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International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 827–842

Dynamics of Cultural Change: The Human Development Perspective

Mark A. Abdollahian Claremont Graduate University

Travis G. Coan Harvard University

Hana Oh Deloitte Analytics and

Birol A. Yesilada Portland State University

The relationship between , cultural change, and political liberalization is often explored through the lens of classic . Recent scholarship attempts to extend classic theory to be more closely aligned with empirical . Under the human development perspective, economic prosperity acts as a catalyst for cultural development, leading to social values that favor liberalization, and thus promotes effective democracy. Using a systems dynamic approach, we formalize the dynamic causal structure specified in the human development perspective, develop a novel econometric procedure (Genetic Algorithm Nonlinear Least Squares) to estimate the parameters of highly nonlinear, continuous models, and verify our formal model using five waves of data from the . Our results indicate that development is strongly nonlinear and path dependent: Economic is a necessary condition for successful and expressive political behav- ior, which are antecedents for lasting democratic . Thus, policies and institutional arrangements must be tailored to, not outpace, a nation’s level of economic progress to create demand for a secular and expressive political marketplace where democratic institutions can sustain and thrive.

Since the turn of the twentieth century, social scien- How do evolve over time? What are the tists have identified dynamic linkages between eco- implications of cultural development for political devel- nomic modernization, cultural change, and political opment? How are these processes linked to economic development. Subsequently, a long line of literature progress? These questions have been central to a wide has explored the implications of modernization for range of social disciplines, from , developed and developing economies, which also , and to cultural . In a includes popularized for and against global- series of recent studies, Ronald Inglehart and Christian ization (Chua 2003; Sachs 2005). However, recent Welzel posit a theory that unifies modernization, cul- international events, such as Arab Spring, give a new tural change, and political development around one sense of urgency to understanding the dynamic inter- basic theme: human development. Human develop- action between social forces. Several recent studies ment (HD) theory is grounded in a of needs funda- have linked motivations for international terrorism to mental to human and views modernization as economic modernization (Barnett 2004), instability a constant struggle to break the chains of human con- driven by friction associated with globalization (Rodrik straint. More specifically, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 1998), while the ‘‘clash of ’’ thesis places describe a phased theoretical sequence in which rising cultural differences at the forefront in explaining levels of existential security lead to generalizable international instabilities (Huntington 1996). Against changes in cultural predispositions and political institu- this backdrop, we offer a formal representation of the tions. In their test of modernization theory, Inglehart dynamic linkages between economic progress, cultural and Baker (2000:49) found partial support for the development, and political change, as posited in the proposition that ‘‘the rise of industrial society is linked literature to explore the non-obvious policy conse- with coherent cultural shifts away from traditional quences for human development. systems and the rise of postindustrial society is

Abdollahian, Mark A. et al. (2012) Dynamics of Cultural Change: The Human Development Perspective. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111 ⁄ j.1468-2478.2012.00736.x 2012 International Studies Association 828 Dynamics of Cultural Change linked with a shift away from absolute norms and val- tions of the modernization process. While the analyti- ues toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, toler- cal foundations of modernization theory is traced back ant, trusting, postindustrial values.’’ However, they also to the late eighteenth century (Condorcet [1795] found strong that values seem to be path 1979), the study of modernization flourished during dependent, where cultural —whether Protes- the 1960s and continues to capture the attention of tant, Orthodox, Islamic, or Confucian—give rise to cul- scholars today (see Huntington 1971; So 1990; and In- tural zones with distinctive value systems that persist glehart 1997 for informative overviews). According to empirically even after controlling for the impact of eco- So (1990), these classic studies generally view moderni- nomic development. They show how economic devel- zation as a phased process that is progressive, lengthy, opment tends to push societies in a common direction, and in many ways irreversible. Moreover, moderniza- but on parallel development paths, rather than toward tion tends to have homogenizing effects (Levy 1967) convergence. and represents the ‘‘westernization’’ of developing Indeed, socioeconomic development gives way to nations. As such, modernization is viewed as a roughly profound changes in basic human values that shape linear process that transforms nations from underde- politics. Thus Inglehart, Baker, and Welzel hypothesize veloped to advanced and industrial. that through socioeconomic development and the Extensive criticisms of this framework exist within gradual secularization of society, the advanced demo- both mainstream political science (Huntington 1967) cratic states of the EU and other developed democra- and neo-Marxist scholars (Frank 1969). Political sci- cies should display similar values. Likewise, newly ence questioned, among other things, whether the democratized members of Central and Eastern Europe process was irreversible and unidirectional, while neo- should have values that are different, but over time, as Marxists suggested that the normative in early they reach higher levels of socioeconomic develop- work amounted to the ‘‘North American emperor’s ment, their values should become more in line with social scientific clothes’’ (Frank 1969:xi). Others, those found in advanced developed democracies. This including Samuel Huntington, argued that cultural val- phased sequence is neither linear nor predetermined; ues are autonomous and have permanent influence thus, HD theory retains some of the fundamental char- on societies that lead to a clash of civilizations (Hun- acteristics of classic modernization theory, while also tington 1993, 1996). Recent advances in HD theory providing a novel perspective grounded in empirics. are generally centered on the first set of criticisms. The main goal of our work is to provide a formal, That is, the human development perspective provides dynamic representation of HD theory. The question a theoretical account of the modernization process remains: Why formalize? One of the key benefits of for- that is neither inevitable nor unidirectional—moderni- mal modeling is to derive precise and robust empirical zation process differs based on major changes in tests of theory.1 Other benefits of formal modeling sug- existential conditions. Following Maslow’s (1954) hier- gested in Fiorina (1975) include conceptual precision, archy of needs, HD theory provides a framework in clarity of assumptions, ease of assessing internal validity, which economic modernization interacts with basic the power of deduction, and unambiguous communica- human needs and facilitates generalizable shifts in cul- tion with other researchers. Perhaps, the most impor- tural predispositions (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and tant advantage of formal modeling in the context of Baker 2000; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003; HD theory is the ‘‘precision and clarity of thought’’ nec- Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In large part, individual essary to identify the specific functional relationships value orientations drive an individual’s level of existen- between the core variables of interest (Taber and Tim- tial security and change in predictable ways given shifts pone 1996). Given all these, we employ a nonlinear in existential security. dynamic model to shed light on the temporal change Extensive empirical assessments of survey data world- inherent in HD theory. More specifically, we posit a sys- wide suggest that individual value orientations are rep- tem of asymmetric, coupled nonlinear differential equa- resented by two primary dimensions: rational-secular tions that capture the core of HD theory. We then and self-expression value orientations (Inglehart 1997; empirically test the model using five waves of data from Inglehart and Baker 2000; Welzel et al. 2003; Norris the World Values Survey (WVS), developing an econo- and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Consis- metric estimation procedure that we refer to as Genetic tent with modernization perspectives, HD theory sug- Algorithm Nonlinear Least Squares (GANLS). Finally, gests that both value dimensions are shaped by we explore the model’s behavioral dynamics via simula- economic progress and are more prevalent at different tion methods to identify successful paths toward devel- states in a nation’s development cycle. First, rational- opment. By both formalizing HD theory and secular values correspond to individuals’ growing empirically testing its propositions, we strive to add emphasis on technical, mechanical, rational, and insights into the relationships between economic pro- bureaucratic views of the world. During the industriali- gress, , and institutions, while also offering direc- zation phase, cultural dispositions tend to progress tions for further inquiry. from an emphasis on traditional pre-industrial val- ues—often measured in terms of religious attendance and the importance of in an indi- Overview of Human vidual’s life—to secular world views (Norris and Ingle- Human development theory is the newest perspective hart 2004). In effect, these dispositions tend to in a well-established literature on the dynamic implica- emphasize a transfer of authority from traditional reli- gious figures to technological progress and bureau- 1 Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this advantage. cratic political life. Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 829

