DOCSLIB.ORG

Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D Which Path Will You Take?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D Which Path Will You Take? Pharmaceuticals & Life sciences Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D Which path will you take? Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D 1 TableTable ofof contentscontents Innovation essentials 1 Getting to know ourselves 4 Making research more predictive 6 Expediting development 9 Collaborating to bring treatments to the market 15 Imperatives for change 18 Acknowledgements 19 References 20 Contacts 21 Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D – Which path will you take? is the second in a series of papers published by PricewaterhouseCoopers exploring the future of the pharmaceutical industry. Published in June 2007, Pharma 2020: The vision – Which path will you take? highlighted a number of issues that will have a major bearing on the industry over the next 13 years and outlined the changes we believe will best help pharmaceutical companies realise the potential the future holds to enhance the value they provide to shareholders and society alike. This paper explores the opportunities to improve the R&D process. It proposes new technologies will enable the adoption of virtual R&D; and by operating in a more connected world, the industry in collaboration with researchers, governments, healthcare payers and providers, can address the changing needs of society more effectively. Innovation essentials Pharma is at a pivotal point in Seven major trends reshaping the pharmaceutical marketplace its evolution. As we* indicated The pharmaceutical marketplace is changing dramatically, with huge ramifications in “Pharma 2020: The vision” by for the industry as a whole. We have identified seven major socio-economic trends. PricewaterhouseCoopers, published in June 20071, the social, demographic The burden of chronic disease is clinical advances render previously fatal and economic milieu in which the soaring. The prevalence of chronic diseases chronic. The self-medication industry operates is undergoing huge diseases like diabetes is growing sector is also increasing as more changes (see sidebar, Seven major everywhere. As greater longevity forces prescription products are switched to trends reshaping the pharmaceutical many countries to lift the retirement age, over-the-counter status. The needs marketplace). These challenges have more people will still be working at the of patients are changing accordingly. been compounded by the dearth of point at which these diseases start. The Where treatment is migrating from the good new compounds in its pipeline. social and economic value of treatments doctor to ancillary care or self-care, for chronic diseases will rise accordingly, patients will require more comprehensive but Pharma will have to reduce its information. Where treatment is prices and rely on volume sales of such migrating from the hospital to the products because many countries will primary-care sector, patients will require otherwise be unable to afford them. new services such as home delivery. Healthcare policy-makers and payers The markets of the developing world, are increasingly mandating what where demand for medicines is likely doctors can prescribe. As treatment to grow most rapidly over the next 12 protocols replace individual prescribing years, are highly varied. Developing decisions, Pharma’s target audience countries have very different clinical is also becoming more consolidated and economic characteristics, and more powerful, with profound healthcare systems and attitudes implications for its sales and marketing towards the protection of intellectual model. The industry will have to work property. Any company that wants to much harder for its dollars, collaborate serve these markets successfully will with healthcare payers and providers, therefore have to devise strategies that and improve patient compliance. are tailored to their individual needs. Pay-for-performance is on the rise. Many governments are beginning A growing number of healthcare payers to focus on prevention rather than are measuring the pharmacoeconomic treatment, although they are not yet performance of different medicines. investing very much in pre-emptive Widespread adoption of electronic measures. This change of emphasis medical records will give them the will enable Pharma to enter the realm outcomes data they need to determine of health management. But if it is to best medical practice, eschew do so, it will have to rebuild its image, products that are more expensive since healthcare professionals and or less effective than comparable patients will not trust the industry to therapies and pay for treatments provide such services unless they are based on the outcomes they deliver. sure it has their best interests at heart. So Pharma will have to prove that its The regulators are becoming more medicines really work, provide value for risk-averse. The leading national and money and are better than alternative multinational agencies have become forms of intervention. much more cautious about approving The boundaries between different truly innovative medicines, in the wake * PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the network forms of healthcare are blurring. The of the problems with Vioxx. of member firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers primary-care sector is expanding as International Limited, each of which is a separate and independent legal entity. Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D 1 Table of contents Pharma’s traditional strategy of Figure 1: The decline in R&D productivity placing big bets on a few molecules, promoting them heavily and turning them into blockbusters worked well 50,000 60 for shareholders for many years. s 45,000 al However, its productivity in the lab 50 40,000 is now plummeting, as it switches pprov 35,000 A 40 its attention from diseases that are A 30,000 relatively common and easy to treat to 25,000 30 those that are much more complex or 20,000 20 unusual. In 2007, the US Food and Drug 15,000 Administration (FDA) approved only 19 10,000 10 No. of NME, BL new molecular entities and biologics – a R&D Spending (US$ Millions) 5,000 smaller number than at any time since 0 0 2 1983 (see Figure 1) . 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Moreover, the patents on many of the medicines the industry launched in R&D Spending NME and New Biologics Approved (BLA) the glory days of the 1990s will expire NME: over the next few years, leaving Big New chemical or biological prescription therapeutic: excludes vaccines, Pharma very exposed. US research firm antigens and combination therapies which do not include at least one new constituents Sanford C. Bernstein estimates that generic erosion will knock between 2% and 40% off the revenues of the top Source: FDA CDER, PhRMA and PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis 10 companies between now and 2015 Note: Data on R&D spending for non-PhRMA companies are not included here. (see Figure 2). Worse still, it calculates that only four of the 10 have pipelines containing products sufficiently valuable to offset these losses.3 2 PricewaterhouseCoopers Figure 2: The impact of generic erosion on Big Pharma’s revenues “Base Revenue Estimates” (US$ Millions) Company 2008 2015 % Change Novartis $40,529 $45,714 13% Schering-Plough $20,595 $20,216 (2%) Wyeth $22,367 $20,537 (8%) GlaxoSmithKline $22,858 $20,294 (11%) sanofi-aventis $43,177 $36,186 (16%) Merck & Co $29,724 $24,428 (18%) Bristol-Myers Squibb $21,603 $16,364 (24%) Eli Lilly $20,275 $15,286 (25%) Pfizer $48,639 $34,075 (30%) AstraZeneca $31,522 $18,878 (40%) Source: Bernstein estimates and analysis Note: These figures show each company’s “base revenues” from products that are already on the market. They exclude any future pipeline contributions This “innovation deficit” has enormous We believe that, if the industry is to strategic implications for the industry become more innovative and cut its as a whole. Many pharmaceutical R&D costs, four features will be vital: companies need to decide what they • A comprehensive understanding of want to concentrate on doing and how the human body works at the identify the core competencies they will molecular level require, a process which may involve exiting from some parts of research and • A much better grasp of the development (R&D). But even those that pathophysiology of disease (by regard research and development as a which we mean the functional core element of their business will have changes associated with, or arising to make fundamental alterations in the from, disease or injury) way they work. They may, for example, • Greater use of new technologies to have to focus more heavily on speciality “virtualise” the research process and therapies, since most of the diseases accelerate clinical development; and for which there are currently no effective medications or cures are not amenable • Greater collaboration between the to mass-market treatments, as well as industry, academia, the regulators, reducing the time and costs involved governments and healthcare in researching and developing such providers. medicines to ensure that society can We shall discuss some of the changes afford them. we consider necessary in more detail in the following pages. Pharma 2020: Virtual R&D 3 Getting to know ourselves At present, when pharmaceutical predictive models and generate further Virtual vermin companies start investigating biological knowledge. The American Diabetes Association targets, they may know relatively little Bioinformatics experts aim to create a and US biopharmaceutical company about how those targets are involved complete mathematical model of the Entelos have developed a diabetic in the diseases they want to treat. The molecular and cellular components of the virtual mouse that is being used to information they possess usually comes human body – a “virtual” man – which study cures for Type 1 diabetes. from academic literature and patents, can be used to simulate the physiological Researchers can simulate the effect and is often based on animal studies, effects of interacting with specific targets, of new medicines, including different which may not be relevant to the way in identify which targets have a bearing on dosing levels and dosing regimens, which a disease progresses in humans.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality ONLINE APPENDIX
    Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality ONLINE APPENDIX Will Gornall Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia Ilya A. Strebulaev Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and National Bureau of Economic Research Sept 2017 Find the full paper here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 The online appendix follows. Appendix A contains the alternative names for the unicorns in our sample. Appendix B lists companies whose COIs omit information. Appendix C lists companies where we could not locate the most recent COI. Appendix D contains examples of legal text for each of the major terms. Appendix E details the major terms we found for each company in our sample. Appendix F contains comparative statics. Appendix G contains discussion of our return distribution assumptions. Appendix A: Full Legal Names and Other Names for Unicorns in Our Sample Short Name Legal Name Also Known As 23andMe 23andMe, Inc. A123 Systems A123 Systems, Inc. B456 Systems Actifio Actifio, Inc. Adaptive Biotech Adaptive Biotechnologies Adaptive TCR Corporation Age of Learning Age of Learning, Inc. Airbnb Airbnb, Inc. Airbed & Breakfast, Inc Anaplan Anaplan, Inc. AppDirect AppDirect, Inc. Origo Networks Corporation AppDynamics AppDynamics, Inc. Singularity Technologies, Inc. Appnexus AppNexus Inc. Apttus Apttus Corporation Automattic Automattic Inc. Avant Avant, Inc. Avant Credit Corporation Better Place Better Place, Inc. Better Place Holdings; Better PLC Bloom Energy Bloom Energy Corporation Bloom Energy Server; Ion America Corporation Bloom Energy Bloom Energy Corporation Ion America Corporation Blue Apron Blue Apron, Inc. Petridish Media, Inc. Box Box, Inc. Box.Net Buzzfeed BuzzFeed, Inc. Carbon3D Carbon3D, Inc. EIPI Systems, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment
    The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Susan L. Young, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-4536 [email protected] Birton Cowden, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-36781 [email protected] 1 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Abstract Stakeholder theory suggests dishonest ventures would struggle with stakeholder enrollment, limiting resource access and ultimately failing. Yet cases exist where amoral entrepreneurs do enroll stakeholders through deceit. We propose “fear of missing out” on an opportunity facilitates enrollment by encouraging stakeholder acceptance of information asymmetry. To illustrate we use exemplar Theranos: a biotech firm which convinced stakeholders it would revolutionize healthcare, rising to a $10 billion valuation through 15 years of sustained deceit. We contribute to theory by demonstrating the dark side of stakeholder enrollment, where opportunism increases venture power over stakeholders, and deceit can endure long past start up. Keywords: stakeholder theory, stakeholder enrollment, entrepreneurial deceit, fear of missing out, legitimacy 2 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment “Theranos had demonstrated a commitment to investing in and developing technologies that can make a difference in people’s lives, including for the severely wounded and ill. I had quickly seen tremendous potential in the technologies Theranos develops, and I have the greatest respect for the company’s mission and integrity.” (Johnson, 2015) — 4-star General Jim Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2017-2019 The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Silicon Valley-based private company Theranos Inc., its founder and CEO Elizabeth Holmes, and its former President Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani with raising more than $700 million from investors through an elaborate, years-long fraud in which they exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, and financial performance.
    [Show full text]
  • Debates9 963919 9878034 Final Group Paper
    Group 9 Against Edison- Potential Patients Kendall Travis, Charles Goff, Jenna Lang, Isaiah Watts Position: Against Edison Perspective: Potential Patients Strategy: Against Edison- Potential Patients Background As appealing as Theranos’s low prices are for blood testing, the cost of that is results that are far from the truth. The lab technicians who work at Theranos have little faith in the tests that they do. They feel criminal, uncertain, and concerned enough to the point where they would never do a test there or allow a family member to. For anyone to work there, non-disclosure agreements have to be signed. Clearly the company is hiding something. And for the many workers who have quit Theranos, they have spoken up about how defective everything is there, knowing it would result in the harassment and hounding from Theranos’s team of lawyers and higher up individuals, a price they were willing to pay to warn potential patients like us. The life-changing effects of Theranos’s work have all been anecdotal claims from Elizabeth Holmes, her work is discovered in isolation, and also her work is impossible to achieve with a single drop of blood according to medical experts. All of these are signs of bogus science that can be tied to Theranos. The list of concerns we have compiled comes from watching The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley on HBO. The documentary alone has made it easy for us, as potential patients, to see that Theranos is a fraudulent and unfit company that is unethical for any patient to go to.
