October 2018 Volume 10, Issue 3
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Theranos As a Legal Ethics Case Study
Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2021 How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study G. S. Hans Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon May 24 12:25:08 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. G. S. Hans, How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study, 37 GA. St. U. L. REV. 427 (2021). ALWD 6th ed. Hans, G. G., How and why did it go so wrong?: Theranos as a legal ethics case study, 37(2) Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 427 (2021). APA 7th ed. Hans, G. G. (2021). How and why did it go so wrong?: Theranos as legal ethics case study. Georgia State University Law Review, 37(2), 427-470. Chicago 17th ed. G. S. Hans, "How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study," Georgia State University Law Review 37, no. 2 (Winter 2021): 427-470 McGill Guide 9th ed. G S Hans, "How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study" (2021) 37:2 Ga St U L Rev 427. AGLC 4th ed. G S Hans, 'How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study' (2021) 37(2) Georgia State University Law Review 427. MLA 8th ed. -
A Delaware Limited Partnership, : PFM HEALTHCARE
EFiled: Apr 11 2017 04:50PM EDT Transaction ID 60459576 Case No. 2017-0262-JTL IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PARTNER INVESTMENTS, L.P., : a Delaware limited partnership, : PFM HEALTHCARE MASTER FUND, L.P., : a Cayman Islands limited partnership, and : PFM HEALTHCARE PRINCIPALS : FUND, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, : : Plaintiffs, : v. : C.A. No. 2017-0262-JTL : THERANOS, INC., a Delaware corporation, : Original Version Filed: ELIZABETH HOLMES, : April 6, 2017 FABRIZIO BONANNI, : WILLIAM H. FOEGE, and : Redacted Public Version DANIEL J. WARMENHOVEN, : Filed: April 11, 2017 : Defendants. : VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF Plaintiffs Partner Investments, L.P. (“PIM”), PFM Healthcare Master Fund, L.P. (“HCMF”), and PFM Healthcare Principals Fund, L.P. (“HCP”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “PFM”), by and through their attorneys, allege upon knowledge as to themselves and their own conduct, and otherwise upon information and belief, as follows: NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 1. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to, among other things, enjoin Defendants Theranos, Inc. (“Theranos” or the “Company”), Elizabeth Holmes (“Holmes”), Fabrizio Bonanni (“Bonanni”), William H. Foege (“Foege”), and Daniel J. Warmenhoven (“Warmenhoven”) (collectively, “Defendants”) from consummating a self-interested and coercive exchange offer that breaches their fiduciary duty of loyalty, constitutes corporate waste, and fails entire fairness review. 2. Through a string of repeated lies, misrepresentations, misleading statements, and omissions of material information, Theranos, Holmes, and former Chief Operating Officer and member of the Board of Directors Ramesh Balwani (“Balwani”) induced PFM to invest approximately $96.1 million in Theranos in February 2014. PFM became a holder of Series C-2 Preferred Stock in the Company, with a liquidation preference ahead of holders of the Company’s common stock and holders of the Company’s Series A and B Preferred Stock, and pari passu with the holders of Series C and C-1 Preferred Stock. -
Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality ONLINE APPENDIX
Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality ONLINE APPENDIX Will Gornall Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia Ilya A. Strebulaev Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and National Bureau of Economic Research Sept 2017 Find the full paper here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 The online appendix follows. Appendix A contains the alternative names for the unicorns in our sample. Appendix B lists companies whose COIs omit information. Appendix C lists companies where we could not locate the most recent COI. Appendix D contains examples of legal text for each of the major terms. Appendix E details the major terms we found for each company in our sample. Appendix F contains comparative statics. Appendix G contains discussion of our return distribution assumptions. Appendix A: Full Legal Names and Other Names for Unicorns in Our Sample Short Name Legal Name Also Known As 23andMe 23andMe, Inc. A123 Systems A123 Systems, Inc. B456 Systems Actifio Actifio, Inc. Adaptive Biotech Adaptive Biotechnologies Adaptive TCR Corporation Age of Learning Age of Learning, Inc. Airbnb Airbnb, Inc. Airbed & Breakfast, Inc Anaplan Anaplan, Inc. AppDirect AppDirect, Inc. Origo Networks Corporation AppDynamics AppDynamics, Inc. Singularity Technologies, Inc. Appnexus AppNexus Inc. Apttus Apttus Corporation Automattic Automattic Inc. Avant Avant, Inc. Avant Credit Corporation Better Place Better Place, Inc. Better Place Holdings; Better PLC Bloom Energy Bloom Energy Corporation Bloom Energy Server; Ion America Corporation Bloom Energy Bloom Energy Corporation Ion America Corporation Blue Apron Blue Apron, Inc. Petridish Media, Inc. Box Box, Inc. Box.Net Buzzfeed BuzzFeed, Inc. Carbon3D Carbon3D, Inc. EIPI Systems, Inc. -
