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Ex-Fighters) Q: What Type of Work Were You Doing Before the War Began ?

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Ex-Fighters) Q: What Type of Work Were You Doing Before the War Began ? “Voices of Syria” Vera Mironova University of Maryland Project Loubna Mrie Syria Sam Whitt High Point University Overview • Presentation includes recent interviews of ex-combatant Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel fighters now living in Turkey. • We compare attitudes and opinions of former FSA fighters to active FSA fighters inside Syria, non-combatant refugee populations currently living in Turkey. "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Methodology • Unknown population parameters and security concerns preclude random sampling • We rely on non-probability, cluster sampling • No more than 5 per cluster, 1 per household • Interviews in Aleppo and Idlib (August- December 2013) • Interviews in Turkey (January 2013- April 2014) • N = 250 "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Demographics Respondents Age Group 44.2 39.0 30.2 27.1 26.6 26.8 24.5 22.1 22.0 16.3 13.5 9.3 Refugee Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugee Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugee Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugee Fighter Ex-Fighter 16-21 22-30 31-40 41-60 "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Respondents Education Levels 46.0 46.7 45.0 44.0 38.0 34.0 28.0 10.0 8.3 0.0 Refugees Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugees Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugees Fighter Ex-Fighter Refugees Fighter Ex-Fighter None Primary Secondary Higher "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Occupation Before War (Fighters) Q: What type of work were you doing before the war began ? Student 35.59 Unemployed 13.56 Unskilled manual worker 3.39 Semi-skilled manual worker 1.69 Skilled manual worker 6.78 Non-manual - office worker 1.69 Supervisory - office worker 1.69 Professional worker 27.12 Employer/ manager of an establishment 6.78 Employer/ manager of a big establishment 1.69 Occupation Before the War (Ex-Fighters) Q: What type of work were you doing before the war began ? Student 30.23 Unemployed 18.6 Member of armed forces 4.65 Skilled manual worker 23.26 Professional worker 11.63 Employer/ manager of an establishment 4.65 Employer/ manager of a big establishment 6.98 "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Displacement Time at Current Location Q: How long have you been in the location where you are currently living/seeking shelter? Refugees 4.0 4.0 2.0 42.0 26.0 22.0 Fighters 1.6 14.1 29.7 21.9 29.7 3.1 Ex- 2.3 16.3 37.2 7.0 37.2 Fighters Less then a week 1–3 weeks 1-3 months 3-6 months 6-12 months 1-2 years More than 2 years "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Displacement by Conflict Q: How many times have you moved since the war began? Refugees Fighter Ex-Fighter 50.0 37.2 34.8 32.7 27.8 27.3 16.4 13.9 11.1 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.2 5.6 5.6 5.4 1.8 0 1234 56 # times moved "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Displacement of Family Members Q: Where are most of your immediate family members now ? Refugees Ex-Fighters 66 58.14 41.86 34 Most still in Syria Most now outside of Syria "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Cross-Border Migration Q: How often have you returned to Syria ? 48.8 Refugees Ex-Fighters 34.8 34 30 20 16 13.9 2.3 Never Once Twice Three times or more "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Self-Reported Reasons for Leaving Syria Q: Why did you decide to leave Syria? (Indicate all that apply) Refugees Ex-Fighters 86.1 69.8 53.5 48.0 44.0 46.0 40.0 40.0 30.0 32.0 26.2 28.0 25.6 24.0 20.9 16.2 14.0 12.0 9.3 Too People My family My friends Most of my The costs of Government Rebels took I had no Government I ran out of dangerous threatened convinced convinced neighbors living in forces took control over other place forces money and to stay in me to leave me to leave me to leave also left Syria control over my town inside Syria destroyed therefore Syria became to my town to stay my home couldn’t high stay in Syria "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Self-Reported Main Reason for Leaving Syria Q:What is the most important reason for you to leave Syria ? Refugees Ex-Fighters 48.8 48.0 46.0 44.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 30.0 28.0 25.6 24.0 14.0 12.0 7.0 7 4.7 4.7 2.3 Too People My family My friends Most of my The costs of Government Rebels took I had no Government I ran out of dangerous threatened convinced convinced neighbors living in forces took control over other place forces money and to stay in me to leave me to leave me to leave also left Syria control over my town inside Syria destroyed therefore Syria became to my town to stay my home couldn’t high stay in Syria "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Likelihood of Returning to Syria Q: When do you think you will be able to return to Syria ? Refugees Ex-Fighters 41.9 42.0 22.0 20.9 20.0 18.6 16.0 14.0 4.7 0.0 In a few weeks In a few months In a year More than a year Never "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Expectations of Returning to Syria Q: Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree of disagree with the following statement? Strongly agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Ex-Fighter 20.9 14.0 20.9 44.2 Syria Refugees 14.0 18.0 26.0 42.0 I have no desire no I have to ever return to return ever to Ex-Fighter 44.2 32.6 7.0 16.3 future for the for It is too is It Refugees 51.0 26.5 22.5 foreseeable dangerous to dangerous return to Syria to return Ex-Fighter 25.6 18.6 25.6 30.2 Refugees 53.1 20.4 14.3 12.2 I would like like to I would soon as possible as soon return to Syria Syria as to return Ex-Fighter 41.9 34.9 11.6 11.6 Refugees 68.0 14.0 12.0 6.0 other options other I feel I have have no I I feel but to stay here stay to but "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Safety and Security Reliance on Others for Safety and Security Q: How much confidence do you have in the following to help keep you safe? Strongly agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Refugees 78.0 14.0 8.0 Ex-Fighters 58.14 16.28 13.95 11.63 Refugees 62.0 18.0 18.0 2.0 Ex-Fighters 44.2 9.3 9.3 37.2 Local leaders Friends Family religious Refugees 50.0 8.3 29.2 12.5 Ex-Fighters 37.2 27.9 18.6 16.3 Local leaders political Refugees 38.0 28.0 26.0 8.0 Ex-Fighters 76.7 9.3 9.3 4.7 Refugees 62.0 14.0 20.0 4.0 Ex-Fighters 30.2 16.3 9.3 44.2 Refugees 52.0 22.0 14.0 12.0 Aid groups Aid police Local "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Assessment of Current Conditions Q: Compared to 12 months ago, do you think conditions here have: Got a lot worse Got a little worse Stayed the same Got a little better Got a lot better Ex-Fighters 51.2 4.7 44.2 Refugees 4.0 8.0 58.0 8.0 22.0 Expectations for the Future Q: And over the next 12 months, do you expect conditions here to ... ? Get a lot worse Get a little worse Stay the same Get a little better Get a lot better Ex-Fighters 14.0 9.3 32.6 7.0 37.2 Refugees 10.0 28.0 42.0 6.0 14.0 "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Rebel Recruitment Reasons Given for Joining Rebel Groups (Fighters) Q: If you are currently fighting or have fought with the FSA or any other group in the past, why did you join? (select all that apply, % selecting each option) 83.9 71.9 72.4 63.2 50.9 53.6 17.5 10.5 5.2 0.0 For money Forced by To be Family All friends Inspired by Support the To defeat To defend my To take a others respected pressure had joined others group’s goals Assad community revenge against Assad Reasons Given for Joining Rebel Groups (Ex-Fighters) Q: If you are currently fighting or have fought with the FSA or any other group in the past, why did you join? (select all that apply, % selecting each option) 93.0 93.0 86.1 69.8 74.4 58.1 7.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 For money Forced by To be To get Family To defend To defeat Support the To take a All friends Inspired by others respected combat pressure my Assad group’s goals revenge had joined others training community against Assad "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Main Reason Given for Joining Rebel Groups (Fighters) 46.3 Q: And what was the most important reason? (%) 18.5 11.1 13.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.7 Inspired by Family pressure To be Forced by All friends had To defeat To defend my Support the To take a others respected others joined Assad community group’s goals revenge against Assad Main Reason Given for Joining Rebel Groups (Ex-Fighters) Q: And what was the most important reason? (%) 50.0 26.0 10.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 To defeat Family To be Forced by Inspired by To take a All friends had To defend my Support the Assad pressure respected others others revenge joined community group’s goals against Assad "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt 53.5 Reasons Given for Leaving Rebel Groups (Ex-Fighters) Q: Why are you no longer fighting ? (select all that apply, % selecting each option) 44.0 34.9 36.0 28.0 24.0 16.3 14.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I do not have Too old or Fighting was Do not The risks of Fighting was Family Have to take Wounded, Lack of Lack of I felt it was combat skills not in good too support dying in the not worth pressure care of family not able to teamwork in discipline in impossible to health emotionally rebeles goals war the risks I fight the group the group win stressful anymore outweigh the was taking benefits of victory Main Reason Given for Leaving Rebel Groups (Ex-Fighters) Q: And what was the most important reason? (%) 44 16.0 14.0 12.0 2.33 2.33 4.0 4.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 I do not have Too old or Fighting was The risks of Fighting was Lack of Do not Have to take Wounded, Lack of I felt it was combat skills not in good too dying in the not worth teamwork in support care of family not able to discipline in impossible to health emotionally war outweigh the risks I the group rebeles goals fight the group win stressful the benefits was taking anymore of victory "Voices of Syria" Mironova, Mrie, Whitt Likelihood of Returning to Combat (Ex-Fighters only) Q: Do
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