    [Show full text]
  • Theranos' Bad Blood
    Theranos’ Bad Blood In 2003, Stanford University student Elizabeth Holmes founded the health care company Theranos. The goal of the company was to revolutionize health care. Beginning with the goal of creating a patch to deliver drugs, the company instead shifted focus to developing a simple and effective method for blood diagnosis. Holmes dropped out of Stanford and began raising millions of dollars in funding. The company claimed that its technology could offer over 240 tests from just a prick of the finger. Test results could be delivered to a patient’s phone in hours, and a single test would cost less than half of the reimbursement rate of Medicare and Medicaid. Blood could be diagnosed easily without the need for many vials of blood drawn from patients’ veins or expensive lab work. By 2014, the company was valued at $9 billion, of which Holmes held a majority stake. Many investors backed the company based on the promise of the technology. Holmes received glowing profiles in news magazines, was featured on television shows, and presented keynote addresses at tech conferences. But the excitement of investors and the promise of the technology did not translate into success. Operating largely in a cloak of secrecy, the company could never validate its claims about its blood sampling technology, and many of its lab results went unchecked. In 2015, journalist John Carreyrou investigated the company for an article in The Wall Street Journal. He disclosed problems in the company’s equipment and testing methods. He found that the company did not even use its own technology in tests and often relied on older technology from other companies.
    [Show full text]
  • Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278E)
    Nominee Report | U.S. Office of Government Ethics; 5 C.F.R. part 2634 | Form Approved: OMB No. (3209-0001) (March 2014) Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278e) Filer's Information DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") Secretary, Department of Education Other Federal Government Positions Held During the Preceding 12 Months: Names of Congressional Committees Considering Nomination: ● Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Electronic Signature - I certify that the statements I have made in this form are true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge. /s/ DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") in Integrity.gov] Agency Ethics Official's Opinion - On the basis of information contained in this report, I conclude that the filer is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (subject to any comments below). /s/ Goodridge-Keiller, Marcella, Certifying Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Goodridge-Keiller, Marcella in Integrity.gov] Other review conducted by /s/ Sprague, Marcia, Ethics Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Sprague, Marcia in Integrity.gov] U.S. Office of Government Ethics Certification /s/ Shaub, Walter M, Certifying Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Shaub, Walter M in Integrity.gov] 1. Filer's Positions Held Outside United States Government # ORGANIZATION NAME CITY, STATE ORGANIZATION POSITION HELD FROM TO TYPE 1 The Stow Company - Holland, Inc. See Endnote Holland, Corporation Chief Creative 5/2016 11/2016 Michigan Officer 2 The Stow Company - Holland, Inc. See Endnote Holland, Corporation Director 6/1994 11/2016 Michigan 3 RCB Main Floor, LLC (d/b/a "Reserve GR, See Endnote Grand Rapids, Corporation Director 3/2010 11/2016 LLC") Michigan 4 The Stow Company See Endnote Holland, Corporation Director 5/2010 11/2016 Michigan 5 Neurocore, LLC See Endnote Grand Rapids, Corporation Member/Manag 2/2009 11/2016 Michigan er 6 Windquest Group, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market
    University of Miami Business Law Review Volume 28 Issue 2 Article 8 September 2020 The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market Theodore O'Brien Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Theodore O'Brien, The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market, 28 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 404 (2020) Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol28/iss2/8 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market Theodore O’Brien* America’s securities laws and regulations, most of which were created in the early twentieth century, are increasingly irrelevant to the most dynamic emerging companies. Today, companies with sufficient investor interest can raise ample capital through private and exempt offerings, all while eschewing the public exchanges and the associated burdens of the initial public offering, public disclosures, and regulatory scrutiny. Airbnb, Inc., for example, quickly tapped private investors for $1 billion in April of 2020,1 adding to the estimated $4.4 billion the company had previously raised.2 The fundamental shift from public to private companies is evidenced by the so-called “unicorns,” the more than 400 private companies valued at more than $1 billion.