The second dimension of value change corresponds the motivation for political change. primarily to the postindustrial phase of economic provides initial support for these propositions. Using development (Bell 1973). Postindustrial societies are factor analytic techniques to empirically derive the characterized by prolonged and the rational-secular and self-expression dimensions, Ingle- overall reduction in objective human constraints. Eco- hart and Baker (2000) provide support for the claim nomic progress and an advanced system pro- that economic progress (measured as real GDP per vide many individuals in postindustrial societies with capita) has positive and statistically significant effects an overwhelming sense of existential security. More- on each value orientation. In a more detailed analysis over, as the of economic activity changes from on secularization, Norris and Inglehart (2004) further primary, to secondary and tertiary sectors, the majority confirm the relationship between economic prosperity of individuals no longer work on farms but in facto- and rationalist values using a wide range of indicators ries, while some pursue careers in the service industry. on economic development, human development, and The reduction in human constraint—via economic economic equality. Likewise, Welzel et al. (2003) pro- progress, advances in , and service related vide robust empirical support for the relationship economic activities—brings about a new sense of between economic means, cultural motives, and politi- . Because the primary focus is no longer on cal rules. Using a simple path analysis, the authors survival, individuals are free to emphasize a general show a statistically significant association between HD need for self-expression, question authority, and theory’s core variables of interest.2 demand political participation. In the terminology of Figure 1 provides a basic overview of the expected Maslow, individuals in postindustrial societies are well relationships between economics, culture, and politics. positioned to begin to seek true self-actualization. First, the HD perspective suggests a phased process in Rising self-expression values have important implica- which rising level of existential security leads to an tions for the of effective political institu- increased emphasis on rational-secular and self-expres- tions (Welzel et al. 2003). Mass tendencies toward self- sion values. Specifically, individuals tend to emphasize expression facilitate a political climate conducive to rational-secular values during the industrialization elite-challenging activity and a civic culture consistent phase of development and self-expression values dur- with genuine democratic governance. Specifically, self- ing the postindustrial phase. Second, the rise in self- expression values promote liberal political institutions expression values strengthens democratic norms and through two mechanisms. First, to the extent that promotes effective democracy, implying a positive rela- there is incongruence between cultural demand for tionship between self-expression and liberal political liberal institutions and political supply of liberal insti- institutions. Lastly, based on work showing the relation- tutions, individuals are more or less prone to elite- ship between liberal institutions and economic devel- challenging activity. The consequences and forms of opment (Diamond 1992:93–139; Boix and Stokes 2003; elite-challenging activity, both violent and non-violent, Feng 2003), we expect positive feedback between dem- have been discussed at length in the literature (see ocratic institutions and economic progress. The Gurr 1970; Eckstein and Gurr 1975). Second, self- remainder of this study specifies and tests a systems expression values support the social acceptance of dynamic model and captures these expected relation- basic democratic norms such as and political par- ships in a manner consistent with the core tenants of ticipation. The end result is a gradual transition HD theory. toward democratization in autocratic nations and more effective political representation in democratic Toward a Formal Representation nations (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Based on the lit- erature outlined above, HD theory suggests two core Human development theory, as with all theories of the propositions: modernization process, describes a series of variables interacting over time. Given the subject’s inherently Hypothesis 1: (Existential Security Proposition) Changes in dynamic structure, we employ a system of asymmetric, rational-secular and self-expression value orientations coupled nonlinear differential equations to model HD increase or decrease based on major changes in existential theory. These types of models have been successfully security. employed in diverse physical as well as in settings, from electoral politics (Przeworski and Spra- Declining economic conditions reintroduce the pri- gue 1986) to international conflict (Richardson 1960; macy of basic economic needs, fueling the structural Zinnes and Muncaster 1984; Kadera 2001; Abdollahian conditions for more traditional value orientations and and Kang 2008; Abdollahian, Baranick, Nicholson, and reducing society’s ability to seek true self-actualization. Nickens 2008), and the mathematical theory of both The centrality of existential security is one of the defin- linear and nonlinear differential equations is complete ing features of the human development perspective. (Boyce and Diprima 2007). The formal system described below is, at its core, a Hypothesis 2: (Political Incongruence Proposition) There deterministic process. Some scholars may argue that will be a general tendency of individuals to demand increased social phenomena are inherently stochastic, and thus, political and civil when culturally defined probabilistic mathematics is the appropriate methodo- political expectations are out of line with political .

2 See also Inglehart and Welzel (2005: chapter 8) which provides evidence The disequilibrium between expectations and reali- that self-expression values Granger cause effective democracy (measured as ties promotes elite-challenging activity and provides the combination of political rights and weighted by corruption). 830 Dynamics of Cultural Change

proportional rate that transforms the interactive inputs into changes in rationalist values to be estimated empirically later. This simple specification of rational-secular values captures the core insight of dynamic change from Nor- ris and Inglehart (2004) that during of abject and extreme economic insecurity, rationalist value orientations cannot develop and traditional reli- gious systems dominate. One should also note, however, that the current specification implies an exponential growth process that increases without bound. Thus, this specification is not all together con- sistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) conception of human development theory, which suggests that change in rationalist orientations slows in the postin- FIG 1. Causal Path Diagram of the HD System dustrial period. To introduce this theoretically speci- fied annealing process, we modify Equation 1 as follows: logical approach for the social . While we agree that social phenomena are in many ways stochas- dR ¼ a YRð1 RÞð2Þ tic, even stochastic models are structured around a dt 1 ‘‘deterministic core’’ (Brown 2007:9). Moreover, we where the (1 ) R) represents the upper limit on the agree with Brown (2007:9) that ‘‘the relatively greater derivative of R and R itself defines the lower limit. algebraic richness that is possible with deterministic Aside from more effectively squaring the simple inter- mathematics more than compensates for any informa- active framework in Equation 1 with HD theory, this tional loss that is a consequence of dropping the more specification has the added value of a substantively complex probabilistic baggage that accompanies sto- 3 meaningful interpretation: As there are fewer individu- chastically oriented models.’’ As such, our work is a als in society to form rationalist orientations, growth in first approximation at capturing the core logic of HD these values becomes more difficult. theory and not a comprehensive final specification. While Equation 2 captures the core dynamics of Once we have an initial understanding of the underly- change in rationalist values specified in past literature, ing dynamic processes, we can proceed with further we extend this framework to include what may be research to tackle more complex and stochastic labeled economic incongruence. Operationally, we behavior. define economic incongruence as the difference We begin by examining cultural change in the first between the level of rationalist value orientations and phase of the modernization process—that is, change economic modernization. We argue that value orienta- in rational-secular values. As discussed in the literature tions not only ‘‘set the standards for desirable and review above, classic modernization theory suggests a undesirable goals,’’ but condition the expectations of steady and unmitigated rise of rationalist value orienta- achieving these goals (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:23). tions. Whether through the ‘‘loss of ’’ suggested Consistent with functionalist sociology (Parsons 1951) by Weber (1905) or the functional of Durk- and various strands of (Durham heim (1893), rationalist value orientations are viewed 1991; Shore 1996; Boyd and Richerson 1985), we as positively influenced by past levels of rationalist val- argue that individuals choose to adopt more rationalist ues. As with modernization theory, more broadly, how- value orientations based on the (real or ever, scholars have criticized the explicitly otherwise) that secularization will indeed improve liv- deterministic nature of classic secularization theory. ing standards. To the extent that modernization fails To correct for these deficiencies, Norris and Inglehart to meet culturally based expectations, individuals are (2004) modify classic demand side theory to include likely to abandon functionally useless value orientation the interaction of rationalist values and the existential and revert back to traditionalism. This is security provided by economic development and mod- introduced algebraically as: ernization. The dynamic associated with this condi- dR tional relationship can be represented by the following ¼ a YRð1 RÞa ðR Y Þð3Þ simple differential equation: dt 1 2 ) dR where (R Y) represents economic incongruence, a2 ¼ a YR ð1Þ dt 1 is a constant parameter that regulates the transition + to equilibrium between rational-secular values and where Y {Y: Y 2 R } represents the level of economic economic realities to be estimated later. Given the progress (used to proxy economic modernization), + dynamic interactions of other variables in the system, R {R: R 2 R , R £ 1} represents the level of rational-sec- there is no guarantee that Equation 3 will remain ular value orientations, and a1 represents the constant within the theoretically specified bounds of 0 and 1. The second term must be similarly bound by adding ) 3 an upper limit (1 R) and a lower limit (R). Intro- See Brown (2007) and the citations therein for a description of the sto- chastic vs. deterministic debate, as well as a persuasive for determin- ducing this necessity and rearranging yields the com- istic mathematics in the social sciences. pleted specification of rationalist values: Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 831

