corroborated by

Odeh, who stated during his interrogation that “Fahad [alias of Msala] took an advanced explosive course (…) while in Afghanistan”362 and described further that this 60-days course was “very comprehensive” and that Msala “had even more knowledge of explosives than he did”363, as his interrogator put it.

To sum up, the testimony of Hussein Abebe showed that the group purchased industrial TNT that originated from a mining company to attack the embassies. Moreover, it has been shown that several individuals in the group received advanced training in Al’Qaida training camps during which they acquired both the theoretical knowledge and expertise to assemble the IED´s to attack the embassies. In addition to the trained members of the group,

Al’Qaida explosive expert Abdul Rahman Al-Muhasar joined the group to perform the crucial and most complex parts of the manufacturing processes. As described by Khamis, Al-

Muhasar possessed huge amounts of experience in bomb manufacturing that enabled him to wire the bomb without any assistance of manuals.

(RQ4) Result of these analyses point to which factors might have been involved in the decision process of the group to use TNT for the attack. While Hamm and researcher James

Forest show in detail that the decision to attack the two embassies was clearly influenced by symbolic and ideological factors364, there is no evidence that the decision to use TNT for this attack was influenced by symbolic factors. Rather, the above performed analysis shows that especially the operational factors of availability and quality led Owhali, Odeh, Msalam, and the others to choose TNT over other explosives as weapon for this attack: As Odeh and

Msalam stated, TNT was readily available in Tanzania, due to the flourishing mining industry in this country. Thus, the group could easily purchase large amounts of this explosive without

361 Mohamed interrogation transcript, p. 8. 362 Odeh interrogation transcripts, p. 30. 363 Court Transcript Day 12, p. 1657. 364 Hamm, Terrorism as crime, p. 67f; Forest, Countering Terrorism, p. 105f.

Page 66 of 139 running the risk of arrest. Furthermore, since Odeh had learned in the advanced explosive course how to calculate the type and amounts of explosive that would be needed to attack buildings, it seems reasonable that TNT was the best choice to attack the embassies, since it is a high explosive that is even in small amounts more powerful than, for example, ANFO or peroxide based explosives.365

4.3. The acquisition and use of RDX and C-4

4.3.1. Bombay Bombing (1993)

During the afternoon of March 12, 1993, a coordinated terrorist attack hit the inner city of

Mumbai (then Bombay). Beginning with the detonation of a car bomb in the basement of the

Bombay Stock Exchange building, altogether 13 explosive devices detonated at various places in Bombay including markets, hotels, airport facilities, and a cinema. Simultaneously, individuals detonated hand grenades at Sahar International airport and other places in the city.

By the end of the at least two hours lasting attack, 257 people had lost their lives and more than 700 people had been injured.366 Shortly after the attack, both the media and investigators portrayed the attack as an act of revenge for the destruction of the mosque Babri Maijd in

December 1992 by Hindu protesters and for the, during the consequent protests and riots, killed Muslims. The Pakistani-Indian crime syndicate D-Company owned by Dawood

Ibrahim was identified as perpetrators of the attack.367 By recruiting more than 100 young

Muslims in India of which approximately 32 planned and 13 executed the attacks on March

12, Ibrahim managed to combine a personal act of revenge of the crime syndicates, which was damaged by the ongoing riots in Bombay, with the motives of Jihadi terrorism in India that has been aimed at fighting against the Hindu majority in Indian society and Government.368

365 See Appendix B. 366 Tankel, Jihadist Violence, p. 16 ; Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 45. 367 Tankel, Jihadist Violence, p. 16. 368 Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, pp. 708f. Page 67 of 139

Since the attacks, the D-Company repeatedly financed and supported Jihadi terrorist activities and allied itself with groups like Al Qaida and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).369 Ibrahim is still a leading members of the syndicate.370

However, both the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and some researchers state that the attack was not only orchestrated by Dawood Ibrahim, who coordinated the attack from Dubai, but also heavily supported by the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-

Services Intelligence (ISI).371 While some authors even claim that the whole attack was

“orchestrated by Pakistani intelligence”372, it seems, given the below analyzed sources, reasonable to assume that the ISI or other Pakistani protagonists close to the Government at least provided the perpetrators with the means to execute the attack, including the explosive technology to execute the attack.

To analyze RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 in this case study, this analysis uses predominantly journalistic sources, including the analysis of journalist S. Hussain Zaidi, who managed to interview some perpetrators of the attacks and had access to police and intelligence reports.373

In the first days after the attack, forensic evidence that was collected at the blasting sites as well as a seizure from a not detonated device hidden in a scooter revealed the nature of the explosive that was used to attack Bombay:374 After a short analysis, the investigators concluded that RDX was used in the 13 IED´s.375 A police raid that seized approximately

1,034 kg of RDX on March 24, 1993 and connected it to the attacks from March 12 corroborated that conclusion. Furthermore, thanks to the seizure and the evidence at the blasting site, the investigators could also identify further specifications of the IED´s: To initiate the charges of RDX, the RDX putties were combined with pencil detonators that were

369 For detailed discussion see Tankel, Jihadist Violence and Tankel, World Stage. 370 Tankel, Jihadist Violence, p. 31; Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, pp. 707. 371See for example: Tankel, Jihadist Movement, p. 3; Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’. 372 Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 45. 373 Zaidi, Black Friday. Author´s note. For this analysis, only the ebook version of Zaidi´s book was available. Thus, instead of page numbers, indications of the chapters will be used in the references. 374 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 6. 375 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 6. Page 68 of 139 timed to detonate in a series. These IED`s were hidden in seven cars, four scooters, and one motorcycle and placed close to the targets in Bombay by the 13 perpetrators.376

However, while the composition of the IED´s could be quickly identified, the identification of RDX as the explosive technology that was used during the attacks raised further question of how the D-Company acquired the military explosive.

(RQ2) According to Zaidi´s account, which proved to be coherent with short claims of several researchers, Dawood Ibrahim organized the acquisition of the RDX for the attack on

March 12 together with his lieutenant Tiger Memon.377 With the help of several recruited or bribed police officers and custom officials, the D-Company smuggled approximately between

1,500 and 5,000 kilograms of RDX, several AK-56 rifles as well as hand grenades from

Pakistan via speedboats, alongside the already established smuggling routes of the D-

Company, to the Indian region Raigad in early February 1993.378 However, this account only answers the questions how the RDX explosives entered India. To answer the question, how the D-Company acquired the RDX that was smuggled from Pakistan into India, it is necessary to analyze the investigations after the blast.

Since RDX is almost worldwide considered a military explosive, it seems highly unlikely that Ibrahim and Memon purchased the explosives in Pakistan. Rather, for the investigators it seemed reasonable to assume that individuals in the Pakistani government provided the RDX. Thus, they focused on finding evidence of a Pakistani involvement in the acquisition of the RDX.379 On March 21, police officers raided the house of Tiger Memon´s family and seized 25 empty cartons that could be identified as the containers for the RDX explosives that were used during the attack on March 12. On some of these cartons, the investigators found an imprinting that read “Packstile Packages Ltd., Lahore. Consignee: Wah

376 Sen, ‘Low-down’; Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 6. 377 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 2; Tankel, Jihadist Violence, p. 16; Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 46. 378 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 3; Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 45; Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, pp. 706. 379 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 13; Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, p. 706f.

Page 69 of 139

Noble”380, which led the investigators to identify the private explosive company Wah Noble in Pakistan as origin of the RDX. However, since the disposal and the export of RDX and other military explosives are usually monitored by the government of the respective country, the investigators inferred that a Pakistani governmental agency or at least persons within this agency organized the purchase and the smuggling of the RDX.381

Thus, the investigators analyzed Ibrahim´s network and activities in Pakistan to locate the supporters of the attack in the Pakistani government. During the investigations, several pieces of evidence linked Dawood Ibrahim with the ISI, including a home-video that showed

Ibrahim and ISI agents, and including the fact that Tiger Memon´s family was protected and provided with new passports by the ISI.382 Furthermore, after arresting and interrogating Tiger

Memon´s brother, Yaqub Memon, it turned out that Dawood Ibrahim had a strong network in

Pakistan and frequently met with Raza Ashfaq Sarvar, minister in the Muslim League government in the Pakistani region Punjab, before the attacks.383 Yacub Memon also told his interrogators that Ibrahim had several contacts in the Pakistani army and was working together with the Pakistani smuggler Taufiq Jaliawala, who was, in cooperation with the ISI, responsible for supplying Ibrahim with the RDX for the attack.384

Thus, on basis of the investigator´s account, it can be assumed that the ISI together with the smuggler Taufiq Jaliawala purchased the RDX from the Pakistani company Wah

Noble and smuggled it into India via the smuggling routes of the D-Company. As a governmental agency, it seems highly likely that the ISI did not have any problems to purchase RDX. Furthermore, it could be alternatively assumed that the RDX was, through the

ISI, provided by the Pakistani army, who uses and stores RDX as well as maintained contacts with Ibrahim (see above). These narrative of Pakistani state-funded terrorism in India by

380 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 13. 381 Ibidem. 382 Ibidem. 383 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 13. 384 Ibidem.

Page 70 of 139 providing RDX explosives has been adopted by several researchers, including Srikanta

Ghosh, who shows in a thorough analysis that the Pakistani government has been providing

RDX to terrorist groups in India in several cases to destabilize the Hindu government.385

In addition to the origin of the RDX; the investigators also managed to reveal the origins of the pencil detonators that turned out to be “part of a consignment that the United

States had sent to Pakistan in the 1980s“386.

(RQ3a&b) While the acquisition of the RDX for the attack on Bombay can be seen as highly influenced by members of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI, also the expertise of the perpetrators on how to manufacture and use IED´s seem to originate from Pakistan.

Several researchers point out that the D-Company had sent between 15 and 30 for the attack recruited Indian Muslims to terror training camps in Pakistan to improve their abilities in guerilla warfare and bomb manufacturing.387 In most of the publications, no further information is provided about the location, nature, and hosts of this training. However, on basis of Stephen Tankel´s and Marika Vicziany´s analyses concerning the connections between Dawood and Pakistani terrorist groups, one could assume that the D-Company might have cooperated with the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to train the jihadists.388

However, while the academic sources on the attack only provide a vague account on the origin of the tacit and explicit knowledge to execute the attack, investigative journalist

Hussain Zaidi gives a detailed account of the training camps that is based on the court statement and on an interview with one of the perpetrators, Badshah Khan: In a section in

Zaidi´s book that recollects Khan´s experiences during his training in Pakistan, Zaidi shows that the above mentioned account of the training camps in the literature seems to be coherent

385 Ghosh, Pakistan´s ISI, p. 91-100 and further Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 57-60. 386 Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, p. 706. 387 Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 61; Kalyanaraman, ‘India and the Challenge’, p. 706; Tankel, Jihadist Violence, p. 15. 388 Tankel, Jihadist Violence, pp. 17-46; Vicziany, ‘Mumbai Bombings’, p. 60-65.

Page 71 of 139 with Khan´s account. Khan describes in Zaidi´s book that he was sent to a training facility near Islamabad by Tiger Memon on February 11, 1993.389 However, since a direct flight from

India to Pakistan ran the risk of detection, Tiger Memon sent altogether 19 recruits (7 recruits on February 11, 3 on February 15, and 9 on February 19) to Dubai, where they changed flights to Islamabad. After arriving in Islamabad, Khan describes that he enjoyed the hospitality of a man who was called Jaafar bhai and who organized the transfer to the training camps close to Islamabad for the D-Company.390

After spending a night in Islamabad, Khan and his fellow recruits were driven to a training compound that was, according to Khan, located in the mountains approximately 150 kilometers from Islamabad. Here, Jaafar bhai introduced the recruits to an instructor Babaji, who exercised with the D-Company recruits and provided them with the explicit and tacit knowledge on how to use AK-56 rifles and handle hand grenades.391 Furthermore, on

February 19, Tiger Memon arrived in the camp and gave, together with Babaji, lessons on how to prepare and use RDX explosives. Here, Khan describes in detail that, first of all, the group was provided with basic information about the history and nature of the explosive.392

However, besides this explicit knowledge, both Tiger Memon as well as the instructor at the camp provided the recruits with practical expertise to use RDX. Khan describes here: “He taught us how to make an RDX bomb. He attached a thirty-minute pencil timer to the bomb.