The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment
The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Susan L. Young, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-4536 [email protected] Birton Cowden, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-36781 [email protected] 1 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Abstract Stakeholder theory suggests dishonest ventures would struggle with stakeholder enrollment, limiting resource access and ultimately failing. Yet cases exist where amoral entrepreneurs do enroll stakeholders through deceit. We propose “fear of missing out” on an opportunity facilitates enrollment by encouraging stakeholder acceptance of information asymmetry. To illustrate we use exemplar Theranos: a biotech firm which convinced stakeholders it would revolutionize healthcare, rising to a $10 billion valuation through 15 years of sustained deceit. We contribute to theory by demonstrating the dark side of stakeholder enrollment, where opportunism increases venture power over stakeholders, and deceit can endure long past start up. Keywords: stakeholder theory, stakeholder enrollment, entrepreneurial deceit, fear of missing out, legitimacy 2 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment “Theranos had demonstrated a commitment to investing in and developing technologies that can make a difference in people’s lives, including for the severely wounded and ill. I had quickly seen tremendous potential in the technologies Theranos develops, and I have the greatest respect for the company’s mission and integrity.” (Johnson, 2015) — 4-star General Jim Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2017-2019 The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Silicon Valley-based private company Theranos Inc., its founder and CEO Elizabeth Holmes, and its former President Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani with raising more than $700 million from investors through an elaborate, years-long fraud in which they exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, and financial performance. -
AGAINST Continuing Edison Research
The Eight Edison Debate 2 Peyton Chiotti• Miranda Vanlith Thomas Rolfs • Claire Johnson Position: AGAINST continuing Edison research. Perspective: (Elizabeth) HOLMES' INTERESTS Strategy: Discontinuing Edison, redirecting Holmes’ career so she can start paying debts instead of prison. Background ● In the last days of Theranos, December 2017 Theranos was forced to mortgage all of their assets to an investment group called fortress investment group for a 100M$ loan. ● One of the main conditions of the loan agreement was that Theranos was to produce audited financial statements. According to Phillipe, they had not done so since 2009. ● Over 700M$ was given to Theranos between 2015 and 2013. Not one of the investors had ever asked for financial audits. ● In the spring of 2018, Theranos received the final audit, forcing them to disclose that they didn't have enough money to continue any further research. ● On March 14, 2018, the SEC filed charges against Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes (CEO), and Ramesh Balwani (COO). The SEC claimed that Theranos had been lying when they said that they were conducting blood tests on The Edison. ● Theranos and Holmes settled immediately. Holmes was stripped of voting control of Theranos, could not become a director of any company for 10 years and she was fined 500K$ ● After battling multiple charges, she and Balwani stand trial in summer 2020 for 11 accounts of wire fraud totaling over 100 million ● Character of circumstances ○ Concerns that matter the most ■ Holmes has proven she cannot be trusted to run a company by enacting several accounts of fraud and deception. ■ Her intentions of creating a device that could provide affordable in-home blood testing were whole, however, her means of creating such a device were flawed. -
Debates9 963919 9878034 Final Group Paper
Group 9 Against Edison- Potential Patients Kendall Travis, Charles Goff, Jenna Lang, Isaiah Watts Position: Against Edison Perspective: Potential Patients Strategy: Against Edison- Potential Patients Background As appealing as Theranos’s low prices are for blood testing, the cost of that is results that are far from the truth. The lab technicians who work at Theranos have little faith in the tests that they do. They feel criminal, uncertain, and concerned enough to the point where they would never do a test there or allow a family member to. For anyone to work there, non-disclosure agreements have to be signed. Clearly the company is hiding something. And for the many workers who have quit Theranos, they have spoken up about how defective everything is there, knowing it would result in the harassment and hounding from Theranos’s team of lawyers and higher up individuals, a price they were willing to pay to warn potential patients like us. The life-changing effects of Theranos’s work have all been anecdotal claims from Elizabeth Holmes, her work is discovered in isolation, and also her work is impossible to achieve with a single drop of blood according to medical experts. All of these are signs of bogus science that can be tied to Theranos. The list of concerns we have compiled comes from watching The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley on HBO. The documentary alone has made it easy for us, as potential patients, to see that Theranos is a fraudulent and unfit company that is unethical for any patient to go to. -