dR cal institutions that provides the motivation for elite- ¼ ½a Y a ðR Y Þ Rð1 RÞð4Þ dt 1 2 challenging activity. While the combination of self-expression and politi- With the dynamic specification of rational-secular cal incongruence is the primary causal mechanisms for values in hand, the next challenge to formalizing HD effective democracy in HD theory, a number of studies theory is to find a suitable algebraic representation of show that democracy has a dynamic of its own. Schol- self-expression values. The core dynamics of self- ars argue that past experience with democratic institu- expression are quite similar to rationalist value orienta- tions, institutional learning, and habituation to tions as expressed in Equation 2. First, while the need democratic norms facilitate levels of effective for self-expression may be inherent in human nature, democracy (Jackman and Miller 1998). This internal self-expression value orientations must be passed on dynamic is included by adding effective democracy to through intergenerational transfer or social learning the right-hand side of Equation 7: (Murdock 1970), which suggests a dynamic relation- ship with past values. Second, as with the dynamics of dD ¼ c1SðS DÞþc2D ð7Þ R, the primary variable conditioning the trajectory of dt self-expression is economic progress—that is, rising where D and S are as specified in Equation 6 and c2 levels of existential security allow individuals to move represents a constant parameter that regulates the up Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs and closer to dynamic effects of past experiences with democratic achieving true ‘‘self-actualization.’’ Analogous to Equa- institutions—capturing institutional and tion 2, the algebraic representation of changing self- momentum. Given the current specification of the expression values includes: democracy function, there is no guarantee that Equa- ) dS tion 7 will remain within the specified bounds of 1 ¼ b1YSð1 SÞð5Þ and 1. Thus, we standardize by including the following dt additional term to Equation 7: where S {S: S 2 R+, S £ 1} represents self-expression val- dD ¼ ½ðc1SðS DÞþc2D 1 DÞð8Þ ues and b1 represents an estimated constant parameter dt in the model. Equation 5 captures the logistic func- tional form suggested in the natural language theory where (1 ) D) provides the upper and lower bound (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:30), as well as the ability of on the effective democracy function. economic resources to accelerate the trajectory of self- The final variable in the system, and a core causal expression and thus provides a suitable representation variable in HD theory, is economic progress. A vast for- of changes in self-expression values. mal literature exists on the study of economic growth, According to HD scholars, changes in postindustrial and these studies provide valuable insights into the values have important implications for the nature and core dynamics of economic progress (Swan 1956; So- effectiveness of political institutions and thus democ- low 1965; Romer 1986). Given the wealth of empirical racy. Postindustrial values, with their emphasis on self- support for the conditional convergence hypothesis of 4 expression, bring about three changes: a decline in neoclassical theory (Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and respect for authority, elite-challenging activity, and a Weil 1992), we begin our specification by employing growing emphasis on genuine political participation the Solow model in differential equation form: (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). These shifts tend to pro- dY mote the emergence of democratic institutions in ¼ k1ð1 Y Þ: ð9Þ authoritarian states and more effective liberal institu- dt tions in democratic states. However, it is not enough Again, Y represents economic progress, k1 represents to simply have individuals in society with self-expres- a constant that regulates economic growth, and in sion values—there must be some mechanism that order to ease the model’s presentation, we fix the causes elite-challenging action. To capture the neces- steady-state equilibrium of each nation to 1.5 As shown sity of both having the means and the motivation to in Equation 9, the core process driving dynamic change political institutions, we specify the following change in the classic model is a nation’s distance equation: from their steady state. While this specification pro- dD vides a useful starting point, a number of studies ¼ c SðS DÞð6Þ dt 1 have shown that economics is not the only factor contributing to growth. A number of studies link where D {D: D 2 R+, D £ 1} represents the level of effective democracy, (S ) D) represents the political 4 The neoclassical growth model predicts that income levels of poor coun- incongruence between cultural demands for demo- tries will converge toward that of rich nations given similar economic, institu- tional, and educational conditions. cratic institutions and their supply, and c1 represents 5 It is important to note that this specification implies several simplifying an estimated constant parameter in the model. A sig- assumptions on economic growth that are not included in the traditional So- nificant body of research has been devoted to the con- low model. This specification assumes that all nations are moving toward the cept of political incongruence and its effects on same long-run steady state equilibrium of 1. As described more in the section changes in political institutions (Eckstein and Gurr on measurement below, this steady state is assumed to be equal to the level of 1975; Huntington 1967). In effect, this research argues development of the most developed economy in our sample of data. It is important to recognize that the purpose of this paper is not to examine the that it is the difference between culturally defined details of economic development, but instead to find a suitable formal repre- political expectations and the actual structure of politi- sentation of changes in a nation’s level of existential security. 832 Dynamics of Cultural Change democratic governance to economic growth (Dia- ent in the human development perspective. That is, as mond 1992:93–139; Boix and Stokes 2003; Feng 2003). a nation approaches a value of 1, it is virtually guaran- To incorporate the political aspects of economic pro- teed that the average individual is existentially secure.7 gress, we modify Equation 9 to include: Second, the key cultural variables were collected from the first five waves of the World Values Survey (WVS).8 dY Specifically, this study uses the factor scores for tradi- ¼ k1ð1 Y Þþk2D ð10Þ dt tional versus rational-secular values and survival versus where D is the same as above and k represents a con- self-expression values described in Inglehart and Welzel 2 (2005), and rescaled each factor score to range stant parameter that regulates the impact of effective 9 political institutions on economic progress. Our com- between the theoretically specified 0 and 1. Given this plete model specification produces a system of four specification, it is reasonable to view these variables as asymmetric, coupled nonlinear differential equations, the percentage of individuals in society holding pre- which is summarized below: dominantly secular or self-expression values. Lastly, we follow Welzel et al. (2003) and measure effective dR democracy by multiplying the sum of ¼ ½a Y a ðR Y Þ Rð1 RÞð4Þ dt 1 2 and civil rights—using the well-known Freedom House data set—with a measure of corruption provided by dS the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group (see Welzel ¼ b1YSð1 SÞð5Þ et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005 for more infor- dt mation on this measure of effective democracy).10 We dD then rescale the variable to range between 0 and 1. ¼ ½ðc1SðS DÞþc2D 1 DÞð8Þ Our final data set includes 45 countries spanning five dt waves of the WVS. The level of temporal coverage ranges from a minimum of two waves to a maximum dY ¼ k ð1 Y Þþk D ð10Þ of five waves, with an average of roughly three waves dt 1 2 per country.11 Table 1 provides summary statistics and where the elements of the system include the follow- source for each variable. ing: R is the rational-secular values; S is the self-expres- sion values; D is the effective democracy; Y is the Estimation Approach: Genetic Algorithm Nonlinear economic progress; a1 is a parameter that maps the Least Squares (GANLS) nonlinear effects of Y and R onto growth in the level of R; a is a parameter that regulates the dynamic Estimating parameters of highly nonlinear continuous 2 time models is not a trivial task. As pointed out in effects of economic incongruence; b1 is a parameter that maps the nonlinear effects of Y and S onto Brown (1995:65), in the case of nonlinear systems of growth in the level of S; c is a parameter that regu- equations, it is ‘‘only a stroke of luck if the equations 1 can be uncoupled and linearized to allow the use of lates the dynamic effects of political incongruence; c2 is a parameter that maps past governance structure commonly available regression techniques.’’ Using onto the growth in effective democracy; k is a growth conventional time series methods—such as SUR, 2SLS, 1 3SLS, LIML, or FIML—becomes even more problem- parameter for economic progress; k2 is a growth parameter that captures the political aspects of eco- atic when using data with limited time series observa- nomic development.