We began chatting after he set it up. Suddenly an explosion rocked the jungles and mountains.“393 and further “Babaji told us to make bombs as well. We began moulding the malleable black putty. He triggered several explosions of RDX bombs, though this time on a relatively muted scale.“394 This account is, according to Zaidi, corroborated by another

389 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 3. 390 Ibidem. 391 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 3. 392 Ibidem. 393 Ibidem. 394 Ibidem.

Page 72 of 139 recruit, who describes that “(…) the most important part of our training was making bombs.

We were taught how to connect the RDX putty to pencil detonators”395.

It is clearly visible that Khan and the other recruits of the D-Company acquired the explicit and tacit knowledge to execute the attack on March 12, 1993, in training facilities close to Islamabad. However, why did the D-Company send its recruits to Pakistan and thereby accepted financial loss and the risk of detection, instead of training them at a safehouse of the syndicate in India? Here, once more the account of Khan helps to answer this question. After receiving training in shooting, Khan realized why the syndicate underwent such risks to train its recruits:

There was no other place where we could have received such training; anywhere else

the booming shots and loud reports would have attracted too much attention. Such

intensive training was not possible anywhere in India, nor in Dubai or any other place

I could think of. Pakistan—the one place so sensitive to the plight of Indian

Muslims—was the only option.396

In this quote, Khan identified the remote area of the training facilities in Pakistan as essential precondition for the acquisition of the tacit expertise, namely shooting practice and test blasts, which were necessary to execute the attack. Furthermore, Khan´s phrase “sensitive to the plight of Indian Muslims” could be seen as hinting to the above mentioned involvement in, or at least support of, the attacks on behalf of the Pakistani government.

To sum up, it has been shown that the D-Company acquired the RDX that was used during the attacks on March 12, 1993 with the help of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI.

Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the recruits of the D-Company obtained the explicit and tacit knowledge to execute the attack in training camps in Pakistan. Here, an involvement of the ISI can be assumed as well.

395 Zaidi, Black Friday, chapter 3. 396 Ibidem. Page 73 of 139

(RQ4) On basis of these results, one can identify certain elements that were involved in the decision of the D-Company to use RDX as weapon in the attack against Bombay.

While no evidence for symbolic reasons for the usage of RDX were found in this case, several operational considerations seemed to be involved in the decision making of the perpetrators.

Here, financial considerations do not seem to be of high importance, since the D Company could be seen as highly successful and supported by Pakistani governmental agencies.

Furthermore, the handling of the explosive did not seem to play crucial roles either, since its use was subject of the training that the D-Company recruits received with the help of the ISI.

Rather, in this case the ISI, in cooperation with the D-Company, chose to use RDX because of its qualities: As high-end military explosive with strong explosive power by using only small amounts, RDX simply seemed to be the best choice for the attack. Furthermore, the fact that RDX was readily available to the Pakistani government, since it was produced in

Pakistan and its distribution was monitored by the Pakistani government, made it even easier for the ISI to provide the D-Company with high amounts of the explosive.

4.3.2. Tequendama Hotel Bombing (2002)

Unlike most of the other case studies in this paper, the bombing of the Tequendama Hotel in

Bogota, Colombia on December 13, 2002 did not receive any global attention in law enforcement, media, or research. In fact, primarily local newspapers reported on this incident in depth and no researcher has investigated this attack yet. Hence, the following case study is the first scientific discussion of the events on December 13, 2002 and, thereby, can only provide limited information about the incident that are based on short reports in one English and several Colombian newspapers.397

397 The author would like to express his gratitude to Kristina Panova and Stefanie Carolina Schmidt for their assistance with the Spanish language.

Page 74 of 139

In the morning of December 13, 2002, two individuals entered the Tequendama Hotel in Bogota, Colombia carrying a suitcase or a laptop case.398 They entered the restaurant on the

30th floor of the hotel that was owned by the Colombian military, where an Argentinean salsa stage show was entertaining approximately 100 hotel guests.399 The two individuals took a seat in the restaurant, but left the restaurant shortly afterwards while leaving the suitcase or laptop case behind. Few minutes later the case of the, by then unidentified, the suitcase or laptop case detonated during the stage show in the restaurant and wounded approximately 30 persons.400 Additionally, approximately three hours before the suitcase detonated in the

Tequendama Hotel, the Colombian senator German Vagas Lleras was injured by a small IED that was, disguised as a Christmas present, sent to his house.401 During the immediate aftermath of the events, neither the Colombian public nor the investigators on the ground had any information about the explosion at the Tequendama Hotel, but rumors spread about a terrorist attack that caused the detonation. However, while the Colombian government speculated about an attack by left-wing guerillas, who might have been supported by the IRA or the ETA, no group claimed responsibility for the attack.402

During the subsequent months, Colombian investigators managed to identify the eastern bloc of the Colombian guerilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(FARC) as perpetrator of the attack.403 Since its foundation in 1964, the FARC evolved to both a criminal network of drug trafficking and a guerilla and terrorist group that follows a radical, left-nationalist Marxist-Leninist ideology.404 With numerous attacks against the

Colombian military, police forces, and against civilians from the Colombian upper and middle class, the FARC can be seen as one of the most relevant terrorist group on the American

398 For discussion see below. 399 [El Tiempo], ‘Cárcel por bomba’; [Los Andes], ‘Explotó una bomba’; [Semana], ‘Viernes Negro’; [BBC], Many hurt. 400 [El Tiempo], ‘Cárcel por bomba’. 401 [Semana], ‘Viernes Negro’; [BBC], Many hurt. 402 [BBC], Many hurt. 403 [El Tiempo], ‘Cárcel por bomba’; [El Tiempo], ‘Mujer’; [Semana], ‘Viernes Negro’. 404 Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, p. 75-77.

Page 75 of 139 continent.405 As it became evident in the beginning of 2003, the bombing of the Tequendama hotel and the attempted assassination of senator Vaga Lleras appeared to be two of these numerous attacks that were planned and executed by members of the FARC: In March, the

Colombian police forces managed to arrest several FARC members including Diana Muñoz,

Alfonso Jiménez, Cristina Guzmán Martinez, and Duberney Loaiza Barrero.406 According to two contradictory sources, either Munoz and Jimenez407 or Guzman Martinez and Barrero408, could be identified as the two individuals, who executed the attack against the Tequendama

Hotel. However, while the journalistic sources concerning the attack do not manage to unambiguously report who, in fact, executed the attacks, all sources give the same information about the nature of the explosive technology that was used during the attack:

According to the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, the IED that was used to attack the

Tequendama Hotel on December 13, 2002 consisted of 1,200 grams of the plastic explosive

C-4 that was hidden in either a briefcase or “un computador personal”409 (a personal computer or laptop). This IED was apparently detonated by an electrical timer that was remotely activated by “un celular”410 (a cell phone). The bomb that injured senator Vaga Lleras consisted of a book filled with 80 grams of C-4. It was disguised as Christmas present and equipped with a booby trap that ignited the IED when Vaga Lleras opened the present.411

However, these detailed descriptions of the IED´s that were used in the attacks in December

13 raise the important question of how the perpetrators managed to acquire the military explosive C-4.

(RQ2) There is no open source information available concerning the question where the FARC members acquired the particular C-4 explosives that were used during the attacks

405 Murray, ‘Explosive Journey’, p. 69. 406 [El Tiempo], ‘Juicio por bomba’. 407 Ibidem. 408 [El Tiempo], ‘Cárcel por bomba’. 409 [El Tiempo], ‘Cárcel por bomba’ and [BBC], ‘Many hurt’. 410 [El Tiempo], ‘Juicio por bomba’. 411 [BBC], ‘Many hurt’; [Los Andes], ‘Explotó una bomba’. Page 76 of 139 on December 13, 2002. However, based on the structure and history of the FARC and on grounds of other cases, it is possible to formulate reasonable assumptions concerning the origin of the particular C-4 from the attacks. The FARC can be seen as large, very influential, and well-organized guerilla group, which strategically uses the tool of terrorism to enforce its

Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, besides from its political activities, the group is one of the largest criminal networks in South America and accumulates enormous financial profits from the production and smuggling of narcotics.412 This mixture of political terrorism and organized crime, called narcoterror413, provides the FARC not only with great financial resources, but also with two valuable sets of contacts that could be used to acquire weaponry and in particular explosives:

(i) Since its foundation, the FARC has been benefitting to a large extent from the sponsoring or at least ideological support of several American states, of which Venezuela and

Cuba can be seen as the most influential supporters of the group.414 Thus, it could be argued that these states provided the FARC with weaponry, including C-4 explosives, to support their fight in Colombia in 2002. However, while several researchers point out that Venezuela and

Cuba sponsored the FARC, they also emphasize that this support usually took place in form of ideological support and the provision of “safe havens”415 for FARC smuggling activities or for FARC members who sought to avoid arrest or to meet with other groups. Although there are recorded incidents in which at least Venezuela were accused of providing weapons to

FARC, it seems more reasonable to believe that the state sponsorship of the FARC was restricted to the support of the smuggling of weapons from other sources.416

(ii) These other sources can be identified by taking a close look at the contacts of FARC in organized criminal networks. Due to its decisive role in South America´s organized drug

412 Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, p. 75-77; Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 17f. 413 Murphy, ‘The IRA and the FARC’, p. 78; [UNODC], Digest, p. 47. 414 Byman, ‘State sponsorship’, p. 21f; Murray, ‘Explosive Journey’, p. 70; Sullivan, Cuba, p. 6. 415 Murray, ‘Explosive Journey’, p. 70; Sullivan, Cuba, p. 6. 416 Cragin&Hoffman, Arms Trafficking, p. 15f; Byman, ‘State sponsorship’, p. 21.

Page 77 of 139 trafficking, the FARC has been maintaining extensive networks in the world of organized crime.417 Thus, one can assume that the FARC purchased the explosives for the attack in

Bogota from illegal arms traders. Due to its enormous financial resources, its global criminal networks, and its well-established and state-tolerated smuggling routes across the Venezuelan border, the FARC would have had the capabilities to purchase large amounts of weaponry from the black market. Furthermore, two arrests that were performed by the United States

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2007 and 2008 show that the FARC also had the possibilities to purchase C-4 explosives from illegal arms dealers:

In 2007, the DEA executed a sting operation with the codename “Operation Legacy” to arrest the illegal arms dealer and supporter of several terrorist groups Monzer al-Kassar.418

During the operation, DEA agents reached out to Al-Kassar by pretending to be FARC members who wanted to purchase weaponry from Al-Kassar´s organizations. During the negotiations with the fake FARC members, Al-Kassar offered, amongst other things, to provide the FARC with “ton-quantities of c4 explosives”419 and with explosive experts to train FARC members in the usage of C-4 explosives. By establishing fake companies like

Cenrex Trading Cooperation, LTD, Al-Kassar managed to acquire large amounts of high explosives in the early 1990´s.420 In a similar sting operation, the DEA arrested Viktor Bout, a

Russian arms dealer, in 2008.421 Bout, who was notorious for spreading violence by supplying weapons to several conflict parties on the African continent, agreed to sell, amongst other things, surface-to-air missiles, AK 47-rifles and C-4 explosives to the FARC.422 Bout´s

417 Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 18. 418 Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 24; Weiser, ‘Arms Dealer’; [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Monzer al-Kassar. 419[United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Monzer al-Kassar, p. 9. 420 Madani, ‘New Report’. 421 Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 24f; Lynch, ‘Arms Dealer’; [United States District Court Southern District of New York], United States v. Victor Bout. 422 Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 24f; Lynch, ‘Arms Dealer’.