    [Show full text]
  • Theranos Phenomenon – Part 5: Theranos’ Presentation at the American Association for Clinical Chemistry Annual Conference 2016
    Clin Chem Lab Med 2016; 54(10): e313–e314 Letter to the Editor Eleftherios P. Diamandis* and Mario Plebani Theranos phenomenon – Part 5: Theranos’ presentation at the American Association for Clinical Chemistry Annual Conference 2016 DOI 10.1515/cclm-2016-0737 Master, two highly recognized and respected clinical Accepted for publication August 18, 2016; previously published chemists, who did a good job in asking pertinent ques- online August 30, 2016 tions to Ms. Holmes and her associates. In this respect, AACC lived up to the expectations of high standards and Keywords: diagnostics; new technologies. impartiality for this presentation. Holmes presented to a large and curious, if not To the Editor, hostile, audience. She avoided talking about Theranos’ past and the difficulties of her company [1–7]. She also The widely anticipated presentation of Theranos at the made it clear that her presentation would focus on the Annual Conference of the American Association for future, not the past, and she distanced herself from the Clinical Chemistry (AACC) was finally given on Monday, previous “Edison” instrument and introduced a new August 1st, 2016 at the Philadelphia Convention Center. analyzer named “MiniLab”. In the first part of her pres- This journal has followed the Theranos story closely over entation, Ms. Holmes described the engineering behind the last 2 years and provided frequent updates [1–4]. Eliza- the MiniLab and explained that it is a compact desktop beth Holmes, the Chief Executive of Theranos, presented device that houses a mini spectrophotometer, a mini- to an audience of over 2500 clinical chemists and other luminometer, and mini-flow-cytometer and a mini-PCR laboratory scientists, as well as to an impressive number machine, along with a centrifuge.
    [Show full text]
  • Bad Blood Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup by John Carreyrou
    Bad Blood Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup By John Carreyrou At its peak in 2013/14, Theranos had a valuation of $10 billion, representing incredible growth in the 10 years since its incorporation in 2003. The company claimed that it had developed and commercialized a revolutionary new blood testing solution. Viewed as a stunning start-up success, the Theranos board was a roster of well-known government and business leaders, including Henry Kissinger, James Mattis and Riley Bechtel. The buzz around Theranos was electric, and high-profile investors such as Betsey DeVos, the Walton family, and Rupert Murdoch invested hundreds of millions of dollars to fund the company. At the helm was Elizabeth Holmes, founder and CEO. Holmes dropped out of Stanford Engineering in 2004 and used her tuition fees to help fund her brainchild. Blond, attractive, and possessed of an unusually deep baritone voice, Holmes was listed by Forbes as one of America’s Richest Self-Made Women in 2015, with a net worth of over $4 billion. That same year, however, it all came crashing down when investigative reporter John Carreyrou of the Wall Street Journal revealed that the Theranos technology did not work as claimed. Carreyrou’s exhaustive research uncovered a web of lies and cover-ups, dating back to the earliest days at Theranos. Today, the company is worth nothing and has been dissolved, investors have lost multi- millions, and Elizabeth Holmes was charged with massive fraud by the SEC in March, 2018. This riches-to-rags story has captured the public’s imagination, and a movie based on Carreyrou’s book (starring Jennifer Lawrence as Elizabeth Holmes), is slated for release in 2020.
    [Show full text]
  • Inovio Pharmaceuticals (INO) – Bad Blood the COVID-19 Version of Theranos – Target Price $1
    April 27, 2020 Inovio Pharmaceuticals (INO) – Bad Blood The COVID-19 Version of Theranos – Target Price $1 It was less than 10 years ago when Theranos was the talk of the med tech community as the mysterious startup claimed breakthrough advancements with the ability to quickly process over 240 laboratory tests with a prick of the finger. Seemed too good to be true? Well, as you know, the rest of the story is business history. Fast forward 10 years and we are now facing the largest global pandemic in generations. As the greatest scientific minds globally are working tirelessly to find a cure, Inovio Pharmaceuticals (INO) claims to have developed a vaccine in just 3 hours under the same scientific team that has spent decades deceiving investors. It’s been over 40 years since Inovio was founded, yet the company has NEVER brought a product to market, and all the while insiders have enriched themselves with hefty salaries and large stock sales. In this report, Citron will detail why Inovio shareholders have been “Theranosed” and why the SEC should immediately halt this blatant stock promotion. The Secret Algorithm Much like Theranos, Inovio claims to have a “secret sauce” that, miraculously, no pharma giant has been able to figure out. This is the same “secret sauce” that supposedly developed a vaccine for COVID-19 in just 3 hours. Simply put, the management team at Inovio is a group of charlatans. Just look at this exchange with 60 minutes and Inovio’s SVP of R&D Researcher Kate Broderick: Kate Broderick: All we need is that genetic code.