7 It is important to point out that given this specification, while the vari- Data able ranges between 0 and 1 in our sample, it need not (and should not) remain in this range over time. If we simply rescale to 1 at all time periods, The next step in modeling the dynamics of cultural this would imply that a nation’s value for Y changes only if it is growing faster change and modernization is to estimate the structural than the most developed economy. Thus, we could have a nation that is rela- tively existentially secure with a value that is still quite low. The emphasis in parameters specified in our system of equations. Esti- HD theory is on existential security that is related to the absolute level of mation requires information on economic progress, development, not the relative level as we currently specify given the scope of the two cultural dimensions, and effective democracy. this paper. First, we operationalize Y as real GDP per capita and 8 Our data includes Wave 1 1981–84, Wave 2 1989–93, Wave 3 1994–99, normalize the variable by the maximum in our sample Wave 4 1999–2004, and Wave 5 2005–2007. Available at http://www.world- 6 valuessruvey.org. of nations. We normalize GDP in order to more effec- 9 To construct the rational-secular factor, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) tively capture the notion of existential security inher- included questions related to the importance of religion in a respondent’s life, the respondent’s level of national pride, and the respondent’s respect for authority. To construct the self-expression factor, the authors relied on ques- 6 The maximum in our sample is the United States at $33,548. It is also tions regarding the priority given to self-expression and of life, the important to note that the use of per capita GDP to measure society’s respondent’s likelihood of signing a petition, and a general measure of a ‘‘human resources’’ has been criticized by a number of scholars (Anand and respondent’s trust in other individuals. See Inglehart and Baker (2000) Table Sen 2000); indeed, per capita income measures only the economic aspects of 1 for a complete list of the questions included to derive the rational-secular a society’s human development potential. Nevertheless, per-capita GDP is values and self-expression factor scores. highly correlated with the UN’s well-known ‘‘’’ 10 The measures of formal democracy come from Freedom in the World (0.78 for cross sectional data from 2005). Moreover, there is a well-established Comparative and Historical Data, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org. formal literature on the dynamics of economic development from which to The corruption data from PRS is available at http://www.prsgroup.com. build formal models of modernization and economic progress. In future 11 For computational ease, we assume a time step equal to 1 wave and research, we can estimate the model’s parameters using different measures of thus restrict our sample to include only countries with at least two consecutive socioeconomic and human development. waves. Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 833

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics

Variables Source N Mean SD Min Max

Rational-secular values World Values Survey 133 0.605 0.203 0.163 1 Self-expression values World Values Survey 133 0.520 0.199 0.133 1 Effective democracy Freedom House & Political Risk Services 133 0.483 0.230 0.038 0.863 Economic progress Penn World Tables 133 0.272 0.161 0.019 0.724 tions, as is the case in our data (Brown 1995: chapter ministic mathematics outweighs the benefits associated 2). In order to ensure valid parameter estimation, with the information gains from using probabilistic social scientists must find alternative techniques for models (e.g., the ability to derive an estimate of vari- estimating these systems. ance). Nevertheless, this discussion underscores an Courtney Brown (1991, 1995, 1996) provides one of important point: Deterministic model used to derive the few attempts—if not the only attempt in the social predictions from a theory must be understood as ana- sciences—to estimate the parameters in a system of lytically separate from the empirical strategy used to multiple nonlinear differential equations. Brown devel- statistically test those predictions. ops a nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation proce- Here, we develop a Genetic Algorithm Nonlinear dure, which uses a simple hill climbing algorithm to Least Squares (GANLS) estimation procedure that optimize the fit between model and data. As with all extends Brown’s basic approach by utilizing a mix of nonlinear models, however, no one set of initial global and local search routines. The GANLS routine parameter guesses will lead to a global maximum. The estimates Equations 4, 5, 8, and 10 simultaneously problem of becoming trapped in a local maximum is using nonlinear optimization.14 Specifically, our three- particularly acute when a model’s objective function step approach first employs a genetic algorithm to does not satisfy properties such as continuity, differen- search the parameter space globally, then a simplex tiability, and convexity (Goldberg 1989). Moreover, algorithm to search the parameters space locally, and there is little to presume that the fit hyper-sur- finally a bootstrapping procedure to derive the uncer- faces of highly nonlinear differential equation systems tainty associated with the parameter estimates. The will display such niceties. In this type of optimization remainder of this section discusses each step of the environment, it seems reasonable to question the use- estimation procedure in turn (for a more detailed fulness of a simple hill climbing algorithm.12 description of the estimation routine, see the Appen- Before outlining the details of our algorithm, it is dix). important to address concerns that testing determinis- tic model parameters using stochastic methods in Fitness Function some way contradicts the model’s deterministic focus. There has been a lively debate in the political method- The estimation procedure begins with Brown’s (1995) ology literature on the appropriate tests for determin- method for comparing the fit between model simula- istic and stochastic models, particularly for tions and real data. We use the widely accepted fourth- theoretic models of strategic behavior (Signorino order Runge–Kutta approximation of definite integra- 1999; Signorino and Yilmaz 2003; Carrubba, Yuen, and tion to simulate the model’s system of equations (i.e., Zorn 2007).13 We believe that these concerns are less Equations 4, 5, 8, and 10) forward in time, and the relevant to our study, as it is important to recognize predicted values of the model-derived trajectories are that almost all stochastic models—e.g., the linear then compared to the actual data using the following regression model of Y=bX+e—are structured around equation: a deterministic core (Y=bX) with a random error RSS term e to make it a stochastic model. More often than FIT ¼ 1 ð11Þ not for researchers, it is this deterministic component TSS that is of interest when examining hypotheses or mak- where RSS represents the residual sum of squared ing model-based predictions (Brown 2007:9). If ran- errors and TSS represents the total sum of squared domness does not a prominent role in deriving errors. The FIT measure thus represents the objective propositions from an underlying theory, we agree with function that is maximized during the optimization Carrubba et al. (2007:480) that ‘‘writing down a deter- routine and is calculated using the common formula 2 ministic model, carefully deriving predications from for the R statistic—though, as pointed out in Brown that model, and recognizing that the world is not (1995), for nonlinear models FIT need not range deterministic when generating the empirical estimator between 0 and 1 as negative values of FIT indicate are enough to ensure consistency between one’s the- poor performance. ory and test.’’ In these cases, we agree with Brown (2007) that the algebraic richness possible with deter- Step 1: Genetic Algorithm With this conception of fitness in hand, the estimation

