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The Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System the Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System This Is Version 2.4.3 of the Samhain Manual

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The Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System the Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System This Is Version 2.4.3 of the Samhain Manual The Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System The Samhain Host Integrity Monitoring System This is version 2.4.3 of the Samhain manual. Copyright © 2002-2019 Rainer Wichmann Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. You may obtain a copy of the GNU Free Documentation Licensefrom the Free Software Foundation by visiting their Web site or by writing to: Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. This manual refers to version 4.4.0 of Samhain. Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1. Backward compatibility ...................................................................................... 1 2. Compiling and installing ............................................................................................. 2 1. Overview ......................................................................................................... 2 2. Requirements .................................................................................................... 3 3. Download and extract ......................................................................................... 3 4. Configuring the source ....................................................................................... 4 4.1. Some more configuration options ............................................................... 5 5. Build ............................................................................................................... 6 6. Install .............................................................................................................. 6 6.1. Important make targets ............................................................................. 7 7. Customize ........................................................................................................ 7 8. Initialize the baseline database ............................................................................. 8 9. Run samhain ..................................................................................................... 8 10. Files and directory layout .................................................................................. 9 10.1. Trusted users and trusted paths ................................................................ 9 10.2. Directory layout .................................................................................... 9 10.3. Runtime files ...................................................................................... 10 10.4. Installed files ...................................................................................... 10 11. The testsuite .................................................................................................. 11 3. General usage notes ................................................................................................. 13 1. How to invoke ................................................................................................ 13 2. Using daemontool (or similar utilities) ................................................................. 13 3. Controlling the daemon ..................................................................................... 13 4. Signals ........................................................................................................... 14 5. PID file .......................................................................................................... 14 6. Wait on file check ........................................................................................... 15 7. Log file rotation .............................................................................................. 15 8. Updating the file signature database .................................................................... 16 9. Improving the signal-to-noise ratio ...................................................................... 16 10. Runtime options: command-line & configuration file ............................................ 17 11. Remarks on the dnmalloc allocator .................................................................... 17 12. Support / Bugs / Problems ................................................................................ 18 12.1. If samhain appears to hang indefinitely .................................................... 18 4. Configuration of logging facilities ............................................................................... 19 1. General .......................................................................................................... 19 1.1. Severity levels ...................................................................................... 19 1.2. Classes ................................................................................................ 20 1.3. Error message customization ................................................................... 21 2. Available logging facilities ................................................................................ 21 3. Activating logging facilities and filtering messages ................................................ 22 4. E-mail ............................................................................................................ 23 4.1. E-mail reports and their integrity .............................................................. 26 5. Log file .......................................................................................................... 27 5.1. The log file and its integrity .................................................................... 27 6. Log server ...................................................................................................... 29 6.1. Details ................................................................................................. 29 7. External facilities ............................................................................................. 29 8. Console .......................................................................................................... 29 9. Prelude ........................................................................................................... 30 9.1. Prelude-specific command-line options ...................................................... 30 9.2. Registering to a Prelude manager ............................................................. 31 10. Using samhain with nagios .............................................................................. 31 11. Syslog .......................................................................................................... 32 12. SQL Database ................................................................................................ 33 iii The Samhain Host In- tegrity Monitoring System 12.1. Upgrade to samhain 2.3 ........................................................................ 34 12.2. Upgrade to samhain 2.4.4 ...................................................................... 35 12.3. Upgrade to samhain 2.8.0+ .................................................................... 35 12.4. Upgrade to samhain 4.0 ........................................................................ 36 12.5. MySQL configuration details ................................................................. 36 5. Configuring samhain, the host integrity monitor ............................................................ 37 1. Usage overview ............................................................................................... 37 2. Available checksum functions ............................................................................ 38 3. File signatures ................................................................................................. 38 4. Defining file check policies: what, and how, to monitor .......................................... 38 4.1. Monitoring policies ................................................................................ 39 4.2. File/directory specification ...................................................................... 40 4.3. Suppress messages about new/deleted/modified files .................................... 42 4.4. Dynamic database update (modified/disappeared/new files) ........................... 43 4.5. Recursion depth(s) ................................................................................. 43 4.6. Hardlink check ...................................................................................... 44 4.7. Check for weird filenames ...................................................................... 44 4.8. Support for prelink ................................................................................ 45 4.9. SELinux attributes and Posix ACLs .......................................................... 45 4.10. Codes in messages about reported files .................................................... 46 4.11. Loose directory checking ...................................................................... 46 4.12. Storing the full content of a file ............................................................. 46 4.13. Who made changes to a file? ................................................................. 46 4.14. Skip checksumming for particular
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