    [Show full text]
  • How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos As a Legal Ethics Case Study
    Georgia State University Law Review Volume 37 Issue 2 Winter 2021 Article 6 3-1-2021 How and Why Did it Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study G.S. Hans Vanderbilt University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons Recommended Citation G.S. Hans, How and Why Did it Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 427 (2021). Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hans: How and Why Did it Go So Wrong? HOW AND WHY DID IT GO SO WRONG?: THERANOS AS A LEGAL ETHICS CASE STUDY G.S. Hans* ABSTRACT The Theranos saga encompasses many discrete areas of law. Reporting on Theranos, most notably John Carreyrou’s Bad Blood, highlights the questionable ethical decisions that many of the attorneys involved made. The lessons attorneys and law students can learn from Bad Blood are highly complex. The Theranos story touches on multiple areas of professional responsibility, including competence, diligence, candor, conflicts, and liability. Thus, Theranos serves as a helpful tool to explore the limits of ethical lawyering for Professional Responsibility students. This Article discusses the author’s experience with using Bad Blood as an extended case study in a new course on Legal Ethics in Contemporary Practice.
    [Show full text]
  • Theranos Phenomenon: Promises and Fallacies
    Clin Chem Lab Med 2015; 53(7): 989–993 Opinion Paper Eleftherios P. Diamandis* Theranos phenomenon: promises and fallacies DOI 10.1515/cclm-2015-0356 Received April 8, 2015; accepted April 15, 2015; previously published Introduction online May 9, 2015 My Vice-President of Operations at a major teaching Hospital in Toronto asked me to update him on a “new” company called Theranos that promises to revolutionize Abstract: Recently, spectacular advances in diagnostic diagnostics by offering multi-analyte testing at bargain technologies, genomics, etc. offer unprecedented oppor- prices in commercial outlets such as pharmacies [1]. The tunities for widespread testing of asymptomatic individu- interest of my Vice-President was triggered by an inquiry als, in the hope that this testing will unravel early disease from the recently appointed Hospital President, who was signs which could lead to preventative or more effective wondering as to how Theranos could do diagnostic testing therapeutic measures. In particular, one commercial at 10% of the cost of centralized laboratories. I assumed organization, Theranos, promises to revolutionize diag- from these discussions that my administrators are seri- nostics by offering multi-analyte testing at low prices in ously thinking of adopting some kind of a “Theranos commercial outlets, thus challenging the current para- model” to drastically reduce current laboratory costs. digm of targeted and centralized diagnostic testing. In Theranos seems to be a highly successful enterprise this paper, I analyze the Theranos technology and their that managed to raise hundreds of millions of dollars in promises, and contrast this information with the cur- multiple rounds of fundraising and has a stellar govern- rently used technologies, to show that most of the com- ance body.
    [Show full text]
  • 03. Style Approach
    IMSA Leadership Education and Development “The minute you start compromising for the sake of massaging somebody's ego, that's it, game over.” - Gordon Ramsay Time Period and Situation Research regarding the Style Approach Theory is thought to have begun around the 1940s at Ohio State University and the University of Michigan that served to determine the most significant behaviors exhibited by leaders. One of the first identifications of the theory was that leadership is divided into task and relationship behaviors, which serves as the basis of the division between the two aspects of the theory. Later, in the 1960s, further studies were conducted by the pair Blake and Mouton that explored how managers used task vs. relationship behaviors in an organizational setting. Following this era, the Leadership (Managerial) Grid was created and encompassed the ideas of all three studies on a scale of production centered behaviors vs relationship-focused behaviors (Northouse 71-76). Agenda 1. Theories a. Style Approach to Leadership i. Task vs. Relationship Oriented 2. Concepts a. Situational Awareness b. Social Identity Theory c. Social Norm Theory 3. Style Approach Examples a. Gordon Ramsay i. Situational Awareness b. Elizabeth Holmes i. Task-oriented style approach 4. Activities a. Situational Awareness: Task vs Relationship b. A Building Activity: Task Oriented/Relationship Oriented Behaviors 5. Supplemental Materials 6. References Revised July 2019 IMSA Leadership Education and Development Student Objectives: 1. Students will understand Style Approach and be able to differentiate between task and ​ ​ ​ relationship-oriented Style Approach. ​ 2. Students will understand the concepts behind Social Identity Theory and Social Norm ​ ​ ​ Theory and how they are incorporated into leadership.
    [Show full text]