12 procedure utilized in this paper follows a three-step It is important to note that Brown (1995) recognizes the problem of process. First, the GANLS procedure uses a genetic becoming trapped in a local equilibrium and provides several rules of thumb for increasing one’s chance of finding a global equilibrium. 13 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to our attention how this debate relates to our work. 14 See Fletcher (2001) for an introduction to optimization. 834 Dynamics of Cultural Change algorithm (GA) to search the parameter space glob- works particularly well in terms of computational ally, identifying solutions likely to contain the optimal efficiency when paired with a local optimizer. To incor- parameter estimates. A GA simulates the stochastic porate this insight into the GANLS procedure, we rely process of evolutionary competition in order to opti- on the well-known Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm mize a function (see Goldberg 1989 for a comprehen- (Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright 1998). The algo- sive overview). In a typical evolutionary environment, rithm uses the optimal solution from the GA (i.e., xb) individuals (or species) pass on genetic information to as a starting point and constructs a simplex that is a future through reproduction, and on aver- generalized triangle in n dimensions with k + 1 points, age, only the strongest genes survive. The empirical where k is the number of estimable parameters in the estimation procedure described below remains close in system. The algorithm then uses operations of reflec- to the traditional biological interpretation; how- tion, expansion, contraction, and shrinking to itera- ever, individuals are solutions that provide the greatest tively update the solution vector (see Lagarias et al. overall fit between model and data. To implement the 1998 for a detailed overview). basic procedure, then, we need to define the initial population of individual solutions, the fitness function Step 3: Assessing Parameter Uncertainty responsible for determining who is the strongest, and When transitioning from the neat world of theory to a set of basic evolutionary operators that update the the messy world of data analysis, researchers explicitly initial population of solutions to ensure that the recognize that there is uncertainty associated with any strongest do indeed survive to find the global optima. model’s parameter estimates. Given a general lack of An individual in the algorithm is represented by a information upon which to base parametric assump- 1 · k row vector of floating point parameter values, tions, we rely on re-sampling methods to examine where k is the total number of estimable parameters in parameter uncertainty. Specifically, the procedure uti- the system. Often referred to as chromosome, this vec- lizes a block bootstrap to computationally derive a dis- tor of parameter values provides each individual’s tribution of estimates for each parameter in the system genetic information—that is, it provides the informa- (see the Appendix for detailed information on the tion needed to calculate each solution’s level of fit- bootstrap procedure). Moreover, given that the esti- ness—and each of the n individual chromosomes is mated parameter distributions are rarely symmetric, combined into an n · k initial population matrix, P0. we report bias-corrected confidence intervals (Efron The initial parameter values in P0 are determined by and Tibshirani 1993). the user; the user must specify the bounds—a mini- mum and maximum value for each parameter in the Empirical Results system—of the parameter space using prior informa- tion. After doing so, P0 is seeded using the standard Table 2 provides the results of the GANLS estimation uniform distribution for each i individual and k procedure for the formalized HD system. The table pre- parameters. Obviously, the better the prior informa- sents the parameter estimates based on WVS data, a FIT tion, the easier it will be for the algorithm to find the measure for the entire nonlinear system, and bias-cor- optimal solution. Nevertheless, in the spirit of Brown rected 95% confidence intervals for each parameter. It (1995), it is best to use a conservative estimate when is difficult to gain a complete understanding of the unsure of the theoretical or empirical bounds, given model’s dynamics from Table 2 alone, and thus, graphi- that these bounds determine the relevant parameter cal analysis will be used in the next section to clarify our space used during the optimization process. substantive findings. After constructing the initial population of solu- Nevertheless, several features of Table 2 should be tions, future generations of solutions are created using highlighted. First, the model fits the data quite well—- the following basic tools of evolutionary simulation: with an overall system FIT measure of 0.83. Second, selection, crossover, and mutation functions (Goldberg the signs on each parameter estimate—with the excep- 1989). The general form of the GA is as follows:

1. Supply initial population, P0 TABLE 2. Parameter Estimates 2. Calculate fitness based on Equation 11 3. i ‹ 1 Bias-corrected 95% m 4. Pi ‹ Use tournament selection to choose Parameters Estimates Confidence Interval mating pool 0 Rational-secular values 5. Pi ‹ Use reproduction function with the ) m a1 0.2333 0.1204 to 0.7184 input P ) i a2 0.1073* 0.2518 to 1.7167 6. Pi ‹ Mutate Self-Expression values 7. i ‹ i +1 b1 0.5708** 0.1145 to 0.9395 8. Repeat steps 3 through 6 until termination Effective democracy 9. Return the optimal solution, xB c1 0.5696** 0.0976 to 1.1482 ) ) ) c2 0.2257** 0.3309 to 0.0952 Economic progress ) Step 2: Simplex Algorithm for Local Optimization k1 0.0102 0.0164 to 2.7635 ) If given enough time, the GA described above should k2 0.0502 2.3181 to 2.6992 converge on the correct solution. Nevertheless, Houck, System FIT 0.8354 – Joines, and Kay (1995) demonstrated that the GA (Notes. **Significant at the P < .05 level; *Significant at P < .10 level.) Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 835 tion of c2—conform to the theoretical priors of a posi- trajectories in each figure, this type of phase portrait is tive relationship. The negative estimate for c2 indicates generally referred to as a flow diagram. In order to that effective democracy may not be self-reinforcing in better understand these flow diagrams, consider Fig- and of itself. Third, the parameters vary in terms of ure 2, which examines the relationship between eco- statistical reliability. The parameters for the self-expres- nomic progress (horizontal axis) and rational-secular sion (b1) and effective democracy equation (c1 and c2) values (vertical axis). Each dot in the figure represents are significant at the 5% error level, while the parame- a set of initial values for any country on the variables Y ter mapping rational-secular values to economic pro- and R, while the dashed lines show the predicted gress (a2) is significant at the 10% error level. As for change in the values or the nation’s expected trajec- the magnitude of our coefficients, since all our vari- tory path in Y and R if allowed to evolve for 25 consec- ables are rescaled between 0 and 1, we can make sub- utive waves or roughly 125 years. As such, the figure stantive interpretations about their size and infer allows one to examine the predicted evolution of the representative effects. Here we note that both b1 and HD system given different assumptions on the values c1 have the largest values, indicating the importance of of the primary variables of interest in the system. economic security to accelerate self-expression, as well Turning first to rational-secular values, Figure 2 as how political incongruence drives democratic out- demonstrates a general tendency of country trajecto- comes. Finally, both coefficients for our economic pro- ries to flow to the upper-right quadrant. More pre- gress equation are insignificant at traditional levels. cisely, the long-run dynamics are characterized by Despite somewhat mixed results, our GANLS results progressive movement to the attracting equilibrium of provide general support to the theoretical foundation an economically prosperous, secular society. It is provided in HD theory. important to recognize, however, the country trajecto- ries in Figure 2 are t0 fi 125 and that equilibrium is only reached in the distant future. Development paths Behavioral Dynamics are a slow yet steady process. With the system parameters in hand, we can now study A closer examination of each quadrant in Figure 2 the HD model’s behavioral dynamics. To do so, we fol- provides information on the unique behavior implied low a two-step process. First, we use our empirically by our results and allows us to examine more closely estimated parameter coefficients and the available our stated propositions. First, moving from the Inse- range of data on each variable to systematically choose cure-Traditional lower left quadrant to the Secure-Sec- the initial conditions necessary to solve the model. ular upper-right quadrant, we find slow initial growth This step provides the necessary information to simu- in rational-secular values, followed by rapid increases late our human development trajectories and sets the in growth for national trajectories. This result fits quite bounds within which to examine the system’s behavior. nicely with the qualitative description provided in In- Second, consistent with the empirical estimates above, glehart and Welzel (2005)—that is, economic progress we use the fourth-order Runge–Kutta (RK4) approxi- promotes secularization by increasing levels of existen- mation of definite integration to provide numerical tial security and society’s sense of technological con- solutions for the nonlinear equations. Given that the trol over natural forces. This dynamic provides general model’s parameters are estimated using WVS waves as support for the Existential Security Proposition. Second, the principal unit of time, waves also serve as the unit the national trajectories in the Insecure-Secular upper- of time used in the simulations presented in this sec- left quadrant indicate a slight reversion to traditional tion. More specifically, the computations below assume values before becoming more secular through a step size h = 0.1, with a total of 250 iterations of the increased economic security. The behavior here, as RK4 algorithm, to create projections for 25 consecu- well as the parameter estimate for a2, suggests a gen- tive waves. While any number of waves could have eral tendency for society to abandon values systems been simulated in practice, 25 waves provide sufficient that fail to live up to economic expectations. More time to explore both the evolutionary and - importantly for policymakers, emergence of societal ary aspects of HD theory.15 rational-secular values must first be preceded by eco- nomic growth in order to sustain a successful progres- sion toward secure-secular outcomes. Changing Values: Secularization, Self-Expression, and Economic Turning next to self-expression values, Figure 3 pre- Progress sents the flow diagram for the means-motive linkage In order to present the results of the solved model, we (Welzel et al. 2003), with economic progress on the rely on a series of ‘‘phase portraits,’’ which is a graphi- horizontal axis and self-expression on the vertical axis. cal method to examine how one variable evolves with Again, the simulated national trajectories move toward respect to another variable over time. In the figures the attracting equilibrium of Secure-Expres- presented in this section, a country’s initial conditions sion—though it takes many years to ultimately reach are represented by dots and the dashed lines indicate this steady state as t0 fi 125. the length and direction of the simulated time trajec- Looking across Figure 3, we find that the self-expres- tories. Moreover, given that we present multiple time sion function in Equation 5 captures the core dynam- ics of postindustrial value orientations quite well.

15 Moving from Insecure-Survival in the lower left to the It is important to note that each WVS wave is separated by roughly Secure-Survival lower right quadrant, our results again 5 years and thus the estimated trajectories correspond to roughly 125 years of simulated data. The assumed 25 waves provide a reasonable amount of time suggest a substantial change in dynamic behavior. to examine the model’s long-term dynamics. When economic progress is low and society is econom- 836 Dynamics of Cultural Change

FIG 2. Flow Diagram for Rational-Secular and Economic Progress

ically insecure (on the left-hand side of Figure 3), the finding is a direct function of the substantively large country trajectories are virtually horizontal with a parameter estimates for the effective democracy func- slight positive slope indicating little potential for tion (c1 and c2) presented in Table 2. Specifically, expression expansion unless accompanied by requisite these parameter estimates suggest that societies that economic growth. As economic conditions improve, lack political congruence quickly readjust back to a however, Figure 3 displays a rapid increase in country lower politico-cultural equilibrium before progressing trajectories. These dynamics follow the narrative of further. change presented in Inglehart and Welzel (2005): slow Both the Survival-Democratic upper-left and Expres- growing self-expression values in the industrialization sion-Democratic upper-right quadrants display trajecto- phase, followed by rapidly growing self-expression ries that move quickly toward an attracting once existential security is all but guaranteed. Again, equilibrium. In addition to the general behavior of this behavior provides general support for the Existen- the effective democracy function, several aspects of tial Security Proposition. Figure 4 deserve further elaboration. First, note the dynamics associated with different initial conditions in the Survival-Autocratic quadrant. This quadrant clearly Changing Political Institutions: The Motives–Rules Linkage represents what may be referred to as a ‘‘zone of dem- The rise of self-expression values is posited to have ocratic transition,’’ as societies located in this quadrant important implications for the formation of demo- have a tendency to move toward more repressive forms cratic institutions. That is, changing value orientations of political organization before more liberal demo- are expected to promote culturally based expectations cratic forms of organization based on their unique ini- for liberal political institutions. To study the dynamics tial conditions. More specifically, there is a critical of value change and changing political institutions, point within the zone of democratic transition where Figure 4 presents the flow diagram for motives–rules the cultural forces for change are outweighed by the linkages, with self-expression on the horizontal axis enduring effects of past autocratic structures. As such, and effective democracy on the vertical axis. This in the extreme left corner of the Survival-Autocratic allows us to examine the expected positive relationship zone, the model anticipates the almost complete col- between self-expression and democracy more generally lapse of democratic governance when a society lacks and the effects of political incongruence on demo- the mass political culture to buttress effective demo- cratic institutions in particular. cratic structures. This finding is consistent with the The dynamics of national development change con- notion of the poverty trap found in the growth litera- siderably in Figure 4 based on a nation’s effective ture, where low levels of per capita GDP combined democracy and self-expression values status. In gen- with low levels of growth are self-re-enforcing mecha- eral, the effects of self-expression on democratic insti- nisms that perpetuate poverty (Romer 1987; Bernanke tutions are quite pronounced, indicated by the and Gertler 1989; Matsuyama 2004). convergence of trajectories onto a well-defined equilib- Our results indicate that the foundations of lasting rium path toward expressive-democratic regimes. This democratic institutions are based on the rise of secular- Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 837