Page 78 of 139 extensive arsenal of weaponry mainly consisted of former USSR weaponry that entered the black market with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.423

The cases of Al-Kassar and Bout clearly show that the FARC did not only have the capabilities, but also the possibilities to acquire C-4 explosives via the black market, since prominent arms dealers were apparently interested and willing to sell these explosives to the group. In addition to that, the researcher John Rollins points out that at least Bout could be seen as making business with the FARC before his arrest in 2008.424 Why did the FARC use

C-4 explosives to perform the attack? Interestingly, this question can be answered by analyzing where the perpetrator acquired the explicit and tacit knowledge to use C-4 explosives:

(RQ3a&b) Its sponsoring by Cuba and Venezuela and its global network did not only help the FARC to acquire explosives, but also to train its combatants. Thus, to obtain professional expertise in IED manufacturing, the FARC reached out to foreign terrorist groups such as the

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Spanish Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).425

United through their Marxist-Leninist worldviews and Catholic religion, the three groups cooperated on several occasions and provided each other with tactical expertise and financial as well as operational support.426 Within this relationship, the PIRA and the ETA mainly provided expertise in explosive manufacturing, while the FARC supplied the European groups with financial support.427

As researchers Kim Cragin et al. pointed out, the PIRA possessed an in-depth knowledge about IED ´s and the manufacturing of homemade mortars. Especially the manufacturing of C-4 or Semtex-based IED´s with cell phone detonators can be seen as

423 Roberts, ‘All about Bout’. 424 Rollins, International Terrorism, p. 25. 425 Curtis&Karacan, Nexus Among Terrorists, p. 6-7; Murphy, ‘The IRA and the FARC’; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, pp. 71-89. 426 Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, pp. 78-83. 427 Murphy, ‘The IRA and the FARC’, p. 83-84; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth, pp. 78-83. Page 79 of 139 typical expertise of the PIRA explosive experts.428 This expert knowledge was shared with the

FARC in the late 1990´s by means of PIRA explosive experts who travelled to Colombia to train FARC members. Three of those experts, Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley, and James

Monaghan, were arrested in Bogota in 2001 after they allegedly travelled around in Colombia in 1998 and 2000 to train FARC rebels in IED manufacturing.429 While the media referred to several FARC attacks by stating that these rebels were allegedly trained in bomb manufacturing by PIRA members, also the attack against the Tequendama hotel was a result of PIRA training sessions of FARC rebels. According to the Irish Times, “President Alvaro

Uribe said that the IRA and the Basque separatist group, ETA, had helped to train the FARC rebels who set off the bomb in a restaurant of the Tequendama Hotel”430. While the involvement of PIRA expertise in the bombing can be seen as probable, it remains to clarify to which extent the ETA was involved in the attack:

In 2009, the newspaper El Tiempo issued an article about the arrest of Adela Pérez

Aguirre who was allegedly one of the perpetrators of the attacks against the Tequendama

Hotel and against senator Vagas Lleras. In this article, the author states further that Aguirre

(alias Camila) “recibió instrucción, en explosivos, de los hombres de ETA que estuvieron en el Caguán durante la zona de distensión”431 (received an explosive training from ETA members, who tarried in the demilitarized zone Caguan). According to the article, this training enabled Aguirre to prepare and execute the attacks on December 13, 2002. This claim can be seen as implicitly supported by an article of journalist Hannah Aronowitz from 2011, in which she cites a former FARC member, who revealed that he was trained by ETA

428 Forest, Teaching Terror, p. 82; Ranstorp&Brun, Terrorism Learning, p. 29f; Oppenheimer, ‘Technology and Training’. 429 Ranstorp&Brun, Terrorism Learning, p. 29f; Forest, ‘Armed Groups’, p. 272; ‘Murray, Explosive Journey’, p. 70-72; Oppenheimer, ‘Technology and Training’. 430 O´Driscoll, ‘IRA condemned’. 431 [El Tiempo], ‘Mujer’.

Page 80 of 139 explosives experts on how to build IED´s with C-4 explosives and “cellphones as timers”432.

Furthermore, an article of The Guardian from 2010 cited Colombian investigators who claimed that in the past “up to half a dozen Eta members had travelled to Venezuela to train

Farc [sic] members in the use of C4 explosives and mobile telephones as detonators”433. Thus, it also seems highly probable that the perpetrators of the attack were trained by ETA members, since the ETA possessed exactly the expertise that was needed to execute the attacks and, in fact, trained FARC members. However, as several researchers point out that, just as FARC members, also ETA members benefitted from explosive training that was provided by PIRA explosive experts.434 Thus, the bomb making expertise of both the ETA and the FARC should be seen as originating from the PIRA and, further, as circulating between these three actors. Here, befriended countries such as Cuba and Venezuela supported this knowledge circulation by providing sanctuary for meetings of the three groups.435

To sum up, it seems most reasonable that FARC obtained C-4 via illegal markets.

Furthermore, although it is not certain whether the PIRA directly trained the perpetrators of the attack from December 13 or provided its expertise through ETA explosive trainers, it was possible to locate the PIRA as eventual source of expertise for the attack.

(RQ4) This conclusion further manages to explain why the FRAC members chose C-4 explosives to execute the attacks against the Tequendama hotel and against senator Vagas

Lleras: Because of its well-financed smuggling network, factors like financial restrictions do not seem to be important for the FARC. Rather, besides the good performance of C-4 explosives, especially the expertise of the FARC members seems to have been the decisive factor to use C-4 in the attacks: As seen above, it is highly likely that the perpetrators were trained by ETA or PIRA explosive experts who taught them their characteristic IED

432 Aronowitz, ‘Ex-FARC members’. 433 Tremlett, ‘Hugo Chávez’. 434 Forest, ‘Armed Groups’, p. 272; Ward&Hackett, ‘IRA´s foreign links’, p. 1; Cragin et al., Dragon´s teeth, p. 87. 435 Sullivan, Cuba, p. 9; Ward&Hackett, ‘IRA´s foreign links’, p. 1; Murray, ‘Explosive Journey’, p. 76. Page 81 of 139 manufacturing process that involved C-4 explosives and cell phone detonators. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the FARC decided to use C-4 explosives, simply because they were trained to handle this explosive and because they knew how to build an IED with C-4. Finally, the composition of the IED that was based on this shared knowledge between the FARC,

PIRA, and ETA further might have had the additional power to intimidate the Colombian society and government by demonstrating a worldwide union of different terrorist groups with the bombing. However, it seems too farfetched to assume that this symbolic factor played a decisive role in the decision to use C-4 during the attacks.

4.4. The acquisition and use of PETN and Semtex

4.4.1. “Mai Offensive” of the Red Army Faction (1972)

On May 11, 1972 the German leftist terrorist group “Rote Armee Fraktion” (RAF) started a series of bombings in West Germany; the so-called “Mai-Offensive”.436

In the first incident of this serial bombing, the RAF cell “Kommando Petra Schelm” killed one person and wounded 13 others by detonating three car bombs in front of the

German headquarter of the Fifth Corps of the U.S. Army in Frankfurt am Main on May 11437.

The second bombing occurred in the police directorate in Augsburg on May 12. One day later, the so-called “Kommando Thomas Weisbecker” detonated an IED in the police directorate in Augsburg and wounded 10 persons. On May 15, the RAF “Kommando Manfred

Grashof” failed to execute investigative judge Wolfgang Buddenberg with a car bomb, but instead injured his wife.438 Further, on May 19, RAF “Kommando 2. Juni” detonated two

IED´s in the fourth and sevenths floor of the editorial office of Springer press and injured 38

436 Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion, pp. 30-38. 437 Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion, pp. 30-31; Varon, Bringing the War Home, p. 210; 0019720511 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Kommando Petra Schelm – HQ. US-Armeekorps Frankfurt. 438 Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion, p. 31-32; Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, p. 161.

Page 82 of 139 persons.439 The last attack in May 1972 happened in Heidelberg, where the RAF “Kommando

15. Juli” placed two vehicles with explosive devices on the territory of the headquarter of the

Seventh United States Army and killed 3 and injured 5 persons.440

Established in 1970 with the jailbreak of activist Andreas Baader (among others supported by Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof), the Red Army Faction planned and executed several attacks against the German and other Western Governments until its dissolution in 1993.441 Motivated by a Marxist-Leninist ideology and inspired by South

American-guerilla groups, Baader, Meinhof, and three “generations”442 of RAF members perceived themselves and their group as fighting against Western imperialism and capitalism.443 Thus, also the “Mai Offensive” can be seen as motivated by these ideology, since the “Kommando´s” stated that the attacks on the Army bases should be seen as a response to American crimes against humanity during the Vietnam war444 and that the attack against Springer was motivated by the hostile position of the Springer publishers towards the

German extra-parliamentary opposition.445

Shortly after the attacks in May 1972, German law enforcement agencies focused their investigations on arresting as many RAF operatives as possible. With the help of an extensive manhunt, called “Aktion Wasserschlag”, the Federal Crime Police Office (BKA) managed to rouse and, eventually, arrest high ranked members of the Red Army Faction on May 31.446

Among the arrested were Andreas Baader, Holger Meins, and Jan-Carl Raspe. The three men were besieged and arrested in a garage in Frankfurt am Main, which was kept under

439 Varon, Bringing the War Home, p. 210; Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, p. 161-162. 440 Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion, pp. 33-35; Varon, Bringing the War Home, p. 210; Aust&Bell, Baader- Meinhof, p. 163-164. 441 For detailed discussion see: Aust&Bell, Baader Meinhof; Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion. 442 Several researchers divide the phases of RAF activities in Germany in three generations of activitiy between 1970 and 1977, between 1978 and 1982 as well as between 1982 and 1992. See: Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion. 443 0019700522 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Rote Armee aufbauen; 0019710501 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Das Konzept Stadtguerilla. 444 0019720511 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Kommando Petra Schelm – HQ. US-Armeekorps Frankfurt.; 0019720524 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Kommando 15, Juli – HQ US-Army Heidelberg. 445 0019720519 [Rote Armee Fraktion], Kommando2. Juni – Springer. 446 Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, pp. 164-167; Pflieger, Rote Armee Fraktion, pp. 37-39.

Page 83 of 139 surveillance by the German police.447 Along with the arrest of the three RAF members, police officers seized several weapons, bomb shells, and explosives that were stored in the garage.

Thanks to the arrests and seizures in Frankfurt, the investigators could compare the seized explosives with the traces of explosive material at the bombing scenes of the “Mai

Offensive”. Thereby, it turned out that nearly all bombings were executed with the same material that was found in the garage in Frankfurt.448 However, although some researchers still state that the RAF used TNT to attack the Army Headquarter in Heidelberg449, no trinitrotoluene were used during the entire “Mai Offensive”: Rather, during a raid in a RAF safehouse in Berlin, investigators seized AN, as Der Spiegel reported shortly afterwards.450

Furthermore, two years after the attacks, the investigators stated, again in Der Spiegel, that

IED´s with a grey mixture of AN mixed with kalium nitrate, sulphur, and wood chips as well as with a red mixture of AN, kalium nitrate, minion, aluminum, ferric oxide, and sulphur were used during the “Mai Offensive”.451 This mixture was placed in homemade steel bombshells and equipped with fuses. However, to ensure the detonation of the IED´s, the RAF members added a second explosive452 – namely PETN.