A Work Project Presented As Part of the Requirements for the Award of a Master’S Degree In
A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s degree in Finance from the Nova School of Business and Economics. THERANOS: BETTING ON BLOOD DIOGO JESUS NETO Work project carried out under the supervision of: Paulo Pinho 06-01-2020 Abstract Theranos was a Silicon Valley start-up founded by Elizabeth Holmes in 2003. Holmes claimed to have developed a new blood-testing device that had the potential to revolutionize the healthcare industry. She established partnerships with Walgreens and Safeway to make her technology available nationwide. She also secured a prestigious board of directors and an equally impressive investor base that raised over $700 million at a peak valuation of $9 billion. However, an investigation by The Wall Street Journal revealed the company had misled investors and endangered patients’ lives. In 2018, Theranos collapsed after years of battling lawsuits and federal charges. Keywords: Theranos, Corporate Governance, Fundraising, Due Diligence This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 1 Theranos: Betting on Blood “One of the most epic failures in corporate governance in the annals of American capitalism”. - John Carreyrou1 On June 28, 2019, a crowd of journalists awaited Elizabeth Holmes at the door of the San Jose Federal Court in California for a pre-trial hearing2. She was accused of engaging in a multi-million- dollar scheme to defraud investors, doctors, and patients alongside her former partner, Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani. -
Theranos' Bad Blood
Theranos’ Bad Blood In 2003, Stanford University student Elizabeth Holmes founded the health care company Theranos. The goal of the company was to revolutionize health care. Beginning with the goal of creating a patch to deliver drugs, the company instead shifted focus to developing a simple and effective method for blood diagnosis. Holmes dropped out of Stanford and began raising millions of dollars in funding. The company claimed that its technology could offer over 240 tests from just a prick of the finger. Test results could be delivered to a patient’s phone in hours, and a single test would cost less than half of the reimbursement rate of Medicare and Medicaid. Blood could be diagnosed easily without the need for many vials of blood drawn from patients’ veins or expensive lab work. By 2014, the company was valued at $9 billion, of which Holmes held a majority stake. Many investors backed the company based on the promise of the technology. Holmes received glowing profiles in news magazines, was featured on television shows, and presented keynote addresses at tech conferences. But the excitement of investors and the promise of the technology did not translate into success. Operating largely in a cloak of secrecy, the company could never validate its claims about its blood sampling technology, and many of its lab results went unchecked. In 2015, journalist John Carreyrou investigated the company for an article in The Wall Street Journal. He disclosed problems in the company’s equipment and testing methods. He found that the company did not even use its own technology in tests and often relied on older technology from other companies. -
Private Company Lies
Private Company Lies ELIZABETH POLLMAN* Rule 10b±5's antifraud catchall has been called one of the most conse- quential pieces of American administrative law and one of the most highly developed areas of judicially created federal law. Although the Rule broadly prohibits securities fraud in both public and private com- pany stock, the vast majority of jurisprudence, and the voluminous aca- demic literature that accompanies it, has developed through a public company lens. This Article illuminates how the explosive growth of private markets has left huge portions of U.S. capital markets with relatively light secur- ities fraud scrutiny and enforcement. Some of the largest private compa- nies by valuation grow in an environment of extreme information asymmetry and with the pressure, opportunity, and rationalizing culture that can foster misconduct and deception. Many investors in the private markets are sophisticated and can bear high levels of risk and signi®cant losses from securities fraud. It is increasingly evident, however, that pri- vate company lies can harm a broader range of shareholders and stake- holders as well as the ef®ciency of allocating billions of dollars for innovation and new business. In response to this underappreciated prob- lem, this Article explores a range of mechanisms to improve accountabil- ity in the private markets and ultimately argues for greater public oversight and enforcement. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 354 I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 10B±5 IN A -
Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278E)