FIG 3. Flow Diagram for Self-Expression and Economic Progress

ized values and postindustrial values like self-expres- tionary activity. This dynamic effect facilitates a rather sion. This sheds light on the antecedents for economic large incongruence between political realities and cul- institutional reform that democratic development turally based expectations for political rights and civil scholars assert as the reason why prosperity and devel- liberties, which in turn promotes elite-challenging opment differ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006, political action and forces for democratic change. In 2008). Acemoglu and Robinson’s work on elite behav- sum, we find compelling evidence both empirically ior, geography, labor, and political transition processes and via simulation in support of our Political Incon- indicates that reform of economic institutions based on gruence Proposition. changes in political institutions and distributions can lead to societal prosperity. Our HD perspective adds to Economic Progress and Political Institutions: Feedback Effects their results by introducing a formalized theory on pop- ulation behavioral dynamics that fosters the growth of The last relationship specified in our HD system is the such political institutions. This also portends policymak- feedback between liberal political institutions and eco- ers against prematurely exporting democratic institu- nomic progress. While this feedback is not explicitly tions without fostering necessary underlying political addressed in HD theory, a significant body of litera- culture, consistent with several globalization hypotheses ture has examined the relationship (Boix and Stokes (see Rodrik 1998). Note that the equilibrium path lies 2003; Feng 2003). Empirical evidence on the relation- in the lower right side of the figure. This strongly sug- ship between democratic institutions and economic gests that political expression is an antecedent for effec- growth is mixed. Though some scholars find evidence tive and sustainable democracy, as higher expressive of the expected positive relationship (Boix and Stokes values must not only create but continually push for 2003), many studies find either negative or null results democratic institutions. Otherwise, there is a clear and (Barro 1996; Krieckhaus 2004). The results of the quick reversal to more authoritarian regime types. empirical analysis provided in Table 2 (see k2) are Nevertheless, if self-expression values continue to generally consistent with the results of the Krieckhaus rise, the trajectories get pushed out of the zone of (2004) study, which suggests that there is no relation- democratic transition into the Expression-Autocratic ship between democratic institutions and growth dur- quadrant. This quadrant represents what we call a ing the 1990s. Given the statistically insignificant ‘‘zone of revolutionary political change,’’ as trajecto- estimate of the relationship between progress and insti- ries are characterized by fast, almost vertical shift tutions, we forgo presenting behavioral dynamics relat- toward democratic political governance. Under these ing these variables. structural conditions, self-expression value orientations continue to grow—perhaps due to changes in income Implications for Path Development and Dependency or social learning—while political elites fail to recog- nize or refuse to acknowledge important shifts in polit- The last several subsections have discussed the equilib- ical culture. The disequilibrium between political rium behavior of our model’s core variables in passing. expectations and realities sows the seeds for revolu- However, such behavior has important implications for 838 Dynamics of Cultural Change

FIG 4. Flow Diagram for Democracy and Self-Expression the nonlinear nature of national development, as well scientists’ minds that the sun will eventually die; how- as the path dependency process of development. The ever, to reach this steady state will take roughly 5 bil- defining feature of our formalized HD system in its lion years. Obviously the dynamics of the HD system present form is the presence of a positive feedback are not so slow, but the general point holds for the among variables. This feature is evident in Figure 1 as current specification. well as the empirically derived trajectories for both Questions over the appropriate equilibrium condi- rational-secular and self-expression value orientations tions for the HD system require further theoretical in Figures 2 and 3. More precisely, regardless of where exploration and empirical testing. For instance, a nation is initially located in the figures, if given suffi- recent empirical research indicates that there are a cient time, they will reach the stable attracting equilib- number of ‘‘cultural zones’’ in which the level and rium of development. This is not to say that major change in rational-secular and self-expression values exogenous changes to economic progress will not of a set of countries with homogenous cultural tradi- reduce the level of rational-secular and self-expression tions is qualitatively similar (Inglehart and Baker value orientations in society.16 However, in all observa- 2000). Should one expect these cultural zones to con- ble cases based on the available data in our sample, verge on different steady-state equilibria? Or do the the long-run steady-state equilibrium is toward cultural cultural zones simply represent different rates of tran- enlightenment. We know that is rife with sition to the same steady-state equilibrium? While our change and equilibrium shocks. Therefore, future current specification deduces the latter, these work will attempt to focus on modeling these as per- questions provide an interesting basis for future for- turbations from equilibrium, such as the fall of the mal work on the equilibrium dynamics of human Soviet Union, and the cascading effects it had on for- development. mer Soviet states as well as recent Arab Spring events and democratic experiments in countries like Afghani- Conclusions stan and Iraq. While the current system displays a stable attracting Our primary goal in this study was to provide a base- equilibrium of 1, the more interesting question cen- line formalization of the dynamics of Human Develop- ters on the time it takes to reach this steady state. As ment theory. The estimated system displays the core suggested in Miller and Page (2007:83), ‘‘while proof dynamic regularities suggested in the natural language that [a] system will, say, asymptotically converge on a theory: Economic progress has important implications particular equilibrium is very useful, the importance of for the evolution of rational-secular and self-expression the result depends on whether the transit time is a few value orientations. Specifically, the interactive relation- or few billion, iterations.’’ There is little doubt in ship between progress and value orientations suggests that major changes in existential conditions moderate