In the article from 1974, the authors of Der Spiegel mentioned the existence of this second explosive very briefly and only by referring to a so-called “grüne ‘Dynacord’

Sprengschnur”453, which was used in all explosive devices that detonated during the “Mai-

Offensive”. However, neither the journalistic sources, nor the existing literature discussed the nature of this second explosive. Dynacord (or Cordtex) is the product name of a detonating cord, which has been manufactured by Orica Germany GmbH.454 According to the company´s information sheet, this detonating cord consists of PETN in a range of 5 to 40 gram per meter

447 Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, p. 165-167. 448 [Der Spiegel], ‘Sprengstoff-Spuren’; [Der Spiegel], ‘Kommen Sie raus’. 449 Varon, Bringing the War Home, p. 210. 450 [Der Spiegel], ‘Kommen Sie raus‘ 451 [Der Spiegel], ‘Sprengstoff-Spuren’; Aust, Baader-Meinhof, pp. 158-159. 452 [Der Spiegel], ‘Sprengstoff-Spuren’. 453 Ibidem. 454 Meyer, Explosives, p. 113.

Page 84 of 139 and is mainly used as detonator for non sensitive explosives.455 This detail of the RAF bombs may seem irrelevant at first glance, since the main charge consisted of an AN based mixture, but it raises the question, how the RAF managed to acquire the powerful PETN based detonation cord. While both the sources and the existing literature show that the ingredients for the main charges were simply bought via the free market456 (just like other cases in chapter 4.2), researchers have not yet discussed in detail how the RAF members got their hands on the PETN explosives.

(RQ2) The answer to this question lies near to the small village Oberaula in Hessen.

According to Meinhof-biographer Jutta Ditfurth457 and following a brief entry in the journal

Zeitgeschichte in Hessen458, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof scouted the woods near

Oberaula on April 2, 1972. Here, they discovered a stone pit owned by the “Kasseler

Basaltwerke”.459 It is further reported that Meinhof and Baader assumed to find explosives in the stone pit and, hence, drove to Frankfurt and came back to Oberaula with Holger Meins,

Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Klaus Jünschke to gain access to the stone pit during the night. According to Ditfurth, they entered the storage rooms of the stone pit with the help of a welder that they found in the workshop of the pit. They found and stole different fuses, not specified blasting caps - and 370 meters of Dynacord detonating cord.460

This incident is also implicitly verified by Andreas Baader himself, who wrote a secret message from prison to a non-identified RAF member in January 1974. Here, Baader plans a prison break and gives instructions on how to acquire and manufacture explosive devices. On the first page of the unfortunately incomplete letter, Baader wrote:

[…] sprengsto[f]fbunker in steinbrüchen zu finden, die so liegen, daß du da nachts

schweißen kannst, frißt ne menge zeit. Du brauchst einen schweißbrenner, amaturen,

455 Orica Mining Services Website 2009. 456 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 2; Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, p. 158. 457 Ditfurth, Ulrike Meinhof, p. 338. 458 [Zeitgeschichte in Hessen], ‘RAF-Terroristen stehlen Zünder’. 459 Ditfurth, Ulrike Meinhof, p. 338; [Zeitgeschichte in Hessen], ‘RAF-Terroristen stehlen Zünder’. 460 Ibidem.

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flaschen (wenn du das nicht im steinbruch findest.) (…) lohnt sich auch nur um an

sprengkapseln und sprengschnur [author´s note: “sprengschnur” subsequently

underlined] (…) ranzukommen.461

In this message, Baader presents a detailed account of how to steal explosives from stone pits by describing the tools (welder) and the captured goods (fuses, detonation cord) that are to expect in stone pits. Later, he refers to detonating cords more specific as “Dynacord oder

Cortex”462 and explains how to use it as detonator. All these advices and descriptions in this secret message match Ditfurth´s description of the events during the night of April 2, 1972.

Thus, Baader´s advices and descriptions from 1974 could be seen as experience gained from the burglary of the stone pit in Oberaula. Furthermore, Baader revealed that the RAF bought

AN from agriculture suppliers by disguising themselves as farmers.463

However, to assemble and to mix the ingredients to build the IED´s for the “Mai

Offensive”, the RAF members needed both explicit and tacit knowledge.

(RQ3a) According to the first assumptions of the investigators, the explicit knowledge to manufacture the IED´s, which detonated between May 11 and May 25, may have come from an article of Prof. Jakob Meier in the journal Kriminalistik.464 In this article, Meier describes how to handle and modify fuses and how to connect them with main charges.

However, besides Meier´s article, the investigators only named very vaguely “‘zahlreiche

Veröffentlichungen in Verordnungsblättern über Herstellung, Vertrieb und Aufbewahrung von Sprengstoff‘“ that could provide "‘auch viele Erkenntnisse (…)‘“465 for the group.

However, as soon as the explosives could, thanks to Baader´s arrest, be identified, the investigators mentioned another manual as source of explicit knowledge for the RAF:

461 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 1. 462 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 27. 463 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 2. 464 [Der Spiegel], ‘Die Guerilla‘. 465 Ibidem.

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William Powell´s The Anarchist Cookbook.466 As the investigators told the authors of Der

Spiegel in 1974, one of these “recipes” for homemade explosives in The Anarchist Cookbook matched both the seized red and grey chemicals-mixtures and the alleged explosives used during the “Mai-Offensive”.467 Furthermore, by mentioning that the explosives seem to be

“hergestellt nach einem Rezept aus ‚The anarchist cookbook‘, in dem handschriftlich die deutsche Übersetzung vermerkt worden war“468, the investigators stated implicitly that

German Police officers found a copy of The Anarchist Cookbook with a handwritten translation in a RAF related location.

The last manual, a chemistry handbook, which seemed to have provided the RAF with explicit knowledge about bomb manufacturing was mentioned by Andreas Baader in the secret message from 1974. While giving advice to an anonymous RAF member on how to organize a terrorist cell, he wrote: “gibt son standartbuch über sprengstoffe aus der ddr, 2 bände in denen wirklich alles steht (also sämtliche sprengstoffe seit ihrer erfindung herstellung etc.) hat einer von uns in einer bibliothek in ffm geklaut.”469. Thus, the sources show that the RAF gained the explicit knowledge to manufacture and use explosives from open source literature. Furthermore, Baader´s secret message included detailed descriptions and even sketches on how to combine fuses with detonators and main charges, to mix different chemicals to manufacture explosives, and to build time fuses and, thereby, provided later generations of the RAF with even more explicit knowledge. However, to write such a manual, Baader needed expertise gained from experience:

(RQ3b) This expertise, the tacit knowledge to manufacture and use explosive devices, gained Baader, Meinhof, Raspe, and other RAF members in Jordan from June to August,

466 [Der Spiegel], ‘Sprengstoff-Spuren’. 467 Sontheimer, Natürlich kann geschossen werden, chapter 3. Author´s note. For this analysis, only the ebook version of Sonderheimer´s book was available. Thus, instead of page numbers, indications of the chapters will be used in the references. 468 [Der Spiegel], ‘Sprengstoff-Spuren’. 469 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 1. Page 87 of 139

1970. With PLO member Said Dudin as arbiter, the RAF members were able to receive training in one of the training camps of one faction of the PLO organization Al Fatah.470 Here, they not only learned basics of guerilla tactics, but also received a training in the manufacturing of explosive devices.471 Although not much is known about the subjects of this explosive-training, it is reasonable to assume that Baader, Meinhof, and the others were not only given theoretical manuals on how to build IED´s, but also got the chance to build test devices and to learn from the expertise of the Al Fatah bomb manufacturers.472

Thus, after their return to Germany, the RAF members possessed an in-depth knowledge about bomb manufacturing, which they applied in 1972. The time in the training camp as well as the experience gained from the preparations for the “Mai-Offensive” in 1972 enabled Andreas Baader to write a detailed manual about bomb making that included several experienced based advises concerning the explosives (“Sprengschnur=(…) Ist praktisch eine schnur aus sprengstoff. Detoniert wenn sie mit einer sprengkapsel gezündet wird“473), tools to grind the chemicals (“kleine kaffeemühlen”474), and the right size of the bomb shells (“Um detonieren zu können muss die mischung in einem metallbehälter verdämmt sein”475).

To sum up, in this case study the acting terrorist group did not only buy the ingredients to manufacture explosives via the free market. The group also stole a PETN based explosive from the facilities of a mining company. The explicit and tacit knowledge to manufacture and use this explosive was acquired via open source literature and professional training.

(RQ4) These results of the above performed analysis can be used to give possible answers to the question why the RAF used the described explosives during the Mai-

Offensive. First of all, while the usage of bombs had a huge symbolic value in the attacks,

470 Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, pp. 10. 471 Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, pp. 65-75. 472 Aust&Bell, Baader-Meinhof, p. 73. 473 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 27. 474 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 2. 475 0019740100_01Baader, Kassiber, p. 30. Page 88 of 139 since not only people, but also buildings, which represented Western imperialism, should be the target of the attacks, it does not seem reasonable to argue that the specific explosives

(PETN and AN mixtures) were used for symbolic reasons by the RAF. Rather, operational reasons can explain the choices of these explosives: Since Baader, Meinhof, and the other

RAF members possessed manuals with mixtures for these explosives (The Anarchist

Cookbook) and may have learned to manufacture them in Jordan, they possessed expertise to use them. Additionally, one could argue that the easy and relatively inexpensive access to AN and PETN played a huge role in the group´s decision to use these explosives: While the group could easily buy AN, huge amounts of PETN could be easily stolen within hours in the

(probably not very strictly secured) stone pit. This last acquisition technique additionally protected the financial resources of the group.

4.4.2. Pan Am Flight 103 (1988)

In the evening of December 21, 1988, the aircraft Clipper Maid of the Seas, with the label Pan Am 103, left London Heathrow with 259 passengers and headed towards New York

JFK Airport. However, at a height of 9,400 meters an IED detonated in the luggage room of the Clipper Maid of the Seas and caused the collapse of the airplane over the small town

Lockerbie close to the Scottish border.476 The crash of Pan Am Flight 103 claimed the lives of all 259 passengers and crew members as well as of 11 citizens of Lockerbie. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, both the media and the investigators on the ground came to the conclusion that the detonation from inside the luggage room, which caused the collapse of the airplane, could be associated with a terrorist attack.477 The reasons for these quick evaluation of the situation by both the media and the investigators on the ground are based on a prior,

476 [BBC], ‘Jumbo crashes’; Wallis, Lockerbie, p. 27-35; St. John, ‘Politics’, p. 36. 477 Wallis, Lockerbie, pp. 29-30; 37-44.

Page 89 of 139 anonymous, terror warning from Helsinki as well as in a raid in Frankfurt executed by the

BKA (see below).478

Shortly after the investigation in Lockerbie began, the two specialist teams, the

RARDE and the AAIB, managed to localize the exact position of the IED in the luggage container AVE 4041 PA that contained a suitcase from Malta.479 Here, the investigator assumed that the IED was stored in a Toshiba radio in the Samsonite suitcase that, besides the radio, contained clothes from a Maltese clothing store. Furthermore, the remains of what appeared to be a timing device from the Swiss company MEBO Communications were found.480 On basis of these pieces of evidence, the investigators arrested, after extensive diplomatic efforts, two high ranked Libyan officials, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, who was the chief of security of Libyan Airlines and director of the centre of Strategic Studies in Tripoli, as well as Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, in 1999. These arrests were based on the facts that MEBO sold several timing devices to Libya and that the Maltese clothing store owner could identify

Megrahi as the customer who bought the clothes that were found in the remains of the suitcase.481 Although Megrahi denied the charges, he was sentenced to life in prison in 1999.

In 2003, Libya´s leader Muammar Gaddafi officially claimed responsibility for the attack, which was alleged to be a Libyan response to US aggressions in the Middle East in the

1980´s.482 However, throughout this decade of investigations and trials, several counter theories and conspiracy theories were published, of which the claim that the attack was executed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-

GC) seems to be the most serious counter theory - not least because of interesting similarities concerning the nature of the explosive device:

478 Miller, ‘Western Policy’, p. 299; Wallis, Lockerbie, pp. 21-24 479 Ushynskyi, ‘Pan Am Flight 103’, p. 79; Lockerbie trial transcript, p. 430; Wallis, Lockerbie, p. 41. 480 Lockerbie trial transcript, pp. 960-1001; Miller, ‘Western Policy’, p. 297; Wallis, Lockerbie, p. 62. 481 Wallis, Lockerbie, p. 62; Lockerbie trial transcript, pp. 3-7; Miller, ‘Western Policy’, pp. 296-299. 482 St. John, ‘Politics’, pp. 36-38.