Nominee Report | U.S. Office of Government Ethics; 5 C.F.R. part 2634 | Form Approved: OMB No. (3209-0001) (March 2014) Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278e) Filer's Information DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") Secretary, Department of Education Other Federal Government Positions Held During the Preceding 12 Months: Names of Congressional Committees Considering Nomination: ● Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Electronic Signature - I certify that the statements I have made in this form are true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge. /s/ DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by DeVos, Elisabeth P ("Betsy") in Integrity.gov] Agency Ethics Official's Opinion - On the basis of information contained in this report, I conclude that the filer is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (subject to any comments below). /s/ Goodridge-Keiller, Marcella, Certifying Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Goodridge-Keiller, Marcella in Integrity.gov] Other review conducted by /s/ Sprague, Marcia, Ethics Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Sprague, Marcia in Integrity.gov] U.S. Office of Government Ethics Certification /s/ Shaub, Walter M, Certifying Official [electronically signed on 01/19/2017 by Shaub, Walter M in Integrity.gov] 1. Filer's Positions Held Outside United States Government # ORGANIZATION NAME CITY, STATE ORGANIZATION POSITION HELD FROM TO TYPE 1 The Stow Company - Holland, Inc. See Endnote Holland, Corporation Chief Creative 5/2016 11/2016 Michigan Officer 2 The Stow Company - Holland, Inc. See Endnote Holland, Corporation Director 6/1994 11/2016 Michigan 3 RCB Main Floor, LLC (d/b/a "Reserve GR, See Endnote Grand Rapids, Corporation Director 3/2010 11/2016 LLC") Michigan 4 The Stow Company See Endnote Holland, Corporation Director 5/2010 11/2016 Michigan 5 Neurocore, LLC See Endnote Grand Rapids, Corporation Member/Manag 2/2009 11/2016 Michigan er 6 Windquest Group, Inc. -
The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market
University of Miami Business Law Review Volume 28 Issue 2 Article 8 September 2020 The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market Theodore O'Brien Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Theodore O'Brien, The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market, 28 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 404 (2020) Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol28/iss2/8 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private Securities Market Theodore O’Brien* America’s securities laws and regulations, most of which were created in the early twentieth century, are increasingly irrelevant to the most dynamic emerging companies. Today, companies with sufficient investor interest can raise ample capital through private and exempt offerings, all while eschewing the public exchanges and the associated burdens of the initial public offering, public disclosures, and regulatory scrutiny. Airbnb, Inc., for example, quickly tapped private investors for $1 billion in April of 2020,1 adding to the estimated $4.4 billion the company had previously raised.2 The fundamental shift from public to private companies is evidenced by the so-called “unicorns,” the more than 400 private companies valued at more than $1 billion. -
Theranos Phenomenon – Part 5: Theranos’ Presentation at the American Association for Clinical Chemistry Annual Conference 2016
Clin Chem Lab Med 2016; 54(10): e313–e314 Letter to the Editor Eleftherios P. Diamandis* and Mario Plebani Theranos phenomenon – Part 5: Theranos’ presentation at the American Association for Clinical Chemistry Annual Conference 2016 DOI 10.1515/cclm-2016-0737 Master, two highly recognized and respected clinical Accepted for publication August 18, 2016; previously published chemists, who did a good job in asking pertinent ques- online August 30, 2016 tions to Ms. Holmes and her associates. In this respect, AACC lived up to the expectations of high standards and Keywords: diagnostics; new technologies. impartiality for this presentation. Holmes presented to a large and curious, if not To the Editor, hostile, audience. She avoided talking about Theranos’ past and the difficulties of her company [1–7]. She also The widely anticipated presentation of Theranos at the made it clear that her presentation would focus on the Annual Conference of the American Association for future, not the past, and she distanced herself from the Clinical Chemistry (AACC) was finally given on Monday, previous “Edison” instrument and introduced a new August 1st, 2016 at the Philadelphia Convention Center. analyzer named “MiniLab”. In the first part of her pres- This journal has followed the Theranos story closely over entation, Ms. Holmes described the engineering behind the last 2 years and provided frequent updates [1–4]. Eliza- the MiniLab and explained that it is a compact desktop beth Holmes, the Chief Executive of Theranos, presented device that houses a mini spectrophotometer, a mini- to an audience of over 2500 clinical chemists and other luminometer, and mini-flow-cytometer and a mini-PCR laboratory scientists, as well as to an impressive number machine, along with a centrifuge.