16 the ebb and flow of . Our work, how- In all but the most extreme cases, there is little in the system to alter a ever, goes beyond previous empirical studies on the sustained path to human development. Specifically, we would need to have complete economic collapse—i.e., GDP would have to equal zero—in a society human development perspective. We show in a system- that is heavily autocratic. atic formal way that the expected rate of change in both Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 839 rational-secular values and self-expression are related arrangements that are tailored to, not outpace, a to where a nation is located in the development pro- nations level of economic progress, primus inter pares, cess. Moreover, we derive a more complete picture of that creates demand for secular and expressive politi- the boundaries in which HD theory is assumed to cal marketplace where democratic institutions can sus- operate, providing unique insight into the theory’s tain and thrive. If not, then the historical evidence expectations at various levels of economic progress, strongly suggests that their efforts are doomed to fail. cultural traditions, and institutional capacity. This might become even more important as economic In addition to finding general support for the Exis- activity pushes into the quaternary phase of develop- tential Security Proposition, the HD system provides ment (transitioning to information and - important insight into the dynamic implications of based services) and the impact that has on political incongruence. From the model, we deduced culture, politics, and development. However, we two important states of political change: the zone of reserve this exploration for further research. democratic transition and the zone of revolutionary As with any enlightening modeling enterprise, our change. These zones highlight the interplay between initial work demonstrates that scholars still have a past governance structures and culturally based expec- long way to go in understanding the dynamic link- tations for political freedoms, and provide a cultural ages of economic, cultural, and political change. With foundation for examining democratization and institu- that said, the human development perspective pro- tional change. This analysis is both consistent with past vides an innovative, dynamic framework to under- studies on revolutionary political change (Gurr 1970) stand major changes in developing and developed and provides a new avenue to approach the well- societies. The future prospects of employing nonlin- known concept of political grievance. Thus, the infor- ear dynamic models to further elaborate human mation gleaned from our estimated system provides development are useful for its ability to both facilitate valuable information on the structural conditions for a greater understanding of and aid pol- revolutionary change and mass political preferences icy decisions that further enhance social progress. for liberal forms of government. Our results are consistent with Inglehart and Welzel While the system of equations above provides gen- (2005:34), who tell us that ‘‘modernization is not lin- eral support for the human development perspective, ear, and cultural change does not move in a straight one of the most useful characteristics of developing line from industrialization to the End of History. It these types of formal models is to identify areas of changes direction in response to major changes in potential theoretical improvement and future avenues existential conditions.’’ Paraphrasing Woodrow Wil- for theoretical insight. Again, the defining feature of son, society must feel the road beneath its feet each the HD system in its current form is the presence of a day and cannot jump from mountain top to moun- positive feedback among variables in which the cul- tain top. Thus, we believe further work on the HD tural variables move to an attracting equilibrium. perspective can provide insights into some of our Whether the steady-state equilibrium of human devel- most pressing global challenges today and well into opment is complete, cultural enlightenment is an open the foreseeable future. philosophical question. Nevertheless, a closer examina- tion of the system suggests plausible alternative specifi- Appendix: Estimation Procedure cations that imply negative feedbacks between the variables. For instance, the revolutionary change in Below, we present an overview of the technical details political institutions displayed in Figure 4 suggests pro- associated with implementing our three-step GANLS nounced forces for change when political expectations procedure described in the text. Here we document fail to align with political realities. In the current form each step in detail, providing pseudocode for the of the model, the elite-challenging behavior that drives interested reader. Software written in the matlab lan- the progression of liberal institutions is assumed to guage is available on Travis Coan’s Dataverse (available translate directly into promoting liberal forms of gov- at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/tcoan). ernment. Elites, however, do not necessarily appreciate challenged. The dynamics associated with the Genetic Algorithm zone of revolutionary political change is likely to pro- duce political instabilities that reverberate through the A GA simulates the stochastic process of evolutionary entire system. These instabilities imply that nations competition in order to optimize a function. The algo- could become trapped in an oscillating system charac- rithm requires an n · k initial population matrix, P0, terized by unmet demands for political change and where each of the n rows represents a different individ- instability. In future research, we plan to examine the ual solution and each of the k columns represents a possibility of an incongruence trap explicitly. different set of initial parameter estimates. As dis- Our empirically supported policy implications cussed in the text, a minimum and maximum value include a good deal of nonlinear path dependence: for each initial parameter value must be specified Economic progress is a necessary condition for success- ahead of time using prior information. The user must ful secularization and expressive political behavior, also specify the total population size (n) prior to esti- which are antecedents for lasting democratic institu- mation (there is no hard rule for the size of n, though tions. This is not to say that egalitarian the authors have found n = 1,000 to be sufficient for building is in vain, quite the contrary. The interna- most models). After doing so, P0 is seeded using the tional community, multilateral donors, and national standard uniform distribution for each i individual leaders all must focus on policies and institutional and k parameters: 840 Dynamics of Cultural Change

  U ðminj ; maxj Þ; if j ¼ k 0 U ðmini; maxiÞ; if i ¼ j pij ¼ : ðA:1Þ xi ¼ : ðA:3Þ pij ; Otherwise xi; Otherwise It is important to keep in mind that these bounds The mutation operator incorporates an additional determine the relevant parameter space used during source of randomness in order to avoid becoming optimization process, and thus, they must be large trapped in local equilibria. With (A.3) in hand, the enough to include the global solution. complete algorithm is simply a series of nested loops that are run until some fixed termination time (which Fitness, Selection, and Crossover Functions is determined by the user): With the initial population in hand, we are now ready populate P0 using A.1 to describe the fitness and selection function. As dis- for i = 1 to terminate do cussed in the text, the GANLS procedure utilizes run selection function Brown’s (1995, 1996) least squares representation of ) run crossover function Fitness = 1 RSS ⁄ TSS (see Equation 11). For each run mutation function potential solution in the matrix P0, a fourth-order copy new solutions to Pi Runge–Kutta approximation of definite integration is end used to generate predicted values of the model, which print Pi are compared to the actual data using Equation 11. After determining each individual solution’s fitness, we use a simple tournament selection procedure to determine which 1 · k vectors of parent solutions Simplex Algorithm for Local Optimization reproduce. Tournament selection is determined by the In order to improve computational efficiency, we pair following: the GA discussed in the previous section with a local for i =1ton do optimizer. Specifically, we rely on the well-known Nel- randomly select 2 solutions with replacement from der-Mead simplex algorithm (Lagarias et al. 1998). Pi)1: The basic simplex algorithm then uses four basic oper- s = U(1, n) ations—reflection, expansion, contraction, and shrink- select the solution with the highest fitness: maxfit[s] ing—to iteratively update the solution vector: copy winner to Ri While convergence criteria are not met, end Order k solution points from best (lowest value) to worst (highest value) where n continues to represent the total population Reflect the point with the highest fitness value size. The tournament selection function thus provides through the center of the simplex a new population of solutions (Ri)—the winners of the If the reflected point smaller than the worst point, n randomly selected two-way tournaments—that have Expand the simplex the opportunity to reproduce or crossover their genes. If the reflected point is the same as the worst point, The crossover function combines the two sets winning Contract the simplex solutions into a single new solution (or an offspring) If the reflected point is the larger than the worst that will move on to future generations. The model point, uses the following simple arithmetic crossover (Houck Shrink the simplex et al. 1995) formula: End 0 print solution vector p1 ¼rp1 þð1 rÞp2 0 ðA:2Þ p2 ¼ð1 rÞp1 þ rp2 For a detailed overview of the algorithm, see Laga- where p represents the first new parent solution vec- rias et al. (1998). The implementation of this proce- 1 dure in matlab is carried out by the built in function tor, p2 represents the second parent, and r is a con- ganls stant parameter (2 0,1). The full crossover algorithm fminsearch, which is the function utilized in the is thus: procedure (http://www.mathworks.com/help/tech- doc/ref/fminsearch.html provides detailed informa- for i =1ton do tion on the matlab implementation of the simplex randomly select 2 solutions (p1 and p2) without algorithm). replacement from Ri calculate (A.2) Bootstrap Procedure to Examine Parameter Uncertainty copy new solutions to P¢1 end In order to examine the uncertainty associated with each parameter in the system, we utilize a paired boot- strap. Specifically, by country, we sample with replace- Mutation Operator ment, pairs of consecutive waves that serve as initial In addition to the selection and crossover functions, conditions and actual values in the estimation algo- the GA utilizes a real-valued uniform mutation opera- rithm. For instance, a single call to the bootstrap sam- tor. That is, it selects one parameter j and sets it equal pling procedure could return wave 1 as an initial to the random number U(minj, maxj): condition and wave 2 as an actual value for the coun- Mark A. Abdollahian et al. 841 try of Japan. As is typical for bootstrap estimates, this Diamond, Larry. (1992) Economic Development and Democracy procedure is repeated (with replacement) until the Reconsidered. In Reexamining Democracy, edited by Larry number of in the bootstrap sample is Diamond, and Gary Marks. London: Sage. Durham William equal to the number of observations in the actual sam- , H. (1991) Coevolution: Genes, Culture, and Human ple. Also, the ganls procedure is used to produce Diversity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Durkheim, Emile. (1893) The Division of Labor in Society. New York: parameter estimates for the bootstrap sample; this pro- The Free Press. cedure is repeated (typically n > 1,000 times) to pro- Eckstein, Harry, and Ted Robert Gurr. 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