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By analyzing the remains of the container AVE 404 PA, the RARDE investigators found traces of the explosives RDX and PETN and concluded that approximately 400 grams of Semtex-H was used in the IED.483 On basis of the remains of the timing device, the investigators concluded that the IED was initiated by a MST13 timing device that was manufactured by MEBO. The main charge and the timing device were assumed to be built into a Toshiba RT-SF 16 “Bombeat” radio, since fragments of the radio and of a manual were found in Lockerbie.484 However, only two months before the disaster in Lockerbie, Western

German police forces arrested the PFLP-GC bomb manufcturer Marwan Abdel Khreesat in a safehouse in Neuss, in which they found four IED´s in the safehouse, of which one IED consisted of 312 grams of Semtex-H in Toshiba Radios “Bomb Beat 453” with barometric instruments and a timing device made of ice cubes.485 These obvious similarities to the IED in

Lockerbie motivated several researchers and journalists to assume that the bombing of Pan

Am Flight 103 was executed by the PFLP-GC – not least because, according to Khreesat, at least two Toshiba IED´s were manufactured by him.486 During the trial, advocates of this theory stated that, although Khreesat used rather rudimentary ice cube timing devices, the timers could have easily been switched into MST13 Timers.487 However, regardless whether

Megrahi or the PFLP-GC executed the attack on Pan Am Flight 103, this begs the question of how either of these actors managed to acquire the binary explosive Semtex. Interestingly, there is one single answer to this question in both of the possible cases.

(RQ2) According to the outcomes of the trial, the Libyan Government was accused to be, at least indirectly, responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, since Megrahi was not only a Libyan Government official, but was also assumed to be an officer for the Libyan

483 Lockerbie trial transcript, pp. 517-520. 484 Miller, ‘Western Policy’, pp. 297-298; Ushynskyi, ‘Pan Am Flight 103’, p. 79-80. 485 Miller, ‘Western Policy’, pp. 299; Lockerbie trial transcript, pp. 944,1043,2708-2723. 486 Interview Khreesat – Marshman, pp. 10; 22. 487 Lockerbie trial transcript, p. 2945.

Page 91 of 139 intelligence agency “Mukhabarat el-Jamahiriya“.488 Furthermore, it was only after the

European Union and the United States pressed economic sanctions against Libya that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi handed over Megrahi and Fhimah.489 Finally, with Gaddafi´s statement from 2003, it seems reasonable to assume that Libya promoted or at least supported the attack in 1988.

Thus, based on the premise that the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 could be seen as state sponsored terrorism, it seems reasonable to assume that said state also provided the advanced explosive technology to execute the attack. And, in fact, a certain arms deal of

Libya in the late 1980´s seems to corroborate this hypothesis: In 1973, the Libyan

Government ordered 700 tons of Semtex explosives from the Czech explosive factory

Explosia.490 According to several sources, the order was shipped to Libya by the Czech trading company Omnipol in 1973.491 Hence, since the Libyan Government had both the will and the means to provide Megrahi with Semtex to perform the attack in 1988, it can be assumed that the Semtex that Megrahi allegedly used in the attack was bought by the Libyan

Government in the Czech republic. It seems that the same means of acquisition have been used in case of the timer that was built in the IED: The Libyan Security Service officially acquired 20 pieces of the allegedly used MST-13 timers from the Swiss communications company MEBO in 1985.492 This deal was later verified by both Edwin Bollier, the owner of

MEBO, and the Libyan Government.493

However, despite these convincing indices of the involvement of the Libyan

Governments in the attacks against Pan Am Flight 103, the similarity of the IED in Lockerbie with the seized devices in Frankfurt let many journalists and researchers believe that the

488 Lockerbie trial transcript, p. 3; Miller ‘Western Policy’, p. 296; Ushynskyi, ‘Pan Am Flight 103’, p. 81. 489 Wallis, Lockerbie, pp. 168-169. 490 Meyer et al., Explosives, p. 279; Brown, Big Bang, p. 165; Anthony, Arms Regulation Policy, pp. 50-53. 491 Anthony, Arms Regulation Policy, pp. 50-53. 492 Miller, ‘Western Policy’, p. 297; St. John, ‘Politics’, p. 37. 493 Ushynskyi, ‘Pan Am Flight 103’, p. 81.

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PLFP-GC, with Khreesat as one of the operators should be held responsible for the attack.

Yet, if this was the case, through which sources did the PFLP-GC acquire the Semtex that was used during the attack? Interestingly, the answer to this question is still the Libyan

Government. According to both several researchers and investigative journalists, Libya was the main explosive supplier of the PFLP-GC and other Islamic terrorist organizations: The

Libyan government provided the PFLP-GC, among other explosives, also with Semtex at several occasions to execute attacks.494 Hence, if the PFLP-GC was responsible for the attack in 1988, it is reasonable to assume that the Semtex that was used in the attack was still acquired through the Libyan government. However, how did the perpetrator acquire the explicit and tacit knowledge to manufacture the IED and to Semtex in the attack?

(RQ3a&b) Just like the answer to the question how the perpetrators of the attack acquired the explosive technology, the answer to this second question also depends on who, in fact, executed the attack. If one accepts Megrahi as perpetrator of the attack, then the answer is rather simple: As director of the center of strategic studies as well as head of security for

Libyan Arab Airlines, Megrahi had access to a huge variety of explicit knowledge concerning bomb making, IED´s, and airborne terrorism. Furthermore, it seems likely that, due to his long-standing experience with topics in airborne security and strategic studies, he also had the chance to acquire limited amounts of tacit knowledge to assemble IED´s. Furthermore, according to the court transcripts, Megrahi was suspected to work as an officer for the Libyan intelligence agency “Mukhabarat el-Jamahiriya“ and, thereby, was not only supplied, but also trained by this agency in matters of how to assemble explosive devices.495 Thus, it can be assumed that Megrahi possessed an in-depth explicit and tacit knowledge about how to assemble and handle Semtex-containing IED´s.

494 St. John, ‘Politics’, p. 40; Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting footnote 39 (p. 27-28). 495 Lockerbie trial transcript, pp. 3-4.

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However, also in case of the alternative theory concerning the Lockerbie bombing, various sources of explicit and tacit knowledge can be found: If the PFLP-GC planned and executed the attack, it seems likely that Marwan Abdel Khreesat prepared the IED that detonated on board of Pan Am Flight 103, since Khreesat´s IED´s show many similarities to the device in the attack. Khreesat was known as the leading bomb making expert of the PFLP-

GC and already worked in the 1970´s and then again in the late 1980´s for the terrorist group.496 Because of this reputation within the group, it is highly likely that Khreesat possessed a huge amount of both explicit and tacit knowledge in IED manufacturing.

However, while no academic researcher has, yet, investigated Khreesat´s life in detail, other sources reveal valuable information about the sources of Khreesat´s impressive expertise:

According to journalistic sources, Khreesat obtained training as an electrician by his father and joined the PFLP-GC before the 1970´s.497 Thus, it is likely that Khreesat, additionally to his electrician training, obtained a special training in bomb manufacturing by members of the PFLP-GC. Moreover, a partial transcript of an interview with Khreesat performed by FBI special agent Edward Marshman suggests that Khreesat practiced the assembling of the IED´s, which were found in Neuss, in Syria.498 These trainings and an apparently long-lasting experience in anti-aircarft bomb manufacturing enabled Khreesat to build the IED´s in Neuss and may also enabled him to build the IED that detonated on board of Pan Am Flight 103.

To sum up, it has been shown that in both possible scenarios concerning the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 the Libyan government can be seen as supplier of Semtex.

Furthermore, the expertise of Megrahi as convicted perpetrator of the attack can be seen as stemming from a long-lasting experience in the security business as well as from possible training by the Libyan government. The roots of Khreesat´s expertise are mostly speculative,

496 St. John, ‘Politics’, p. 39; Miller, ‘Western Policy‘, p. 299. 497 de Braeckeleer, ‘PFLP-GC Bomb Maker’. 498 Interview Khreesat – Marshman, p. 5. Page 94 of 139 but also seem to be acquired through long-lasting experience. In Khreesat´s case, the acquisition of this experience was not sponsored by a state, but by a terrorist group.

(RQ4) On basis of these results, one could infer possible reasons, why Semtex was chosen as explosive for the attack on Pan Am Flight 103: While the sources do not indicate any symbolic factors that might have been involved in the decision process, certain operational factors could be identified: Since it has been shown that high quantities of Semtex were officially bought by the Libyan government, criteria like the availability of the explosive or financial resources do not apply to this case, since, as a sovereign state, the Libyan government was legally allowed to buy Semtex and had a huge budget at its disposal to acquire large quantities of the explosive. However, the qualities of the explosives seemed to play a huge role in the decision to use Semtex for the attack. It can be assumed that the

Libyan government bought huge quantities of Semtex, since this explosive offers high performance in very small amounts and was known as not detectable by airport security measures such as chemical detection dogs or x-ray scans.499 Hence, the fact that Semtex was used in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 can be seen as the result of a state-funded decision to acquire the, by then, most suitable explosive technology for airborne terrorism.

4.5. Special case: The terrorist use of peroxide explosives – London Bombings (2005)

In the morning of July 7, 2005 several explosions hit the public transport in the inner city of

London: On 8.50 am three explosions occurred almost simultaneously in the Subway circle line tunnel between Liverpool street and Aldgate station, on the circle line at Edgware Station as well as on the Picadilly Line between King´s Cross and Russell square.500 On 9.47 am a fourth explosion on the upper deck of bus no. 30 at Tavistock Square killed and injured additional persons. This series of explosions claimed 52 lives, left more than 700 injured and

499 See chapter 3.4.2.; Brown, Big Bang, p. 165. 500 [House of Commons], Report, p. 2-7; [Intelligence and Security Committee], Report, p. 2.

Page 95 of 139 was quickly identified as a coordinated terrorist attack by the House of Parliament, which published a claim of responsibility for the attack by a group called “The Secret Organization

Group of Al Qaida in Europe”.501 This claim of responsibility could never be verified.

During the night of July 8, the investigators on the ground managed to identify

Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer through personal items at blasting site as possible perpetrators of the attack. The investigators concluded by the end of the day that the four attacks were coordinated suicide bombings executed by four individuals. 502 Two days later, Hasib Hussain was identified as third suspect, since he was seen travelling with

Tanweer and Khan from Leeds, the residence of the three men, to London. Hence, the apartments of Tanweer and Hussain were searched on July 12. Here, police officers did not only find evidence for the hypothesis that the attack could be seen as inspired by the Islamic extremist group Al Qaida, but also found links to a fourth perpetrator of the attack, Germaine

Lindsay.503 Furthermore, the investigators found a fully equipped workshop for IED´s in one of the apartments.504 Thanks to this finding and together with the forensic evidence from the blasting site in London, the nature of the explosive that was used during the attack could be identified.

After the investigators’ findings in the apartment in Leeds, the media released detailed information about the nature of the explosive. For example, on July 15, The Times cited experts that stated that, on basis of the results of the raid in Leeds, triacetone peroxide (TATP) could have been used in the attack.505 This account has been shared by both the media and several researchers ever since.506 However, on August 4, 2005, the U.S. counterintelligence officials released information about the attack in which was stated that “a volatile peroxide-

501 [House of Commons], Report, p. 8; [Intelligence and Security Committee], Report, p. 2. 502 [House of Commons], Report, p. 8 503 [House of Commons], Report, p. 10 504 [House of Commons], Report, p. 23. 505 Naughton, ‘TATP’. 506 Rasmussen&Hafez, Terrorist Innovations, p. 23; Jones, ‘Future of Al Qa´ida’, p. 6.

Page 96 of 139 based explosive called HMDT [sic], or hexamethylene triperoxide diamine“507 was used in the attack. This statement proved to be coherent with the information about the nature of the explosives that was published in the Coroner´s inquests into the London bombings of 7 July

2005 from February 2010 to May 2011.508 Here, it is written that the investigators found an improvised detonator that consisted of a light bulb and small amounts of HMTD and several kilograms of pure HMTD as well as TATP and a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and pepper in the apartment on 18 Alexandra Grove.509 Furthermore, the inquest states that, according to forensic experts, it can be concluded that Kahn, Tanweer, Lindsay, Hussain most likely used

HMTD (in the above described detonator) as well as the mixture of hydrogen peroxide and pepper to execute the attacks on public transport in London.510 However, this account raises the question of how the four bombers acquired the ingredients for the IED´s.

(RQ2) Both the official report of the House of Commons and the Intelligence report stress that all ingredients that were necessary to build the IED´s were obtained via the free market. While the official reports states that “[a]ll of these ingredients are obtainable via the free market without any restrictions”511, the intelligence reports only refers to the acquisition of the explosives by stating that the used IED´s “can be made using readily available materials and domestic equipment“512. Furthermore, in the official report it is written that the

“First purchase of material to make explosives”513 could be identified in March 2005 and that the costs to manufacture the explosives did not exceed 8000 pounds.514

A more detailed account can be found in media reports about the incident. Here, journalists state that HMTD “can be made from simple ingredients such as hair bleach, which contains hydrogen peroxide, citric acid, and heat tablets, sometimes used by the military to

507 [Reuters], ‘London bombers’. 508 Coroner´s Inquest transcripts. 509 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 111010, p.62-63. 510 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 111010, p.65-66. 511 [House of Commons], Report, p. 23. 512 [Intelligence and Security Committee], Report, p. 11. 513 [House of Commons], Report, Annex D. 514 [House of Commons], Report, p. 23.

Page 97 of 139 cook food”515. This account is coherent with academic literature, in which it is written that all ingredients for HMTD and TATP could be obtained or synthesized from ingredients that are available on the free market.516 For example, HMTD can be manufactured by mixing hydrogen peroxide, which is a basic ingredient in bleach, with sulfuric acid, which can be found in battery acid, and hexamethylenetetramine, which is used in heat tablets (e.g.

“Esbit”).517 The acetone peroxide that would be, next to hydrogen peroxide and sulphuric acid, necessary to manufacture TATP can fo instance be acquired through the purchase of nail polish remover. Thus, Tanweer, Kahn, Lindsay, and Hussain had various possibilities to purchase the ingredients for their IED´s via the free market. Furthermore, it is possible to show, where the groups specifically bought these ingredients.

In this regard, the transcripts of the Coroner´s inquests transcripts are valuable sources of information: By reconstructing Tanweer´s and Khan´s phone and internet connections, the investigators discovered that the men researched and contacted approximately 45 hydrogen peroxide outlets in England between February and May 2005 including “Huddersfield

Hydroponics” and “Dr. Greenthumb Hydroponics”.518 Additionally, investigators found a business card of the latter store in Khan´s personal belongings at the blasting site. On basis of these pieces of evidence as well as on basis of witness reports, the investigators concluded that the perpetrators of the attack bought hydrogen peroxide in Hydroponic stores, such as the above mentioned stores.519 Since hydrogen peroxide finds many applications in hydroponic farming and, thus, is regularly sold by hydroponic stores in large quantities, Kahn, Tanweer, and the others could easily obtain amounts of up to 5 liters of hydrogen peroxide per purchase. Furthermore, it seems likely that the perpetrators also bought heat tablets to extract

515 [Reuters], ‘London Bombers’. 516 Oxley, ‘Non-Traditional Explosives’, p. 45; Kirby, ‘London Bombers’, p. 425. 517 Yeager, ‘Dangerous Innovations’, p. 61. 518 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 010211, p. 112; Coroner´s Inquest transcript 020211, p. 118; Coroner´s Inquest transcript 140211, p. 91. 519 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 010211, p. 113. Page 98 of 139 hexamethylenetetramine via the free market. However, to purchase these ingredients, Khan,

Tanweer, and the others had to acquire the explicit and tacit knowledge concerning peroxide based IED´s beforehand.

(RQ3a) The official report about the attacks in London does not discuss the acquisition of explicit knowledge by the group in depth, but points out that “no great expertise is required to assemble a device of this kind”520. However, the inquest transcripts discuss the group´s acquisition of explicit expertise in bomb making and reveal that found computer files with

“information that is freely available to anyone who wants to search on the internet in relation to the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (…)”521 were found in the apartment in

Leeds. Moreover, the Lady justice summarized the account of the investigators by stating during the inquest:

The theme that emerges from your work on this case sadly, is that there's a huge

amount of material that is freely available on the internet for anyone who wants to do

research into bomb-making techniques and the like? (…).522

Thus, the transcripts of the inquest clearly indicate that Khan, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay acquired the explicit knowledge to buy the ingredients and to assemble the IED`s via openly available sources on the Internet. These sources could include entries in pyrotechnique forums or online-manuals of terrorist organizations as researcher Akil N. Awan suggests. Concerning this, he writes: „[T]he manufacture of acetone peroxide, the material allegedly used in both the 7 July and 21 July attacks, is given a comprehensive treatment in the online Al-Aqsa

Encyclopaedia, available on a number of jihadi forums.“523. Furthermore, also journalistic sources suggest that the group obtained the explicit knowledge that was required to assemble the IED´s via the internet: A New York Times article that was issued shortly after the attacks

520 [House of Commons], Report, p. 23. 521 Ibidem. 522 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 010211, p. 153. 523 Awan, ‘Transitional Religiosity’, p. 221.

Page 99 of 139 cited Police Commissioner Raimund Kelly, who was quoted with the statement “The recipe to make a bomb is unfortunately as available on the Internet as a recipe for meatloaf”524.

However, while the internet may have served Tanweer and the others to acquire information on how to manufacture TATP and HMTD, it is highly unlikely that the group obtained the recipe for the hydrogen peroxide-pepper mixture via bomb manufacturing manuals, since this mixture seemed to be unknown before the attacks on July 7, 2005, and may have been initially used by Tanweer, Khan, Hussain, and Lindsay.525 Hence, it seems like the groups gained knowledge not only via the internet, but also via other sources.

Furthermore, these sources seemed to have provided the group with in depth tacit knowledge on how to modify and improvise peroxide based explosives:

(RQ3b) Other than in the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the group from Leeds did not have the chance to acquire tacit knowledge via trial and error for two reasons: Firstly, the safehouse of the groups was located in the inner city of Leeds and, thus, did not allow tests or small errors without the risk of detection. Secondly, peroxide based explosives such as

HMTD and TATP are extremely instable.526 To manufacture and use these chemical mixtures as explosives, one has to obey strict precautions and a certain style of manufacturing and, even then, still runs the risk to get seriously injured or even killed by premature detonation of the highly fragile mixtures.527 The official report of the bombings come to the same conclusion by stating that it is “likely that the group would have had advice from someone with previous experience given the careful handling required to ensure safety during the bomb making process and to get the manufacturing process right”528.

This advice may have been given to Khan during a journey to Pakistan in 2003 and to

Tanweer during a journey to Pakistan together with Khan from November 19, 2004 to

524 Rashbaum, ‘Ingredients’. 525 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 010211, p. 93. 526 See chapter 4.2.5. 527 Ibidem. 528 [House of Commons], Report, p. 23.

Page 100 of 139

February 8, 2005.529 According to several sources it seems highly likely that Khan and

Tanweer met with Al Qaida officials and attended an Al Qaida training camp at the Pakistani-

Afghanistan border during their stay in Pakistan: The Intelligence report speaks of „some form of operational training [that] is likely to have taken place“530 during Khan´s as well as during Kahn´s and Tanweer´s stay in Pakistan and the inquest refers to Khan´s and Tanweer´s attendance of “terrorist training camps”531.

A more detailed account of the actual training that Khan and Tanweer received in Pakistan provide journalistic sources by making reference to leaked interrogation transcripts as well as personal documents of Al Qaida member Rashid Rauf. The following is stated concerning

Tanweer´s and Kahn´s stay in the training camp:

Rauf wrote that Haji arranged for a trainer called Marwan Suri to provide bomb-making

training using hexamine peroxide detonators and hydrogen peroxide. Siddique Khan and

Tanweer test-detonated a 300-gram hydrogen peroxide mixture in the tribal areas.

“Siddique was always saying to me I hope these mixtures are as good as you say they are.

After he tested the mixtures he was very happy,” Rauf wrote.532

This quote clearly shows that Tanweer and Khan acquired the tacit knowledge to assemble and use peroxide based explosive in the safe environment of an Al Qaida training camp. With the careful supervision of Al Qaida bomb-making experts, Khan even performed test detonations and, thereby, gained the expertise that was necessary to prepare and perform the attack in London.

To sum up, it has been shown that the perpetrators of the attack in London acquired the ingredients to manufacture their peroxide based IED´s via the free market. Furthermore, it has been shown that while it seems that the group acquired some explicit knowledge to assemble the IED´s via the internet, the training of Tanweer and Khan in an Al Qaida training

529 [House of Commons], Report, Annex D. 530 [Intelligence and Security Committee], Report , p. 12. 531 Coroner´s Inquest transcript 030311, p. 162 532 Robertson et al., ‘Documents’. Page 101 of 139 camp enabled the group to acquire the tacit knowledge to prepare and execute the attack.

These outcomes can be used to reconstruct the reasons why peroxide based explosives were chosen for this attack:

(RQ4) First of all, the sources do not suggest that the decision to use peroxide based explosives in this attack was primarily influenced by ideological concerns. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that the group was taught to handle peroxide based explosives, since these explosives can be manufactured with openly available ingredients. Thus, the group´s decision to use peroxide based explosives (or respectively the decision of the Al Qaida bomb making-experts to train the group in peroxide explosives) could be characterized as highly influenced by the nature of the explosives regarding availability and by the financial capabilities of the group.

5. “What to do with the results? The possibilities of quantitative research in the history

of terrorism and technology

So far, this paper presented five historical overviews of different explosive technologies as well as nine isolated analyses of the acquisition and usage of these technologies in terrorist attacks. However, how is it possible to connect these case studies in order to draw conclusions concerning the relation between terrorism and explosive technology that also manage to anticipate the future relation and to give policy advice? One in the social sciences common and in terrorism studies increasingly popular approach to reach these goals is to analyze historical cases in quantitative approaches, like Peter de Kock did in his doctoral thesis

Anticipating Criminal Behaviour. In this thesis, de Kock manages in a particular innovative approach to characterize current and even to anticipate future terrorist behaviour by relying on large amounts of historical data:

Page 102 of 139

After collecting information on more than 50,000 historical terrorist incidents, De

Kock identified a set of key components (so-called Elementary Scenario Components

(ESC))533 in these incidents to deconstruct each incident into altogether 98 variables.534

According to de Kock, these 98 variables can be used to create scenarios of terrorist incidents that are based on historical data and that can, thereby, be used in an Experimental Scenario

Platform (called ESP Pandora) to anticipate the future behavior of terrorist groups and lone operators.535 However, although this very detailed analysis of historical terrorist incident manages to show fascinating results, only few out of De Kock´s 98 variables could be theoretically applied to the research questions of the present study: While four variables, which refer to the means involved in the attack, present an opportunity to identify the nature of the explosive that was used during a terrorist incident,536 only one variable, which refers to the modus operandi of an attack, describes pre-incident actions of the respective terrorist groups. Further, De Kock splits this variable into categories such as “Material/Weapon movements”537 and “Terrorist training”538 that, at least in parts, account for the acquisition of the technology and the expertise to perform an attack.

Although the ESP Pandora does not include categories for the research questions of the present paper, one could easily think of ways to include the results of the present study into a similar framework. For example, one could add the categories “acquisition of technology” as well as “acquisition of explicit knowledge” and “acquisition of tacit knowledge” to the above described “pre-incident actions” variable of the ESP Pandora and assign these categories with several subcategories that would visualize the results of the

533 See Appendix C. 534 De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, pp. 109-122. 535 De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, p. 149-160 and for lone operators: Van der Heide, Individual Terrorism. 536 De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, p. 193-198. 537 De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, p. 200. 538 Ibidem.

Page 103 of 139 present study539. Thereby, especially the questions RQ2 and RQ3 could be included into De

Kock´s quantitative approach to anticipate criminal behavior and, further, could help to anticipate future acquisition of technology and expertise by terrorist groups.

However, while De Kock´s approach seems very promising and persuasive in general, the implementation of the results of the present study face serious problems that are closely bound to both general problems of quantitative research and the complexity of history of technology. Due to its formalized structure with variables, categories, and sub-categories, quantitative datasets cannot account for details and historical backgrounds of an historical terrorist incident. However, exactly the details of the nine case studies and the historical background of the explosives are crucial parts in answering the research questions RQ2 and

RQ3 properly:

Beginning with RQ3, it has been shown that, for example, both the New Year´s Gang and Anders Behring Breivik used open-source material to acquire the explicit knowledge to build an AN-based IED and are, thus, appointed with the same subcategory in the quantitative framework that is presented in Appendix D. However, by analyzing the details of each incident, it becomes apparent that the means by which both perpetrators acquired the tacit knowledge differed significantly. The New Year´s Gang simply had to read a farmer´s manual and absorb the common knowledge concerning ANFO in Wisconsin in the 1970´s. Contrary,

Breivik had to retrieve huge amounts of information (639 files!) on AN-based bomb manufacturing by using different means of disguise and by searching the internet for over 200 hours in 2011. These differences in the same categories can be easily explained by taking a close look at the history of ammonium nitrate: In the 1970´s, AN based IED´s were commonly used among farmers and, thus, the explicit knowledge to build such IED´s was publicly available. However, due to several terrorist incidents involving AN between 1970

539 See Appendix D.

Page 104 of 139 and 2011, Breivik had to go through more efforts to retrieve valuable information concerning

AN based IED´s, since, due to the changes that had been made in the structure of AN, Breivik had to obtain very specific information to use it in an IED. The simple formula that was used by the New Year´s gang was useless to Breivik.

Furthermore, although both the New Year´s gang and Breivik purchased the AN via the free market and, thus, can be assigned with the same subcategory, the details of these purchases reveal that one cannot at all equate the acquisition of AN by the New Year´s Gang with the AN acquisition of Breivik: While the New Year´s Gang simply stepped into the farmer´s supply store in Baraboo and purchased large amounts of AN by spontaneously pretending to be the employees of a farmer, Breivik invested enormous amounts of time, financial resources, and creativity to purchase AN in a farmer´s supply store: He did not only found a legitimate farming company, but also bought a farm on which he lived and worked as a sugar beet farmer for several years only to receive the permit to legally buy AN. It is clearly visible that in this case, once again, the use history of AN is an important factor for explaining why the subcategory 1 applies to both cases, but still explains different acquisition processes.

Finally, it is not even possible to identify explosive technology unambiguously in a quantitative approach. To stay with the example of AN, it becomes apparent that, while the

New Year´s gang used a very simple IED that only contained ANFO and a stick of dynamite,

Breivik used a very sophisticated and complex, yet still AN based IED to execute his attack.

Of course, one could distinguish in this case between explosives like ANFO, ANALFO,

ANNM, ANALNM and so on, but this would create very complex systems of explosive categories and subcategories, in which almost no case would seem comparable to another.

However, even worse, it does not seem accurate to even claim that the New Year´s Gang and

Breivik used the same AN. Since AN had been changed crucially since the 1980´s, Breivik was confronted with a completely different explosive with hardened, dense prills and without

Page 105 of 139 any combustible substances, while the New Year´s gang used an AN that was readily mixable with fuel oil and that detonated without any complex preparation. Thus, by taking the history of AN into account it becomes apparent that not even the same explosive technology was used in both cases.

This list of problems could be applied to other cases in this paper and could be easily extended. However, I hope to have shown with the case of AN that a quantitative approach to process and compare the results of this paper would be possible and holds certain advantages, but also faces serious problems, since it does not manage to include historical details of the case studies and the explosives that were used in these cases. However, only these details and historical backgrounds make it possible to answer the research questions properly that were posed in the beginning of this paper.

6. Discussion, concluding thoughts, applications

6.1. Discussion

It has been shown that each case study in this paper produces unique results. Results that are hard to quantify and even harder to compare directly. However, by interpreting these results in combination with the use histories of the five explosive technologies, it is, beyond the conclusion of each case study, possible to formulate some overarching conclusions. With this qualitative approach, the in the introduction formulated research questions can be answered on a more general level.

(RQ1) By comparing the use histories of the four explosives AN, TNT, RDX, and

PETN, it becomes possible to locate the stage in the life cycles of the selected explosive technologies in which terrorist groups started to use these technologies frequently. First of all,

Edgerton´s claim that there is a significant temporal gap between the innovation histories and

Page 106 of 139 the use histories of many technologies seems to apply to the presented explosive technologies.

It has been shown that the frequent use of the presented explosive technologies occurred approximately 50 to 200 years after their discovery and first synthesis. Furthermore, the terrorist use of these explosive technologies also seems to follow a pattern by means of a temporal gap between the initial legitimate use of a particular explosive and the start of the frequent terrorist use of said explosive. Here, it seems that approx. 40 to 70 years lay in- between the starting point of these use histories. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the claim that terrorists are rather conservative in adapting new technologies can be corroborated in case of the here discussed explosive technologies.

However, by taking a closer look at the use histories of the four explosives, it becomes clear that the temporal gaps between the legitimate use and the terrorist use of these explosives highly depended on the nature of the particular explosives. For example, those explosives that have been used not only for military purposes, but also for commercial reasons in mining, blasting, and quarrying (i.e., dual-use explosives, such as AN and TNT), tend to be adapted earlier by terrorist groups than those explosives that have been exclusively used by the military (i.e., such as RDX or C-4). This tendency can be explained by the fact that dual use explosives have been used more frequently, have been available more openly, and, due to their frequent usage on construction sites, have been designed to be handled more easily than military explosives. However, as the special case of peroxide explosives has shown, the frequent legitimate use of an explosive does not determine the frequent terrorist use of an explosive entirely. As the cases of HMTD and TATP, which have not been used in legitimate ways at all, have shown, even only the availability of the ingredients to manufacture a certain explosive can influence the popularity of this explosive among terrorists.

Page 107 of 139

(RQ2) Analyzing the means by which terrorist groups acquired a certain explosive technology revealed that the most common ways of acquiring AN, TNT, RDX, PETN, and peroxide explosives are stealing, purchasing via the free market, purchasing via illegal markets, and state sponsorship. In combination with the use histories of these explosives, it can be further shown that dual use explosives (or ingredients to manufacture explosives) without strict restrictions in trade (such as AN, HMTD, and TATP) have been frequently acquired through the free market by small groups and lone operators such as the New Year´s gang, Breivik, or the group in London. However, dual use explosives with a restricted use history (such as PETN or TNT) were stolen or purchased via semi-legal markets, as for example through employees of mining services by terrorist cells, such as Odeh´s cell, or local groups, such as the Red Army Faction. Finally, military explosives that have not been available on the free market throughout their use histories (Semtex, RDX, C-4), were obtained via state sponsorship or illegal markets by globally connected groups or crime syndicates such as FARC or the D-Company. Thus, this paper has shown that the means of acquiring a certain explosive technology do not only depended on the group structure of the certain terrorist group, but are also determined by the use history of the particular explosive.

(RQ3) The question of how terrorist groups and lone operators acquired the (a) explicit and (b) tacit knowledge to successfully use the presented explosive technologies can be answered by combining the histories of the explosive technologies with the case studies.

(a) First of all, it has been shown that one can divide the acquisition of the explicit knowledge about the usage of these technologies into legal manuals, illegal manuals, and professional training. Just in case of research question RQ1 and RQ2, it has been shown that these means of acquiring explicit knowledge highly depended on group size, the respective use history and nature of the explosive technology. While the explicit knowledge to handle nearly unrestricted dual use explosives, such as AN, were acquired through legal or illegal

Page 108 of 139 manuals by small groups and lone operators, the explicit knowledge to use more sophisticated and restricted explosives such as RDX, Semtex, or PETN were obtained via professional training exercises by large groups and cells. Here, it can be argued that the common and frequent use of dual use technologies (e.g., ANFO) by several different groups, including miners and farmers, enabled the evolution of open source information concerning the use of these explosives.

(b) In the same manner, also the tacit knowledge to use the presented technologies can be categorized, namely into trial and error, professional training, or military experience. These different forms of tacit knowledge acquisition highly depend on both group size and use history as well as nature of the technology: Here it became apparent that very small groups and lone operators that used dual use explosives, obtained the tacit knowledge to use these explosives to a certain extent through training and prior military experience, but mostly through trial and error. Here it has been clearly visible that the availability as well as the simple handling of dual use enabled the possibility to acquire tacit knowledge concerning these explosives via trial and error. Large groups, however, that used military explosives, such as RDX or C-4, in attacks tended to acquire the tacit knowledge via professional training.

Moreover, it has been shown further that a suitable environment by means of safe space is inevitable both for acquiring tacit knowledge via trial and error and professional training. Only in remote safehouses, such as Breivik´s farm, or guarded training facilities, such as Al Qaida training camps, tacit knowledge can be acquired without running the risk of compromising the preparations for the attacks and without running the risk of arrest.

Finally, the case studies have managed to support the claims of several researchers that networks of transferring professional knowledge can be identified in the terrorism world.540 In

540 See Forest, Teaching Terror; Cragin&Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat; Forest, ‘Knowledge Transfer’; Cragin et al., Dragon´s Teeth.

Page 109 of 139 accordance with the structure of many modern (Jihadist) terrorist groups as segmented, polycentric, integrated networks (SPIN)541, these networks of knowledge spread dynamically and are even open to individuals outside of these groups or communities: Through the analysis, it has been shown that networks of sharing knowledge in IED manufacturing and explosive handling do not only exist among ideologically close groups, such as between the

PLO and the RAF or between the FARC and the ETA and PIRA. Implicit networks of sharing and transferring professional knowledge have also been existing beyond the border of ideology, as the example of Anders Behring Breivik´s studying of Andreas Baader´s IED manufacturing guides shows. Furthermore, these networks of shared knowledge enabled terrorist groups to re-discover and successfully use peroxide explosives, such as TATP and

HMTD. These explosives can therefore can be seen as genuine terrorist explosives, since their use history has been restricted to the terrorist world to this very day.

(RQ4) Finally, also the fourth research question of this paper concerning the factors that might be involved in the decision process of terrorist groups to acquire a certain explosive technology can be answered in respect to the in chapter 2.2. formulated factors and restrictions. It has been shown that the decisions to use a particular explosive is the result of a complex decision making process that includes an innumerable amount of factors, including spontaneous factors and recurring sets of factors. It has been shown that these recurring factors seem to consist of almost exclusively rational cost-benefit considerations. These operational factors highly depend on both the group´s capabilities and the nature of the respective explosive.

Within this framework, this paper showed that especially small groups and lone operators consider the availability and handling of the explosive to be the most important factors in their decision to use a particular explosive technology, because these groups tend to

541 De Graaff, ‘dark mobs’, p. 133. Page 110 of 139 have limited capabilities by means of financial resources, expertise, and network. Thus, these groups tended to use dual use explosives, such as AN, for their attacks. In case of internationally connected, large groups, the qualities of the explosives seemed to be the most important factor, since these groups possess large capabilities by means of financial resources and network. In case of cell structured groups, it was possible to show that, despite large capabilities, these groups chose to preserve resources, for example by purchasing TNT via

(semi)legal markets in Nairobi.

The group capability of expertise was identified as especially important for groups of all sizes and capabilities, since some groups possessed expertise that is specialized on particular explosive technologies, as for example the case of the FARC showed. Thus, on basis of this observation, one can argue that even resourceful groups tend to choose explosives that fit this specialized expertise rather than only focusing on the qualities of the explosive.

To sum up, while the decision to use explosives to execute attacks seems to have a strong symbolic element, the decision to use a particular explosive technology could be identified as a operational decision rather than a symbolic one.

6.2. Applications of the results

The above described results of the present study can be used to formulate recommendations to apply the outcomes of this thesis to the field of counterterrorism.

It has been shown that the adaption of new technologies by terrorist groups cannot be seen as solely following a pattern of 40-70 years after initial use of the particular technology, but as also highly dependent on the nature of technology. This result could explain why novel technology, including CBRN, have not been used extensively yet. Technologies, such as nuclear technology and biotechnology, cannot be seen as commonly and frequently used, are

Page 111 of 139 hardly available via the free market, and require a huge amount of expertise and financial resources. Thus, the acquisition of these technologies and the knowledge to use these technologies would consume an enormous amount of resources and, thus, do not seem to be the first choice of most terrorist groups in terms of a rational cost-benefit consideration – not least because, as Israeli forces have shown recently, the damage caused by one dirty bomb is not dramatically higher than the damage caused by large amounts of conventional explosives such as Semtex, which acquisition would still require less resources.542

Furthermore, this study has shown that with regards to the acquisition of explosives by terrorists, especially dual use explosives such as AN or the ingredients for TATP and HMTD require particular attention, since these explosives are still available via the free market without effective restrictions and seem to be the weapon of choice for small groups and lone operators. To prevent these groups from acquiring dual use explosives, it is necessary to make the acquisition and use of these explosives as resource-consuming as possible for terrorist groups, not only by restricting their trade and by monitoring purchases via customer screenings, but also through marker technologies, advanced detection methods, and especially through the modification of the explosives themselves: The proposed rendering of AN to make it impossible to detonate would make it unattractive to terrorists, would make all other restrictions concerning AN obsolete, and would save thousands of lives.

Moreover, concerning the acquisition of knowledge, this paper has shown that it is merely impossible to restrict explicit knowledge: Even without the flood of information on the internet, even a small book about hunting or a conversation with a farmer or a professor could provide terrorists with first explicit knowledge. However, in contrast, this paper has also shown that the acquisition of tacit knowledge can be prevented, since tacit knowledge is,

542 See [Times of Israel], ‘Dirty bombs’. I use the term „damage“ only in terms of “hard facts” such as casualties and do not include possible psychological or symbolic effects of a CBRN attack. For a detailed discussion, see: Cole, Changing Face, pp. 133-158.

Page 112 of 139 even in elusive terrorist groups organized as SPIN´s543, always bound to places and persons.

Thus, counterterrorism efforts should focus on denying terrorist groups hideouts, safe havens, and training facilities to acquire this tacit knowledge and on identifying and neutralizing hosts of tacit knowledge in the terrorist world.

Finally and more generally, this study has shown that every explosive technology has a different, and constantly changing, use history – a history that is still present and should also be present to operators in counterterrorism. For example, terrorist groups are still in possession of large amounts unmarked pre-1991 Semtex and in several countries AN with porous prills can still be purchased without any restrictions. Furthermore, the special case of unconventional explosive technologies, such as TATP and HMTD, shows that also terrorist are aware of, and contribute to, the history of explosives with dangerous consequences.

6.3. Concluding thoughts

To conclude this discussion and to present a general conclusion to this paper, it is necessary to retreat from the large amount of small conclusions and specialized implications and to come back to the initial aim of this paper of connecting the history of technology with the history of terrorism: David Edgerton´s proposal of assigning use-based approaches to the history of technology did not only manage to explain the current research focus on CBRN terrorism, but made it also able to combine the histories of certain technologies with their use by terrorists.

By discussing this relation between explosive technology and terrorism from the point of view of the explosive, rather than exclusively by focusing on the terrorist groups, it became apparent that the history of explosive technology has been interacting with the terrorist community by means of access and use. By starting to gain access to the technology and to the knowledge on how to use it, terrorist groups changed the course of the use history of

543 For detailed discussion see: De Graaff, ‘dark mobs’.

Page 113 of 139 explosives by means of causing restrictions, marking, and modifications of these technologies. In turn, the use history of the particular explosive technology is one determining factor for its acquisition and use by terrorist groups. Within this development, particular explosives, like AN, showed that in the history of explosives a democratization of technology has taken place that was initiated by the availability of the explosive and the existence of open source knowledge concerning its use.

The present paper tried to sketch parts of these complex historical interactions by using selected examples and, further, can be seen as part of the ongoing interaction between explosive technology and terrorism, since it contributes to this interaction by recommending countermeasures against the acquisition and use of explosives by terrorist groups. Of course, as a case study, this paper only gave a selective and incomplete perspective on the complex historical relationship between technology and terrorism and could, thereby, only give an incomplete and preliminary set of recommendations for policy makers. More research on the interaction between technology and terrorism from the point of view of history of technology has to be conducted in order to give a more thorough view on this relationship.

The desperate need for more research to understand the relation between explosive technologies and terrorism becomes visible by consulting newspapers that report on a daily basis on the use explosives by groups like IS or Boko Haram. During the last week of writing on this thesis, the latter claimed responsibility for a bombing in Maiduguri – where a girl of

12 years was used as a suicide bomber.544

544 [BBC], ‘Nigeria violence’. Page 114 of 139

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A2 Patents

Centralstelle für wissenschaftlich-technische Untersuchungen G.m.b.H. ‘Verfahren zur Herstellung eines Geschoßtreibmittels, das gegen Schlag verhältnismäßig unempfindlich ist’ Deutsches Reich Reichspatentamt, Patent DE298539 (Germany 1919). Escales, Richard. ‘Explosive Compound’ United States Patent Office, Patent US812195 (United States 1906). Firma G. Roth. ‘Neuerung an Sprengstoffen’ Kaiserliches Patentamt, Patent DE172327 (Germany 1900). Firma Sprengstoffwerke Dr. R. Nahnsen & Co. A.G. & Pyl, Gottfried. ‘Verfahren zur Herstellung von Initialzündmitteln’, Deutsches Reich Reichspatentamt, Patent DE423176 (Germany 1925). Henning, G. F. ‘Verfahren zur Darstellung eines Nitrokörpers aus Hexamethylentetramin’ Kaiserliches Patentamt, Patent DE104280 (Germany 1890). Von Herz, Edmund. ‘Explosives’ United States Patent Office, Patent US1402693 (United States of America 1922). Wolffenstein, Richard. ‘Darstellung von Cycloacetonsuperoxyd’ Kaiserliches Patentamt, Patent DE84953 (Germany 1985).

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[United Nations Office for Disarment Affairs (UNODA)]. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) (London, Moscow, Washington 1975), retrieved from: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (Last access June 22, 2015). [United Nations Office for Disarment Affairs (UNODA)]. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) (Paris 1997), retrieved from: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (Last access June 22, 2015). [United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)]. Federal Explosive Law and Regulations (2012), retrieved from: https://www.atf.gov/file/58741/download (Last access June 16, 2015). [United States Congress, 107th]. Aviation and Transportation Security Act (TSA) (Public Law 107 - 71 2001). [United States Department of Homeland Security]. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program (2007), retrieved from: http://www.dhs.gov/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards (Last access June 16, 2015). [United States Department of Homeland Security],. Ammonium Nitrate Security Program Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (2011), retrieved from: http://www.dhs.gov/ammonium-nitrate-security-program (Last access June 16, 2015). [United States Directorate of Defense Trade Control]. United States Munitions List (US Department of State: Washington DC 2013), retrieved from: https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/documents/official_itar/ITAR_Part_1 21.pdf (Last access June 16, 2015). [United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin]. United States of America v. Fine, 413 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1976), retrieved from: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/413/740/1661056/ (Last access April 1, 2015). [United States District Court Southern District of New York]. United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al., 98 Cr. (New York 2001), retrieved from: http://americanjihadists.com/2008-12-Ghailani-Interrogation-all.pdf (Last access June 15, 2015).

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[United States District Court Southern District of New York]. United States of America v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261 (New York 2010), retrieved from: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2467692/united-states-v-ghailani/ (Last access June 15, 2015). [United States District Court Southern District of New York]. United States of America v. Monzer al-Kassar (New York 2007), retrieved from: http://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2008/pr061308_attach.pdf (Last access June 15, 2015). [United States District Court Southern District of New York]. United States of America v. Victor Bout (New York 2010), retrieved from: http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/newsrel/nyc050608_indictment.pdf (Last access June 15, 2015). [WA Plenary]. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies (The Hague/Wassenaar 1995), retrieved from: http://www.wassenaar.org/index.html (Last access June 20, 2015).

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Appendices

Appendix A: Analysis concerning frequency of explosive

Explosives RAND GTD Pandora LexisNexis

Ammonium Nitrate 54 140 > 20 101

TNT 202 1839 > 20 44

RDX + C-4 43 43 20 57

PETN + Semtex 13 19 7 55

TATP + HMTD 0 3 1 34

HMX 0 0 0 0

Picric acid 0 0 0 0

nitroglycerine 6 1 1 4

Urea nitrate 0 1 0 4

DDNP 0 0 0 0

Potassium nitrate 6 17 11 3

PNNM 0 0 0 0

Black Powder 9 45 10 2

Smokeless Powder 1 10 0 1

Dynamite 289 missing > 20 30

Sources: Global Terrorism Database, RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, ESC Pandora Database; LexisNexis News Database. Page 136 of 139

Appendix B – Relative effectiveness factor of explosives

Explosive RE factor

AN 0.42

ANFO 0.80

TATP 0.83

HMTD 0.88

TNT 1.00

Composition 4 1.34

RDX 1.60

PETN 1.66

Semtex 1.66

Sources: Pichtel, Terrorism, p. 256; Pal, ‘Laser remote sensing ’, table 3.1.

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Appendix C: Structure of De Kock´s ESP Pandora

Elementary Scenario Variables Components (ESC)

Arena 10

Time(frame) 6

Context 2

Protagonist 26

Antagonist 17

Motivation 2

Primary objective 2

Means 15

Modus Operandi 10

Resistance 8

Source: De Kock, Criminal Behaviour, table 7.1.

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Appendix D: Quantitative visualization of this paper´s results

Incident Explosive Cat 1: Cat 2: Cat 3: Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Technology Knowledge Knowledge (expl.) (tacit)

Sterling Hall AN 2 B X

Oslo AN 2 B, A X Bombing

King David TNT 1, 4 C, D Y,Z Bombing

Embassy TNT 2 C Y Bombings

Bombay RDX 3 C Y Bombings

Hotel RDX 4 C Y Tequendama

“Mai PETN 1 A, B Y Offensive”

Lockerbie PETN 3 C,D Y,Z

London HMTD/TATP 2 C Y Bombings

Subcategories (Cat. 1) Subcategories (Cat. 2) Subcategories (Cat. 3) 1 = Theft A = Manuals (illegal) X = Trial and Error 2 = Purchased (legal) B = Manuals (legal) Y = Training 3 = State sponsored C = Training Z = Military 4 = Purchased (illegal) D = Military

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